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Case 1:20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 2 of 26 Pageld 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICTOF HAWAII
UNITED STATES
CR . NO. 20-001016DKW -RT
VS.
AFFIDAVITOF CHRIS JENSEN
ALEXANDER YUK CHING MA
AFFIDAVIT OF FBISPECIAL AGENT CHRIS JENSEN
1 . I am a SpecialAgent oftheFederalBureau of Investigation (“ FBI” ),
and havebeen so employed since 2012.I am currently assigned to the Honolulu
Field Office of the FBI. SinceMay 2013 , I have been assigned to a
Counterintelligencesquad where my primary responsibility is the investigationof
matters involving foreign counterintelligence. I have completed FBItraining in
foreign counterintelligencematters, which hasincluded training in criminal
violations associated with espionage. I have also worked extensively with
representativesofother U.S.intelligenceagencies on matters related to foreign
counterintelligence . In the course ofmy career, Ihave participated in the service of
multiple federalsearch warrants relating to counterintelligenceinvestigations. I
have led many counterintelligence investigations, including those related to
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espionagematters. In 2017, I receivedan award from the U.S.Departmentof
Defense related to a counterintelligence investigation where I served as the FBI's
lead investigator. I havereceived specialized training on the tactics,methods
techniques , and tradecraft of persons disclosing classified information in an
unauthorized manner. In addition , I haveworked collectively on this investigation
with multipleFBIagents and analystswho possessmany years of experiencein
counterintelligence investigations such as the one described in the affidavit. As a
result of thebackground, training, and experience, ofboth myself, andthe other
agents with whom I am collectively working on this investigation , I am familiar
with tactics,methods, techniques, and tradecraftof foreign intelligence services
and their agents, as well as personswhomaybeacting in violation ofU.S.laws
forbidding espionageactivity aswell as persons disclosing classified information
in an unauthorizedmanner.
2 . The statements contained in this affidavit are based , in part, on
information gathered through court- authorized search and surveillanceprocesses,
my own personalobservations and review ofaudio and video recordingsmade
during the conduct of the investigation , information provided by other government
agencies that your affianthas found to be reliable, and conclusions reachedby me
baseduponmytraining and experience as an FBISpecialAgent. Because this
affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of securing authorization for
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theexecution ofan arrest warrant, I havenot included each and every fact known
tomeconcerning the investigation . I have set forth only the facts that I believe are
necessary to establish thenecessary foundation supporting issuance of the
requested process.
ALEXANDERMA
3 Alexander Yuk ChingMA ("MA ), age 67, is a naturalized United
States citizen who resides in Honolulu, Hawaii. Hewasborn in HongKongin
1952 and cameto Honolulu, Hawaii, in or about 1968, where he finished primary
school and attendedthe University ofHawaiiatManoa.
4 MA joined the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ) in 1982. In 1983,
MA was assigned as a CIA officer overseas. As a CIA officer,MA held a TOP
SECRET security clearance and had access to classified national defense
informationof the United States. In addition to his TOP SECRETclearance,MA
had access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (“ SCI ). This access included
the identities of covert CIA officers ; the identities of clandestine human sources ;
details ofsensitive intelligence collection operations and methods details of CIA
clandestinetraining cryptographic information related to CIA communications
and details of clandestine tradecraft the CIA employs to avoid detection by hostile
foreign intelligence services. Asa CIA officer, MA was trained in methodsof
covert communication, surveillancedetection, andoperationalsecurity, for
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purposes of conducting authorized intelligence activities for theUnited States. In
1989,MA resigned from the CIA .
5 According to recordsprovided by U.S.Customsand Border
Protection (“CBP ), when MA arrived in Honolulu on November 24, 2000, he told
CBP agents during a secondary inspection that he had been residing in China for at
leastthe previous five years and thathe was an “ importer and exporter. MA was
carrying $ 9,000 cash in U.S.currency.
COCONSPIRATOR # 1
6 Coconspirator # 1 (“ CC # 1 ), age 85, is a naturalized United States
citizen who resides inLosAngeles, California. CC was born in Shanghai,
People'sRepublic ofChina (" PRC" ), and cameto the United States in 1961. CC# 1
is related by blood to MA. CC # 1 joined the CIA in 1967 and worked as an officer
from 1971to 1982.Formultiple years during CC # CIA employment, CC # 1 was
assigned overseas. As a CIA officer, CC# 1held a TOP SECRETsecurity clearance
andhad accessto classified nationaldefense information of theUnited States In
addition to CC # TOP SECRET clearance, CC# 1had access to SCI. This access
included the identities of covert CIA officers; the identities of clandestine human
sources; details ofsensitive intelligence collection operations and methods; details
of CIA clandestine training cryptographic information related to CIA
communications and details of clandestine tradecraft the CIA employs to avoid
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detection by hostile foreign intelligence services. As a CIA officer, CC# 1 was
trained in methods of covert communication , surveillance detection , and
operational security , for purposes of conducting authorized intelligence activities
for the United States.
7 In 1983, CC # 1 resigned from the CIA after it was determined CC # 1
was inappropriately using CC# official position to assist PRCnationals in
obtaining entry into the United States. After ending employmentwith the CIA ,
CC # 1resided in Los Angeles, California . In or about 1998, CC # 1was convicted
on two (2) counts ofviolating 18 U.S.C. 1014 (FalseStatement to a Lending
Institution)
8 . TheFBIinvestigation into CC# 1 has revealed that CC # 1 currently
suffers from an advanced and debilitating cognitive disease. Due solely to CC#
presentcognitive issues we do not seek an arrest warrant for CC# 1 at this time.
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
9 . The CIA is a U.S.government intelligence agency with various
offices, and is a componentof theUnited States IntelligenceCommunity. The CIA
is responsible for, among other things, collecting ( including through clandestine
means), producing, anddisseminating foreign intelligenceand counterintelligence
used to inform U.S.policymakers conducting counterintelligence activities ;
conducting administrative and technical support activities conducting covert
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action activities approved by the President; and conducting foreign liaison
relationships with intelligence and security services of foreign governments. The
collection offoreign intelligence is, in part, done through the use of sources or
assets. Sources or assets are people who agree to help a foreign intelligence service
by providing information to that service in response to tasking from foreign
intelligenceofficers or agents.
CHINESE INTELLIGENCE SERVICESAND ASSOCIATED TERMS
10 . The PRC intelligence services encompass both the civilian and
militarycomponentsofChinese intelligence programs. TheMinistryofState
Security ("MSS handlescivilian intelligence collection and is responsible for
counterintelligence and foreign intelligence, and well as political security . The
MSS consists of a centralministry, provincialstate security bureaus, andmunicipal
state security bureaus. The Shanghai State Security Bureau ( SSSB ) is a
provincialstate security bureaucharged with collecting intelligence within the
geographic region surrounding Shanghai. BecausetheSSSB reports directly the
MSS, and is a department thereof,MSS and SSSB will be collectively referred to
in this affidavit as theMSS.
Among other things, the MSS is tasked with collecting intelligence
information that would be of value to the PRC'spolitical, economic, andnational
security , and actively recruits human intelligence sources in order to gather
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intelligenceinformation and state secretsof foreign countries. TheMSS operates
in part through the use of intelligence officers (" ) who focus their attention on
conducting clandestineand overt human source operations to gather intelligence
information. TheUnited States is a primarytargetoftheMSS intelligence
gatheringmission.
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
12. Pursuant to Executive Order 12958 signed on April 17, 1995, as
amendedby Executive Order 13292on March 25, 2003, andExecutiveOrder
13526 on December 29, 2009, national security information is classified as " TOP
SECRET," "SECRET, or " CONFIDENTIAL National security information is
information owned by produced by, produced for, and under the control of the
United States government that is classified as follows:
a. Information is classified as TOP SECRET if the unauthorized
disclosure of that informationreasonably could be expected to cause
exceptionally grave damage to the nationalsecurity that the original
classification authority is able to identify and describe.
b Information is classifiedas SECRETifthe unauthorizeddisclosureof
that information reasonably could be expected to cause serious
damage to the national security that the original classification
authority is able to identify and describe.
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c . Information is classified as CONFIDENTIAL if the unauthorized
disclosure of that information reasonably could be expected to cause
damage to the national security that the original classification
authority is able to identify and describe.
13 Access to nationalsecurity information classified at any levelcan be
further restricted through designation in SCIcategories. Only individuals with the
appropriate security clearance and additionalSCIpermissionscan have authorized
access to such classifiednationalsecurity information.
14 Information classified at any levelcan only belawfully accessed by
persons determined by an appropriate United States government official to be
eligible for access to the classified information and to have a "need to know the
classified information . Classified information should only be stored in an approved
facility and container
SECURITY CLEARANCES
15 Both MAand CC # 1 worked during their CIA careers in the East- Asia
and Pacific region. Both MA and CC# 1held U.S.security clearances atthe TOP
SECRET//SCIleveland had access to a broadrange ofhighly sensitiveclassified
material.
. BecauseMA and CC # 1 held security clearances, the U.S. government
entrusted them with access to sensitive government materials, including classified
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documents andmaterials and informationrelating to the nationaldefense thatwas
closely held by the government .
17. Throughout their careers, as a prerequisite to their access to classified
information,MAand CC # 1 signed severalnondisclosureagreements in which they
acknowledged both the harm that could result from the unauthorized disclosure of
classified informationand the applicabilityof criminalpenalties should they make
in violation of their security oaths disclosures of such informationto personsnot
authorized to receive it.
APPLICABLE LAW
18. Title 18 United States Code, Section 794 a ) provides:
Whoever, intent or reason to believe that it is to beused to the injury of
the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates,
delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit to
any foreign government ... any representative, officer , agent,
employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly , anydocument, writing, code book, signal book, sketch , photograph,
photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map,model note, instrument,
appliance, or information relating to thenationaldefense, shall be punished
by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life[
Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(c ) makes it a crimeto conspire to violate
Section794( a )
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PROBABLE CAUSE
19 . The FBI'sinvestigation has revealed that beginning at least by early
2001, former CIA officerMAbecame a compromised asset of the MSS. The
investigation has revealedthatbeginning on March 24, 2001, and continuing
through March 26, 2001,MA and former CIA officer CC # 1 conducted a series of
meetings with at least five (5 )MSS intelligence officials in a Hong Kong hotel
room . During thesemeetings,MAand CC # disclosed a substantialamountof
highly classified national defense information of the United States to the MSS
officers .
20. Your affiant has reviewed both audio and video recordings of these
March 2001meetings, and the recordings have also been reviewed by appropriate
officials within the CIA. Based on our collective review , it hasbeen determined
that during the three days of intensive questioning byMSS intelligence officials
MA and CC# voluntarily and knowingly revealed U.S.classified information
including, butnot limited to , the following subjectmatters:
a . Their CIA work experience and activities;
b Information concerning CIA international operations, including thecover used by CIA officers and CIA activities;
c . Cryptographic informationused in classified and sensitiveCIA
communications and reports
d. Information concerningthe internalstructureand organizationof theCIA ;
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e. Information concerning CIA officer identities;
f . Information concerning CIA human assets;
g. Information concerning CIA use ofoperational tradecraft;
h. InformationconcerningCIA technical departments;
i Information concerning CIA secure communication practices; and
j Information concerning CIA staffing practices.
21. Your affianthas reviewed a videotapeoftheMarch 26 , 2001meeting
betweenMA, CC# 1, and theMSS officers.MAidentified importantaspectsofthe
tape, such aslocation , people present, and topics discussed, during an FBI
undercover operation described later in this affidavit. The videotape and
accompanyingaudio depictMSS officials payingMAand CC# 1 $50,000 in U.S.
currency , whichMA counted while CC# 1continued to provide classified
information to theMSS officersattendingthemeeting.
22 Following theMarch 2001HongKongmeetings, MA continued to
remain in contactwithMSSofficials andto work on their behalf. The investigation
has revealed that as a mechanism once again give himself access to U.S.
government information, MA applied for employmentwith the FBI. OnDecember
26 , 2002, MA applied with the FBIfor the position of “ SpecialAgent. On or
about December 30 , 2002, after being advised by theFBI that he did notmeet the
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age requirements for the FBISpecialAgent position,MA submitted an online job
application to the FBIfor a contract linguist/monitor/ tester position .
23 On or aboutApril 14, 2003,MA submitted a written application for a
contract linguist position , in Chinese languages , at the FBIHonolulu Field Office,
in Honolulu, Hawaii. On or about April21, 2003,MAused a prepaid calling card
to callhisMSShandlersto notify them of the status ofhis efforts to gain FBI
employment
24 . OnoraboutMay 20, 2004,MA was notified thathis background
investigation for the contract linguist position was complete that an
employment contract wouldbe ready for review in several weeks. agreed to
continue the hiring process.
25 . On or about August 10, 2004, one day beforereporting to work with
theFBI, MAtelephoned a suspected accompliceand stated thathewould be
working for the other side.
26 On or about August 11, 2004, MA reported to work with the FBIto
begin employmentand acknowledgedwith his signature on an FBInondisclosure
agreementhis understandingofthe secrecy requirements of his employmentwith
the FBI, including secrecy concerning his FBIwork product andmaterials
provided to him . The nondisclosure agreement specifically cautioned him that
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federal criminallawsprohibited the unlawfulgatheringand disclosureofsuch
materials. In the nondisclosure agreement,MA acknowledged , I understand the
need for this secrecy agreement; therefore , I agree that I will never divulge,
publish , or reveal either by word or conduct, or by othermeans of disclosure, to
any unauthorized recipientwithoutofficialwritten authorization by theDirectorof
theFBIor his delegate , any information from the investigatory files of the FBIor
any informationrelatingto materialcontained in the files, or discloseany
informationor produceanymaterialacquired as a partoftheperformanceofmy
contract
27. OnoraboutAugust11, 2004, during a security briefing the FBI
conducted with MA, the FBI advised MA that because hewas working in a
controlled security environment designed for the storage of classifiedmaterials, he
could not use any personaldevices , including laptop computers, cellular
telephones, personal digital assistants, digital cameras, or removable media, to
perform his duties, including translating materials or storing FBI information .
Additionally, theFBIinstructedMA that he was never to remove any documentor
digitalmaterialfrom the secure FBIworkspace. Your affiantknowsfrom his years
of work in FBIsecure spacesthatall employeesand contractorsare trained and
instructed on the importance ofsecurity protocols, including the prohibition against
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bringingphotographic equipment, digitalmedia, andmobile devices into secure
space designed for the handling, storage, and discussion of classified information .
As a former employeeofthe CIA , MA was instructedon theprotocols and
procedures regarding devices that could notbebrought into secure workspaces In
addition, MAalso understoodthathe could notdepart secure workspaceswith
classified information unless specifically authorized to do so .
28 In August 2004, MA began work for theFBIHonolulu Field Office as
a Chinese languages contract linguist. As a partofhis employment,MA
understoodhewouldhave access to classifiedU.S.nationaldefense information.
The investigation has revealed that between in or about August 2004 and in or
about November 2010 ,MA regularly gathered documents marked with U.S.
classificationmarkingsfrom the secureFBIworkspacewith the intentto provide
them to hisMSShandlersduringregulartripshemadeto China.
29. On or about September 8 , 2004 ,while working in the secure FBI
workspace ,MA used his assigned FBIcomputer to "burn onto a CD -ROM disc
digital photographic imagesofdocuments related to guided missile and weapons
system technology research .
30. On or aboutJuly 27, 2005, in violation of FBIpolicy and thesecurity
protocols upon which he had been instructed ,MAbrought a digital camera into the
secure FBIworkspace and photographed translation documents.
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31. On or about August 18, 2005,MAbroughta digitalcamera into the
secure FBIworkspace and photographedtranslation documents.
32 On or about August 22, 2005,MA brought a digital camera into the
secure FBIworkspace and photographed translation documents.
33 On or about August 26, 2005,MA broughta digital camera into the
secure FBIworkspace and photographed translation documents .
34. On or about September6 , 2005,MAbroughta digital camerainto the
secure FBIworkspace and photographed translation documents.
35. On or aboutSeptember 12, 2005,MA brought a digitalcamera into
the secure FBIworkspace and photographed translation documents.
36 . On or aboutSeptember 16 , 2005, MA brought a digital camera into
the secure FBIworkspace and photographed translation documents .
37 On or about October 3 , 2005, MAbrought a digital camera into the
secure FBIworkspace and photographed translation documents.
38. In or about February 2006 ,MA exchanged several e-mailmessages
and phone calls with MSS IOs. In the exchanges , they discussedMA's upcoming
travelplansto Shanghaiin late February 2006. TheMSS officers toldMA they
would book MA's hotel and pick him up from the airport .
39. On or about February 17, 2006 MAdepartedHonolulu, Hawaiifor
Shanghai, PRC via Narita International Airport in Tokyo, Japan .
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40. On or aboutFebruary 23, 2006 , MAreturned to the Honolulu
InternationalAirport, arriving from Tokyo followinghis travel in Shanghai.
During Customs screening, CBP agents interviewed and searchedMA. During the
interview , CBP determined thatMAwas in possessionof $ 20,000 in U.S.
currency. In addition,MA had a set of golf clubs he did notpreviously own.
41. On or aboutFebruary 23, 2006,MA forwarded twoe-mailmessages
from his personale-mail accountto the MSS. The first e-mailmessage contained
information regarding classified CIA activities . The second e-mailmessage was an
e-mailmessageMAhad received from a Taiwanese diplomatic .
42 On or about February 27, 2006 , MA sent CC # 1 an e -mailmessage to
advise CC # 1 that MA was going to forward to CC # 1 photographs of suspected
human sources thatMSS operativeswanted CC# 1 to identify.
43 On or aboutMarch 2, 2006 ,MAtelephoned CC# 1 at therequestof
theMSS to inquire with CC # 1 as to the identities of the persons in the photographs
sent toMAby the MSS, whichMAin turn to CC # 1. CC# 1 agreed to provide
MA and the MSS with the identities of the individuals in the photographs.
44. On or aboutMarch 6 , 2006 ,MA received an e-mailmessage from the
MSS with an attachment consistingof one photo of five puppiessittingon a park
bench. TheFBIassesses that this photographwas sent in order to promptMA
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arrange for CC # 1to provide identity information on five (5 ) individuals who had
been suspectedhuman sources.
45 On or about March 16 , 2006 , MA possessed at his residence a digital
memory card with photographsof five 5) individuals, one ( 1) picture of a piece of
paper with names written in Chinese labeled a” through “ e," and eight(8)
photographs of a document that had been removed from the secure FBIworkspace .
46 On or aboutMarch 28, 2006 , CC# sentan emailmessage toMA
wherein CC # identifiedtwoofthe five individualsdepicted in the photographs
provided by theMSS.
47 On or about May 31, 2006 ,MA arranged for his wife to fly to
Shanghai, PRC. TheFBI assesses that one purpose of this trip was for MA's wife
to meetwith MA'sMSS contacts, and the investigation has revealed thatMA's
wife likely delivered a laptop computer to theMSS during this trip .
48. Onor aboutJune 10, 2006 , one ofMA'sMSS handlers sentMA an
emailmessage thanking him for sending hiswife and delivering the present."
49. On or about June 16, 2006 ,MA departed Honolulu for Hong Kong for
the purpose ofmeeting with hisMSS handlers.
50 . On or aboutJuly 15, 2006 ,MAreturnedto Honolulu from China and
declared $ 7,000 in U.S.currency to CBP at the Honolulu International Airport.
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51. On or about May 2, 2007,MA photocopied and removed copies of
translation documents from the secure FBIworkspace .
52 On or aboutOctober 24, 2007, MA photocopied and removed copies
of translation documents from the secure FBIworkspace .
53 On or aboutMarch 27, 2008,MAphotocopied and removed copiesof
translation documents from the secureFBIworkspace.
54. On or aboutMay 8, 2008,MAphotocopied and removedcopies of
translation documents from the secure FBIworkspace .
55 On or about June 2, 2008, one ofMA'sMSShandlerstelephonedMA
and said his would have a lot ofwork orders this year .
56 . On or about August 15, 2008, oneofMA'sMSShandlers telephoned
MA and reminded MA to call him if a “ good opportunity arises.
57. Onor aboutFebruary 3, 2009, MA photographed and removed
documents with classificationmarkings from the secure FBIworkspace and
removedcopiesoftranslation documents from the secure FBIworkspace.
58. On or about April21, 2009, MA photocopied and removeddocuments
with classificationmarkingsfrom the secure FBIworkspace.
59 On or aboutDecember 2, 2009, during a telephoneconversation,
CC # 1 told MA that CC # 1 hadmetwith an MSS contact in Yunnan , China during a
recenttrip to China.
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60. On or aboutJanuary 14, 2010,MA photographed documents in the
secure FBIworkspacewith his cellular phone.
61 On or aboutMarch 6 , 2010, one ofMA'sMSS handlers telephoned
him to discuss meetingin HongKongin lateMarch . Approximatelyone ( 1) hour
after thiscall, theMSShandlercalledMA again, and they confirmed travel
schedule to HongKong.During this call, the MSS handler advisedMA thathis
" leadership eagertomeetMA
62 Onor aboutMarch 17, 2010,MAboarded a flight from Honolulu to
Seoul, South Korea. In his possession as heboarded the flightwas a document
with SECRET classificationmarkings thatMAhad taken from the secure FBI
workspace . In addition,MA possessed a Chinese language document that he had
improperly removed from the secure FBIworkspace .
63 On or aboutMarch 31, 2010 ,MA sent one ofhisMSS handlers an e
mailmessage requesting"reimbursement for businessexpenses. MA provided
thebank accountnumber at a HongKongbank for paymentpurposes.
64. On or aboutMay 17, 2010 ,MAreceived a telephone call from an
MSS officer. During the ensuingconversation, theMSS officer apologized for not
seeingMA duringMA'srecent travel to China and extended an invitation to meet
in Shanghai in the future. During the call, the MSS officer told MAheshould
communicate with CC # 1 moreoften and determine ifCC # 1 would be willing to
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��
discusstheir" businessventure. In the experienceofyour affiant, and the
collective experienceof the other counterintelligence agents with whom I have
worked on this investigation , it is not unusual for espionage actors and foreign
counterintelligence agents to utilize substitute terminology when discussing their
activities. In this investigation, MSS officerscommonly used the term " business
to discuss MA's espionage activities conducted on their behalf.
65 . On or about May 19, 2010 , MA sent one ofhis MSS handlers an e
mailmessagetelling the officerhe neededmoney when he was next in Hong
Kong
66 . On or about August28, 2010, MAreceived a telephone call from an
MSS officer . During the conversation , theMSS officer inquired how " business "
was goingand invited MAto visit with him in Shanghai, preferably in March
2011.
67. On or about November 2 , 2010 , MA inserted a digital storage device
into his FBI computer at the secure FBIworkspace .
68. On or about November 23, 2010, MA inserted a digital storage device
into his FBI computer at the secure FBIworkspace.
69. On or about November 30 , 2010 , MA inserted a digital storage device
into his FBIcomputer at the secure FBIworkspace .
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70. In January 2019, the FBIconducted an undercover contact withMA.
An FBIUndercover Employee (UCE), posing as a representative ofthe MSS,
conducted a meetingwith MA in MA'sHonolulu business office. TheUCE
showed MA a copy of the video recording of theMarch 26 , 2001meeting
described above as a mechanism to convince MA that theUCE truly was employed
by the MSS, and askedMA for assistance in identifying certain parties present
during theMarch 2001meetings. TheUCE told MAthat theUCEwas conducting
an investigation on behalfof the PRC government into how MA had been treated,
includingthe amounthe had been compensated, by certainMSS officers.
71. After seeing the video recordingof theMarch 26 , 2001meetingwhere
MAandCC# 1 provided classified information to the MSS,MAappeared to be
convinced that the UCE truly was a representativeoftheMSS.MA then told the
UCE that MA had provided classified information to theMSS and that he had
continued to work with some of theMSS officials present in the video recording of
theMarch , 2001meeting.MAthen assisted theUCE in identifyingsomeofthe
MSSofficialspresentduringthemeetingusingthe videotape. During themeeting
with theUCE,MA verified the authenticityofthe video recordingoftheMarch
26 , 2001meetingand confirmed that it accurately depicted the personspresent
during the meeting, including himself,CC # 1 and severalMSS officers.
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(Screenshottaken from the covert video and audio recordingmadeby the UCEduring themeeting with MA in January 2019.)
72 On March 13, 2019 , the UCE calledMA to ask him ifhewould meet
with him again.MA agreed and metwith the UCE On this occasion , the UCE
provided MA with $2,000 cash in U.S. currency. The UCE toldMA the money
was to acknowledgehis work on behalfof China.MAaccepted themoney and
counted it. (See screenshot from UCE video below ; see also Exhibit A.) MAtold
the UCE he was willing to continue to help the MSS, and confirmed thathe
had providedmultiple items of valuable U.S. government information to the MSS
duringthe timehe worked for the FBI.
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(MA counting $ 2,000 provided to him by the UCE as a
" token appreciation for hiswork on behalf of China.)
73. On August 12 , 2020, the UCE metagain with MA. On this occasion ,
the UCE provided MAwith $2,000 cash in U.S.currency contained within a red
envelope. The UCE toldMAthat the money was from his employer in
appreciation ofMA'sefforts to assist them . MA accepted themoney, counted it,
and placed the envelope containing the money in his pants pocket
74. MA told the UCE during themeeting that hewanted themotherland”
to succeed. The UCE asked MA about his past work with theMSS. MA told the
UCE that: (a)hehad already given theMSS allof the information he possessed;
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( b) a lot of the information heprovided to theMSS was contained on a laptop
computer that had been given to him by hisMSS handler and that he returned; (c )
MAwas firstapproachedbytheMSSwhenhewas living in China, andthatthe
MSS officerwho approachedhim was direct and open abouthis affiliationwith the
Chinese government; and (d ) the reason theMSS approachedhim was to get to
CC # 1, whose membership in an anti-communist organization was viewed as a
threat by the Chinese government.
75 . Duringthemeeting,MA also told the UCEthathewas willing to
continue to help the Chinese government, possibly asa consultant, but thathe
would prefer to discuss opportunitiesafter the COVID -19pandemichassubsided
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76 . Based on the above facts, youraffiantasserts thatthere isprobable
cause to believe thatMA conspired with CC# 1 andmultiple PRC intelligence
officers to gather and communicate national defense information of the United
States to thePRC in violation of 18U.S.C.Sections794 a ) and ( )
Chris Jensen
SpecialAgentFederal Bureau of Investigation
Sworn and subscribed beforeme this 13th, day ofAugust, 2020 .
DISTRICT
Judge
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