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Transcript of Capital Deepening and Non-Balanced Economic...
Capital Deepening and Non-Balanced Economic Growth�
Daron AcemogluMIT
Veronica GuerrieriUniversity of Chicago
First Version: May 2004.This Version: March 2008.
Abstract
We present a model of non-balanced growth based on di¤erences in factor proportionsand capital deepening. Capital deepening increases the relative output of the more capital-intensive sector, but simultaneously induces a reallocation of capital and labor away fromthat sector. Using a two-sector general equilibrium model, we show that non-balancedgrowth is consistent with an asymptotic equilibrium with constant interest rate and capitalshare in national income. For plausible parameter values, the model generates dynamicsconsistent with US data, in particular, faster growth of employment and slower growth ofoutput in less capital-intensive sectors, and aggregate behavior consistent with the Kaldorfacts.
Keywords: capital deepening, multi-sector growth, non-balanced economic growth.JEL Classi�cation: O40, O41, O30.
�We thank John Laitner, Guido Lorenzoni, Iván Werning, three anonymous referees and especially the editorNancy Stokey for very helpful suggestions. We also thank seminar participants at Chicago, Federal ReserveBank of Richmond, IZA, MIT, NBER Economic Growth Group, 2005, Society of Economic Dynamics, Florence2004 and Vancouver 2006, Universitat of Pompeu Fabra for useful comments and Ariel Burstein for help withthe simulations. Acemoglu acknowledges �nancial support from the Russell Sage Foundation and the NSF.
1 Introduction
Most models of economic growth strive to be consistent with the �Kaldor facts�, i.e., the rela-
tive constancy of the growth rate, the capital-output ratio, the share of capital income in GDP
and the real interest rate (see Kaldor, 1963, and also Denison, 1974, Homer and Sylla, 1991,
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Beneath this balanced picture, however, there are systematic
changes in the relative importance of various sectors (see Kuznets, 1957, 1973, Chenery, 1960,
Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie, 2001). A recent literature develops models of economic growth
and development that are consistent with such structural changes, while still remaining ap-
proximately consistent with the Kaldor facts.1 This literature typically starts by positing
non-homothetic preferences consistent with Engel�s law and thus emphasizes the demand-side
reasons for non-balanced growth; the marginal rate of substitution between di¤erent goods
changes as an economy grows, directly leading to a pattern of uneven growth between sectors.
An alternative thesis, �rst proposed by Baumol (1967), emphasizes the potential non-balanced
nature of economic growth resulting from di¤erential productivity growth across sectors, but
has received less attention in the literature.2
In this paper, we present a two-sector model that highlights a natural supply-side reason for
non-balanced growth related to Baumol�s (1967) thesis. Di¤erences in factor proportions across
sectors (i.e., di¤erent shares of capital) combined with capital deepening lead to non-balanced
growth because an increase in capital-labor ratio raises output more in sectors with greater
capital intensity. We illustrate this economic mechanism using an economy with a constant
elasticity of substitution between two sectors and Cobb-Douglas production functions within
each sector. We show that the equilibrium (and the Pareto optimal) allocations feature non-
balanced growth at the sectoral level but are consistent with the Kaldor facts in the long run.
1See, for example, Matsuyama (1992), Echevarria (1997), Laitner (2000), Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001),Caselli and Coleman (2001), Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002). See also the interesting papers by Stokey(1988), Matsuyama (2002), Foellmi and Zweimuller (2002), and Buera and Kaboski (2006), which derive non-homothetiticites from the presence of a �hierarchy of needs� or �hierarchy of qualities�. Finally, Hall andJones (2006) point out that there are natural reasons for health care to be a superior good (because expectedlife expectancy multiplies utility) and show how this can account for the increase in health care spending.Matsuyama (2005) presents an excellent overview of this literature.
2Two exceptions are the recent independent papers by Ngai and Pissarides (2006) and Zuleta and Young(2006). Ngai and Pissarides (2006) construct a model of multi-sector economic growth inspired by Baumol. InNgai and Pissarides�s model, there are exogenous Total Factor Productivity di¤erences across sectors, but allsectors have identical Cobb-Douglas production functions. While both of these papers are potentially consistentwith the Kuznets and Kaldor facts, they do not contain the main contribution of our paper: non-balancedgrowth resulting from factor proportion di¤erences and capital deepening.
1
In the empirically relevant case where the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors is
less than one, one of the sectors (typically the more capital-intensive one) grows faster than
the rest of the economy, but because the relative prices move against this sector, its (price-
weighted) value grows at a slower rate than the rest of the economy. Moreover, we show that
capital and labor are continuously reallocated away from the more rapidly growing sector.3
Figure 1 shows that the distinctive qualitative implications of our model are consistent with
the broad patterns in the US data over the past 60 years. Motivated by our theory, this �gure
divides US industries into two groups according to their capital intensity and shows that there
is more rapid growth of �xed-price quantity indices (corresponding to real output) in the more
capital-intensive sectors, while (price-weighted) value of output and employment grow more
in the less capital-intensive sectors. The opposite movements of quantity and employment
(or value) between sectors with high and low capital intensities is a distinctive feature of our
approach (for the theoretically and empirically relevant case of the elasticity of substitution
less than one).4
Finally, we present a simple calibration of our model to investigate whether its quantita-
tive as well as its qualitative predictions are broadly consistent with US data. Even though
the model does not feature the demand-side factors that are undoubtedly important for non-
balanced growth, it generates relative growth rates of capital-intensive sectors that are consis-
tent with the US data over the past 60 years. For example, our calibration generates increases
in the relative output of the more capital-intensive industries that are consistent with the
changes in US data between 1948 and 2004 and accounts for one sixth to one third of the in-
crease in the relative employment of the less capital-intensive industries. Our calibration also
shows that convergence to the asymptotic (equilibrium) allocation is very slow, and consistent
with the Kaldor facts, along this transition path the share of capital in national income and
3As we will see below, in our economy the elasticity of substitution between products will be less than one ifand only if the (short-run) elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is less than one. The time-seriesand cross-industry evidence suggests that the short-run elasticity of substitution between labor and capitalis indeed less than one. See, for example, the surveys by Hamermesh (1993) and Nadiri (1970), which showthat the great majority of the estimates are less than one. Recent works by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, andViolante (2000) and Antras (2001) also report estimates of the elasticity that are less than 1. Finally, estimatesimplied by the response of investment to the user cost of capital also typically imply an elasticity of substitutionbetween capital and labor signi�cantly less than 1 (see, e.g., Chirinko, 1993, Chirinko, Fazzari and Mayer, 1999,Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay, 1999).
4 It should be noted that the di¤erential evolutions of high and low capital intensity sectors shown in Figure 1is distinct from the major structural changes associated with changes in the share of agriculture, manufacturingand services. Our model does not attempt to account for these structural changes.
2
the interest rate are approximately constant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model of non-balanced
growth, characterizes the full dynamic equilibrium of this economy, and shows how the model
generates non-balanced sectoral growth while remaining consistent with the Kaldor facts. Sec-
tion 3 undertakes a simple calibration of our benchmark economy to investigate whether the
dynamics generated by the model are consistent with the changes in the relative output and
employment of capital-intensive sectors and the Kaldor facts. Section 4 concludes. Appendix
A contains additional theoretical results, while Appendix B, which is available on the Web,
provides further details on the NIPA data and the sectoral classi�cations used in Figure 1 and
in Section 3, and additional evidence consistent with the patterns shown in Figure 1.
2 A Model of Non-Balanced Growth
In this section, we present the environment, which is a two-sector model with exogenous
technological change. The working paper version, Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006), presents
results on non-balanced growth in a more general setting as well as an extension of the model
that incorporates endogenous technological change.
2.1 Demographics, Preferences and Technology
The economy admits a representative household with the standard preferencesZ 1
0exp (� (�� n) t) ~c(t)
1�� � 11� � dt; (1)
where ~c (t) is consumption per capita at time t, � is the rate of time preferences and � � 0
is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (or the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion). Labor is supplied inelastically and is equal to population L (t) at time t, which
grows at the exponential rate n 2 [0; �), so that
L (t) = exp (nt)L (0) : (2)
The unique �nal good is produced competitively by combining the output (intermediate
goods) of two sectors with an elasticity of substitution " 2 [0;1):
Y (t) = F [Y1 (t) ; Y2 (t)] (3)
=h Y1 (t)
"�1" + (1� )Y2 (t)
"�1"
i ""�1
;
3
where 2 (0; 1). Both sectors use labor, L, and capital, K. Capital depreciates at the rate
� � 0.
The aggregate resource constraint, which is equivalent to be the budget constraint of the
representative household, requires consumption and investment to be less than the output of
the �nal good,
_K (t) + �K (t) + C (t) � Y (t) ; (4)
where C (t) � ~c (t)L (t) is total consumption and investment consists of new capital, _K (t),
and replenishment of depreciated capital, �K (t).
The two goods Y1 and Y2 are produced competitively with production functions
Y1 (t) =M1 (t)L1 (t)�1 K1 (t)
1��1 and Y2 (t) =M2 (t)L2 (t)�2 K2 (t)
1��2 ; (5)
where K1; L1;K2 and L2 are the levels of capital and labor used in the two sectors.
If �1 = �2, the production function of the �nal good takes the standard Cobb-Douglas
form. Hence, we restrict attention to the case where �1 6= �2. Without loss of generality, we
assume that sector 1 is more labor intensive (or less capital intensive), that is,
� � �1 � �2 > 0: (A1)
Technological progress in both sectors is exogenous and takes the form
_M1 (t)
M1 (t)= m1 > 0 and
_M2 (t)
M2 (t)= m2 > 0: (6)
Capital and labor market clearing require that at each date
K1 (t) +K2 (t) � K (t) ; (7)
and
L1 (t) + L2 (t) � L (t) ; (8)
where K denotes the aggregate capital stock and L is total population. The restriction that
each of L1, L2, K1, and K2 has to be nonnegative is left implicit throughout.
2.2 The Competitive Equilibrium and the Social Planner�s Problem
Let us denote the rental price of capital and the wage rate by R and w and the interest rate
by r. Also let p1 and p2 be the prices of the Y1 and Y2 goods. We normalize the price of the
4
�nal good, P , to one at all points, so that
1 � P (t) =h "p1 (t)
1�" + (1� )" p2 (t)1�"i 11�"
: (9)
A competitive equilibrium is de�ned in the usual way as paths for factor and intermediate
goods prices [r (t) ; w (t) ; p1 (t) ; p2 (t)]t�0, employment and capital allocations
[L1 (t) ; L2 (t) ;K1 (t) ;K2 (t)]t�0 such that �rms maximize pro�ts, and markets clear, and con-
sumption and savings decisions [c (t) , _K (t)]t�0 which maximize the utility of the representative
household.
Since markets are complete and competitive, we can appeal to the Second Welfare Theo-
rem and characterize the competitive equilibrium by solving the social planner�s problem of
maximizing the utility of the representative household.5 This problem takes the form:
max[L1(t);L2(t);K1(t);K2(t);K(t);~c(t)]t�0
Z 1
0exp (� (�� n) t) ~c(t)
1�� � 11� � dt (SP)
subject to (2), (6), (7), (8), and the resource constraint
_K (t) + �K (t) + ~c (t)L (t) � Y (t) (10)
= FhM1 (t)L1 (t)
�1 K1 (t)1��1 ;M2 (t)L2 (t)
�2 K2 (t)1��2
i;
together with the initial conditions K (0) > 0, L (0) > 0, M1 (0) > 0 and M2 (0) > 0. The
objective function in this program is continuous and strictly concave, while the constraint
set forms a convex-valued continuous correspondence, thus the social planner�s problem has a
unique solution, and this solution corresponds to the unique competitive equilibrium.
Once this solution is characterized, the appropriate multipliers give the competitive prices.
For example, given the normalization in (9), which is equivalent to the multiplier on (10) being
normalized to one, the multipliers associated with (7) and (8) at time t give the rental rate,
R (t) � r (t) + �, and the wage rate, w (t), at time t. The prices of the intermediate goods are
then obtained as
p1 (t) =
�Y1 (t)
Y (t)
�� 1"
and p2 (t) = (1� )�Y2 (t)
Y (t)
�� 1"
: (11)
2.3 The Static Equilibrium
Inspection of (SP) shows that the maximization problem can be broken into two parts. First,
given the state variables, K (t), L (t),M1 (t) andM2 (t), the allocation of factors across sectors,5See Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006) for an explicit characterization of the equilibrium.
5
L1 (t) ; L2 (t) ;K1 (t) and K2 (t), is chosen to maximize output Y (t) = F [Y1 (t) ; Y2 (t)] so as
to achieve the largest possible set of allocations that satisfy the constraint set. Second, given
this choice of factor allocations at each date, the time path of K (t) and ~c (t) can be chosen
to maximize the value of the objective function. These two parts correspond to the character-
ization of the static and dynamic optimal allocations, which are equivalent to the static and
dynamic equilibrium allocations. We �rst characterize the static equilibrium and the implied
competitive prices p1 (t), p2 (t), r (t) and w (t), and then turn to equilibrium dynamics.
Let us de�ne the maximized value of current output given capital stock K (t) at time t as
� (K (t) ; t) = maxL1(t);L2(t);K1(t);K2(t)
F [Y1 (t) ; Y2 (t)] (12)
subject to (5), (6), (7), (8);
and given K (t) > 0, L (t) > 0, M1 (t) > 0, M2 (t) > 0:
It is straightforward to see that this will involve the equalization of the marginal products of
capital and labor in the two sectors, which can be written as
�1
�Y (t)
Y1 (t)
� 1" Y1 (t)
L1 (t)= (1� )�2
�Y (t)
Y2 (t)
� 1" Y2 (t)
L2 (t); (13)
and
(1� �1)�Y (t)
Y1 (t)
� 1" Y1 (t)
K1 (t)= (1� ) (1� �2)
�Y (t)
Y2 (t)
� 1" Y2 (t)
K2 (t): (14)
Since the key static decision involves the allocation of labor and capital between the two sectors,
we de�ne the shares of capital and labor allocated to the labor-intensive sector (sector 1) as
� (t) � K1 (t)
K (t)and � (t) � L1 (t)
L (t):
Clearly, we also have 1 � � (t) � K2 (t) =K (t) and 1 � � (t) � L2 (t) =L (t). Combining (13)
and (14), we obtain
� (t) =
"1 +
�1� �21� �1
��1�
��Y1 (t)
Y2 (t)
� 1�""
#�1(15)
and
� (t) =
�1 +
�1� �11� �2
���2�1
��1� � (t)� (t)
���1: (16)
Equation (16) shows that, at each time t, the share of labor in sector 1, � (t), is (strictly)
increasing in � (t). We next determine how these two shares change with capital accumulation
and technological change.
6
Proposition 1 In the competitive equilibrium,
d ln� (t)
d lnK (t)= � d ln� (t)
d lnL (t)=
(1� ")� (1� � (t))1 + (1� ")� (� (t)� � (t)) > 0, �(1� ") > 0; and (17)
d ln� (t)
d lnM2 (t)= � d ln� (t)
d lnM1 (t)=
(1� ") (1� � (t))1 + (1� ")� (� (t)� � (t)) > 0, " < 1: (18)
Proof. To derive these expressions, rewrite (15) as
� (�; L;K;M1;M2) � ��"1 +
�1� �21� �1
��1�
��Y1Y2
� 1�""
#�1= 0;
where, from (5),
Y1Y2= ��1 (1� �)��2 �1��1 (1� �)�(1��2)
�L
K
�� M1
M2;
with � given as in (16). Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to � (�; L;K;M1;M2) and
using the expression for Y1=Y2 given here, we obtain (17) and (18).
Equation (17) states that the fraction of capital allocated to the labor-intensive sector
increases with the stock of capital if " < 1 and it increases if " > 1. To obtain the intuition for
this comparative static, which is useful for understanding many of the results that will follow,
note that if K increased and � remained constant, then the capital-intensive sector, sector 2,
would grow by more than sector 1� because an equi-proportionate increase in capital raises the
output of the more capital-intensive sector by more. The prices of intermediate goods given in
(11) then imply that when " < 1, the relative price of the capital-intensive sector will fall more
than proportionately, inducing a greater fraction of capital to be allocated to the less capital-
intensive sector 1. The intuition for the converse result when " > 1 is straightforward. An
important implication of this proposition is that as long as " 6= 1 and there is capital deepening
(i.e., as long as K=L is increasing over time), growth will be non-balanced and capital will
be allocated unequally between the two sectors. This is the basis of non-balanced growth in
our model.6 The rest of our analysis will show that non-balanced growth in this model is
consistent with the Kaldor facts asymptotically and can approximate the Kaldor facts even
along transitional dynamics.
Equation (18) also implies that when the elasticity of substitution, ", is less than one, an
improvement in the technology of a sector causes the share of capital allocated to that sector6As a corollary, note that with " = 1, output levels in the two sectors could grow at di¤erent rates, but there
would be no reallocation of capital and labor between the two sectors, and � and � would remain constant.
7
to fall. The intuition is again the same: when " < 1, increased production in a sector causes
a more than proportional decline in its relative price, inducing a reallocation of capital away
from it towards the other sector (again the converse results and intuition apply when " > 1).
In view of equation (16), the results in Proposition 1 also apply to �. In particular, we
have that d ln� (t) =d lnK (t) = �d ln� (t) =d lnL (t) > 0 if and only if �(1� ") > 0.
Next, since equilibrium factor prices, R and w, correspond to the multipliers on the con-
straints (7) and (8), we also obtain
w (t) = �1
�Y (t)
Y1 (t)
� 1" Y1 (t)
L1 (t); (19)
and
R (t) = �K (K (t) ; t) = (1� �1)�Y (t)
Y1 (t)
� 1" Y1 (t)
K1 (t); (20)
where �K (K (t) ; t) is the derivative of the maximized output function, � (K (t) ; t), with re-
spect to capital. Equilibrium factor prices take the familiar forms and are equal to the (values
of) marginal products from the derived production function in (10). To obtain an intuition for
the economic forces, we next analyze how changes in the state variables, L, K, M1 and M2,
impact on these factor prices. Combining (19) and (20), relative factor prices are obtained as
w (t)
R (t)=
�11� �1
�� (t)K (t)
� (t)L (t)
�; (21)
and the capital share in aggregate income is
�K (t) �R (t)K (t)
Y (t)= (1� �1)
�Y (t)
Y1 (t)
� 1�""
� (t)�1 : (22)
Proposition 2 In the competitive equilibrium,
d ln (w (t) =R (t))
d lnK (t)= �d ln (w (t) =R (t))
d lnL (t)=
1
1 + (1� ")� (� (t)� � (t)) > 0;
d ln (w (t) =R (t))
d lnM2 (t)= �d ln (w (t) =R (t))
d lnM1 (t)
= � (1� ") (� (t)� � (t))1 + (1� ")� (� (t)� � (t)) < 0, �(1� ") > 0;
d ln�K (t)
d lnK (t)= � (1� ")�2 (1� � (t))� (t)
[1� �1 +�� (t)] [1 + (1� ")� (� (t)� � (t))]< 0, " < 1; and (23)
8
d ln�K (t)
d lnM2 (t)= �d ln�K (t)
d lnM1 (t)(24)
=�(1� ") (1� � (t))� (t)
[1� �1 +�� (t)] [1 + (1� ")� (� (t)� � (t))]< 0
, �(1� ") > 0:
Proof. The �rst two expressions follow from di¤erentiating equation (21) and Proposition
1. To prove (23) and (24), note that from (3) and (15), we have�Y1Y
� "�1"
= �1�1 +
�1� �11� �2
��1� ��
���1:
Then, (23) and (24) follow by di¤erentiating �K as given in (22) with respect to L, K, M1 and
M2, and using the results in Proposition 1.
The most important result in this proposition is (23), which links the impact of the capital
stock on the capital share in national income to the elasticity of substitution between the
two sectors, ". Since a negative relationship between the share of capital in national income
and the capital stock is equivalent to an elasticity of substitution between aggregate labor
and capital that is less than one, this result also implies that, as claimed in footnote 3, the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is less than one if and only if " is less
than one. Intuitively, an increase in the capital stock of the economy causes the output of the
more capital-intensive sector, sector 2, to increase relative to the output in the less capital-
intensive sector (despite the fact that the share of capital allocated to the less-capital intensive
sector increases as shown in equation (17)). This then increases the production of the more
capital-intensive sector, and when " < 1, it reduces the relative price of capital more than
proportionately; consequently, the share of capital in national income declines. The converse
result applies when " > 1.
Moreover, when " < 1, (24) implies that an increase in M1 is �capital biased� and an
increase in M2 is �labor biased�. The intuition for why an increase in the productivity of the
sector that is intensive in capital is biased toward labor (and vice versa) is once again similar:
when the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors, ", is less than one, an increase in
the output of a sector (this time driven by a change in technology) decreases its price more than
proportionately, thus reducing the relative compensation of the factor used more intensively in
that sector (see Acemoglu, 2002). When " > 1, we have the converse pattern, and an increase
in M1 is �labor biased,�while an increase in M2 is �capital biased�.
9
2.4 Equilibrium Dynamics
We now characterize the dynamic competitive equilibrium allocations. We again use the social
planner�s problem (SP) introduced above. The previous subsection characterized the static
optimal (equilibrium) allocation of resources and the resulting maximized value of output
� (K (t) ; t) for given values of K (t), L (t), M1 (t), and M2 (t). Given � (K (t) ; t), problem
(SP) can be written as
max[K(t);~c(t)]t�0
Z 1
0exp (� (�� n) t) ~c (t)
1�� � 11� � dt (SP0)
subject to
_K (t) = � (K (t) ; t)� �K (t)� exp (nt)L (0) ~c (t) ; (25)
and the initial condition K (0) > 0. The constraint (25) is written as an equality since it
cannot hold as a strict inequality in an optimal allocation (otherwise, consumption would be
raised, yielding a higher objective value). The other initial conditions of the original problem
(SP) are incorporated into the maximized value of output � (K (t) ; t) in constraint (25). This
maximization problem is simpler than (SP), though it is still not equivalent to the standard
problems encountered in growth models because constraint (25) is not an autonomous di¤er-
ential equation. To further simplify the characterization of equilibrium dynamics, we will work
with transformed variables. For this purpose, we �rst assume:
either (i) m1=�1 < m2=�2 and " < 1; or (ii) m1=�1 > m2=�2 and " > 1; (A2)
which ensures that the asymptotically dominant sector will be the labor-intensive sector, sector
1. The asymptotically dominant sector is the sector that determines the long-run growth rate
of the economy. Observe that this condition compares not the exogenous rates of technological
progress, m1 and m2, but m1=�1 and m2=�2, which we refer to as the augmented rates of
technological progress. This is because the two sectors di¤er in terms of their capital intensities,
and technological change will be augmented by the di¤erential rates of capital accumulation
in the two sectors. For example, with equal rates of Hicks-neutral technological progress in
the two sectors, the adjustment of the capital stock to technological change implies that the
labor-intensive sector 1 will have a lower augmented rate of technological progress than sector
2.
Notice that when " < 1, the sector with the lower rate of augmented technological progress
will be the asymptotically dominant sector. This is because, when " < 1, the output of the two
10
sectors are highly complementary and the slower growing sector will determine the asymptotic
growth rate of the economy. When " > 1, the converse happens and the more rapidly grow-
ing sector determines the asymptotic growth rate of the economy and is the asymptotically
dominant sector. In this light, Assumption (A2) implies that sector 1 is the asymptotically
dominant sector. Appendix A shows that parallel results apply when the converse of (A2)
holds and sector 2 is asymptotically dominant. The empirically relevant case is part (i) of
Assumption (A2); as already argued, " < 1 provides a good approximation to the data, and
�1 > �2 from (A1). Therefore, as long as m1 and m2 are close to each other, the economy will
be in case (i) of (A2).
Let us next introduce the following normalized variables,
c (t) � ~c (t)
M1 (t)1=�1
and � (t) � K (t)
L (t)M1 (t)1=�1
; (26)
which represent consumption and capital per capita normalized by the augmented technology
of the asymptotically dominant sector, which, in view of Assumption (A2), is sector 1 (and
thus the corresponding augmented technology is M1 (t)1=�1). Next proposition shows that
the solution to (SP)� and thus the dynamic equilibrium� can be expressed in terms of three
autonomous di¤erential equations in c, � and �.
Proposition 3 Suppose that (A1) and (A2) hold. Then, a competitive equilibrium satis�es
the following three di¤erential equations
_c (t)
c (t)=
1
�
h(1� �1) � (t)1=" � (t)�1 � (t)��1 � (t)��1 � � � �
i� m1
�1; (27)
_� (t)
� (t)= � (t)�1 � (t)1��1 � (t)��1 � (t)� � (t)�1 c (t)� � � n� m1
�1;
_� (t)
� (t)=
(1� � (t))h� _�(t)�(t) +m2 � �2
�1m1
i(1� ")�1 +�(� (t)� � (t))
;
where
� (t) � "
"�1
�1 +
�1� �11� �2
��1� � (t)� (t)
�� ""�1
; (28)
with initial conditions � (0) and � (0), and also satis�es the transversality condition
limt!1
exp
����� (1� �)m1
�1� n
�t
�� (t) = 0: (29)
Moreover, any allocation that satis�es (27)-(29) is a competitive equilibrium.
11
Proof. See Appendix A.
The �rst equation in (27) is the standard Euler equation, written in terms of the normalized
variables. The �rst term in square brackets, (1� �1) � (t)1=" � (t)�1 � (t)��1 � (t)��1 , is the
marginal product of capital. The second equation in (27) is the law of motion of the normalized
capital stock, � (t). The third equation, in turn, speci�es the evolution of the share of capital
between the two sectors. We also impose the following parameter condition, which ensures
that the transversality condition (29) holds:
�� n � (1� �) m1
�1: (A3)
Our next task is to use Proposition 3 to provide a tighter characterization of the dynamic
equilibrium allocation. For this purpose, let us �rst de�ne a Constant Growth Path (CGP)
as a dynamic competitive equilibrium that features constant aggregate consumption growth.7
The next theorem will show that there exists a unique CGP that is a solution to the social
planner�s problem (SP) and will provide closed-form solutions for the growth rates of di¤erent
aggregates in this equilibrium. The notable feature of the CGP will be that despite the constant
growth rate of aggregate consumption, growth will be non-balanced because output, capital
and employment in the two sectors will grow at di¤erent rates. Let us de�ne:
_Ls (t)
Ls (t)� ns (t) ;
_Ks (t)
Ks (t)� zs (t) ;
_Ys (t)
Ys (t)� gs (t) for s = 1; 2, and
_K (t)
K (t)� z (t) ;
_Y (t)
Y (t)� g (t) ;
so that ns and zs denote the growth rates of labor and capital stock, ms denotes the growth
rate of technology, and gs denotes the growth rate of output in sector s. Moreover, when-
ever they exist, we denote the corresponding asymptotic growth rates by asterisks, so that
n�s = limt!1 ns (t), z�s = limt!1 zs (t), and g�s = limt!1 gs (t). Similarly, let us denote the
asymptotic capital and labor allocation decisions by asterisks, that is,
�� = limt!1
� (t) and �� = limt!1
� (t) :
Then we have the following characterization of the unique CGP.
Theorem 1 Suppose that (A1)-(A3) hold. Then, there exists a unique CGP where consump-
tion per capita grows at the rate g�c = m1=�1, and �� = 1,
�� =
"(�m1=�1 + �+ �)
"
"�1 (1� �1)
#� 1�1
; (30)
7Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001) refer to this as a �Generalized Balanced Growth Path�.
12
and
c� = "
"�1 (��)1��1 � ���� + n+
m1
�1
�: (31)
Moreover, the growth rates of output, capital and employment in the two sectors are
g� = g�1 = z� = z�1 = n+
m1
�1; (32)
z�2 = g� � (1� ")!; (33)
g�2 = g� + "!; (34)
n�1 = n and n�2 = n� (1� ")!; (35)
where
! � m2 ��2�1m1:
Proof. From Proposition 3, a competitive equilibrium satis�es (27)-(29). A CGP requires
that limt!1 _c (t) =c (t) is constant, thus from the �rst equation of (27),
� (t)1=" � (t)�1 � (t)��1 � (t)��1 must be constant as t!1. Consequently, as t!1,
1
"
_� (t)
� (t)+ �1
_� (t)
� (t)� �1
_� (t)
� (t)� �1
_� (t)
� (t)= 0: (36)
Di¤erentiating (16) and (28) with respect to time and using the third equation of the system
(27), we obtain expressions for _� (t) =� (t), _� (t) =� (t), and _� (t) =� (t) in terms of _� (t) =� (t).
Substituting these into (36) and rearranging, we can express (36) as an autonomous �rst-order
di¤erential equation in � (t) as
_� (t)
� (t)= G (� (t))�1�2 (1� ")
�m2
�2� m1
�1
�; (37)
where
G (� (t)) =[�� (t) + (1� �1)] (1� � (t))
�� (t) + �2 (1� �1):
Clearly, G (0) = 1=�2, G (1) = 0 and G0 (�) < 0 for any �. These observations together with
Assumption (A2) imply that (37) has a unique solution with � (t)! �� = 1. Next, _� (t) =� (t) =
0 combined with (16) and (28) implies that _� (t) =� (t) = _� (t) =� (t) = 0. Moreover, given
� (t) ! �� = 1, (16) implies � (t) ! �� = 1 and (28) implies � (t) ! �� = "=("�1). Equation
(36) then implies that limt!1 � (t) = �� 2 (0;1) must also exist, thus _� (t) =� (t) ! 0. Now
setting the �rst two equations in (27) equal to zero and using the fact that �� = �� = 1 and
13
�� = "=("�1), we obtain (30) and (31). By construction, there are no other allocations with
constant _c (t) =c (t).
To derive equations (32)-(35), combine (26) with the result that _� (t) =� (t) ! 0, which
implies z� = n+m1=�1. Moreover, �� = �� = 1 together with the market clearing conditions
(7) and (8)� holding as equalities� give z�1 = z� and n�1 = n. Finally, di¤erentiating (3), (5),
(13) and (14), and using the preceding results, we obtain (32)-(35) as unique solutions.
To complete the proof that this allocation is the unique CGP we need to establish that
it satis�es the transversality condition (29). This follows immediately from the fact that
limt!1 � (t) = �� exists and is �nite combined with Assumption (A3), which implies that
limt!1 exp (� (�� (1� �)m1=�1 � n) t) = 0.
There are a number of important implications of this theorem. First, growth is non-
balanced, in the sense that the two sectors grow at di¤erent asymptotic rates (i.e., at di¤erent
rates even as t ! 1). The intuition for this result is more general than the speci�c para-
metrization of the model and is driven by the juxtaposition of factor proportion di¤erences
between sectors and capital deepening. In particular, suppose that there is capital deepening
(which here is due to technological progress). Now, if both capital and labor were allocated to
the two sectors in constant proportions, the more capital-intensive sector, sector 2, would grow
faster than sector 1. The faster growth in sector 2 would reduce the price of sector 2, leading to
a reallocation of capital and labor towards sector 1. However, this reallocation cannot entirely
o¤set the greater increase in the output of sector 2, since, if it did, the change in prices that
stimulated the reallocation would not take place. Therefore, growth must be non-balanced. In
particular, if " < 1, capital and labor will be reallocated away from the more rapidly growing
sector towards the more slowly growing sector. In this case, the more slowly growing sector,
sector 1, becomes the asymptotically dominant sector and determines the growth rate of ag-
gregate output as shown in equation (32). Note that sector 1 is the one growing more slowly
because Assumption (A2), together with " < 1, implies m1=�1 < m2=�2. Hence, Y1=Y2 ! 0.
Appendix A shows that similar results apply when the converse of (A2) holds.
Second, the theorem shows that in the CGP the shares of capital and labor allocated to
sector 1 tend to one (i.e., �� = �� = 1). Nevertheless, at all points in time both sectors produce
positive amounts and both sectors grow at rates greater than the rate of population growth (so
this limit point is never reached). Moreover, in the more interesting case where " < 1, equation
(34) implies g�2 > g� = g�1, so that the sector that is shedding capital and labor (sector 2) is
14
growing faster than the rest of the economy, even asymptotically. Therefore, the rate at which
capital and labor are allocated away from this sector is determined in equilibrium to be exactly
such that this sector still grows faster than the rest of the economy. This is the sense in which
non-balanced growth is not a trivial outcome in this economy (with one of the sectors shutting
down), but results from the positive and di¤erential growth of the two sectors.
Finally, it can be veri�ed that the share of capital in national income and the interest rate
are constant in the CGP. For example, under (A2), we have ��K = 1 � �1. This implies that
the asymptotic capital share in national income will re�ect the capital share of the dominant
sector. Also, again under (A2), the asymptotic interest rate is
r� = (1� �1) "
"�1 (��)��1 � �:
These results are the basis of the claim in the Introduction that this economy features both non-
balanced growth at the sectoral level and aggregate growth consistent with the Kaldor facts.
In particular, the CGP matches both the Kaldor facts and generates unequal growth between
the two sectors. However, at the CGP one of the sectors has already become (vanishingly)
small relative to the other. Therefore, this theorem does not answer the question of whether we
can have a situation in which both sectors have non-trivial employment levels and the capital
share in national income and the interest rate are approximately constant. This question is
investigated quantitatively in the next section. Before doing so, we establish the stability of
the CGP.
2.5 Dynamics and Stability
The previous subsection demonstrated that there exists a unique CGP with non-balanced
sectoral growth� that is, there is aggregate output growth at a constant rate together with
di¤erential sectoral growth and reallocation of factors of production across sectors. We now
investigate whether the competitive equilibrium will approach the CGP. We focus on allocations
in the neighborhood of the CGP, thus only investigating local (saddle-path) stability. Because
there are two pre-determined (state) variables, � and �, with initial values � (0) and � (0), this
type of stability requires the linearized system in the neighborhood of the asymptotic path to
have a (unique) two-dimensional manifold of solutions converging to c�, �� and ��. The next
theorem states that this is the case.
15
Theorem 2 Suppose that (A1)-(A3) hold. Then, the competitive equilibrium, given by (27),
is locally (saddle-path) stable, in the sense that in the neighborhood of c�, �� and ��; there is
a unique two-dimensional manifold of solutions that converge to c�, �� and ��.
Proof. Let us rewrite the system (27) in a more compact form as
_x = f (x) ; (38)
where x � ( c � � )0 is the transpose of the row vector ( c � � ). To investigate the
dynamics of the system (38) in the neighborhood of the steady state, consider the linear
system
_z = J (x�) z;
where z � x�x� and x� is such that f (x�) = 0, where J (x�) is the Jacobian of f (x) evaluated
at x�. Di¤erentiation and some algebra enable us to write this Jacobian matrix as
J (x�) =
0@ 0 ac� ac��1 a�� a��0 0 a��
1A :Hence, the determinant of the Jacobian is det J (x�) = �a��ac�, where
a�� = � (1� ")�m2 �
�2�1m1
�;
ac� = � "
"�1 (��)��1�1 �1 (1� �1)
�:
The above expressions show that both a�� and ac� are (strictly) negative, since, in view of
(A2), " 7 1 , m2=�2 ? m1=�1. This establishes that det J (x�) > 0, so the steady state
corresponding to the CGP is hyperbolic (that is, all eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated at
x� have nonzero real parts) and thus the dynamics of the linearized system represent the local
dynamics of the nonlinear system (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2008, Theorem B.7). Moreover, either
all the eigenvalues are positive or two of them are negative and one is positive. To determine
which one of these two possibilities is the case, we look at the characteristic equation given
by det (J (x�)� vI) = 0, where v denotes the vector of the eigenvalues. This equation can be
expressed as the following cubic in v, with roots corresponding to the eigenvalues:
(a�� � v) [v (a�� � v) + a�cac�] = 0:
16
This expression implies that one of the eigenvalue is equal to a�� and thus negative, so there
must be two negative eigenvalues. This establishes the existence of a unique two-dimensional
manifold of solutions in the neighborhood of this CGP, converging to it.
This theorem establishes that the CGP is locally (saddle-path) stable, and when the initial
values of capital, labor and technology are not too far from the constant growth path, the
competitive equilibrium converges to this CGP, with non-balanced growth at the sectoral level
and constant capital share and interest rate at the aggregate.
3 A Simple Calibration
We now undertake an illustrative calibration to investigate whether the equilibrium dynamics
generated by our model economy are broadly consistent with the patterns in the US data. For
this exercise, we use data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) between
1948 and 2005. Industries are classi�ed according to North American Industrial Classi�cation
System (NAICS) at the 22-industry level of detail.8 We use industry-level data for current-price
value added (which we refer to as value), chain-type �xed-price quantity indices for value added
(which we refer to as quantity), total number of employees,9 total employee compensation, and
�xed assets. To map our model to data, we classify industries into low and high capital intensity
�sectors�, each comprising approximately 50% of total employment. Table 1 below shows the
average capital share for each industry and the sector classi�cation.10
Figure 1 in the introduction depicts the evolution of relative quantity, value, and employ-
ment in these sectors and shows the more rapid growth of quantity in the capital-intensive
sectors and the more rapid growth of value and employment in the less capital-intensive sec-
tors.11
For our calibration, we take the initial year, t = 0, to correspond to the �rst year for
8Throughout, we exclude the Government and Private household sectors and Agriculture, forestry, �shing,and hunting and Real estate and rental.
9 In particular, we use full-time and part-time employees, since this is the only measure for which we haveconsistent NAICS data going back to 1948. The alternative classi�cation system, SIC, does not enable us toextend data to 2005 and also reports the quantity indices for value added only back to 1977.10NAICS data on compensation of employees are only available between 1987 and 2005 (all the other variables
are available between 1948 and 2005). We therefore compute the capital share of each industry as the averagecapital share between 1987 and 2005. The average capital shares in the two sectors are relatively stable overtime. In particular, the average capital share of sector 1 is 0:288 in 1987 and 0:290 in 2005, while the averagecapital share of sector 2 is 0:466 in 1987 and 0:499 in 2005.11Appendix B provides more details on data sources and constructions. It also shows that the general patterns
in the US data, in particular those plotted in Figure 1, are robust to changing in the cuto¤ between high andlow capital-intensity industries.
17
which we have NIPA data for our sectors, 1948. In our model, L (t) corresponds to total
employment at time t, K (t) to �xed assets, Yj (t) to the quantity of output in sector j, and
Y Nj (t) � pj (t)Yj (t) to the value of output in sector j.
Our model economy is fully characterized by ten parameters �, �, �, , ", �1, �2, n, m1 and
m2, and �ve initial values, L (0), K (0), M1 (0), M2 (0) and � (0). We choose these parameters
and initial values as follows. First, we adopt the standard parameter values for the annual
discount rate, � = 0:02, the annual depreciation rate, � = 0:05, and the annual (asymptotic)
interest rate, r� = 0:08.12 We take the annual population growth rate n = 0:018 from the
NIPA data on employment growth for 1948-2005 and choose the asymptotic growth rate to
ensure that our calibration matches total output growth between 1948 and 2005 in the NIPA,
which is 3:4%. This implies an asymptotic growth rate of g� = 0:033. The initial values
L (0) = 40; 3360; 000 and K (0) = 244; 900 (in millions of dollars) are also directly from the
NIPA data for 1948. Next, our classi�cation of industries leads to two �aggregate sectors�with
average shares of labor in value added of 0:72 and 0:52. In terms of our model this implies
�1 = 0:72 and �2 = 0:52.
An important parameter for our calibration is the elasticity of substitution between the
two sectors. Although we do not have independent information on this variable, our model
suggests a way of evaluating this elasticity. In particular, equation (11) implies the following
relationship between value and quantity ratios in the two sectors:
log
�Y N1 (t)
Y N2 (t)
�= log
�
1�
�+"� 1"
log
�Y1 (t)
Y2 (t)
�. (39)
We can therefore estimate ("� 1) =" by regressing the log of the ratio of the nominal value
added between the two sectors on the log of the ratio of the real value added. Since our focus is
on medium-run frequencies (rather than business cycle �uctuations), we use the Hodrick and
Prescott �lter to smooth both the dependent and the independent variables (with smoothing
weight 1600) and use the smoothed variables to estimate (39). This simple regression yields an
estimate of " ' 0:76 (and a two standard error con�dence interval of [0:73; 0:79]). We therefore
choose " = 0:76 for our benchmark calibration. We also choose the parameter to ensure that
equation (39) holds at t = 0.
Throughout, motivated by our estimate of " reported in the previous paragraph, the existing
evidence discussed in footnote 3, and the pattern shown in Figure 1 indicating that employment12These numbers are the same as those used by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) in their calibration of the
baseline neoclassical model.
18
and value grow more in the less capital-intensive sector, we focus on the case in which " < 1 and
m1=�1 < m2=�2 (case (i) of Assumption (A2)). In particular, for our benchmark calibration
we set m1 = m2 (even though, as we will see below, higher values of m2 improve the �t of
the model to US data). Since in this case sector 1 is the asymptotically dominant sector, the
asymptotic growth rate of output is g� = n + m1=�1. The above-mentioned values of g�, n
and �1 imply m1 = m2 = 0:0108. The growth rate of output also pins down the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. In particular, the Euler equation (27) together with (26) yields
g� = (r� � �) =�+n, which implies � = 4 and results in a reasonable elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of 0:25.
This leaves us with the initial values for �, M1 and M2. First, notice that equation (15) at
time 0 can be rewritten as:
� (0) =
�1 +
�1� �21� �1
�Y N2 (0)
Y N1 (0)
��1: (40)
This equation together with the 1948 levels of values in the two sectors from the NIPA data,
Y N1 (0) and Y N2 (0), gives � (0) = 0:32. Equation (16) then gives the initial value of relative
employment as � (0) = 0:52.13 It is also worth noting that in addition to the parameters and the
initial values necessary for our calibration, the numbers we are using also pin down the initial
interest rate and the capital share in national income as r (0) = 0:095 and �K (0) = 0:39.14
Moreover, since sector 1 is the asymptotically dominant sector, the asymptotic capital share in
national income and the interest rate are determined as ��K = 1��1 = 0:28 and r� = 0:08. This
implies that, by construction, both the interest rate and the capital share must decline at some
point along the transition path. A key question concerns the speed of these declines. If this
happened at the same frequency as the change in the composition of employment and capital
across the two sectors, then the model would not generate a pattern that is simultaneously
consistent with non-balanced sectoral growth and the aggregate Kaldor facts. We will see that
this is not the case and that the model�s implications are broadly consistent with both sets of
facts.13We can also compute the empirical counterparts of � (0) and � (0) from the NIPA data using employment
and capital in the two sector aggregates. These give the values of 0:49 and 0:50, which are similar, thoughclearly not identical, to the implied values we use. The fact that the theoretically-implied values of � (0) and� (0) di¤er from their empirical counterparts is not surprising, since we are assuming that the US economy canbe represented by two sectors with Cobb-Douglas production functions and with their output being combinedwith a constant elasticity of substitution. Naturally, this is at best an approximation, and in the data, sectoralfactor intensities are not constant over time.14This is because the capital share and interest rate are functions of � only (just combine (20) and (22) with
(3) and (15)).
19
Finally, given � (0) = 0:32 and � (0) = 0:52, the NIPA data imply values for L1 (0), L2 (0),
K1 (0) and K2 (0), and we also have the values for Y1 (0) and Y2 (0) directly from the NIPA. We
then obtain the remaining initial values, M1 (0) andM2 (0), from equation (5). This completes
the determination of all the parameters and initial conditions of our model. We then compute
the time path of all the variables in our model using two di¤erent numerical procedures (both
giving equivalent results).15
Figure 2 shows the results of our benchmark calibration with the parameter values described
above. In particular, in this benchmark we have " = 0:76 and m1 = m2 = 0:0108. The four
panels depict relative employment in sector 1 (�), relative capital in sector 1 (�), the interest
rate (r) and the capital share in national income (�K) for the �rst 150 years (in terms of data,
corresponding to 1948 to 2098).
A number of features are worth noting. First, for the �rst 150 years, there is signi�cant
reallocation of capital and labor away from the more capital-intensive sector towards the less
capital-intensive sector, sector 1, and the economy is far from the asymptotic equilibrium
with � = � = 1. In fact, the economy takes a very long time, over 5000 years, to reach the
asymptotic equilibrium. This illustrates that our model economy generates interesting and
relatively slow dynamics, with a signi�cant amount of structural change. Second, while there
is non-balanced growth at the sectoral level, the interest rate and the capital share remain
approximately constant. The interest rate shows an early decline from about 9.5% to 9%,
which largely re�ects the initial consumption dynamics. It then remains around 9%. The
capital share shows a very slight decline over the 150 years. This relative constancy of the
interest-rate and the capital share is particularly interesting, since as noted above, we know
that both variables have to decline at some point to achieve their asymptotic values of r� = 0:08
and ��K = 0:28. Nevertheless, our model calibration implies more rapid structural change than
15 In particular, we �rst return to the two-dimensional non-autonomous system of equations in c and � (ratherthan the three-dimensional representation used for theoretical analysis in Proposition 3). This two dimensionalsystem has one state and one control variable. Following Judd (1998, Chapter 10), we discretize these di¤erentialequations using the Euler method to obtain a system of �rst-order di¤erence equations in c (t) and � (t). Thissystem can in turn be transformed into a second-order non-autonomous system in � (t), which is easier towork with. We then compute the numerical solution to this second-order di¤erence equation using either ashooting algorithm or by minimizing the squared residuals. Our main numerical method is to use a basicshooting algorithm starting with initial value of � (0), and then guess and adjust the value for � (1) to ensureconvergence to the asymptotic CGP. The second numerical procedure is to choose a polynomial form for thenormalized capital stock as � (t) = � (t;�), where � represents the parameters of the polynomial. We estimate� by minimizing the squared residuals of the di¤erence equations using nonlinear least squares (see, e.g., Judd,1998, Chapter 4) and then compute c (t) and � (t). The two procedures give almost identical results, andthroughout we report the results from the shooting algorithm.
20
the speed of these aggregate changes, and thus over the horizon of about 150 years, there is
little change in the interest rate and the capital share, while there is signi�cant reallocation of
labor and capital across sectors.
These patterns are further illustrated in Table 2, which shows the US data and the numbers
implied by our benchmark calibration between 1948 and 2005 for the relative quantity and
relative employment of the high versus low capital intensity sectors as well as the aggregate
capital share in national income (in terms of the model, t = 0 is taken to correspond to
1948, thus t = 57 gives the values for 2005). The �rst two columns of this table con�rm the
patterns shown in Figure 1 in the Introduction� quantity grows faster in high capital intensity
industries, while employment grows faster in low capital intensity industries. The next two
columns show that the benchmark calibration is broadly consistent with this pattern. In
particular, while in the data, Y2=Y1 increases by about 19% between 1948 and 2004, the model
leads to an increase of about 17%. In the data, L2=L1 declines by about 33%.16 In the model,
the implied decline is in the same direction, but considerably smaller, about 5%.17 However,
the evolutions of the capital share in the data and in the model are very similar. In the data,
the capital share declines from 0:398 to 0:396, whereas in the model it declines from 0:392 to
0:389.18
Table 3 and Table 4 show alternative calibrations of our model economy. In Table 3,
we consider di¤erent values for the elasticity of substitution, ", while Table 4 considers the
implications of di¤erent growth rates of the capital-intensive sector, m2.
The results for di¤erent values of " in Table 3 are generally similar to the benchmark model.
The most notable feature is that when " is smaller, for example, " = 0:56 or " = 0:66 instead
of the benchmark value of " = 0:76, there are greater changes in relative employments. With
" = 0:56, the decline in the relative employment of the capital-intensive sector is approximately
9% instead of 5% in the benchmark. The opposite happens when " is larger and there is even
less change in relative employment. This is not surprising in view of the fact that, as noted in
16Equivalently, in the data the share of sector 1 in total employment, L1=L increases from 0:49 in 1948 to0:56 in 2005. The corresponding increase in our benchmark calibration is from 0:52 to 0:54.17Note that the initial values of L2=L1 is not the same in the data and in the benchmark model, since, as
remarked above, we chose the sectoral allocation of labor implied by the model given the relative values ofoutput in the two sectors (recall equation (40)).18One reason why our model accounts only for a fraction of the structural change in the US economy may
be that it focuses on a speci�c dimension of structural change: the reallocation of output between sectors withdi¤erent capital intensities. In practice, a signi�cant component of structural change is associated with thereallocation of output across agriculture, manufacturing and services. In addition, our model does not allow forchanges in sectoral factor intensities over time.
21
footnote 6, with " = 1 there would be no reallocation of capital and labor.
The broad patterns implied by di¤erent values of m2 in Table 4 are also similar to the
results of the benchmark calibration. It is noteworthy, however, that if m2 is taken to be
greater, for example, m2 = 0:0128, the �t of the model to the data is improved. For example,
in this case, there is a somewhat larger change in relative employment levels and also a larger
decline in the relative quantity of the capital-intensive sector. In contrast, when m2 is smaller
than the benchmark, the changes in Y2=Y1 and L2=L1 are somewhat less pronounced.
Overall, our calibration exercises indicate that the mechanism proposed in this paper can
generate changes in the sectoral composition of output that are broadly comparable with the
changes we observe in the US data and changes in relative employment levels that are in the
same direction as in the data, though quantitatively smaller. Notably, during this process of
structural change the capital share in national income remains approximately constant.
4 Conclusion
We proposed a model in which the combination of factor proportion di¤erences across sectors
and capital deepening leads to a non-balanced pattern of economic growth. We illustrated the
main economic forces using a tractable two-sector growth model, where there is a constant
elasticity of substitution between the two sectors and Cobb-Douglas production technologies
in each sector. We characterized the constant growth path and equilibrium (Pareto optimal)
dynamics in the neighborhood of this growth path. We showed that even though sectoral
growth is non-balanced, the behavior of the interest rate and the capital share in national
income are consistent with the Kaldor facts. In particular, asymptotically the two sectors still
grow at di¤erent rates, while the interest rate and the capital share are constant.
The main contribution of the paper is theoretical, demonstrating that the interaction
between capital deepening and factor proportion di¤erences across sectors will lead to non-
balanced growth, while being still consistent with the aggregate Kaldor facts. We also pre-
sented a simple calibration of our baseline model, which showed that the equilibrium path
exhibits sectoral employment and output shares changing signi�cantly, while the aggregate
capital share and the interest rate remain approximately constant. Moreover, the magnitudes
implied by this simple calibration are comparable to, though somewhat smaller than, the sec-
toral changes observed in the postwar US data. A full investigation of whether the mechanism
22
suggested in this paper plays a �rst-order role in non-balanced growth in practice is an empiri-
cal question left for future research. It would be particularly useful to combine the mechanism
proposed in this paper with non-homothetic preferences and estimate a structural version of
the model with multiple sectors using US or OECD data.
23
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3
The equivalence of the solutions to (SP) and (SP0) follows from the discussion in the text, while
the equivalence between (SP) and competitive equilibria follows from the First and Second
Welfare Theorems. Next, consider the maximization (SP0). This corresponds to a standard
optimal control problem. Moreover, the objective function is strictly concave, the constraint set
is convex and the state variable, K (t), is non-negative, so that the Arrow Su¢ ciency Theorem
(e.g., Acemoglu, 2008, Theorem 7.14) implies that an allocation that satis�es the Pontryagin
Maximum Principle and the transversality condition (29) uniquely achieves the maximum of
(SP0). Thus we only need to show that equations (27)-(29) are equivalent to the Maximum
Principle and the transversality condition. The Hamiltonian for (SP0) takes the form
H (~c;K; �) = exp (� (�� n) t) ~c (t)1�� � 11� � + � (t) [� (K (t) ; t)� �K (t)� exp (nt)L (0) ~c (t)] ;
with � (t) denoting the co-state variable. Inspection of (SP0) shows that paths that reach zero
consumption or zero capital stock at any �nite t cannot be optimal, thus we can focus on
interior solutions and write the Maximum Principle as
H~c (~c;K; �) = exp (� (�� n) t) ~c (t)�� � � (t) exp (nt)L (0) = 0 (41)
HK (~c;K; �) = � (t) (�K (K (t) ; t)� �) = � _� (t) ;
whenever the optimal control ~c (t) is continuous. Combining these two equations, we obtain
the Euler equation for consumption growth as
d~c (t) =dt
~c (t)=1
�[�K (K (t) ; t)� � � �] : (42)
Moreover, equations (13) and (14) imply
� (K (t) ; t) = � (t)1="M1 (t)L (t)�1 � (t)�1 K (t)1��1 � (t)1��1 ; and (43)
�K (K (t) ; t) = (1� �1) � (t)1="M1 (t)L (t)�1 � (t)�1 K (t)��1 � (t)��1 : (44)
The law of motion of technology in (6) together with the normalization in (26) implies _c (t) =c (t) =
(d~c (t) =dt) =~c (t) �m1=�1. Also from (26), we have � (t)��1 � M1 (t)L (t)�1 K (t)��1 . Using
24
the previous two expressions and substituting (44) into (42), we obtain the �rst equation in
(27). Next, again using (26) to write
_� (t)
� (t)=
_K (t)
K (t)� n� m1
�1
and substituting for _K (t) from (25) and for � (K (t) ; t) from (43), we obtain the second
equation in (27). Notice also that both of these equations depend on � (t). To obtain the law
of motion of � (t), di¤erentiate (15) and then use (5) and (16). Here � (0) is also taken as given
because for given K (0), (15) uniquely pins down � (0).
Finally, the transversality condition of (SP0) requires
limt!1
[exp (� (�� n) t)� (t)K (t)] = 0:
Combining (26) with (41) shows that this condition is equivalent to (29).
Results with the Converse of Assumption (A2)
In the text, we stated and proved Proposition 3, Theorems 1 and 2 under Assumption (A2).
This assumption was imposed only to reduce notation. When it is relaxed (and its converse
holds), sector 1 is no longer the asymptotically dominant sector and a di¤erent type of nor-
malization than that in (26) is necessary. In particular, the converse of Assumption (A2)
is
either (i) m1=�1 > m2=�2 and " < 1; or (ii) m1=�1 < m2=�2 and " > 1: (A20)
It is straightforward to see that in this case sector 2 will be the asymptotically dominant sector.
We therefore adopt a parallel normalization with
c (t) � ~c (t)
M2 (t)1=�2
and � (t) � K (t)
L (t)M2 (t)1=�2
: (45)
Given this normalization, it is straightforward to generalize Proposition 3, Theorems 1 and 2.
Proposition 4 Suppose that (A1) and (A20) hold. Then, a competitive equilibrium satis�es
the following three di¤erential equations
_c (t)
c (t)=
1
�
h(1� �2) � (t)1=" � (t)�2 � (t)��2 � (t)��2 � � � �
i� m2
�2; (46)
_� (t)
� (t)= � (t)�2 � (t)1��2 � (t)��2 � (t)� � (t)�1 c (t)� � � n� m2
�2;
_� (t)
� (t)=
(1� � (t))h�� _�(t)
�(t) +m1 � �1�2m2
i(1� ")�1 ��(� (t)� � (t))
; where
25
� (t) � "
"�1
�1 +
�1� �21� �1
��1� � (t)� (t)
�� ""�1
; (47)
with initial conditions � (0) and � (0), and also satis�es the transversality condition
limt!1
exp
����� (1� �)m2
�2� n
�t
�� (t) = 0: (48)
Moreover, any allocation that satis�es these conditions is a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is analog to that of Proposition 3 and is omitted.
Theorem 3 Suppose that (A1), (A20) and (A3) hold. Then, there exists a unique CGP where
consumption per capita grows at the rate g�c = m2=�2, and �� = 0,
�� =
"(�m2=�2 + �+ �)
(1� )"
"�1 (1� �2)
#� 1�2
;
and c� = (1� )"
"�1 (��)1��2����� + n+ m2
�2
�. Moreover, the growth rates of output, capital
and employment in the di¤erent sectors are given by
g� = g�2 = z�2 = n+
m2
�2, z�1 = g
� � (1� ") ~!
g�1 = g� + "~!, n�2 = n, and n�1 = n� (1� ") ~!;
where
~! � m1 � �1m2
�2> 0:
Proof. The proof is analog to that of Theorem 1 and is omitted.
It can also be easily veri�ed that in this case ��K = 1��2 and r� = (1� �2) "
"�1 (��)��2��.
Theorem 4 Suppose that (A1), (A20) and (A3) hold. Then, the non-linear system (27) is
locally (saddle-path) stable, in the sense that in the neighborhood of c�, �� and ��; there is a
unique two-dimensional manifold of solutions that converge to c�, �� and ��.
Proof. The proof follows that of Theorem 2. Once again linearizing the dynamics around
the CGP, we obtain _z = J (x�) z, with z � x � x� and x� such that f (x�) = 0, where
26
J (x�) is the Jacobian of f (x) evaluated at x�. The determinant of the Jacobian is again
det J (x�) = �a��ac�, where
a�� = � (1� ")�m1 � �1
m2
�2
�ac� = � (1� )
""�1 (��)
��2�1 �2 (1� �2)�
:
Once again a�� and ac� are strictly negative, since, under Assumption (A20), " ? 1, m2=�2 ?m1=�1. Therefore, as in the proof of Theorem 2, det J (x�) > 0 and the steady state is
hyperbolic. The same argument as in that proof shows that there must be two negative
eigenvalues and establishes the result.
27
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Table 1: Industry Capital SharesINDUSTRY SECTOR CAPITAL SHARE
Educational services 1 0:10Management of companies and enterprises 1 0:20Health care and social assistance 1 0:22Durable goods 1 0:27Administrative and waste management services 1 0:28Construction 1 0:32Other services, except government 1 0:33Professional, scienti�c, and technical services 1 0:34Transportation and warehousing 1 0:35
Accommodation and food services 2 0:36Retail trade 2 0:42Arts, entertainment, and recreation 2 0:42Finance and insurance 2 0:45Wholesale trade 2 0:46Nondurable goods 2 0:47Information 2 0:53Mining 2 0:66Utilities 2 0:77
Note: US data from NIPA. Sector 1 comprises the low capital-intensity industries, while sector 2
comprises the high capital-intensity industries. The capital intensity of each industry is the average
capital share between 1987 and 2005, where capital share is computed as value added minus total
compensation divided by value added.
31
Table 2: Data and Model Calibration, 1948-2005
US DataBenchmark Calibration" = 0:76 , m2 = 0:0108
1948 2005 1948 2005
Y2=Y1 0:85 1:01 0:85 1:00L2=L1 1:03 0:80 0:91 0:87�k 0:40 0:40 0:39 0:39
Note: US data from NIPA. Classi�cations and calibration described in the text.
32
Table 3: Data and Model Calibration, 1948-2005 (Robustness I)
US DataModel
" = 0:56; m2 = 0:0108Model
" = 0:66, m2 = 0:0108Model
" = 0:86, m2 = 0:0108
1948 2005 1948 2004 1948 2004 1948 2004
Y2=Y1 0:85 1:01 0:85 0:96 0:85 0:98 0:85 1:02L2=L1 1:03 0:80 0:91 0:83 0:91 0:85 0:91 0:89�k 0:40 0:40 0:39 0:39 0:39 0:39 0:39 0:39
Note: US data from NIPA. Classi�cations and calibration described in the text.
33
Table 4: Data and Model Calibration, 1948-2005 (Robustness II)
US DataModel
" = 0:76; m2 = 0:0098Model
" = 0:76, m2 = 0:0118Model
" = 0:76, m2 = 0:0128
1948 2005 1948 2004 1948 2004 1948 2004
Y2=Y1 0:85 1:01 0:85 0:96 0:85 1:05 0:85 1:09L2=L1 1:03 0:80 0:91 0:88 0:91 0:86 0:91 0:85�k 0:40 0:40 0:39 0:39 0:39 0:39 0:39 0:39
Note: US data from NIPA. Classi�cations and calibration described in the text.
34
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
labor ratio high relative to low capital intensity sectors value ratio high relative to low capital intensity sectors
quantity ratio high relative to low capital intensity sectors
Figure 1: Employment, price-weighted value of output, and �xed-price quantity indices in highcapital intensity sectors relative to low capital intensity sectors, 1948-2005. See Section 3 forindustry classi�cations. Data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).
35
0 50 100 1500.52
0.53
0.54
0.55
0.56
0.57lambda
0 50 100 150
0.32
0.33
0.34
0.35
0.36kappa
0 50 100 1500.085
0.09
0.095
0.1
interest rate
0 50 100 1500.37
0.38
0.39
0.4
0.41
0.42capital share
Figure 2: Behavior of �, �, r and �K in the benchmark calibration with " = 0:76 and m2 =0:0108. See text for further details.
36
Appendix B for Acemoglu-Guerrieri �Capital Deepening andNon-Balanced Economic Growth�(Not for Publication)
National Income Product Accounts Data
All the data used in the paper refer to US data and are from the Gross Domestic Product by
Industry Data of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Industries are classi�ed
according to the North American Industrial Classi�cation System (NAICS). Throughout, we
use the 22-industry level of detail data. This level of aggregation enables us to extend the
sample back to 1948. We exclude the Government and Private household sectors as well as
Agriculture, forestry, �shing, and hunting and Real estate and rental. Real estate is excluded
since it has a very high capital share due to the value of assets in this sector, which does not
re�ect the share of capital in the production function of the sector.
Employment is total full-time and part-time employment (FTPT), in thousands of employ-
ees, in the indicated industries. We use this measure of employment because it is the only
one for which the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released estimates based on NAICS
classi�cation going back to 1948. All other employment measures are calculated using SIC up
to 1997. The quantity in a sector is equal to the expenditure-weighted sum of industry-level
quantities. More speci�cally, let S denote a subset of the industries. Then quantity in this
subset of sectors at time t is calculated as:
QSt =
Pj2S Ej;t �Qj;tP
j2S Ej;t;
where Qj;t is �xed-price quantity index in sector j at time t in 2000 dollars, calculated as the
product of the chain-type quantity index for value added (VAQI), with 2000 as base year, and
the year 2000 current-dollar value added of the corresponding series (VA) divided by 100, and
Ej;t is expenditure on sector j at time t, approximated by value added.
The share of capital in national income is computed as value added minus total compen-
sation to employees over value added, i.e.,
capital sharet =Et �Wt
Et; (B1)
where Et is total value added (VA) at time t and Wt is total compensation to employees
(COMP) at time t.
B-1
The value of the initial capital stock is the initial value of private �xed assets in current
dollars.
As discussed in the text, in Figure 1, and in Section 3, sectors are classi�ed according to
their capital intensity. Capital intensity in each sector is calculated as:
capital sharej;t =Ej;t �Wj;t
Ej;t; (B2)
where Ej;t is value added in sector j at time t and Wj;t is compensation to employees in sector
j at time t. Because of the change in the classi�cation of industries before and after 1987,
we compute the capital share of each industry as the average between 1987 and 2005, which
enables us to use the consistent NAICS classi�cation for the compensation series (before 1987
this variable is only available with the SIC classi�cation). Industries are then ranked according
to their average capital intensity as shown in Table 1 in the text, and the capital share cuto¤
level for separating industries into high and low capital intensity industries is chosen to create
two groups of industries with approximately 50% of employment each. According to this
ranking, low capital intensity industries are: Construction; Durable goods; Transportation
and Warehousing; Professional, scienti�c, and technical services; Management of companies
and enterprises; Administrative and waste management services; Educational services; Health
care and social assistance; Other services, except government. High capital-intensive industries
are: Mining; Utilities; Non-durable goods; Wholesale; Retail trade; Information; Finance and
Insurance; Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation; Accommodation and food services.
One might worry that the capital intensity of di¤erent industries may change over our
sample period because of technological reasons or because of changes in relative factor prices.
The next two tables show that the classi�cation of industries according to capital industry is
highly stable over time. These two tables show the Spearman�s rank correlation matrix among
alternative rankings of industries based on average capital share in di¤erent time periods and
using di¤erent industry classi�cations in order to document this point. In these two tables, we
denote the ranking based on average capital share between dates t and t0 by �t;t0 . As noted
in the text, the NAICS classi�cation starts in 1987, so we can only compare the stability of
capital intensity ranking between 1987 and 2005 using the NAICS data. To supplement this, we
compute capital shares choosing data for SIC industries matched to the NAICS classi�cation
(using the correspondence tables constructed by the US Census Bureau). This enables us both
to show the similarity of the ranking according to NAICS and SIC classi�cations and also to
B-2
extend the comparison of the classi�cations to 1948 (though ending in the year 2000, since this
is the last available year for the SIC classi�cation). We denote the rankings between dates t
and t0 that use data based on SIC by �̂t;t0 .
Table B1 reports the Spearman�s rank correlation matrix among our benchmark ranking,
�87;05, that averages capital share over all the years for which the NAICS data are available,
rankings that use the same data for 5 year subperiods (in particular, between 1987 and 1991;
1992 and 1997; and so on), and the ranking using the SIC data for the period 1948-2000.
This table shows a high degree of correlation between the NAICS rankings across di¤erent
subperiods. In particular, all of the correlation indices are greater than 0.94. The last row of
the table also shows that there is a signi�cant correlation between the ranking based on SIC
classi�cation using data between 1948 and 2000 and the one based on NAICS classi�cation,
though now the correlation is somewhat lower, around 0.75.
Table B1: Spearman Correlation Matrix for Capital-Intensity Rankings (NAICS)�87;05 �87;91 �92;96 �97;01 �02;05 �̂48;00
�87;05 1:00�87;91 0:96 1:00�92;96 0:99 0:98 1:00�97;01 1:00 0:95 0:98 1:00�02;05 0:99 0:94 0:97 0:99 1:00�̂48;00 0:73 0:75 0:72 0:76 0:74 1:00
Note: This table reports the Spearman correlation matrix for di¤erent capital intensity rankingsof the NAICS at the 22-industry level of detail, measuring each industry�s capital intensity as theaverage value over the whole sample available with the NAICS data, 1987-2005 (�87;05), and over 5 yearsubperiods, 1987-1991 (�87;91), 1992-1996 (�92;96), and so on. The last row (�̂48;00) is obtained usingSIC data for the whole sample available with SIC data, 1948-2000, and matching the industries basedon the SIC classi�cation to the NAICS classi�cation using the correspondence tables constructed bythe US Census Bureau. See text for details.
Table B2 reports the Spearman�s rank correlation matrix among rankings that use SIC data
only, again averaging capital shares over 5 years periods. This table also shows a considerable
amount of stability in rankings based on capital intensity. Most correlation coe¢ cients are
above 0.8, though when we compare the rankings in the late 1990s to those in the early 1950s,
the correlation becomes as low as 0.50.
B-3
Table B2: Spearman Correlation Matrix for Capital-Intensity Rankings (SIC)�̂48;00 �̂48;52 �̂53;57 �̂58;62 �̂63;67 �̂68;72 �̂73;77 �̂78;82 �̂83;87 �̂88;92 �̂93;97 �̂98;00
�̂48;00 1:00�̂48;52 0:60 1:00�̂53;57 0:77 0:95 1:00�̂58;62 0:77 0:94 0:99 1:00�̂63;67 0:77 0:92 0:96 0:98 1:00�̂68;72 0:86 0:88 0:96 0:97 0:98 1:00�̂73;77 0:88 0:83 0:94 0:95 0:93 0:97 1:00�̂78;82 0:94 0:76 0:90 0:90 0:88 0:94 0:98 1:00�̂83;87 0:97 0:73 0:88 0:87 0:86 0:92 0:94 0:98 1:00�̂88;92 0:96 0:56 0:74 0:74 0:71 0:82 0:85 0:90 0:94 1:00�̂93;97 0:99 0:50 0:69 0:69 0:69 0:80 0:82 0:89 0:93 0:96 1:00�̂98;00 0:98 0:50 0:69 0:69 0:71 0:81 0:81 0:88 0:92 0:92 0:99 1:00
Note: This table reports the Spearman correlation matrix for di¤erent capital intensity rankings ofthe NAICS at the 22-industry level of detail, measuring each industry�s using SIC data over di¤erenthorizons. We compare rankings obtained averaging industries� capital share over the whole sampleavailable with SIC data, 1948-2000 (�̂48;00), and over 5 year subperiods, 1948-1952 (�̂48;52), 1953-1957(�̂53;57) and so on. Industries based on the SIC have been matched to the industries based on theNAICS using the correspondence tables constructed by the US Census Bureau. See text for furtherdetails.
We next check the robustness of the pattern shown in Figure 1 in the Introduction. Recall
that this pattern, which involves more rapid growth of quantity in the high capital-intensive
sector and more rapid growth of value and employment in the low capital-intensive sector, is
a distinctive prediction of our model. In particular, we would like to ensure that this pattern
is not an artifact of the exact cuto¤ we use in the classi�cation (which also determines the
industries that are in the di¤erent groups), the speci�c source of data, and sample period.
Table B3 documents the robustness of this pattern by showing the relative growth rate of
quantity, employment and value in the high capital intensity industries (compared to low capital
intensity industries) in each case with a di¤erent classi�cation. The �rst column corresponds
to our benchmark classi�cation and shows that between 1948 and 2005, quantity in high
capital intensity industries has grown by 19% more than in low capital intensity industries.
In the meantime, employment in these high capital intensity industries has declined by 22%
and value has declined by 18% relative to low capital intensity industries. Recall that our
benchmark classi�cation placed approximately 50% of employment in each of the two sectors.
B-4
The second and third columns report the same statistics, but using alternative cuto¤s so that
60% (column 2) and 40% (column 3) of total employment is in the industry grouping with
low capital intensity. In the former case, Accommodation and food services move into the low
capital intensity group. In the latter, Transport and warehousing move into the high capital
intensity group. In both cases, the general patterns remain very similar to the benchmark. For
example, with the 60% cuto¤, there is a 21% increase in the relative quantity of high capital
intensity industries, a 36% decline in their relative employment, and a 19% decline in their
value. With the 40% cuto¤, the relative increase in quantity is 44%, the relative decline in
employment is 19%, and the relative decline in value is 9%. Columns 4 and 5 show similar
results with the SIC data for the periods 1948-2000 and 1977-2000. We do not have quantity
data before 1977 with the SIC classi�cation, so the �rst row is missing in the fourth column.
The remaining rows in these columns are again similar to the benchmark, though when focusing
on the narrower sample of 1977-2000, the relative increase in quantity is only 2%. Finally, in
column 6 we report the results for the longer horizon 1929-2000. The only measure of value
added by industry available starting in 1929 is data on income by industry from the Historical
Statistics of the United States (the original source for these data is the BEA). The series of
full-time and part-time employees by industry in the NIPA tables also extends back to 1929. As
in column 4, we do not have quantity data, so that the �rst row of this column is missing. The
other two rows show a pattern consistent with the rest of the table, with a more rapid growth
of employment and value in the less capital-intensive industries than in more capital-intensive
industries.
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Table B3: US Data robustness checks(1)
Benchmark(1948-2005)
(2)Cuto¤ 60%(1948-2005)
(3)Cuto¤ 40%(1948-2005)
(4)SIC Data(1948-2000)
(5)SIC Data(1977-2000)
(6)SIC Data(1929-2000)
growth %Y2=Y1
19% 21% 44% n:a: 2% n:a
growth %L2=L1
�22% �36% �19% �27% �20% �39%
growth %Y N2 =Y
N1
�18% �19% �9% �24% �9% �37%
Note: Column 1 in Table B4 reports the growth rate of quantity (quantity index for value added),employment (full-time and part-time employees) and value (value added) in the high capital intensitysector relative to the low capital intensity sector, constructed according to our benchmark classi�cationshown in Table B1. Columns 2 and 3 report the same statistics using alternative sectoral classi�cations,where the capital share cuto¤ for dividing industries into high and low capital intensity sectors ischosen to create a group of high-capital intensity industries including approximately 60% and 40%of total employment, instead of 50% as in the benchmark. The last three columns report the samestatistics for the benchmark sectoral classi�cation using the SIC data for di¤erent sample periods. Seetext for further details.
Finally, we have also looked for other sources of data to go back further than 1929. The
Historical Statistics of the United States provides a number of employment series, though in
most cases data are only available at a higher level of aggregation than the NIPA and the related
data we have used so far. The series with the �nest industry classi�cation in the Historical
Statistics of the United States is based on Sobek (2001) and covers only the time period 1910-
1990, which is only slightly earlier than the data we have reported in Table B3. These data are
available in 10 year intervals and use the 1950 Census industry classi�cation. Matching these to
the NAICS classi�cation, we computed employment growth in the high and low capital intensity
sectors.19 The results from this exercise are consistent with those in Table B3 and show that
employment in high capital intensity industries declines by about 10% relative to employment
in low capital intensity industries between 1910 and 1990. The remaining sources of data on
employment by industry have higher levels of aggregation, making the type of exercise we are
performing here more di¢ cult. One source of data on employment by industry is the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, which covers the period 1919-1999. However, a signi�cant fraction of the
industries are missing before 1939. We matched the industry classi�cation of this dataset to
the NAICS classi�cation,20 and computed employment growth in high and low capital intensity19For this exercise we dropped one of the 1950 census industry groups, �Transportation and Communication,�
because it combines two industries that are separated according to the NAICS classi�cation.20With this classi�cation, for the same reason as with the Sobek data, we had to drop the composite industry
�Transportation, Communication and Utilities�.
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industries. The results show that employment in high capital intensity industries declines by
about 70% relative to employment in low capital intensity industries between 1939 and 1999.
The Historical Statistics of the United States also provides two other series, one from Lebergott
(1964) and Weiss (1992) covering the period 1800-1960, and the other from Lebergott (1984)
for 1900-1940. Unfortunately, given the more crude industry classi�cations, we were not able to
create a consistent match with to the NAICS classi�cations, especially with the former dataset.
It is also possible that the ranking of industries according to capital share, which appears to
be fairly stable in the postwar era, may be quite di¤erent when we go back before 1900. In any
case, using these data we were not able to obtain consistent patterns on relative employment
growth across high and low capital intensity industries. We believe that this re�ects the less
�ne industry aggregation in these data and the possible changes in the ranking according to
capital intensity, though it may also be due to data quality or because the patterns we have
documented for the past 80 years do not apply to the period before.
Additional References for Appendix B
The Historical Statistics of the United States (Millennial Edition Online), Editors: Carter
Susan B., Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, Gavin
Wright, New York : Cambridge University Press, c2006.
Sobek, Matthew �New Statistics on the U.S. Labor Force, 1850�1990,�Historical Methods
34 (2001): 71�87.
Lebergott, Stanley, Manpower in Economic Growth: The American Record since 1800,
McGraw-Hill, 1964.
Lebergott, Stanley, The Americans: An Economic Record, Norton, 1984.
Weiss, Thomas, U.S. Labor Force Estimates and Economic Growth, in Robert E. Gallman
and John Joseph Wallis, editors, American Economic Growth and Standards of Living before
the Civil War, University of Chicago Press, 1992.
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