Carbon Policy: The Right - and Wrong - Ways to Use NAFTA

8/6/2019 Carbon Policy: The Right - and Wrong - Ways to Use NAFTA

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Carbon Policy:

Te Right and Wrong Ways to Use NAFABy Lewis J. Perelman

COMMENTARY/COMMENTAIRE

Dr. Lewis J. Perelman is a policy and management consultant inWashington, DC. In the past he worked on federal solar and renew-

able energy programs at two US national laboratories. He also hasbeen a fellow of the Homeland Security Institute and the Homeland

Security Policy Institute. Contact: [email protected].

Carbon policy is a messy tangle o energy, eco-nomic, environmental, and security problems thatspan North America and interact through the North

American Free rade Agreement (NAFA).Te ailed cap-and-trade scheme to regulate the useo ossil uelsin the name o climate protectionor energy securityis a bad policy that analystsJerey Schott and Meera Fickling at the Peterson In-stitute or International Economics recommend us-ing NAFA to impose on Canada, the United States,and Mexico. Experience indicates it would raise en-ergy costs even urther, undermine economic recov-ery, be prone to corruption, and yet yield minuscule

benets.Te act is that the technology needed to reduce en-vironmental impacts o ossil uels while providingeconomically ecient alternatives mostly does notyet exist.

A ar better strategy comes rom an emerging con-sensus o analysts at the Breakthrough Institute andseveral other research institutes, agencies, and pol-icy groups. Tey conclude that solving the carbonpolicy mess requires a basic shi in ocus: away rom

emissions regulation and instead on creating tech-nology innovations to make clean energy cheap.

Te advocates o a technology-ocused strategy callor a continuing public investment o around $0

La politique de rduction des missions de carboneest un enchevtrement compliqu de problmesconcernant lnergie, lconomie, lenvironnement et

la scurit qui embrassent toute lAmrique du Nordet qui sont relis par lAccord de libre-change nord-amricain (ALNA).

Le systme de plaonnement et dchange des droitsdmission pour rguler lutilisation de combustiblesossiles au nom de la protection du climat oude la scurit nergtique est une mauvaisepolitique que les analystes Jerey Schott et MeeraFickling de lInstitut Peterson pour lconomie in-ternationale recommandent dimposer au Canada,aux tats-Unis et au Mexique par lentremise delALNA. Lexprience dmontre quil entraneraitune augmentation encore plus orte des cots delnergie, compromettrait la reprise conomique, se-rait susceptible dentraner de la corruption, tout enne produisant que de minuscules avantages.

La ralit est que la technologie ncessaire pourmitiger les consquences environnementales descombustibles ossiles tout en orant des solutions

de rechange ecaces sur le plan conomique nexistepas encore.

Un consensus en voie dmerger parmi les analystesde lInstitut Breakthrough et de plusieurs autres in-stituts de recherche, agences et groupes de rfexionprsente une bien meilleure stratgie. Selon eux, ilest ncessaire pour sextirper du ptrin de la poli-tique de carbone de modier ondamentalement


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billion a year in North America to create the neededenergy innovations. Dicult public nances maymake winning that ull commitment dicult atpresent.

However, a big energy technology push can belarge in the number and diversity o innovation e-

orts without necessarily being high in cost. Apply-ing the social network architecture o modern in-ormation systems can enable a broadly distributedprogram or collaborative innovation that is opento wide participation across the NAFA commu-nity. Such an open innovation model could spawnmore and better technical xes or carbon problems,aster, and at lower cost.

notre perspective, en sloignant de lobjecti de r-guler les missions pour plutt se concentrer sur lacration dinnovations technologiques permettantde rendre lnergie propre bon march .

Les partisans dune stratgie centre sur la technol-ogie proposent des investissements publics perma-

nents denviron 0 milliards de dollars par anne enAmrique du Nord pour crer les innovations n-ergtiques dont on aura besoin. Des nances pub-liques en mauvais tat pourraient rendre un tel en-gagement dicile ce stade-ci.

Un projet ambitieux de dveloppement des tech-nologies nergtiques peut touteois tre impor-tant en termes de nombre et de diversit des e-orts dinnovation sans ncessairement coter trscher. En appliquant larchitecture de rseau socialdes systmes modernes dinormation, on pourraitmettre en place un programme tendu dinnovationsur une base collaborative qui serait ouvert une vaste participation au sein de la communaut delALNA. Un tel modle d innovation ouverte pourrait voir merger plus de solutions techniquesmieux appropries pour rsoudre les problmesquentrane la production des missions de carbone,et cela plus vite et meilleur cot.


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Introduction

Carbon policiesinvolving the development and use o ossil uelspowerully aectthe relationships among the members o the North American Free rade Agreement:Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Good carbon policies, such as those emphasizing

technology innovation, can benet the economic and strategic interests o all three NAF-A countries. Bad ones can have the opposite eect, aggravating conficts, underminingtrade relations, thwarting economic development, and weakening national security.

One glaring example o bad carbon policy is a proposal1 by Jerey Schott and MeeraFickling o the Peterson Institute or International Economics, an infuential Washingtonthink tank. Teir proposal would use the NAFA ramework to impose a carbon-elimi-nating regulatory scheme, in the style o the ailed Kyoto Protocol, across North America.Among other measures, it would cap permitted emissions o carbon-based greenhousegases rom power plants, actories, motor vehicles and so on; and create an adminis-tered market or trading carbon-emission permits or credits.

In his prescription to improve the competitiveness o manuacturing both in Canada andacross North America, Rob Wildeboer, chairman o Martinrea International, worriedthat such restrictive policies, pushed to an extreme, threaten to castrate our economyand hurt millions o people.3

Tere are substantial reasons to worry about Schott and Ficklings proposed NAFAstrategy:

Its hazard is not just potential but real and present: Despite the abject ail-ure o global climate pact negotiations, and despite the current lack o sup-port in the US Congress, government allies o the climate protection andenergy security lobbies are proceeding to use regulations (such as rulesimposed by the Environmental Protection Agency) and other means to ac-complish the same results incrementally. Similar initiatives are under way atthe state/provincial and local government levels.

At a time o rising energy prices, it would reduce energy supplies and raisetheir costs even higher.

Te clash it embodies between the agenda o special interest groups and thebroader interest in economic recovery and development o North Americaas a whole threatens to infame discord among NAFAs member nations.

It seeks to use a ree trade agreement to constrain trade.4 It largely ignores the imperative or technology innovation.

Te bad news is that the sort o carbon-regulating scheme Schott and Fickling aim to ex-pand via NAFA already has been shown to impose burdensome costs with at best smallbenets. For instance, University o Colorado Proessor Roger Pielke, Jr. has ound that


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any emissions reductions rom the European carbon-trading scheme have been minus-cule.5 Similarly, Proessor Richard ol o the Economic and Social Research Institutein Dublin analyzed Europes regulatory plan to reduce carbon emissions by 0% in tenyearshe estimated that the costs exceed the benets by a ratio o 30 to 1.6

Te good news is that an alternative, technology-ocused approach is gaining broad sup-port and promises to do ar more to achieve tangible environmental, economic, andsecurity benets at much lower cost and with ar less confict.

Emerging Consensus for echnology-focused Solutions

For several years, Breakthrough Institute7 ounders ed Nordhaus and Michael Shellen-berger have promoted a case or a undamental shi in carbon policy strategiesbroadly,away rom emissions regulation and toward technology innovation. Experienced envi-ronmental activists, Nordhaus and Shellenberger recognized that the climate policyagenda environmentalists had pursued over two or more decades was doomed to ail,because it undamentally misread public opinion: most people in developing countries,

and even in wealthier nations, would not give up the desire or greater prosperity. Nordid it seem especially liberal to expect people to do so. Hence, they concluded that pro-paganda eorts aimed at changing the publics hearts and minds to abandon economicgrowth to save the planet simply did not and would not work.

Rather, Nordhaus and Shellenberger counselled their ellow environmental activists tobreak once and or all rom green orthodoxy that ocuses primarily on making dirtyenergy more expensive and instead embrace a strategy to make clean energy cheap.8

Te technology-ocused policy ramework has been echoed in various orms by a grow-

ing number o other policy groups and thought leaders in what they now call the emerg-ing consensus. Te thread that joins their diverse interests together is a undamental act:Tat the technology needed to achieve ambitious carbon policy goals does not currentlyexist.

Its not true that all the technologies are available and we just need the political will todeploy them, says Nathan Lewis, proessor o chemistry at the Caliornia Institute oechnology.

Lewis points out that the worlds energy demand is likely to triple by 050, growing romabout 14 terawatts (trillion watts) o power today to some 45 terawatts. Even with mini-

mal population and economic growth, and a huge ve-old increase in eciency, demandwould still double.

o keep atmospheric CO2 levels below 450 parts per million (ppm), Lewis calculatesthat over 94 percent o even the minimal 8 terawatts would have to be rom carbon-reegeneration. Yet clean energy sources, including a small amount rom renewable sourcesand several times more rom nuclear power, currently provide only about 8 percent oglobal power supply.


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Lewis shows that replacing nearly all current ossil-ueled power generation and mere-ly doubling current power production would require an almost unimaginable expan-sion o current non-carbon power sources. For instance, getting only 10 terawatts romnuclear power would require building at least one new reactor every day or two orthe next our decades. o get 10 terawatts o solar power by 050, a million rooopswould need to be covered with the best photovoltaic panels now available every dayuntil then.9

Te call to accelerate energy innovation is supported by a 006 report to Canadasederal government rom its National Advisory Panel on Sustainable Energy Scienceand echnology. It argued that a substantial decline in the countrys investment in en-ergy research and development since the early 1980s urgently needed to be reversed.Te panel called on the ederal government to at least double its investment in energyR&D over the coming 10 years. And, refecting the decentralized nature o the Cana-dian government, the panel also challenged each o the countrys provinces to morethan double their relatively small current investment in energy R&D over the sameperiod.10

Along similar lines in the United States, the Obama White Houses council o scienceand technology advisers recommended in a 010 report that the ederal governmentshould greatly increase its unding or energy technology R&D while also reducingbarriers to innovation.11

And an expansive paper by Isabel Galliana and Christopher Green o McGill Universi-ty1 bolstered the case or a major worldwide commitment to greater investment in en-ergy technology innovation. in a new book rom the Copenhagen Consensus Center.13

Despite some variations among aligned analysts, the consensus strongly holds to the

view that a greatly increased investment in breakthrough technology innovation is es-sential to resolving the mess o carbon-related energy and other problems. Moreover,its proponents all agree that the much expanded commitment o resources must besustained over a long span o time, decades, or the needed technology xes to be cre-ated and implemented at a scale sucient to make a strategic dierence.

Te Big Push for Innovation

Te exact amount o unding recommended or the energy innovation initiative variesamong dierent experts and organizations, and also over time. However, $0 billion

(US$) a year or North America is a representative gure that gives a sense o the scaleo investment proposed.

Te big push or technical xes does ace a number o thorny problems:

Its not clear how big a public investment is really needed, or what it needsto be spent on. As Galliana and Green observe, It is much easier to spendon R&D than assure the monies are well spent.

Successul innovation requires more than just R&D.


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Tere are many social barriers to innovation to overcome: backlash, po-litical gaming, rebound eects, hype, corruption, and others.

However, a big technology push can be large in the number and diversity o innova-tion eorts without necessarily being high in cost. A dozen or more specic tactics canpromote innovation on a budget.14 Some involve reallocating government resourcesto more ecient activities. Others leverage private initiatives: oering lucrative prizes

or innovative achievements; creating government-sponsored venture capital compa-nies; and ocusing the investments o private philanthropy.

Moreover, it is signicant that the advocates o the technology-ocused strategy gen-erally agree that the structure o the big energy innovation push needs to be ar moredecentralized and diversied than traditional national technology programs.

North America: How

In their detailed prescription or the NAFA agenda on climate change,15 Schott andFickling useully point out that the three major countries o North America have longrecognized that environmental, economic, and other issues span the continents politi-cal borders. And in addition to NAFA, which includes its own mechanisms or ad-dressing a number o such issues, the neighbors have made a number o other specicagreements or managing cross-border interests.

Most pertinent to the particular problems involving energy and climate, Schott andFickling observe that:

Given their strong energy interdependence, US decisions that aect energy con-sumption will have a heavy impact on Canada and Mexico. Likewise, decisions

made in Canada and Mexico that aect energy production will impact the USeconomy.

However, in spite o (or perhaps because o) the ailure o the United Nations Co-penhagen conerence to consummate an eective global pact, the major thrust o thePeterson Institute brie is to use the NAFA structure to impose a climate protectionregulatory scheme on North America.

Kyoto Redux

Schott and Ficklings prescription lags ar behind the growing consensus or an in-novation-ocused strategy. While their brie does make passing suggestions or somecollaborative eort on a smart grid and national energy eciency standards, it ailsto recognize the need or breakthrough innovations to make clean energy cheap inact, the word technology appears not once in the entire Peterson Institute paper.Moreover, in its single-minded ocus on climate protection, it largely ignores multipleother equally i not more important public policy goals.

Te scheme promoted by Schott and Fickling is as obsolescent procedurally as it is stra-tegically, in seeking to replicate the continually ailed approach o UN climate negotia-


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tions aimed at achieving a Grand Bargain among national governments. Tat strategyis based on the increasingly dubious presumption that such top-down, command-and-control regulatory sanctions would work, even i sharp dierences in national and re-gional interests could be reconciled.

Even in the limited tri-national context o NAFA, the Grand Bargain conceit seemsunrealistic and impractical. Although the member countries may be treated as legally

equal in their contractual relationship, the important qualitative dierences betweenthe countries, as opposed to just governments, is crucial to any workable collaboration.

Actually, the national governments o the countries do share a germane similarity: theyare all ederations. Each national government has constituent componentsstates orprovinces, as well as indigenous tribal nations with some signicant degree o sov-ereignty.

Each o the three nation states o North America is big but not monolithic. Rather, theyare highly pluralistic and richly diversied: ethnically, culturally, regionally, geographi-

cally, economically, demographically, environmentally, and in many other ways. Tequalitative dierences within the three countries inevitably season the relationshipsbetween each and the others.

In contemplating a easible ramework or North American carbon policy, those di-erences need to be realistically considered and accommodated. Schott and Ficklingsprescription mostly does not.

Instead, it portrays Canada as paralyzed and deerring its own actions on climatechange hence, carbon policy to whatever policy course the US chooses. Tis viewhardly ts with reports that Canadian diplomats actively worked in Washington to

steer US energy and climate legislation in a direction congenial to Canadian interests.

Nor does Schott and Ficklings view o Canada as a junior partner within NAFA jibewith the perspective o the recent Macdonald-Laurier Institute book, Te CanadianCentury: Moving Out o Americas Shadow.16 As a Forbes magazine report last yearobserved, Canada has avoided many o the problems that currently bedevil the US mountains o public debt, a banking system in crisis, the housing debacle and aweakened currency.17

In contrast, Schott and Fickling evince unbridled admiration or the Mexican govern-ments ardent advocacy o climate protection schemes: Unlike Canada, Mexico hasnot predicated its actions upon those o the United States, and President Felipe Calde-rn has sharply criticized Canada or reusing to take a unilateral approach i neces-sary. Tis is symptomatic o the way their brie distorts or ignores salient dierencesbetween the three countries to bolster its impracticable proposal.

Among those dierences is that Mexico identies its interests with those o the bloc odeveloping countries. As such, it tends to view the conduct o rich countries, such asthe US and Canada, as the principal cause o climate hazards as well as o other envi-ronmental, energy, economic, etc. problems. Consistent with that perspectivewhich


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has been central to the persistent ailure o climate, trade, and other multinationalnegotiations between the so-called North and Souththe solutions Mexico and otherdeveloping countries seek generally combine regulatory sanctions on the supposedlyrich nations with generous transers rom them o money, technology, and other com-pensatory benets to those that are yet developing and presumed poor. (Actually, thedecline or stagnation o the developed economies o Europe and the US, concurrentwith the rapid growth o China and other developing economies, is blurring this ste-

reotype.18)

Uncritically refecting that viewpoint, Schott and Fickling approvingly mention thevague intent unocially expressed at the Copenhagen conerence, and echoed in Can-cun a year later, or the developed countries to provide $100 billion a year to help de-veloping countries adapt to climate change.

But Schott and Fickling go even urther, to prescribe this:

Given the slow pace o progress o UN eorts, Mexico would beneft rom ad-

ditional bilateral technical and fnancial assistance rom its NAFA partners, aswell as the development o an integrated North American climate regime thatwould ensure that environmentally sound Mexican projects qualiy to sell carbon

credits to the other two countries.

Te bries sanguine view o Mexico as not only a capable but leading partner in itscontinental climate protection scheme glosses over some glaring, inconvenient reali-ties, notably including the virtual civil war currently estering between the Mexicangovernment and violent criminal syndicates.

In contrast to Schott and Ficklings vision o Mexico as inspirational partner in their

Grand Bargain, some analysts now view Mexico as teetering on the brink o break-down. Even its president shares that worry: In unusually sombre remarks, PresidentFelipe Caldern told the Mexican people Wednesday that criminal organizations wereseeking to topple the state, violence was growing worse, kidnapping and extortion wererampant, and the government needs their help.19

Te collateral eects o Mexican drug-, weapons-, and human-tracking have spilledover into the US and Canada. Yet Schott and Fickling also ignore the substantial po-tential o their proposed carbon credit exchange already shown to be prone to raudelsewhere0 to provide a urther opportunity or criminal enterprise.

Te North American community has a shared interest in resolving the carbon policymessbut Schott and Ficklings ormula oers no solution. Rather, the emerging strat-egy or breakthrough innovation points to an eective path orward.

Te echnology-focused Alternative

So ar, both the arguments and the advocates or a technology-ocused initiative havecome mainly rom within the United States, with US policy as its major target. Te onlylimitation to extending its prescription to the continent as a whole is that its rationale is


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sometimes tied to American concerns or energy independence. Te latter objectiveusually emphasizes reducing US dependence on imports o oreign oil.

Some legitimate national security interests are indeed tied to Americas steadily grow-ing dependence on imported uel, chiefy petroleum. (Problems associated with im-ports o liqueed natural gasLNGhave been tempered by the rapid expansion odomestic supplies o natural gas.) Not only do oil imports contribute to the US trade

decit, but some portion o the US petro-dollar outfow also goes to regimes that arehostile to American interests and/or that channel oil revenue to support terrorism.

Nevertheless, painting American concerns about energy security with too broad abrush blurs the important act that the largest share o US oil imports comes rom Can-ada and Mexico. Canada is one o Americas truest and most reliable strategic allies.Historically, US relations with Mexico have been marked by a more signicant degreeo riction and suspicion; and in the distant past, by confict. But any security threatsrom Mexico stem rom the trac in drugs, guns, and arguably peoplecertainly notpetroleum. Actually, with oil and gas revenues providing one-third o Mexican govern-

ment revenues and the largest source o oreign currency, American energy importsrom Mexico i anything bolster the ability o the Mexican government to tackle itscurrent security problems.

American advocates o the energy innovation push oen tie their case to the intensedemand or job creation in the US. O course, Canadians and Mexicans have keendesire or new jobs in their countries too. But legitimate domestic interests in employ-ment should not be used to hinder expansion o the energy technology initiative acrossNorth America.

Te predicate o NAFA, aer all, is that its members can prosper more together than

they can in isolation. In practice, their three economies are so connected that com-pletely autonomous action is not really an option. Arizona State University researchanalyst Stephen Blank emphasizes that the practical reality o the NAFA communityis not just trade integrationit is the integration o production systems. 1

Te act remains that NAFA already exists, and legally binds most o the carbon pol-icy interests o each member to those o the others. So the nationally ocused energyinnovation strategy promoted by several American consensus allies really must bereconceived within a North American ramework.

Expanding the boundary o the policy and program concepts o the big innovationpush to the North American community oers a number o potential benets.

With the US ederal budget sinking beneath a rising food o red ink, theprospects or Washington unding the technology push at the level reom-mended are uncertain at best. Expanding participation to Canada andMexico can ease some o the budget constraint by bringing more sourceso unding into play.


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A continental program also would expand human capital, intellectualcapital, and the diversity and range o other resources.

Te continent-wide ramework could be especially valuable to achievingthe central goal to make clean energy cheapparticularly so that it canbecome an aordable alternative to uel the growth o developing countryeconomies.

Mexico can serve as a valuable laboratory or breakthrough innovations that can ac-tually work in the developing world. (Te indigenous tribal communities scatteredthroughout North America may contribute to that end as well.) A socially networkedprogram design can engage the continents less developed communities, as well as oth-ers seeking to rebound rom acute economic distress, not merely as passive recipientso aid or technical assistance but as active collaborators.

I clean energy technology is going to contribute to the growth o developing econo-mies, it needs to be cheapbut also attuned to local social, economic, and environ-mental conditions. Te most eective way inventors, engineers, designers, and others

can assure that an innovation meets those needs is to engage the intended users in itscreation rom the outset.

Several o its proponents agree that, to be cost-eective, the structure o the energyinnovation program should be ar more dispersed and collaborative than traditionalnational technology programs, which are commonly centralized in national laborato-ries and research institutes. A coalition o organizations convened by the BrookingsInstitution, or instance, has called or a network o dozens o regional energy innova-tion institutes, engaging participants rom universities, industry, and nance.

Tat is a step in the right directionbut an even more granular and more broadly

participative approach is warranted. Te program needs to adopt the sort o digitallyand socially networked open architecture that begat products such as the Linux op-erating system, the World Wide Web, Wikipedia, and thousands o soware apps orsmartphones and other devices.

In act, economist Tomas Dapp o Deutsche Bank Research nds that the gatheringpower o social networking is driving the leading edge o corporate practice towardopen innovation. BMW, Dell, SAP, Lego, and other major companies are using socialnetworks to open up their innovation eorts to broad participation.

InnoCentive is one o the major international networks acilitating this trend by bring-ing problem-solvers together with solution-seekers. As it explains its mission:

Once you untether the search or solutions rom an individual, department orcompany, amazing things happen. Problems are solved better, aster and at a low-er cost than ever beore.

Te global economy is orcing organizations to attack problems with all the brain-power they can muster both inside and outside the enterprise. Unlocking the po-


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tential o millions o people to work productively on pressing problems is the powero Open Innovation.

A network oriented, open innovation program design can achieve broad and diverseparticipation across North America more eectively and at lower cost than the tradi-tional orm o centralized, top-down, hub-and-spoke national programs. Te energyinnovation program should deocus activity to many diverse nodes at the edge, and

nurture bottom-up innovation.

Conclusion

Carbon policy, and the associated development and use o ossil uels, unquestionablyposes serious economic, environmental, and security problems or the entire NorthAmerican community.

NAFA provides an established, potentially useul ramework or developing collab-orative solutions among the diverse, interdependent communities o its three member

nations.

However, the ailed cap-and-trade regulatory scheme recommended by Schott andFickling is the wrong solution at the wrong time in the wrong place. It would confictwith the goals o ree trade, economic recovery, and energy security, and infame politi-cal confict, all while oering at best minor environmental or other benets.

Because the technology needed to solve carbon-related problems does not yet exist, anaggressive energy innovation push oers a ar more appropriate, politically easible,and promising path orward.

NAFA makes extending participation in the energy innovation program throughoutNorth America not only appropriate but benecial. A decentralized, continent-wideprogram that takes advantage o the growing power o social networking will engagemore resources, more people, more knowledge, more ideas, and more market oppor-tunities.

Canada, the United States, and Mexico can do more to resolve the carbon policy messtogether than they can alone. But a ocus on innovation, not regulation, will be the keyto success.


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Endnotes:

1. Jerey J. Schott and Meera Fickling, Revisiting the NAFA Agenda on Climate Change, Policy BriePB10-19, Peterson Institute or International Economics, July 010.

. See http://www.iie.com.

3. Rob Wildeboer,Martinrea and Manuacturing Competitives, MLI Commentary, Macdonald-Laurier In-stitute, February 7, 011.

4. By seeking to stem what they call leakagemigration o industry to less restrictive jurisdictionsvir-tually all climate protection schemes tend to work against the objectives o ree trade.

5. Roger S. Pielke, Jr., Minuscule: Eects o European ES on CO2 Emissions, blog entry, September 13,010; http://rogerpielkejr.blogspot.com/010/09/miniscule-eects-o-european-ets-on.html.

6. Richard S.J. ol, Te Costs and Benefts o EU Climate Policy or 2020, Copenhagen Consensus Center,June 1, 010.

7. See http://www.thebreakthrough.org.

8. ed Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, Te Green Bubble Bursts, Te Los Angeles imes, September30, 008; emphasis added.

9. Sharon Begley, We Cant Get Tere From Here, Newsweek, March 14, 009; several detailed presenta-

tions and publications o Lewis energy analyses can be ound at: http://nsl.caltech.edu/energy.10. National Advisory Panel on Sustainable Energy Science and echnology, Funding o Canadian En-

ergy S&, Chapter , Power Connections: Priorities and Directions in Energy Science and echnology inCanada, Oce o Energy Research and Development, Natural Resources Canada, 006.

11. Oce o Science and echnology Policy press release, Presidential Report Provides Roadmap or Fed-eral Role in ransorming Americas Energy System, November 9, 010; also c., Presidents Council oAdvisers on Science and echnology, Report to the President on Accelerating the Pace o Change in Energyechnologies Trough an Integrated Federal Energy Policy, November 010.

1. Isabel Galliana and Christopher Green,An Analysis o a echnology-ledClimate Policy as a Response toClimate Change, Copenhagen Consensus Center, August 009.

13. Bjorn Lomborg, ed., Smart Solutions to Climate Change: Comparing Costs and Benefts, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, September 010. N.B.: Te Galliana and Green paper appears as Chapter 7.14. A number o tacticsnot specic to energy innovation but mostly applicableare described in: Robert

D. Atkinson, et al, Innovation Policy on a Budget: Driving Innovation in a ime o Fiscal Constraint, TeInormation echnology & Innovation Foundation, September 4, 010; http://www.iti.org/publica-tions/innovation-policy-budget-driving-innovation-time-scal-constraint.

15. Jerey J. Schott and Meera Fickling, Revisiting the NAFA Agenda on Climate Change, Policy BriePB10-19, Peterson Institute or International Economics, July 010.

16. Brian Lee Crowley, Jason Clemens, and Niels Veldhuis, Te Canadian Century: Moving Out o AmericasShadow (Bolton, ON: Key Porter Books, 010).

17. Nathan Vardi, Te Canadian Century?, Forbes, February 11, 010.

18. Te World Bank classies Mexico among the group o upper middle income countries, which includes

urkey, Chile, Brazil, and the Russian Federation.19. William Booth, Mexican president calls or nations help to curb deant, violent criminals, Te Wash-

ington Post, August 11, 010; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/010/08/07/AR01008070604.html.

0. For example, viz., Rowena Mason, Te great carbon trading scandal, Te elegraph, January 30, 011.

1. Stephen Blank, Driving Continental Integration: Auto Manuacturing and the Future o North America,MLI Commentary, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, May 1 011.

. Tomas Dapp, Promoting Innovation via Social Networks, presentation, American Institute or Con-temporary German Studies, Washington, DC, December , 010; http://www.aicgs.org/eventlist/view.aspx?ID=331&top_parent=156


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