Mercado vs Santos

Facts: Antilano Mercado filed the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. Intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint against Mercado for falsification/forgery of the will probated. Mercado was arrested. The complaint was subsequently dismissed at the instance of de Leon herself. Same intervenor charged Mercado with the same offense, this time in the justice of the peace court of Mexico, Pampanga. Mercado was arrested again. The complaint was likewise dismissed, again at de Leon’s instance. Same intervenor charged Mercado with the same offense. Upon due investigation, the case was dismissed on the ground that the will alleged to have been falsified has already been probated and that there was no evidence that Mercado had forged the signature of the testatrix but that, on the contrary, satisfactory evidence was presented that established the authenticity of said signature. Rosario Basa de Leon and other intervenors moved ex parte to reopen the probate proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction to probate the will and to close the proceedings. This motion was denied, having been filed ex parte. The provincial fiscal moved for reinvestigation of the criminal case for forgery before the Pampanga CFI. The motion was granted, and for the fourth time, Mercado was arrested. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost a year. A second motion to reopen and close probate proceedings was filed, this time with notice to the adverse party. Same was denied until the CFI ordered the forgery case to be tried on the merits. Intervenors’ motion was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the probate court’s order of denial. Mercado moved to dismiss the case, claiming again that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof. The CFI overruled the motion. Mercado thus filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals, which promptly denied same.

Issue: WON the probate of Ines Basa’s will is a bar to Mercado’s criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of said will.

Ruling: Sec. 306 of the Civil Procedure provides, as re: the effect of judgments: in case of a judgment/order in respect to the probate of a will, such judgment/order is conclusive upon the the will. Sec. 333 of CP establishes an incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments declared by the Code to be conclusive. Sec. 625 of CP provides, as re: conclusiveness of the due execution of a probate will: “… the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.”In view of the provisions of Secs. 306, 333 and 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a criminal action will not lie against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Revilla vs CA

Facts: Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, owned 2 pieces of land with buildings in Manila and 6 parcels of land in his hometown in Bulacan. These properties are worth P30M. In 1978, he executed a 13-page last will and testament, bequeathing all his properties to his 9 nephews and nieces including petitioner, Heracio Revilla. To each, he gave 1/10 of his estate reserving the last tenth for masses to be said after his death and for the care of religious images he kept in a chapel in Bulacan. During his lifetime, Don Cayetano sought the probate of his will to which the CFI Manila admitted. However, the City Hall of Manila was burned by fire where the records were also burned. A petition for reconstitution of the records was filed and it was granted. After Don Cayetano died, Heracio Revilla filed another petition of a will wherein he instituted Heracio as sole heir of his uncle’s estate and executor of the will allegedly executed in 1982. The probate was opposed by Heracio’s 8 brothers and sisters on the grounds that:- Since 1978 up to Cayetano’s death, he never informed that he revoked the will executed in 1978

- The 1982 will was not executed in accordance with law and the signature of Cayetano was different from his usual and customary signature- Cayetano was of unsound mind when he executed the will- That the alleged will was executed with undue pressure and influence- That the 1978 will is void for the reason that it was executed under duress or the influence of fear or threats- Cayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured by fraud and he did not intend that the instrument be his will at the time of fixing his signatureThe trial court disallowed the second will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the second will.

Held: When Don Cayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second will which he supposedly made. He identified his first will and declared that it was his true and only will. He could not have executed a second will because he was sick in the hospital during that time (he stayed there for 2 months) and he could not sign any papers while he was confined in the hospital. During the reconstitution proceedings, the will was produced. It was placed in a browned envelope stating “Buksan ito pagkalibing ko” to which Cayetano agreed to open. He recognized the original will and acknowledged that he signed it. In the court records, Cayetano declared that he did not execute another last will and testament after the original will had been probated. Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don Cayetano's first will, he did not reveal the second will which Don Cayetano supposedly made only 2months before he testified in the reconstitution proceeding. If the second will already existed on November 27, 1982, it would have been Heracio's strongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate of the first will. Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the alleged date (September 13, 1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick in the hospital then) it must have been procured at the time when the testator was a virtual prisoner, held incommunicado, in his house. Judge Eduardo Bengson had to issue an order commanding the petitioner to allow his 8 brothers and sisters to visit Don Cayetano. Only then were they able to penetrate the iron curtain that Heracio had placed around their uncle. A videotape, taken during their visit and shown in court, belied Heracio's allegation that Don Cayetano was displeased with his said nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out of his second will. Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize Don Cayetano and his estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible to the private respondents, Heracio transferred him from his own house in Manila to Heracio's house in Quezon City. The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and the disinheritance of his 8 other nephews and nieces, justified the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' belief that undue influence was exercised by Horacio over Don Cayetano to make him sign the second will (which Don Cayetano did not know to be such) in order to deprive his brothers and sisters of their rightful share in their uncle's estate. There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing with Co, Barredo and Lim ( as witnesses) was a second will revoking the dispositions of property that he made in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest, he would not have denied that he made it. He would probably have caused it to be probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first will. But apparently, the instrument was foisted on him without his being aware of its true nature which the petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court and the private respondents, but from Don Cayetano himself. That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven by the omission of Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and the income thereof to pay for holy masses and to be spent for the maintenance of his family chapel. That provision in his first will, for his personal benefit, would not have been deleted by Don Cayetano if his only purpose in making a second will was to disinherit his nephews and nieces.

Reyes vs Reyes

Facts: Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City. The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes. On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property was levied sold and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government. Sometime in 1976, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIRs tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the property upon payment of the reduced tax liability. The Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to Felisa Revita Reyes informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure to settle the real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981. On December 15, 1986, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise agreement with the City Treasurer and settled the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes. On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat properties. Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase.

Issue: WON the property should be excluded from the inventory of the estate.

Ruling: For the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. The provisional inclusion of the subject properties to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes is without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the subject properties are still titled under the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law. The declaration of the provisional character of the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.

Ortega vs Valmonte

Facts: Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Before he died, Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. Placido leave all his properties to Josefina. Leticia opposed the allowance of the probate. The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticias family to live with him and they took care of him. During that time, the testators physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.

Issue: WON Placido has mental incapacity at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility.

Ruling: The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will. Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:

Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases: (1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with; (2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution; (3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person; (5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; (6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines: Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution. Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval. According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will. It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was

sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

Dy Yieng Seangio vs Judge Reyes

Facts: A petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will of Segundo Seangio which was denominated as “Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana” was filed. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.

Issue: Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

Ruling: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

Maloles II vs Philips

Facts: In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He declared that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de los Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The court determined that Arturo is of sound mind and was not acting in duress when he signed his last will and testament and so the last will and testament was allowed.

Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as executrix, filed a motion for the issuance of letters of testamentary. She however withdrew the motion but later on refilled it. Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that as a next of kin (him being the full blooded nephew of Arturo) he should be appointed as the administrator of the estate and that he is an heir.

Issue: WON Octavio Maloles II was preterited in the will.

Ruling: The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.[18]

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testators will.

Pecson vs Coronel

Facts: Lorenzo Pecson, husband of Angela Coronel, who is a niece of the deceased Dolores Coronel, submitted the will of said deceased for probate. The blood relatives of the deceased opposed the probate on arguing that it was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her estate, as set forth in the will, her true intention being that the same be distributed among her blood relatives; and if such intention was not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous illegal influence. The opponents contend that it was not, nor could it be, the will of the testatrix, because it is not natural nor usual that she should completely exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate, in order to will the same to one who is only a relative by affinity, there appearing no sufficient motive for such exclusion, inasmuch as until the death of Dolores Coronel, she maintained very cordial relations with the aforesaid relatives who had helped her in the management and direction of her lands. From the testimony of Atty. Francisco, the deceased’s legal adviser, it was however found that Dolores Coronel revealed to him her suspicion against

some of her nephews as having been accomplices in a robbery against her. CFI allowed probate of the will.

Issue: WON preterition of relatives from the inheritance invalidates the will.

Ruling: There is nothing strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary. Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the most usual and customary, still this would not be null per se. In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud of undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust.

Parish Priest of Victoria, Tarlac vs Rigor

Facts: Fr. Pascual Rigor died in 1935. He left a will which was duly admitted to probate. The project of partition was also approved and implemented. Named as devisees were the testator’s nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters and a first cousin. In addition, it contained the controversial devise or bequest of four parcels of land with a total area of forty four hectares in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood and become a priest. Attached to this conditional devise is the appointment of the parish priest of Victoria, Tarlac as administrator of the four parcels of land during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood.About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, the parish priest of Victoria filed a petition in the pending testate proceeding for the appointment of a new administrator because the old one died. A new administrator was appointed. Subsequently, the priest filed a petition for the delivery of the four parcels of land to the Church as trustee. This petition was opposed by the intestate heirs. The petitioner contends that the intention of the testator in case no nearest relative of his should become a priest is to create a public charitable trust with the church as trustee or substitute devisee. The intestate heirs, on the other hand, contend that since the devise became inoperative because of the fact that no nearest relative of the testator became a priest, the rules of intestacy should now apply with respect to the subject matter of the devise.

Issue: WON Whether or not a device in favor of a person whose identity at the time of the testator’s death cannot be ascertained, may be efficacious.

Ruling: The said bequest refers to the testator’s nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. “In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper” (Art. 1025, Civil Code).The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to the testator’s nearest male relative at any time after his death would render the provision difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the rice lands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the rice lands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated. Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the rice lands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was likewise inoperative.

Article 956, which provides that if the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists. This case is also covered by Article 912 (2) of the old Civil Code, now Article 960 (2), which provides that legal succession, takes place when the will “does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator.” There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said rice lands, the same should be distributed among the testator’s heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said rice lands.“The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator’s will is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property covered by the said legacy.

Austria vs Reyes

Facts: Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, all have been declared by the former as her legally adopted children. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.

Issue: WON the institution of the heir is valid.

Ruling: The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aide the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will be annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.

Nuguid vs Nuguid

Facts: Rosario Nuguid died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Issue: WON preterition of relatives from the inheritance invalidates the will.

Ruling: Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir.

Preterition annuls the institution of heir but maintains the validity of legacies and devises to the extent that these latter do not impair the legitimes. Such annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as

the legitimes are concerned. Thus, if the will contains only institutions of heirs and there is preterition, total intestacy will result.

In the case at bar, the deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line — her parents. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. The one- sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete.

Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Acain vs IAC

Facts: In 1960, Nemesio Acain wrote a will giving all his properties to his brother Segundo, or, in case Segundo predeceases Nemesio, to Segundo’s children. Segundo died before Nemesio. Petitioner Constantino is one of Segundo’s children. In 1984, after the death of Nemesio, Constantino petitioned the court to have the will probated. This was opposed by Rosa Diongson, Nemesio’s wife, and Virginia Fernandez, a legally adopted child of Nemesio and Rosa. The opposition was denied by the trial court, hence Diongson and Fernandez went to the SC, which transferred the case to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to dismiss the probate petition since Diongson and Fernandez were preterited.

Issue: WON preterition of relatives from the inheritance invalidates the will.

Ruling: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the

universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased.

Neri vs Akutin

Facts: Agripino Neri y Chavez had by his first marriage six children named Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina; and by his second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children named Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and Emma. Getulia, daughter in the first marriage, died on October 2, 1923, that is, a little less than eight years before the death of said Agripino Neri y Chavez, and was survived by seven children named Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen, Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda. Testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage with omission of the children by his first marriage. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents were indebted to their father.

Issue: WON there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs.

Ruling: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share in the heriditary property, without expressly being disinherited. It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest.

Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious" (art. 814 of the Civil Code), preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. In the instant case, no such legacies or betterments have been made by the testator. "Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly provided, according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code, and where no express provision therefor is made in the will, the law would presume that the testator had no intention to that effect. In the will here in question, no express betterment is made in favor of the children by the second marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have already received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention, as may be clearly inferred from his will, would have been to divide his property equally among all his children.

Viado Non vs CA

Facts: During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several pieces of property. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children -- Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents --- his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.

Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 01 February

1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case for partition before the court. Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two documents --- a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which TCT was cancelled and new TCT was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado. Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated at the assailed instruments, although executed on 23 August 1983, were registered only five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died.

Issue: WON preterition present that would warrant annulment.

Ruling: When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs --- her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement. In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid and binding.

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on TCT. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.

Perez vs Garchitorena

Facts: Plaintiff Carmen Perez is the sole heiress of Ana Maria Alcantara. The amount of P21,428.58 is deposited in her name with La Urbana as the final payment of the liquidated credit of deceased. As Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of Carmen, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana. Carmen filed a petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara.

Issue: WON a fideicommissary exists.

Ruling: In order that there is a valid fideicommissary substitution, the following requisites must concur:

(1) There must be a first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. (2) There must be a second heir.(3) There must be an obligation clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve the estate and to transmit it to the second heir.

To the above requisites, a fourth is sometimes added that the second heir or fideicommissary should be entitled to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latter and not from the fiduciary. This is, however, not a requisite, but merely a consequence of the substitution.

It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution.

Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs.

Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiressshould die after the testatrix and after receiving and enjoying the inheritance.

By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.