TEEHANKEE VS MADAYAG 207 SCRA 134Facts:On July 19, 1991 an information for the crime of frustrated murder was filed against Claudio Teehankee Jr. allegedly committed to Maureen Navarro Hultman.

After the prosecution had rested its case, the petitioner moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, but before the motion was filed, the victim died. So, the private prosecutor filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file the amended information. The amended information filed on October 31, 1991 charges Teehankee of murder.

The trial court admitted the amended information. During the arraignment, the petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information contending the lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. The judge, then, ordered the plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner. The prosecution was ordered to present its evidence. The petitioner's counsel manifested that he did not want to take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised. So, the trial court appointed a counsel de officio to represent the petitioner.

The petitioner now seeks, among other things, for the SC to nullify the respondent judge's admittance of the amended information, and to compel the judge to order preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the amended information.

Issue:WON an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted.

Held:Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.

Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of murder; hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning and proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the information filed for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.

In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.

VILLAFLOR VS VIVAR 349 SCRA 194Facts:An information for slight physical injuries was filed agaist Dindo Vivar for beating Gian Paulo Vivar outside the Fat Tueasday Bar. On his way out, Gian met Dindo who told that next time, I will use my gun on you. The injuries sustained by Gian turned out to be more serious than they had appeared so an information for serious physical injuries was filed and the charge for slight physical injuries was withdrawn. Another information for grave threats was filed against Vivar. Vivar, instead of filing a counter affidavit, filed a Motion to Quash the Information for grave threats since it was made in connection with the charge of serious physical injuries and believes it should have been absorbed by the latter, and also because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. The MTC denied the Motion to Quash. Vivar then filed for a Motion for Reconsideration which was again denied. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Vivar filed a petition for certiorari in theRTC.The RTCgranted the Motion to Quash but denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Villaflor. Villaflor then filed a Petiton for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issues:(1) WON the court can motu proprio order the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of preliminary investigation;

(2) WON the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation be considered a ground to quash the information

Held:

(1) No. The Court ruled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information. In the case a bar, a preliminary investigation for slight physical injuries was conducted by the assistant city prosecutor. But the information was however amended when petitioners injuries turned out to be more serious. However the change in the information was only a formal amendment and did not violate the right of Vivar against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, since it still involves the same facts.

(2) No. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the grounds on which an accused can move to quash the complaint or information. Nowhere in the rule mentioned of a lack of preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash. When accused failed to assert any ground for a motion to quash before arraignment, he has deemed waived his right.

PEOPLE VS BORROMEO 123 SCRA 253Facts:The Solicitor General for petitioner.Acting City Fiscal Celso M. Gimenez for respondentsPetitioners seek to set aside the order of respondent Judge dated June 30, 1982 denying the verbal motion of the City Fiscal of Mandaue City to amend the information for grave coercion against private respondent Joaquin Borromeo by changing the date of the commission of the crime from "on or about the 24th day of June, 1981 " to "on or about August 28, 1981, " after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty and during the testimony of the complainant, as well as the order of July 28, 1982 denying the motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order.As opined by the Solicitor General in his comment dated May 9, 1982, the change of the date of the commission of the crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is more formal than substantial and would not prejudice the rights of the accused, as the said proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense of grave coercion (Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63 Phil. 627). In said Arevalo case, the amendment which was allowed was the allegation in the information that B carried the revolver and C, the knife, instead of C carrying the revolver and B, the knife.In an order dated June 30, 1982, the respondent Judge denied the verbal motion to amend on the ground that the proposed amendment would impair the substantial rights of the accused as guaranteed by the Constitution, invoking the case of People vs. Hon. Reyes (G.R. No. L-32557, Oct. 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 23). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an order dated July 28, 1982. Issue:WON the amended information of herein petitioners can be validly admittedHeld:Yes. The petition is meritorious. The respondent Judge erred in relying on the case ofPeople vs. Reyes,supra.The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been said to be whether a defense under the information, as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance-not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.Section 10 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that "it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense,but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which date the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit."The precise time is not an essential ingredient of the offense of grave coercion.In the case ofPeople vs. Reyes,supra, on which the respondent Judge relies, the change sought was from 1964 to 1969, a difference of five (5) years, which gap of five years "is so great as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same offense."This is not so in the case at bar where the difference is only, as aforestated, two months and five days, which disparity allows approximation as to the date of the commission of the offense of grave coercion.Moreover, as stressed by the Solicitor General, the error as to the date of the commission of the offense was discovered early and the motion to amend or correct the same was as immediate as to preclude any surprise or prejudice on the part of the accused.

PEOPLE VS RIVERA 33 SCRA 746Facts:This is case about an original action for a writ ofcertiorariandmandamus, against respondent Court's order denying the prosecution's petition to amend the original information for grave threats against respondent-accused so as to allege the true and actual date of commission of the offense on March 2, 1964, rather than March 2, 1965 as inadvertently alleged in the original information.On June 20, 1966 the original information was filed with respondent court against respondent Rivera as accused, charging him for grave threats, alleged by the prosecution to have been committed as follows:That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1965, in the Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by personal resentment which he entertained against one Ricardo Rivera, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and, in a letter, seriously threatened to kidnap the wife and the daughter of said Ricardo Rivera if the latter would not give him P25,000.00, the accused thus threatening to inflict upon the persons of the wife and daughter of Ricardo Rivera of a wrong amounting to a crime, that is, to kidnap them, although the said accused failed to attain his purpose.Upon arraignment held on August 24, 1966, respondent entered a "not guilty" plea. Trial was set by respondent court, with the prosecution initially presenting the complainant as a witness on February 22, 1967, who testified that the incident complained of occurred in March, 1964, (not March, 1965 as alleged in the original information).On March 9, 1967, the prosecution filed a formal petition for admission of its amended information, the sole amendment consisting of changing the year of commission of the offense from March 2, 1965 to March 2, 1964 on the grounds of clerical error and of having the information conform to the evidence in its possession with respect to the year of commission of the crime charged.Respondent court, on respondent's opposition, denied on April 12, 1967 admission of the amended information ruling that it was unfair to respondent and concerned material facts constituting the offense and would consequently be prejudicial to the substantial rights of respondent-accused.Issue:WON under Rule 110, section 13 of the Rules of Court, the amendment sought after respondent-accused's plea and during the trial, is merely formal and may be permitted without prejudice to the rights of respondent-accused.Held:Yes. We hold that the amendment sought by the prosecution (merely to state the true and actual year of commission of the offense charged on March 2, 1964 rather than March 2, 1965 as inadvertently alleged through oversight in the information) is a matter of form which does not prejudice or impair the rights of respondent-accused.The rule consistently applied by the Court is that after the accused's plea is entered, amendments that touch upon matters of substance are not permitted and the information or complaint may be amended only as to formal matters by leave and at the trial court's discretion, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. Thus, an amendment which does not adversely affects any substantial right of the accused is an amendment as to a matter of form.The amendment which sought the correction of an obviously typographical or clerical error in the last digit of the year alleged (from 1965 to 1964, the month and day being left exactly the same) did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as originally charged. Neither did it involve any change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to cause surprise to respondent and require him to effect any material change or modification in his defense.Respondent court erroneously relied on time cases of People vs. Opemia and Wong vs. Yatco to rule that the amendment would impair the substantial rights of respondent-accused as "he must have been caught by surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending to prove a similar offense committed in 1964." Both cases involved amendments of substance and not merely of form, which respondent court failed to appreciate properly.

REGALA VS CFI OF BATAAN77 PHIL 684Summary of the entire case:In this case, the defendant was charged with murder. After plea, the fiscal presented an amended information wherein two other persons were included as co-accused. There was further allegation that the accused and his co-defendants had conspired and confederated together and mutually aided one another to commit the offense charged. The amended information was admitted, following which the fiscal sought the discharge of the two other co-defendants in order to utilize them as prosecution witnesses. The court granted the discharge. His appeal having been denied as well as his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the appeal, defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. It was alleged that the admission of the amendment was an abuse of discretion.

SEPARATE OPINIONS FERIA,J.,concurring:According to section 1, Rule 67,certiorarilies when a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.There is no doubt that appeal does not lie against an order of a court admitting or denying the amendment of a complaint or information, because such order is incidental or interlocutory and not final in character, that is, it does nor put an end to the ordinary proceedings of the case in court. Interlocutory or incidental order may be impugned as erroneous in the appellate court, when appeal is taken from the judgment or order of the lower court which is final in character.The question to determine, therefore, is whether or not the respondent judge acted (a) without or in excess of the court's jurisdiction, or (b) with grave abuse of discretion, in allowing the amendment of the information in this case.a. From the foregoing, it necessarily follows that the decision or order of the respondent judge allowing the amendment of the information after the defendant petitioner has pleaded would be erroneous if it is an amendment of substance and not of form, but it would not be an act beyond or in excess of the court's jurisdiction, because the court has power or jurisdiction to decide that question. The respondent judge has not, therefore, acted without or in excess of the court's jurisdiction in allowing the amendment of the information, however erroneous that resolution may be.b. If the respondent judge has no discretion to act in one way or another, as in the present case, he could not have acted with grave abuse of discretion, for he can not abuse a discretion which does not have.Therefore the question is reduced to whether or not the court has power to allow the amendment in substance of an information after the defendant has pleaded. If it has no power to permit such amendment, it does have discretion to allow it or not because discretion supposes power to do.Section 13, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, provides:SEC. 13. Amendment. the information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.According to the above quoted provisions, after the discretion to allow the amendment of an information or complaint in matters of form, but not in matters of substance. The court having no power to allow amendment in substance it could not have discretion to allow it or not, and hence it could not have acted with grave abuse of discretion, which the court did not have. Therefore, the respondent judge has not acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amendment, even assuming that the amendment is of substance. HILADO,J.,dissenting:I dissent.It, therefore, appears that the amendment of the information was made by the Provincial Fiscal and allowed by the respondent courtafterthe defendant (now petitioner) had pleaded not guilty to the original information.Was the amendment merely formal, or was it substantial? To charge a person with havingalonekilled another is not the same as to the chargehim and the two otherswith the killing. That the first act is substantially nay, essentially different from the second is to my mind too obvious to require argument. The first act is the act of only one individual while the second is the act of three. The first act is the act of onlyoneindividual while the second, if duly established, will result in the conviction ofthree. To say that the act of one person is substantially the same as the act of three persons, would virtually be tantamount to saying that one and three arethe same. How, then, can the first and the second acts be substantially the same? Consequently, in the amended information petitioner was charged with an act entirelydifferentanddistinctfrom that charged against him in the original information. Hence, the amendment was not merely in form but in substance. The subsequent discharge of the accused Conrado Manalac and Wenceslao Cruz could not, of course, alter the principle.1. The amendment does not refer merely to the form of execution of the crime. If the one executing were thesame person in both cases, then the statement would be correct. But such is not the situation here Ceferino M. Regala, Conrado Manalac and Wenceslao Cruz, the alleged perpetrators of the crime according to the amended information, are not thesameas Ceferino M. Regala, the sole offender according to the original information.

2. Another substantial amendment involved in the change from the original to the amended information is the augmentation of the jeopardy or danger of punishment to which the accused was subjected. Under the original information, in order to convict him, the evidence must established beyond reasonable doubt that he, by his own direct act, killed the victim. Under the amended information, after proof of conspiracy between him and his two co-accused, he could be convicted as co-author of the crime even without proof of his having personally and directly killed or physically participated in the killing of the victim, if sufficient evidence were adduced proving that the other two or anyone of the other two accused committed the direct act of killing. The amendment which gives rise to this difference of danger of punishment cannot in any rational sense be called merely formal.

3. Neither can I agree with the view of the majority that we are here concerned at most with an error of procedure, and not an abuse of discretion. Neither can I subscribe to the corollary of said proposition, that the error is only corregible by appeal and not throughcertiorari. That we are dealing with the exercise according to my theory, with a grave abuse of the Court's discretion, is patent from the provision of Rule 106, section 13 which says that after plea and during the trial the information or complaint may be amended as to all matters of form (and may I add, as to matter of formonly) by leave and "at thediscretionof the court," when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.In view of the foregoing considerations, I submit that appeal would fall far short of being a speedy and adequate remedy for this petitioner.I think petitioner is entitled to the writ ofcertiorarithat he seeks, and that this court should annul the action of the respondent court in admitting the amended information and all proceedings had thereafter, with the proper instructions.

PEOPLE VS ZULUETAG.R. NO. L-4017 ; AUGUST 30, 1951Facts:This case is about the review of decision of the Court of Appeals that annulled the order of Hon. Juan R. Liwag, Judge admitting the amended information filed in Criminal Case No. 11232 of Manila.On October 15, 1949 an information was filed in said criminal case charging Jose C. Zulueta with the crime of malversation of public property. The substance of the accusation is that the accused, as Acting Chairman of the Surplus Property Commission, wilfully or thru abandonment permitted Beatriz Poblete to take and convert 3,000 kegs of nails of the aforesaid Commission. It is alleged that he secured the approval of sale to her of said nails at very low prices by "astutely" prevailing upon Commissioner Angel Llanes to approve it on the pretext of urgency to expedite the liquidation of surplus properties. As an alternative charge the information states that at least through abandonment the accused permitted Beatriz Poblete to carry the hardware away.Arraigned on November 24, 1949, the accused pleaded "not guilty."On January 14, 1950, the prosecution submitted an amended information, which practically reproducing the original accusation, contained the additional assertion among others that in permitting the misappropriation the accused Jose C. Zuluetaacted in conspiracywith Commissioner Llanes, who had subsequently been booked for malversation of the identical public property (nails) in Criminal Case no. 11727 of the same court.The accused objected to the admission of the amended information contending that it introduced allegations about acts and omission constituting another offense, and that the amendments were substantial and prejudicial to his right.The court admitted amended information by its order dated February 28, 1950.Having failed a in a motion to reconsider, the accused started proceedings on certiorari in the Court of Appeals to annul the last mentioned order of admission.The appellate court upheld his contentions. Hence, the People presented this petition for review, which was given due course.Issue:WON the amendment was erroneously admitted for being a substantial one.Held:Yes. An amended information stating forth a different manner of committing the felony, a totally new proposition is a substantial amendment.Contrasting the two information one will perceive that whereas in the first the accused is charged with misappropriation, of public property because: (1) he deceived Angel Llanes into approving the bargain sale of nails to Beatriz Poblete or (2) at least, by his abandonment he permitted that woman to obtain information a third ground responsibility is inserted, namely, that he connived and conspired with Angel Llanes to consummate the give-away transaction.It will be observed that the third ground of action in effect contradicts the original theory of the information: if the accusedconspiredwith Llanes, he did notdeceivethe latter, and did not by merenegligencepermit the sale.Even in civil cases wherein the rules are more liberal as to amendments its not generally permissible to alter plaintiff's theory of the case, alteration being substantial.Undoubtedly the allegations of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused Zulueta all the facts, knowledge, admission and even omissionsof his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendments thereby widen the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Needless to emphasize, in criminal cases the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared adversaries.Here there is an innovation, or the introduction of another alternative imputation, which, to make matters worse, is inconsistent with the original allegations. In view of the above, we believe it unnecessary to discuss the defendant's proposition that the original information did not actually describe the crime of malversation (but only of theft), which the amended information sets forth. Neither is it unnecessary to pass on the other minor amendments objected to.

One other point remains to be threshed out. The petitioners insist thatcertiorariis improper, because the accused has an adequate remedy by appeal. Of course these special civil actions may not generally be entertained if the party has an adequate remedy by appeal. However there have been exceptions.Now, inasmuch as the surplus properly cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof, and inasmuch as the Court of Appeals delving into the legal question has reached a conclusion which we do not reckon to be erroneous, it would not be in furtherance of justice presently to dismiss the whole proceedings on the technical ground that the accused has a remedy by appeal at the proper time.