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Bank Regulation Is Changing:Bank Regulation Is Changing:
But for Better or Worse?But for Better or Worse?
Gerard CaprioGerard Caprio
Williams CollegeWilliams College
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If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls would be necessary.
In framing a government which is to beadministered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: you must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.
James Madison, Federalist Papers, Number 51
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Institutional EnvironmentDemocratic, Political Structure/System
Technology, Information
Infrastructure
Judicial ,
Legal
,
Reg
ulatoryEn
viron
ment
Market
Structu
re
Med
ia
The Market:Depositors,creditors,rating agencies
Politicians
Regulators andsupervisors
Borrowers,counterparties
Corruption
corruption Banks
The Public
corruption
A Framework for Bank Regulation
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2. Debate about governments role2. Debate about governments role
Public interest viewPublic interest view
Govt maximizes social welfareGovt maximizes social welfare
Govt has incentives / ability toGovt has incentives / ability toameliorate market failuresameliorate market failures
If we identify best practices,If we identify best practices,countries will change.countries will change.
Private interest viewPrivate interest view
Govt maximizes Govt welfare; so doGovt maximizes Govt welfare; so doregulateesregulatees
Govt does not necessarily haveGovt does not necessarily have
incentives / ability to fix failuresincentives / ability to fix failures
Need more than best practices:Need more than best practices:
Combination of incentives forCombination of incentives for
regulators and regulatees will notregulators and regulatees will not
maximize social welfaremaximize social welfare
Laissez-Faire : Market failures minorno need for government
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3 Surveys3 Surveys 11stst: 1998-99-2000: 1998-99-2000
107 countries107 countries 175 questions175 questions
22ndnd: 2003: 2003 152 countries152 countries 275 questions275 questions
3rd: 20063rd: 2006 142 countries142 countries 300+ questions300+ questions
3. Collecting the data...3. Collecting the data...
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14%
64%
361%
Ratio of Bank Assets to GDPRatio of Bank Assets to GDP
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Not AvailableLess Than 10 Percent
Greater Than 60 Percent
Greater Than 10 Percent, Less Than 30 PercentGreater Than 30 Percent, Less Than 60 Percent
Government-Owned BanksGovernment-Owned Banks
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Government Ownership of Banks DiffersGovernment Ownership of Banks Differs
WidelyWidely
Share of Total Assets in Government-Owned Banks
as of Year-End 2005
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Brazil 45%
China 68%Germany 40%
Russia 39%
India 74%
United State 0%
Median = 5%
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Government-Owned Banks Share ofGovernment-Owned Banks Share of
Total Bank AssetsTotal Bank Assets
78 Percent 68 Percent
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Foreign Ownership of Banks Differ WidelyForeign Ownership of Banks Differ Widely
Share of Total Assets in Foreign-Owned Banks
as of Year-End 2005
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Brazil 20%
China 2%
Germany 6.5%
Russia 8.3%India 6.8%
United Kindom 54%
United States 8.5%
Japan 6.1%
Median = 39%
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11 Percent 98 Percent
Foreign-Owned Banks ShareForeign-Owned Banks Share
of Total Bank Assetsof Total Bank Assets
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Grouping and Aggregating Data to AssessGrouping and Aggregating Data to Assess
What Works BestWhat Works Best
Structure, scope,Structure, scope,independence ofindependence ofregulation andregulation and
supervisionsupervision
Bank activitiesBank activities Entry requirementsEntry requirements CapitalCapital
requirementsrequirements Deposit InsuranceDeposit Insurance
Supervisory powersSupervisory powers
Private monitoringPrivate monitoring
ExternalExternalgovernancegovernance
OwnershipOwnership
characteristicscharacteristicsAll the data is online in the hopes oflowering the entry barriers to
conducting better research.
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How Many Bank Supervisory AuthoritiesHow Many Bank Supervisory Authorities
Do Countries Have?Do Countries Have?
6
9
44
82
92
51
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Is there a single financial
supervisory agency for all
of the main financial
institutions (insurancecompanies, contractual
savings institutions,
savings banks)?
Is there a single financial
supervisory agency for all
of the activities in which
commercial banks areallowed to do business?
N ot Availab le Yes N o
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Is the Central BankIs the Central Bank
a Supervisory Authority?a Supervisory Authority?
Yes
54%
No
42%
Not
Available
4%
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Who Funds SupervisionWho Funds Supervision
in Countries?in Countries?
Banks
23%
Government
31%
Not
Available
36%
Both10%
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What Is a Bank?What Is a Bank?
Regulatory Restrictions on ActivitiesRegulatory Restrictions on Activities
36
13 11
31
40
4220
34
33
18
21
26
46
32
31
41
7
974
0
20
40
60
80
100
Securities InsuranceReal estate Bankownership
of
nonfinancial firms
Nonfinancial firm
ownership
of banks
PercentUnrestricted Permitted Restricted Prohibited
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CapitalCapital
Summary measure of initial and generalSummary measure of initial and general
capital stringencycapital stringency Basel C/ABasel C/A
Capital varies with market riskCapital varies with market risk
loan securities, FX losses deducted from capitalloan securities, FX losses deducted from capital
initial capital only with cash and government securitiesinitial capital only with cash and government securities
borrowed funds for initial capitalborrowed funds for initial capital
verify capital sourcesverify capital sources
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Are Countries Planning on Adopting BaselAre Countries Planning on Adopting Basel
II?II?
Yes
76%
No13%
Not
Available
11%
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Which Approach DoWhich Approach Do
Countries Plan to Adopt?Countries Plan to Adopt?
Yes
82%
No
2%
Not
Available
16%
Yes45%
No38%
NotAvailable
17%
Standardized Approach
Foundation IRB Approach
Yes
40%
No43%
NotAvailable
17%
Advanced IRB Approach
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Deposit Insurance GenerosityDeposit Insurance Generosity
ExplicitExplicit
Level of coverageLevel of coverage
CoinsuranceCoinsurance Coverage (e.g., FX, interbank deposits)Coverage (e.g., FX, interbank deposits)
Funding (source; flat or risk based)Funding (source; flat or risk based)
ManagementManagement MembershipMembership
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Do Countries Have ExplicitDo Countries Have Explicit
Deposit Insurance Schemes?Deposit Insurance Schemes?
Yes
49%No
51%Yes54%
No44%
Not Available
2%
Survey III143 CountriesSurvey II
152 Countries
Countries recently adopting depositinsurance: Armenia, Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Moldova, Russia, Singapore,Tajikistan, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe
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Percent of the Commercial Banking SystemsPercent of the Commercial Banking Systems
Assets Funded by DepositsAssets Funded by Deposits
0 20 40 60 80
ColombiaMauritius
PhilippinesGreece
United StatesBulgariaMexicoCanadaIrelandCroatia
KoreaJamaicaBurundi
GhanaCzech Republic
IndonesiaPortugalJordan
RomaniaEl Salvador
ArgentinaCyprus
ChileSlovakiaArmenia
Kyrgyz RepublicTrinidad and Tobago
ItalyTajikistan
LatviaUnited Kingdom
SloveniaHungary
PolandGermanyMozambique
ZimbabweMalta
EstoniaSpain
NorwayBelarus
BrazilNetherlands
AustraliaSingapore
DenmarkRussia
BelgiumLuxembourg
LesothoFinland
SwedenIceland
FranceBotswana
Algeria
SurinameGuyana
SeychellesMacau, China
FijiDominica
Dominican RepublicBhutan
BangladeshTanzania
Cook IslandsMorocco
Papua New GuineaSouth Africa
ChinaPakistan
KenyaLebanon
LithuaniaIndia
BahrainNew Zealand
BelizeLiechtenstein
NicaraguaThailandMoldova
GuatemalaMalawiJersey
VenezuelaUruguayMaldives
Bosnia andSaudi Arabia
BoliviaMalaysia
Costa RicaSri Lanka
OmanJapan
PeruSwitzerland
HondurasUganda
MacedoniaPanama
Angola
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Percent of the Commercial Banking SystemsPercent of the Commercial Banking Systems
Assets Funded with Insured DepositsAssets Funded with Insured Deposits
ColombiaCzech Republic
IndonesiaBulgaria
BangladeshLithuania
GuatemalaLatvia
PortugalPoland
HungaryMexico
DenmarkNetherlandsMacedoniaArgentinaZimbabwe
United StatesCyprus
KoreaSlovakiaRomania
NicaraguaPeru
SloveniaJamaicaNorwayCroatia
SpainEl Salvador
MalaysiaLuxembourg
IcelandFinland
LiechtensteinTanzania
FranceArmeniaMoldovaLebanon
SwedenBrazil
62 countries with no assets62 countries with no assets
funded with insured depositsfunded with insured deposits
Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,
Australia, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,Australia, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Botswana, British Virgin Islands, BurkinaBotswana, British Virgin Islands, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cayman Islands,Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cayman Islands,Central African Republic, Chad, China,Central African Republic, Chad, China,
Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, CoteCongo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote
d'Ivorie, Dominica, Dominican Republic,d'Ivorie, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,
Ghana, Grenada, Guernsey, GuineaGhana, Grenada, Guernsey, Guinea
Bissau, Guyana, Jersey, Kosovo, Kuwait,Bissau, Guyana, Jersey, Kosovo, Kuwait,
Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Macau, China,Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Macau, China,Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius,Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius,
Montserrat, Mozambique, New Zealand,Montserrat, Mozambique, New Zealand,
Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua NewNiger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa,Guinea, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname,Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname,
Syria, Thailand, Togo, VanuatuSyria, Thailand, Togo, Vanuatu
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Official SupervisionOfficial Supervision
Supervisory powerSupervisory power Power to take legal action against auditors, director, officersPower to take legal action against auditors, director, officers Force bank to provision, change organizational structureForce bank to provision, change organizational structure Power to suspend dividends, bonuses, management feesPower to suspend dividends, bonuses, management fees Legal power to declare insolvencyLegal power to declare insolvency
Power to supercede shareholder rights, remove/replacePower to supercede shareholder rights, remove/replacemanagers, directorsmanagers, directors
Forbearance discretionForbearance discretion
Loan classification and provisioning stringencyLoan classification and provisioning stringency
Diversification: domestically and abroadDiversification: domestically and abroad
Supervisory resourcesSupervisory resources
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What Powers Do Supervisors Possess?What Powers Do Supervisors Possess?
8
12
9
28
66
11 7
10 6
64
16
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Can individual supervisory staff be held personally
liable for dam age s to a bank caused by their actions
or omissions committed in the good faith exercise of
their duties?
Can the supervisory agency be held l iable for
damages to a bank caused by its actions?
Are ba nk directors lega lly liable if informa tion
disclosed is erroneous or misleading?
Not Available Yes No
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Are Courts Supervisory Authorities Too?Are Courts Supervisory Authorities Too?
9
9
9
6
69
115
127
64
18
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Is court approval required for supervisory actions, such
as superceding shareholder rights, removing and
replacing management, removing and replacing director,
or license revocation?
Is court order re quired to appoint a receiver/liquidator in
the e vent of liquidation?
Can the bank shareholders appeal to the court against a
decision of the bank supervisor?
N ot Available Yes N o
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3. Private monitoring3. Private monitoring
Certified audit requiredCertified audit required
Percent of 10 biggest banks rated byPercent of 10 biggest banks rated byinternational rating agenciesinternational rating agencies
Accounting disclosure and liabilityAccounting disclosure and liability accrued but unpaid interestaccrued but unpaid interest consolidated statementsconsolidated statements
liability of directorsliability of directors No deposit insuranceNo deposit insurance
Private monitoring
Laissez-Faire
Private monitoring
involves supervision
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Do Countries Require a SimpleDo Countries Require a Simple
Leverage Ratio?Leverage Ratio?
Yes
17%
No
70%
Not
Availabl
13%
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4. What Works Best?4. What Works Best?
What worksWhat works Bank developmentBank development
EfficiencyEfficiency IntegrityIntegrity StabilityStability Bank governance?Bank governance?
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4. Bank development4. Bank development
s = Supervisory/regulatory indicatorss = Supervisory/regulatory indicators
X = Exogenous determinants of Bank Development, identifiedX = Exogenous determinants of Bank Development, identifiedby existing research (legal origin, ethnic diversity, settlerby existing research (legal origin, ethnic diversity, settlermortality, etc.)mortality, etc.)
Z = Instrumental variables for the bank supervision andZ = Instrumental variables for the bank supervision andregulation variables (religious orientation, endowments,regulation variables (religious orientation, endowments,latitude)latitude)
u andu and are error termsare error terms ,, ,, , and, and are the estimated parametersare the estimated parameters
Bank Development =Bank Development = ++ s +s + X + uX + u
s =s = Z +Z +
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Private monitoring boosts bank developmentPrivate monitoring boosts bank development
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Official supervisory power lowers bankOfficial supervisory power lowers bank
developmentdevelopment
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Changes in Restrictions on BanksChanges in Restrictions on BanksChanges - Overall Restrictions - Survey III - I
Belarus
MauritiusBelgiumBhutan
PolandRomania
BrazilGhana
GreeceIcelandIreland
Morocco
Guatemala
JordanKuwaitLatviaLebanonMaltaNetherlands
BahrainBoliviaBotswanaCanadaCroatiaDenmarkIndia
Saudi ArabiaSloveniaSweden
AustraliaAustriaFinlandGermanyHondurasHungary
Italy
Lithuania
South AfricaSpain
ChileCyprusFrance
PortugalSwitzerland
MoldovaPeru
Thailand
GuyanaTajikistan
Japan
United Kingdom
PhilippinesUnited States
Malaysia
Russia
Korea
Argentina
Singapore
Panama
CzechRepublic
Oman
Lesotho
Indonesia
Trinidad and Tobago
BurundiEstonia
Mexico
Luxembourg
NewZealand
Kenya
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
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Impact of Changes in RestrictionsImpact of Changes in RestrictionsDifference in BankDevelopment - Overall Restrictions - Survey III - I
GuyanaTajikistan
CzechRepublicKenya
MoldovaPeru
ThailandChile
CyprusFrance
LuxembourgPanama
Portugal
Trinidad and TobagoAustralia
AustriaFinland
GermanyHondurasHungary
Italy
Lithuania
South Africa
BahrainBolivia
BotswanaCanadaCroatia
DenmarkIndia
Lesotho
SloveniaSweden
BurundiEstonia
Guatemala
JordanKuwaitLatviaLebanonMaltaNetherlands
BrazilGhanaGreece
OmanPolandRomania
Belarus
Indonesia
Japan
PhilippinesUnited States
United Kingdom
Mexico
Korea
Singapore
NewZealand
Saudi Arabia
Morocco
Bhutan
Mauritius
Belgium
IrelandIceland
Russia
Malaysia
Spain
Switzerland
Argentina
-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
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Changes in Entry RequirementsChanges in Entry Requirements
Changes - Entry Requirements - Survey III - I
Cyprus Peru
SwedenAustralia
GreeceKenya
RomaniaSpain
TajikistanVenezuela
AustriaBahrainBelarusBelgiumBoliviaBotswanaBrazilCanadaCroatiaCzechRepublicDenmarkEstonia
GhanaGuatemalaHondurasIndiaIrelandItalyJordanLebanonLesothoLithuaniaLuxembourgMaltaMauritius
MoldovaMoroccoOmanPanamaPortugal
Saudi ArabiaSlovenia
South AfricaSwitzerlandThailand
BhutanChileEl SalvadorFranceGuyanaHungaryIceland
PolandSingapore
BurundiGermanyLatviaTrinidad and Tobago
KuwaitFinland
Philippines
Malaysia
KoreaNetherlands
Russia
United Kingdom
Indonesia
NewZealand
Sri Lanka
Japan
Mexico
Argentina
United States
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
I t f E t ChI t f E t Ch
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Impact of Entry ChangesImpact of Entry Changes
Difference in BankDevelopment - Entry Restrictions - Survey III - I
CyprusPeru
SwedenAustralia
GreeceKenya
NetherlandsRomania
TajikistanVenezuela
AustriaBahrainBelarusBelgiumBoliviaBotswanaBrazilCanadaCroatiaCzechRepublicDenmark
EstoniaGhanaGuatemalaHondurasIndiaIrelandItaly
JordanLebanonLesothoLithuaniaLuxembourgMaltaMauritius
MoldovaMoroccoOmanPanamaPortugalSaudi Arabia
SloveniaSouth AfricaSwitzerland
BhutanChileEl SalvadorFranceGuyanaHungaryIceland
PolandSingapore
BurundiGermanyLatvia
Trinidad and TobagoKuwait
Finland
Korea
Philippines
United Kingdom
Malaysia
United States
Sri Lanka
NewZealand
Japan
Thailand
Russia
Mexico
Spain
Indonesia
Argentina
-0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15
I t f I d S i iI t f I d S i i
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Impact of Improved SupervisionImpact of Improved Supervision
Difference in BankDevelopment - Official Supervisory Power - Survey III - I
Singapore
South AfricaMauritius
LithuaniaTrinidad and Tobago
LatviaGuatemala
IrelandMoldova
GhanaIcelandMalta
BelarusGuyana
SpainAustralia
Bolivia
BurundiDenmarkEstonia
FranceIndia
ThailandItaly
CanadaChile
Finland
MoroccoPortugal
Switzerland
BelgiumLesotho
BrazilGreeceHondurasHungary
KenyaLebanonPeru
VenezuelaEl SalvadorGermanyOmanPanamaSloveniaSaudi Arabia
CroatiaCyprusPoland
BahrainNewZealand
AustriaLuxembourgCzechRepublic
BotswanaBhutan
United Kingdom
United States
Japan
ArgentinaRussia
Malaysia
Mexico
Korea
-0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1
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Impact of Private MonitoringImpact of Private Monitoring
Difference in BankDevelopment - Private Monitoring - Survey III - I
BurundiFinland
OmanAustralia
Jordan
MaltaPeru
Portugal
Switzerland
BotswanaBrazilChileCroatiaEstoniaGuyanaHonduras
LuxembourgMoldovaPanamaSingapore
Trinidad and Tobago
BahrainBelgiumBoliviaIcelandIreland
MauritiusNewZealand
Slovenia
South AfricaSpainSweden
CyprusCzechRepublicEl SalvadorFranceGermanyGreeceGuatemalaHungaryItalyLatviaMoroccoNetherlands
ThailandBelarusMexico
Indonesia
Russia
LithuaniaJapan
ArgentinaUnited States
United Kingdom
Korea
Malaysia
-0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
I t f Di ifi tiI t f Di ifi ti
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Impact of DiversificationImpact of Diversification
Difference in Probability (Banking Crises) - Diversification Index - Survey III - I
GuyanaHonduras
BurundiLesotho
GuatemalaGhana
Lithuania
DenmarkPanama
India
Tajikistan
AustraliaAustriaBoliviaBotswanaBrazilCanadaChileCroatiaCyprusEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyIcelandItalyJapanLuxembourgMalaysiaMauritiusMoroccoNetherlandsNewZealandPeru
PolandPortugalRomania
SloveniaSwedenSwitzerlandThailandTrinidad and Tobago
Saudi ArabiaMoldovaMaltaBahrainJordan
SpainHungaryCzechRepublicRwandaSouth AfricaOman
VenezuelaGreece
LebanonBelarus
Korea
Mexico
Indonesia
Argentina
Philippines
Russia
United KingdomUnited States
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4
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6. Qualified Conclusions6. Qualified Conclusions Until angels govern, the data suggest Until angels govern, the data suggest
Avoid relying on official oversight, restrictions, & ownershipAvoid relying on official oversight, restrictions, & ownership Emphasize private monitoring / incentives (deposit insurance)Emphasize private monitoring / incentives (deposit insurance) Stress Basel IIs 3Stress Basel IIs 3rdrd pillar (not capital and official oversight)pillar (not capital and official oversight)
Supervisors have crucial roleSupervisors have crucial role
Support market discipline, not supplant itSupport market discipline, not supplant it Foster / force information disclosureFoster / force information disclosure
Do not fax best practices to countries!Do not fax best practices to countries!
Empiricists / Researchers deserveEmpiricists / Researchers deserve aa seat atseat at
the regulatory reform tablethe regulatory reform table
Wh d ?Wh t t d ?
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What to do?What to do? Data say that capital and supervision do notData say that capital and supervision do not
workwork Implications:Implications:
Emerging markets need to emphasize infrastructureEmerging markets need to emphasize infrastructurefirst, with better information, incentives to use itfirst, with better information, incentives to use it
Look to why supervision has not been workingLook to why supervision has not been working(politics).(politics).
Focus on private sector incentives and diversifyFocus on private sector incentives and diversify State guarantees (deposit insurance) and/or stateState guarantees (deposit insurance) and/or state
ownership reduces monitoringownership reduces monitoring Limits on activities are badLimits on activities are bad Diversification (activities, portfolios) is essentialDiversification (activities, portfolios) is essential Foreign entry matters, esp. for small countriesForeign entry matters, esp. for small countries
Go slow on Basel II (wait for version II.x,Go slow on Basel II (wait for version II.x,or later)or later) Emphasize pillar 3Emphasize pillar 3Till Angels GovernTill Angels Govern..
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Our LimitationsOur Limitations
MeasurementMeasurement Errors, omissions,Errors, omissions, time-seriestime-series in measuring supervision / regulation?in measuring supervision / regulation? Impact of supervision on the ground (only have proxies)Impact of supervision on the ground (only have proxies) Better aggregate indexes of approaches to supervision / regulation?Better aggregate indexes of approaches to supervision / regulation? Solution: get better dataSolution: get better data
Gauging Government RoleGauging Government Role Policies may work differently in different political / institutional regimesPolicies may work differently in different political / institutional regimes Do we capture these nuances?Do we capture these nuances? Solution: add case studiesSolution: add case studies
Regulatory choicesRegulatory choices Does X-C evidence add much?Does X-C evidence add much? Solution: add time series dataSolution: add time series data
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Our LimitationsOur Limitations
MeasurementMeasurement Errors, omissions,Errors, omissions, time-seriestime-series in measuring supervision / regulation?in measuring supervision / regulation? Impact of supervision on the ground (only have proxies)Impact of supervision on the ground (only have proxies) Better aggregate indexes of approaches to supervision / regulation?Better aggregate indexes of approaches to supervision / regulation? Solution: get better dataSolution: get better data
Gauging Government RoleGauging Government Role Policies may work differently in different political / institutional regimesPolicies may work differently in different political / institutional regimes Do we capture these nuances?Do we capture these nuances? Solution: add case studiesSolution: add case studies
Regulatory choicesRegulatory choices Does X-C evidence add much?Does X-C evidence add much?
Solution: add time series dataSolution: add time series data
P t f th C i l B ki S t P t f th C i l B ki S t
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Percent of the Commercial Banking SystemsPercent of the Commercial Banking Systems
Assets Denominated in Foreign CurrencyAssets Denominated in Foreign Currency
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Trinidad and TobagoCroatia
LesothoRussia
UgandaIcelandPolandGhanaFrance
Czech RepublicGuatemalaIndonesia
NorwayNetherlands
MexicoArgentina
BurundiSaudi Arabia
ChilePakistan
KenyaSlovakia
GuyanaBhutan
BotswanaZimbabwe
MozambiqueVenezuela
MalawiThailand
Papua New GuineaBrazil
GreeceDominica
Dominican RepublicKorea
South AfricaBelize
FijiSeychelles
ItalyMoroccoMalaysia
SpainColombiaPortugal
AustraliaNew Zealand
AlgeriaBangladeshEl Salvador
BahrainMalta
Macau, China
KazakhstanBolivia
SingaporeUruguay
LatviaLebanon
KyrgyzMaldives
PeruSwitzerland
LithuaniaNicaraguaBosnia and
MauritiusCyprus
MacedoniaCook Islands
United KingdomCosta Rica
BulgariaArmenia
LiechtensteinTajikistanSuriname
AngolaRomania
HungarySloveniaDenmarkJamaicaFinlandBelarus
MoldovaCanada
HondurasTanzania
OmanIsle of Man
JordanBelgium
P t f th C i l B ki S t P t f th C i l B ki S t
-
8/8/2019 Caprio College Prezentacija
49/50
Percent of the Commercial Banking SystemsPercent of the Commercial Banking Systems
Liabilities Denominated in Foreign CurrencyLiabilities Denominated in Foreign Currency
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
MoldovaHungary
RussiaIsle of Man
JordanUganda
BelgiumNetherlands
SlovakiaFranceGhanaOman
DominicaDominican
New ZealandSaudi Arabia
GuatemalaIndonesia
ChileCzech Republic
PolandBelize
MexicoArgentina
KenyaPakistanBurundiGreeceMalawi
BotswanaZimbabwe
BrazilPapua New Guinea
ItalyKorea
MalaysiaGuyana
SpainFiji
ColombiaThailand
KazakhstanSouth Africa
AustraliaMorocco
SeychellesLesotho
VenezuelaBhutan
El Salvador
BoliviaBahrainUruguay
KyrgyzMacau, China
SingaporeNicaragua
LatviaJersey
LebanonArmenia
PeruTajikistan
SwitzerlandMauritius
LiechtensteinCyprus
Bosnia andMaldives
Cook IslandsCroatia
BulgariaUnited Kingdom
FinlandAngola
Costa RicaSurinameLithuania
MacedoniaMalta
MozambiqueDenmarkRomaniaSloveniaJamaica
HondurasIcelandNorwayCanadaBelarus
TanzaniaTrinidad and
P t f th C i l B ki S t P t f th C i l B ki S t
-
8/8/2019 Caprio College Prezentacija
50/50
Percent of the Commercial Banking SystemsPercent of the Commercial Banking Systems
Assets in Government SecuritiesAssets in Government Securities
OmanBelarus
Macau, ChinaMauritius
BangladeshMalta
FijiTrinidad and Tobago
BulgariaSurinameLithuaniaHungary
KazakhstanThailand
DenmarkBhutan
ChileCanadaCroatiaCyprus
MoldovaSouth Africa
Kyrgyz RepublicBolivia
SingaporeRussia
ItalySpain
UruguayBelizeLatvia
MalaysiaIreland
SwedenNew Zealand
FrancePanama
RomaniaGermany
NorwayIsle of Man
Cook IslandsCayman Islands
FinlandSwitzerland
IcelandBurundi
United KingdomTajikistanJersey
SyriaKosovo
Bosnia and Herzegovina
JamaicaIndia
Papua NewMalawi
VenezuelaGuyana
ZimbabweIndonesia
UgandaKenya
TanzaniaGhana
LebanonColombia
AngolaPoland
LuxembourgSlovenia
NicaraguaBrazil
Saudi ArabiaCosta Rica
SlovakiaLesothoMoroccoPakistanJordan
PhilippinesMexico
HondurasBelgiumArmenia
CzechGreece
El SalvadorUnited States
JapanPeru
DominicanDominica
MacedoniaNetherlands