Carmelo Furci - The PCCh and Its Third Underground Period

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Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)

The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) and Its Third Underground Period, 1973-1980Author(s): Carmelo FurciSource: Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Oct., 1982), pp. 81-95Published by: Wiley on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)

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The ChileanCommunist Party(PCCh) and its thirdunderground

period, 1973-1980CARMELO FURCI

LondonSchool of EconomicsINTRODUCTIONThis paper examines the third undergroundperiod of the ChileanCommunistParty, 1973-80; the Party'sanalysisof the Allende years, the post-1973 Partystructureboth in Chile and in exile, and its presentpolitical strategy for areturn o democracy n Chile.The Chilean CommunistParty was founded in 1912 by Luis Emilio Re-cabarren.1After an early period of relativelyinsignificantpolitical influenceit was banned and forced to go underground n the late 1920s, re-emerginglegally in 1931.2 After the sectarianismof the CommunistInternational thirdperiod'-which the PCCh, ike all Communist orcesat the time, obeyed blindly-the PCCh was reduced to a small sect. It then gainedconsiderable upportwith the formation of the PopularFront in 1938.3 But in 1948, duringtheclimax of the Cold War,the Radicalgovernmentof Gonzalez Videla launchedthe Ley Permanenteen Defensade la Democracia,and the PCChwas forcedtogo underground or the second time.4Once more it re-emerged egallyin 1958,andactedopenlyuntil 1973.Thus, the coup d'etat of September 1973 was the beginningof the thirdundergroundperiod for the PCCh.In both earlier nstances the official policyof the PCChat the beginningwas to 'retreat n orderto save the cadresandtheorganization'.In terms of repressionsuffered, the 1973-80 period has been(and continues to be) the most difficult one because its clandestinenatureis absolute and the repressionis always there. Converselyduringthe period1948-58 there had been periods of acute persecution(1948-50, 1955), butalso periodswhen the PCChwas only semi-clandestine, nd it was able to takepart in two political alliances(1952-Frente del Pueblo; 1956-Frente deAccion Popular).When the PCChwas undergroundn 1949 therewas a disputebetween the Luis Reinoso group5 and the rest of the leadership regardingpolitical strategy. During the period 1973-80 there was never a major splitor strongdebate.The crucialdifferenceduring he thirdunderground eriodlies in the tremen-dous numberof Communistsand other left-wingmilitants and leaders in exile.This is a new experience,not only for the PCChbut for all the Left. For thefirst time in its history the PCCh s 'divided' nto two majorgroups:the under-ground one in Chile and the legal one in exile. In some Communistpartiesduringthe Nazi-Fascistperiod(where therewas a similardivision between theparty undergroundand in exile) there were debates, organizationalproblems

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BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCHand different interpretationsof the political line, aggravatedby the lack ofcommunication nd differences n experienceandpoliticalambitions.COMMUNISTARTIESAND UNDERGROUNDERIODSIn comparisonwith other Communistpartiesthat have sufferedundergroundperiods the PCCh is in some respect unusual,as the cases of Spain, Brazil,Italy and Portugal ndicate. After the Communistpartieswere declared llegalin SpainandItaly, a seriesof damagingplitsfollowed.In the case of the ItalianCommunistParty (PCI)these relatedto the disputebetween StalinandTrotskyas well as (later on) to the Russian-Germanon-aggressionact.6The SpanishCommunistParty (PCE) suffered a split (almost a verticaldivision)betweenthe party underground n Spain and the party in exile that lasted for years;because of this split, plus the repression hat the PCEsuffered while under-ground, t becamea 'party n exile'.Onlyby the late 1960swasthe undergroundapparatusre-established.7 he PortugueseCommunistParty(PCP)was a verysmall organizationwithout a consistent influence in society, but it managedto survive.Althoughit also had a split and severaldisputesover its politicalstrategy, it was one of the few Communistpartiesthat by 1965 still openlyconsidered the possibility of following a strategy of armed struggle.8TheBrazilianCommunistParty is the only one considered here that attemptedan armeduprisingand failed.9In its earlyyearsit oscillatedbetween an armedstrategyand a peacefulone and has been dominatedby the role of its leader,CarlosPrestes.But again, althoughthe PCBhas also sufferedsplitsand strongdebates, t hasmanagedo survive.Analysing hese caseswe can trace a commonpattern: a) whileundergroundthe Communistpartiestend to be dominatedby splits,and strongdebatesontheir political strategies; b) they tend to be divided into two majorgroups,undergroundand exile; (c) the armedstrategytends (in the long run) to bethe predominanttrategy.The PCCh follows the last two characteristics f the patternbut afterthecoup it did not split. While in the previousundergroundperiods(1927-31;1948-58) there were splits, in this periodof illegality(from 1973 up to now)there areno signsof division.It is interesting o note how, in spite of operating n differentcountries,allillegalCommunistpartiesworkwithin more or less the sametype of organiza-tional structure.For example, in the above-mentionedcases,the organizationis divided into two centres:undergroundand exile. It maintainsat the sametime the cell system, which has alwaysbeen its basicfeature. Once the partyis declared llegal,the organizationends to be reduced n size and functioninsuch a way as to surviveratherthan provokefrontal attacks andconsequentlybe destroyed.This has been the case with the Italian and PortugueseCom-munists n particular.Thusthe cell systemand the reduced izeof the organiza-tion, plus the priority given to the protection of the small undergroundapparatus s a body in itself, are the basicfeaturesof clandestineCommunists.Theseaspectsof organi7.ationhouldbe taken into account f we wantto under-stand how they have always managed o survive.It could be suggested hat amore rigid,verticaland smallerorganization urvives he severecircumstancesof being underground etter than other kindsof partystructure.But there are

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THECHILEANCOMMUNIST ARTY(PCCh)problems when the same principles of organizationand party discipline aremaintained in normal circumstances,as has been the case with the ChileanCommunistParty.THEMILITARY UNTAAND THEPOLITICAL ARTIESA majoraspect of the 1973 coup d'etat was the speedwith which the militaryseverely repressedthe leftist partiesby meansof detention, the disappearanceof numerousmilitants and frequentsummaryexecutions.?1One of the reasonsfor the successof the coup lay in the military's ability to destroy any possibleresistanceby 'cutting off the head' of the political partiesof PopularUnity.According to Robert J. Alexander three stages can be seen in the action ofthe junta againstthe political parties.1lOn 22 September 1973, the militaryoutlawed the Marxistparties. All the parties forming part of PopularUnitywere banned, even non-Marxistones, like the RadicalPartyand the ChristianLeft, and also the MIR (Movimiento de IzquierdaRevolucionaria).On 27September 1973 Pinochet declared that all remainingpartieshad to be con-sidered 'in recess'.This was a curious measure.In fact, althoughthe junta didnot outlaw the centre and right-wingparties with this step, these were notallowed to hold any kind of public activity. In practicethey were banned frompolitics as long as they acted as organizedpartiesbut not repressedn the waythat PopularUnity was. In March1977, the militarydecreed the dissolution ofthe parties'in recess'. Since then, no political partyhas been able to participatein Chileanpolitics. Only the right-wing ractionof the CDP has playeda publicrole, not by appearingas a party but throughits leader, EduardoFrei. Forexample, on the occasion of the Referendumon the new Constitution elabor-ated by the military (4 April 1980), Frei challenged Augusto Pinochet to apublicdebate'American tyle'. Of course this debatedid not takeplace.12The position of the CDP, in relation to its position in September1973-when the majorityof its leadership upported he coup-has changed.They areagainstthe junta and supportthe idea of a civil-militarygovernmentof transi-tion leading to a returnto parliamentarydemocracy.13There are no signs ofactivity from the NationalParty andPatriay Libertadin terms of organizationand political activity except in terms of declarations n favour or againstthejunta.14The small parties of Popular Unity and the MIR continue to exist, par-ticularlyin exile where most of theirleaders ive. In Chileit is not inappropriateto assertthat althoughstill existing they were crushedby the militarybetween1973 and 1976. Because of their lack of experienceof illegalpolitical activitythey have been preventedfrom organizingan effective undergroundapparatus.It seems that during the last four years there have been signs of persistentactivity from these smallparties,particularly he Radicals andMAPU,but it isevident that their role is a minor one.ls The other small organizationof theLeft, USOPO (Union Socialista Popular) led by Raul Ampuero, joined theSocialistPartyin 1979.16The MIR,with some experienceof illegal activity (under Frei'sgovernment)has an undergroundapparatus,armedand trained for urbanguerrillaactions,but this extremeleft-winggrouphas been severelydamaged,particularlyduringthe period 1973-74. In the first two yearsthe MIRsuffered two majorsetbacks.

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BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCHIn 1974, its GeneralSecretary,MiguelEnriquez,waskilled in anarmedconflictwith the police in Santiago.17n 1975, four membersof the CentralCommitteeof the MIR, appearingat a news conference,urgedtheircomrades to give upthe struggle'against he military.'8The military unta has alwaysrepressedheMIR because of its armedapparatus.Even before the coup security policeofficers had infiltratedinto its ranks;their role was decisiveand the MIRwasheavilyaffectedby theiraction.19The SocialistParty (PSCh)presentsa more complexsituation.Prior to thecoup this partywas a federation of groupsandideologicaltendencies.20Afterthe coup, with the party alreadydivided andwith a lax internalorganization,it suffered tremendousrepressionand entire local secretariatswere killed.2'The partywas left without a link betweenthe militantswho survived.Onlybyearly 1976 were there signsof some kind of reorganizationn its rankswithinChile. Subsequently, through a series of disputes, splits and a lack of com-municationbetween the party in Chile and the leadership n exile, in April1979 the PSChexperiencedthe most serious crisisof its history.What s leftnow of the old SocialistPartyis a majoritygroupled by ClodomiroAlmeydaand at least seven small organizations.22t is not inappropriateo assert thatthe PSChhasnow disintegrated.ORGANIZATIONALTRUCTUREOFTHEPCCh,1973-80The position of the PCCh is much better than that of the PSCh.While theSocialists did not unite after the coup d'etat, the PCCh ooks more unitedthanever, or so its leaders and militants claim. Althoughthere has been a debatewithin the party about its rigidstructure,23he PCChretainsa high degreeoforganization.This is mainly because in the first days of the coup the PCChgave a political directiveto its militants to retreat and save the organization,'because t was not rightto throwall forces nto anunequalmilitaryconfronta-tion'.24Looking back, the PCCh and PopularUnity had no chanceat all ofdefeatingthe military.A differentpolitical directive(fighting the military,asthe MIR suggested)would have meant political suicide. If we want to under-standwhy the PCChsurvived he repressionwe have to take this directive ntoaccount.25Even so the PCChhas sufferedheavily;for example,six membersofits CentralCommitteewere killed by the militaryand eleven werearrested n1976 and are now desaparecidos.26 nother six who died of naturalcausesmainlybecauseof their agedid not survive he illegalstatusor the problematicsituationof exile.27Only two-thirdsof the CentralCommitteeof 1973 are alive.It is very difficult to establishhow manyCommunistmilitants died during hecoup d'etat, or are in jail. The PCCh asserts hat 'thousandsof militantshavebeen killed, put in jail or are in exile'.CertainlyhejuntaseverelyrepressedhePCCh,but it did not manage o destroyit. Thismeansthata newgenerationofyoung cadres s directing he illegalapparatus f the PCCh n Chile,particularlybecausemostof its well-known eaderswerearrested r sent into exile.In terms of organizationaltructure n the underground onditionswe candistinguish wo periods:from 1973 to 1976 and from 1977 up to now. Thefirst is the period in which the party tried to adaptits structures o the newcircumstancesof illegality,and to organizeand prepare tself for a long-termbattle. It seems that even before the coup d'etat the PCChhad a clandestine

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THECHILEANCOMMUNISTARTY(PCCh)TABLE1 Organizationaltructuresof thePCCh, n Chileandin exile

Undergroundn Chile GeneralSecretary InexileI I

Political PoliticalCommission CommissionI IComComit Comitdirectivo ' directivo

Comite | Comiticentral centralI 1Regional Regional

Comite Comiteloclocal localCell Cell

Source: PCCh, Estatutos del Partido Comunista de Chile (Texto aprovado en el XIVCongreso Nacional en Noviembre 1969, con la modificaciones aprobadas por unanimidaden la session plenaria del Comite Central en Agosto 1977 y Abril 1979), in Boletin delexterior, no. 42 (Julio-Agosto 1980), pp. 80-102.In the condition of exile the Regionals are constituted by the cells of each city in thecountries where the PCCh is organized (Cfr. Ibid., p. 102).2 Because of the difficulties of organizing a General Congress of the Party, the CentralCommittee will make important decisions of political strategy and organizational problems.The Political Commission, Comite Directivo and Central Committee act as in normal cir-cumstances, with the exception that the members of these structures are in Chile (under-ground) and in exile.Direcci6n in case it was outlawed.28The PCChadoptedthe same policy as in1948, since once againthe conditions were not favourable or a frontalattackagainst the military. Principally,after the coup the PCChmaintained a rigidstructurebased on the cell system. Cells areverticallyorganized,so that mili-tants are isolated from each other and contact is maintainedby the leader ofeach cell. The main source of communication between militants is the news-paperEl Siglo, which was the PCCh daily before the coup. The theoreticalreview of the party, Principios,also circulated. Another journalof the under-ground apparatusof the PCChis FrenteAntifascista.Naturally,becausethesepublicationsare illegal, their circulation s limited. Moreover, n orderto avoidtreason the party isolatesa militant from the organization or a period,once hehas been injail, to make sure he is not followedby the secretpolice.The majorcrisisin the undergroundapparatuswasin 1976, when almost theentire clandestineDireccion of the party was captured, apparentlybecausea militant talked undertorture. Apart from the arrestof the GeneralSecretary,Luis Corvalan,n October 1973, this was the most serioussetbackfor the PCCh.The party existed for a short period with only those few members of theDirecci6n who survivedthe arrest.But when Victor Diaz was arrested n 1976

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BULLETINOF LATINAMERICAN ESEARCH(he was in chargeof the party'sunderground pparatus)he majortask of theillegal apparatus, rying to organizean effective organization,had almostbeenaccomplished.By then the partyhad alreadyreacheda good level of organiza-tion and the arrestof the head of the underground pparatusprovedthat themilitarycould reachthe Direccionof the PCChonly by treacheryrom its ownmembers.Moreover, he arrestsdid not allow the militaryto touch the rest ofthe apparatusbecauseof its rigidand verticalorganization.The namesof thenew leadersof the PCChn Chile after 1976) arekept secret for securityreasons.Theparty nexile is organizednto cells andverticallydivided ntoRegionales.There operates a sector of the Central Committee and a Comite Directivo,plus all the featuresof organization hat the PCChhad before the coup. Thecontacts between the undergroundn Chile and exile aremaintainedby mem-bers of the Comisi6nPolitica, ComiteDirectivo and a section of the CentralCommittee see Table 1). The GeneralSecretary,LuisCorvalain,as livedsincehis release29n the Soviet Union,where the centreof thePCCh n exile is estab-lished. The activity of the section of the party in exile has two basic tasks:organizing he solidaritycampaignand financingthe underground pparatus.It also has the responsibility f organizinghe sessionsof the CentralCommitteeand guaranteeinghe securityof its memberswhen they travelto take partinmeetingswith the rest of the leadership n exile. It seems that the socialistcountries(particularlyCuba and the Soviet Union) play an importantrole inthis last procedure. n general erms,the activityof the PCCh n exile dependsheavilyon the socialistcountries.There are radioprogrammes veryday fromMoscow, and the majorityof its leadersand party'sofficials live in EasternEurope and the USSR. The party maintainsa publishinghouse and regularperiodicals,suchas Boletin del Exterior-the officialpublicationof the PCChin exile-and Araucaria,which hasa culturalrather hanpoliticalapproach.In termsof politicalactivitythe PCCh n Chile,like the otherpartiesof theLeft, has not led any majorpoliticalevent. Its activityis mainly undergroundand only occasionally appearsopenly. Its actions are mainly concentrated nthe unions and othersemi-legaltructures.ThePCChhasa considerable resencein the CoordinadoraNacional Sindical (CNS) which representsthe unitedstructure of various local and regionalunions.30Although the PCChneverappearsas such (otherwiseit would be repressed) here aresectorswhere thePCCh s visible,particularlywithin the mining,textile andbuilding ndustries.Accordingto membersof variouspartiesof the ChileanLeft, the PCCh s thestrongestpolitical influence in the unions.31Another sector where the PCChis present s the Uni6nNacionalde EstudiantesDemocraticos UNED),althoughhere it seemsto playa lessimportantrole.Becauseof clandestinity t is impossibleto know the size andeffectivenessof the PCChinfluencein the antijunta movement,but there are indicationsfrom which its 'politicalpresence'can be traced.For example,for five or sixyears there have been celebrationson May Day, in which PCChbannershavebeen shown. On various occasionsthe PCChhas organizedsmallmeetingsinstrategic places (bus stops, parks) where they have launched slogans andrecordedspeeches againstthe military.32They also participatedn the massivedemonstrationat the CaupolicanTheatre wherethe former eaderof the CDPand former Presidentof Chile(1964-70) EduardoFrei madea historicspeech

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THECHILEANCOMMUNIST ARTY(PCCh)on 27 August 1980, calling upon the Chileanpeopleto vote NO in the Referen-dum on the new Constitution.33Oppositioncannotbe expressedopenly,norbe'evident' since repression s always there. But the undergroundactivity of thePCCh s persistent; he PCCh'spublicationscirculate,even if amonga restrictedcircle;acts of sabotagehavebeen performed.Yet, if they areto move fromthisfirst stage of political 'presence' o a more aggressive orm of political activity,the PCCh-and the Left in general-will have to accomplish a long anddifficult task.THEPCChANALYSISOF THEPOPULARUNITYEXPERIENCEThe coup d'itat of 1973 represented he defeat of a political strategythat wasbasically implementedby the CommunistParty. The coup ended twenty-oneyears in which the PCChworked andstruggled or the realizationof its politicalaimsbased on three main tasks: firstly, the formationof a broadallianceof allprogressive orces under the hegemonic role of the CommunistPartyand theSocialist Party; secondly, the implementationof a programmeof 'transition'to socialism;and thirdly, the carrying out of this process by the 'peacefulroad'. By 1970, the PCChhad achieved the first two tasks. However, in thespace of three years the organizedlabour movement and the political systemof Chile collapsedunder the intervention of the ArmedForces. 'Ourdefeathasbeen the expressionof the isolation of the workingclass. This led to victoryfor the counter-revolutionn the strugglefor power.Thismeansthat morethana military defeat, it was a political one.'34 This was one of the first officialstatements of the PCCh analysingwhat happened during the Allende years.From the official documents and articles writtenby leadersof the PCChwe candiscusstheiranalysisunderthreeheadings.THEROLEOFU.S. INTERVENTIONN CHILEAccordingto the PCChthere is evidence of U.S. interventionduring he Allendeyears, in order to destabilize the PopularUnity government.In short, therewas U.S. intervention in Chile but this was certainlynot the most importantreasonfor the defeat of Allende. The interventionof the U.S. was not a directone, nor a military one. Unless there is directmilitaryinterventionthe reasonfor the defeat of a regimein a particularcountry must be found within thepolitical forces of that country and their actions, including the role of themilitary, and its degree of intervention in politics. This does not mean thatU.S. intervention in Chile was inconsiderable,35 ut it was certainlynot themost importantreason for the coup, as some Chileanpoliticians(particularlythe SocialistParty)suggest.6THEABSENCEOFA MOREUNITEDDIRECTIVEAMONGPOPULARUNITYAll the leadersof the PCChandof otherpoliticalpartiesof PopularUnity agreethat 'one of the most importantfactors in the defeat was the absenceof unity(in tactics and strategies)between its political forces; the absence, therefore,in crucialmoments, of a united directionto the revolutionaryprocess'.37 It isvery difficult to achieve a high degree of unity in an alliancewhere differentpolitical forces are taking part with their consequently distinct approaches.

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BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCHAfter 1956, there were within the ChileanLeft two political programmes.Although these aimed for the same result-the construction of a Socialistsociety-their strategiesand tacticswere different.8 This presenceof a dualityof strategieswithin the revolutionaryprocesswas, according o the PCCh, hemost importantreason for the defeat of 1973. The absenceof a more uniteddirectionwas clearfrom the roleplayedby the extremeLeft,39and its influencein some sectorsof PopularUnity.ThePCCh,wheneferringo theultraizquierda eans heMIR nparticular,andits claims to represent 'revolutionary ole'thatcouldhavechangedhereformistpoliciesof aPopularUnitydominatedby thePCCh.40 ccording o thePCCh, histendencytook dogmaticpositions.For example,it consideredall social sectorsthat were not proletarianor semi-proletariano be enemies. This approachpushedthe middle class into the forefrontof the opposition,and contributedto isolating he workingclass and the government.41Meanwhile he PCChsupporteda more moderateapproachn order o avoidcreating the conditions that would facilitate an interventionby the ArmedForces. Its moderateapproachwas even more evident on the issue of PoderPopularand all the spontaneousorganizationshat emerged n Chile afterthestrikesof October1972-Cordones Industriales,ComandosComunales,ConsejosCampesinos.42 he Socialist Party and other groups of the Left maintainedtheir conviction that the 'bourgeoisState' should be replacedtout court byimplementing he PoderPopular.43The CommunistPartyconceivedthe PoderPopulardifferently;Luis Corvalandeclared hat the PCCh supported he Cor-dones Industriales,Consejos Campesinos,ComandosComunales,but believesthat these new organizations . . cannotbe regarded nd orientated n opposi-tion to the governmentof Allende . . . nor should they be consideredalter-nativeorganizations f otherstructures f the peope'.44According o the PCCh,the more radicalconceptionof the ultra-Left ontributed o the hostile reactionfrom the centre-rightparties,and the CDPin particular,hus creatingconflictbetween PopularUnity and the middle classwhichled to the progressivesola-tion of the government.It seemsto me thatalthough he problemsmentionedby the PCChwerereal,the Party places the responsibilities oo much on other political forces andtheir policies, without analysing ts own inability to implementits policiesinthe political circumstancesof the time, i.e. the high expectationsof PopularUnity after winningthe election of 1970. For examplethe responsibility ornon-agreementwith the CDP was not only the result of the ultra-Leftand theSocialistParty,but was also due to the complexityof the CDPas a party,withone sectorwillingto havedialoguewithPopularUnity,and another particularlythe wing dominatedby Frei) having no intention of establishinga workingrelationshipwith Allende.

In politics it is not alwayspossibleto act in accordancewith a set of plansor stages in carryingout a programme;ometimesthere is an urgentneed toreact quickly to circumstances hat the originalpoliticalstrategydid not con-template.This is where the PCChfailed, in being unable to adaptits originalprogrammeo a new situation.For examplewhen it was clearthat the agree-ment with the CDP had no future, by the summerof 1973, the PCChstillcontinuedto pursueit. Moreover,when it was clear,after the attemptedcoup

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THECHILEANCOMMUNISTARTY(PCCh)of June 1973, that the Army was preparing o overthrowAllende, the PCChstill insisted in its slogan,No a la guerracivil. In generaltermsits failurelay inits rigidity in a rapidlychangingsituation, particularlywhen it became clearthat the next objective of PopularUnity could not be the next presidentialelection(1976) but a solution to secure ts immediatesurvival.THELACKOFA DEFENSIVEAPPARATUSOne of the striking aspects of the coup d'etat was the absence of effectiveresistancefrom the political partiesof the Left. No seriousattempt to defeatthe military was possible, partly becauseof the unpreparedness f the Left tooppose them, but mainly becauseof the isolation of the PopularUnity govern-ment from the military leadership,with the exception of a handfulof seniorgenerals,already solatedfromcommand, ike CarlosPrats.Thereis no doubt that in spite of the previouscoup attemptby the militaryin June 1973, Popular Unity did not organize itself for possible resistance.Althoughthe PCChassertsthat it had an armedapparatusa verymodestone),it was certainlycommitted to the 'peacefulroad'as the only realisticstrategyin Chile at the time. Whilethe MIRand the SocialistPartystated the necessityof 'arming he masses',the PCChmaintainedthat it was possibleto defendthegovernmentonly throughconstitutionalmeans,i.e. throughthe isolation of thereactionaryforces, an alliancewith the CDP, and supportfrom the democraticwing of the Army. 'The decisiveaspect, in the defence of the revolution, s theArmedForces, and in general ermsthe balanceof forces at the military evel.'45The PCCh finds two reasons for the behaviour of the military: firstly, theabsenceof a correctpolicy fromPopularUnity towardsthe Army;andsecondly,the alarmof the Armed Forces at attempts by the MIR,MAPUand PSChtoinfiltrate its rank and file. Moreover, he PCChassertsthat 'in the relationshipbetween Popular Unity and the ArmedForces errorspredominated.Werefertothe belief that the ArmedForces were different(in Chile), that they would besubordinate to the civil power'.46 n synthesis,the PCChbelievesthat only anintegrationof the Armed Forces in the processof political changecould haveled to a different role for them, andthusto a possibilityof survivalor Allende'sgovernment.THE1977 CONFERENCEOFTHEPCChThe session of the CentralCommittee of the PCCh n August 1977 (at an un-known venue) was a historic one for three reasons.Firstly, it was the first tofollow the coup d'tat; secondly, it providedan analysisof the PopularUnityperiod;and thirdly, it proposeda programme or the reconstructionof Chileandemocracy. Although almost five years have gone by, that programme s stillin force. The PCChproposesimmediatelythe militaryis defeated,to establisha Gobiemo Provisional(ProvisionalGovernment)made up of PopularUnity,the ChristianDemocratic Party, and the democratic sectors of the ArmedForces. This ProvisionalGovernmentwould preparea Constitutionthat wouldset up guidelines for the democraticrevivalof Chile. The centralpoint of thisis that the PCChdoes not intend to replacePinochetwith 'the formation of asocialist state nor with a typically bourgeoisone. In other words, the dilemmais not fascism or bourgeoisdemocracy.What is needed is a new democratic,

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BULLETINOFLATINAMERICANRESEARCHpopular,nationalregime,which would favour andpromotethe changeswhicharise out of the objectiveneeds of socialprogress'.47his conceptionof a pro-gressivedemocracyas a stage between the bourgeoisstate and a socialiststateis a plan that the PCChpromotedfrom the early 1950s,48with its elaborationof an 'anti-imperialist, nti-oligarchic,anti-feudalrevolution'. The proposednew democracyby the PCCh s distinct from the SocialistParty'sBloque porel Socialismo, in which it states that the struggleagainst he militarydictator-ship must be part of a struggleto constructa socialistsociety. The SocialistParty denies the validityof a policy that promotesa stage in between, con-sidering t instead as one process.Once again,the SocialistParty'sapproachsin line withthe strategyof the 1950s Frentede Trabajadores.49The PCCh s againproposinga strategyon the basisof a broadallianceofpoliticalandsocial forceswithinChileansociety.50 t is in favourof the forma-tion of a Frente Antifascista that would achieve the defeat of the militarydictatorship, he disruptionof the 'totalitarian' tate and the constructionofa new state of law-democratic, anti-fascist,national,popularandpluralist.51The centralissue in this strategyis the relationshipwith the ChristianDemo-cratic Party. From the originalformation of the allianceof the Left to thepresent,the relationshipbetween the left and centre-rightpartieshas remainedcontroversial.The PCChnow asserts hat 'from the point of view of the contri-butionof politicalparties o unity, the main ssueis the alliancewith the CDP'.52Withinthe SocialistPartythere is a less favourableapproachon this. Certainlythe CDPcould not accept an alliancewith PopularUnity if the latterwere totry to implement fully socialistpoliciesafterdefeating he military unta. Forthe moment there is agreementbetweenPopularUnity and the CDP on theneed to replacePinochet with some kind of provisionalgovernment.But theformationof an alliance in termsof a long-term trategy s more complicated.The Left and the CDP have differentconceptionsof the meansby which toachieve the defeat of thejunta. It is very difficult to foreseea strategicratherthan tacticalalliance,as the PCChwants.THEEMERGENCE F A STRATEGYOF ARMEDSTRUGGLE?The PCChhas neveradoptedthe armedstruggleas its official line, nor con-sidered this possibility to be realisticduringthe developmentof its politicalprogrammeover the period 1912-80. But, since the end of 1980, for the firsttime, the PCChhas put forward a propositionthat could be interpretedasa novelty in the recent developmentof its strategy. Some statementsfromleadersof the PCCh and official documentsof the party released n Santiagosuggestthis changeof line.53These statementsrepresent he first attempt bythe PCCh o adopta strategyof armedstruggleo defeat thejunta.Thiscreatesa new phasein the political debate of the PopularUnity alliance,andat thesametime could pushthe CDPand its strategy peacefuland moderateopposi-tion within 'legality')into a decision:whether to commititself to a definitivealliancewith the Left, or to seek analliancewith conservative olitical-militaryforces opposedto thejunta. The debateto come will be interestingandwillbeof substantialmportanceo the futureof Chileandemocracy.But, is there really a new strategywithin the PCCh?Apparently here is.Various militantsmaintainthat after the session of the CentralCommittee n

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THECHILEANCOMMUNISTARTY(PCCh)1977 there was some dissatisfactionwithin the party, because the leadershipstill preferreda more moderate line in the struggle againstthe junta. In factsome statements by Luis Corvalanmight suggest this. Speakingbefore theRegional Conferenceof the party in Sweden (November 1980) he referred othis by sayingthat 'the partymustgivean answer o the doubtsof the militants.First of all the comradeshave the rightto state them. They can do it in theircells. They can, accordingto ourEstatutos, state them directlyto the CentralCommittee.Even more, the party can and must organizespecialconferences norderto analysespecificissueson whichthereexist doubts'.54He evensuggesteda revisionof the strict internalorganizational tructureto givegreater nfluenceto forces within the Party.55Although there is no direct evidence of conflictbetween the partyundergroundn Chileand the leadership n exile, there havebeen rumoursof conflict over the resolutionsof the CentralCommittee n 1977.Criticismof those resolutions shouldbe regardedas one of the reasonsfor thenew strategy.With the newConstitutionapprovedby plebiscite n 1980, AugustoPinochet'sterm of office lasts until 1989. Thisdevelopmentof the Chileanunta is perhapsthe most importantreasonfor the PCCh'smove towards armedstruggle.Until1980 the PCCh preferredto seek a common non-violentposition that couldunite the CDP, the MIR, the 'non-fascist orces', the 'democratic'militaryandPopular Unity. This kind of democraticalliance(Frente Antifascista)was tounify different political forces with opposing political strategiesand aims(theCDP and the MIR, for example), in order to achieve as a common objectivethe defeat of the military dictatorship.But, with the new Constitution,andthe consequent institutionalizationof the junta, political changes are onlypossible within the Constitucionalidaddictatedby the military,i.e. there is noroom for manoeuvre or the traditionalpoliticalparties,becausethey continueto be illegal. Once the PCCh realizedthat all possibilityof the 'liberalization'of the military regimewas at an end, it stated that 'the rightof the people torebellion is even more indisputable'.56The official document of the PCChgoes beyond this, it states that 'there is no road other than the frontalstruggleagainstthe dictatorship'.57Accordingto the PCCh,the time has come when theuse of violence is necessary.If we look at the theoreticalelaborationof the 'peacefulroad' made duringthe 1960s,58we realizethat the PCChconsideredthe possibilityof adoptinganarmedstruggle,or rather,the PCChneverstateda priori a rejectionof it. Whenthe Sino-Soviet dispute started(1960) and the consequentconference of the81 Communistpartiesmet to discussthe Chinese'heresy' (the theory of 'bothlegs') the PCChsupportedthe 'peacefulroad' as its official line, but consideredarmed struggleas a possibility in exceptional circumstances.59 he conditionsimposed by the military regime prevent, accordingto the PCCh,a peacefulsolution, and thus the rightof the popularmovement'to rebellionandviolence'hascome.Thereis evidence that the PCCh s carryingout the armedstrategy.One signis its new relationshipwith the MIR-formerly consideredby the PCChas agroup of extremists,adventuristsand terrorists.The MIRhas advocatedarmedstrugglefrom the time of its foundation(1965). Also, according o reports romChileanpartymembers n exile, there have been severalactsof sabotagecarried

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BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCHout together,by the MIR and the PCCh.This new approachby the PCChhasprovokedcriticismon the Left, mainlyfor the suddenchangeof strategyfrommassivepeaceful opposition(in order to attract the CDP) to armedstruggle.There is scepticism(particularlyn the SocialistParty) about whethersuch astrategywill work in the short term.60The other smallpartiesof the Left aredividedon thisissue.In the short term the Left is not prepared, or are thereappropriate oliticalconditions, for a frontalattack on the junta. Whatis not clear in the PCCh'sapproach s the timing of the armedstruggle, .e. is it goingto be a long-termventure or a short-term actic? The cases of other countries(like Nicaragua)suggest that such a strategy could work only in the long-term.In any case,such a strategyraisesquestions.The Chileanmilitaryuntalooks well establishedin power and institutionalized;hus, is the armedstruggle trategydestinedtobe defeated with the consequentstrongrepressionhat would follow, or is thearmedstruggleonly a declarationuntil the conditionsareright-a crisisof thejunta and readinessof the Left in military erms-for a militaryconfrontation?Is there a possibility that dissatisfiedgroupswithin the militarywould jointhe popularmovement? It is too early to answer these questions,but therecertainly s a riskthat the PCCh trategycouldrelegate he anti-juntamovementto obscurity ora longtime.There arealreadyconflicts betweenPopularUnity and the CDPin terms ofthe futureorganization f the Chileanpoliticalsystem,if the junta is defeated.The CDP will not accept a Marxistgovernment.The move towards armedstruggleby the PCChwill createmoreproblemswithin the FrenteAntifascista.Two different anti-militaryalliancesmight emergefollowingthe adoptionofa strategyof armedstruggleby the PCCh.The first would be PopularUnityand the MIR joined together in a radicalpolicy carryingout armedstruggleand the second would involve the CDP and civil-militarymoderatesopposingthejuntawithin'legality', ookingat opportunitieshatthejuntamayoffer.The latest development n the politicalstrategyof the PCChmay have beeninfluencedby other LatinAmericanmovements.The triumphof the Nicaraguanrevolution, or example,provedthe viability,in particularircumstances,f thearmedstruggle.The case of El Salvadormay also haveinfluencedthe PCCh'snew strategy.If this is the case, then it will be interesting o know what kindof positionthe Soviet Union takeson this issue.Certainly,a CommunistPartylike the Chileanwill not take such a step, without at least some kind of con-sultation with the USSR.If the Soviet Union officiallyendorsesarmed trugglein Latin America,this would be the result of the triumphof the Nicaraguanrevolution and the new conflict in internationalpolitics.Its approvalwill pro-ducenewmotivesfor conflict with the USAandthis couldpushthe U.S.govern-ment to give more support to the military regimein Chile. If the ChileanCommunistPartyandPopularUnity adopt, as seemslikely,the armed truggle,the result is very difficult to foresee, but certainlythe system of class andpoliticalalliance n Chilewill changeconsiderably.NOTES

1. There is some dispute about the date of foundation of the PCCh. I have tried todemonstrate why the date of foundation of the PCCh should be considered as 1912

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THECHILEANCOMMUNISTARTY(PCCh)and not 1922 (CarmeloFurci, 'Thepoliticalstrategyof the ChileanCommunist arty,1950-1980', Ph.D.thesis n progress.)2. On the period 1912-47, see Heman-Ramirez-Necochea1965), Origeny formaciondel Partido Comunistade Chile, EditorialHorizonte(Santiago de Chile); AndrewBernard 1978), 'TheChileanCommunistparty, 1922-1947', Ph.D. thesis,Universityof London;and(1981), 'ChileanCommunists,RadicalPresidents ndChilean elationswith United States, 1940-1947', Journalof LatinAmericanStudies, vol. 13, pt. 2,pp. 347-74.3. On the Communist nternationalthirdperiod',see JeanElleinstein 1975), StoriadelfenomenoStaliniano,EditoriRiuniti(Rome).4. Onthe secondunderground eriod(1948-58), see C. Furci,op. cit.5. ErnestHalperin1965), Nationalism nd Communismn Chile,M.I.T.Press.6. Paolo Spriano(1969), Storiadel Partito Comunistataliano,Giulio EinaudiEditore,5 vols. (Torino).Also UmbertoTerracini 1978), Intervista ul Comunismodifficile,Laterza Bari);GiorgioAmendola 1974), Letterea Milano,EditoriRiuniti(Rome).

7. EduardoC. Colomer (1965), Historia del Partido Comunistade Espaia, EditoraNacional Madrid);Guy Hermet(1971), Les Communistes n Espagne,ArmandColin,Foundationdes SciencesPolitiques Paris).8. RichardA. H. Robinson 1979), Contemporaryortugal,GeorgeUnwin(London).9. Thomas Skidmore(1970), 'Failure n Brazil: from PopularFront to armedrevolt',Journalof ContemporaryHistory,vol. 3, p. 141. Fora historyof thePCB,seeRonaldH. Chilcote (1974), The BrazilianCommunistparty, 1922-1972, OxfordUniversityPress London).10. According o sourcesreleasedby the Ministerof Interior,41,359 peoplehave beenarrestedbetween September 1973 and March1975, of whom 36,605 have beenreleased.The numberof people executed is not known(see Latin AmericanPoliticalReport(11/4/1975), vol. IX,no. 14, p. 104).11. Robert J. Alexander (1978), The Tragedyof Chile, GreenwoodPress (Westport,London),p. 357.12. Hoy (1980), afioIV,no. 162, pp. 12-17.13. EduardoFrei (1975), El Mandatode laHistoria lasexigenciasdelPorvenir,Editorialdel Pacifico(Santiagode Chile).14. RobertJ. Alexander1978), op. cit., p. 358.15. Althoughsome socialscientists(e.g. GonzaloFalabella 1980), 'Labourunderauthor-itarianregimes: he Chileanunion movement,1973-1980', Ph.D. thesis,University fSussex) presenta more optimisticview regardinghese minor parties,in relation totheirpolitical mportance.16. PSCh 25/3/1979), Declaraci6npublica,Comisi6nPolitica (Santiagode Chile).17. CarmenCastillo (1980), Un jour d'Octobrea Santiago,Voix de Femmes,Stock 2(Paris).18. LatinAmericanPoliticalReport(28/2/1975), vol. IX,no. 9, p. 72.19. Ibid.20. On the organizationaltructureof the PSCh,see BennyPollack(1978), 'The ChileanSocialist party: prolegomenato its structure and organization', ournalof LatinAmericanStudies,vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 117-52.21. RobertJ. Alexander1978), op. cit., p. 359.22. On the crisis of the PSCh,see Le Monde (28/4/1979 and 5/5/1979); PSCh(April1979),Resolucionesdel Pleno del ComiteCentral,Santiagode Chile;PSCh 8/5/1979),La opinion del Partido sobre un relevo y expulsion,ComisionPolitica (Santiago).AlsoChile-America1979), nos. 53-4 (Rome).23. Hints of this criticism can be traced in Luis Corvalan 1980), 'Discursoemitido enla ConferenciaRegionalde Suecia',TallerRicardoFonseca London).24. Rene Castillo (1974), 'Chile: ensefianzasy perspectivasde la revolucion', n PCCh(1975), Documentos oficialesdel PartidoComunistade Chileemitidos en Santiagodespuesdelgolpemilitar ascista,pp. 122-3.25. JorgeMontes n.d.),La luz entre assombras,p. 172.26. Thereare around2,500 desaparecidos.They have been arrestedand no one knowsif they arealive,deadorwherethey are.Among he desaparecidosreExequielPonce,

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94 BULLETINOF LATINAMERICAN ESEARCHCarlosLorca,RicardoLagos,headof the undergroundpparatus f the PSCh LatinAmericanPoliticalReport (1976), vol. X, no. 43, p. 338). Accordingo the UnitedNationsCommissionor refugees here are aroundone millionChileansn exile,bothfor politicaland economic reasons.In Europeare the morepoliticizedones, about18,500(LatinAmericanPoliticalReport(1977), vol.XI,no. 23, p. 180).27. Membersof the CentralCommitteeof the PCChkilled: IsidoroCastillo,EnriqueParis, David Miranda, Alberto Molina, Juan Lopez, Marta Ugarta. Membersdesaparecidos: ictorDiaz(Vice-Generalecretary f thepartyandheadof the under-ground apparatusn Chile until 1976), MarioZamorano,UldaricoDonaire,JorgeMufioz,Jose Weibel, Fernado Ortiz, Jaime Donato, FernandoNavarro,BernardoAraya,CesarCerda,ManuelVargas.Anothersix diedof natural auses: he poet andNobelPrizewinnerPabloNeruda,OscarAstudillo,HectorCorbalan, ugenioVallejas,LuisFigueroa formerPresident f the CentralUnicade Trabajadores,UT).Anothermemberof the CentralCommittee,Herman amirez-Necochea,iedin Paris n 1980.He is the author(1965) of the only historyof the PCCh 1922-36), Origen For-maciondel PartidoComunistade Chile,EditorialHorizonte Santiago). See PCCh,El PlenodeAgosto1977del ComiteCentral el PartidoComunista e Chile,EdicionesColo-ColoBarcelona), . 3.)28. JorgeMontes n.d.),p. 172.29. LuisCorvalanwas released n December1976, exchangedwith the Soviet dissidentVladimirBukovskyLatinAmericanPoliticalReport(1976), vol.X, no. 50, p. 393).30. The majorevent performedby the CNSwas a PliegoNacional,directed o Pinochetin June 1981, requesting emocratic eformsn the economyand abourorganizations(CNS, Coordinadora acional Sindicala la opinionpublica(June 1981), pamphlet(Santiago)).Following he presentation f thePliegoNacional, he leadersof theCNS,ManuelBustos (President)and AlamiroGuzman GeneralSecretary)were arrested.(BoletindelExterior Sept.-Oct.1981),p. 2.)

31. CarlosMarino,nterview,October1981, London.32. Recently,for example, he CommunistYouthOrganizationJuventudesComunistas)celebrated he anniversary f its foundationby organizing demonstrationn theO'Higgins ark n Santiago.Severalmilitantswerearrested.AfterSeptember 980,andthe adoptionof armedstruggle, here havebeenacts of sabotage arriedout by thePCCh ndthe MIR.33. Boleti'ndel Exterior Nov.-Dec.1980),no. 44, pp.8-9.34. Ren6Castillo 1974), op. cit., pp. 120-1.35. ITT-CIA:Subversionn Chile 1973), Spokesman ooks, he BertrandRussellFounda-tion Ltd. Also UnitedStates and Chileduring heAllendeyears,1970-1973 (1975),U.S. Government rintingOffice(Washington, .C.).36. Carlos Altamirano 1974), 'Riflessionicritichesul processorivoluzionarioCileno',in QuestioniAttualidel Socialismo Belgrade).37. VolodiaTeitelboim,memberof the PoliticalCommission f the PCCh 1975), inter-view,Florence.38. C.Furci,op. cit., chap.III.39. PCCh 1975), El ultraizquierdismoaballode Troyadel imperialismo, fficial docu-ment(Santiago eChile).40. See ReneCastillo 1974), op. cit., p. 113.41. Ibid.42. On these structures see Alan Angell (1980), Political mobilization and class alliancesin Chile,1970-1973, Institute or theNewChile Rotterdam).43. AlainTouraine1975), Vida muertedel Chilepopular,SigloXXI(Mexico),p. 13.44. ChileHoy,no. 43 (April1973) (Santiago).45. JorgeInsunza 1978), 'La dialecticade las vias revolucionarias',n PCCh,Los 1000dias de revolucion,EditorialPazy Socialismo,p. 83. See alsoIanRoxborough t al.(1977), Chile:the State and the Revolution,Macmillan ress London),pp. 187-203.46. Luis Corvalin (1977), op. cit., pp. 27-8.47. Luis Corvalin (1979), Our democratic project, Taller Ricardo Fonseca (London), p. 1.48. C. Furci(1980), TheChileanCommunist arty(PCCh} nd the originsof its politicalproject, 1951-1956, paper, Institute for the New Chile (Rotterdam).



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THECHILEANCOMMUNISTARTY(PCCh) 9549. ClodomiroAlmeyda October1979), CartaPublica,p. 20.50. LuisCorvalan1977), op. cit., p. 58.51. PCCh December1974), Al partidoy al pueblo de Chile,official document Santiago

de Chile).52. LuisCorvalan1977), op. cit., p. 59.53. Luis Corvalan 3/9/1980), 'Discursodel SecretarioGeneraldel PartidoComunistadeChile',Moscow;PCCh 1980), 'Discursoemitidopor el SecretarioGeneraldel PartidoComunistade ChileCompaieroLuisCorvalin,en la ConferenciaRegionalde Suecia',Taller Ricardo Fonseca (London). PCCh (23/11/1980), Declaracion del PartidoComunista e Chile(Santiago).Also PCCh 1981), 'El enriquesimiento eldesarrollode la linea politica del Partido', n Boletin del Exterior,pp. 14-43. The speechesbyLuis Corvalin related to the armedstrugglehave been edited in Luis Corvalan,Larebeli6npopular e abrecaminoen Chile no date orpublisher iven).54. PCCh(1980), 'Discurso .. en la ConferenciaRegionalde Suecia',op. cit., p. 9. Onthe criticismand doubts which emergedafter the launchof the new strategy,seeBoletin delExterior,no. 49, pp. 84-98.55. LuisCorvalan1980), op. cit., p. 11.56. Ibid.57. PCCh 1980), Declaracion el PartidoComunista e Chile Santiagode Chile),p. 15.58. ErnestHalperin1965), op. cit.59. Ibid.,p. 68.60. CarlosMarinoOctober1981), interview,London.

Carmelo Furci - The PCCh and Its Third Underground Period

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