Cascadia Region Coordinated Earthquake Risk

Communication Plan: Findings and

Recommendations

A report to the Cascadia Region Earthquake Workgroup by the

Resilience Institute of Western Washington University

Dr. Rebekah Paci-Green

Ryan DeNoyer

December 2016

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Cascadia region, spanning from Northern California to lower British Columbia, is an active seismic

region. On a regional scale, an informal network of scientists current coordinates communication about

earthquake hazard. However, many earth scientists and emergency managers in the region support a

more formal regionally coordinated approach to earthquake risk communication. Regionally

coordinated earthquake risk communication, as defined for this project, meant communication

regarding 1) short-term earthquake forecasts, whether qualitatively or quantitatively assessed, and 2)

recommended protective actions associated with those forecasts.

In 2016, the Resilience Institute worked with the Cascadia Regional Earthquake Workgroup (CREW),

through funding from the US Geological Survey (USGS), to engage with regional stakeholders and

develop this report. The Resilience Institute engaged with 85 regional stakeholders through a series of

online surveys, regional workshops and meetings, interviews, and opportunities to provide feedback and

vote on whether, and how, to more formally coordinate earthquake risk communication.

Coordinated earthquake risk communication can improve the current approach. The current, informal

communication that does occur is rapid and flexible. This current approach provides a qualitative,

scientifically vetted assessment of heightened earthquake probability, an assessment that is shared with

emergency managers and the media in an ad hoc way. However, the approach does not include a

process for coordinating, or even ensuring, that information about heightened earthquake probability is

coupled with recommendations about protective action.

More formal regional earthquake risk communication will provide a clear and, over time, authoritative

source of scientifically vetted information on short-term heightened earthquake probability.

Coordination will also ensure these hazard assessments are part of an effective communication plan

that links hazard with clear, actionable protective action information. Coordination will allow parties to

develop and test template language for earthquake risk communication, templates that may increase

the speed and effectiveness of communication. Most critically, coordination will ensure that earthquake

risk communication in Cascadia is based upon clear guiding principles:

a commitment to transparency,

a separation between hazard and risk assessment,

a commitment to timely, accurate, and actionable communication, and

a process that is flexible and adaptable.

There is strong support for coordinated earthquake risk communication in the Cascadia region in the

following situations: 1) when seismic activity on the Cascadia Subduction Zone occurs, 2) when unusual

fault activity occurs that may have implications for short-term heightened earthquake probability across

the region, 3) when, if ever, an earthquake prediction is made, and 4) in the event that automated

aftershock forecasting is implemented in the region. Project participants believe that automated

aftershock forecasting, if it were implemented, would need to be supported by coordinated, regional

public outreach and education, both before and immediately after the forecast, for the forecast to be

beneficial.

Project participants support the establishment of a formal process for coordinating regional earthquake

risk communication. No such body currently exists with full regional representation, statutory authority,

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and appropriate expertise to carry out such a task. As such, the Resilience Institute recommends a two-

part strategy:

the establishment of a NEPEC subcommittee on the Cascadia region (with British Columbia

representation) to rapidly assess unusual fault activity and provide state/provincial authorities

with an authoritative, vetted assessment of short-term heightened earthquake probability, and

the establishment of a CREW subcommittee on Earthquake Risk Communication to support the

develop and refinement of public outreach material about earthquake forecasting, common

language regarding protective action recommendations, and earthquake risk communication

templates for a range of scenarios.

Together, these two groups can support state/provincial authorities if they choose to issue earthquake

advisories and/or information statements. These groups can also support public understanding of

automated aftershock forecasting, were it to be implemented. (Though outside the scope of this project,

the coordination recommended here should also extend to cover implementation of earthquake early

warning as well.)

The goal of coordination will not be to produce identical earthquake risk communication. Rather,

coordination will support a convergence of message content about the hazard and the actions recipients

of the messages should take to protect themselves and their communities. The following graphic, a

more detailed version of which is provided in Section 4.5, provides a broad overview of the

recommended coordinated earthquake risk communication plan.

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Acronyms and Terminology Acronyms

Cal OES – California Office of Emergency Services

CEPEC – California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council

CREW – Cascadia Region Earthquake Workgroup

CSZ – Cascadia Subduction Zone

ERC – proposed subcommittee of CREW on Earthquake Risk Communication

GSN Science — the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited, a semi-commercial New

Zealand Crown Research Institute and a successor of the New Zealand Geological Survey

NEIC - National Earthquake Information Center

NEPEC – United States National Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council

NOAA – United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NorPEEC – recommended deliberative body for Cascadia region coordination of earthquake risk

communication (North Pacific Earthquake Evaluation Council)

NRCan – Natural Resources Canada

OEF –Operational earthquake forecasting

PIO – Public Information Officer

PNSN – Pacific Northwest Seismic Network

USGS – United States Geological Survey

WAEMD - Washington state Emergency Management Division

Terminology

Hazard: A potentially damaging seismic event that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage,

social and economic disruption or environmental degradation.

Risk: The potential negative and degradative public safety, economic, social, and environmental

consequences of hazardous seismic events that may occur within a specified time frame.

Earthquake Prediction: A deterministic statement that an earthquake will, or will not, occur in the

future. Generally, predictions provide specific details about the timing, location, and size of such events.

Earthquake Forecast: A probabilistic statement of an earthquake occurring, ranging from greater than

zero and less than 100 percent.

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Operational Earthquake Forecast: An earthquake forecast — statement about the heightened

probability of an earthquake occurring — within a short timeframe of days, weeks, or months.

Operational earthquake forecasts also are called short-term earthquake forecasts. These forecasts are

time-dependent; they are based upon changes in geophysical conditions, such as a recent earthquake or

swarm of tremors.

Long-term earthquake probability: The modeled seismicity of a region, based upon probabilistic

seismic hazard analysis that considers instrumental and paleo-seismological records. It is reported as the

probability of shaking intensity being exceeded at a particular location, over a specified timeframe,

typically several decades (e.g. A 10% probability of peak ground acceleration equal to or greater than

0.5g over the next 30 years). It can be considered the “background” seismicity of a region.

Protective Action: Actions decision-makers may take to reduce the likelihood of damage from an

earthquake. Long-term actions at the community level include changes to building codes, zoning

ordinances, hazard mapping. At the household level, long-term actions may include tying a home to its

foundation, purchasing earthquake insurance, and securing furniture. Short-term actions at the

community level may include pre-positioning supplies, postponing repairs, fueling vehicles, testing

backup power, designating standby individuals for essential functions, and even evacuating high-risk

structures in certain circumstances. At the household level, short-term actions may include updating

and reviewing emergency plans, refreshing emergency supplies, filling up gas tanks, postponing elective

surgery, and withdrawing cash. For further discussion, see (Field, Jordan, Jones, Michael, & Blanpied,

2016).

General Earthquake Messaging: General information about seismic risk based upon long-term

probabilistic hazard analysis. The wider public accesses these general earthquake messages through

hazard assessments, publications, emergency management and preparedness websites, public events,

and occasionally, news coverage.

Earthquake Advisory Messaging: Messages rapidly prepared and purposefully disseminated to advise

decision makers about a perceived, measured, or modeled change in earthquake probability. Advisory

messages are meant to provide important information that could influence a decision maker’s choices

about protective actions.

Earthquake Early Warning: Earthquake Early Warning activities include the development of early

warning systems, emergency alert systems, and the coordination of emergency notifications. These

activities allow for messages triggered by the initiation of seismic shaking, giving the audience a

timeframe of seconds to minutes of notification before imminent seismic waves reach their location.

Regular testing and drilling of these systems is required. Earthquake early warning was outside the

scope of this project.

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1 Introduction This report, prepared for the non-profit Cascadia Region Earthquake Workgroup (CREW), through

funding from the US Geological Survey (USGS), is the outcome of a project to engage with regional

stakeholders with the aim of exploring options for developing a coordinated earthquake risk

communication1 plan for the Cascadia Region. The Cascadia region spans British Columbia, Washington,

Oregon, and Northern California.

The area’s geological setting, especially the Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ), and the political complexity

of a multi-state and multi-country region was believed to be unique enough to warrant a coordinated

approach. The coordination plan was to delineate how information about increases in short-term

probabilities of damaging earthquakes occurring in the near future— a process known as operational

earthquake forecasting — could be rapidly and consistently disseminated.

To develop an earthquake risk communication coordination plan, CREW asked the Resilience Institute to

facilitate a series of workshops and collect input from scientists, emergency managers, risk

communication professional and decision makers at the local, state/provincial, and federal levels to

answer questions about:

- Processes for determining when notifications are warranted. - Audiences to whom messages will be delivered. - The need for and possible development of template messages and other products. - Paths of information flow among producers, communicators, and end-users. - Expected schedules for message exchanges.

The intended outcome of this CREW project was a draft earthquake risk communication coordination

plan.

1.1 Summary of Methodology In the spring of 2016, the Resilience Institute worked with CREW board of directors to develop a list of

key individuals in the Cascadia region and, through snowball technique, to expand this list. The list was

dominated by two broad groups: 1) earth scientists and researchers; and 2) emergency managers from

state/provincial, local, tribal, and federal levels. The list also included a smaller number of regional

experts or practitioners in risk communication, news media, and public outreach. The finalized list

included 159 people from across the region, of which 85 participated in some way. See Section 7.1

Appendix A. List of Participants and Involvement for a list of people invited and their involvement.

Participants were asked to grapple with issues of coordinated earthquake risk communication through a

series of workshops, meetings, interviews, surveys and participant comment and voting opportunities. A

full description of the methodology can be found in Section 7.2 Appendix B. Methodology Details, and is

summarized here. Links to appendices that document participant comments are also provided.

1 Earthquake risk communication is a broad term that could encompass everything from communicating about long-term seismicity to earthquake early warning. Through conversations with CREW, it was clear the intent was to focus on communicating short-term, time-dependent earthquake risk following unusual seismic/aseismic activity. This type of communication is formalized as “earthquake advisories” in California; in the literature, it is often called short-term or operational earthquake forecasting or, for brevity, forewarning.

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Step 1. Survey on Existing Earthquake Messaging Context. In May 2016, the Resilience Institute

initiated engagement through an email inviting recipients to participate in a regional

conversation on coordinated earthquake risk messaging. Recipients were invited to provide

initial thoughts on earthquake risk messaging via an online survey. Of the 51 emailed and invited

to participate, 41 responded to the survey. See Section 7.3 Appendix C. Pre-Workshop Survey

Results for a full list of survey questions and a summary of the responses.

Step 2. Regional Workshops- Seattle, WA and Salem, OR. Following the survey and interviews,

the Resilience Institute worked with state/provincial emergency management earthquake

program officers to organize a series of workshops or meetings. British Columbia and

Washington decided to hold a joint workshop on June 27, 2016 (33 attendees) to better discuss

the cross-border coordination issues. An Oregon workshop was held on July 20, 2016 (46

attendees) with the earthquake and tsunami hazard program officers from California Office of

Emergency Services (CalOES) attending. See 7.4 Appendix D. Summary of Workshops for a

detailed summary of the outcomes of these workshops.

Step 3. Early draft of an Earthquake Risk Coordination Plan and CREW Concerns. Following an

analysis of the workshop discussions, the Resilience Institute began drafting a two-part

document that included a 1) Cascadia Regional Coordinated Earthquake Message Plan and a 2)

Procedural Guidelines that laid out when a notification process would occur and the actions

organizations would then take.

Step 4. Exploration of Regional Coordinated Earthquake Risk Communication Options. In

October, the Resilience Institute developed a framework for exploring possible forms of regional

coordinated earthquake risk communication. Using the comments and discussions from the

survey and workshops of steps 2 and 3, the Institute delineated three somewhat distinct stages

of regional risk communication and from two to four options for each of these stages. For a list

of advantages and disadvantages of each option, along with review comments from project

participants, see Section 7.5 Appendix E. Participant Comments on Coordinated Earthquake Risk

Communication Framework and Options

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Stage 5. Expansion to Consider Coordination in conjunction with Future Automated

Earthquake Forecasting and Online Voting. In late November, the Resilience Institute reviewed

comments on the communication framework and the various options within it. They developed

an online survey to allow participants to vote on the options they favored. See 7.7 Appendix F.

Post- Workshop Survey Results for the online voting outcomes and comments.

1.2 Report Organization This report first reviews the Cascadia regional context and other experiences with earthquake risk

communication for short-term heightened earthquake probability in the section 2 Overview below. In

this section, the experiences of other councils that are charged with similar earthquake risk

communication are particularly noted.

Section 3 summarizes findings from the yearlong engagement with regional earth scientists, emergency

management, and other participants. It summarizes the views participants shared during regional

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workshops and surveys on the current ways earthquake risk communication is, and is not, coordinated

and the opportunities and challenges of more formal coordination. Based upon draft plans and online

voting, the section then described participants’ preferences for whether and how to achieve better

coordination.

Section 4 makes seven broad recommendations for formalizing earthquake risk communication in the

Cascadia region. While participants were not unanimous in their support for formalization, strong

preferences for deliberation, dissemination, and coordination did emerge. These areas of broad

agreement, allow for the development of a strategic coordination plan, one that focuses on coordinating

communication around unusual fault activity, evaluation of earthquake predictions, and public outreach

and support regarding potential automated aftershock forecasting. A strategy for coordinating

communication, while maintaining a separation between hazard assessment and risk communication for

public safety, by recommending a regional National Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (NEPEC)

subcommittee that coordinates with a new CREW subcommittee on Earthquake Risk Communication.

Procedural guidelines are also laid out for several likely scenarios where coordination would be

warranted.

Appendices make up the bulk of this report. These appendices provide the participant survey response

and comments made throughout the yearlong process.

2 Overview This section provides an overview of several contexts of relevance to regional coordination of

earthquake risk communication. The section first provides a brief summary of the geophysical context —

the seismic hazards and potential indicators of short-term heightened earthquake probability. It then

discusses the ways scientists, emergency managers and media interact when unusual activity has

occurred in the past. Finally, the section looks outside the region to experiences and lessons from other

jurisdictions. It looks at U.S. federal and California state strategies for short-term earthquake risk

communication. It also explores an emerging possibility and potential need for increase coordination —

the prospects of automated aftershock forecasting, a technique tried in California, New Zealand and

with the potential for roll out in the Cascadia region in the near future.

2.1 Cascadia Geophysical Context The Cascadia region, spanning from Northern California up to lower British Columbia, is an active seismic

region. Inland from the Pacific Coast, the region has experienced several large earthquakes. In the Puget

Sound region of Washington, events in circa 900, and in the years 1949, 1965 and 2001 occurred. On

Vancouver Island a M7.3 event occurred in 1946. In 1993, the M6.0 Klamath Falls earthquake occurred

on the border of Oregon and California, and the 2011 the M6.8 Nisqually earthquake struck central

Washington. These large events are in addition to the hundreds of other smaller quakes across the

region each year (CREW, 2011).

While the Benioff and surficial quakes in the region have the capacity to cause large earthquakes and to

cause significant impacts across multiple state/provincial jurisdictions, it is the Cascadia Subduction

Zone (CSZ) that is of the biggest concern for regionally coordinated earthquake risk communication. The

CSZ is an 800-mile long fault off the Pacific Coast stretching the entire length of the region, from Cape

Mendocino in Northern California to mid-Vancouver Island. The last 30 years of scientific research

indicate that the CSZ has the potential to produce some of the largest earthquakes in the world. The

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fault has produced at least seven great earthquakes in the last 3500 years, a return interval of 400 to

600 years (Cal OES, 2013; PNSN, 2016); recent paleoseismological research may suggest a more frequent

interval on some segments of the fault (Goldfinger, 2012).

During the last several decades of instrumental monitoring, the CSZ has been nearly silent along its fault

system. The exceptions are relatively frequent activity occurring at the ends of this system near Cape

Mendocino, CA and Vancouver, BC and a reoccurring cluster of smaller earthquakes off the shore of

Newport, Oregon. The triple junction region off the Cape Mendocino also experiences larger quakes

with a reoccurrence interval on the order of a decade or more. This activity occurs at relatively shallow

depths and is located where the plates are just beginning their descent (subduction) (Gomberg, et al.,

2015; USGS, 2016).

The USGS Open Report on Earthquake Forewarning in the Cascadia Region defines five conditions that

regional experts would consider unusual activity:

M> 4 earthquakes on the plate interface

Changes in the pattern of slow slip on major faults

Shallow crustal faults that slip slowly, without generating seismic waves but with measureable

ground deformation

Changes in shallow seismicity patterns

Increased rates of moderate and larger intraplate earthquakes (See Gomberg, et al., 2015 for

further detail.)

Any activity outside of normal conditions, such as the five unusual activities above, would likely indicate

short-term heightened earthquake risk for the Cascadia region. Heightened risk may warrant regionally

coordinated earthquake risk communication.

2.2 Current Cascadia Communication Coordination On a regional scale, communication about earthquake hazard is currently taking place through an

informal network of scientists. When unusual activities occur on the CSZ or other faults in the region, a

loose network of individuals representing organizations and agencies monitoring seismicity and

geodetics initiate conversations over email exchange and conference calls, and/or through one-on-one

phone conversations between scientists. Most conversations are between scientists in Washington and

Oregon states, but sometimes include scientists from British Columbia and California.

While the scientists do not follow a formal process, the goal of these informal discussions is to develop a

shared understanding of the events. An initial conference call or email exchange helps the scientists

determine what they know about the situation and what further information they may need to gather

to better characterize the situation and any changes it may indicate for regional hazard probability. If

additional information, modeling, or calculations are needed, the group will disband to do so and may

reconvene via conference call to complete their conversation(s).

Dissemination of the scientists’ assessment of unusual activity is also informal and ad hoc. Scientists

involved in these discussions disseminate what they believe to be the most accurate information to

those whom they feel need of this information. This information is shared primarily through informal

professional relationships between the scientists and emergency managers, reporters, and other

information seekers (various personal communications, 2016).

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Local journalists that report on seismic risk often develop personal relationships with scientists;

scientists may disclose potentially sensitive information about unusual activity to the select few media

representatives with whom they have a relationship (Workshops, 2016), sometimes without being

named directly as the source. Thus, hazard information may be disseminated quickly to the public

through media channels, but may not be linked with risk and protective action information. Emergency

managers, who are responsible for linking hazard information with risk and protective action

information, call the scientists with whom they have established working relationships. They may call

more than one scientist to get multiple perspectives on an unusual or evolving situation before deciding

whether to formulate public communication. However, when an emergency manager is new to a

position, he or she may even struggle to know whom to call.

According to interviews conducted, organizations and some individuals often involved in informal

conference calls to discuss unusual fault activity include, but are not limited to the following:

Pacific Northwest Seismic Network, (John Vidale, Paul Bodin)

Cascadia Regional Earthquake Workgroup

University of Oregon

University of Washington (Bill Steele)

Oregon State University (Chris Goldfinger)

Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries

Washington Department of Natural Resources (Tim Walsh)

USGS Hazard Response Executive Committee

United States Geological Survey, (Andrew Michael, Morgan Page)

Cascades Volcano Observatory (Seth Moran)

California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council

Menlo Park (Anne Wein)

Washington, Oregon, and California emergency management contacts (not part of discussions, but informally contacted as needed)

It is important to note that the current informal conversations among scientists do not have a direct

linkage to potential users of the hazard information. Nor is scientific information about changes in short-

term earthquake hazard necessarily coupled with risk information to communities or recommended

protective actions. That is, while there is an informal hazard assessment plan in the U.S. portion of the

Cascadia Region with an ad hoc approach to communicating the findings of that assessment to the

public, emergency management and interested parties. There is no defined earthquake risk

communication plan.

Many organizations also use websites to provide both earthquake hazard and risk information to their

audiences. These include emergency management and scientific organizations. Websites are typically

information rich, but often fail to follow the principle of hazard-risk separation (Jordan.et.al, 2014).

Rather, the information includes hazard data and advice for varying audiences. Additionally, those

requiring technical information and those simply seeking basic safety advice are given the same message

(personal communication, A. Michael, June 16, 2016).

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Formal procedures for earthquake hazard and risk communication do exist, but are less frequently, if

ever, initiated. Interviewees noted that if a large seismic event were to occur in the Cascadia region,

regional scientists have points of contact and plans to develop and distribute talking points in

coordination with the National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC)2 in Golden, Colorado. In the event

of a large earthquake, Washington state’s Emergency Management Division (WAEMD) also has an

agreement in place to set up a Joint Information Center with the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network

(PNSN).

2.3 Other Experiences Communicating Short-Term Heightened Earthquake Probability Experimentation with formalized earthquake risk communication about short-term heightened

earthquake probability has occurred outside of the Cascadia region. The creation of the National

Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council in the United States, a similar and more active council within

California, and implementation of automated aftershock forecasting in the United States and New

Zealand offer insights for coordinating earthquake risk communication in the Cascadia region.

2.3.1 National Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (NEPEC) Within the United States, the Director of the United States Geological Survey (USGS) is responsible for

issuing timely earthquake warnings per the U.S. Stafford Act of 1978. Towards this end, the Director

established the National Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (NEPEC) that same year; NEPEC was

formally recognized as a Federal Advisory Committee by the U.S. Congress in 1970 (Jordan.et.al., 2011;

Roeloff, 2016). Established with the high hopes of a future full of short-term, high-probability

earthquake predictions, the council rarely met. It was even dispended for about a decade during the late

1990s and early 2000s. In 2006, NEPEC was reformed with a new charter.

According to its 2006 charter, NEPEC provides the USGS Director with recommendations and advice

regarding earthquake predictions in the United States, outside of California, a state with its own council

(Roeloffs & Goltz, 2016). It objectively reviews data scientists present as supporting earthquake

prediction, providing critical feedback to the scientists, archives information about prediction

evaluations, and provides the USGS Director with timely review and recommendations as to whether

there is sufficient evidence to warrant the issuance of an official USGS prediction (Jordan.et.al., 2011).

NEPEC current also reviews and supports national efforts at probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and

the development of short-term earthquake forecasting capacity (Jordan.et.al., 2011).

Members of the council are appointed by the USGS Director for a 3-year tenure. Members typically

include both internal USGS scientists as well as those from academic institutions and the private sector.

NEPEC also has the authority to consult with experts outside the council as needed. Importantly, the

Tort Claims Act of 1948 protects members of the council, in their role of giving advice to the USGS

Director from legal liability (Gomberg, et al., 2015).

As stated in Gomberg et al, The Cascadia region is potentially of heightened NEPEC’s concern for three

reasons. Firstly, the Geological Survey of Canada reviews regular slip along the plate interface in their

jurisdiction and has may announce that it is evidence of heightened earthquake probability. Secondly, at

2 NEIC coordinates regional seismograph networks. The center determines the location and size of seismic events anywhere in the globe and provides rapid earthquake alerts to state and federal emergency management, news organizations, and others.

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the opposite end of the fault, the California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (CEPEC) may issue

warnings of heightened earthquake risk due to activity in the region of the Mendocino Triple Junction

where the Gorda, North American, and Pacific plates meet. Finally, unusual activity, such as M>4

earthquake on an area of the CSZ that has not, thus far, been recorded as having such activity is of

concern. Under any of these scenarios, CEPEC could advise the Director to issue an official USGS

prediction (Gomberg, et al., 2015). Public concern in the wake of any of these scenarios may also compel

the Director to issue a clarifying statement, even if evidence is not strong enough to be able to quantify

heightened earthquake probability.

Despite a statutory mandate for issuing timely warnings of enhanced seismic risk in the U.S. portion of

the Cascadia Region, regional experts interviewed expressed concern that NEPEC does not regularly

meet and may not be experienced at rapidly deliberating and issuing statements on heightened

earthquake probability. Similarly, experts noted that NEPEC appointees may not have significant

knowledge of regional seismicity, especially the CSZ and the rapidly emerging research on this fault

system (multiple interviews, 2016).

2.3.2 California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (CEPEC) Four years after the formation of NEPEC, the California Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES)

established a state-level advisory council. Two years later, in 1976, CEPEC was formalized. The Governor,

at the recommendation of the Director of Cal OES and the state geologist, appoints nine experts in

geology, seismology, volcanology, and geophysics for four-year terms; the state geologist functions as

the chair of the council and reports to the Director of Cal OES (Roeloffs & Goltz, 2016). CEPEC formally

advises the Director on short-term elevated seismic potential and on the validity of earthquakes

predictions. In 1990, Cal OES adopted a formal advisory plan that governed the coordination of scientific

assessment and emergency management actions, including pre-determined recommended protective

actions for various users and heightened probability levels (Cal OES; Roeloffs & Goltz, 2016).

The original vision for the council, much like that of NEPEC, was to review and discuss published

earthquake predictions — deterministic statements that an earthquake will definitively happen within a

defined geographic boundary and a defined, short-term timeframe. Thus, CEPEC’s charter was

structured to distinguish between two types of CEPEC meetings:

CEPEC Prediction Screening Meetings. When CEPEC meets to evaluate a proposed

“prediction,” the meeting is open to the public and advertised as such, per state law. Any

formal minutes prepared, and documents presented during the proceedings are available

to the public upon request. The author of the “prediction” is invited to present the

reasoning supporting the prediction. In formulating its conclusions about the prediction

presentation, the CEPEC members are allowed to go into closed session for the discussion if

it so wishes. This allows an uninhibited conversation; however, when re-entering Public

Session, the CEPEC must announce its findings and conclusions as a body. Individual

members do not have to disclose their votes or draft notes on various issues (personal

communication, J. Parrish, 2016).

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CEPEC Rapid Assessment. When unusual seismic activity occurs in California state, the chair

may convene a rapid assessment in closed session.3 The findings and recommendations

from rapid assessment sessions go directly to Cal OES. Cal OES decides whether to issue a

formal earthquake advisory to the public and the content of that advisory. Cal OES can also

issue public statements explaining unusual seismic activity, even if it is not believed to

result in enhanced seismic hazard. CEPEC’s advice to the Governor is legally proprietary,

and therefore not disclosable (Cal OES) and (personal communication, J Parrish, 2016).

Earthquake Advisories, issued by Cal OES, are “statements by OES regarding scientific

assessments that, within a specified period (usually 3-5 days), there is an enhanced

likelihood for damaging earthquakes to occur in areas designated in the Advisory” (Cal OES,

pp. 98, emphasis mine). The protocols for issuing and cancelling Earthquake Advisories are

laid out in the California Earthquake Advisory Plan. The plan also includes readiness

procedures and checklists for OES and a list of specific facilities operated by the state. 4

Over its forty-year history, CEPEC has evaluated two earthquake predictions, neither of which were

found valid, and met for eminent alert meetings 19 times. Of the 19 times the council met over unusual

seismic activity, eight times Cal OES issued an earthquake advisory to the public.5 Two additional times

Cal OES issues other forms6 of communication (Roeloffs & Goltz, 2016). The procedures around CEPEC

deliberations have been improved and formalized. Yet, significant challenges remain.

CEPEC’s primary challenge is the rapidity at which Earthquake Advisories can be issued. The scheduling

of meetings or teleconference calls often delays deliberation by several hours, and if unusual activity

occurs late in the evening, the council may not meet until the following morning. Meetings often last

several hours and may be followed by internal deliberations within the Governor’s Office before any

issuing of an earthquake advisory (Roeloffs & Goltz, 2016). This is problematic because enhanced

earthquake probabilities decay rapidly towards long-term probability levels in the hours and days after a

seismic event (Jordan.et.al., 2011, p. 342). When earthquake advisories take several hours or more to be

issued, the time of greatest heightened earthquake probability may have already passed. Even with the

3 Starting in 2015, triggers for rapid assessment were established: an M≥5 event or three or more M≥3.5 events that are “closely-space, closely-timed” (Roeloffs & Goltz, 2016, p. 7). 4 The Advisory Plan itself is an appendix of the California Short-Term Earthquake Prediction Response Plan, which

describes operating guidelines for CEPEC, but also how the Governor’s Office and state organizations are to

respond to increasingly severe earthquake predictions, were CEPEC to ever find a prediction credible. Because

CEPEC has rarely screened predictions and has never found a prediction to be credible, it is the appendix of the

Response Plan — the Earthquake Advisory Plan — that is most used.

5 Eighteen CEPEC eminent alert meetings are recounted by Roeloffs & Goltz (2016) in their history of the California Earthquake Advisory plan; a more recent advisory was issued September 27, 2016 and was not covered in review manuscript obtained. 6 In 1992, after the Cape Mendocino earthquake, they issued an information statement. In 2009, California’s emergency management office was in the throes of a reorganization under the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security; the Governor’s Office issued a “preparedness advisory” based upon CEPEC’s recommendation that an earthquake advisory be issued.

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advent of automated operational earthquake forecasts for all M>5.0 events in California, estimates of

aftershock probabilities are sent to Cal OES and still necessitate a review before the Governor’s office

may issue an earthquake advisory (Jordan.et.al., 2011).

A secondary challenge involves the formal pathway of information flow — the transparency and

separation of hazard information from risk information. While the Earthquake Advisory Plan, as written

in 1990, draws a distinction between hazard and risk information, the structure does not fully adopt the

emerging consensus about the guiding principles for operational earthquake forecasting, described in

more detail below. CEPEC does separate assessment of hazard, which is done by CEPEC scientists, and

risk assessment, conducted by Cal OES when they determine whether to issue a public warning.

However, when Cal OES decides against issuing a public warning, the public may not receive the most

authoritative scientific information about future earthquakes, allowing each individual or organization to

make its own decisions about the threat such earthquakes pose to them. Certainly, scientists within and

beyond CEPEC can provide news media and interested organizations with their assessment of the

hazard, yet the plan does not provide for a clear path from scientific deliberation to public disclosure.

Rather, deliberations of the most authoritative body in the state are the property of the Governor’s

Office only.

As such, dissemination of scientific information essentially rests with emergency managers, violating the

hazard-risk separation principle.

This second concern has led to a third challenge, namely the inconsistent application of earthquake

advisories. The calling of CEPEC meetings is, at times, inconsistent. For example, the council did not

convene in 2004 following the M5.97 Parkfield Earthquake; the council chair noted that the Parkfield

area was an area of dense instrumentation and a long-term prediction. The low-density population had

high levels of preparedness and a detailed response plan. While these conditions led to a valid argument

for not convening a CEPEC meeting, the decision was out of sync with the initiation trigger of M>5

threshold for convening CEPEC members (Roeloffs & Goltz, 2016). Similarly, the Governor’s Office has

issued advisories for some events, such as the 2001 M4.1 Bombay Beach earthquake, while not issuing

advisories for a swarm and a M4.8 earthquake in the same area (Roeloffs & Goltz, 2016; Jordan.et.al.,

2011).

A case study of the Sept 27, 2016 Salton Sea Swarm Earthquake Advisory provides insights into the

challenges of coordinated earthquake risk communication in California. See Section 7.8 Appendix G.

CEPEC Case Study: Salton Sea Earthquake Advisory, Sept 27, 2016.

2.3.3 Automated Aftershock Forecasting Earthquakes often cluster in space and time -- large earthquakes tend to be followed by aftershocks;

clusters of earthquakes are more likely to be followed by a large event than at other times. Yet, it is

currently impossible for scientists to designate seismic activity as foreshocks, mainshocks, or aftershocks

a priori. For example, foreshocks are not discernable a priori and only about 15% of earthquakes are

preceded by a close proximity foreshock within a 10-day window of time (Jordan.et.al., 2011, p. 336).

These designations are made in hindsight. Epidemic Type Aftershock Sequence models have been

developed to forecast changes in seismicity following seismic events and have been shown to

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approximate the short-term changes in seismic probability observed historically (Jordan.et.al., 2011, pp.

325-326).

Operational earthquake forecasting (OEF) is the process of authoritatively stating time-dependent

earthquake probabilities for a specific region within an immediate timeframe, often days and weeks.

Forecasts are time-dependent assessments of instrumental, historical written paleoseismic records,

surface ruptures, and seismic catalogs. Some forecasts are based upon earthquake trigger statistics —

for example, following a large earthquake a region is statistically more likely to experience other seismic

activity relatively soon (i.e. aftershocks). Others forecasts are based upon seismic theories like elastic

rebound theory (Jordan.et.al., 2011). OEFs can 1000 or more times background seismicity (Jordan.et.al.,

2011, p. 340). However, even with these large increases, the overall probability of an earthquake

occurring over a short timeframe may still be quite low, near 1 percent.

Some form of OEFs has been instituted in several locations, including California where aftershock

forecasts are automated. In 1998, California began issuing automated aftershock forecasts for the

seven-day period following any M≥5 event in the state. These automated forecasts state the number of

M≥5 events and M≥3 aftershocks expected, using the Reasenburg and Jones methodology. Notably,

such aftershock forecasts are jointly issued by USGS and CEPEC, but not labeled as earthquake

advisories. Forecasts are posted to the web, available to the public, and sent directly via email to

emergency management. Template text used for the forecasts was revised to state that larger

mainshocks, while possible, were not probable (Roeloffs & Goltz, 2016; Jordan.et.al., 2011).

Automated aftershock forecasting was also disseminated during the Canterbury sequence in New

Zealand. Between the initiating sequence Sept 4, 2010, and the end of 2012, Canterbury region

experienced over 3,500 aftershocks, including three that were around M6 and one that caused

significant fatalities and injuries, as well as the closure of the central business district. During the multi-

year earthquake sequence, GSN Science, the geological research institute associated with the

government of New Zealand, issued both aftershock summaries and various forms of aftershock

forecasts (Wein, Potter, Johal, Doyle, & Becker, 2016).

Following the Canterbury sequence in New Zealand, earth scientists and risk communication experts

conducted a series of focus groups and interviews to understand the impact of aftershock forecasting.

They asked recipients of the forecasts how useful the information was and asked earth scientists and

emergency managers how the forecasts affected their work. The study found that after large

earthquakes, the public was often too shocked to take in detailed forecast information. They desired

practical messages focused on immediate health and safety actions, such as reminders about filling

water containers, moving away from unsafe buildings, and checking on neighbors. Yet, the public also

seemed to derive psychological benefits from learning that scientists found the fault activity expected;

the geophysical activity was not as chaotic and unpredictable as it felt to the public. They concluded that

the public was best served with forecast information paired with protective action recommendations

and directions for where interested individuals could delve into greater technical detail (Wein, Potter,

Johal, Doyle, & Becker, 2016).

USGS plans to roll out automated aftershock forecasting for the rest of the United States, outside of

California, in the coming months. Yet, the transfer of these automated aftershock forecasts to the

Cascadia region is not without its challenges. Methods for calculating heightened earthquake

probabilities are difficult outside of California because clustering statistics are not well documented

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(Blanpied, 2014), requiring that the forecasts be based upon global databases. As noted by Gomberg et

al. (2015), “[e]ven if we can identify extraordinary events, quantitative short-term forecasts will

have huge uncertainties [in the Cascadia region] because they will be based on observations for

which, by definition, no clear precedent exists. In some cases, only qualitative judgments may be

possible” (p. 7).

The public has shown strong interest in the prospects of better anticipating earthquakes. While,

undoubtedly, the public most desires earthquake predictions, an impossibility, there may still be benefit

in providing OEFs in the Cascadia region. As noted by Jordan et al (2011, p. 359) such forecasts:

Provide scientific transparency by not presuming to know for whom such information may

shape decisions;

Fill information vacuums that would otherwise be ripe for rumor and pseudoscientific

explanations or “prediction;” and

Clarify the source of authoritative information and instills trust further by showing a proactive,

rather than reactive, approach to scientific information.

OEF also builds upon lessons learned in the field of earthquake risk communication. It provides

“teachable moments” and may provide important reminders of seismic risk, something especially

important in the Cascadia region where frequent tremors cannot be counted on to remind the public

(Field, Jordan, Jones, Michael, & Blanpied, 2016). Yet, automated earthquake forecasting in the Cascadia

region also has the potential to create confusion. At first, OEFs may create false alarm as individuals and

organizations learn to adjust their risk tolerance and protective action choices against novel information

formats and content. Some may tend to treat low probability forecasts as certainties, or conversely as

vanishingly small impossibilities. OEFs may also increase frustration as people try to find more specific

and deterministic statements. Cascadia region forecasts issued by the USGS may also create confusion

for Canadian residents in British Columbia. As such, OEF in the Cascadia region needs appropriate public

outreach and information support. Most importantly, it needs to be coupled with protective action

information in order to be effective (Milleti, 1999).

3 Summary of Findings This section summarizes findings from the yearlong engagement with regional earth scientists,

emergency management and other participants. It first summarizes the views participants shared during

regional workshops and surveys on the current ways earthquake risk communication is, and is not,

coordinated and the opportunities and challenges of more formal coordination. It then shifts to explore

participant preferences, as voiced in draft plan feedback and online voting opportunities, for how to

effectively coordinate earthquake risk communication.

3.1 Participant Assessment of Current Context The informal approach to earthquake hazard communication described in Section 4.2 has, thus far,

provided a swift and ad hoc means for scientists to discuss and come to agreement about unusual

activity in the Cascadia Region, and agreement that is then shared informally with colleagues in

emergency management. However, the current coordination has mainly been in Washington and

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Oregon. Project participants were concerned that the approach may be insufficient in future scenarios

and for other jurisdictions in the Cascadia region.

Project participants saw that the current state of earthquake risk communication as having both

strengths and weaknesses. Often they did not draw a strong distinction between general and advisory

communications, discussing both as the current state of earthquake risk communication. The following

are some of the concerns raised in interviews, surveys, and regional workshops with earth scientists,

emergency managers, and social scientists:

Strengths of current state of earthquake risk communication:

The region has a strong network of experts

Much of the communication is diffused, allowing local emergency managers to adapt to

local contexts, especially for coastal communities where seismic and tsunami hazards are

intertwined

Good rapport between media, scientists, and emergency managers

Messages are generally simple and gauged towards audiences with some familiarity

Existing state/provincial systems for rapidly disseminating risk information for other hazards

exist and are well-established (e.g. NOAA weather alerts, tsunami warnings, emergency

management internal notifications)

Weaknesses of current state of earthquake risk communication:

Ad hoc coordination may leave emergency managers and media not knowing whom to ask

about rapid changes earthquake risk (Earthquake hazard program officers and emergency

managers spoke of calling multiple scientists to get different perspectives on seismic

hazards and unusual activity, and sometimes feeling they were hearing conflicting/

inconsistent information.)

Language inconsistencies and conflicting information remain a problem as earth scientists

may describe unusual activity differently

Ad hoc coordination between scientists centers on building scientific agreement about

geophysical processes. The scientists do not have the authority or expertise to address

implications for mitigation and preparedness and there is no process for coordinating the

risk and protective action content of messages.

Ad hoc coordination may be less effective in a rapidly evolving scenario. It could lead to

competing public safety communications; it may be less able to systematically provide

rumor control.

Ad hoc coordination may lead to important experts being left out of conversations.

In reference to both general and advisory communication, the following weaknesses were also

noted:

Some media and internet distortion does occur around seismic risk

Lack of a clear differentiation between worst case and likely earthquake scenario in

communication

Messages largely superficial and lacking clear recommended actions

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Communication doesn’t distinguish between different goals —to promote an individual or

organization, to provide basic information about long-term hazard, to change beliefs, or to

prompt action

Unclear if communication is reaching intended audience and being understood

Proposed improvements to current state of earthquake risk communication:

Need:

a go-to group for media that is perceived as local and authoritative

a defined process, especially for heightened short-term earthquake probabilities

a form of aftershock forecasting, and a way to notify public about the real dangers

associated with aftershocks

coordinated conference calls for emergency management during heightened earthquake

probability

to bring in communication experts — such as Public Information Officers (PIOs) — to craft

messages

to use evidence-based practices from risk communication in crafting messages

to better understand audience (how often do they want messages, what levels of

uncertainty with which they are comfortable, content, intended use)

to coordinate in advance for advisory messaging

to develop and text templates for advisory messaging

3.2 Participant Assessment of Coordination Opportunities During regional workshops in Seattle, Washington and Salem, Oregon, project participants discussed six

hypothetical scenarios where coordinated earthquake risk communication could have been desired. For

each scenario, they considered whether coordination would be better than the current ad hoc approach

to earthquake risk communication. Some of the scenarios were based upon the types of events that

prompt the California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (CEPEC) to convene. The following table

summarizes project participant support for coordinated advisory earthquake risk communication. For a

more detailed summary of the workshop discussions and votes, see Section 7.4 Appendix D. Summary of

Workshops.

Scenario Support for Advisory

Messaging Major Discussion Points

Large CSZ seismic event

Strong

Region needs to be warned of heightened aftershock potential;

may be a precursor — in which case, need to notify public immediately;

immoral to withhold what is, and is not, known scientifically

Coordination would provide consistency

Needs to be pre-scripted— post event environment may make coordination more challenging

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Unusual activity (e.g. swarm/unusual deformation)

Moderate

Activity may indicate heightened earthquake probability, which warrants “advisory”

May not have sufficient science to quantify heightened probability

Coordination needed to ensure separation of hazard info. from scientists and preparedness info. from emergency managers

Earthquake prediction

Moderate

“Advisory” is the wrong word but we need to communicate validity of prediction to public

Coordination would ensure communication about the scientific evaluation of the prediction came from an authoritative source

Would be important to educate on distinction between probability vs prediction

Media coverage of CSZ risk (e.g. New Yorker article)

Low

No change in risk, so no need for “advisory” communication;

coordination needed to communicate convergent (not identical) communication on long-term earthquake risk, ensuring media has access to trusted experts, and that message is reaching everyone

Coordinated public outreach would indicate to public that risk is known and being addressed

Large earthquake elsewhere

Very Low

No change in risk, so no need for “advisory” communication

Teachable moment, need standard public education and outreach

Need for getting the right experts in front of camera

Coordination of public outreach would lessen confusion and ensure that preparedness information was synced into discussion of hazard

Newly published research on long-term earthquake probability

Very Low

Scientific argument, don’t need to coordinate messages

No need for “advisory” since short-term probability does not change (and long-term probability dealt with through codes)

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Teachable moment to remind public of long-term hazard and recommended protective action

May need enhanced public education about what is, and is not, known about regional earthquake risk if research is getting a lot of media coverage, but may not need to be formally coordinated

May be especially important to provide information to policy makers, but not formally coordinate

3.3 Participant Assessment of Coordination Challenges While there was moderate to strong support for coordinated earthquake risk communication in the

cases of short-term heightened earthquake probability, due to a large event or unusual geophysical

activity in the region, as well as lower levels of support for better coordination for earthquake public

education, project participants saw multiple challenges with coordination. These included:

Epistemic uncertainty. Several scientists noted that the regional long-term probabilistic hazard,

especially due to the CSZ, was only recently characterized. Seismologist of the Cascadia region

do not have sufficient instrumental records. Several scientists believe there is insufficient data

to quantify increased seismic risk in the short term with much accuracy. (In contrast, California

integrates long-term earthquake hazard analysis with short-term probability based models of

seismic triggering and clustering that produce short-term earthquake forecasts in the Uniform

California Earthquake Rupture Forecast (UCERF3). This modeling is routinely used for

quantitative earthquake forecasting following unusual seismic activity.)

Speed of Coordination. Many project participants noted that any advisory communication

needs to be rapid, but were pessimistic that coordination would be fast enough. Daughter

events — mainshocks or aftershocks following an earthquake — may occur within minutes or

hours. Similarly, unusual activity can trigger larger, damaging events in the very near future. On

the social side, timeliness was also seen as important. A fearful or curious public would seek

answers. Without rapid, authoritative communication, pseudoscientific answers could flourish.

However, coordinated communication could take hours or more to set up communication,

deliberate, come to agreement, and then craft appropriate messages. Many participants were

concerned that messages would arrive too late and that emergency managers would need to

make statements before coordination could be achieved. This concern led some participants to

question the value of any coordination in communication.

Cross-jurisdictional Coordination. The Cascadia region spans three states and one Canadian

province. California has its own council for evaluating predictions and making rapid advisory

statements about earthquake risk. USGS, specifically NEPEC, does not cover British Columbia.

Creating a coordination plan that spans all jurisdictions may need to involve as much as two

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federal scientific organizations, four state/provincial governments, each with their own

organizational structures for emergency management and with their own communication

channels.

Who gets notification first. Emergency managers at the state/provincial and local levels were

acutely concerned about communication plans that rapidly disseminated heightened

earthquake probability information to the public and media before they received it. Currently,

they struggle when information is rapidly disseminated to the media, public or government

officials, who call them to ask what they should do about the evolving situation when they have

not yet seen or digested situational information. In order to avoid inconsistent language with

scientists and to craft locally tailored safety messages and recommendations for protective

action, emergency managers stated that they needed at least 15 minutes between receiving a

notification and public dissemination of that notification.

The term “advisory” may be confusing. Many emergency managers were uncomfortable with

the term “advisory” when referring to earthquake forecasting. They objected on two grounds:

o The term “advisory” in other contexts meant for the audience to listen and take specific

actions now, whether that be take shelter or evacuate. Some were unclear what specific

and immediate actions they would advise in the context of short-term heightened

earthquake probability, when heightened probability still meant a very low probability

of an earthquake actually occurring.

o Other hazard communication plans used the term “advisory” and distinguished it from

other alert levels like watches and warnings. However, the use of these terms is

inconsistent. USGS’s volcanic alert levels are sequenced as normal-advisory-watch-

warning. In contrast, NOAA’s alert levels for tsunami are sequenced information

statement-watch-advisory-warning. NOAA’s hurricane and tornado alerts distinguish

between watches and warnings. Moreover, social scientist participants noted that

research suggests the public struggles to understand the differences between these

terms. It remains unclear as to how Cascadia region residents will understand the term.

Lack of practice. Risk communication plans, especially those intended for rapid execution, must

be accompanied by training of all parties involved and frequent drilling, or it will not be

executed appropriately, if at all. If a coordinated earthquake risk communication focuses on the

scenarios of a seismic event, unusual geophysical activity, and/or a prediction evaluation, the

plan will likely be activated only infrequently. It may be years, or even a decade, between

activation. Personnel changes and forgetfulness will undermine its effectiveness. Creating drills

and practicing the communication plan, perhaps through regular drills like ShakeOut, was seen

as one solution.

Lack of perceived authority. The recipients of coordinated risk communication need to develop

trust in those that deliver the message of heightened earthquake risk and associated protective

actions recommended. If the plan is executed infrequently, the recipients may not trust the

source. If executed too frequently, it may lead to a high false-alarm rate and the erosion of

trust.

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When and how to coordinate between scientists and emergency management. When

discussing who would need to be part of a coordinated earthquake risk communication plan, it

was clear that both scientists and emergency managers were necessary. Scientists needed to

provide hazard information, and needed to agree on what rapid changes in the geophysical

environment meant for future hazard probabilities. Emergency managers needed to consider

public safety and recommend protective actions based upon hazard forecasts. However, it was

unclear when and how the two groups should coordinate. Some strongly believed that scientists

needed to meet in closed sessions to openly argue, debate, and come to agreement about data;

they would be less able to do so if non-scientists were present. With others present, scientists

may need to speak with less precision and less jargon, and disagreements may also be

misinterpreted (as was the case in L’Aquila). Others strongly believed emergency managers,

public information officers, social scientists, and others needed to be part of the crafting of

earthquake risk communication. Scientists may not correctly gauge the type of information is

desired (as was partially the case in the Salton Sea advisory) — what time ranges, what

geographic areas, and what magnitude events to use in developing forecasts. Emergency

managers are the authoritative voice on protective action. Also, those with expertise in risk

communication may be able to shape the language and/or visual content of short-term

earthquake forecasts to make it more widely understood. Some participants suggested that a

skilled social scientist may help the scientific body reach agreement more quickly by acting as a

facilitator. In fact, social scientists were seen as a critical component to a coordinated

communication plan, but few participants could articulate a good strategy for incorporating

their expertise during a rapidly evolving situation (i.e. following an earthquake or potential

precursor event).

Providing useful content for a variety of users. A coordinated earthquake risk communication

plan was understood to produce a single message for the region. Local emergency managers

were especially vocal about the ineffectiveness of such broad messages when it came to

prompting protective action in their communities. They also noted that overarching messages

overlooked specific vulnerable populations or geographies in their area. For example, a

moderate increase in seismic hazard is much more significant for coastal residents than for

residents even a few kilometers inland. Also, public utilities may have a lower risk tolerance than

retail businesses or households in the same community. They believed any coordinated

communication plan needed a way to tailor communication to local contexts and to specific

users.

3.4 Participant Preferences for Coordination In December 2016, project participants were asked to vote and comment on the potential forms a

coordinated earthquake risk communication process could take in the Cascadia Region. Based upon the

workshops, surveys, interviews and review feedback, the project participants were asked how

supportive they were of some sort of deliberative process for coordinating earthquake risk

communication in the Cascadia region. The vast majority were supportive – 82% stated they were

somewhat or extremely supportive of a coordinated process, as shown in Error! Reference source not

18

found.. Notably, several participants commented that such coordination would ideally be through

NEPEC and that coordination could help the public understand changes in earthquake risk or debunk

inaccurate risk or protective action information. A participant from the media noted that access and

visibility of academics was high, but visibility of USGS scientists in the region was very low. However, one

participant noted that timeliness of earthquake risk communication, especially actionable messages,

was of paramount importance; coordination that increased accuracy, but at the expense of timeliness

was not supported.

Figure 1. Support for regional coordination process for earthquake risk communication

Participants who supported some form of regional coordination in earthquake risk communication were

also asked to vote and comment on initiation, deliberation, and dissemination options. The following

summarizes the votes and comments made:

Initiation Options. Participants were asked how supportive they would be of having no formal

initiation option and formal initiation based upon defined criteria. The participants showed

support for both options, with over 75% of respondents being somewhat or very supportive of

either option. In comments, many participants noted that a deliberative process should have

the possibility for BOTH formal and informal initiation as it would be difficult to fully specify all

formal criteria a priori.

Deliberative Options. Participants were asked how supportive they would be of having no

deliberative body, informal or a formal deliberative body, with or without coordination

between it and emergency management or other organizations before finalizing its

deliberation. The strongest support, 84%, was for a formal deliberative body that worked

independently and finalized its deliberation before releasing any documentation. Having no

19

deliberative body received the least support, only 24%. In comments, participants noted that

the process would only work with a formal deliberative body, but that timeliness was so

important that the body should not consult with others before finalization and should have

clear guidelines to spur a rapid process of deliberation. Those who were against any

deliberative body were concerned that any deliberative process would delay the release of

information – media would seek other sources and emergency managers would need to make

decisions and public statements in a low-information environment.

Project participants that responded to the survey stated it was absolutely essential to include

the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network (95%), US Geological Survey (95%), natural resource

organizations/ agencies (74%), and state/provincial emergency management (63%). Less than

half the respondents felt it was absolutely essential to include other groups, such as local (37%)

and federal emergency managers (42%), research universities with expertise in seismology

(26%), geodetics (26%), social science (26%), though there was support for consulting with

these groups as needed. Representatives from public and private facilities, public health, and

news media received very little support as being essential to a deliberative body, though they

too were seen as potentially good sources for consultation.

Dissemination Options. Participants were asked how supportive they were of having

independent dissemination where experts chose how and when they disseminated outcomes of

the deliberative process, outcomes being given to emergency management for public

dissemination, or disseminating a formal statement directly to the public. Respondents most

strongly supported delivering outcomes to emergency management; 84% of respondents were

somewhat or very supportive of this option. Respondents also supported providing a statement

directly to the public; 72% were somewhat or very supportive of this option. However, in

comments, respondents noted that the ideal scenario may be all three options in concert – a

deliberative body issuing a formal statement, individual scientists and emergency management

amplifying and expanding the message within their realm of expertise and/or statutory duty.

However, a clear concern was also that emergency managers have the ability to “stay on top”

of the public safety message by having some short time window to establish recommended

protective actions and determine what regions and groups need to be formally notified. Again,

timeliness was of critical importance.

For project participant votes and comments on the proposed initiation, deliberation, and dissemination

options, see Section 7.7 Appendix F. Post- Workshop Survey Results.

3.5 Participant Preferences regarding Automated Aftershock Forecasting Project participants indicated strong support for having regional coordination to support and provide

context to automated aftershock forecasting, if USGS were to initiate such forecasting in the Cascadia

region. As shown in Figure 2, in a December 2016 survey of project participants, 82 percent were

somewhat or extremely supportive of coordinating regionally for this reason. Such coordination would

not necessarily occur prior to an automatic forecast since the automated aftershock forecast would be

published almost immediately after an earthquake with magnitude that exceeded the trigger threshold.

The overwhelming support project participants have for such coordination forms the basis for many of

the recommendations in Section 6, below.

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Figure 2. Support for regional coordinating body to develop public outreach and contextual messaging to follow automated earthquake forecasts

Participants noted that such coordination would build collaboration around earthquake risk

communication. Once established, the coordination could adapt as the science of earthquake

forecasting in the Cascadia region advances. Some also saw it as a supportive check on automated

forecasting or as a supportive collaboration of scientists, emergency managers and risk communication

experts if USGS’s process of developing templates for automated forecasting lacked that vetting process.

A minority of participants were unsupportive. One believed that providing forecasting in a low

probability environment was not useful; a second did not believe automated forecasting was possible.

Others questioned the efficacy of such a deliberative body without a clear mandate, funding, or

delineation from state/provincial level earthquake programs.

Participants voted on the importance of different activities a deliberative body could take to support

potential automated aftershock forecasts, as shown in Table 1. Notably, several participants argued that

the role of this deliberative body could be to provide scenarios for drills, but that the body should not

actually coordinate such drills since that responsibility was already covered by existing organizations. For

a full list of comments provided on this survey question, see Section 7.7 Appendix F. Post- Workshop

Survey Results.

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Table 1. Participant support for coordinated activities related to automated aftershock forecasting

Activities of Deliberative Body Respondents

somewhat or highly supportive

Drafting and field testing language for automated messages, in coordination with USGS

95%

Developing and organizing regular communications drills to prompt state and local governments to practice disseminating information statements and protective action advice following an automated forecast

96%

Developing talking points or other material to educate recipients (emergency managers, public, public and private organizations) of the value and limitations of automated earthquake forecasting

95%

Developing templates for couching automated messages in terms of regional seismicity, regional risk, and appropriate short and long-term protective actions

95%

Identifying the most useful parameters for quantifying heightened risk 91%

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4 Recommendations The year-long engagement of earth scientists, emergency managers, risk communication specialists and

others across the Cascadia region (British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, and northern California) has

provided an initial foundation for recommendations regarding coordinated earthquake risk

communication.

Regional coordinated earthquake risk communication, as defined for this project, meant communication

regarding 1) short-term earthquake forecasts, whether qualitatively or quantitatively assessed, and 2)

recommended protective actions. These short-term forecasts, indicative of heightened probability of a

damaging earthquake in the coming days, weeks or months, have been modeled and observed to occur

following seismic activity and, although less well understood, following other unusual geophysical

activity.

Although short-term forecasting occurs in a low-probability environment7 that does not generally merit

extreme measures like building evacuation, other protective action and readiness activities may still

warrant recommendation. For example, individuals and organizations involved in emergency

management may choice to review procedures and notify key staff. Some decision-makers may want to

refresh emergency supplies or ensure vehicles are fueled. Individuals may postpone elective surgery and

industries may postpone repairs of critical infrastructure during the heightened earthquake probability.

Surveys, workshops, interviews, and draft feedback drew out a range of perspectives on coordinated

earthquake risk messaging. Some participants felt the existing system of scientists informally discussing

unusual geophysical activity together, then sharing their understanding with the media and emergency

managers would continue to be sufficient and effective. However, this approach has been primarily

active among Washington and Oregon participants. Others felt that a more coordinated approach

needed to be developed to avoid a future scenario where the decision-makers, whether elected officials,

organizations, critical industry or even the general public, remained unaware of heightened earthquake

probabilities that would prompt them to take protective action. Conversely, participants felt that a lack

of coordination could result in conflicting communication across the region, possibly leading to

confusion, fear, or rumors. Yet, such instances have not arisen to date and will likely remain a rarity in

the future. Many participants were also concerned that coordination would lengthen the time before

decision-makers received vetted and accurate earthquake risk messages, a prospect all agreed would be

dangerous – decision-makers may not receive information in time to act and rumors could rapidly

spread in an information vacuum.

Project participants did support regional coordination for earthquake risk communication. However,

project participants did not come to full consensus as to the structure and procedural aspects of such

coordination. The recommendations laid out below provide a strategic plan for developing an

operational earthquake risk communication plan in the Cascadia region. They recommend an

organizational structure, scope, and guidelines for initiation, deliberation, and dissemination of

coordinated earthquake risk communication. Where participants expressed strong support for one

option, the recommendations reflect this support and that broad support is noted. Where participants

support multiple options, or where no strong agreement emerged, the authors have recommended the

7 Heightened probability may by hundreds or thousands of times higher than long-term regional seismicity, but still only on the order of 1 percent likelihood of a damaging earthquake during the forecasted time period.

23

option that provides the most coherence with other aspects of the plan and the option that best reflects

the lessons learned from the California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (CEPEC) and risk

communication research.

Given the considerable concern participants have over coordinated earthquake risk communication,8

the region needs continued cross-disciplinary discussion and a gradual process of increased regional

coordination. This process should perpetuate the cross-disciplinary discussions that occurred during this

project, with a goal of further delineating responsibilities, achieving organizational support, and drafting

of inter-organizational agreements.

4.1 Recommendation 1: Formalize Coordinated Earthquake Risk Communication CREW and USGS should work together to implement coordinated earthquake risk communication in the

Cascadia region. Participants exhibited strong support for increased coordination, with over 75% of

voting participants (n=28) indicating they were somewhat or extremely supportive. A similar level of

support was evident in regional workshops (n=70).

The current, informal approach describe in Section 2.2, is a rapid and flexible communication between

scientists. It provides a qualitative, scientifically-vetted assessments of heightened earthquake

probability that is shared with emergency managers and the media in an ad hoc way. However, the

approach does not include a process for coordinating, or even ensuring, that information about

heightened earthquake probability is coupled with recommendations about protective action. The

approach also remains susceptible to the introduction of language inconsistencies and conflicting

information as decision-makers, especially emergency managers, seek out multiple scientists to get their

“take” on the situation. Currently no single entity is seen as authoritative. The current approach also

supports little or no coordination with British Columbia.

Coordinated earthquake risk communication can improve the current approach. It will provide a clear,

and, over time, clearly authoritative source of scientifically-vetted information on heightened

earthquake probabilities. Coordination will also ensure these hazard assessments are part of an effective

communication plan that links hazard with clear, actionable protective action information. Coordination

will allow parties to develop and test template language for earthquake risk communication, templates

that may increase the speed and effectiveness of communication. Most critically, coordination will

ensure that earthquake risk communication in Cascadia is based upon clear guiding principles that

include a separation between hazard and risk assessment and a systematic approach to improving the

process.

8 See section Error! Reference source not found. for a discussion of concerns the project participants raised -- epistemic uncertainty, speed of coordination, cross-jurisdictional coordination, order of notification, and terminology, lack of practice, and lack of perceived authority, coordination between scientists and emergency management, and usefulness of message content

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4.2 Recommendation 2: Guiding Principles for Coordination Coordinated earthquake risk communication in Cascadia should be guided by the following five

principles:

The Transparency Principle. “Authoritative scientific information about future earthquake

activity should not be withheld from the public” (Jordan, Marzocchi, Michael, & Gerstenberger,

2014, p. 956).

A transparent and accessible source(s) of information about seismic hazard in the Cascadia

region is an important component for building public awareness. Transparency builds trust and

may reduce the allure of rumors and less credible sources. The public would benefit from

information on short-term heightened earthquake probability (whether that information is

based upon qualitative expert opinion or quantitative models) so that they have a more

complete understanding of regional seismicity. As such, the public should have access to this

information and the epistemic uncertainties contained within it, even when those providing the

scientifically-vetted information may not see a need for public notification.

Further, scientifically-vetted information about heightened earthquake probability is of interest

to a wide range of information users. These most obviously include emergency managers, but

also private industry, governments, residents and even visitors to the region. Each information

user has their own level of risk tolerance and specific actions they may want to take under even

low-probability conditions. To withhold information assumes that the information holder

knows better than the information users what their risk tolerance is and what information they

need in making decisions about their safety.

Increasingly, the general public’s experience with social media has created expectations that

information users have near instantaneous accesses to information. As such, the transparency

principle means that scientifically-vetted information about heightened earthquake

probabilities be provided in a manner that is both widely accessible and as timely as feasible.

The Hazard-Risk Separation Principle. “Authoritative scientific information about future

earthquake activity should be developed independently of its applications to risk assessment

and mitigation” (Jordan, Marzocchi, Michael, & Gerstenberger, 2014, p. 956).

The assessment of hazard is distinct from the assessment of risk and decisions about protective

action. While scientists monitor geophysical activity and model earthquake probabilities to

produce an assessment of the physical hazard, emergency managers have a statutory duty to

assess the associated risks. The later assessment considers who and what is exposed to the

hazard and how vulnerable each is to the negative impacts. Crucially, decisions about

protective action are rooted in economic, psychosocial, and physical realities that vary

substantially within communities and across the region. While risk assessment relies upon

hazard assessment, both should be performed by the individuals and organizations with

expertise and legal responsibility to do so.

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In terms of a regional earthquake risk communication plan, the hazard-risk separation principle

means that hazard information and public safety/protective action information should be

drafted separately and have the capability of being disseminated separately. Scientists should

not rely upon emergency managers to disseminate information about heightened earthquake

probabilities, nor should the scientific community, in their role as scientists, make statements

related to risk and protective action. Conversely, emergency managers should point the public

to scientifically-vetted sources about earthquake probability. Those responsible for safety

should not have to wait for scientific consensus before taking protective action or directing

others to do so. 9

Coordination should respect the unique roles, knowledge, and duties of each, while also

helping to amplify and support the message of the other.

Timely, Accurate, and Actionable Communication. Communication about earthquake risk,

specifically heightened earthquake probability, will be most effective if it is timely, accurate,

and actionable. A plan that creates a significant delay in communication may mean the

recipients receive information after it is no longer useful; yet, a message that is timely, but

inaccurate may result in false alarms or ineffective protective actions. A regional

communication plan needs to balance speed with accuracy, ensuring that the public receives

scientifically-vetted hazard information, and receives it quickly. However, hazard information

alone may leave many recipients wondering what, if anything, they should do about a

heightened earthquake probability. As such, communication needs to include (either as a

separate or bundled message) clear statements of action. Actions may include statements of

where to get further information, when to expect more information, or specific protective

actions individuals, households, or organizations should take immediately.

Flexibility. The Cascadia region has significant seismic hazard, yet the most notable regional

hazard is a fault that has had little to no seismic activity, other than reoccurring swarms off

Newport, Oregon, since modern instrumentation began. Any unusual activity on the CSZ,

including a large earthquake, would be unprecedented. A regional communication plan is

unlikely to be able to fully consider possible scenarios and contingencies where coordinated

communication may be desired. As such, the plan needs to be flexible so actors can adapt the

procedural guidelines to meet a range of novel situations.

Adaptiveness. The need for regional communication is likely to occur very infrequently. Years,

even decades, may pass between unusual activity on the CSZ or other faults of regional

significance. A plan used infrequently may become forgotten or obsolete. For the plan to

9 Notably, the majority of project participants voted against members of a deliberative body independently disseminating information. They most preferred deliberative outcomes being sent to emergency management, which would then add public safety content and distribute; centrally posting deliberative outcomes was also supported. However, several scientists in the workshop and in surveys were adamant that they should not be “muzzled” by emergency management protocol. The plan outlined here seeks to follow both the transparency principle and the hazard-risk separation principle in a way that also addresses emergency management’s concern of being “blindsided” earthquake forecasting.

26

remain relevant and effective, especially in rapidly evolving situations like a major earthquake,

it needs to be practiced and adapted to the changing realities of the region.

4.3 Recommendation 3: Scope of Activity Coordinated earthquake risk communication should be established for a limited number of scenarios.

Two of these broad scenarios are:

Seismic activity in the CSZ

Unusual fault activity

Both a seismic event and unusual fault activity on the CSZ warrant coordinated communication and are

strongly supported by project participants.

In these cases, the public would seek situational information from whatever sources they could find. The

public would benefit from having a consistent, authoritative, and vetted source that could explain short-

term heightened earthquake probability in the context of long-term seismic hazard. Regional

coordination around earthquake risk communication could ensure a standardized approach to

describing short-term heightened earthquake probability (e.g. identical or complementary timeframes,

magnitudes, spatial extents, and formats for stating probabilities throughout the region). While

protective action information would need to be tailored to state/provincial and local contexts, regional

coordination would ensure that communication about protective action used common language to help

avoid confusion and support message convergence across and within the affected jurisdictions.

Coordinated communication in these two scenarios should have both 1) established criteria for initiation

and 2) the ability to initiate coordination in novel situations. In the first case, geophysical thresholds

should be established as triggers for coordinated communication.10 The second case allows for the

flexibility needed to trigger coordinated communication even when activity does not exceed established

thresholds. Such flexibility may be needed as scientists may not be able to agree upon a threshold for

some cases of unusual activity. Combinations or geophysical activity may also cause scientists to be

concerned, even before any one activity reaches an established threshold.

In addition to the two geophysical scenarios above, regionally coordinated earthquake risk

communication should also be established for:

Earthquake “prediction” evaluation

While currently an unlikely scenario, it is possible that a deterministic earthquake prediction could be

issued by a scientific or amateur source for the CSZ or other fault of regional significance. A formal

procedure for evaluating and issuing public statements about the merits of such predictions would help

ensure that widespread belief in a baseless prediction does not emerge. Coordinated communication

would help contextualize the geophysical aspects of such predictions and provide a formal means of

10 Because northern California is part of the Cascadia region, CEPEC’s threshold for issuing rapid assessments — an M≥5 event or three or more closely spaced, closely timed M≥3.5 events — should be taken into account when determining a threshold for the region.

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connecting said predictions with protective action recommendations vetted by emergency managers,

were a future “prediction” to have some element of scientific merit. Project participants moderately

supported coordination for earthquake “prediction” evaluations.

Finally, regional coordination for earthquake risk communication should be established to:

Support public understanding of automated earthquake forecasting

With USGS planning to roll out automated aftershock forecasting in the Cascadia region in the near

term, project participants strongly supported regional coordination around this new form of earthquake

risk communication. Coordination would provide additional earthquake risk communication, following

shortly after the automated aftershock forecast. This coordinated communication would provide

information users with the information they needed to better understand the aftershock forecast. For

example, the aftershock forecast could be followed by brief summaries of the long-term seismic hazard,

how automated forecasts are produced, why they are important, and specific protective actions are

recommended.

4.4 Recommendation 4: Council Organization and Membership A formal deliberative body for coordinating regional earthquake risk communication is strongly

supported by project participants. Such a deliberative body needs to have both regional representation

and statutory authority for performing under the scope of Section 4.3 , and a membership that has the

expertise to do so. Such a deliberative body should also ensure that hazard assessment is separated

from risk assessment and public safety communication. Both components are discussed separately

below:

4.4.1 Hazard Assessment through NEPEC subcommittee No existing body meets all three criteria. State/provincial level natural resource organizations and

emergency management organizations have authority only in their jurisdictions. CREW is an

organization that spans the Cascadia region and has representation from both emergency management

and geophysical scientists. While CREW is well respected, it is a volunteer coalition. No state/province or

federal government has given it statutory responsibility to assess short-term earthquake probability,

evaluate predictions, or issue public safety recommendations; to the contrary, those legal

responsibilities rest with the geological and emergency management organizations of each

state/province. At the federal level, the USGS has statutory responsibility for issuing timely earthquake

warnings in the United States, per the U.S. Stafford Act of 1978. Such authority does not include British

Columbia and does not address the public safety content necessary for actionable risk communication.

The prospects of creating a new deliberative body, or of giving CREW appropriate statutory authority,

are daunting. Each state/provincial government would have to enact separate legislation giving the new

deliberative body authority within their jurisdiction and prescribing the roles and responsibilities of it

vis-à-vis other government entities.

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Based upon the current lack of an appropriate deliberative body, the following recommendations are

made:

The U.S. National Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (NEPEC), under the U.S.

Geological Survey, should form a sub-committee11 with responsibility for evaluating

predictions and issuing warnings within the Cascadia region of Washington, Oregon and

Northern California.

The NEPEC sub-committee should be referred to as the North Pacific Earthquake Evaluation

Council (NorPEEC).12 This name provides a well-recognized geographical reference —one that is

not specific to either the U.S. or Canada — and provides some continuity with NEPEC and

CEPEC. It does, however, remove the word “prediction” from the title as many project

participants were uncomfortable with that term and the inaccurate implication that the

council’s primary focus would be on predicting earthquakes.

NorPEEC should include representatives from British Columbia Geological Survey as ex officio

members invited to attend and participate in council deliberations. Were there to be an

instance that council members needed to vote, these ex officio members vote could be tallied

as an advisory vote.

The NorPEEC subcommittee members should be appointed by the USGS Director, in

consultation with the state/provincial chief geologists. The membership should consist of:

o USGS representatives (2) 13

o Washington state representatives (3)

o Oregon state representatives (3)

o Northern California state representatives (2)14

o British Columbia representatives, ex officio (2)

o Chair of the Earthquake Risk Communication subcommittee (described below), observer

Each member of the subcommittee should be appointed for a 5-year term. Term appointments

should be staggered to allow for council continuity. The chair of the council should be

appointed by the USGS Director and be one of the USGS representatives. The chair should

report to the USGS Director as the entity with statutory responsibility for issuing earthquake

warnings in the U.S.

11 Importantly, NEPEC has authority to establish sub-committees without first seeking Congressional authorization and such a sub-committee would have statutory authority for issuing earthquake “predictions” and earthquake “advisories” for Washington, Oregon, and Northern California, per public law 96-472, amending the Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act of 1977. 12Alternatively, the geographic term could shift to be the Cascadia Region Earthquake Evaluation Council (CREEC). To be perfectly consistent with CEPEC, the subcommittee could be titled the Cascadia Region Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (CREPEC) is a possibility. Other suggestions have focused on the messaging component of the council’s work: Cascadia Region Earthquake Messaging Council (CREMC) or the North Pacific Earthquake Messaging Council (NorPEMC). However, because the council proposed here focuses on assessing hazard as part of a hazard-risk separation principle, the description of earthquake evaluation used in the originally proposed title may be most appropriate. 13 Appointment of the chair of NEPEC to the NorPEEC subcommittee would help ensure coordination between the two bodies and would streamline reporting from NorPEEC to both NEPEC and the USGS Director. 14 Appointment of the chair of CEPEC to the NorPEEC committee would help ensure coordination between the two councils.

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NorPEEC should, at minimum, meet twice a year (physically or conference call) to review the

emerging research on Cascadia Region seismicity, review and revise procedures as needed, and

to review coordination with a corollary committee, described in Section 6.4.2 Coordinated Risk

and Public Safety Communication: CREW Subcommittee, focused on coordinated earthquake

risk messaging.

The USGS should provide NorPEEC with part-time administrative support, through the

appointment of a NorPEEC executive secretary, and funds/technical support for conference

calls.

The responsibilities of NorPEEC should be to:

o Assess the implications of seismic activity or other unusual geophysical activity

that may have implications for heightened earthquake probability in the

Cascadia region and provide the USGS Director with a summary statement

o Regularly review monitoring and earth science research related to Cascadia

seismicity

o At the request of the USGS Director, provide an evaluation of earthquake

predictions or other scientific data related to the Cascadia region

o Coordinate with the CREW Earthquake Risk Communication (ERC)

subcommittee on Earthquake Risk Communication to develop public outreach

messages on long-term seismicity, earthquake forecasting, and other relevant

topics

o (Long term) In collaboration with NorPEEC, develop a coordinated system of

earthquake risk alert levels, with corresponding recommended protective

actions for emergency management, gov’t, and other decision makers, including

general public. CEPEC’s alert levels protocol for 3-day probabilities of a major

earthquake of M≥7 are: D (0.1-1%), C (1-5%), B (5-25%), and A (>25%). While it

may be much more difficult, if not impossible, to categorize heightened

earthquake probability in the Cascadia region with quantitative probabilities at

this time, NorPEEC could develop a similar alert scale corresponding to

qualitative risk terms like slight, medium, high, and eminent. ERC could then

develop standard protective actions or readiness recommendations for each

level.

Organized in this way, the NorPEEC subcommittee provides a formalized structure for coordinated

hazard assessment. It also remains purposefully similar to the existing informal coordination among

geophysical scientists to evaluate and understand unusual fault activity in the Cascadia region. However,

it ensures fuller representation of all jurisdictions and direct coordination with NEPEC, the body with

legal responsible for issuing warnings.

4.4.2 Coordinated Risk and Public Safety Communication: CREW Subcommittee While NorPEEC will provide coordinated assessments of seismic hazard in the Cascadia region, better

coordination of risk assessment and public safety information will also support more effective regional

earthquake risk communication.

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Public safety communication is the statutory responsibility the emergency management organizations,

vested to them by the state/provincial governments. Risk assessment and public safety information are

highly context-specific. What is at risk and what protective actions should be taken, and who should take

them will vary based upon geography, organizational structure, economics, and psychosocial factors. As

such, communicating a single public safety message is inappropriate.

Coordination of the public safety message needs to reinforce key, overarching messages and avoid

unnecessary conflicting information, while still ensuring that each jurisdiction is able to rapidly provide

contextualized public safety information at the state/provincial and local levels. The goal of coordination

is not to produce identical earthquake risk communication. Rather, coordination needs to support a

convergence of message content about the hazard and the actions recipients of the messages should

take to protect themselves and their communities. When scientific and protective action claims form

multiple sources have overlapping and convergent claims, the validity of these claims is strengthened;

where these claims focus on protective action, claims that the information user values highly, they are

more likely to be trusted and acted upon (Herovic, Sellnow, & Anthony, 2014).

To ensure message convergence, regional authorities should ensure they have a common terminology

and explore having a common set of public safety recommendations to use during a rapidly evolving

situation. Messages to specific information users and to specific geographic areas will necessarily differ,

but common terms and broad convergence on general public safety recommendations will reinforce and

amplify earthquake risk communication, improving its effectiveness.

CREW, as a regional organization representing all states/provinces of Cascadia and a range of relevant

expertise, is in a unique position to support voluntary coordination of public safety message content.

Earthquake program managers from all state/provincial jurisdictions, as well as structural engineers,

preparedness and other specialists are represented on its board of directors. As such, the following

recommendations are made:

CREW should form an Earthquake Risk Communication (ERC) subcommittee with the

responsibility for reviewing, coordinating, and developing template content on earthquake

protective actions for individuals, households, businesses, industry, and government

organizations.

Members of the ERC subcommittee should include:

o Washington state earthquake program manager, or designated representative

o Oregon state geologic hazards program manager, or designated representative

o California state earthquake program officer, or designated representative

o British Columbia seismic specialist, emergency management British Columbia

o Risk communication specialist — social scientist

o Risk communication specialist — public information officer

o Structural engineer

o Earth scientists (2) (ideally, representatives from NorPEEC for better coordination)

o FEMA earthquake mitigation representative

o Public Safety Canada earthquake mitigation representative

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The responsibilities of the ERC subcommittee should be to:

o Review and ensure earthquake common language for earthquake protective action

communication

o Develop complementary language and templates to support message convergence

across regional state/provincial communication for situations like:

NorPEEC in deliberation

Immediately following earthquake

Heightened probability of earthquake

NorPEEC evaluation of earthquake predication

Immediately following an automated earthquake forecast

Immediately following an earthquake early warning ShakeAlert15

o Test effectiveness of risk communication language and presentation

o Coordinate with NorPEEC to develop public outreach messages on long-term seismicity,

earthquake forecasting, and other relevant topics

o (Long term) In collaboration with NorPEEC, develop coordinated system of earthquake

risk alert levels, with corresponding recommended protective actions for emergency

management, gov’t, and other decision makers, including general public. CEPEC’s alert

levels protocol for 3-day probabilities of a major earthquake of M≥7 are: D (0.1-1%), C

(1-5%), B (5-25%), and A (>25%). While it may be much more difficult, if not impossible,

to categorize heightened earthquake probability in the Cascadia region with

quantitative probabilities at this time, NorPEEC could develop a similar alert scale

corresponding to qualitative risk terms like slight, medium, high, and eminent. ERC

could then develop standard protective action or readiness recommendations for each

level.

4.5 Recommendation 5: Coordination The two recommended committees — the NorPEEC and ERC — should be independent, but collaborate

together to support the state/provincial entities responsible for issuing public safety warnings.

During rapidly evolving situations of unusual fault activity or when asked to evaluate an earthquake

prediction, NorPEEC should report, through NEPEC, to the USGS Director with a summary of their

deliberations. The USGS Director should immediately inform state/provincial government of NorPEEC

deliberations and, as desired, advise the state/provincial governments on whether to issue earthquake

advisories or public information statements to the public. Each state should use their existing

notification systems and procedures to notify local emergency management, local governments, special

facilities, and the general public.

State/provincial emergency management (earthquake program officers and public information officers)

should voluntarily inform each other of any notifications their organizations are releasing, and as

appropriate, use common language and templates developed through the ERC committee.

15 Though outside the scope of this project, regional coordination will likely need to expand to include earthquake early warning communication. As with automated earthquake forecasts, the public will need to be educated prior to early warning being widely available. The ERC subcommittee is in a good position to provide regional coordination of this form of communication.

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Separately, USGS should ensure transparent hazard assessment by providing NorPEEC assessment and

evaluative information to the public via a website and/or other notification platforms. Individual

members of NorPEEC should also be free to disseminate information about short-term changes to

earthquake probability through media contacts and social media platforms. To ensure that NorPEEC

deliberations can be candid, NorPEEC members should refrain from attributing specific statements

made during NorPEEC deliberations.

Emergency managers have noted that it is challenging for them to provide public safety information if

they learn of changes to short-term earthquake probability through calls from the public and media. To

support their statutory role in providing public safety information, the following procedures could be

instituted:

At the initiation of NorPEEC deliberation, the USGS Director could notify state/provincial

emergency managers, and through them, local emergency managers that deliberation on issue

X has been initiated and the USGS Director will inform state/provincial authorities at the

completion of these deliberations. Such notifications would allow public information officers to

response to media requests with statements about waiting for NorPEEC findings. Emergency

managers would also begin preparing localized public safety statements to accompany

communication about short-term heightened earthquake risk.

USGS would slightly delay posting summary findings of NorPEEC deliberations to allow the USGS

Director to notify states/provinces and allow them to rapidly send out advisories or public

information statement notifications. This process assumes that state/provincial authorities have

worked with ERC and already have appropriate template language for such notifications.

The ERC subcommittee, in contrast to NorPEEC, should primarily work on improving and coordinating

earthquake risk communication about short-term heightened earthquake probability prior to any such

events. The ERC should provide state/provincial authorities — for example, earthquake program

officers, governors/premiers, and public information officers — with templates that can be rapidly filled

in and used when NorPEEC notifies them of short-term heightened earthquake probabilities or findings

from other types of deliberations. ERC should also use the CREW website and social media resources to

help educate the public about short-term earthquake forecasts and their value and their epistemic

uncertainties in the Cascadia region. ERC should work with social scientists to test the effectiveness of

risk communication language used in templates and user preferences regarding message presentation

and platform.

During a rapidly evolving situation, such as following a major earthquake or unusual fault activity, ERC

should use its website, social media and direct contact with reporters to amplify messages from

NorPEEC/USGS and state/provincial authorities regarding earthquake hazard, risk and protective

actions. They should support such communication with contextual background information that has

been previously developed and, as needed, in response to the evolving situation. This sort of

coordinated support of earthquake risk communication will be important in rapidly evolving situation, as

well as in the event that automated aftershock forecasting and early warning systems are initiated in the

region.

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, above, provides a schematic overview of the proposed earthquake risk communication plan.

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4.6 Recommendation 6: Procedural Guidelines Detailed procedural guidelines should be developed to cover a range of scenarios where short-term

earthquake risk communication is likely to be needed. The following sub-sections provide broad

recommendations for the three scenarios for which project participants indicated moderate or strong

support.

4.6.1 Earthquake Alert Procedures Earthquake alert procedures should cover scenarios of unusual fault activity of regional concern. These

situations may include seismic activity on the CSZ plate interface, slow slips on major faults, measurable

ground deformation on shallow crustal faults, changes in shallow seismicity patterns, and increased

rates of moderate and larger intraplate earthquakes.

Initiation

NorPEEC chair calls for council deliberation when fault activity in the Cascadia region exceeds

designated thresholds (previously determined by NorPEEC), when NorPEEC members believe an

assessment is warranted, or at the request of the USGS Director.

NorPEEC chair and administrative assistant notify council members and rapidly organize a

conference call as soon as possible with as many council members as can be assembled.

NorPEEC chair and administrative assistant notify designated state/provincial authorities (e.g.

office of the governor/premier, head of emergency management, and/or earthquake program

leads) of the nature and time of deliberation initiation. Such authorities may choose to notify

local authorities at their discretion.

Deliberation

NorPEEC members discuss unusual activity and implications for heightened short-term

earthquake probability. As needed, members seek out additional information or experts and

reconvene.

NorPEEC chair drafts a summary statement of the deliberation and circulates for council

approval. To aid rapid dissemination, such statements should adhere to a standardized template

developed in collaboration with ERC and state/provincial authorities so that it includes, for

example:

o Date/Time

o Location, magnitude and nature of unusual activity

o Qualitative/Quantitative statement about short-term probability of additional activity,

with description of its time, location, magnitude and nature

o Statement of uncertainties

o Statement contextualizing short-term probability (comparison to long-term probability;

as appropriate, statement that an earthquake is unlikely despite change in short-term

forecast)

o Who was notified

o When and how situation will be reassessed

o Where to look when seeking additional information

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Dissemination

NorPEEC chair delivers summary statement to chair of NEPEC who delivers it to the USGS

Director. (If the NorPEEC and NEPEC chair are the same person, delivery will be expedited.)

The USGS Director notifies state/provincial authorities (designated by each state/province) via

direct message. A conference call is initiated as needed. In addition to the NorPEEC statement,

the Director indicates whether he/she would advise the states/province to issue an earthquake

advisory or information statement.

Each state/provincial authority decides whether to initiate notification procedures within their

jurisdiction. As appropriate, state/provincial authorities use templates developed through ERC in

crafting their earthquake risk communication. The templates help ensure consistent, non-

conflicting hazard assessment information and common terminology in localized content about

risk and recommended protective actions.

USGS posts summary statement of NorPEEC deliberations to public site.

At end of short-term heightened earthquake probability timeframe, or as new unusual fault

activity occurs, NorPEEC reconvenes to update statement.

At end of period, USGS notifies state/provincial authorities of advisory cancelation and posts

cancelation to public site.

4.6.2 Prediction Evaluation Procedures In an unlikely event that a scientific or amateur earthquake prediction is announced, the USGS Director

may request that NorPEEC evaluate the merits of the prediction. Such a scenario is unlikely to require

the same speed an earthquake alert procedure needs. Predictions may arouse strong public emotions.

Without a transparent and publicized evaluation process, rumors may flourish. As such, procedures for

earthquake prediction evaluations should be as transparent as possible.

Initiation

USGS Director requests NorPEEC evaluation of an earthquake prediction made for the Cascadia

region.

NorPEEC chair and administrative assistant notify council members and organize a public

meeting in the Cascadia region. The public meeting is schedule as soon as at least half of

members can assemble and review the material.

NorPEEC administrative assistant announces the meeting time and location to the media,

state/provincial authorities. The author(s) of the prediction are invited.

Deliberation

NorPEEC chair convenes public meeting, allowing prediction authors to present prediction and

evidence for prediction. Council members and the general public are allowed to question the

authors. As needed, the NorPEEC chair may announce a close-door session for further internal

discussion among council members, but must announce a summary of the internal discussion

after the meeting is reopened.

NorPEEC administrative assistant takes meeting minutes.

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Following the meeting, the NorPEEC chair drafts a summary statement of the meeting and

circulates for council approval. Such statements should adhere to a standardized template

developed in collaboration with ERC and state/provincial authorities so that it includes, for

example:

o Date/Time

o Prediction and evidence author(s) provided to support it

o Uncertainties and other evidence presented during open meeting

o NorPEEC evaluation statement of either:

Prediction is not considered valid, or

Prediction is considered valid, with additional information on:

Qualitative/Quantitative statement about short-term probability of

additional activity, with description of its time, location, magnitude and

nature

Statement of uncertainties

Short statement contextualizing short-term probability (comparison to

long-term probability; as appropriate, statement that an earthquake is

unlikely, despite change in short-term forecast, etc.)

o Who was notified

o Where to look when seeking additional information

Dissemination

NorPEEC chair delivers summary statement to chair of NEPEC who delivers it to the USGS

Director. (If the NorPEEC and NEPEC chair are the same person, delivery will be expedited.)

The USGS Director notifies state/provincial authorities (designated by each state/province) via

direct message. A conference call is initiated as needed. In addition to the NorPEEC statement,

the Director indicates whether he/she would advise the states/province to issue an earthquake

advisory or information statement.

Each state/provincial authority decides whether to initiate notification procedures within their

jurisdiction. As appropriate, state/provincial authorities use templates developed through ERC in

crafting their earthquake risk communication. The templates help ensure consistent, non-

conflicting hazard assessment information and common terminology in localized content about

risk and recommended protective actions.

USGS posts summary statement of NorPEEC evaluation to public site.

4.6.3 Support for Automated Earthquake Forecasting Procedures In the event that aftershock forecasting becomes operational in the Cascadia region, a modified

earthquake alert procedure may be warranted.

The USGS may want to consider a rapid review of Cascadia region aftershock forecasts by a subset of

NorPEEC scientists, especially scientist with in-depth knowledge of the Cascadia fault systems. If

possible, this subset of NorPEEC should converse within minutes of the automated forecast being

generated. They should rapidly discuss whether there is any reason to distrust the forecast and

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immediately advise the USGS Director and/or designee as to whether they recommend releasing the

forecast, and if not, their reservations. Ultimate authority for release would remain with the Director.

Following the issuing of automated aftershock forecast:

NorPEEC should meet and, as appropriate, draft an extended explanation of the seismic

activities and the specific justifications and uncertainties associated with the aftershock

forecast. They should follow earthquake alert procedures.

State/Provincial authorities should push out advisory notifications, based upon templates

developed previously with ERC, that recommends specific mitigation, preparedness, and

readiness actions for their jurisdictions. Local authorities should adapt and push out to local

jurisdictions as appropriate.

ERC should push out via web, social media, and interviews, existing public outreach materials

that explain earthquake forecasting, background seismicity, and general protective action

measures. ERC should engage with the public as appropriate to address concerns and amplify

NorPEEC and state/provincial earthquake advisory statements.

4.7 Recommendation 7: Training and Evaluation ERC, as a subcommittee of CREW, should support (though not carry out) the coordinated training,

drilling and evaluation of regional earthquake risk communication for short-term heightened

earthquake probability. One strategy would be to use the regional ShakeOut events as a date each year

to practice earthquake risk communication procedures. ERC could request that NorPEEC draft scenario

statements and ERC could work with designated state/provincial authorities to conduct a tabletop drill

considering how each jurisdiction and CREW would respond to the statement. Over time, local

authorities, private sector and other information users would be invited to participate in order to seek

feedback and revise message content, format or communication procedures.

38

5 Next Steps Below are several next steps that can be taken by a number of regional actors to further regional

earthquake risk coordination around short-term heightened earthquake probability. They are broad and

should be revised as the process of implementation causes new issues and constraints to arise.

Preliminary Actions

Present recommendations to USGS and NEPEC for review and comment.

Initiate discussion with state/provincial authorities and establish points of contact, and MOUs.

Recommend scientists for NorPEEC membership. Formally establish council in NEPEC bylaws.

Recommend members for ERC subcommittee. Formally establish subcommittee according to

CREW procedures.

NorPEEC

To the degree possible, establish thresholds for unusual fault activity that should trigger

NorPEEC deliberations

Develop templates for summary statements of deliberations on unusual activity

Develop templates for summary statements on earthquake prediction

ERC subcommittee

Develop risk communication messages around regional seismicity — consider media packets,

tweets, visual aids, videos, and website content options

Develop risk communication messages around earthquake forecasting, including what it is, how

it differs from long-term probabilistic hazard assessment, what it can and cannot do, and why it

is relevant to the region. Consider multiple dissemination options, including media packets,

tweets, visual aids, videos, and website content.

Develop broad protective action recommendations for short-term heightened earthquake

probability — consider a range of information users.

Review and, as needed, develop common terminology for risk communication and protective

action in the region.

Work with social scientists to evaluate and revise risk communication materials.

NorPEEC and ERC subcommittee

Collaboratively develop templates for hazard and risk messages following automated

earthquake forecasting. Seek feedback from appropriate state/provincial and federal

authorities.

Seek regional input when developing the format (e.g. magnitudes of concern, timeframes of

concern, and uncertainty levels and formats) of automated earthquake forecasting messages

and provide feedback to USGS.

39

Consider the development of earthquake alert levels that can link short-term hazard assessment

with emergency management readiness levels. Reviewing the California Short-Term Earthquake

Prediction Response Plan may be a good starting point.

State/Provincial Emergency Management Organizations

Draft a list of protective actions and readiness actions for emergency management, other

government organizations/agencies, critical facilities, and the general public. As appropriate,

consider ranking these activities into those recommended for low levels of heightened risk and

those recommended for greater levels of heightened risk.

Develop earthquake risk communication templates for short-term heightened earthquake

probability, including recommended actions for intended recipients of the communication.

Consider communication to local emergency managers, government organizations, critical

facilities, media, and the general public. Consider a range of communication formats including

internal notifications, press releases, tweets, website content, and other social media formats.

40

6 Works Cited Blanpied, M. (2014). Evaluation and Public Dissemination of Earthquake Forecasts in the United States.

Operational Earthquake Forecasting and Decision Making (pp. 1-34). National Earthquake

Hazards Reduction Program.

Cal OES. (2016). Statement from CEPEC. Mather, CA: CalOES.

Cal OES. (n.d.). California Short-term earhtquake Prediction Response Plan. California Office of

Emergency Services.

Cal OES, C. O. (2013). California Cascadia Subduction Zone Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan.

FEMA.

CREW. (2011). History of Earthquakes in Cascadia. Retrieved from Cascadia Region Earthquake

Workgroup : http://www.crew.org/earthquake-information/history-of-earthquakes-in-cascadia

Field, E. H., Jordan, T. H., Jones, L. M., Michael, A. J., & Blanpied, M. L. (2016). The Potential Uses of

Operational Earthquake Forecasting. Siesmological Research Letters, 313- 322.

Goldfinger, C. (2012). Turbidite Event History- Methods and Implications for Holocene Paleoseismicity of

the Cascadia Subduction Zone. Reston, VA: United States Geological Survey.

Gomberg, J., Atwater, B., Beeler, N., Bodin, P., Davis, E., Frankel, A., . . . Whitmore, P. (2015). Earthquake

Forewarning in the Cascadia Region. USGS Open File Report 2015-1151.

Herovic, E., Sellnow, T., & Anthony, K. (2014). Argumentation and Advocacy: Risk Communication as

Interacting Arguments: Viewing the L'Aquila Earthquake Disaster Through the Message

Convergence Framework. The Journal of the American Forensic Association, 73- 86.

Jordan, T., Marzocchi, W., Michael, A., & Gerstenberger, M. (2014). Operational Earthquake Forecasting

can Enhance Earthquake Preparednes. Seismological Research Letters, 85(5), 955-959.

Jordan.et.al, T. (2014). Operational Earthquake Forecasting Can Enhance Earethquake Preparedness.

Seismological Research Letters Volume 85, Number 5, 955-959.

Jordan.et.al. (2011). Operational Earthquake Forecasting- State of Knowledge and Guidelines for

Utilization. Annals of Geophysics, 356- 359.

Milleti, D. (1999). Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States.

Washington, DC: John Henry Press.

PNSN. (2016, April 06). Cascadia Subduction Zone. Retrieved from Pacific Northwest Seismic Network.

Roeloff, E. (2016). Comments During Review Process.

Roeloffs, E., & Goltz, J. (2016). The California Earthquake Advisory Plan: A History. Seismological

Research Lettersq, under review.

41

USGS. (2016, December 15). Earthquake Hazards Program. Retrieved from Search Earthquake Catalog:

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/

Wein, A., Potter, S., Johal, S., Doyle, E., & Becker, J. (2016). Communiccating with the public during an

earthquake sequence: Improving communication of geoscience by coordinating roles.

Seismological Research Letters, 87(1), 112-118.

Workshops. (2016). Cascadia Regional Earthquake Risk Communication Workshop. Plenary Discussions.

Seattle, WA and Salem, OR: The Resilience Institute.

42

7 Appendices

7.1 Appendix A. List of Participants and Involvement

Last Name First Name Title

Invite

d

Particip

ated

in an

y way

Surve

y 1

Surve

y 2

Particip

ated

in an

y

surve

y

Wo

rksho

p W

A

Wo

rksho

p O

R

1 o

r mo

re w

orksh

op

(s)

Me

etin

g CA

Inte

rview

s

Allen Trevor Earthquake Hazards Seismologist- Natural Resources Canada

X X X X X X

Anderson Peter Associate Professor- Simon Fraser University

X

Anderson Scott Energy/ Utilities Engineer- Utilities and Transportation Commission

X

Ash Cale Principal- Degenkolb Engineers X X X X

Ashford Scott Dean- College of Engineering- Oregon State Uni.

X

Bailey Danielle Disability Integration Specialist- FEMA Region X

X X X X X X X X

Barbosa Andre Assistant Professor- Oregon State Uni. X X X X

Barrett Denise Administrator- Regional Disaster Preparedness Org.

X X X X

Barry Alexis Tribal Administrator- Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians

X X X X

Baxter Jamie Emerg. Operations Coordinator- Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde- Tribal Police Department

X X X X X X

Biasco Tamra Risk Analysis Branch Chief- FEMA Region X

X

Bird Alison Earthquake Seismologist- Natural Resources Canada

X

Birkeland Paul Electricity Reliability (General)- Public Utility Commission

X X X X X X X

Black Julie All Hazards Planner- Oregon Health Authority

X X X X

Blanpied Michael Associate Program Coordinator- USGS X

Bodin Paul PNSN Network Manager X X X X X X

Bostrom Ann Weyerhaeuser Endowed Professor in Environmental Policy

X X X X

Brown Tiffany Emergency Manager- Clatsop County X

Brown Tiffany Clatsop County Emergency Manager X X X X

Bruno Laura Regional Disaster Preparedness Organization (RDPO) Project Coordinator

X X X X

Calzada Manuel Tsunami Program Coordinator- WA EMD

X

Carby Shawn Exec. Director, EM Unit- Ministry of Health

X

43

Cardwell Michael Community Services Director- Quinault Indian Nation

X

Carter Rick Emergency Preparedness, Disaster Response Management- Public Utility Commission (Critical Infrastructure Preparedness)

X

Cassidy John EQ Seismologist- Natural Resources Canada

X

Clague John Professor and Shrum Chair- Simon Fraser University

X

Cook Linda Lane County Emergency Manager X X X X X

Cope Ian Communications Director- Grays Harbor PUD

X

Corcoran Patrick Coastal Natural Hazards Specialist- Oregon Sea Grant

X X X X X X

Cox Dale Program Manager- USGS X

Cox Daniel Civil and Construction Engineering Professor- Oregon State Uni.

X X X X

Cramer Lori Associate Sociology Professor- Oregon State Uni.

X X X X

Dangler Lori Tsunami , Earthquake, Geophysics, Natural Hazard Mitigation Researcher- Humboldt State Uni.

X X X

DeNoyer Ryan Research Assistant- The Resilience Institute

X X X X X X

Depew Tracy Emergency Management Director- Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indians

X X X X

Deyerin Marcus Training and Exercise Coordinator- King County

X

Dixon Maximilian Earthquake Program Manager- WA EMD

X X X X X X X X

Doughton Sandi Science Reporter- Seattle Times X

Douthit Dan Public Information Manager- Portland X X X X X X X

Dubray Brian Tribal Police Lieutenant- Confederated Tribes of Coos- Lower Umpqua- Siuslaw

X X X X

Dugaw Monique Communications Director- American

Red Cross X

Dziak Robert NOAA/PMEL X X X X

Eble Marie NOAA Oceanographer- Tsunami Program

X

Ek-Collins Greg Emer. Prep, Chair- Oregon DOT X

Firman Alice Consumer Protection Manager- Utilities and Transportation Commission

X

Flick Ed Emergency Manager- Marion County X X X X

Frankel Arthur Affiliate Professor- Uni. Washington X X X X X X X

Friederich Steven Digital Media Coordinator, Washington Military Dept.

X X X X X X

Fritts Stephanie Chief Deputy- Pacific County X X X X X X X X

Gargett John LEPC Coordinator- Whatcom County X X X X

Gee Lind Director of CISN, northern and central CA- USGS

X

Goldfinger Chris Geology and Geophysics Professor- Oregon State Uni.

X

Gomberg Joan Research Geophysicist X X X X X X X X

44

Gulacsik Gala Regional Earthquake Program Manager at FEMA

X X X X X X X

Hansen Alison Communications Director X X X X X

Hardebeck Jeanne Research Geophysicist X X X X X X

Harryman Mike Interim Director of Emergency Operations- Oregon Health Authority

X X X X X X X

Hazzard Pat Director, Safety and Consumer Protection- Utilities and Transportation Commission

X

Hennessy Kevin Chief of Pipeline Safety- Oregon Public Utility Commision

X

Hickson Catherine Scientist- Uni. British Columbia X

Higgins Kevin Emergency Manager- Benton County X

Hildebrandt Colleen Social Media Unit- Emergency Management British Columbia

X X X X X X

Holm Morgan Senior Vice President and Chief Content Officer- Oregon Public Broadcasting

X X X X X X X

Hudnut Ken Research Geophysicist- USGS X

Ike Ryan External Affairs Officer- FEMA Region 10

X X X X X X

Jahn Ed Contributor- Oregon Public Broadcasting

X

Jones Larry Director, Resource Information X

Jones Russ Deputy Auditor General of British Columbia

X

Journeay Murray Research Scientist X

Kanamori Hiroo Director, Seismological Lab- Caltech X

Kao Honn Seismologist — research scientist X

Kaplan Alysha MRR Unit Manager- WA EMD X

Kneaper Bradley Chief Law Enforcement Officer- Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians

X

Lafevre Scott Chief of Police- Coquille Indian Tribe X

Lanni Dori Emergency Services Manager- Humboldt County

X X X

Latta Thomas Director of Operations- Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians

X

Leith Bill Senior Science Advisor for Earthquake and Geologic Hazards- Central Washington Uni.

X

Lindell Mike Affiliate Prof, Urban Design and Planning- Uni. Washington

X

Loehr Michael Chief of Emergency Preparedness and Response- WA State Department of Health (DOH)

X

Long Kate EQ and Tsunami Program Deputy- Cal OES

X X X X X

Ludwig Kristin Staff Scientist- USGS X X X X X X

Madin Ian Chief Scientist- DOGAMI X X X X

Malone Steve Emeritus Seismology, Tectonics, and Hazards Research Professor- Uni. Washington

X X X X X

Marshall Ken Senior Emergency Management Officer X

45

Mattson Jim Outreach Coordinator- Simpson Strong Ties

X

McCaffrey Julianne Manager, Issues and Media Management- Emergency Management British Columbia

X

McCourt Patricia Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada

X X X X X X

McCoy Cynthia Risk Analysis GIS/ HAZUS- FEMA Region X

X

McCaw Gordon Director- Tillamook County Emergency Management

X X X X X X X

McCarty Jennifer Online Communications Officer- Emergency Management British Columbia

X

Meets Andrew Geoscientist- Oregon State Uni. X X X X X X X

Melbourne Timothy Head of the Pac. NW geodetic Array X

Michael Andy Research Geophysicist- USGS X X X X X X X X

Miller Kevin Tsunami Program Lead- Cal OES X X X X X X X X

Moore Teron Business Analyst- Ocean Networks Canada

X X X X

Moran Seth Scientist-in-Charge of the USGS Cascades Volcano Observatory

X X X X X X

Mullen Jim Emergency Management NW Consulting

X X X X X X X

Negele Paula Public Info Officer- Oregon OEM X X X X

Niolini Troy Meteorologist-in-Charge- Eureka, CA National Weather Service

X X X

Norman David State Geologist- WA DNR X

Olsen Mike Associate Professor- Oregon State Uni. X

Olsen Sue Regional Manager, Emergency Management- Public Safety Canada

X X X X X X

Olson Michael Civil and Construction Engineering Professor- Oregon State Uni.

X X X X

Paci- Green Rebekah Director- Resilience Institute X X X X X X

Parish John California State Geologist X X X

Pearce Ines Senior Disaster Advisor- US Chamber of Commerce

X X X X

Phillips Lucianne Miscellaneous Admin. And Program- FEMA

X

Porter Scott Director- Washington County Emergency Management Cooperative

X X X X

Pyrch Allison Associate Geotechnical Engineer X X X X X X X X

Raskin Jay Vice- Chair- OSSPAC X X X X

Rettmann Mark Public Utility Commission- Oregon Critical Infrastructure Preparedness

X

Rizzo Althea OEM Geological Hazards Program Coordinator

X X X X

Roeloff Evelyn Researcher- USGS X X X X X X X X X

Rubin Jeff Emergency Manager- Oregon Resilience Task Force/ Tualitin Valley Fire and Rescue

X X X X X X X

Safran Elizabeth Associate Professor of Geological Science- Lewis and Clark College

X X X X X

Sawyer Dean Emergency Management Planner- National Tribal Emer. Man. Council

X

46

Schelling John Earthquake, Tsunami, and Volcano Programs Manager for the Washington State Military Department’s Emergency Management Division

X X X X X X X X

Schina Brittany Emergency Management Education Coordinator- Emergency Management British Columbia

X

Schuback Pascal Emergency Manager, Crisis Management, and Incident Operations- Seattle, WA

X X X X X

Sebok Bryan Media Studies- Lewis and Clark College X X X X

Shagren Karina Communications Director- WA EMD X

Shelby Matt DAS Communications Strategist- Oregon Dept. of Admin. Services

X X X X X

Sherrod Brian Affiliate Assistant Professor- Uni. Washington

X X X X

Shipman Lee Emergency Management Director- Shoalwater Bay Tribe

X

Sinnott Denny Department of Fisheries and Oceans X X X X

Sloman Cara OSSPAC- American Red Cross X

Steele Bill Seismology Lab Coordinator- Uni. Washington

X X X X X

Stewart Mark Communications- WA EMD X X X X X X X

Stinson Wayne Emergency Manager- Douglas County X

Terbush Brian EQ/Volcano Program Coordinator- WA EMD

X X X X X

Tomlinson Stuart Breaking News Reporter- Oregonian X X X X

Trehu Anne Director- National Science Foundation (EarthScope office)

X X X X X X

Tripp Todd Public Works Director- Coquille Indian Tribe

X

Van Der Elst Nicholas Operational EQ Forecasting Researcher- USGS

X X X X X X X

Ventura Carlos Director of the EQ Engineering Research Facility- University of British Columbia

X

Vidale John Director- PNSN X X X X X X X X

Voss Chris Director- Multnomah County X

Wallace Charles Deputy Director- Grays Harbor County Emergency Management

X X X X X X X

Wallack Larry Professor of Public Health- Oregon Department of Admin. Services

X X X X

Walsh Tim Chief Hazards Geologist- WA DNR X X X X X X

Walter Neary Public Relations- Comcast X

Wang Haizhong Assistant Professor- Oregon State Uni. X

Wang Kelin Research Scientist- Geological Survey Canada geodynamics and hazards

X

Wang Yumei Geotechnical Engineer- DOGAMI X X X X X X

Ward Erin Tribal Liaison- FEMA Region X X

Warden Steve Emergency Operations Coordinator- The Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde

X X X X

Watters Stan Utilities Stakeholder- OSSPAC X

Weed Nathan Health Emergency Manager- WA state Dept. of Health

X

47

Wein Ann Research Geographer- USGS X X X X

White Robert Seismic Specialist- Emergency Management British Columbia

X X X X X X

Wilson Jay Chair- OSSPAC X X X X X X X

Wilson Mike Deputy Regional Administrator- Cal OES

X X X

Wise cup Jayme Program Coordinator- Clallam County X

Wood Nate Research Geographer- USGS X

Yeats Robert Professor Emeritus of Geosciences- Oregon State Uni.

X

Yen Harry Distinguished Chair in Engineering X X X X

Yoshihara Grant PIO- VP Engineering X

Young Betty Transportation Planning Specialist- Utilities and Transportation Commission

X

Yu Kent Oregon Resilience Plan (ORP), founder of the SEFT Consulting Group

X

Zambrano Lynda Executive Director- Northwest Tribal Emergency Management Council

X

Total In

vitee

s

Total P

roje

ct Particip

ants

Total Su

rvey 1

Total Su

rvey 2

Total Su

rvey P

articipan

ts

Total W

A A

ttend

ees

Total O

R A

ttend

ees

Total W

orksh

op

(WA

an

d O

R)

Total C

A M

eeting

Total In

tervie

ws

159 87 41 28 51 33 46 70 10 17

48

7.2 Appendix B. Methodology Details Step 1. Survey on Existing Earthquake Messaging Context. In May 2016, the Resilience Institute

initiated engagement through an email inviting recipients to participate in a regional conversation on

coordinated earthquake risk messaging. Recipients were invited to provide initial thoughts on

earthquake risk messaging via an online survey. Of the 51 emailed and invited to participate, 41

responded to the survey.

Because the invitees spanned a range of disciplines and familiarity with earthquake risk messaging, the

online survey delineated earthquake risk messaging into three broad categories. Messaging was

assumed to include both probabilistic statements of seismic risk and recommendations regarding

protective action. The three broad categories were:

- General earthquake messaging. Messaging related to long-term, time-independent

earthquake disseminated to diverse users. This risk information is based upon well-known

scientific information about faulting characteristics, seismicity, and expected damage

through probabilistic hazard risk analysis. The wider public accesses these general

earthquake messages through hazard assessments, publications, emergency management

and preparedness websites, public events, and occasionally, news coverage.

- Advisory16 earthquake messaging. Messages rapidly prepared and purposefully

disseminated to advise decision makers about an estimated or modeled increase in

earthquake risk. Advisory messages are time-dependent, probabilistic statements that

forecast heightened risk due to recent changes in geophysical activity. Advisory messages

are meant to provide important factual information that could influence a decision maker’s

choices about immediate protective actions or to remind decision makers of the continued,

dynamic nature of seismic threat in the region.

- Earthquake early warning17 messaging. Messages triggered by the initiation of seismic

shaking and rapidly disseminated via specialized early warning systems to alert decision-

makers seconds to a minute in advance of the arrival of more damaging shaking.

16 The word “advisory” was intended to encompass a message that provided both short-term earthquake forecast information and recommendations for appropriate protective actions. The term “advisory” became problematic later in the workshop as many participants, especially emergency managers, saw the need for such earthquake messaging based upon changes in earthquake forecasts, but felt that the word “advisory” was used to connate that the recipients of the message needed to engage in immediate action, such as is the case with hurricane and severe weather advisories. While this type of earthquake messaging is analogous to NOAA advisories in some ways, the low-probability environment of earthquake forecasting was seen as being insufficient for wording as strong as “advisory.” Workshop discussions helped participants clarify this difference and led to the deliberate decision to shift towards using other terms — short-term earthquake forecasting for probabilistic statements of hazard and protective action messages based upon these forecasts. 17 While the focus of the project explicitly excluded earthquake early warning (EEW), some jurisdictions were in the process of developing or beta testing EEW. Many participants, even those who were not directly involved in EEW development and testing, were vaguely aware of its existence. We felt it was important to clearly delineate between general earthquake messaging based upon probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, messaging that was based upon short-term earthquake forecasting prior to an anticipated event, and EEW messages that would be sent out in the immediate seconds after seismic P-wave propagation.

49

For each type of messaging, survey respondents indicated whether each type of messaging existed in

their jurisdiction, and if it did, what was, and was not, working well. They were also asked what potential

problems could arise and what improvements could be made to each type of messaging. In addition to

the survey, the Resilience Institute phone interviewed 16 regional experts in seismology and related

disciplines to understand how earthquake messaging in any form tended to develop and be

disseminated. A summary of the current earthquake messaging context is provided in Section 2.2 below.

See Section 9.2 Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. for a full list of survey questions and a

summary of the responses.

Step 2. Regional Workshops. Following the survey and interviews, the Resilience Institute worked with

state/provincial emergency management earthquake hazard specialists to organize a series of

workshops or meetings. British Columbia and Washington decided to hold a joint workshop on June 27,

2016 (33 attendees) to better discuss the cross-border coordination issues. An Oregon workshop was

held on July 20, 2016 (46 attendees) with the earthquake and tsunami hazard program officers from

California Office of Emergency Services attending.

The regional workshops were intended to evoke a cross-disciplinary conversation about the need for,

opportunities and challenges of coordinated earthquake risk messaging. They also explored some of the

logistical options of coordinated earthquake risk messaging related to short-term earthquake forecasts

or heightened earthquake risk, including the content and format of messages intended for the public.

See Section 9.3 Appendix D. Summary of Workshops for detailed summary of the outcomes of these

workshops.

After unavoidable scheduling delays, a small meeting and teleconference of several California hazard

specialists and emergency management officials took place on October 27, 2016, which coincided with

activities of Step 4 described below. The California meeting was used to discuss coordinated earthquake

messages within the context of California’s own California Earthquake Prediction and Evaluation Council

(CEPEC), a body that could be a potential model for a Cascadia regional coordinating body.

See Section 9.4 Error! Reference source not found. for a full list of workshop participants.

Step 3. Early draft of an Earthquake Risk Coordination Plan and CREW Concerns.

Following an analysis of the workshop discussions, the Resilience Institute began drafting a two-part

document that included a 1) Cascadia Regional Coordinated Earthquake Message Plan and a 2)

Procedural Guidelines that laid out when a notification process would occur and the actions

organizations would then take.

This early draft of an earthquake messaging plan was based upon the California Earthquake Prediction

and Evaluation Council’s own plan and procedures, albeit adjusted to reflect the multi-jurisdictional

nature of the Cascadia Region and the challenges workshop participants had raised. The draft was then

sent to the CREW Board of Directors for their feedback. In written feedback and during a September

CREW meeting, CREW Board of Directors showed marked concerns about the draft. These concerns

included:

50

The plan was too formal and expecting local emergency managers adhere to the protocols

described, rather than offering recommendations.

The plan focused primarily on how emergency management would act after a scientifically

vetted message as created, rather than on the actions of the scientific community.

Plans focused primarily on the common threat of the Cascadia Subduction Zones, but should be

applicable to all seismic hazards in the region.

Message templates need to be developed and refined by social scientists/risk communication

experts.

The Board of Directors, based upon personal perspective as well as their assessment of the workshop

discussions, believed that there was insufficient consensus in the region to warrant the drafting of an

operational plan. Rather, some members of the Board and some workshop participants felt it was

important to explore a range of possible options, from continued status quo to highly structured

coordinated messaging. They were uncomfortable with assuming formal coordination was needed and

formalizing operational procedures.

At the CREW meeting, it was agreed that the Resilience Institute would not move forward with the

development of an operational earthquake risk communication plan that included messaging templates,

notification procedures and plans for inter-organizational coordination. Rather, the Resilience Institute

would develop a framework for the range of options for regional earthquake risk communication and

seek further input from stakeholders about whether regional coordination was desired, and if so, what

sort of coordination. The outcome would be recommendations for coordination, if broad support for

such coordination existed.

Step 4. Exploration of Regional Coordinated Earthquake Risk Communication Options

In October, the Resilience Institute developed a framework for exploring possible forms of regional

coordinated earthquake risk communication. Using the comments and discussions from the survey and

workshops of steps 2 and 3, the Institute delineated three somewhat distinct stages of regional risk

communication and from two to four options for each of these stages. The stages and their options are

listed below. For a list of advantages and disadvantages of each option, along with review comments

from project participants, see Section 9.5 Appendix E. Participant Comments on Coordinated Earthquake

Risk Communication Framework and Options

Initiation Stage. How and when coordinated earthquake risk communication begins and what

sort of events warrant such coordinated communication are important considerations of the

initiation stage. Options for initiation range from geophysical triggers identified by geo-science

experts to socio-cultural triggers initiated by emergency managers or others.

Initiation Option 1 (I1). Informal Initiation. Experts with in-depth knowledge of

Cascadia’s seismic risk individually or collectively believe that unusual circumstances

warrant coordinated discussion of earthquake risk in the Cascadia region. Such experts

51

call for the initiation of coordinated discussion about regional earthquake risk. At their

discretion, experts initiate a conference call or electronic exchange; as needed, follow-

up communication also occurs.

Initiation Option 2 (I2). Formal Initiation based upon Defined Criteria. Specific

geophysical and/or social initiations warrant specific individual experts to formally

gather to discuss the potentials, changes, and uncertainties of seismic risk within

Cascadia. A deliberative body, the membership of which is discussed in section 2.2 on

deliberation options, convenes under well, defined geo-physical and/or social

circumstances. However, one or more of the triggers for formal initiation could be

qualitative – a request for clarification by emergency management representatives, or a

request for initiation by geophysical scientists or monitoring network representatives.

Deliberation Stage. Which experts are involved in deliberating on and developing a coordinated

earthquake risk communication/message(s) are important concerns of the deliberation stage.

Alternatives range from the current, informal network to a formal, appointed Deliberative Body.

Deliberative Option 1 (Db1). No Deliberative Body. Once coordinated earthquake risk

communication is initiated, one option for deliberation would be simply to have no

deliberative body. Ad hoc deliberation among experts within their existing professional

circles would likely occur. During and following this informal discussion between

experts, the experts would likely provide information to emergency managers and

media at their discretion and through their own organizations. This alternative would be

most aligned with Initiation Option 1-Informal Initiation.

Deliberative Option 2 (Db2). Informal Deliberative Body.18 The expert community

informally identifies key institutions and individuals who should be part of deliberations

about regional earthquake risk. These institutions and individuals are not formally

appointed or bound to specific organizational charter, though they may develop

informal procedures and institutional culture. Once coordinated earthquake risk

communication has been initiated, this informal Deliberative Body of experts initiates a

deliberative procedure, such as conference call(s) and follow-up digital communications.

During their deliberations, they discuss the knowns and unknowns of regional

earthquake risk and any qualitative or quantitative changes that may have occurred. The

informal Deliberative Body concludes deliberation without seeking to develop a unified

outcome (e.g. consensus statement), though members of the body may agree upon

broad talking points.

Deliberative Option 3 (Db3). Formal Scientific Deliberative Body. The expert community

formally identifies key institutions, networks, and/or individuals who should be part of

18 The Db2 option is similar to the current approach to coordinated earthquake risk deliberation, mainly among geophysical science experts and monitoring organization, but generally limited to those within Washington and Oregon. See more in 3 Summary of Current Context.

52

formal deliberations about changes in regional earthquake risk or clarification about

existing risk. Institutions and networks appoint individuals to a formal Deliberative Body,

with care to ensure broad theoretical and geographic representation. Once coordinated

earthquake risk communication has been initiated, this formal Deliberative Body

initiates a deliberative procedure through a defined protocol, such as a series of

conference call(s), internal communications and data gathering, and/or digital

communications. During their deliberations, they discuss the knowns and unknowns of

regional earthquake risk and any qualitative or quantitative changes that may have

occurred. The formal Deliberative Body concludes deliberation by writing a formal

statement. This statement could take various forms, such as approved meeting minutes,

approved talking points, approved information statement, or consensus statement.

Deliberative Option 4 (Db4). Formal Scientific Deliberative Body with Coordinated

Finalization. Formation of a Deliberative Body and initial deliberations as in Db3. Unlike

Deliberative Option 3, the Deliberative Body does not finalize their formal statement in

isolation. Rather, the Deliberative Body coordinates with State/Provincial EM

Organizations, such as with earthquake Program Managers and/or Public Information

Officers (PIOs). The Deliberative Body provides these EM representatives with its draft

of a formal statement, allowing EM counterparts to identify areas needing further

clarification or to add public safety content related to response and readiness. Together

they finalize a coordinated formal statement, which may take the form of an approved

meeting minutes, an approved information statement, approved talking points, or a

consensus statement.

Dissemination Stage. How deliberations are shared with a broader audience and with whom

these deliberations are shared are important concerns of the dissemination stage. Options

include delivery of deliberation outcomes to emergency managers, to online platforms, or

coordinated development of talking points and/or information statements with emergency

managers. Notably, options are not mutually exclusive.

Dissemination Option 1 (Ds1). Independent Dissemination. Experts, whether part of a

Deliberative Body or not, disseminate risk information through their existing social

media, social networks, and formal communication channels. If they receive calls or

other requests for information from emergency managers, media, or public, they

choose if, when, and how to respond.

Dissemination Option 2 (Ds2). Deliberative Outcome Delivered to State/Provincial

Emergency Management Organizations. Outcomes of the deliberative stage (e.g.

talking points, approved meeting minutes, formal statements, etc.) are delivered

directly to State/ Provincial EM Organizations immediately following deliberation. EM

Organizations then use existing channels of communication and their own protocols to

disseminate updated risk information, as they see fit.

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Dissemination Option 3 (Ds3). Formal Statement, Centrally Disseminated. The chair or

other designated member of the Deliberative Body writes a formal statement(s) and

posts to a centralized information platform accessible by all, such as a website. Such a

platform may also include a means of responding to further requests for clarification

through a traditional FAQs approach or through other social media formats

In addition, the framework considered options for the membership of a Deliberative Body, if one were

desired, and the options for having formal policies for how members of a Deliberative Body

communicated with those outside the Body during the deliberation and dissemination stages.

The CREW Board of Directors was given the opportunity to review the new framework of options for the

initiation, deliberation, and dissemination, along with membership and communication options, to

provide feedback. It was then sent in an email to all project participants. Participants were asked to

review the options and provide comments on them, especially on the potential benefits and drawbacks

of each. Twenty-four participants commented on the framework options through written feedback or

one-on-one interviews conducted in October and November. For participant comments on each option,

see Section 7.5 Appendix E. Participant Comments on Coordinated Earthquake Risk Communication

Framework and Options

.

Stage 5. Expansion to Consider Coordination in conjunction with Future Automated Earthquake

Forecasting and Online Voting

In late November, the Resilience Institute reviewed comments on the communication framework and

the various options within it. They developed an online survey to allow participants to vote on the

options they favored.

The voting mechanism allowed each participant to indicate their support for or their dissent against

each option for the framework. A total of 28 participants participated in the online voting and

commenting. At the completion of the voting, participants were directed to a google document where

the Resilience Institute updated daily the tallies and comments from the voting, allowing participants to

see what others were saying and even provide additional comments.19

19 By November, a new concept of coordinated earthquake risk communication – the possibility of

deliberate, regional coordination to develop procedures and template before any need for such

communication was needed -- began to emerge. The concept emerged out participant concerns about

the speed at which a body could deliberate and develop communications. It also emerged out of the

challenges that CEPEC and California Office of Emergency Services experienced in the October 2016

Sultan Sea advisory, and, in particular, USGS’s capacity and intentions to post time-dependent

automated earthquake forecasting for broad public dissemination in the near future. Many participants

saw a need for regional coordination and regional messaging that followed automated earthquake

forecasts to contextual the forecasts and provide protective action recommendations, as appropriate.

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See Section 7.7 Appendix F. Post- Workshop Survey Results for the online voting outcomes and

comments. The voting and comments, as well as all other material from the previous stages, forms the

foundation of the recommendations for regional earthquake risk communication provided in Section 4

Recommendations.

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7.3 Appendix C. Pre-Workshop Survey Results Pre-Workshop Survey Summary, May 17, 2016

Survey Timeline:

Date Sent Surveys Sent Respondents

WA/BC May 11 27 18

OR/CA May 10 24 23

Total: 51 Total: 41

Participants State/ Province of Residence

State/ Province of Participants Responses

British Columbia 6

Washington 12

Oregon 18

California 5

Participants were asked to provide their disciplinary background(s) and area(s) of expertise to ensure

each area was well represented.

Participant Areas of Expertise

Responses

Seismology 12

Geology 7

Geodesy 3

Engineering 4

Tsunami Risk 14

Earthquake Risk 21

Hazard Mitigation 16

Response 13

Preparedness 18

Public Health 3

Emergency Management 19

Public Information 10

Risk Communication 14

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ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT GENERAL, ADVISORY AND EARLY WARNING EARTHQUAKE MESSAGING

A. General Earthquake Messaging. General public risk assessments produced and disseminated to

diverse decision-makers. This risk information is based upon broad, generally well-known scientific

information about faulting characteristics, seismicity, and expected damage. The wider public accesses

these general earthquake messages through hazard assessments, publications, emergency management

and preparedness websites, public events, and occasionally, news coverage.

In your jurisdiction, what types and quality of GENERAL earthquake messaging currently exists for

Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquakes?

Answer Choices Responses Comments

Does not exist 2

Planned, but not currently available

1

Exists, but is limited or ad hoc

14 Attempts at regional coordination are in the works, but not

as effective as desired.

Focuses around ShakeOut information

Exists and is well established

20 Some good content exists, but I would say that one has to

seek it out; the ordinary person does not encounter it as a matter of course.

Our Department works in collaboration with Province and First Nations to encourage registration on the various hazard notification systems, including earthquakes.

Currently messaging is reasonably well established however we continue to look at opportunities to improve upon the messaging

Scientists and emergency managers do a good job of developing messaging... getting people to listen is another matter altogether

There's no shortage, there's a lot of content, much of it is based on expert input, and the message is more consistent than in years past, but none of that means that it's effective.

I do not know 4 Note, I don't work in the Cascadia region and so have

limited knowledge of current messaging there.

Most stated general earthquake messaging existed, either on an ad hoc/limited basis (34%) or a well-

established basis (49%).

General Earthquake Messaging Comments

Who generates messages?

USGS, Universities, state/prov. organizations, scientists, local EM

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Who coordinates? Not officially coordinated, but everyone tries to stay consistent

How disseminated? State orgs./agencies pushed through to local EM; scientists pushed through media; PIOs at local or incident level; media/web/newsletters/meetings/events

For whom are these intended?

Public, sometimes agency employees or more targeted

Positives If no time urgency, strong network of experts

Simple messaging is effective for people somewhat familiar

Diffused and often adapted to local context

Rapport exists between media and EM/scientists

Eventually gets widely dispersed

Occurs when people can digest info (not during disaster)

Negatives Some media and internet distortion

Possibility of mixed messages because of ad hoc nature and number of sources

Unclear if it is reaching the right people or understood

Won’t work in a disaster because it won’t systematically address rumors

One size fits all – not differentiated by geography

Confusion in message between worst case and likely scenario

Messages largely superficial and not geared towards clear, actions

Little distinction between messages for media promotion (academia, organizations), providing basic info, changing beliefs, and changing behavior

Improvements Need a defined process and agreed upon standard messages

Need a go-to group for media (PNSN may work for Seattle, Lucy Jones for CA, but elsewhere missing)

Messaging that is site specific

Aftershock forecasting

More use of social media, graphics, multi-language

Coordinated conference calls for EM during heightened risk

PIOs who can craft messages

Use of evidence-based practices in messaging

B. Advisory Earthquake Messaging. Messages rapidly prepared and purposefully disseminated to advise

decision makers about a perceived, measured, or modeled change in earthquake risk. Advisory

messages are meant to provide important factual information that could influence a decision maker’s

choices about protective actions.

Answer Choices

Responses Comments

Does not exist 12 Advisory messages do not exist but distribution processes are in place

I hesitate to say that it doesn't exist, but I'd say it’s safe to say that it isn't reality available

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Approach would likely be based on type used for volcano coordination plan.

Planned, but not currently available

2 Aftershock forecasts are in the planning stage

Exists, but is limited or ad hoc

9 Do tsunamis fit in this category? Tsunami advisories are well

established. Changes in earthquake probabilities... not so much

With the caveat that there has been no geophysical activity warranting advisory messaging for decades, so this question is somewhat academic.

This is a fuzzy area, depending on the timescales involved, but there's certainly info on latest risk estimates and ad hoc communication of recent findings.

Exists and is well established

8 code changes go out and are adopted - but with long turnaround times

I do not know 8 Emergency Management BC does not have any advisory messaging

at this point in time

At the moment general and advisory are the same, since we don't have the means to judge increased seismic risk in the short term.

Most stated advisory earthquake messaging existed on a limited basis (23%) or did not exist at all (30%);

(21% stated it was well-established). Many (21%) did not know. Some pointed out that we haven’t had

the need for advisory messaging (no geophysical activity warranting it and lack of ability to assess

increased risk in short term) and that general and advisory messaging are currently treated as the same

thing

Advisory Earthquake Messaging Comments

Questions Responses

Who generates messages?

USGS, DOGAMI, WA DNR, WA Emer. Services, PNSN, Local emergency managers, CREW, WA EMD, NEIC, NRCan, Regional Messaging Task Force (OR), earth scientists, occasional non-scientist

Who coordinates? USGS, NEPEC, PNSN, Regional Messaging Task Force (OR), Province of BC, SAFRR, NRCan, Local emergency managers, PIOs, not aware of anyone who does, if anyone.

How are these messages disseminated?

State protocols for EM message distribution; mass notification; news media and any/all communication forms, emails, reports/ fact sheets, alert notifications, stakeholder groups and public forums

For whom are these intended?

emergency managers and public generally, sometimes specific orgs./agencies/owners/operators

Positives State system of dissemination frequently employed for other hazards, so well known

Single body sending out vetted info

Sent to people who need/want to know through employee distribution or opt-in systems

Flexible and fast

Negatives False alarms

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Opt-in needs people to sign up

What if no internet access?

May be misunderstood

Improvements Needs testing and refinement

Needs templates

Need to know audience (how often do they want, what level of certainty are they comfortable with, linking content with intent)

Better coordination in advance

C. Early Warning Earthquake Messaging. Messages triggered by the initiation of seismic shaking and

rapidly disseminated via specialized early warning systems to alert decision-makers seconds to a minute

in advance of the arrival of more damaging shaking.

Answer Choices

Responses Comments

Does not exist 14 EEW has no value for the Oregon coast. The earthquake is our

warning.

Watches take care of this

Concerns over adequate social science understanding of risk perception, assumptions of relative earthquake safety, and conflicting instructions (drop, cover, hold or evacuate unsafe buildings).

There is no messaging regarding earthquake early warning (EEW) for the Cascadia Subduction Zone at this point in time in BC as EEW is still in development within the province

Planned, but not currently available

10 the EEW is at the research stage

Exists, but is limited or ad hoc

8 In the absence of EEWS, all we really have is tsunami warnings

(including distal tsunamis), for which there is a more coordinated system, but that's for a geographically bounded area. We have pre-incident guidance on immediate protective actions (drop/cover/hold) and have some pre-scripted info on post-EQ aftershocks.

currently in beta testing, hardware not sufficiently installed

UBC working with schools in SW BC, Ocean Networks Canada working on a system for CSZ

Ad hoc and not yet intended for use. Useful warnings are slated to become available in the fall, but warnings for the public currently await full funding and perhaps another year of testing and public education. It would still then require years of further education and incorporation to mitigate risk to the maximum extent possible.

Exists and is well established

3

I do not know 4

Most stated early warning earthquake messaging did not exist (36%) or was only in the planning stages

(24%). A few said it already existed, in beta or pilot versions, or that the tsunami alert system served as

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an early warning system for at least the tsunami aspect of CSZ, though with some canned messaging

about aftershocks.

Early Warning Earthquake Messaging Comments

Who generates messages?

earth scientists, occasional non-scientist

Who coordinates? USGS, PNSN, NOAA, some universities

How disseminated? Voice/text/email/internet, PA systems in schools, sirens

For whom are these intended?

Sophisticated users at this point and those in tsunami zone

Positives If it works, will save lives and damage

Consistent, fast message

May seem like its working, until we look at haphazard human response

Negatives Potential for false messages that could be costly and reduce credibility

May saturate at M7.5 or underestimate initial ground shaking Improvements General refinement

Needs to be based upon good social science

Develop the messaging that needs to accompany it

OPINIONS ON COORDINATING ADVISORY EARTHQUAKE RISK COMMUNICATION

Potential Benefits of Coordinated Advisory Earthquake Messaging

Less public confusion

Standardized messaging is key for effectiveness

Clear voice of authority for media to turn to

More efficient use of limited resources, ability to share resources

Hub of expertise for consistent and vetted info

Could cover landslides, tsunami, and earthquake as one-stop-shop

Authorities would be better prepared and able to send messages more quickly

Note: A lot of people blurring lines between advisory and general, suggesting the coordination should be

for both types. Some people also brought in early warning. Long term, all of these probably need to be

coordinated together, perhaps loosely.

Potential Negative Impacts

Complex geology and hazard types. Coordination would need to span many disciplines

Rarity of events and turnover of staff may make rapid coordination challenging

Is the effort worth the low frequency?

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Messages may not be specific enough for local geography/context. A standardized message will

be wrong for most recipients.

Lack of rigor could undermine credibility

How to handle scientists who disagree or jurisdictions who disagree in a rapid manner

Coordination might actually slow down messaging

How important is advisory messaging for a range of events?

Most important Large CSZ earthquake Unusual deformation Small, potential precursor, CSZ event Volcanic activity also mentioned in comments

Moderately important News coverage New research Swarms

Least important Large earthquakes elsewhere Large tsunami elsewhere

How important are various groups’ involvement in advisory messaging?

Most important* State EM, state level geological orgs. /agencies (others mentioned PIOs, public health agencies; tsunami agencies, academics/NGOs trusted by public; K-12 educators and social media communicators)

Moderately important Local and tribal EM, seismic networks, federal EM, federal geological orgs./agencies, risk communication specialists,

Least important State/Prov. local gov’t, media, public and private utilities, general public

What hurdles need to be overcome or future tasks need to be completed for effective coordination?

There’s a tradeoff between comprehensiveness of a plan and usefulness. Coordinated

advisory, if dominated by scientists, will likely never occur (NEPEC issued no advisory in

last 6 years outside of CA). If it is a mix of EM and scientist, might be more active.

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Lots of potential players here — EM, several types of hazard specialists, risk

communication specialists, PIOs — could easily bog down if too many approvals

How to do a regional coordination and still have messages useful to local communities

Getting frequency of messages and communication protocols to use existing channels

How to keep plan active when events are so rare and people are so busy

How to disseminate info in a post-disaster situation?

Note: Some concern this is a solution addressing an unmanageable problem (what media says) or a

solution for too rare a problem.

What questions does the workshop most need to discuss?

Need: Do we need this? (Biggest issue is EEW messages, but that needs to be tackled up and

down the coast, not just CSZ. Advisory and general messaging diffused and needs to be

adaptive, which it already is.)

Potential uses of info (protective action, awareness, coping, politics)

How to represent changes without alarming public?

Audience: What info and format for each scenario type?

Cost and coordination: Who funds? Who owns? Roles and responsibilities?

Logistics of situation: How to agree upon messages and even communicate across international

border after event? Loss of power and communication?

Adaptability: Coordination vs flexibility to adapt during crisis

Usefulness: How to address messaging to specific populations — needs, geography, language?

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7.4 Appendix D. Summary of Workshops Two workshops were held in Seattle, WA, June 27th 2016 and Salem, OR, July 20th 2016 to better

understand the current practices of earthquake risk communication and the potential needs for

increased formalities in the subject. Both workshops had approximately 40 participants, with 35% being

from the emergency management field, 35% from earth science, 20% with communications or public

outreach expertise, and 10% from the private sector. Representatives of British Columbia and

Washington attended the Seattle workshop; the Salem workshop was primarily attended by Oregon

representatives, although some attendees were from Washington and California.

The first part of the workshop, participants divided into interdisciplinary groups and discussed six

hypothetical scenarios that might warrant regionally coordinated earthquake messaging. After

discussing and presenting what conclusions each small breakout group had arrived at, the entire group

“voted” on whether each scenario would be better handled through coordinated advisory or public

information statements.

Scenario Seattle Vote Salem Vote

1. Large CSZ Event 27 26

2. Media Coverage of CSZ Risk (such as

New Yorker article) -6 -9

3. Unusual Swarm/Unusual deformation 22 10

4. Rogue prediction of heightened risk 16 17

5. Large earthquake elsewhere -15 -7

6. Newly Published Research on return

period -12 -12

Positive votes (green) indicate support for coordination around the hypothetical scenario. Negatively

valued votes (red) indicate preference that coordinated advisory messaging not occur around the

hypothetical scenario.

In both workshops, the participants indicated the strongest support for coordinated advisory messaging

in the event of a moderate or large CSZ event, one where the public would need to be warned about the

extent and size of aftershocks. The participants also had modest support for coordinated messaging in

the case of unusual aseismic activity on the fault or a “rogue” prediction of heightened risk. The group

generally did not support other scenarios – heightened media coverage, a large earthquake elsewhere

(not within the Cascadia region), or newly published research on regional seismicity -- as needing

coordinated advisory messaging. In these cases, the current practice of each jurisdiction engaging with

the public through social and traditional media channels was seen as more appropriate. However, a

minority of participants felt that even in these cases, coordinated messaging and a coordinated

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earthquake public awareness campaign were critically important for the Cascadia region due to low risk

awareness and preparedness.

The second half of the workshop was spent in plenary discussion on group-selected issues of concern.

The following insights emerged out of these discussions:

Who would make up an advisory body?

Group composition- scientists from orgs./agencies (USGS, NRC, etc.), academia, social scientists,

emergency managers, tribal, PIOs

Size of group- 10-20 experts with support from larger auxiliary groups, issues in rapidly

assembling may appear

Inclusion of diverse disciplines- scientists discuss and arrive at a consensus, then relay info. to

emergency managers to use

Timing- Social scientist facilitator needed to expedite arrival of consensus/ solutions, message

templates needed to expedite process, plan should have flexibility and guidelines to follow

based upon potential trigger events

What would trigger and advisory message?

Magnitude reaching a predetermined threshold, and/or increase in risk including secondary

hazards

A peak in public interest

Size and extent of people experience shaking, cross jurisdictional events would require

coordination

Specific geo-physical phenomena that may be a precursor to an event

Multiple reputable entities need to coordinate and create a unified message (limit frequency to

limit possible false alarms)

What would regional coordination look like? Who would coordinate and how? Who would be the face/

figure?

An existing trusted group such as NEPEC or CREW could be used to facilitate regional

coordination, NEPEC could incorporate Cascadia in their plans and NEMA could use their new

committee to coordinate emergency managers

Using volcano and wildfire plans as templates could be helpful

Coordination is necessary to bridge communication gaps, as seen in After Action Reports from

Cascadia Rising

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Rotating state/ provincial emergency managers and state geologists would prevent heavy

reliance upon one group

USGS and PNSN currently coordinate before sending messages

Message purposes: public education? preparedness?

USGS= EQ, NOAA= tsunami info. experts, we need to ensure that the public knows this

Should we coordinate at all?

Coordination takes time that we don’t have during an event, but coordination could also save

time by reducing conflicting info. and informing the audience with accurate info.

“If the goal is to inform the public despite our inability to predict the moment at which

earthquakes occur, it’s important to ensure that public is well-educated ahead of time so that

they can take action based on their knowledge”, this may be done by expanding ShakeOut to

include messaging and practice drills

Social scientists are a critical component for success

Concerns over an outside entity making decisions for what should be a regionally invested body

expressed (i.e. National committee making decisions for Cascadia)

New Insights

Seattle: Salem:

Bodies designed to provide advisories exist (NEPEC, CEPEC), but have no method for communicating directly with public

Coordination with NOAA will be needed

Language is important, an “advisory” may not be the best term to use if these will be used as public education opportunities

Small bits of digestible info. through social media such as twitter may satiate public demand for answers, but scientific community Has not yet embraced this (this may include maps, photos, etc.)

Local EMS need this info. First, before the public to allow time to properly digest it

International divide (USA/CA) creates confusion, which agency is the authority on the subject, many were surprised USGS does issue advisories

Coordinated messaging would be particularly useful in recovery of infrastructure

Allows public to make fast and informed decisions (evacuate or shelter in place)

Goals for these messages need to be established to be effective (to save lives, property, debunk rumors, etc.)

The audience of these messages needs to be established to determine content

Any advisory would likely prompt public panic (in Oregon), needs to be coupled with continuous public education for public to act based on what they have been taught

Lack of experience with seismic events= lack of mitigation culture, avoid fatalism and intimidating language that might spark failure to prepare

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Project participants indicated the strongest support for coordinated advisory communication in the

event of a moderate or large CSZ event that affects multiple jurisdictions in the region. Following such

an event, the public would need to be warned about the extent and size of aftershocks. The project

participants noted that advisory communication would be warranted for large events on other faults,

but such events may only affect a single state/province and may not necessarily need regional

coordination of communications.

The participants also had modest support for coordinated messaging in the case of unusual geophysical

activity or to evaluate a “prediction” — whether originating from a scientific source or an amateur — of

an eminent earthquake.

The group generally did not support other scenarios – heightened media coverage, a large earthquake

elsewhere, or newly published research on seismicity -- as needing coordinated advisory messaging. In

these cases, the current practice of each jurisdiction engaging with the public through social and

traditional media channels was seen as more appropriate. However, a minority of participants felt that

even in these cases, a coordinated earthquake public awareness campaign was critically important for

the Cascadia region, due to low risk awareness and preparedness. Notably, the participants in Oregon

were more vocally supportive of coordinating earthquake public education and outreach.

Where coordinated earthquake risk communication — either through “advisory” messages of

heightened risk or general earthquake messages about the validity of predictions — was supported, the

project participants noted these potential benefits:

Formalized coordination would ensure the principle of hazard-risk separation was followed

— scientists would speak authoritatively on hazard while emergency managers would

address risk and protective actions

If rapid enough, coordinated communication could pro-actively inoculate public against

pseudoscientific explanations that would arise to “fill the gap”

If frequent enough, formally coordinated communication could prompt the public to expect

and seek information from an authoritative source

Formalized coordination would help ensure that following scientific agreement, message

will actually be sent out

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7.5 Appendix E. Participant Comments on Coordinated Earthquake Risk Communication

Framework and Options

7.6 In October, 2016, a draft framework that broke earthquake risk communication for short-term

heightened earthquake probability into three stages — initiation, deliberation, and dissemination. The

framework defined several options for each stage and explore a range of alternative combinations of

those options. Participants were asked to provide comments and their own alternatives. Below is text

from that framework (in black) and participant comments (in orange).

Post Workshops and First Draft Review Interview Comments:

Informal earthquake risk communication is currently taking place within a few small scientific communities across the region. Most of these conversations are between WA and OR scientists, but sometimes include professionals from BC and CA. These conversations are typically done over a conference call or through one-on-one phone conversations between scientists. Scientists involved in these discussions then disseminate what they believe to be the most accurate information to those whom they feel are in need of this information. This information is shared based on informal professional relationships (between scientists, emergency managers, Media, etc.)

Current Means of Regionally Coordinating Earthquake Risk Communication

Currently, regionally-coordinated earthquake risk communication is done informally within several small

exclusively internal scientific communities, whom advise appropriate state and county Emergency

Managers (interviews). This community is comprised mostly of experts within Washington and Oregon,

but consultation with expert from other state and national organizations occurs when necessary. Upon

meeting via conference call, email, or other forms of communication, these experts aim to develop

talking points for individuals to then use when addressing interested parties (e.g. Duty Officers, media,

etc.). Those taking part in the deliberations also may search for any additional sources of information

after the group determines that additional information is needed to answer important questions.

Participant Comments: 1. This means DOGAMI, EMD, DNR, and CalOES do not talk to each other? The PNSN and the USGS

certainly talk often informally with the OR and WA state orgs./agencies for any earthquake large enough to feel (M>3). CREW spans all these groups, and produces earthquake risk communication. I think you mean to talk about the lack of formal, not informal, communication.

2. I’m not so sure anything will be adopted. Our job is simply to suss out if, and in what form, coordination would be desired. Then, we write recommendations to USGS based upon what we’re hearing. USGS would then decide whether to move forward, or not. Certainly, no matter what the staff feel, it would be the governors and the state emergency managers who would ultimately authorize anything more formal than currently exists.

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So, yes, we can certainly provide them with veto power here as we’re discussing now, but I suspect they’ll ultimately hold the power of veto through their role advising the governors to agree to, or not agree to, any plans that develop. Getting three states and a province to all agree to anything formal is a pretty tall task and likely a slow process. What is also interesting is that automated USGS earthquake forecasting is on its way, as is early warning. Coordination may be a moot point as everyone may already have the info a deliberative body is envisioning as providing before such a body could do anything about it. Can you help out just a bit more in clarifying this bit from your email: If there was a consensus from the DC a determination collectively between the DC and EM what dissemination model should be used. That communication already exists and has been used in many EOCs.

Resilience Institute reply to above comment:

What I meant was if there is a Deliberative Committee, there would need to be an agreement as to the way information would be disseminated to the public about a potential event. As I reflect further, there may be some appeal for government types to have one "official" voice to hear from rather than multiple voices, but I don't think that would necessarily eliminate confusion from developing. After the tsunami in 2011, the issues/rumors of toxic debris required that I assign a full court press with experts from all over to counter the social media meanderings of self- proclaimed experts that added to panic, and the report was "they (government) are not telling you the truth". We succeeded but it was pretty tense for a while as Gregoire kept getting slammed over literally nothing. Also, the communication models now that exist are established between USGS, UW, and Seattle (at least when I was there) and the State EMD. I know other jurisdictions had their own contacts as well, though some smaller shops relied on the state for that link.

Brief Overview of California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (CEPEC)

In 1974, California created its own state-wide advisory group on earthquake predictions. Two years

later, the group was formally titled the California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (CEPEC).

CEPEC formally advises California’s director of the state’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) on

short-term elevated seismic potential and, occasionally, on the validity of earthquakes predictions.

In the event of concerning seismic activity or other phenomena warranting a CEPEC meeting, this

advisory group will convene via conference call to discuss and evaluate the situation (Cal OES, 2016).

They then report their findings to OES, which then decides whether to issue a formal earthquake

warning to the public. Because the southern end of the CSZ fault extends to Cape Mendocino in

northern California, CEPEC has the responsibility to convene and advise California OES in the case of

unusual activity or earthquake predictions related to the CSZ fault within its jurisdiction.

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Participant Comments: 1. If the CEPEC is meeting to review and discuss a published “prediction” by some author,

the CEPEC meeting is conducted in a setting that is open to the public and advertised as such per the California Bagley-Keene Open Meetings Act requirements. Any formal minutes prepared, and documents presented during the proceedings are available to the public upon request. The author of the “prediction” is invited to present the reasoning supporting the prediction.

In formulating its conclusions about the prediction presentation, the CEPEC members are allowed to go into “Closed Session” for the discussion if it so wishes. This allows an uninhibited conversation; however, when re-entering Public Session, the CEPEC must announce its findings and conclusions as a body – but individual members do not have to disclose their votes or draft notes on various issues. In the event of an emergency setting, the CEPEC may convene when called and is not required to meet in a public setting, nor to disclose any of its findings and recommendations except directly to the Governor’s Office. This is because only the Governor can declare an emergency. The Governor may release the CEPEC letter if he/she desires. Releasing CEPEC findings and recommendations to the public prior to the Governor’s chance to act on them could cause dangerous panic and undesirable conditions upon the public. Under potential emergency conditions, the advice given to the Governor by CEPEC is considered legally proprietary, and therefore not disclose-able. In addition, all members of CEPEC, like other government employees, receive immunity from legal prosecution when performing their duties in accordance with the law – so they cannot be sued for their comments and opinions made whilst on the job.

2. Better to use the term “earthquake event forecasts” unless this has been directly quoted

from another document

3. [On CEPEC: one concern with the structure of CEPEC is that it places not just the use but also dissemination of scientific information under the control of emergency management. That is an uncomfortable position and violates the principle of hazard-risk separation (see Jordan et al, SRL, 2014) that underlies recent developments in Operational Earthquake Forecasting. It was the violation of this principle, allowing incorrect statements by civil defense officials, that misled people in L’Aquila. And it also led to confusion and misinformation during the recent earthquake swarm at Bombay Beach, in southern California. In this latter case, CalOES misstated the scientific information leading to a statement of probabilities that was off by a few orders of magnitude. As one develops a deliberative body, I think it is important to maintain a separation of scientific information from decisions on actions. One can merge them together in joint statements but neither side should control the other.]

OPTIONS FOR COORDINATED EARTHQUAKE RISK COMMUNICATION IN THE CASCADIA REGION

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This section outlines potential alternatives for the coordinated initiation, deliberation, and

dissemination of earthquake risk communication in the Cascadia Region, stretching from northern

California to southern British Columbia. Currently, some geo-scientists from several academic

institutions, government organizations, and scientific monitoring networks engage in an informal and

internal coordination, primarily in Washington and Oregon. When unusual seismic or a-seismic activity

occurs, participants in this loose network initiate a conference call between about six

individuals/institutions. Over a single or multiple calls, they clarify what is collectively known and

unknown about the activity and develop talking points about the activity and earthquake risk. Each

scientist involved simply engages with media and emergency management counterparts when

contacted, and as they feel is appropriate. This status quo approach does not include a standardized

dissemination of earthquake risk information out to emergency management, the media or the broader

public.

Participant Comments:

1. This is incorrect. While no event warranting it has happened in the last decade, there is a formal process involving the NEIC in Colorado, joint points of contact, and the distribution of talking points. This is true for every ANSS regional network. This is not to say adding the involvement of state orgs./agencies would not be an improvement. I believe there are long-standing internal plans at WA-EMD for setting up a joint information center, to which the PNSN is connected.

2. A standard for public comment directing media and the public to emergency management

websites and sources would be possible- as in a statement of professional responsibility.

3. This current approach does not include any formalized dissemination of these talking points

The purpose of the CREW Cascadia Region Coordinated Earthquake Risk Communication Plan is to

explore the possibilities for more formalized coordination and to make a recommendation(s) for such

coordination, if broadly desired.

Early online surveys, interviews, and two workshops in Seattle and Salem helped identify potential

options and the potential benefits and drawbacks of both existing informal risk communication and

more formal coordination options.

In this document, which forms background information for the final report to USGS, we divide

coordinated earthquake risk messaging into three major components:

Initiation Stage. How and when coordinated earthquake risk communication begins and what

sort of events warrant such coordinated communication are important considerations of the

initiation stage. Options for initiation range from geophysical triggers identified by geo-science

experts to socio-cultural triggers initiated by emergency managers or others.

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Deliberation Stage. Which experts are involved in deliberating on and developing a coordinated

earthquake risk message(s) are important concerns of the deliberation stage. Alternatives range

from the current, informal network to a formal, appointed Deliberative Body.

Dissemination Stage. How deliberations are shared with a broader audience and with whom

these deliberations are shared are important concerns of the dissemination stage. Options

include delivery of deliberation outcomes to emergency managers, to online platforms, or

coordinated development of talking points and/or information statements with emergency

managers.

Participant Comment: There is no time for scientists to create a message separate from the messaging that government authorities issue.

Were a more formal Deliberative Body to be recommended for the Deliberation Stage, questions still

remain regarding the membership of that Body and the degree to which members of the Body should

have guidelines or formal restrictions on their external communication during deliberation. For these

reasons, this section also explores options for and the benefits and drawbacks of:

Deliberative Body Membership. Which organizations and institutions or specific experts should

be part of a Body. Options include a more limited membership of geophysical scientists and

monitoring networks, to a broader membership of these and emergency managers, even media

representatives.

Forms of External Communication. External communication by Deliberative Body members can

also take several forms. Options include allowing members to engage with individual and

organizations at will, and options that restrict this type of engagement and require all outside

communication to be exclusively through the Deliberative Body chair.

Options for the Initiation Stage of Coordinated Earthquake Risk Communication in the Cascadia Region

This section reviews two options for the Initiation Stage of coordinated earthquake risk communication:

1) informal initiation where experts request or suggest deliberation when they identify unusual activity,

and 2) formal initiation where defined events “trigger” deliberation and experts wait until these event

characteristics are present before moving to the Deliberative Stage. For both of these options, this

section lists the advantages and disadvantages and explores some of the option details. Advantages and

disadvantages were drawn directly from workshop, interview, and survey responses from regional geo-

science and social science experts, emergency managers and local, state and federal level

representatives, and others.

Initiation Option 1. Informal Initiation

Description: Experts with in-depth knowledge of Cascadia’s seismic risk individually or collectively believe that unusual circumstances warrant coordinated discussion of earthquake risk in the Cascadia region. Such experts call for the initiation of coordinated discussion about regional earthquake risk. At their discretion, experts initiate a conference call or electronic exchange; as needed, follow-up communication also occurs.

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Participant Comments:

What unusual circumstances: examples would help. We seem to have a perpetual unusual set of circumstances, what would be different?

Some have argued that this only makes it more flexible, not nimble

Advantages:

Informal internal discussions could potentially expedite consensus

No change in current informal approach (Interviews)

Conversation and any response evolves with situation; flexible and adaptive

Enacting deliberations can help in further refining the defined criteria that initiate deliberations

Disadvantages:

Informal initiation may leave out important voices and rely too heavily on who-knows-whom in novel cases (Interviews)

Organizations and individuals outside the informal network of experts may not have a pathway for requesting or initiating coordination (Workshops, CREW meeting)

Informal approach may result in a reluctance to act, or a reactive approach in rapidly changing situations (Workshops)

An event that warrants coordination may be ignored or missed due to a lack of attention (California meeting)

Lack of responsibility and structure could result in a failure to coalesce

Lack of structure may let an event slip through the gaps in communication

Comments: 1. [On the initiation stage: the existence of automated aftershock forecasting means that some

statements will go out very rapidly. This is appropriate because the decay of aftershock activity means that there can be a very short window of time between a foreshock and a larger event or a main shock and a large aftershock. For instance, the recent large aftershocks in Italy on October 26, 2016 were separated by only 2 hours. Utilizing the first event to forecast the increased probability of the second event would fail if you relied on a group of people to decide on the appropriate message and to give that message to local emergency managers before releasing it.

Instead, a workable approach is for a deliberative body to approve the scientific methods to be used, to craft message templates based on input from both scientists and emergency managers, to test those templates via social science, and then train the emergency managers about what to expect. This approach involves all of the correct people ahead of time and allows for rapid dissemination of information when events warrant it. These templates, most likely released directly from the USGS, can include stock preparedness resources that depend on the general location (e.g. PNW versus southern California versus Oklahoma) that include resources on what to do and who to contact for more information.

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Of course, there will be odd situations where discussion is needed to reach a decision on what things mean. But the one case where we actually have a meaningful statistical model is earthquake clustering and we can run all sorts of scenarios ahead of time to help craft messages that can be rapidly released.

Initiation Option 2. Formal Initiation based upon Defined Criteria

Description: Specific geophysical and/or social initiations warrant specific individual experts to formally gather to discuss the potentials, changes, and uncertainties of seismic risk within Cascadia. A deliberative body, the membership of which is discussed in section 2.2 on deliberation options, convenes under well, defined geo-physical and/or social circumstances. However, one or more of the triggers for formal initiation could be qualitative – a request for clarification by emergency management representatives, or a request for initiation by geophysical scientists or monitoring network representatives.

Advantages:

Deliberation process would have clearly defined “start;” it would initiate immediately after defined circumstance

Deliberation and communication would be pro-active rather than reactive

If initiation included criteria based upon public concern, questions would be addressed when the public wants them most (Seattle)

Disadvantages:

Experts may disagree on thresholds that warrant discussions (Workshops, Interviews)

Defined criteria may be inappropriate in a novel and unanticipated situation

Criteria would date to time of last modification, unlikely to be frequently revisited

Continuum of risk hard to capture in thresholds – recent history of activity, distance offshore, mechanism, accompanying deformation and aftershocks, etc.

Raising public awareness of a threat that may not materialize without a careful outreach pre event could set back government credibility and public education efforts for years.

Participant Comment: Disadvantages: I think for government employees in most or all organizations, the policy is that individual scientists do not make statements to the media or the public that have "policy implications" without them being vetted at a higher level in the organization. For experts in academia or elsewhere, I don't think any restrictions are possible.

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Evaluation of Potential Initiations for Initiation Option 2

Several geophysical and social circumstances could, potentially, warrant the initiation of formal

deliberation. Several of these scenarios were discussed at the workshops and CREW meetings,

where the following insights about the need for and advantages or disadvantages of each were

explored.

Potential Triggers Advantages Disadvantages Workshop

Support

Unusual geophysical activity, outside of normal conditions occurs (could be defined by quantitative thresholds or by real-time expert consensus)

Provides public a credible source for scientifically vetted earthquake risk information

May increase situational awareness for even a public that is not typically aware of earthquake hazards and risks and changes to them

Requires expert consensus

Possibility of incorrectly defining thresholds

Possibility of defining too many thresholds which could lead to a large number of differing scenarios that each warrant unique action

Expertise necessary may or may not be captured by pre-existing committee

Historically a very rare happening in the PNW

Since science is unable to predict an earthquake with any level of confidence this is problematic without a major public education effort that might swamp other responsible outreach.

High support; should be a formal or informal trigger

Experts or emergency management authorities observe widespread concern or panic, with potential

Trusted expert consensus offers realities and explain uncertainties to public concerns (Seattle)

Offers defense against unrealistic expectations for preparedness efforts (Seattle)

Possibility of causing more panic if safety suggestions are not given (Seattle)

Initiation threshold may be difficult to determine (Seattle)

Mixed support; many stated they wanted this trigger option, but did not want it to result in formal advisory

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emergence of rumors or misinformation

Aids emergency managers in developing situational awareness and messages for the public (Seattle)

Without restrictions on outside comments, most “exciting” points, rather than most useful, may go viral (Seattle)

notices. Wanted coordinated discussion, but flexibility in determining how to disseminate info from EM to public. emergency managers, especially, were interested in having a way to understand and develop talking points about public concerns and new or conflicting scientific research or observations

Emergency managers submit a request for clarification about regional earthquake hazards and risks

Clear and concise risk communications can be formulated in coordination with experts

Those in charge of public safety will have a better idea of the realities and uncertainties of a potentially concerning situation (Workshops)

Can provide solid scientific basis for public safety decisions

Those responsible for public safety will have a known credible source for scientifically vetted seismic information (Seattle), in addition to existing ones

Experts may become overwhelmed with requests (Workshops)

A consensus may not be achieved

Participant Comments: Potential Triggers: CEPEC procedure is that the chair of CEPEC or the Governor are the only ones who can convene CEPEC Disadvantages: Perhaps NEPEC is adequate? Disadvantages: There exist alternatives short of invoking an entire committee, with the formal response and vetting, although sometime this is good

Options for the Deliberative Stage of Coordinated Earthquake Risk Communication in the Cascadia

Region

This section reviews four options for the Deliberative Stage of coordinated earthquake risk

communication. These options include: 1) deliberation without a formal Deliberative Body, 2)

deliberation with an informal Deliberative Body, 3) deliberation with a formal Deliberative Body, and 4)

deliberation that begins with an internal process within a Deliberative Body, but is then coordinated

with representatives of Emergency Management organizations before finalization. For all of these

options, this section lists the advantages and disadvantages and explores some of the option details.

Advantages and disadvantages were drawn directly from workshop, interview, and survey responses

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from regional geo-science and social science experts, emergency managers and local, state, and federal

level, and others.

In section 2.4. Other Aspects of Coordination, we consider options of the membership of a Deliberative

Body and options for how they might interact with organizations and individuals outside the

Deliberative Body who seek information about regional earthquake risk.

Participant Comments:

[On the design of the deliberative body: I feel that the first body that examines the geological processes should consist primarily of scientists but could include a couple of emergency managers to provide insight into what matters to them. However, emergency managers are just one of the many possible users of time-dependent earthquake hazards information and so it is useful to maintain some separation so that emergency managers will not be the deciders on whether information goes out. What may not matter to them could matter to some of the other users discussed in the Field et al. (SRL, 2016) article on uses of Operational Earthquake Forecasts.

The role of PIOs is also important and should be utilized to help draft templates for rapid release, in addition to crafting statements for more slowly developing situations.]

Deliberative Option 1. No Deliberative Body

Description: Once coordinated earthquake risk communication is initiated, one option for deliberation would be simply to have no deliberative body. Ad hoc deliberation among experts within their existing professional circles would likely occur. During and following this informal discussion between experts, the experts would likely provide information to emergency managers and media at their discretion and through their own organizations. This alternative would be most aligned with Initiation Option 1-Informal Initiation, described in section 2.1.1.

Advantages:

If emergency managers or media have questions, they can seek immediate answers from experts of their choosing

No/little operating costs (Salem Workshop)

Media and public like to hear about risk from a person to whom they can connect; a lack of a defined deliberative body may increase the number of “faces” the public sees and increase their satisfaction

Fast; uses well-established relationships

Lack of requirement to reach unified outcome may expedite the deliberation

Disadvantages:

Multiple sources create the possibility for inconsistent or even conflicting risk communications (Survey)

Experts with potentially important perspectives may not be included in informal conversations

Multiple, overlapping conversations may occur, creating inefficient communication among experts (people being added to email chains mid-way through conversations; having to “catch people up”

Lack of leadership and responsibility could lead to a situation where no deliberation occurs when it is actually needed (Workshops, CREW meeting)

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Low rumor control (Salem Workshop)

Participant Comments:

Disadvantages: As noted in the Eureka meeting, it won't be possible for every expert's "viewpoint" to be represented in a group that must deliberate speedily. However, it is important that those who are deliberating are aware of published, peer-reviewed research results relevant to the matter being discussed. For example, the body of work on foreshock probabilities must be understood by at least someone in the group.

Disadvantages: Conducting this type of discussion by email chain is a very inefficient way to operate.

Disadvantages: I don’t agree with this. Perhaps you mean less authoritative commentary on rumors. Rumors can be countered quicker without requiring vetting from a process, but might suffer from less unison and emphasis.

Deliberative Option 2. Informal Deliberative Body

Description: The expert community informally identifies key institutions and individuals who should be part of deliberations about regional earthquake risk. These institutions and individuals are not formally appointed or bound to specific organizational charter, though they may develop informal procedures and institutional culture. Once coordinated earthquake risk communication has been initiated, this informal Deliberative Body of experts initiates a deliberative procedure, such as conference call(s) and follow-up digital communications. During their deliberations, they discuss the knowns and unknowns of regional earthquake risk and any qualitative or quantitative changes that may have occurred. The informal Deliberative Body concludes deliberation without seeking to develop a unified outcome (e.g. consensus statement), though members of the body may agree upon broad talking points. (Note: This option is similar to the current approach to coordinated earthquake risk deliberation, mainly among geophysical science experts and monitoring organization, but generally limited to those within Washington and Oregon.)

Advantages:

Experts have opportunity to hear from each other and expand their individual perspectives in a deliberative process

All experts within informal body start conversation together, increasing efficiency of deliberation

Formally outlines realities and uncertainties of the situation (Salem Workshop, interviews)

Lack of requirement to reach unified outcome may expedite the deliberation

Without the requirement of a unified outcome, each expert can more freely speak from his/her area of expertise,

Disadvantages:

Requires extra time to populate and assemble informal body

Even if broad agreement is achieved within the informal deliberative body, that agreement may not be apparent to public/emergency management

emergency managers and public do not receive risk information from a single source, allowing for potential confusion

Media and public may inadvertently exploit lack of unified communication and seek multiple opinions

Media, emergency managers, and public may contact multiple experts to

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while still being aware of diverge points of view and uncertainties

understand “their take” and bog down experts in work of communicating deliberation

Possibility for inconsistent or even conflicting communication of risk (Workshops)

Lack of leadership and responsibility may mean no one disseminates deliberation, or that deliberations are disseminated unevenly (Salem Workshop)

Low rumor control (Seattle Workshop)

Formal statements may unduly frighten public or make low-probability risk feel eminent

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Deliberative Option 3. Formal Scientific Deliberative Body

Description: The expert community formally identifies key institutions, networks, and/or individuals who should be part of formal deliberations about changes in regional earthquake risk or clarification about existing risk. Institutions and networks appoint individuals to a formal Deliberative Body, with care to ensure broad theoretical and geographic representation. Once coordinated earthquake risk communication has been initiated, this formal Deliberative Body initiates a deliberative procedure through a defined protocol, such as a series of conference call(s), internal communications and data gathering, and/or digital communications. During their deliberations, they discuss the knowns and unknowns of regional earthquake risk and any qualitative or quantitative changes that may have occurred. The formal Deliberative Body concludes deliberation by writing a formal statement. This statement could take various forms, such as approved meeting minutes, approved talking points, approved information statement, or consensus statement.

Advantages:

Experts have opportunity to hear from each other and expand their individual perspectives in a deliberative process

All experts within formal body start conversation together, increasing efficiency of deliberation

Formally outlines realities and uncertainties of the situation (Salem Workshop, interviews)

When experts are in broad agreement and provide a formal statement, that agreement can be made apparent to public, emergency management, and other interested parties

emergency managers and public receive risk information from an authoritative source, reducing potential confusion

Formal statement frames public and media discussion around the broad agreement in the statement (e.g. media asks for clarification or quote about statement)

Formal statement sets framework and terms for consistent communication, even among peripheral experts (and non-experts) who may be communicating about risk through their own networks

Formal leadership and responsibility better ensures deliberation results in effective dissemination of outcome

Formal body, especially a Chair, provides a natural spokesperson for communicating risk and from which to seek clarification (Salem Workshop)

Better rumor control (Seattle Workshop)

Current informal Deliberative Body may be used as a founding group of individuals

Disadvantages:

Requires time to assemble, discuss issues, AND reach agreement (Workshops)

For formal statements to be most effective, experts appointed to the Deliberative Body may need to agree to guidelines for when and how to talk with emergency managers, media, and public on issues that are under deliberation or that have been covered in formal statements from the deliberative body (See Section 3.4.)

Coordination with many regional organizations may be difficult

May require organizations to formally appoint individuals and keep appointments filled

Adds to formal duties of participating experts

Formal statements may unduly frighten public or make low-probability risk feel eminent

Formalized deliberative body may require financial resources

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Participant Comments: Advantages: No mention of a Chair in description Disadvantages: I see the DB as having responsibility to come to consensus on probabilities of seismic events. The way this is described to the public needs to be informed by social science and EM experience, and presumably would be pre-scripted. This "con" would seem to also apply to the "informal DB option" Disadvantages: NEPEC and CEPEC have rules like this, but it only means panel members can only speak for themselves, not speak individually for the group. They are not muzzled.

Deliberative Option 4. Formal Scientific Deliberative Body with Coordinated Finalization

Description: As in Deliberative Option 3, the expert community formally identifies key institutions, networks, and/or individuals who should be part of formal deliberations about changes regional earthquake risk or clarification about existing risk. Institutions and networks appoint individuals to a formal Deliberative Body, with care to ensure broad theoretical and geographic representation. As in Deliberative Option 3, this formal Deliberative Body initiates a deliberative procedure through a defined protocol, such as a series of conference call(s), internal communications and data gathering, and/or digital communications. During their deliberations, they discuss the knowns and unknowns of regional earthquake risk and any qualitative or quantitative changes that may have occurred. The formal Deliberative Body then drafts a formal statement.

Participant Comments:

This needs to be a quick process

Unlike Deliberative Option 3, the Deliberative Body does not finalize their formal statement in isolation. Rather, the Deliberative Body coordinates with State/Provincial EM Organizations, such as with earthquake Program Managers and/or Public Information Officers (PIOs). The Deliberative Body provides these EM representatives with its draft of a formal statement, allowing EM counterparts to identify areas needing further clarification or to add public safety content related to response and readiness. Together they finalize a coordinated formal statement, which may take the form of an approved meeting minutes, an approved information statement, approved talking points, or a consensus statement.

Comments:

Seems inconsistent with the time-sensitive danger in earthquakes. Aftershock danger falls by 1/time in many cases.

This option may be best if implemented for the first few years of implementation to identify communication gaps between the scientific community and emergency managers. After these gaps are bridged, Deliberation Option 3 may be adopted.

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Advantages:

All advantages listed in Option 3

Coordination allows emergency managers/PIOs to vet their talking points with experts

Coordination allows for most concerning questions, as determined by emergency managers, to be answered/prioritized prior to finalization of statement (Salem Workshop)

emergency managers, with statutory authority and expertise in public safety messaging, lead dissemination

Disadvantages:

All disadvantages listed in Option 3

Coordination with EM organizations would lengthen the deliberative process

Media may turn to less credible sources for information and spread inaccurate information if they have to wait long (Interviews)

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Options for Dissemination Stage of Coordinated Earthquake Risk Communication in the Cascadia Region

Post Workshops and First Draft Review Interviews:

Most emergency managers- able to provide an answer on the subject- stated that 2-4 hours was needed to form a message to be disseminated after receiving scientifically vetted information from a scientific community. emergency managers are also requesting for some type of communication strategy to receive consistent, simple, and legible scientific information to avoid any misinterpretations and to ensure understandability. Some EM participants suggested separation of the scientific data and basic risk information. Additionally, emergency managers requested that any disputes over uncertainties be explained by providing perspectives from both sides of the argument. Finally, emergency managers suggested a centralized communication platform be used or developed to allow for an accessible earthquake risk information clearinghouse to be used. This would allow for a continuous conversation between the scientific community and those responsible for public safety to effectively communicate. This would have to be VERY user friendly. Remaining internal may be an issue due to information policies, regulations, and other legal requirements.

The use of social media to spread earthquake risk information is primarily used to quickly push out exciting and interest sparking materials. Integration of social media into plans is difficult because of bandwidth limitations and platform updates (i.e. Facebook updates every 4 hours, frequently making it essentially a new entity). It’s important to keep the old and reliable methods of communication that are well established and understood (for instances in which new technologies are not available) installed in our plans and strategies. Often times, large organizations (Federal) will provide messages to a wide audience that may not be as well suited for localized areas as the messages of smaller, more localized organizations (State, County, City)

The third stage of a coordinated earthquake risk communication plan would be dissemination of

information following the deliberative stage. If an informal deliberative approach was used, no formal

dissemination options would be needed. However, if Deliberative Option 2, 3, or 4 was chosen, some

form of dissemination of the deliberation would be warranted. The following options include one option

for informal dissemination and two options for formal dissemination that could be applied individually

or in concert.

Participant Comments:

Might be useful to consider a decision tree diagram of some sort to illustrate the options?

Dissemination Option 1. Independent Dissemination

Description: Experts, whether part of a Deliberative Body or not, disseminate risk information through their existing social media, social networks, and formal communication channels. If they receive calls or other requests for information from emergency managers, media, or public, they choose if, when, and how to respond.

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Advantages:

Risk information is immediately accessible through multiple channels

Multiple channels (i.e. access to multiple experts) may better ensure that messages reach a wider range of individuals, quickly

Experts do not need to coordinate before communicating

Disadvantages:

emergency managers and media may receive information at the same time, increasing the challenges for emergency managers and their PIOs to keep their jurisdiction informed with vetted information (Seattle Workshop; BOD meeting);

Communication may be conflicting, varied, or even not happen at all

Experts may all have different “takes” on deliberative outcomes

emergency managers/media/public may be confused by perceived or real conflicts in the earthquake risk communicated by experts

Participant Comments:

[On independent dissemination: I think it is extremely difficult to prevent independent dissemination of information and have a gag order on members of a deliberative body. Reporters have contacts, there are multiple social media outlets (such as the PNSN Facebook group), and it is hard not to respond to direct questions. Refusing to answer could look like a conspiracy and lacks transparency. Plus, reporters like to have their own “talking heads” for their stories. It is hard to make that work if only a small number of people are allowed to talk.

Prepared statements and templates can help keep messages sufficiently consistent. Also, it has been argued that complete consistency could be damaging if the message moves from convergence to congruence (see discussion of the L’Aquila case by Herovic, Sellnow, and Anthony, 2014, in Argumentation and Advocacy, v 51, 73-86). So, I think it would be possible to try and go too far with making a message come from a limited, single source. Of course, you may have a different perspective on the issues they raise.]

Dissemination Option 2. Deliberative Outcome Delivered to State/Provincial Emergency Management

Organizations

Participant Comments:

Before a situation requiring rapid response actually arises, it's imperative that the EM organizations and the DB understand what kind of consensus outcomes the DB may provide (e.g., there is a 5% chance of a M7 earthquake in Gotham City in the next week), and that the EM organizations have planned in advance what actions make sense given those outcomes (public should take precautions? EM agency should move to higher state of readiness?)

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EM organizations need the information quickly, but, as discussed at the Eureka meeting, the information may need to go through state Governors first. I think it is critical that emergency managers, not scientists, define how dissemination is done.

It would be their job (emergency managers) to coordinate among themselves, not scientists job

Description: Outcomes of the deliberative stage (e.g. talking points, approved meeting minutes, formal statements, etc.) are delivered directly to State/ Provincial EM Organizations immediately following deliberation. EM Organizations then use existing channels of communication and their own protocols to disseminate updated risk information, as they see fit.

Advantages:

emergency managers could receive vetted information slightly before media, giving them time to digest information and inform key officials before addressing media and public (Workshops; Interviews)

emergency managers receive the scientific information they need to determine public safety concerns (Workshops)

Strengthens communication between scientific community and emergency managers (Survey)

emergency managers can localize messaging content to their jurisdictions before issuing statements (Seattle Workshop) emergency managers, with statutory authority and expertise in public safety messaging, lead dissemination; in parallel, media will also likely actively pursue responses from experts and disseminate through print, TV, and social media outlets

Improved rumor control (Workshops)

Disadvantages:

emergency managers may misinterpret scientific information when they localize (Survey);

State/Provincial emergency managers would be left to coordinate amongst themselves, if such coordination was desired (Workshops)

Each stage of deliberation incurs delay

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Dissemination Option 3. Formal Statement, Centrally Disseminated

Post Workshops and First Draft Review Interviews:

emergency managers requested that any disputes over uncertainties be explained by providing perspectives from both sides of the argument. Finally, emergency managers suggested a centralized communication platform be used or developed to allow for an accessible earthquake risk information clearinghouse to be used. This would allow for a continuous conversation between the scientific community and those responsible for public safety to effectively communicate. This would have to be VERY user friendly. Remaining internal may be an issue due to information policies, regulations, and other legal requirements.

Description: The chair or other designated member of Deliberative Body writes a formal statement(s) and posts to a centralized information platform accessible by all, such as a website. Such a platform may also include a means of responding to further requests for clarification through a traditional FAQs approach or through other social media formats. This dissemination option could be selected as an add-on to Dissemination Option 2 where a formal statement is delivered to representatives of State/Provincial Emergency Management organizations.

Participant Comments: This and most of the options listed are best handled post event since there is limited

reliability in predicting capability now.

Advantages:

Single source for information ensures consistent language and risk communication (Interviews)

Single platform allows for clarifying questions to be directed to one place (Workshops)

Immediately accessible to all

Disadvantages:

If this option used in isolation, emergency managers and media receive information at the same time (BOD meeting)

Those that require technical information and those only requiring basic safety information will receive the same risk communication, if information is not appropriately separated (Interviews)

Single platform limits access to information (Workshops)

No contextualization – everyone receives same information (Seattle Workshop, Surveys)

Other Aspects of Coordination

Post Workshops and First Draft Review Interviews: Any scientific body that is formed needs to be active and meet regularly to remain effective. Some participants suggested that a weekly, monthly, or quarterly newsletter or other type of product be issued to create credibility, authority and to maintain functionality.

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Beyond the three stages of regionally coordinating risk communications (Initiation, Deliberation and

Dissemination), two major conceptual aspects of a coordinated risk communication warrant

consideration. The first of these is the Membership of a Deliberative Body, if the option of having such a

body is selected. The second of these is whether, and to what degree, external communication between

the members of a Deliberative Body and others should be restricted to. Those restrictions may be

established through guidelines or even binding policies. Each of these conceptual aspects is discussed in

turn.

Participant Comments: This has value well before and after an earthquake, not immediately prior to or for the immediate response.

Membership of Deliberative Body

Post Workshops and First Draft Review Interviews:

While many participants agree that the proposed scientific deliberative body should be comprised of mostly various scientists with no political agendas and extensive regional knowledge including seismologists, geotechnical engineers, geographers, etc.; social scientist’s/ risk communication experts are also required to ensure effective communication between the scientific community and its audience.

Membership Option 1 -- Scientists Only. The Deliberative Body could be comprised of geologists,

geophysicists, seismologists, and other appropriate experts from various disciplines. A Deliberative Body

comprised of scientists only would allow conversations to focus on new or unusual geophysical

processes and allow scientists to discuss these issues quickly and with higher precision than if they had

to explain jargon terms to a more mixed group. Any disagreement between scientists could be

discussed, without fear that someone with less scientific training would misunderstand/ misinterpret

and misrepresent the discussion.

However, a group of scientists may also deliberate and come to conclusions that are misaligned with

public safety concerns. Scientists may provide too much, too little, or the wrong type of information to

the public as the public may be interested in issues of public safety, impacts, resources, and response

that scientists are not qualified to discuss. The scientists may also deliver information using precise, but

jargon, language that reduces clarity for the intended recipient.

Participant Comments:

“Scientists’ only does not take into account the conflicting agendas of grabbing attention for grant purposes, which may conflict with emergency managers’ public safety roles. Scientists without accountability for public safety should not be making pronouncements or discussing possible outcomes if there is a chance that emergency manager and elected executives charged with public safety are going to be blindsided.”

A Social Scientist NEEDS to be included

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Membership Option 2 -- Scientists and Representatives from State/Provincial EM Organizations. The

Deliberative Body could be comprised of geologists, geophysicists, seismologists, and other appropriate

experts from various disciplines, as well as representatives from State/Provincial EM Organizations

and/or their Public Information Officers. Including emergency management representatives would help

bridge existing communication gaps between the two networks. Furthermore, EM representatives could

offer insights into how risk communication may need to address public concerns or be contextualized

geographically. emergency managers may know what questions the public, or they themselves, need

answered and could ensure scientists address these, where appropriate. PIOs have skills for crafting

public risk communications messages and could assist in crafting formal statements.

Such a mixed group comes with distinct disadvantages. Including emergency managers and/or PIOs

could lengthen the deliberation process and require scientists to explain highly technical content.

Involved emergency managers and/or PIOs could also misinterpret the scientific disagreements or

agreed-upon uncertainties, spreading misleading information. Including a larger number of individuals

and organizations in a deliberative process also becomes logistically daunting.

Participant Comments:

This is the only way, however cumbersome, that such a system could be helpful and even then it is unclear who would determine when “to go public”

My personal opinion is that groups of scientists (not necessarily CEPEC) are not skilled in holding efficient meetings. People with social science or EM backgrounds are better at this. Someone present needs to serve the function of keeping the discussion on track and moving forward.

Including emergency managers and PIOs pulls them away from their other duties as well

Membership Option 3 -- Scientists, Representatives from State/Provincial EM Organizations and

Representatives from Media. The Deliberative Body could also extend even further than scientists and

representatives of Emergency Management organizations. Representatives of the media could be

included. While this might expedite communication between scientists and the media and ensure that

the media feels “in the loop” about new and emerging earthquake risk information, such a Deliberative

Body would likely be challenging. The logistics of including this many individuals and organizations

would likely lengthen the time to organize deliberation. Furthermore, scientists may be reticent to speak

openly or disagree with each other in such an open forum. Media representatives, often with much less

expertise in earth science, may easily misunderstand discussions and produce misleading information to

the broader public. Any restrictions on how and what the media reported as coming from the

Deliberative Body would also be in opposition to the important tenets of a free and open press.

Participant Comments:

Scientists simply cannot discuss remote possibilities nor argue in front of journalists. Even knowing that minutes or emails from discussion would be released can inhibit free-ranging discussions.

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Not wise to have media present

Options for External Communication

Each of the options for deliberation and dissemination could occur with, or without, restrictions or

guidelines on how participants in the Deliberative Body engage with those seeking information on

earthquake risk, whether that be requests from the media for interviews, request for information from

public officials, or contact from public citizens. Options for various levels of restrictions are discussed in

this section.

External Communication Option 1 -- No Restrictions. Members of the Deliberative Body could disclose

any information to interested parties at any time, with no restrictions. Without restrictions, risk

information would likely be disseminated rapidly and public concerns addressed promptly. However,

different members may make, or be perceived as making, conflicting statements. Those seeking

information may also see the members of the Deliberative Body as speaking as representatives of that

Body, even when they are speaking only from their own perspective.

Participant Comments:

I think the members of the DB will want their discussions to be confidential. However, data on which these discussions are based are generally publicly available at all times, as is information (e.g., earthquake locations and magnitudes) that is derived from those data.

The discussions will probably need to be confidential during and after deliberation, but I would like to see the reasoning behind the conclusions written down, even if not part of the formal written outcome. For example, if an earthquake was judged not to be a potential foreshock, was that because it did not have a high rate of aftershock productivity? This could be in the form of notes or minutes, without attributing particular viewpoints to any particular expert.

there seems to be no way to prevent conflicting opinions from being shared, but the mere existence of a “Deliberative Body” conveys a gravitas hat may not be justified.

External Communication Option 2 -- Limited Restrictions. Members of the Deliberative Body could

accept some limited restrictions on their external communication. These restrictions could, for example,

allow for members to make empirical statement to those seeking information, while restricting them

from offering interpretation of empirical statements (e.g. confirming that a swarm of earthquakes

occurred on a specific date and in a specific place, but not offering an opinion as to whether these

events were suggestive of a foreshock sequence) while the Deliberative Body was in the deliberative

stage. If members were asked to speak on the situation, they could be expected to make pre-

determined statements, such as stating that expert evaluation was underway and would be provided by

the Deliberative Body. After deliberation was complete, members could make factual and evaluative

statements from their personal perspective under this limited restrictions options.

Participant Comments:

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As noted below, interpretations of seismic sequences are not a black art, the press will get interpretations immediately, whether from members or other geophysicists.

A limited-restrictions option may help ensure that empirical information is disseminated rapidly, quickly

addressing public concerns and assuring the public that evaluation was underway. However, even

knowing that evaluation was underway, others outside the Deliberative Body, perhaps with much less

expertise, may offer interpretations in the void.

Participant Comments:

All swarms are indicative of increased earthquake probabilities. The only question is how much the probabilities have increased.

This makes some sense. There could be an “industry” standard that clearly outlines the lane in which scientists operate, but again, having a Deliberative Body (College of Cardinals model?) seems to provide more weight, and the prospect of interminable conference calls instead of action during an event, that makes this difficult to envision.

As noted below, interpretations of seismic sequences are not a black art, the press will get interpretations immediately, whether from members or other geophysicists.

External Communication Option 3 -- Moderately High Restrictions. Under a moderately-high

restrictions option, members of the Deliberative Body could provide empirical statements to those

seeking information about earthquake risk, much like under the limited-restrictions option above. They

could state that evaluation was being performed by the Deliberative Body and would be announced

shortly. However, under a moderately-high restriction option, members would not make personal

evaluative statements or even share the consensus information or agreed-upon talking points even after

deliberation had concluded. Rather, the members would direct all requests for information to the

Deliberative Body Chair.

This option would maximize the consistency of earthquake risk communication as such information

would be provided by a single source – the Deliberative Body Chair. However, such a restriction would

likely slow dissemination down as the Chair may be unable to respond swiftly to multiple requests. This

option would also place a heavy burden on the Chair, possibly reducing his/her ability to perform other

vital professional tasks. Such high restrictions may also be viewed as stifling information flow; members

of the Deliberative Body may see such restrictions as conflicting with their professional duty and

personal ethic to share risk information.

Participant Comments: 1. “Too restrictive”

2. Option must be accompanied by Deliberations and dissemination with a Chair

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External Communication Option 4 -- High Restrictions. Under a high-restrictions option, members of

the Deliberative Body could be asked to make no comments of factual or evaluative nature at all. Only

the official information statement of the Deliberative Body would be provided after deliberation.

Deliberations of the body may not be discussed, but individuals may offer expert advice outside of their

membership as individuals in their respected disciplines. Such an approach would ensure that the

information interested parties received was highly vetted, but may simply turn those requesting

information to other, less credible sources. Because it would slow communication of earthquake risk

down, it may inadvertently increase the likelihood that incorrect or misleading information is widely

spread through social media and other channels. Such high restrictions may also be viewed as stifling

information flow; scientists may see such restrictions as conflicting with their professional duty and

personal ethic to share risk information.

Participant Comments:

1. Needs to be more descriptive- deliberations of the body may not be discussed, but individuals may

offer expert advice outside of their membership

ALTERNATIVES FOR COORDINATED EARTHQUAKE RISK COMMUNICATION PLAN

Section 2 laid out a variety of options for coordinated initiation, deliberation, and dissemination of

earthquake risk information. These options are summarized in Table 3.1, below. Based upon discussions

during the workshops, interviews, meetings, and surveys responses, this section combines these options

into a number of possible alternatives for a coordinated earthquake risk communication plan.

Table 3.1. Summary of Options for Coordinated Risk Communication:

Initiation Options Deliberation Options Dissemination Options

I 1 - Informal Initiation I 2 - Formal Initiations based upon Defined Criteria

Db 1 - No Deliberative Body Db 2 - Informal Deliberative Body Db 3 - Formal Deliberative Body Db 4 - Formal Scientific Deliberative Body with Coordinated Finalization

Ds 1 - Independent Dissemination Ds 2 - Deliberative Outcome Delivered to EM Orgs. Ds 3 - Formal Statement, Centrally Disseminated

Other Aspects – Membership Options M 1 - Scientists M 2 - Scientists, social scientists, PIO/EM M 3 - Scientists, Reps from EM Orgs and Representatives from Media

Other Aspects – External Communication Options EC 1 - No Restrictions EC 2 - Limited Restrictions EC 3 - Moderately high restrictions EC 4 - High Restrictions

While all the options available allow for a vast number of permutations, we have sketched out several

alternatives. These are believed to be the most viable alternatives for coordinating risk communication.

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These alternatives combine various options for initiation, deliberation, and dissemination discussed in

Section 2, based upon distinct and different goals.

These alternatives, as well as any others that reviewers and participants may suggest, will be voted upon

by participants to identify the alternative(s) with the most support. We will then more fully articulate

the details of that alternative in a recommendation in the next draft.

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Alternative A: Nimble

The first alternative seeks to maximize the flexibility and efficiency of a coordinated earthquake risk

messaging plan. Alternative A would seek to:

Ensure speed of process;

Solidify communication between scientific experts and public safety experts;

Provide process flexibility; and

Reduce the likelihood that media/public would seek information from less credible sources.

Based upon these goals, the following options for Initiation, Deliberation, and Dissemination have been

chosen:

Initiation Deliberation Dissemination

Option 1 - Informal Initiation Experts with in-depth knowledge of Cascadia’s seismic risk, individually or collectively, believe that unusual circumstances warrant coordinated discussion of earthquake risk in the Cascadia region. Individual experts call for the initiation of coordinated discussion about regional earthquake risk. At their discretion, experts initiate a conference call or electronic exchange; as needed, follow-up communication also occurs.

Option 2 - Informal Deliberative Body The expert community informally identifies key institutions and individuals who should be part of deliberations about regional earthquake risk. This informal Deliberative Body of experts initiates a deliberative procedure, such as conference call(s) and follow-up digital communications. The informal Deliberative Body concludes deliberation by developing talking points, but does not develop a consensus statement or other unified outcome.

Option 3 - Formal Statement, Centrally Disseminated Talking points are shared with State/Provincial EM Organizations immediately following deliberation. EM Organizations then use existing channels of communication to disseminate updated risk information, as they see fit.

Membership Option 1 - Scientific experts only Scientists discuss the possibilities and uncertainties of earthquake risk, allowing for free flow of information within an environment where scientific disagreement is less likely to be misunderstood and reported.

External Communication Option 1 or 2 - No or limited restrictions Scientists involved in the informal deliberations may provide information to emergency managers, media and public at their discretion, or, if agreed upon, only after deliberation is completed.

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Participant Comments:

1. This option is not necessarily “nimble”, but more “flexible” than others. Automatic triggers

are faster but less flexible. I think a combination of the two is needed.

2. Initiation Option 1

This will not escape media attention for ill or good

Deliberation Option 2

Who’s is in/ out of this?

Dissemination Option 3

This makes sense but info will be leaked to media. This creates problems before professional EM assessment can be made. Appearing to cry wolf just once could kill credibility of all.

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Alternative B: Formal Authoritative

The second alternative seeks to maximize the flexibility and efficiency of a coordinated earthquake risk

messaging plan, but ensure a formal authoritative review from a Deliberative Body. Alternative B should

seek to:

Reduce probability of rumors spreading;

Reduce inconsistency of information;

Reduce spread of discordant/conflicting information from experts; and

Maximize public trust in a Deliberative Body.

Based upon these goals, the following options for Initiation, Deliberation, and Dissemination have been

chosen:

Initiation Deliberation Dissemination

Option 2 - Defined Initiations for Deliberation Experts convene when unusual seismic activity or widespread misinformation warranting a response occurs within the Cascadia region. emergency managers may also request an information statement from the scientific community in regards to concerning updates in science or a rise in public concern.

Option 3 - Formal Deliberative Body A formal deliberative body with fully appointed members, consisting of set number of members from relevant organizations (e.g. PNSN, USGS, NRCan, geodetic networks, etc.), and an appointed/elected Chair has responsibility to issue a formal outcome of the deliberation (e.g. formal consensus statement, summary of points raised, meeting minutes).

Option 3 - Formal Statement, Centrally Disseminated The chair or other designated member of the Deliberative Body writes a formal statement(s) of deliberation (e.g. consensus statement) and posts to a centralized information platform accessible by all, such as a website. Such a platform may also include a means of responding to further requests for clarification through a traditional FAQs approach or through other social media formats.

Membership Option 1 - Scientific experts only Scientists discuss the possibilities and uncertainties of earthquake risk, allowing for free flow of information within an environment in which scientific disagreement is less likely to be misunderstood and reported.

External Communication Option 4 - High Restrictions No comments of factual or evaluative nature may be made. Only the official information statement provided.

Participant Comments: 1. Membership- So, emergency managers cannot be trusted with their public responsibilities? 2. External Communication- Impossible to enforce

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Alternative C Formal Collaborative

The third alternative seeks to maximize the coordination and increase accountability between the

scientific and emergency management networks. Alternative C should seek to:

Maximize comprehensive expert review (input from experts of appropriate disciplines);

Increase consistency of risk information provided;

Reduce spread of inaccurate information; and

Enhance coordination between scientific experts and emergency managers.

Based upon these goals, the following options for Initiation, Deliberation, and Dissemination have been

chosen:

Initiation Deliberation Dissemination

Option 2 - Defined Initiations for Deliberation Deliberative Body convenes when a defined trigger occurs - unusual seismic activity, widespread public misinformation, request for clarification from emergency management, and/or request for initiation from expert.

Option 4 - Formal Scientific Deliberative Body with Coordinated Finalization A formal Deliberative Body, consisting of set number of appointed members from relevant organizations (e.g. PNSN, USGS, NRC, geodetic networks, etc.) deliberates on the trigger event/situation. An appointed/elected Chair has the responsibility to draft a formal outcome of the deliberation. The Chair coordinates with State/Provincial EM Organizations, such as with earthquake program managers and/or public information officers, allowing these EM counterparts to identify areas needing further clarification or to add public safety content related to response and readiness. Together they finalize a coordinated formal statement.

Option 3 - Formal Statement, Centrally Disseminated The chair or other designated member of the Deliberative Body writes a formal statement(s) and posts to a centralized information platform accessible by all, such as a website. Such a platform may also include a means of responding to further requests for clarification through a traditional FAQs approach or through other social media formats.

Membership Option 1 - Scientific experts only Scientists discuss the possibilities and uncertainties of earthquake risk, allowing for free flow of information within an environment where scientific disagreement is less likely to be misunderstood and reported. However, with coordinated finalization, the outcome of deliberation is finalized with representatives of the state/provincial emergency management.

External Communication Option 3 - Moderately high restrictions Only after the official risk communication is issued may scientists appointed to the Deliberative Body offer statements. They direct most questions to the Chair.

Participant Comments:

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1. Goals- Seems like these should be goals common to all 3 proposed alternatives? 2. Deliberation- What is the timeframe? 3. Dissemination- For what purpose are these messages? What type of information will be

provided? 4. External Communication- enforcement mechanism?

Alternative D: Flexible, Authoritative

Alternative B is close to what I’d select, and I could live with it, but if I were pressed for an ideal

alternative, it’d be as follows.

Alternative D should seek to:

Reduce probability of rumors spreading;

Reduce inconsistency of information;

Provide process flexibility; Reduce spread of discordant/conflicting information from experts;

and

Enhance coordination between scientific experts and emergency managers.

Initiation Deliberation Dissemination

Option 2 - Defined Initiations for Deliberation Experts convene when unusual seismic activity or widespread misinformation warranting a response occurs within the Cascadia region. emergency managers may also request an information statement from the scientific community in regards to concerning updates in science or a rise in public concern.

Option 3 - Formal Deliberative Body A formal deliberative body with fully appointed members, consisting of set number of members from relevant organizations (e.g. PNSN, USGS, NRC, geodetic networks, etc.), and an appointed/elected Chair has responsibility to issue a formal outcome of the deliberation (e.g. formal consensus statement, summary of points raised, meeting minutes).

Modified Option 2 – centrally disseminated to EM/public safety ahead of media I think that central dissemination is useful, but posting for all puts EM/public safety in a difficult position. I’m trying to grab most of the advantages of Options 2 and 3 without sacrificing an expert source. Making it available to EM first offers opportunity for localized tailoring via SME consultation (impractical without adoption of modified External Communication options described below).

Membership Option Modified Option 2: I think the scientists need to drive the determinations but it’s useful to have EM reps to ensure that what’s passed down is relevant and understandable. I’d modify Option 2 from state/provincial EM/PIO representation to broader EM/PIO representation, i.e., pre-

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selecting members who have desirable KSAs (e.g., background in risk communication), regardless of their jurisdictional level.

External Communication Option Modified Option 3: the deliberative body’s structure, which is established largely for process, should not be applied to communication. I agree that funneling everything through a single position almost guarantees a bottleneck (not to mention that relying on a single resource for a critical function in an emergency amounts to incorporating failure), so I’d ask the deliberative body to identify an authorized group of 3-5 who could elaborate on basic info. That should be one of the charges of the body.

Participant Comments:

I think formalizing the SME roles is essential. I’m less concerned with the structure within the body (e.g., Chair), but recognize the value of having some structure, if only to organize and ensure completion.

I think it’s very important to have initiation by experts and offer an EM option, likely based on operational uncertainty or public query (similar to what we set up for Mt. Hood).

Goals for Alternative D

Alternative E should seek to:

Maximizes availability of authoritative scientific information to emergency managers when they

decide they need it to do their jobs

Formal deliberative body is best way to ensure that all needed expertise is brought to the table

Including a liaison/facilitator from an EM agency helps deliberation stay focused on the specific

matter under discussion

Cross-checking of Deliberative Outcome minimizes chance of misinterpretation, but does not

take as long as a full coordinated outcome

Initiation Deliberation Dissemination

Option 2- Defined Initiations for Deliberation

Option 3 – Formal Deliberative Body

Dissemination Option 5. Deliberative Outcome Delivered to EM Orgs, with opportunity to cross validate their understanding of the content

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with chair of the DB (Possibly through Governors)

Scientists convene when unusual seismic activity or other data, or widespread misinformation warranting a response, occurs within the Cascadia region. emergency managers may also request an information statement from the scientific community in regards to concerning updates in science or a rise in public concern.

A formal deliberative body with fully appointed members, consisting of set number of members from relevant organizations (e.g. PNSN, USGS, NRC, geodetic networks, etc.), and an appointed/elected Chair has responsibility to issue a formal outcome of the deliberation (e.g. formal consensus statement, summary of points raised, meeting minutes).

emergency managers, upon receiving written outcome from the DB, have pre-developed plans that they can implement rapidly

Membership Option 2.5 Scientists and liaison/facilitator representing State/ Provincial EM Organizations

External Communication Option 5: Members of the formal deliberative body may provide any information at any time, excepting only that, in recounting the basis for the deliberative outcome, they may not attribute anything to a particular member of the DB. The process under development here imposes no restrictions on communication by anyone else, while noting that government organizations/ agencies generally do impose some restrictions on their employees with respect to public statements that may have public safety or policy implications.

My overall suggestion is a combination of automatic triggered advisories that are pre-approved,

including templates that combine input from scientists and emergency managers; a deliberative body

that acts in two stages: scientific and then user oriented to do those pre-approvals, and allowing for

independent dissemination along with effectively dissemination of the pre-approved messages. There

should also be the ability to convene the deliberative bodies based on informal criteria to take into

account unexpected or slowly developing situations. I also suggest that the scientific panel be

associated with NEPEC as a subcommittee in order to provide some consistency in approach between

different regions of the country. In fact, I think that CEPEC should be reconstituted in that way, although

I realize that each state is free to have a panel, if they wish. This may require developing new

approaches for NEPEC but I think that is worth it.

Post Workshops and First Draft Review Interviews:

NEPEC can form subcommittees. These subcommittees may be formed without an act of congress and are subject to NEPEC Charter rules. (See NEPEC_Charter_2014-2016_signed.pdf, Section 14-15).

NEPEC's founding legislation explicitly allows for rapidly called meetings. We just haven't used that provision on a regular basis. Therefore, NEPEC could have a PNW subcommittee

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that meets in response to rapidly developing situations with the reports going out through NEPEC. One benefit to the members of working through NEPEC is that it provides liability protection to its members. State committees can do the same thing but it would have to be done by each state.

Alternative E: Most flexible and easiest to maintain

Alternative E seeks to:

Involve all emergency managers, scientists, and PIOs

React immediately as information is digested

Converge on a sensible message

Initiation Deliberation Dissemination

Between Option 1 & 2 – seems the most flexible. Scientists, emergency managers, or PIOs could ask the group whether action is timely.

Between Option 1 & 2 – ideally, talking points are generated, but we respond to all questions as they come in. The talking points, once generated, guide response.

Option 1 – the quickest. Organizations would likely still co-ordinate, but not need assent from everyone to move forward.

Membership Option 2 – Maintain an email list, and then participation in necessary conference calls, which involves the range of relevant organizations. Subsets could serve if an event involves just a single state, or not the entire gamut of threats.

External Communication Option 1 – no restrictions. I don’t think restrictions, and their unavoidable delays in talking with the public, are appropriate in a large fraction of earthquake related crises.

Alternative F

This alternative would:

Build on organizational knowledge and competencies associated with ICS (Incident Command Systems) response to other types of disasters

Retains flexibility for initiation and membership options

Provides an external communication structure familiar to media organizations, and workable from their point of view

Enables refinement over time of messaging associated with a particular risk, which would lead to better public education and awareness

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Initiation Deliberation Dissemination

Option 2 - Defined Initiations for Deliberation Experts convene when unusual seismic activity or widespread misinformation warranting a response occurs within the Cascadia region. emergency managers may also request an information statement from the scientific community in regards to concerning updates in science or a rise in public concern. One organization should be designated as a convener to trigger an ICS-type response.

Option 2 - Informal Deliberative Body The expert community informally identifies key institutions and individuals who should be part of deliberations about regional earthquake risk. This informal Deliberative Body of experts initiates a deliberative procedure, such as conference call(s) and follow-up digital communications. The informal Deliberative Body concludes deliberation by developing talking points or a public statement suitable for wide distribution.

Option 3 - Formal Statement, Centrally Disseminated The chair or other designated member of the Deliberative Body writes a formal statement(s) of deliberation (e.g. consensus statement) and posts to a centralized information platform accessible by all, such as a website. Such a platform may also include a means of responding to further requests for clarification through a traditional FAQs approach or through other social media formats. Would recommend establishing an ‘operational center’ (informally, at least) from which public information statements can be issued.

Membership Option 2 - Scientists, Reps from State/Provincial EM Organizations (recommend retaining flexibility to add in specific professional expertise as needed)

External Communication Option 3 - Moderately high restrictions, with the provision for a Public Information Officer-style spokesperson or team, similar to what is provided in the event of a forest fire or similar public hazard. This approach enables rapid response to media inquiries from several qualified sources who can present a cohesive message at the direction of the deliberative body.

Alternative G should seek to:

[Insert what your recommended alternative should achieve/ maximize/ minimize]

Identify single “go-to” entity for scientifically-vetted information during situations defined by

triggering criteria for assembly

Build on existing relationships between scientists and emergency managers

Disseminate agreed-upon info (Ds3), but with the flexibility to tailor messages (EC2) for different

audiences

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Initiation Deliberation Dissemination

Option [insert option number from section 3 or define an entirely new option] I2 – triggering criteria should include exercises (e.g., Cascadia Rising)

Option [insert option number from section 3 or define an entirely new option] Db3

Option [insert option number from section 3 or define an entirely new option] Ds3

Membership Option [insert option number from section 3 or define an entirely new option] M2 – consider including 1-2 observers to entrain next generation of scientists and emergency managers.

External Communication Option [insert option number from section 3 or define an entirely new option] EC2

“This seems to be driving toward the establishment of a Deliberative Committee, yet it is not clear to me

how that would improve the situation during an event. I do not believe that I have ever been

forewarned about a pending earthquake. An expensive gran t program and costly maintenance program

is being planned that will provide a few seconds warning at best. I have too many questions to embrace

any of the recommendations.” Alternative H should seek to:

There is not a persuasive case to be made for this type of organization unless the comments

above can be clarified and explained further.

Emergency managers need advance warning but that still seems a far-off hope. USGS and its

academic colleagues can inform State EM and local EM if they feel there is sufficient information

to share- this can (and does) happen now without the formality of a Deliberative Committee.

This feels like some scientists want to have a public impact on EM decision making without

sharing in the personal and professional accountability that emergency managers shoulder.

Initiation Deliberation Dissemination

Option [insert option number from section 3 or define an entirely new option]

Option Informal (as is now) approach – 2.2.2 seems least offensive[insert option number from section 3 or define an entirely new option]

Option [insert option number from section 3 or define an entirely new option] While scientists are free to issue media reports, they should be sharing in advance whenever possible with state and local EM before going public.

Membership Option [insert option number from section 3 or define an entirely new option]

External Communication Option [insert option number from section 3 or define an entirely new option]

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7.7 Appendix F. Post- Workshop Survey Results

How supportive would you be of a Deliberative Body tasked with coordinating BEFORE automated

earthquake forecasting in the Cascadia region?

Response options N Comments

Extremely supportive

13 ● I think we have some ways to go before we have a CSZ equivalent of CEPEC (at least on the forecasting side), but I think establishing a group and process now make it easier to adapt, and may even provide a way for us to keep up with developments. If nothing else, a good debunking source. FYI: "Salton Sea"

● Coordination and mutual understandings, relationships, and decisions achieved ahead of time could certainly further the decision-making process during and after significant seismic activity. Thus, regular meetings of such a group would be wise.

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● Supportive of the need for expediency in coordination, but doubtful of how capable we are have all the critical expertise at such short notice. Need a drop-dead timeline for any involvement.

● I feel that having coordinated messaging prior to a seismic event is critical for public awareness, understanding of the risk and safety. However, the messaging would need to be distinctively different than POST-event communications and be created with purpose so that the message does not create undue concern or hysteria. Much of these messages can be pre-written and should clearly communicate that while earthquakes are unpredictable, the automated messaging enables the public to become more aware of earthquake risk and offer preparedness information.

Somewhat supportive

8

● This must be coordinated and released only in conjunction with professional emergency managers. They cannot be blindsided, nor should the scientific group act without the approval of local and state jurisdictions: the reason- if people suffer injury or death, it is not the scientists that will be blamed or that will face professional consequences.

● Even a quick phone call should be able to verify whether the swarm activity seems to indicate heightened risk or not (There must be something the prediction algorithm is based on with a person behind it). It should at least be considered that any sort of automated prediction has a potential for false alarm, and people should verify whether the prediction looks like it could lead to an increase in chance of earthquake or not.

● One-man show make time availability limited ● The term 'Deliberative Body' would need to be known by

decision makers so that the information coming out of the DB would be seem as value added.

○ I would like to like that SMEs from USGS and possibility region partners (U.S. states and Canadians) would have a 2-3 reps to ensure buy-in.

● My question is what the role of this body would be as compared to the Washington State Earthquake program office. Would this be a duplication in some respects and if so in what areas? And if not, then I would like to see a matrix of the responsibilities envisioned as compared that of the state, local, and perhaps other federal orgs./agencies.

● The establishment of a deliberative body is a good way to develop a group and process to assess various situations in

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the Cascadia region. The processes could actually help inform automated forecasting in the future. Any information disseminated by such a body would have to be coordinated for release with emergency management organizations to ensure that they are prepared for any media attention or public concern. Also any issues with cross-border coordination would have to resolved before such a body is established.

● The basic science behind earthquake forecasts based on earthquake clustering (foreshocks and aftershocks) is well developed and will continue to be evaluated by NEPEC for the nation. However, the PNW has specific issues due to the lack of seismicity on the megathrust and the complexity of seismicity on crustal faults and associated with the down going slab. Thus, close work with scientists in the PNW is critical to doing the best possible job. And, customizing messaging for the PNW is both possible and desirable. By doing this beforehand, we can consider a wide range of opinions in crafting the messages.

Neither supportive nor unsupportive

1 ● In theory a coordinated effort to review sounds great. However, the logistics and the timeliness of efforts is a concern

Somewhat unsupportive

4 ● First thought: Stop calling it Automated Earthquake Forecasting. That makes it sound like USGS is creating an ability to predict earthquakes. Forecast is the term we use when talking about the weather or storms, not earthquakes. The public won't understand this term. After reading the long description provided, that is absolutely not the case. Correct me if I'm wrong, but USGS will just be firing off Tweets when an earthquake happens via an automated system similar to the way PNSN does in our state? Is that what we're talking about here? How can we coordinate a message that we don't know what the target will be or as a result of a mystery automated message? Perhaps we could craft predetermined messages/prescripted messages to correspond with every event possible, but that's about it.

Response: Automated forecasting is beyond your description. It will forecast heightened earthquake probability in a specific geography for a specific period. (i.e. there is a 1% chance of a damaging earthquake in the 10-mile radius around point X over the next seven

106

days. This risk is 1000 times higher than the usual background risk.)

● Depends on how the USGS internally plans to lay the groundwork for their OEF forecasts. I would expect the forecasts will give probability of earthquakes in near future, with a message that has been vetted by emergency managers as well as seismologists, including outreach specialists. We should only convene committees on this topic if we think the USGS is planning an inadequate or partial procedure.

● The major advantage of this approach would be that a group would be in place on an ongoing basis with expertise and experience in communicating about earthquake risk.

● Without a clear line of authority or mandate from senior (state/federal) agency leadership and the Gov's office, to say nothing of a budget or resource allocation, I do not see how an ad-hoc Deliberative Body will ever be systematically capable of providing usable analyses and conclusions in a timely manner.

● Your last paragraph makes the important point: "The experience of the California Earthquake Prediction and Evaluation Council (CEPEC) over the last two decades validates this concern. CEPEC’s most recent advisory statement following a swarm under the Salton Sea in Southern California took over a day from the activity to when the California Office of Emergency Services issued a statement. Other advisories have also taken several hours, at best." It seems possible that a deliberative body could be formed under rules that would enable it, or at least a subset of it, to review an automatic forecast within a much shorter period of time than has been achieved by CEPEC. I think this would be a great improvement over the CEPEC process, and would provide an important check on purely automated messaging. This would require decision support tools enabling the deliberators to avoid wasting time looking up the earthquake history of an area, etc. Developing such tools is very feasible (and in fact such tools are almost byproducts of the data assembly required for implementation of automatic forecasts). If an automated warning of a significant earthquake is issued, experts such as those making up a deliberative body would need to be convened rapidly anyway, in order to

107

provide supplementary information to the public and to evaluate what is likely to be a dynamically evolving situation.

Extremely unsupportive

2 ● I don't think operational earthquake forecasting in a quantitative sense is practically useful because of the large epistemic uncertainties and low probabilities. So, the question is ill-posed.

● Scientific organizations/ agencies such as USGS should continue their automated ENS and PAGER reports and work to improve the readability of aftershock forecasting products. The public and emergency managers should not be kept in the dark while a deliberative body coordinates. Especially in cases where we are at risk for a potentially large earthquake that could knock out communication. Coordinated messaging to interpret the data can be released on its own volition.

Total 28

How important would the following tasks be for a Deliberative Body that coordinated before automated

messages?

Option Not at all valuable

Somewhat valuable

Very Valuable

I do not support

No Label

Drafting and field testing language for automated messages in coordination with USGS

4 17 1

Developing templates for couching automated messages in terms of regional seismicity, regional risk, and appropriate short and long-term protective actions

10 11 1

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Identifying the most useful parameters for quantifying heightened risk (e.g. stating heightened risk for 10km radius around and for time period of 1 week following trigger event)

1 4 16 1

Developing and organizing regular communications drills to prompt state and local governments to practice disseminating information statements and protective action advice following an automated forecast

1 10 11

Develop talking points or other material to educate recipients (emergency managers, public, public and private organizations) of the value and limitations of automated earthquake forecasting

6 14 1

Comments:

● I don't think the DB should be responsible for developing exercises: we have plenty of people who can do that, and there's no compelling reason to add the workload to a group with a specialized purpose. I think the DB should function as a collective SME, providing trusted content and some guidance, including vetting exercise scenarios. One could make a similar case about templates (content vs. actual products) and such, to ensure key content isn't lost in translation. That doesn't mean that exercises (whether comms drills or other) aren't

109

valuable - they are - just that we don't need to put that on the DB. ● It is not the role of this group to conduct "drills" for emergency managers or local officials. ● The education portion of this is vital: There needs to be public outreach about this, so that the

correct actions (if any are appropriate) are taken in the event of a prediction. Avoiding panic/apathy reactions would be preferred

● The format and suggested content of messaging will be very useful to guide and assist the deliberative body in the "heat of the moment" response to a significant event. Even more useful will be testing them via communications exercises. I support developing talking points as well as guidance of what is useful (context, historical context, what can be expected in terms of damage/casualty info) for emergency managers and ultimately the public.

● The same question arises in response to this question - is this body duplicating work in terms of language the USGS is drafting and possibly testing? Would this body be duplicating drills that a state or local agency might be responsible for? And is there a need for more public education input?

● These lines of efforts should be explored/developed by the deliberative body well after establishing the body's standard processes. The USGS should be concerned with any communications drills regarding forecasting however they could use input from the body whenever possible to assist with the drills

● I'm really glad to see educating recipients on this list. Working with the state and local emergency managers, including those in companies and other organizations, is key to their being able to communicate about these forecasts to people in their jurisdictions, companies, and organizations.

Who should be part of this Deliberative Body?

Essential to include

Good to include

Important to consult with, but not necessary to include

Exclude

Pacific Northwest Seismic Network (PNSN)

18 1

110

Cascadia Regional Earthquake Workgroup (CREW)

7 6 6

United States Geological Survey (USGS)

18 1

Natural Resource Orgs./Agencies (Department of Natural Resources (DNR), Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI), Natural Resources Canada (NRCan))

14 3 2

Research Universities - seismology

5 11 3

Research Universities -- geodetics

5 9 5

111

Research Universities - social science

5 10 4

Public health

1 7 10 1

News media

3 7 5 4

Public facilities managers (e.g. energy, transportation)

4 6 7 2

Private facilities managers (industries)

3 5 9 2

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

8 8 3

State/Prov. emergency

12 6 1

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management

Local emergency management

7 8 4

Specialists in statistics

8 8 2

Comments:

● I don't see anyone on the list I'd exclude. Statisticians' utility would depend on the nature of the forecasting and communications needs. They could be as important as social scientists in framing a message. I think news media could be essential partners and assist with transparency, but there's the potential issues of proprietary issue (if there's a private-sector investment in the network), as well as how to handle raw/unvetted/draft info that normally would not be made public before the fact. If either of those issues are significant, I'd shift media from "good to include" to "important to consult with" - I think excluding them entirely would be a mistake.

● The problem is once this group gets too large, control over timing and messaging is threatened. Question presupposes that deliberative body has power to act- it should not.

● If messages are to prompt an action of the public, then we should consider the following: How is the target audience included in the review of messaging to ensure level of understanding. Does the data and information used consider the demographics of the area? A process to get input from the community. Analysis of impacts to communities of color, people with disabilities, low-income populations, seniors, children, renters, and other historically underserved or excluded groups.

● Public Safety Canada; First nations communities; critical infrastructure owners and/or operators; National Tsunami Warning Centre

● I really like the category of important to consult with. The deliberative body can't be too big but should reach out too many others.

● Experts in risk communication, emergency public information

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● You need someone in communications and messaging.

How supportive would you be of forming a deliberative process for coordinating during or after other

phenomena or rapidly evolving events where clarification of heightened earthquake risk may be

warranted?

Response options N Comments

Extremely supportive 19 ● "Extreme support" notwithstanding, I could see numerous practical obstacles to establishing a process for these circumstances, but it's worth further consideration.

● As a media representative, I can tell you that right now, no one really knows who to turn to for authoritative information. We look to academic experts or emergency managers, but the visibility of experts at USGS, for example, is very low for us. Anything that would bring together qualified sources and a transparent process for getting information from such sources would be a vast improvement on the status quo.

● Yes, scientific interpretation of aseismic activity should be discussed and translated into informational messages with social scientists in order for the public and emergency managers to take appropriate action.

● I would only be 'extremely supportive' if this ties into the ShakeAlert System being developed.

● CEPEC has functioned successfully in this role. The public will look for authoritative information in many of the circumstances described above.

● Such a group would be extremely beneficial to emergency managers and the public's understanding of a given situation. Good coordination with media would be advised.

● This would be the best times to develop the public's understanding and expectations before a critical event occurred.

● It will be critical for key participants to be available immediately following a seismic event - a

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predetermined list of people who can be counted on to meet/discuss message points. The group would include participants with scientific credibility, communications/messaging skills and someone who can interface immediately with government/political entities

Somewhat supportive 4 ● Depends upon the construct of the deliberative body, its authority to issue comments, and its connection with responsible emergency management officials. They can be helpful debunking charlatans like the Circle of Life clown.

Neither supportive nor unsupportive

1

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Somewhat unsupportive 2 ● I'd prefer the option of NEPEC, which already exists and meets at least annually, spearheading debunking false (and true) rumors and interpretation of anomalous strain signals. At least based on history, this sort of panic has not arisen often enough in the Pacific Northwest to warrant a dedicated committee. In my decade at the PNSN, I can't think of a single example.

● A Deliberative Body is unnecessary when the current system depending on our state seismologist works. Now, if our state seismologist wants to convene added experts, that's an entirely different matter and should fall to that person, not an outside entity. That said, don't we already have these systems in place because CREW exists?

Extremely unsupportive 2 ● I don't think such a body would be an improvement over the current situation.

● My primary concern is ensuring that information shared with the public is timely, accurate, and actionable. A deliberative body may be able to add accuracy, but if achieving that impacts the timeliness of sharing the data, thus delaying or confusing specific actions, then it is not worth it from an emergency management perspective. The (brand) credibility of existing orgs./agencies (DNR, USGS, PNSN) are trusted among media, responder orgs./ agencies, and the public. Developing yet another level of oversight seems unnecessarily bureaucratic during or immediately following an event.

Under certain circumstances 0

Total 28

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How supportive are you of the following initiation options?

Option Description

Very su

pp

ortive

Som

ew

hat su

pp

ortive

Neith

er sup

po

rtive no

r u

nsu

pp

ortive

Som

ew

hat

un

sup

po

rtive

Very u

nsu

pp

ortive

I1. Informal Initiation

Experts with in-depth knowledge of Cascadia’s seismic risk individually or collectively believe that unusual circumstances warrant coordinated discussion of earthquake hazard in the Cascadia region. Such experts call for the initiation of coordinated discussion about regional earthquake risk. At their discretion, experts initiate a conference call or electronic exchange; as needed, follow-up communication also occurs.

11

(44%)

8

(32%)

3

(12%)

3

(12%)

0

(0%)

I2. Formal Initiation based upon Defined Criteria

Specific geophysical and/or social initiations warrant specific individual experts to gather formally to discuss the potentials, changes, and uncertainties of seismic hazard within Cascadia. Criteria could be seismic activity of a specific magnitude or frequency, specific levels of aseismic activity, request for evaluation of a prediction, or a formal request for clarification from state/provincial level emergency management.

11

(44%)

8

(32%)

2

(8%)

2

(8%)

1

(4%)

Comments:

● I think for this context it'll be more useful to go with the flow (informal) than try to establish well-defined criteria in a highly speculative domain.

● I have trouble seeing that it much matters whether meetings of such a council are required by specific events or if someone triggers meetings based on judgment. Some criteria, such as slow slip, bad rumors, and relevant events outside the region would be very hard to codify.

● Why is the focus just on Cascadia? Just yesterday The Seattle Times did a huge article about the Seattle fault, for instance. (Response: While the Cascadia Subduction Zone is the fault that

117

spans the entire region and would most warrant regional coordination of messaging, the Deliberative Body could have scope to cover faults within the region.)

● It seems like a practical difficulty with Option 2 is simply defining the criteria that would trigger the deliberation in a way that is clear and actionable.

● During the 2011 radiation event following the Japan quake the initial coordination calls between region X states was great, but after a few days it ballooned so much that it lost value with fed orgs./ agencies falling all over themselves and none would take the lead, very disappointing.

● Initiation option 1 will have less resource and political hurdles to accomplish. ● My assumption is that the science community already coordinates on data to come to

consensus. ● The informal option is not time effective and does not bring all necessary expertise to the

discussion. While one wants to keep rules, formality, etc., to a minimum, it is more important that discussion be initiated in a timely manner and that it proceed objectively with all necessary input.

● The body should be able to convene based on both informal and formal requests, depending on the situation.

● I don't believe that as a collective body, it is realistic to expect to be able to define or specify all potential factors that could initiate.

● I believe that it is very difficult to establish criteria for the initiation of a deliberative process as there are likely a multitude of scenarios that could warrant initiation. I would suggest the development of guidelines that could help define some parameters around initiation and would not specifically point to any particular single criteria.

● I'm somewhat supportive of informal initiation only as a supplement to formal initiation procedures. However, would be very unsupportive of it as the primary or sole means of initiation.

● Both are important ● I can see the value of both, depending on the nature of the triggering event: level 1 and 2. ● Option 1 does not define at what point the group will convene; without a specific "baseline"

can the members be relied upon to initiate the meeting? Option 2 calls for the body to a formal gathering (which might not be possible by all/key participants); should a timeframe be imposed so that the body meets within 24 hours of noted seismic activity?

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How supportive are you of the following Deliberative options?

Option Description

Very su

pp

ortive

Som

ew

hat su

pp

ortive

Neith

er sup

po

rtive no

r u

nsu

pp

ortive

Som

ew

hat

un

sup

po

rtive

Very u

nsu

pp

ortive

Db1—No Deliberative Body

Ad hoc deliberation among experts within their existing professional circles would likely occur. During and following this informal discussion between experts, the experts would likely provide information to emergency managers and media at their discretion and through their own organizations.

2

(8%)

4

(16%)

3

(12%)

6

(24%)

10

(40%)

Db2. Informal Deliberative Body

The expert community informally identifies key institutions and individuals who should be part of deliberations about regional earthquake risk. These institutions and individuals are not formally appointed or bound to specific organizational charter. However, they may develop informal procedures, such as standard agendas or formal guidance for discussion. Once coordinated earthquake risk communication has been initiated, this informal Deliberative Body of experts initiates a deliberative procedure, such as conference call(s) and follow-up digital communications. During their deliberations, they discuss the knowns and unknowns of regional earthquake risk and any qualitative or quantitative changes that may have occurred. The informal Deliberative Body concludes deliberation without seeking to develop a unified outcome (e.g. consensus statement), though members of the body may agree upon broad talking points.

3

(13%)

11

(48%)

2

(9%)

3

(13%)

4

(17%)

Db3. Formal Deliberative Body

The expert community formally identifies key institutions, networks, and/or individuals who should be part of formal deliberations about changes in

11

(44%)

10

(40%)

2

(8%)

1

(4%)

1

(4%)

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regional earthquake risk or clarification about existing risk. Institutions and networks appoint individuals to a formal Deliberative Body, with care to ensure broad theoretical and geographic representation. Once coordinated earthquake risk communication has been initiated, this formal Deliberative Body initiates a deliberative procedure through a defined protocol, such as a series of conference call(s), internal communications and data gathering, and/or digital communications. During their deliberations, they discuss the knowns and unknowns of regional earthquake risk and any qualitative or quantitative changes that may have occurred. The formal Deliberative Body concludes deliberation by writing a formal statement. This statement could take various forms, such as approved meeting minutes, approved talking points, approved information statement, or consensus statement.

Db4. Formal Scientific Deliberative Body with Coordinated Finalization

Deliberative Body initiates a deliberative procedure through a defined protocol, such as a series of conference call(s), internal communications and data gathering, and/or digital communications. During their deliberations, they discuss the knowns and unknowns of regional earthquake risk and any qualitative or quantitative changes that may have occurred. The formal Deliberative Body then drafts a formal statement. Before finalizing, the Deliberative Body coordinates with EM/ Public Information Officers (PIO) or other organizations. The Deliberative Body provides these EM representatives with its draft of a formal statement, allowing EM counterparts to identify areas needing further clarification or to add public safety content related to response and readiness. Together they finalize a coordinated formal statement, which may take the form of an approved meeting minutes, an approved information statement, approved talking points, or a consensus statement.

13

(52%)

2

(8%)

4

(16%)

5

(20%)

1

(4%)

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Comments:

● I'm not sure how Db 2 would be different from the current situation Db 1. ● The key is maintaining security until government authority concurs. Difficult as it might be for

the Deliberative Body, this assures that accountability remains with those charged with public safety. Also, once a "prediction" is wrong, credibility may be lost. My support is limited to the notion that a DB is inevitable no matter what anyone says.

● The primary drawback of option Db4 is the amount of time it would take. People have been trained to expect "immediate analysis" which will happen with or without expert input. Options that get informed expert opinion to the public quickly will be critical to keeping public reactions from rapidly spinning out of control without basis.

● While I like informal, something like this needs to be formal to establish credibility. the problem is, the more cooks you add to the kitchen, the longer the output will take as not all will agree.

● Db 2 and 3 bring together the right stakeholders and give transparency amongst scientists and emergency managers. Db4 is not efficient for cases in which rapid messaging is necessary. In addition, Db 4 lacks transparency and ties the hands of emergency managers to respond to media inquiries. A scientific-focused discussion can still be facilitated in Db 2 and 3 with emergency managers as passive participants (listen-only). I like that Db 3 has outputs.

● All four scenarios have major implementation flaws as currently described. Media will respond and report on information from any number of sources; they will not wait for a deliberative body. Organizations/ Agencies with regulations and appropriated budgets to perform similar functions will not abdicate their responsibility to a deliberative body. EM orgs./ agencies will make the best decisions on imperfect data when responding to a crisis. The public (and potentially impacted communities/businesses/etc.) will not react differently because a new deliberative body is stood up. There will always be "experts" who are not affiliated with the deliberative body who are willing to share their own opinions to the media, public, etc. Any delay in getting information out to the public only increases the probability that these "experts" will be consulted first.

● The body needs to be formal. The science and emergency management functions need to be separated, but there should be an opportunity for those receiving the conclusions of the deliberative body to be sure they have been interpreted correctly before they are used as a basis for action. A back-and-forth and re-drafting process is likely to take too much time.

● A structure, and desired result should be set forth to ensure that something will happen. ● DB 3 and DB 4 may require a large amount of time to deliberate and so there must be

guidelines and/or criteria developed to ensure that in circumstances that warrant timely dissemination information, that information can be made available as soon as possible. The deliberative body should not be held responsible if they make an incorrect statement or forecast.

● I think a formal deliberative body is important if you are going to act quickly. I am neutral about whether there needs to be a formal statement drafted and run by EM. I think that could be a choice of the deliberative body depending on the situation.

● If this is going to work, it has to be formal with a set group of people with a set group of advisors on an as needed basis. It needs to be consistent and the same each time for consistent messaging.

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● Again, I see the benefit of having a tiered approach, depending on the situation. ● Db 2 seems most realistic, however would like to see some outcome (even informal) be

delivered such as described in Db 3 and 4 (e.g., talking points or other statement to be disseminated to emergency managers, PIOs, government/political entities). Db 3 and 4 may likely take too much time and run the risk of not getting information out in a timely manner. In any of these cases, one or more of the body participants should be designated as media representatives for interviews.

How supportive are you of the following Dissemination options?

Option Description

Ve

ry sup

po

rtive

Som

ew

hat

sup

po

rtive

Ne

ithe

r sup

po

rtive

no

r un

sup

po

rtive

Som

ew

hat

un

sup

po

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Ve

ry un

sup

po

rtive

Ds1. Independent Dissemination

Experts, whether part of a Deliberative Body or not, disseminate risk information through their existing social media, social networks, and formal communication channels. If they receive calls or other requests for information from emergency managers, media, or public, they choose if, when, and how to respond.

3

(12%)

7

(28%)

4

(16%)

5

(20%)

6

(24%)

Ds2. Deliberative Outcomes Given to EM Orgs and They Disseminate to Public

Outcomes of the deliberative stage (e.g. talking points, approved meeting minutes, formal statements, etc.) are delivered directly to State/ Provincial EM Organizations immediately following deliberation. EM Organizations then use existing channels of communication and their own protocols to disseminate updated risk information, as they see fit.

9

(36%)

12

(48%)

3

(12%)

1

(4%)

0

(0%)

122

Ds3. Formal Statement, Centrally Disseminated

The chair or other designated member of the Deliberative Body writes a formal statement(s) and posts to a centralized information platform accessible by all, such as a website. Such a platform may also include a means of responding to further requests for clarification through a traditional FAQs approach or through other social media formats (Such as Reddit or Twitter). This dissemination option could be selected as an add-on to Dissemination Option 2 where a formal statement is delivered to representatives of State/Provincial Emergency Management organizations.

8

(32%)

10

(40%)

4

(16%)

2

(8%)

1

(4%)

Comments:

● Would suggest that under DS 2, that dissemination of consensus information occur not only

by emergency managers, but scientific organizations as well.

● Ds 1 will happen regardless of any other actions. The media, public, etc. will still go directly to

some sources, and respondents are not likely to withhold information if asked.

● Ds 1 is the current mode of operation and unstoppable, but could be augmented. Anything requiring formal consultation (which is nothing I can remember in the last 10 years) could be addressed by NEPEC, or, more likely, only affects one state and the Feds. Or are we solely talking about events that threaten to trigger an M9 across the entire margin here?

● I could live with Ds2 or Ds3; each has +/-. I'm leery of telling scientists that they must communicate through emergency managers, but it would be really unpleasant for emergency managers and other agency officials to see it at the same time as the public. Either way, we would/should not tolerate much of a time lag, lest the vacuum be filled by others.

● It must be said that once the media and the public learn of the existence of the Deliberative Body (the caps make it seem like a deity) the DB will be inundated with information requests and the information will be much harder to manage.

● Would suggest that under DS 2, that dissemination of consensus information occur not only by emergency managers, but scientific organizations as well.

● I do like some combination of options 2 and 3 as opposed to either one on its own. ● The more ways the information can get out, the better. It is likely the information will be

necessary to counteract sharing of false news that comes up as a result of any sort of prediction/deliberation. The idea of using Social Media such as Reddit, which can provide 2-way communication is beneficial for increasing transparency and trust.

● I believe it is necessary to have the outcome sent to the EM orgs first, so they can determine what the potential risk could be in their local area, and in turn, make a decision on who to

123

include for the next levels of communication (i.e. do they need to inform critical infrastructure owners, additional local authorities, or is there no need at all)

● Again, it gains more credibility coming from a known person such as the local EM, as opposed to an unknown body.

● Ds 1 will occur in any case as we all have an obligation to provide information to the public. Ds 2 will assist in providing a unified clarifying message. Ds 3 is a nice to have in addition to Ds 2.

● We will coordinate with the USGS for the science and the state EM and Gov for response. We can amplify partner messages in some formats.

● While the flow of information may be unstoppable, it is pertinent to give response management and scientific orgs./ agencies a fighting chance to get the correct information disseminated and have some control over the message. And if everyone is "on message" the "correct" info may get out there and be accepted by the public as valid. Then the next time around the source of this information would be more respected as a valid source of truthful information.

● Perhaps it would be better to have the information disseminated to EM organizations (DS 2) and then have it posted to a central location such as the USGS website (DS 3). This would be a combination of DS2 and DS3.

● I think you can do all three. There can be a central formal statement that is also disseminated in different ways be local EM organizations. However, if you leave dissemination only to each individual EM then you will have varied dissemination in different areas. I also don't think you can stop independent dissemination. We need to answer questions when asked by the public or media. So, I think the best plan is to have central dissemination so that people know where to go to look for authoritative info and then have it backed up by independent dissemination by both scientists and emergency managers. Plus, hearing the same (or similar) info from many sources will make it more believable.

● Again, needs to be a consistent, formal message from scientists that are trusted. Same formal message from all parties. Repeated by emergency managers and to media.

● Ds 2 offers the best flexibility in terms of messaging and how the information will impact individual geographic areas. It also offers scientific credibility and allows the information to come from local emergency managers/PIOs, which will be more widely accepted by the public.

Who should be part of the Deliberative Body for Unusual Phenomena and Rapidly Evolving Situations?

Absolutely Essential to Include

Good to Include Could be Included, but not essential

Exclude

Pacific Northwest Seismic Network (PNSN)

25 1

124

Cascadia Regional Earthquake Workgroup (CREW)

10 9 6

United States Geological Survey (USGS)

25 1

Natural Resource Orgs./ Agencies (Department of Natural Resources (DNR), Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI), Natural Resources Canada (NRCan))

19 5 1

Research Universities - seismology

9 9 7

Research Universities -- geodetics

7 11 7

Research Universities - social science

5 9 11

Public health 2 7 14 1

News media 2 6 4 12

Public facilities managers (e.g. energy, transportation)

2 8 11 3

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Private facilities managers (industries)

2 7 10 5

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

10 11 3

State/Prov. emergency management

16 7 1

Local emergency management

11 7 5 1

Specialists in statistics

12 10 2

Others

Public Safety Canada

First Nation Communities

NTWC

Critical Infrastructure owners and operators

Risk Communication and emergency public info. experts

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Comments:

● Similar reasoning as with #5. I don't see anyone on the list I'd exclude. Statisticians' utility would depend on the nature of the forecasting and communications needs. They could be as important as social scientists in framing a message. I think news media could be essential partners and assist with transparency - and would likely be more engaged under this scenario, but there's the potential issues of proprietary issue (if there's a private-sector investment in the network), as well as how to handle raw/unvetted/draft info that normally would not be made public before the fact. If either of those issues are significant, I'd shift media from "good to include" to "important to consult with" - I think excluding them entirely would be a mistake.

● How is the target audience and diverse needs of the audience included? ● The Deliberative body should consist primarily of earthquake scientists. Their job is limited to

judging how seismic activity is likely to proceed. ● Statistics are the least important in public messaging.

Other Comments:

● Again, are we solely talking about events that threaten to trigger an M9 across the entire margin

here? Which amounts perhaps to an event a decade or less. Or if we're talking about Seattle

quakes, Portland quakes, Vancouver quakes, or a bad swarm near Hanford, how necessary is it

to convene a large committee with subduction and geodetic experts from across a large region?

● Most of the research entities should have their contribution "canned" in models, thus limiting

the number of those that have to know about the analysis of a potential event.

● For non-life threatening events, or for academic/programmatic/policy level discussions, a large

group like this seems more akin to a Clearing House.

● The deliberative body is not a representative body. The deliberative body should bring scientific

judgment to bear. What is to be done with their conclusions is a job for emergency managers,

facilities managers, etc.

● My entire response to this survey should consider my concern regarding duplication of

responsibilities/services. I do believe this discussion from the start has been worthwhile, but I'm

not certain that we aren't driving the outcome based on a lack of understanding of current

existing roles.

● For rapidly evolving events it may be difficult to convene such a body quickly. Therefore, key

organizations should be pre-selected to be a part of the body in these circumstances.

● I think the key is to keep this group focused on the science with a small amount of

representation from key members of the users and social scientists so they can advise on

dissemination. You could have a second body that includes more EM and user representation

that is brought in once the science questions have been addressed.

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● I urge the consistent message to be as free as possible of actual numbers. "An increased risk of

an earthquake in this general area" is fine for public message. Provide access to the data for

those that want it. But you say 2% increase to the public and their eyes glaze over and it doesn't

seem like a big deal. Again, we have so little other info about these risks begin talked about

overall that the public isn't prepared to understand. Keep it as simple and accurate as possible

without using statistics. Statistics turn people off.

Additional Comments:

● Very difficult to answer questions when the scope, membership, coordinating organization, and

product are all not yet defined. Activities maintaining connections between groups are good,

but expectation of regular geophysical action affecting much of the PNW to motivate meetings

seems unrealistic.

● I'm definitely getting interested in next steps...

● Thanks for doing this work.

● Thank you!

● Great survey, but lots of variables to consider in a spectrum of possible applications.

Deliberative Body Tasks and Functions: Online Survey Participant Responses

Participant Comments:

1. I don't think the DB should be responsible for developing exercises: we have plenty of people who can do that, and there's no compelling reason to add the workload to a group with a specialized purpose. I think the DB should function as a collective SME, providing trusted content and some guidance, including vetting exercise scenarios. One could make a similar case about templates (content vs. actual products) and such, to ensure key content isn't lost in translation. That doesn't mean that exercises (whether comms drills or other) aren't valuable - they are - just that we don't need to put that on the DB.

2. It is not the role of this group to conduct "drills" for emergency managers or local officials. 3. The education portion of this is vital: There needs to be public outreach about this, so that the

correct actions (if any are appropriate) are taken in the event of a prediction. Avoiding panic/apathy reactions would be preferred

4. The format and suggested content of messaging will be very useful to guide and assist the deliberative body in the "heat of the moment" response to a significant event. Even more useful will be testing them via communications exercises. I support developing talking points as well as guidance of what is useful (context, historical context, what can be expected in terms of damage/casualty info) for emergency managers and ultimately the public.

5. The same question arises in response to this question - is this body duplicating work in terms of language the USGS is drafting and possibly testing? Would this body be duplicating drills that a state

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or local agency might be responsible for? And is there a need for more public education input?

6. These lines of efforts should be explored/developed by the deliberative body well after establishing the body's standard processes. The USGS should be concerned with any communications drills regarding forecasting however they could use input from the body whenever possible to assist with the drills

7. I'm really glad to see educating recipients on this list. Working with the state and local emergency managers, including those in companies and other organizations, is key to their being able to communicate about these forecasts to people in their jurisdictions, companies, and organizations.

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7.8 Appendix G. CEPEC Case Study: Salton Sea Earthquake Advisory, Sept 27, 2016 The following information is based upon interviews and a meeting with CEPEC and Cal OES

representatives.

On Monday morning, September 26, 2016, a swarm of over 30 small earthquakes struck the Salton Sea

region of Southern California, an area near the southern section of the San Andreas fault. The largest of

these events was M4.3. The Governor asked CEPEC to convene on Monday evening, but the council

could not notify members and meet until Tuesday morning. The council deliberated for 30 minutes,

after which the chair of the council (California’s state geologist) wrote up a summary document and

circulated it for approval, an approval that was received within an hour and a half. The scientists were

not concerned about the swarm itself — such swarms had occurred in 2001 and 2009. However, the

council was concerned that the heightened seismic activity could trigger a larger, damaging earthquake

on the San Andreas Fault in the populous area around the city of Los Angeles. The scientists estimated

the probability of a large and damaging M>7.0 earthquake had risen from a long-term probability of

1/6000 to a short-term earthquake probability of 1/100, or 1%. (See the full text of the CEPEC

statement here: http://www.oesnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CEPEC-MEMORANDUM.pdf)

When Cal OES received the summary statement from CEPEC, Cal OES internally discussed the content

and independently adjusted the message to focus on a similar or larger earthquake, an M>4.3

earthquake in the Salton Sea area, rather than the M>7.0 event on the San Andreas Fault which CEPEC

had based their calculations. The earthquake advisory was issued on Tuesday afternoon, stating there

was a 1% chance of an M>4.3 event in the Salton Sea area. CEPEC quickly noted the mistake — in reality,

the probability of an M>4.3 event was nearly 30%, but detracted attention from the focus of their

concern, a large earthquake on the San Andreas Fault. (The Cal OES advisory and websites were updated

rapidly and news reporting on September 30 correctly stated the enhanced earthquake advisory

probabilities.) Despite the confusion, the advisory prompted some individuals and jurisdictions to take

precautionary actions — San Bernardino City Council meeting, scheduled to meet in the unreinforced

masonry City Hall, was rescheduled to meet after the advisory had been lifted and news reports that

week repeatedly reminded the public of basic preparedness actions they needed to take.

The Salton Sea earthquake advisory suggested that coordination between CEPEC and Cal OES, and the

speed at which Cal OES announced advisories needed to be reviewed. All parties agreed a stronger

scientific fact-checking process was necessary before advisories can be issued. The experience also

suggests that CEPEC scientists may not be able to accurately anticipate the type of forecasting

emergency managers desire and that a more collaborative process may be warranted. Public concern

that a widespread earthquake had been predicted also suggests that earthquake messaging about

enhanced earthquake probabilities, but within a low-probability environment, are challenging to convey.