People v GungonFacts:It was about 3:30 in the afternoon of 12 January 1994. Agnes Guirindola, a 20-year old De La Salle University student, was driving a red Nissan Sentra car along Panay Avenue, Quezon City, on her way to a bookstore, and thereafter, to fetch her mother from work when a man, passing himself off as a traffic enforcement officer and wearing a PNP reflectorized vest, flagged her down and motioned her to execute a U-turn towards him. She complied. She came to know that it was Venancio Roxas who said that she had wrongly traversed a one-way street where, barely two days ago, a little girl had figured in an accident. Agnes surrendered her drivers license. Roxas told her to open the door. He came on board the car and directed Agnes to proceed to the next intersection where Roxas motioned her to turn left. After executing a left turn, she stopped and handed over to him a fifty pesos (P50.00) bill which he accepted. He then returned her license. Agnes asked Roxas where she could drop him off, instead, he suddenly pointed a gun at her and switched off the engine, saying, Miss kailangan ko lang ito,[6]referring to the car. Roxas unlocked the rear door to let another man in. Roberto Gungon, immediately reclined her seat and pulled her over to the back seat by her arms while Roxas promptly slid into the drivers seat. . Momentarily, Roxas pulled over and alighted from the vehicle while Gungon held Agnes and poked a gun at her. When Roxas returned, he had with him a bottle of softdrink and skyflakes which he offered to Agnes. Agnes refused to drink after seeing some tablets floating inside the bottle. The car stopped a second time to load gas at a gasoline station. Once again, Gungon insisted that she take the drink. Fearing his menacing look and the gun pointed at her, she took a sip from the bottle. She was, still later, also forced to swallow two tablets which Roxas gave to Gungon. She took the tablets but had them under her tongue.Agnes noticed the address on the signboard reading, Sto Tomas Batangas and then she lost consciousness. It was about 9:30 p.m. when she found herself lying at the back seat with her legs on the lap of Gungon. She noticed that her pieces of jewelry, bracelets, earrings, ring, necklace and a wristwatch, as well as cash, were missing and that her pair of shoes had been removed. She was told that the items were just being meanwhile kept for her. The pair of shoes, however, were returned to her. By this time, a third man was already seated in front of the car with Roxas.Roxas stopped the car at a deserted area. Gungon escorted her to a place not far away from the car and there she was shot. When she came to, Roxas, Gungon, and the third man, as well as the car, were nowhere insight. She managed to get up and slowly walked down the road until she reached a small house. She was bleeding profusely from the neck and face. She looked around the house but not finding anyone, she went to the sala to lie down. People soon arrived on a vehicle. She again lost consciousness and regained it only at the Batangas Regional Hospital and later transferred to a Manila hospital.NBI agent Feneza met with and talked to Agnes at the V. Luna Medical Center, and showed her about 3 or 4 pictures from his files. Agnes had thereby positively identified Roberto Gungon.Gungon could not be arrested sooner. Based on information given to the NBI, he and his live-in partner had left Manila by car on a Wednesday, passed through Catbalogan Samar, and were bound for Davao. The agents located the arrested him and detained him at their Regional Office in Davao. They flew him back to Manila of the first available flight on Monday.

Issues: WON Gungon is guilty of robbery. WON Gungon is guilty of Anti-Carnapping Act.

Held:Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code defines robbery to be one committed by any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything xxx. Robbery may thus be committed two ways: (a) with violence, or intimidation of persons[32]and (b) by the use of force upon things.[33]To be then liable for robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, the following elements must concur.1)that there be personal property belonging to another;2)that there is unlawful taking of that property;3)that the taking must be with intent to gain; and4)that there is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force upon things.It would appear that the taking of the victims jewelry and cash came only by way of an afterthought on the part of the appellant. The taking was not attended by violence or intimidation upon the person of Agnes. The absence, however, of violence or intimidation did not exculpate appellant from liability for the crime of theft, punishable by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of the Revised Penal Code. Art. 308.Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent.Art. 309.Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:1.The penalty ofprision mayorin its minimum ans medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the things stolen exceed the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. Since the value of the personal property taken from the victim amounted toP38,000.000 the penalty imposable is the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by Article 309 which is the maximum ofprisionmayorin its minimum and medium periods plus one year for the additional ten thousand pesos in excess ofP22,000.00.Lastly, appellant contends that he should not have been convicted of violation of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act, because the taking of the subject motor vehicle. Roxas had already acquired effective possession of the subject vehicle. This argument wouldhave been consequential had there been no finding of conspiracy between appellant and Venancio Roxas. In conspiracy, to once again stress it, the act of the other co-conspirator and, therefore it is of no moment that an accused had not taken part in the actual commission of every act constituting the crime,[34]each of the conspirators being held in the same degree of liability as the others.Napolis V CAFacts:At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peaflor , 47-year old wife of Ignacio Peaflor , the owner of a store located at the new highway, Hermosa, Bataan, after answering a minor call of nature, heard the barkings of the dog nearby indicating the presence of strangers around the vicinity. She woke up husband Ignacio Peaflor who, after getting his flashlight and .38 caliber revolver, went down the store to take a look. The door was pushed and opened by 4 men, one of them holding and pointing a machinegun. Upon receiving from someone a stunning blow on the head, Ignacio fell down but he pretended to be dead. He was hogtied by the men.The men then went up the house. One of the robbers asked the wife for money saying that they are people from the mountain. She immediately took from under the mat the bag containing P2,000.00 in cash and two rings worth P350.00 and delivered them to the robber. Then they tied the hands of Mrs. Casimira L. Peaflor and those of her two sons. After telling them to lie down, the robbers covered them with blankets and left. The revolver of Ignacio, valued at P150.00, was taken by the robbers. The spouses thereafter called for help and Councilor Almario, a neighbor, came and untied Ignacio Peaflor .Chief of Police Delfin Lapid testified that he went to the premises upon receiving the report of Councilor Almario. It appears that the robbers bore a hole on the sidewall of the ground floor of the store and passed through it to gain entrance.

Issue: WON the characterization of the crime committed and the proper penalty therefor is correct.

Held:It should be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of the crime of robbery committed by armed persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been made by breaking a wall, as provided in Article 299 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and, accordingly, sentencing Napolis and Satimbre to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, which is in accordance with said legal provision.In addition, however, to performing said acts, the malefactors had, also, used violence against Ignacio Peaflor , and intimidation against his wife, thereby infringing Article 294 of the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-paragraph (5) of said article, which prescribes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which is lighter than that prescribed in said Article 299, although, factually, the crime committed is more serious than that covered by the latter provision. This Court had previously ruled .... that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is characterized by intimidation, this factor "supplies the controlling qualification," so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence or intimidation against the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual."The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies the "controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to justify said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the person is evidentlygraverthan ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but,precisely, for this reason,We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above cited reductionof the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of violence or intimidation which made it a more seriousone. It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of person takes placewithoutentering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements ofbothprovisions are present, that the crime is acomplexone, calling for the imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, isreclusion temporalin its maximum period. This penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period -- from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years ofreclusion temporal owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. Appellant herein should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years, and one (1) day ofprision mayorto nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days ofreclusion temporal.US v ManlucoFacts:On 16th day of October, 1913, in the municipality of Hermosa, Province of Batan, Philippine Islands, the accused [Ramon M. Velez and Andres Manluco], together with three other persons unknown, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally, with intent to gain, and employing force and intimidation, took, stole, carried away, and appropriated to their own use one piece of narra timber about 4 meters long and 60 centimeters thick, the property of Teodoro David, which timber was in the custody and under the control of Sabas Fonseca, an employee of said Teodoro David, the value of said stick of timber being P70."Held:We find, however, from all the evidence in the case, that the accused has proved sufficient to deprive his act of criminality. He has shown that, at the time of taking the timber, he in good faith believed that he was the owner thereof and that he took it openly and avowedly under the claim. It is law as well as common sense that one who takes property openly and avowedly under claim of title preferred in good faith is not guilty of robbery or of larceny even though the claim is not guilty of robbery or of larceny even though the claim of ownership is untenable.As the record shows, it would appear that the accused has established a better right to the timber than the prosecuting witness. It is not necessary in this case, however, as we have before intimated, to determine that the accused was actually the owner of the property. The demonstration of good faith and the other elements necessary to deprive his act of criminality afford us sufficient basis for the reversal of the judgment.The judgment of conviction is reversed and the accused acquitted.US v AlbaoFacts:

That on or about the 25th day of June, 1913, Vicente Lizarraga was in the possession of 202 "latas de opio," which were of the value of about P14,000.That on the day in question, after repeated efforts to sell the said opium, Vicente Lizarraga met Ciriaco Singson together with others, in the house of one Francisco Jurado, for the purpose of consummating the sale of the 202 "latas de opio."That on the night in question (25th of June, 1913), while Vicente Lizarraga and Ciriaco Singson, in the house of Francisco Jurado, were negotiating for the sale of said opium, the defendant Alejandro Albao, together with others unknown, appeared at the house of Francisco Jurado and demanded that the opium be turned over to him, by means of threats and violence, using a revolver and pointing the same at Vicente Lizarraga. That by reason of said threats, intimidation and demands, by using his revolver, the defendant, Alejandro Albao, took possession of said 202 "latas de opio," against the will and consent of Vicente Lizarraga.That after the said opium had been delivered in the manner above indicated to Alejandro Albao, he promised to return the same upon the payment to him and his unknown associates of the sum of P6,000.That the defendant, Alejandro Albao, had been and was a policeman in the city of Cebu at the time; that he makes no pretense or claim that he was acting in his capacity as a policeman at the time he took forcible possession of the opium in question.That the opium in question was never returned to Vicente Lizarraga, nor to any public authority.That the defendant, Alejandro Albao, took possession of the said 202 "latas de opio" by the use of violence and intimidation against the person of Vicente Lizarraga, with the intent, then and there, to appropriate the same to his own use.Albao contends that Vicente Lizarraga was the unlawful possessor of 202 tins of opium, which then had a value of about P14,000. Testifying as a witness, he stated that he found them by accident on the shore of Mabolo, a suburb of the municipality of Cebu, which statement, it is needless to say, is a falsehood.

Issue: WON ownership is essential in the crime of robbery.

Held:During the trial of the cause there was an effort made to show that Vicente Lizarraga was not the owner of the opium and that said opium was contraband goods, and that, therefore the crime of robbery could not have been committed with reference to said property. In the commission of the crime of robbery, it is not necessary that the person from whom the property is taken, by means of threats and violence, shall be the owner. It is sufficient if the property is taken from him by means of threats and violence,for the purpose of gain, on the part of the person appropriating it. (Art. 502, Penal Code.) The possession of the property is sufficient. Ownership is not necessary.After a careful examination of the record, we are fully persuaded that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged in the complaint, beyond a reasonable doubt.