entry, shows they are disproportionately representedwithin the system, have greater chances of beingincarcerated for a second time, and have higherinstitutional security classifications. This all pointstoward the need for specific attention to Aboriginalprisoners. Some advances have been made by CSCin recent years, and include the construction of theHealing Lodge for federally sentenced females(Okimaw Ohci), Aboriginal-specific health strategiesin HIV/AIDS, endorsement of NativeSisterhoodwithin the prison system, and the establishmentof 24 halfway houses for Aboriginal males acrossCanada. Again, although CSC has acknowledgedthat Aboriginal prisoners have unique experiencesand circumstances in comparison to non-Aboriginalprisoners, there remains a need for ensuing informedpolicy and practice.

Similar to the history of female prisoners inCanadian corrections, the acknowledgment of theuniqueness of Aboriginal in comparison to non-Aboriginal prisoners to date has come at anexpense. In particular, Aboriginal offenders haveoften come to be thought of as a homogeneousgroup. For example, CSC’s OIA does not accountfor diversity within the Aboriginal offender popula-tion (e.g., Inuit, Metis, First Nations). Furthermore,risk and need assessment tools individualizeoffender risk and need, decontextualizing thesefrom the social and political structures, and so thetools are not able to account for the impact of colo-nial oppression, which cannot be individualized.

CONCLUSION

Canada’s two systems of incarceration, federal andprovincial/territorial, have numerous similarities aswell as differences in their operations and prisonerpopulations. At the federal level, which is likewisecharacterized by similarities and differences, thehistory of corrections can be chronicled throughfour models of punishment: deterrence, rehabilitation,incapacitation, and reintegration. These modelsoffer insight into CSC’s approach to imprisonmentduring various time periods, which assists in under-standing the CSC’s historic and current policies andpractices. CSC’s current ideology, conveyed in its

mission statement and evident in its operations,relays the need for increased attention specific tofemale and Aboriginal prisoners.

—Colleen Anne Dell

See also Australia; Classification; Deterrence Theory;England and Wales; Federal Prison System;Incapacitation Theory; Just Deserts Theory; RobertMartinson; Medical Model; Native AmericanPrisoners; Rehabilitation Theory; Rehabilitation Act1973; Restorative Justice; State Prison System;Prisoners; Women; Women’s Prisons

Further Reading

Bonta, J., LaPrairie, C., & Wallace-Capretta, S. (1997). Risk pre-diction and re-offending: Aboriginal and non-Aboriginaloffenders. Canadian Journal of Criminology. 39, 127–144.

Carrigan, D. (1991). Crime and punishment in Canada, ahistory. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.

Correctional Service of Canada. (2001). Basic facts aboutfederal corrections. Ottawa, ON: Public Works andGovernment Services Canada.

Culhane, C. (1985). Still barred from prison: Social injusticein Canada. Montreal, QU: Black Rose Books.

Faith, K. (1993). Unruly women: The politics of confinementand resistance. Vancouver: Press Gang.

Goff, C. (1999). Corrections in Canada. Cincinnati, OH:Anderson.

Hannah-Moffat, K., & Shaw, M. (2000). An ideal prison?Critical essays on women’s imprisonment. Halifax, NS:Fernwood.

Jackson, M. (2002). Justice behind the walls. Vancouver, BC:Douglas & MacIntyre.

Martinson, R. (1974). What works—Questions and answersabout prison reform. Public Interest, 35, 22–54.

Nielsen, M. (2000). Canadian correctional policy and Nativeinmates: The control of social dynamite. In R. Neugebauer,Criminal injustice: Racism in the criminal justice system(pp. 341–354). Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press.

Winterdyk, J. (2001). Corrections in Canada: Social reactionsto crime. Toronto: Prentice Hall.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Capital punishment refers to the use of the deathpenalty as punishment for certain crimes. InAmerica, almost 20,000 persons have been legallyput to death since colonial times, with most of the

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executions occurring in the 19th and 20th centuries.In recent years, opposition to the death penalty hasbecome more vocal in many states, leading somecriminologists to predict its eventual demise.

HISTORY

The United States has had a system of capitalpunishment in place since colonial times. The firstrecorded legal execution in the American coloniesoccurred in 1608 in Virginia, when Captain GeorgeKendall was executed for the crime of spying forSpain. Since then, the crimes eligible for a deathsentence have changed. For example, prior to theAmerican Revolution, the list of capital crimesincluded idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, murder,manslaughter, poisoning, bestiality, sodomy, adul-tery, manslaughter, bearing false witness in capitalcases, conspiracy, and rebellion. Now, the applica-tion of the death penalty is overwhelmingly con-fined to murder. It is noteworthy, however, thecolonial Americans used the death penalty lessoften than courts do today despite the greaternumber of eligible crimes.

During the 19th century, the number of execu-tions increased significantly, with more people putto death between 1800 and 1865 than in the entire17th and 18th centuries combined. Changes werealso enacted that included the introduction of theconcept of degrees of murder and the removal ofexecutions from the public realm. In some states,discretionary death penalty laws replaced those thatmandated the death penalty for anyone convicted ofa capital crime. In addition, the jurisdiction of exe-cutions was changed from local to state control.Individual towns were no longer responsible forcapital punishment. Instead, the state became theexecutioner. Finally, the number of offenses punish-able by death was reduced and some states beganabolishing the death penalty. The number of execu-tions decreased immediately following the CivilWar. However, in the last two decades of the 19thcentury, the number increased again to approxi-mately 1,000 each decade.

Abolitionist efforts grew during this time periodas well. Michigan eradicated the death penalty in

1846 for all crimes except treason. Five other statesalso enacted abolitionist legislation. By 1901, how-ever, three of these states had reestablished capitalpunishment.

During the first two decades of the 20th century,the United States entered what is known as theProgressive period of social reform. More statesabolished the death penalty or severely restrictedits use. Six states (Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington) abolishedthe death penalty entirely, and three others limitedits use to rare offenses such as treason (Arizona,North Dakota, and Tennessee). However, concernabout communism and the threat of revolution ledto the reinstatement of capital punishment in fivestates by 1920, and the number of executions acrossthe country overall increased. The 1930s hold therecord for the greatest number of executions in onedecade in U.S. history, averaging 167 executionsper year. The combination of organized crime dur-ing the Depression and the writings of criminolo-gists who suggested that the death penalty wasnecessary to deter violence increased its popularityduring this period. By 1950, only three states thathad previously abolished capital punishment hadnot reenacted statutes allowing the death penalty.

During the 1950s, public support for capital pun-ishment began diminishing again, although therewere periods of strong support for it. Internationalsupport for the death penalty was declining. Twocases were particularly noteworthy at this time forthe debate surrounding capital punishment. First,the prosecution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg gar-nered public support for capital punishment. TheRosenbergs were accused of engaging in espionagefor the Soviet Union. Although there was publicdebate about their sentences as well as widespreadinternational protest, the Rosenbergs were executedin 1953. A Gallup poll taken five months after theirexecutions indicated strong support in the UnitedStates for capital punishment, with 70% of peoplesupporting the death penalty. Less than one yearlater, however, another case occurred that led tostrong opposition to the death penalty. CarylChessman, who had been sentenced to death in1948, published the first of four books from death

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row in California. In them he claimed innocence,and his case became the focus of worldwide oppo-sition to capital punishment. Chessman’s executionwas stayed eight times before his death sentencewas carried out in 1960. National and internationalefforts to intervene brought the case into the spot-light. Following his execution, opinion polls indi-cated decreasing support for capital punishment.Four states abolished the death penalty within fiveyears (Iowa, Michigan, Oregon, and West Virginia).

By the mid-1960s, a number of constitutionalchallenges to capital punishment had been raised.In the case of Trop v. Dulles (1958), the U.S.Supreme Court set forth the argument of evolvingstandards of decency that became important in laterconstitutional challenges to the death penalty.Eventually, three cases led to a moratorium on exe-cutions. Maxwell v. Bishop (1970) raised the issueof racial discrimination in the application of capitalpunishment, and Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968)called into question the use of “death-qualifiedjuries” (or the practice of removing potential jurorsfor cause if they were opposed to the death penalty).United States v. Jackson (1968) focused on therequirement that a jury recommend death for fed-eral kidnapping cases. The last execution prior tothe 1972 national moratorium on executionsoccurred in Colorado in 1967.

FURMAN V. GEORGIAAND ITS AFTERMATH

In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled on the case ofFurman v. Georgia, instituting a complete morato-rium on executions in the United States. TheFurman case focused on the arbitrariness andcapriciousness of capital punishment that resultedfrom unrestrained discretion of juries. While theSupreme Court did not rule that the practice of thedeath penalty was unconstitutional, it did find thatexisting statutes (involving the process of sentenc-ing) were unconstitutional. Death penalty statutes in40 states and the federal government were overturned,and 629 death sentences were vacated. The Furmandecision not only instituted a moratorium on execu-tions but also established the “death is different

doctrine.” This doctrine has led to the policy oftreating capital cases as different from all othercrimes, requiring what has been referred to as“super-due process” (Radin, 1980). Super-dueprocess refers to the special procedures that arerequired in capital cases. It includes guided discre-tion, automatic appeal, and the suggestion thatstates review all capital cases to ensure that sen-tencing was proportional for similar crimes.

States immediately devised new capital punish-ment statutes. The new statutes either removed alldiscretion by mandating death sentences for allcapital offenses or instituted standards of guideddiscretion. In Woodson v. North Carolina (1976),the Supreme Court rejected statutes that imposedmandatory death sentences. The Supreme Courtthen upheld the death sentence in Gregg v. Georgia(1976). The Gregg ruling provided for guideddiscretion, bifurcated trials, automatic appellatereview of all death sentences, and proportionalityreview to detect sentencing disparities. The firstexecution following reinstatement of capital pun-ishment was in Utah in January of 1977. Since then,nearly 900 persons have been legally executed inthe United States.

THE SUPREME COURTAND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Since the Gregg decision, the Supreme Court hasheard cases on a variety of issues related to capitalpunishment, including constitutionality, proceduralissues, mitigating and aggravating circumstances,and who is eligible for execution. As the composi-tion of the Court has changed, the decisions it hasrendered have also changed. This is particularlyevident in decisions related to the constitutionalityof death penalty statutes and procedural issues. InMcCleskey v. Kemp (1987), the Supreme Courtrevisited the issue of racial discrimination in appli-cation of the death penalty. Using social scienceresearch, McCleskey argued that a marked patternof discrimination based on the race of the victimexisted in capital cases. The Supreme Court found,however, that statistical analysis indicating a patternof racial discrimination in death sentencing did not

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make the death penalty statute unconstitutional.Instead, the Court stated, discrimination must beproven in individual cases. In Pulley v. Harris(1984), the Supreme Court ruled that states werenot required to provide proportionality review ofdeath sentences to determine fairness of sentencing.In a series of cases, the Supreme Court upheld theremoval of potential jurors for cause if they wereopposed to the death penalty. The Supreme Courtruled in Herrera v. Collins (1993) that federalcourts did not have to hear claims of actual inno-cence based on newly discovered evidence.

There have also been a number of constitutionalchallenges to aggravating circumstances included instate death penalty statutes. Aggravating factors mustbe present to seek the death penalty, but the statesdiffer as to what is considered an aggravating factor.Aggravating factors fall into three broad categories:those that focus on the characteristics of the offender(e.g., prior conviction for a violent crime), those thatfocus on the characteristics of the crime (e.g., occur-ring during the commission of a felony); and thosethat focus on the characteristics of the victims (e.g.,law enforcement or multiple victims). The courtshave also allowed the defense to present limitedinformation about mitigating factors, circumstancesthat may be considered to reduce culpability. TheSupreme Court has upheld the use of vaguely definedaggravators, allowed the use of victim impact state-ments, and required that mitigating factors beconsidered only if supported by evidence.

The Supreme Court has rendered a number ofdecisions regarding eligibility for a death sentence.In Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988), the Court ruledthat an individual age 16 at the time of the offensecan be sentenced to death. In Ford v. Wainwright(1986), the Supreme Court addressed the issue ofprisoners who go insane while on death row, rulingthat to be eligible for execution the offender mustbe able to understand the punishment and the rea-son for its application. The Supreme Court’s rulingson degree of participation in the offense have beenless clear, however. In 1982, the Court ruled inEnmund v. Florida that an offender who neitherkilled nor intended to kill could not be sentencedto death. However, in 1987 the Court refined its

position in Tison v. Arizona, stating that the lackof killing or intent to kill were irrelevant if theoffender was a major participant in the crime andshowed a “reckless indifference” to life.

Finally, the Supreme Court applied the “evolvingstandard of decency” interpretation to execution ofthe mentally retarded in Penry v. Lynaugh (1989).Penry, who was sentenced to death in Texas, hadthe mental capacity of a seven-year-old child. Heappealed his sentence arguing that the EighthAmendment ban of cruel and unusual punishmentprohibited execution of the mentally retarded. Hisappeal was denied. The Court’s opinion stated thatbecause no evidence of a national consensus againstexecution of the mentally retarded existed, therewas no basis to suggest the Eighth Amendment wasviolated. The Supreme Court pointed out that onlytwo states prohibited execution of the mentallyretarded at that time, and national opinion polls pro-vided little evidence of consensus on this matter. In2002, the Supreme Court again agreed to hear thePenry case, signaling their desire to revisit the issueof mental retardation and capital punishment.Although Penry’s sentence was commuted foranother reason prior to the arguments, the SupremeCourt revisited the issue in Atkins v. Virginia. In theAtkins case, the court reversed its earlier decisionbased on the “evolving standard of decency” issue.By the time that the Atkins case was argued, 18states had enacted legislation banning the executionof mentally retarded individuals, six within the yearthe case was argued. Furthermore, national opinionpolls provided evidence of a growing consensusthat mentally retarded individuals should not faceexecution. Thus, in June 2002 the Supreme Courthanded down its decision to ban execution of men-tally retarded individuals.

In June 2002, another ruling of the SupremeCourt had far-reaching implications. In Ring v.Arizona, the Court determined that a judge may notdecide critical sentencing issues and impose thedeath sentence as this violates the right to trial byjury. Arizona and eight other states had statutes thatallowed judges, not juries, to determine sentencingin capital cases. As many as 800 death sentencesmay be affected by this ruling.

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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT INTHE UNITED STATES TODAY

As of late 2002, 38 states, the federal government,and the U.S. military have death penalty statutesin place. The District of Columbia and 12 states(Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island,Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) do notauthorize the death penalty. More than 3,500 indi-viduals in the United States are currently under asentence of death. The vast majority of these aremen, with 52 women awaiting execution in late2002. More than 860 persons have been executedsince 1976, including 10 women.

The use of the death penalty is not appliedequally across all jurisdictions allowing it, however.In terms of per capita execution rates, Delaware hasthe highest per capita execution rate, followed byOklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. Almost half of allexecutions have occurred in just two states (Texasand Virginia); Texas accounted for 37% of all exe-cutions between 1992 and 2002. More than 80% ofexecutions post-Furman have occurred in theSouth. Other states and the U.S. military have deathpenalty statutes but have not executed anyone sincethe reinstatement of capital punishment.

THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

The federal death penalty law also was struck downin 1972 by the Furman decision. In 1988, Congressenacted the Drug Kingpin Statute allowing execu-tion for murder committed in the course of a drugconspiracy. The federal death penalty was furtherexpanded in 1994 to include more than 60 offenses.Offenses not related to homicide include treason;espionage; large-scale drug trafficking; authorizingor attempting to kill an officer, juror, or witness in aContinuing Criminal Enterprise case; and using themail system to deliver injurious articles with theintent to kill.

The federal government has executed two indi-viduals since reinstatement of the federal deathpenalty. The first federal execution since 1963 wasthe 2001 execution of Timothy McVeigh, convicted

of the 1995 Murrah Building bombing in OklahomaCity. Later in 2001, Juan Raul Garza was also exe-cuted. Garza was the first person executed under thefederal drug kingpin law that allows execution formurders related to drug trafficking. As of late 2002,there were 26 men awaiting execution on TerreHaute Penitentiary Death Row.

In 1996, Congress focused on speeding up theappellate process in capital cases with the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This lawrestricts the federal appeals process by dismissingsubsequent petitions when a claim has beenrejected and through rejection of new claims unlessrendered valid by a Supreme Court decision orbased on compelling new evidence not previouslyavailable.

The federal death penalty has been strongly crit-icized. In 2000, the Justice Department released areport citing serious racial and geographic dispari-ties in the application of the federal death penalty.Over 40% of the cases where the death penalty wassought originated in five jurisdictions. Furthermore,the report indicated that racial minorities were theaccused in nearly 80% of federal cases in which thedeath penalty was requested. Other research hassuggested that whites are more likely to avoid afederal death sentence by entering guilty pleas. In2002, two district court judges ruled that the federaldeath penalty was unconstitutional. U.S. DistrictJudge William Sessions of Vermont ruled that thefederal death penalty is unconstitutional because ofthe evidence allowed in the guilt phase of the trial(United States v. Fell), while U.S. District Judge JedRakoff (New York) cited the probability that inno-cent individuals have been executed in declaring the1994 federal death penalty law unconstitutional.

METHODS OF EXECUTION

Methods of execution have changed over time andvary slightly from state to state. By the end of 2002,all states except Nebraska allow lethal injection as amethod of execution. Ten states, including Nebraska,authorized electrocution. Five states still authorizedthe use of the gas chamber, three states authorizedhanging, and three authorized the use of firing squads.

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Lethal injection was first authorizedin Oklahoma in 1977, although the firstexecution by lethal injection did notoccur until 1982 in Texas. Since 1977,the majority of executions have reliedon this method. In lethal injection, threedrugs are administered intravenouslyto the condemned person. First, sodiumthiopental, an anesthetic, renders theindividual unconscious. Pancuroniumbromide is then administered. This druginduces muscle paralysis and stopsbreathing. Finally, potassium chlorideis administered to stop the heart.Although developed as a more humanemode of execution, lethal injection hasresulted in several botched executions.In several cases, technicians have haddifficulty locating usable veins. Theinjection equipment has malfunctioned in othercases, either coming loose or becoming blocked. Inseveral cases, the prisoners had severe reactions tothe chemicals, resulting in convulsions.

Until the latter part of the 20th century, electrocu-tion was regularly used for executions. The electricchair, first used in 1890, sends a large jolt of elec-tricity into the body for approximately 30 seconds.Then, medical personnel determine whether the pris-oner’s heart is still beating. If it is, another jolt isadministered. This process continues until the personis pronounced dead. A number of electrocutions haverequired repeated jolts, and there are numerous docu-mented cases of the condemned individual burning. Ina Louisiana execution in 1947, an electrocution mal-functioned and was halted. The Supreme Court ruledthat a second execution attempt did not constitutecruel and unusual punishment, and the prisoner wassubsequently electrocuted successfully (Louisiana exrel. Francis v. Resweber).

The gas chamber was developed in the 1920sas a more “humane” method of execution. Thecondemned individual is restrained in a chair in asealed chamber, under which there is a containerof sulfuric acid. A signal is then given, and sodiumcyanide crystals are released into the chamber. Theprisoner inhales the hydrogen cyanide gas that is

released, resulting in asphyxiation. This method hasbeen criticized as overly cruel, since the condemnedindividuals often struggle and appear to suffer.Today, it is allowed only in Arizona, California,Maryland, and Missouri. All four states, however,authorize lethal injection as well. It is also autho-rized in Wyoming if other methods are declaredunconstitutional.

Two other methods of execution remain legal butare rarely used. Three states still authorize hangingas of 2002, but this method has been used only threetimes since reinstatement of capital punishmentwith the Gregg decision in 1976. In addition, twostates authorize the use of firing squads. The use ofa firing squad is also allowed in Oklahoma if othermethods are declared unconstitutional. However,only two executions by firing squads have occurredsince 1976. The firing squad execution of GaryGilmore in January 1977 in Utah was the first post-Furman execution in the United States.

CONCLUSION: CONTEMPORARYDEBATES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Discussion of the death penalty has centered onseveral topics including the costs of maintaining itand whether or not capital punishment is a deterrent

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to homicide. The research on costs suggests thatcapital punishment is far more expensive than lifewithout parole, due in part to the expenses related totrials as well as with the cost of the appeals process.The “death is different” doctrine requires moreintensive investigation by both prosecutors anddefense attorneys, although prosecutors generallyhave more funding available. Research on the deter-rence aspect is mixed, but most studies indicate thatthe death penalty is not a general deterrent.

Beginning with the work of Cesare Beccaria,many criminologists have argued that instead ofbeing a deterrent the death penalty actually has abrutalizing effect, increasing violence throughexample. Ernest Van den Haag, one of the few sup-porters of a deterrence argument, has suggested thatsince the death penalty is the most severe punish-ment it should have the greatest deterrent effect.However, research does not support his contention.States that have abolished capital punishment havenot seen a rise in murders, and comparisons of con-tiguous states with and without capital punishmentdo not indicate any deterrent effect. Internationalopinion about the American system of capitalpunishment has also been an area of interest. TheUnited States and Japan are the only industrializednations that still maintain a system of capital pun-ishment. This, in conjunction with execution ofjuveniles and foreign nationals, has led to extensiveinternational criticism, particularly from WesternEurope.

Two other issues related to capital punishment havemarshaled considerable interest: racial and economicinequities in the system and wrongful convictions. TheFurman ruling was based on inequitable application ofcapital punishment, and reinstatement was designed toreduce the arbitrariness and discrimination inherent inthe system. The continued pattern of minority deathsentences, at both state and federal levels, has gener-ated serious concern. Regional patterns of executionshave been identified as a serious problem with morethan 80% of post-Furman executions occurring in theSouth, while only 44% of all homicides occurred inthat region. A 1990 U.S. General Accounting Officestudy concluded that race of the defendant was a fac-tor in the decision to prosecute a case as a capital case.

Furthermore, since 1973 more than 100 personshave been released from death rows across theUnited States, 12 as a result of DNA analysis. InIllinois, the release of 13 men from death row ledto Governor George Ryan declaring a moratoriumon executions in January 2001. Two years later, inJanuary 2003, he then commuted the sentences ofall of those on death row to life in prison. As of thiswriting, the long-term impact of this unusual deci-sion is unclear. Opponents of the death penaltyhope for a gradual erosion of this practice in theUnited States. Only time will tell.

—Susan F. Sharp

See also Cesare Beccaria; Death Row; Deathwatch;Furman v. Georgia; Gary Gilmore; Juvenile DeathPenalty; Timothy McVeigh; Julius and EthelRosenberg; Terre Haute Penitentiary Death Row;Karla Faye Tucker; Violent Crime Control and LawEnforcement Act 1994

Further Reading

Acker, J., Bohm, R., & Lanier, C. (Eds.). (1998). America’sexperiment with capital punishment: Reflections on thepast, present, and future of the ultimate penal sanction.Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

Bedau, H. A. (Ed.). (1982). The death penalty in America:Current controversies. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bohm, R. M. (1999). Deathquest: An introduction to thetheory and practice of capital punishment in the UnitedStates. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.

Death Penalty Information Center. (2001). The death penaltyin 2001: Year end report. Washington, DC: Author.Retrieved from http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEndReport2001.pdf

Dieter, R. C. (1997). Innocence and the death penalty: Theincreasing danger of executing the innocent. Retrievedfrom http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/

Liebman, J. S., Fagan, J., Gelman, A., West, V., Davies, G., &Kiss, A. (2002). A broken system, Part II. Retrieved fromhttp://www.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf

Liebman, J. S., Fagan, J., & West, V. (2000). A broken system:Error rates in capital cases, 1973–1995. Retrieved fromhttp://justice.policy.net/jpreport/finrep.PDF

Radelet, M., Bedau, H. A., & Putnam, C. (1992). In spite ofinnocence. Boston: Northeastern University Press.

Radin, M. J. (1980). Cruel punishment and respect for persons:Super due process for death. Southern California LawReview, 53, 1143–1185.

Snell, T. L. (2001). Capital punishment 2000. Washington, DC:U.S. Department of Justice/Office of Justice Programs.

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Legal Cases

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 at 287–289 (1972).Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 1 53 (1976).Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 at 474

(1947).Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989).Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp.2d 469 (D. Vermont 2002).United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).

CELEBRITIES IN PRISON

With few exceptions, celebrities in the UnitedStates do not go to prison. Their wealth, power, andinfluence afford them many privileges, includingthe leniency of the criminal justice system. It is,therefore, worth examining the rare cases in whichcelebrities are incarcerated, to see why theyreceived such unusual treatment.

Celebrity by definition is a social construct thatis usually shaped in large part by the media. Peoplebecome celebrities because some aspect of theirlives is thought to be newsworthy. Such figurestypically include individuals who enjoy success inprofessional athletics, entertainment, politics, andbusiness. Fame can also be a result of notoriety, assome of the subsequent sections will address. Itshould be noted that few women achieve celebritystatus in prisons like men both because of the rela-tive rarity of women in positions of power andinfluence in our patriarchal society, and becausecrime is largely a male activity. People of color arealso unequally represented in the subsequent sec-tions; sometimes they are overrepresented, andother times they are underrepresented. This is due

to the systemic racism of our society generally, andin the criminal justice system specifically.

CELEBRITY CONVICTS

This category includes incarcerated actors, politi-cians, musicians, and athletes. In most instances,these individuals are imprisoned only after numer-ous run-ins with the law. Their fame usually affordsthem a certain amount of leniency from the courts,until they have offended numerous times. Notableexamples include boxer Mike Tyson, who wasimprisoned on a rape charge; televangelists Jim andTammy Faye Bakker, who were incarcerated forfraud and conspiracy; and actor Robert Downey, Jr.,and musician Bobby Brown, who both spent timebehind bars for drugs. In addition, night club ownerSteve Rubell was incarcerated for tax evasion,Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards and OhioCongressman James Traficant, Jr., were sentencedto prison for racketeering, and former NFL playerand music entrepreneur Suge Knight was locked upfor assault and a probation violation. Most recently,businesswoman Martha Stewart recieved a 5-monthsentence for lying to investigators about her sale ofInClone Systems stock in late 2001.

EX-CON CELEBRITIES

Ex-con celebrities are usually individuals who wereincarcerated before they became famous and havesubsequently reached celebrity status in some areaof endeavor (usually) unrelated to their crimes andincarceration. Often, their demographic characteris-tics and the circumstances of their crimes closelyapproximate those typical of the incarcerated popu-lation. This category includes comedian Tim Allen,who was sentenced to prison for drugs; boxer Ralph“Sonny” Liston, who was found guilty of larceny androbbery; and activist and community leader MalcolmX and musician Merle Haggard, both of whom didtime for burglary. Author Piri Thomas was incarcer-ated for attempted murder, while boxing promoterDon King served a sentence for manslaughter, actorMark Walhberg spent time in prison for an assaultcharge, and author and security consultant FrankAbagnale was convicted of forgery and fraud.

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