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Abunado and Abunado v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004

By: Andrew B. Lastrollo

Facts of the Case:

The petitioner, Salvador Abunado was married to Narcisa Arceño in 1967. Narcisa left for Japan in 1988. Upon her return on 1992 she discovered that Salvador is co-habiting with Fe Plato. She also discovered that Salvador married Zenaida Biñas in 1989. Salvador then filed for the annulment of his marriage to Narcisa on January 1995. Subsequently, a bigamy case was filed by Narcisa on May of the same year and both cases proceeded independently.

Salvador was convicted by the trial court and the decision was affirmed by the appellate court. A petition for review was then filed to reverse and set aside Court of Appeals’ decision based on the following arguments. First, there was a defect in information as to the date of bigamous marriage. Second, that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida whic should absolve him from any criminal liability. And lastly, that the petition for annulment is a prejudicial question, hence, the bigamy case proceeding should have been suspended first during the pendency of the annulment case. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s arguments are correct. Held:

The petitioner’s arguments failed on all accounts. First, the defect was an obvious typographical error, this argument therefore is untenable. In addition, the said defect is cured by the evidences submitted during the trial and should be noted that the petitioner made no objection.

Second, condonation of the offended party does not extinguish any criminal liability. Bigamy is a public offence, hence it can be denounced not only by the offended party but even by any civic-spirited citizen with knowledge of the crime.

Third, the annulment case is not a prejudicial question. Its outcome has no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s guilt or innocence, because the crime was consummated when the second marriage which has all the essential requisite for a valid marriage was contracted while there’s a subsisting marriage between Narcisa and Salvador.

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Veronica Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

By: Andrew B. Lastrollo

Facts of the Case: The petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was married to Leticia Ancajas in April 1990. In 1991 he informed Leticia that he was previously married to Hilda Villareyes in November 1986. Thereafter he left Leticia and cohabited with Hilda Villareyes. In 1993, the petitioner contracted yet again another marriage with Nilda Villegas. Upon learning of this third marriage, Ancajas secured a handwritten letter from Hilda Villareyes verifying his marriage to the petitioner and proceeded to file a bigamy case against Mr. Tenebro.

Salvador was convicted by the trial court and the decision was affirmed by the appellate court in all respect. A petition for review was then filed in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage and (2) argues that the declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrate, which indicates that the marriage lacks an essential requisite for validity. Hence, the petitioner argues that all four (4) of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal. Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of bigamy. Held:

The petitioner is guilty of bigamy. There was sufficient evidence presented to establish the validity of his first marriage including a copy of their marriage contract and a handwritten letter from Villareyes. Therefore, the subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of his first marriage would be null and void ab initio regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. For the crime of bigamy penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. As such, the four (4) requisites for the crime of bigamy are present. (Article 349, Revised Penal Code of the Philippines)

It should also be noted that the petitioner have contracted marriage for the third time, which displays the petitioner’s deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, the State’s basic social institution.

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Jaime F. Villalon v. Ma. Corazon N. Villalon G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005

By: Andrew B. Lastrollo

Facts of the case: The petitioner, Jaime F. Villalon was married to the respondent, Ma. Corazon Villalon on April 22, 1978. They lived together for 18 years and sired three (3) children. He continued to visit their children and voluntarily provide monthly support, pay for their tuition fees and shoulder their medical expenses even after he left their conjugal residence.

In 1996, the petitioner filed a petition for the annulment his marriage to the respondent citing his psychological incapacity as ground thereof and claimed it existed even prior to the marriage.

As per testimony of a certain Dr. Dayan the psychological disorder is that of “Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex”. In which person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities and exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another.

The trial court declared the marriage void ab initio but the appellate court held that the petitioner failed to prove the gravity and incurability of the disorder thus dismissed and set aside the previous decision. Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to warrant annulment of his marriage contract. Held:

No. The totality of the evidence presented does not support a finding that the petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. Psychological incapacity should be confined to the most serious case of personality disorders which demonstrates inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage and have existed at the time of the celebration of marriage. Sexual infidelity, in this case is not sufficient proof that the petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. The petitioner does not exhibit the personality of a “serial or habitual adulterer” according to the symptoms provided by Dr. Dayan. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

General dissatisfaction with his marriage and mere refusal to comply with the obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of the law.

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Noel Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 127358, March 31, 2005

By: Andrew B. Lastrollo

Facts of the case: On July 31, 1995, the RTC promulgated a decision declaring the marriage between Noel and Isabel Buenaventura null and void ab initio on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.

In the decision the petitioner was ordered to provide P15, 000 monthly support (subsequently increased to P20, 000) in favor of his son who’s custody was awarded the respondent; pay for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and other litigation costs; and the liquidation of their conjugal properties, particularly the retirement benefits from Far East Bank and the outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group, in which he need to cede 50% of both to the respondent.

The petitioner contends that (1) the appellate court has no legal basis on awarding the defendant with moral and exemplary damage, attorney’s fees and litigation costs; (2) the retirement benefit and the share of stocks are exclusive properties of the petitioner, and therefore should not be part of the conjugal property to be liquidated. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s contention correct. Held: The trial court referred to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in awarding damages to the respondent. It must be noted that Art. 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. By deducing the petitioner to be psychologically incapacitated, it follows that the act was not willfully and deliberately done with malice. The grant of moral damages is therefore without basis in law and in fact. It then follows that the award of exemplary damages, attorney’s fee and other litigation cost are also not proper. The present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution conjugal partnership of gains, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court have been acquired during the union of the parties and no fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included, the liquidation, distribution and partition of the properties appears to have been covered by the regime of co-ownership.

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Eric Jonathan Yu v. Caroline T. Yu G.R. No. 1644915, March 10, 2006

By: Andrew B. Lastrollo

Facts of the case: In January 2002, the petitioner, Eric Yu, filed for a petition of habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals, alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Yu unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child Bianca. Included in the petition was a prayer for the award to him the sole custody of Bianca. In July 2002, the respondent, Caroline Yu, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and the dissolution of the absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC, the petition included a prayer for the award to her of the sole custody of Bianca. But in March 2003, the case was dismissed without prejudice in accordance with the respondent’s request. The petitioner filed his own petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC in June 2003;

In July 2003 the appellate court eventually dismissed the habeas corpus case stating that the restraint of liberty on Bianca has been lifted. Meanwhile the respondent filed her own petition for habeas corpus before the Pasay RTC, praying for the sole custody of their minor child. Issue: Whether or not the question of child custody should be litigated thru the habeas corpus filed in Pasay RTC. Held: No. By petitioner’s filing of case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC, he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of their child as provided under Article 49 and 50 of the Family Code. The only explicit exception stated under Article 50 is “when the matter had been adjudicated in a previous judicial proceeding”, which is not the case here after the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner’s habeas corpus. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is the more appropriate action to determine the custody of Bianca. This must be so in line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits, which had been the case here. Hence, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be availed by the respondent.

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Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006

By: Andrew B. Lastrollo

Facts of the Case: In 1965, Norma Cuison and Eulogio Melgar were married. In 1996, Norma filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with hi essential marital obligations. According to Norma, the manifestations of her Eulogio’s psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness and abandonment of hi family since December 1985. The petition was granted and her marriage was declared null and void by the RTC. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was then filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG, for brevity) contending that the law does not contemplate mere inability to perform the essential marital obligations as equivalent to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of the respondent is in the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Held: No. The totality of the evidence presented by Norma is completely insufficient to sustain a finding that Eulogio is psychologically incapacitated. At best the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person, it is necessary that he must have shown to be incapable of doing so because of his psychological illness. The court cannot presume psychological incapacity from the manifestation solely provided by Norma. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is not indispensable, an expert’s witness would have strengthen Norma’s claim. Furthermore, it was not concluded that the psychological incapacity was present at the inception of the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenant that must be naturally be assumed and discharged by the parties to a marriage. The intendment of the law was to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly demonstrates a party’s inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

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Leonilo Antonio v. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 206

By: Andrew B. Lastrollo

Facts of the case: In 1990, Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes were married, barely 1 year after their first meeting. A child was born out of their union but sadly died five (5) months later. In 1991 due to the petitioner’s unusual behavior they separated in August they attempted to reconcile but it falied and the petitioner left for good in November 1991. In March 1993, the petitioner filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void alleging that at the time their marriage was celebrated the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. As manifestation of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that the respondent (1) persistently lied about herself misrepresenting herself as a psychiatrist, claimed to be a singer and a person of greater means by altering her payslip; (2) fabricated stories about her brother-in-law attempting to rape her and inventing fictitious friend to support her claim as a voice talent; (3) exhibits great insecurities and jealousies to the extent of calling-up the petitioner’s officemate to monitor his whereabouts; and (4) she even concealed bearing an illegitimate child and instead represents it as an adopted child of her family. This claim was supported by Dr. Dante Abcede a psychiatrist and Dr. Arnulfo Lopez, a clinical psychologist, both of which asserting that the respondent’s condition is abnormal and pathological. The RTC declared their marriage null and void. Meanwhile, The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage and was even affirmed by the Vatican’s Roman Rota. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented was insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not been satisfied. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of Family Code. Held: Yes. The totality of the evidence presented sufficiently satisfies the guidelines set in Molina case.

First, the psychological incapacity was sufficiently proven from his testimony, witnesses and experts providing their assessment.

Second, the root cause of the respondent’s psychological incapacity has been clinically and medically identified and proven by experts.

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Leonilo Antonio v. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 206

By: Andrew B. Lastrollo

Third, the respondent’s act of fabricating fictitious friend and

concealing the truth about her illegitimate child established that the psychological incapacity existed at the time of even before the celebration of marriage.

Fourth, the gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to perform marital obligations.

Fifth, being a pathological and habitual liar, makes the respondent unable to commit to the basic tenets of a relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.

Sixth, the Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church. While interpretations by the church on matter about marriage is not controlling or decisive, it should be given great respect by any court.

Seventh, the incurability was evident when her aberrant behavior remained unchanged becoming a hindrance in their reconciliation and ultimately causing the petitioner to left her for good.

Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature are deemed incapable of contracting marriage. The purpose of such provision is to harmonize civil laws with the religious faith, thus great persuasive weight is given to decisions of Matrimonial Tribunals. Yet, it is the factual findings of the RTC that was accorded with significant recognition.

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Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

By: Andrew B. Lastrollo

Facts of the case:

The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, who was previously the governor of the Province of Laguna. During the lifetime of Felicisimo, he was married to three women. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit who predeceased Felicisimo. The second marriage was with Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen, who later obtained a decree granting absolute divorce before the family court of Hawaii. The third marriage was with the respondent, Felicidad Sagalongos, who he lived with for 18 years up to the time of his death.

After the death of Felicisimo, the respondent sought for the dissolution of their conjugal assets and the settlement of the estate. A petition for administration was then filed before the RTC of Makati City.

The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the espondent does not have legal capacity to sue because her marriage with Felicisimo is bigamous and the decree of absolute decree is not binding in the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration. Held: Yes. The respondent has the legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The alleged divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee Corwin which allowed Felicisimo to remarry would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as surviving spouse. Therefore, the case should have been remanded to the trial court to for further reception of evidence to prove the alleged divorce decree.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to re-marry, the respondent has the legal personality to file the subject for letters of administration as Felicisimo’s co-owner in regards with the properties they acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Under Article 144 of the Civil Code as couple who lived together as husband and wife even if their marriage is void ab initio or under Article 148 of the Family Code as couple who living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. Article 148 governs, even if the cohabitation or acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect.

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Oscar P. Mallion v. Editha Alcantara G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006

By: Andrew B. Lastrollo

Facts of the case: In 1995, a petition seeking a declaration of nullity of marriage between the petitioner, Oscar Mallion and the respondent, Editha Alcantara citing the latter’s psychological incapacity. The petition was denied due to the petitioner’s failure to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant granting the relief he is seeking for.

In 1999, when the decision attained finality, another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed, this time alleging that the marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage license. The respondent answered with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. The motion was granted by the trial court.

Hence, a petition for review was filed in which he alleges that there was no violation of the rule of forum shopping and multiplicity of suits. The two cases are distinct and separate because the operative facts and evidence required to sustain each case was different.

Issue: Whether or not a final judgement denying nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license. Held: Yes. The present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred. Section 47 of Rule 39 of Rules of court outlines the dual aspect of res judicata. First, as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. Second, as a rule which ordains issue directly resolved in a former suit cannot be raised in any future case between the same parties involving different cause of action. Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgement is final; (2) it was rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) it’s a judgement on the merits; and (4) there is identity of parties, subject matter and courses of action on both cases. The contention therefore that the second case constitute separate causes of action is untenable. The petitioner cannot evade avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying invoking different ground for the same action or adopting a different method of presenting the case. The petitioner is now bound by implication that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with the law by not raising it in the first case where it could have been presented, heard and adjudged.

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Republic of the Philippines v. Gregorio Nolasco G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993

By: Andrew B. Lastrollo

Facts of the case:

The respondent, Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in England. After that she lived with him on his ship for 6 months. He married her in January 1982. After the marriage celebration, he got another contract and left Janet with her mother in San Jose. Antique. In January 1983, he received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to their son, she left. The petitioner allegedly pre-terminated his contract and returned home 11 month later, November 1983. The respondent in his search for his wife claimed to have done the following: (1) inquired from their friends about her whereabouts; (2) wrote several letters to the bar in England where he and Janet first met; and (3) secured another contract in which England is one of its port calls, to personally search for his wife. On August 1988, the respondent filed for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code or in alternative declare their marriage null and void. The Republic through the Solicitor General opposed the petition and argues that the respondent did not possess a “well-founded belief that his absent spouse was already dead. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a well-founded belief that his absent wife is already dead. Held: No. The petitioner failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead, in accordance with the requirements set by Article 41 of the Family Code. The court considers the alleged investigation too sketchy to form a basis of reasonable or “well-founded” belief that she is dead and the circumstances around it too convenient as an excuse to justify the failure to locate her. Such instances are as follows: (1) the unexplained delay of nine months from his receipt of the letter in January 1983 to the time he finally reach San Jose in November 1983; (2) upon learning of Janet’s departure he did not seek for the help of the local authorities and British embassy and instead secured another seaman’s contract and went to London to look for her; (3) that he still married her despite of having no knowledge about her family background and her alleged refusal to give such information; (4) the loss of the alleged letters he sent to his wife which he claimed were all returned to him.