Capacity building with a political twist Grindle

8/7/2019 Capacity building with a political twist Grindle

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public administration and development

Public Admin. Dev. 26, 5569 (2006)

Published online in Wiley InterScience

(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.394

MODERNISING TOWN HALL: CAPACITY BUILDING

WITH A POLITICAL TWIST

MERILEE S. GRINDLE*

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, US

SUMMARY

Capacity building is a frequent tonic prescribed for local governments in poor performance health. Such initiatives purport toget to the heart of governance with technical approaches that are free of partisanship and political controversy. Data from muni-cipal governments newly affected by decentralisation and democratisation indicate that, contrary to expectations, the destiny ofcapacity building initiatives is dependent upon politics. In the first instance, capacity building initiatives are dependent on theorientation of elected and appointed leaders who choose to invest in or ignore them. Second, capacity building initiatives aresignificantly affected by electoral cycles that create moments when significant new capacity initiatives can be introduced and

abandoned. Third, capacity building initiatives are dependent on the formal and informal institutions that determine how muchscope public officials have for introducing change. Thus, while part of the popularity of capacity building programs and projectsis their apparent distance from politics, those who wish to see the performance of government improved need to be sensitive tohow it is affectedin positive and negative waysby political preferences, calendars, and institutions. Data on 57 capacitybuilding initiatives carried out in 30 medium sized municipalities in Mexico suggest the ways in which such factors shape thedestinies of capacity building initiatives. Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

key words Capacity building; decentralisation; Mexican municipalities; decentralisation; local governance

INTRODUCTION

Endemic lack of resources, clientelism, capture by local elites, widespread corruption, incompetence, inefficiency,

mismanagementthese are pervasive stereotypes of how local government works in many countries in the devel-

oping world. Indeed, lack of local government capacity is universally invoked by those skeptical about the current

worldwide trend towards administrative, fiscal, and political decentralisation. Even advocates of decentralisation

willingly admit that significant administrative and institutional changes are essential if local governments are to

live up to its promise.

In response to the sceptics, proponents of decentralisation argue that with investments in local government

capacity building, good governance will emerge from the ruins of excessive centralisation. When properly

designed and implemented, they contend, decentralisation will bring more efficient use of public resources, better

management of local affairs, innovative solutions to long-standing problems, citizen participation in decision-mak-

ing, and greater responsiveness to citizen needs for basic services.

Capacity building is thus a generalised tonic prescribed for local governments in poor performance health, par-

ticularly when decentralisation initiatives are put in place. Governments, NGOs, and international development

agencies annually invest hundreds of millions of dollars in this kind of medicine. They fund programs and projects

in institution creation and strengthening at local levels, organisational engineering, human resource training, com-

puterisation, and technical inputs for electronic government. They provide support for process development and

Copyright# 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

*Correspondence to: M. S. Grindle, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA, 02138.E-mail: [email protected]


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monitoring, participatory decision-making, and other managerial innovations that promise more efficiency, effec-

tiveness and responsiveness from local government. They argue that by modernising town hall, it is possible to deal

effectively with the scourge of corruption.

Capacity building initiatives are additionally attractive to development professionals because they promise to

get to the heart of governance with technical approaches that are free of partisanship and political controversy.

Those concerned about public sector performance can support capacity building as an appropriate response to poor

governance, and provide on-going assistance to improve government, without at the same time being accused ofdirect intervention in partisan politics, decision-making processes, political conflict, or policy debates.

This paper, which explores data from municipal governments newly affected by decentralisation and democra-

tisation, indicates that, contrary to expectations, the destiny of capacity building initiatives is dependent upon pol-

itics. In the first instance, capacity building initiatives are dependent on the orientation of elected and appointed

leaders who choose to invest in or ignore them. Public officials concerned about improving the performance of

local government make purposive decisions to put capacity building initiatives in motion and maintain them in

place. Thus, while a variety of public, NGO, and international programs can make ideas, resources, and technical

support available to local governments and even mandate change, goal setting and support at local levels determine

whether these interventions can be deployed effectively. The modernisation of the state at local levels is therefore a

function of leadership preferences, not an independent source of improved performance that can be effective

regardless of such preferences.

Second, capacity building initiatives are significantly affected by electoral cycles. These cycles create momentswhen significant new capacity initiatives can be introduced. Characteristically, when municipal officials are con-

cerned about performance issues, their actionsreorganising town hall, appointing professionals to public posi-

tions, introducing training, computerisation, and performance measurement are framed by a well-defined

electoral calendar. At the same time, in newly democratic but poorly institutionalised political systems, electoral

cycles can also undermine capacity as well as encourage its development. Frequently, elections mean that existing

modernisation initiatives fall prey to the priorities of the next incumbents in town hall.

Third, capacity building initiatives are dependent on political institutions in that rules of the game about how

elections are contested and how authority and power are distributed in formal and informal ways determine how

much scope public officials have for introducing change. Characteristically, where parties are non-programmatic,

appointments to town hall relatively unconstrained by civil service or union rules, and opportunities to introduce

change vested in local leaders, extensive change initiatives can be rapidly adopted and put in place. Again, how-

ever, their survival is limited by the same institutional characteristics.Thus, while part of the popularity of capacity building programmes and projects is their apparent distance from

politics, those who wish to see the performance of government improved need to be sensitive to how it is

affected in positive and negative waysby political preferences, calendars, and institutions. Data on 57 capa-

city building initiatives carried out in 30 medium sized municipalities in Mexico suggest the ways in which such

factors shape the destinies of capacity building initiatives. After a brief survey of the issue of capacity and local

governance in the context of decentralisation, this paper explores the data to describe the kinds of capacity devel-

opment initiatives undertaken and the political conditions under which they were adopted, put into effect, and at

times, abandoned.

THE CAPACITY IMPERATIVE

Over a span of two and a half decades of decentralisation, local levels of government in many countries around theworld acquired new responsibilities and more resources for carrying them out.1 Soon, local officials were under

pressure to take charge of administrative and service delivery duties that had formerly been the responsibility of

1Campbell (2003) refers to this trend as the quiet revolution. The literature on decentralisation is voluminous. For useful overviews of recentexperiences in developing countries, see, in addition to Campbell, Crook and Manor (1998); Burki, Perry, and Dillinger (1999); Manor (1999);Angell, Lowden, and Thorp (2001); Eaton (2004); Montero and Samuels (2004); Oxhorn, Tulchin, and Selee (2004).

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Copyright# 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 26, 5569 (2006)


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provincial or national levels of government. Political parties that had long focused on national electoral contests

became active in campaigns for the leadership of towns and cities.2 Citizens increasingly looked to local govern-

ments in their aspirations for better and more secure neighbourhoods, better health and education services, and

programmes to enhance economic opportunities. National, international, and provincial governments increasingly

expected local managers to perform their new responsibilities fairly and efficiently.

From the perspective of local officials and public institutions, this process of decentralisation was a mixed bles-

sing. While it brought significant new resources and power to local decision makers, it also brought headaches anddilemmas. Long bereft of authority and resources by highly centralised political systems, localities throughout the

world now had to grapple with responsibilities for routine administration, public service provision and economic

development.3 Institutions for local decision making, in some cases atrophied from decades of centralisation, had

to be revived to deal with complex problems. Service providing organisations had to be created or restructured;

employees needed to be trained and new procedures put into effect. Fiscal management became more exacting

even as citizens became increasingly aware that local officials could be appealed to, blamed, or supported for

the delivery of a range of public services.

With new processes, redesigned organisations, job descriptions and training, better technology, altered incen-

tives for performance and other investments in capacity building, supporters of decentralisation believe that local

governance can improve.4 Yet the evidence about such initiatives and investments focuses heavily on what kinds of

programmes and projects are undertaken rather than on the contextual factors that encourage their adoption, suc-

cess and failure.5

Under what conditions are capacity-building programmes initiated? Why are they undertaken?What happens to them over time? In responding to these questions, this study of the performance of municipalities

adjusting to new responsibilities provides insight into the political dynamics of public sector capacity building

efforts.

This study focuses on one countryMexicoto hold the nature of national decentralisation and democratisa-

tion policies constant. At the same time, it acknowledges the impact of possible regional differences by selecting at

random one state from each region of Mexico, for a total of six statesGuanjuato, Oaxaca, Puebla, Sinaloa,

Tamaulipas, and Yucatan. Then, five municipalities with populations from 25 000 to 100 000 were randomly

selected from each state, for a total of 30 municipalities in the sample. During the summer and fall of 2004,

researchers visited these municipalities and interviewed past and present local officials; delved into relevant docu-

ments about local fiscal conditions; explored the dynamics of changes in administrative, service, development, and

participatory activities of local government; assessed the electoral history of each; generated insights into the rela-

tionship of local governments to state and federal ones; and came to know well the localities they were studying.6

What we found demonstrates how political contexts shape capacity initiatives.7

Decentralisation in Mexico

Mexicos municipal governments are composed of a mayor and a council, elected for three-year terms and legally

barred from holding the same position again for one term.8 The composition of the government is determined by

proportional representation and voting is on the basis of party lists. Mayors generally set the agenda for action and

2See, for example, Willis, Garman, and Haggard (1999); Montero and Samuels (2004).3On the local impact of centralization, see Wunsch and Olowu (1990).4Moreover, extensive literature on the New Public Management, reinventing government, and private sector organisational change, in additionto beguiling technologies that offer to revolutionize routine activities, add fuel to the idea that it is possible to deliver on promises for improvedperformance.5An exception to this generalisation is Morgan, Land, and Baser (2005).6Collectively, 569 individuals were interviewed, including 51 current and former mayors, 113 councilors, 229 local public managers, 98community leaders and important citizens, 26 local party officials, 48 state and federal level officials, as well as a number of academic experts.Orazio Bellettini, Karla Breceda, Alexi Canaday-Jarrix, Elizabeth Coombs, Xochitl Leon, and Alberto Saracho-Martnez, graduates of theKennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and Sergio Cardenas-Denham, of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, carried outthe research. In addition, Naomi Walcott, Elizabeth Gewurz Ramrez, and Emanuel Garza Fishburn assisted in the research.7On this issue, see Hewitt de Alcantara (1998).8Municipalities in Mexico are equivalent to counties in the United States. They are generally composed of a county seat ( cabecera) andsurrounding communities, which are often rural.

MODERNISING TOWN HALL 57



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determine what is to be done and when. In most municipalities, councilors have oversight responsibility for one or

more public departmentstreasury, public works, public safety, culture and youth, public health, urban develop-

ment, rural development, and so on. These departments, headed by directors, carry out the routine business of local

government.

In many ways, mayors, councillors, department heads, and their employees were still adjusting to decentralisa-tion in Mexico in the mid 2000s. This process was initiated hesitantly in the early 1980s, evolved equally hesitantly

in the 1990s, but gradually allowed local governments greater autonomy and more resources. Importantly, muni-

cipalities began to receive significant increases in grants and transfers from the national government, by far the

most important source of their revenue.9 Figure 1 shows the growth in funds provided to local governments from

all federal sources between 1990 and 2002. In constant pesos of 1993, municipalities received extremely little

before 1994; by 2002, they were receiving almost 2% of GDP. In per capita terms, there was an increase from

0.14 pesos per person in 1990 to 311.58 pesos in 2002 (see Table 1). These resources came with major new respon-

sibilities for the delivery of administrative, public security, public health and infrastructure services.

In addition to decentralisation, the democratisation of the Mexican political system significantly increased poli-

tical competition for local government positions. In the 1980s, opposition parties first began to demonstrate some

capacity to contest the hold of the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) over election results at the local level,

in part because of a series of important electoral reforms and in part because of increased mobilisation ofcivil society, particularly in large cities.10 By the 2000s, the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) and the Partido de

la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) were regularly winning local elections (see Figure 2). In 1990, the likelihood

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

1993 pesos

From 1990 to 1993 Federal Transfers to

all municipalities went from 5.5 to 6.9

million pesos.

Figure 1. Federal transfers to all municipal governments (millions of 1993 pesos).Source: INEGI, Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos http://www.inegi.gob.mx/prod_serv/contenidos/espanol/simbad/default.asp?c=73

9In the thirty research municipalities, locally generated resources accounted for an average of only 11 percent of total funding.10On the history of political competition in Mexico in the period since 1980, see Chand (2001); Beer (2003) Domnguez and Lawson (2003);Shirk (2005).

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that a non-incumbent party would win municipal elections was 0.06; by 2004, it was 0.50. In 2003, some 30% of

Mexicans were living in municipalities governed by parties other than the PRI.11

Currently, local governments in Mexico are responsible for basic municipal services including water, sewage,

public lighting, garbage, urban transport, public markets, roads and highways, public security, and slaughter-

houses.12 They are charged with public health and they maintain social infrastructure, such as school buildings,

Table 1. Total funding of municipal governments 19902002 (1993 Pesos)

Year Total As % Of GDP Per Capita (pesos)

1990 11,493,530 0.00 0.141991 12,844,330 0.00 0.151992 13,957,728 0.00 0.161993 15,670,364 0.00 0.18

1994 16,627,876,932 1.27 185.691995 13,467,271,150 1.10 147.761996 13,593,322,125 1.05 146.841997 14,834,650,367 1.08 157.941998 19,041,518,428 1.31 199.911999 22,914,372,452 1.53 237.252000 24,847,462,509 1.55 253.632001 27,730,706,387 1.73 279.052002 31,412,724,549 1.98 311.58

Source:INEGI and Banco de Mexico

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Year

Percent

Municipal level

State level

Figure 2. Percent of municipalities and states governed by parties other than the PRI 19852003.Source: CIDAC, www.cidac.org

11In 1997, electoral victories in several large cities by parties other than the PRI resulted in a brief period in which over 50 percent of theMexican population was governed by opposition parties. This percentage gradually declined to about 23 percent in 2000 and then began to riseagain.12On municipal service provision, see Garca del Castillo (2003).




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playgrounds, health clinics, and hospitals. They regulate zoning and environmental issues and have control over

property taxes. They can levy a series of local fees. Annually, they must prepare budgets for approval by state

legislatures. In addition, they are required by federal and state governments to have a series of plans and procedures

in place for municipal administration and development. Engendering the skills and processes to accomplish these

municipal tasks has been as much a challenge in Mexico as it has been in many other countries that have had a long

legacy of centralised government.

Throughout most of the 20th century, Mexicos local governments were poor and almost powerless. Highlycentralised, the country boasted a powerful executive, a weak legislature and judiciary, and a dominant party that

won all presidential elections between 1929 and 2000, as well as the vast majority of congressional, state, and local

elections.13 By the early 1970s, the federal system was described as one in which each successive level of

government is weaker, more dependent, and more impoverished than the level above. 14 In local parlance, until

late in the 20th century, state governors invariably elected from the PRI were often referred to as viceroys of

the president; elected municipal governments were treated as their fiefdoms. The system was held together by

extensive clientelist networks that reached from the most remote locations to the presidents office in Mexico City.

In this context, local governments had little to do and very few resources with which to do it. According to

George Fosters classic account of life in Tzintzuntzan, in the state of Michoaca n in the early 1960s, for example,

municipal revenues came from fees for registering land and house titles, for selling livestock, for registering

livestock brands, for animal-slaughtering licenses, for marriage acts, and for permits to operate retail establish-

ments.15

In Tzintzuntzan, this amounted to about $22 000 annually, all but $6000 of which was used to payfor salaries of public officials. The reach of remaining funds was not great. Foster noted that, other than street

lighting no real community services are provided.16

Traditionally, local governments had inefficient and often corrupt leadership. In most localities, political bosses

were beholden to their patrons at higher levels in the political system and regularly delivered local votes in

exchange for small public works, opportunities for personal enrichment, and power over life and death in local

arenas. Any citizens with ambitions to work for government or to pursue political careers regularly abandoned

their municipalities for the challenges and rewards of career advancement in Mexico City.

With decentralisation initiatives, then, many anticipated that Mexico would have a tough time developing effec-

tive local governments. Indeed, Table 2 indicates that many municipalities lacked basic rules and regulations that

were mandated by federal or state law. Yet, by the mid 2000s, to judge by 30 medium sized municipalities selected

from around the country, a large number of capacity building and organisational development initiatives were

underway. Information on when, how, and why these were initiated provides a unique view of the dynamics oflocal political concerns in an era of decentralisation and democratisation.

MODERNISING TOWN HALL

There are significant incentives in Mexico for new political administrations to differentiate themselves from their

predecessors, even when they represent the same political parties. Parties are non-programmatic and local elections

are fought on the basis of particularlistic commitments and the personalities of those in the race. Typically, new

administrations introduce new policies, processes, programs, and projects and curtail, rename, or end those of their

predecessors.

In the 30 research municipalities, then, it was not surprising to find that incumbents in town hall claimed

accurately or notthat in the past, municipal activities were carried out in pencil and on decades-old typewriters.

They believed that many citizens got service only because they had a proverbial friend in town hall.17 According to

13Opposition parties began winning elections at the local level in the 1980s. In 1989, the first governor from an opposition party won election(although earlier in the decade, a number of other opposition candidates at this level may have fallen victim to electoral fraud).14Fagen and Touhy (1972: 20).15Foster (1967: 169).16Foster (1967: 170), emphasis in the original.17Interviews, 6 July 2004, Manuel Doblado, Guanajuato; 15 June 2004, Abasolo, Guanajuato.

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one, In the past, the records were all kept manually. If you were my friend, it was sufficient for me to tear [up] this

card and your tax record would disappear.18 In the view of a new director of public works, it is thought that,

ultimately, everything is politically negotiable in letting contracts and paying for services.19 Officials complained

that their predecessors, in addition to leaving no records or regulations, did not appoint officials with training

appropriate to their responsibilities.20 Such complaints were almost universal, even where parties did not alternate

in the control of town hall.

Among those most frequently cited for low capacity and corruption were police departments. In many munici-

palities, new police commissioners complained that there were no records of arrests and no written policieswith regard to imposing fines on citizens or arresting people for misdemeanours and other infractions of the

law. Citizens regularly accused local police of abusive behaviour.21 Officials were paid poorly, and often had little

or no education. Many supplemented their pay by demanding bribes in exchange for impunity. When police

imposed fines in some municipalities, they were allowed to keep them as part of their pay. 22

In the perception of new arrivals in town hall, change was imperative. One councillor argued that those

concerned about improved performance had little choice other than to throw oneself into the current and try

to navigate against it, to see what could be changed.23 In the research municipalities, four strategies of

modernisation were used to navigate against the currentreorganising town hall; altering the profile of those

appointed to public office; providing training and technical up-grading; and introducing performance standards

for individuals and organisational units within the municipality.

Table 2. Institutional infrastructure in Mexican municipalities 2002

Institutional infrastructure Number of Percent of all Number of research P ercent of municipalities with municipalities municipalities with research

Item (N2429) Item (N30) municipalities

Municipal Development Plan (approved) 2162 89.0 27 90.0Framework for Municipal Governance1 1898 78.1 24 80.0

Internal Regulation of the Ayuntamiento2

1451 59.7 20 66.7Management Regulations3 796 32.8 9 30.0Public Works Regulation 1179 48.5 18 60.0Zoning and Land Use Regulations 646 26.6 8 26.7Land Division and Urbanisation Regulations 506 20.8 8 26.7Public Security Regulation 591 24.3 6 20.0Civil Protection Regulation 1087 44.8 17 56.7Public Amusements and Events Regulation 816 33.6 14 46.7Alcoholic Beverage Sales Regulation 1307 53.8 14 46.7Fire Regulation 145 6.0 1 3.3Environmental Protection and Ecology Regulation 866 35.7 11 36.7

1This framework, called the Bando de Polica y Buen Gobierno, is the basic local document for municipal government. It details the purpose ofthe ayuntamiento, the name and shield of the municipality, its geographic extension, the rights and obligations of its inhabitants, the basicorganizaiton of the municipal government, and public services it offers.2

This presents the basic structure of the ayuntamiento.3This presents the basic administrative rules of the ayuntamiento.Source: INEGI, INDESOL, SEDESOL CONAPO, Encuesta Nacional para Presidentes Municipales sobre Desarrollo Social, 2002.

18Interview, 26 June 2004, Valladolid, Yucatan.19Interview, 24 July 2004, Acatlan de Perez Figueroa, Oaxaca.20One municipal comptroller, for example, complained that his predecessor had been a bricklayer. Interview, 7 July 2004, Manuel Doblado,Guanajuato.21Interview, 29 June 2004, Manuel Doblado, Guanajuato.22Interview, 27 July 2004, Santa Cruz de Juventino Rosas, Guanajuato. Table 23 indicated that only 20 percent of the research municipalitieshad public security regulations in 2002.23Interview, 8 July 2004, Manuel Doblado, Guanajuato.




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As indicated in Table 3, almost all municipalities made efforts to introduce training and computers and a

significant number of them reorganised their administrations. Professionalisation of personnel was put in place

in about a third of the cases, and a few tried the introduction of performance standards. There were ten munici-

palities in which the administration in office at the time of the research had undertaken at least three such activities

to alter the performance of town hall.24

Reorganisation

New administrations often began their tenure by redrawing the organisational map of the municipality. At times,

this activity was undertaken as a way of expanding the number of jobs available, such as the mayor who decided

that all councilors should have substitutes, thus expanding the number of patronage positions he could fill.Frequently, however, reorganisation was undertaken as a way to make sense out of poorly designed or antiquated

municipal structures. Thus, in the early days of a new administration, decisions about policy priorities were

often accompanied by reconfigured organisation charts. New departments were added that reflected what mayors

believed to be the most pressing issues. Among the research municipalities, for example, several added

departments of human resources, institutional development, professional development, social communication,

and legal affairs.

In addition, departments to stimulate urban or economic development or tourism appeared in new organigrams.

Liaison offices and departments of community affairs were created for helping citizens navigate the municipal

bureaucracy, to work with non-Spanish speaking groups in their interactions with town hall, or to improve com-

munication with citizens more generally. At the same time, some departments disappeared.25 These changes were

justified on the basis of efficiency and better service. Mayors and other officials often spoke of wanting town hall to

work like a business, without much bureaucracy, and with good management of information and responsiveness toclient demand.26 These officials anticipated that new organisational structures would add consistency to the

activities of the municipality.

Some reorganisations were motivated by the desire to eliminate the sources of corruption. Traditional efforts,

such as taking officials from the previous administration to court for corrupt practices, were complemented by

organisational changes. In one municipality, for example, by separating the property tax office from the treasury,

town officials hoped that decision making about how much was owed to the local government would become more

transparent and discourage decision making on the basis of friendship and political influence. 27 Developing or

improving lists of town employees, providing organisational manuals, and inventorying municipal property were

widely believed to be important steps towards less corrupt town halls.28

Table 3. Modernisation Initiatives in Reserch Municipalities

Type of Initiative Number of municipalities Percent of municipalities

Reorganisation 16 53Professionalisation 10 33Training and Technology 27 90Performance Standards 4 13

24The municipalities were Abasolo, Santa Cruz de Juventino Rosas, and Manuel Doblado in Guanajuato; Acatla n de Perez Figueroa in Oaxaca;Cignahuapan and Libres in Puebla; Escuinapa and Mocorito in Sinaloa; Miguel Aleman in Tamaulipas; and Valladolid in Yucatan.25In one municipality in Sinaloa, for example, the department of markets and slaughterhouses disappeared and responsibility for tax collectionand monitoring of the two areas was given to the treasurer.26Interview, 29 July 2004, Santa Cruz de Juventino Rosas, Guanajuato.27Interview, 17 July 2004, Acatlan de Perez Figueroa, Oaxaca.28In one municipality, the number of contractors who were eligible for municipal projects was enlarged with the hope that this would limitcorruption in public works departments (interview, 23 August 2004, San Fernando, Tamaulipas). Elsewhere, councillors formed a procurementcommittee to oversee municipal purchases, and in another locality, a new government introduced competitive bidding for municipal purchases(interviews, 27 July 2004, Santa Cruz de Juventino Rosas; 30 June 2004, Abasolo, Guanajuato; 11 September 2005, Ticul, Yucata n).

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A few municipalities followed the advice of management specialists and introduced contracting or autonomous

units for administering services. In one municipality, the government contracted with a private firm to collect water

fees and property taxes; the collectors were students from a local technical institute and received a percentage of

what they were able to collect on their rounds; computerisation of records was expected to limit corruption.29 In

another state, administration of the annual municipal celebration was reorganised substantially by setting up an

autonomous agency to oversee the fiscal management of the festival. A major reason for doing so was to cut down

on the amount of corruption involved in providing permits and contracts for the annual events.

30

Professionalisation

Along with reorganisation, many municipal officials were outspoken about the need to hire professionals to

provide services and carry out routine business in the municipality. Regularly, they argued that past administrations

had relied on ignorant and uneducated mayors who appointed people with little education to carry out the

municipalitys responsiblities. Some local leaders argued that having professionals in office was a first for the

municipality in question. The replacement of poorly educated or corrupt or lazy officials with professional creden-

tials was considered an important adjunct to reorganisation if municipalities were to improve their performance.31

In one municipality very focused on improved performance, professional credentials were considered a sine qua

non for working in a management position in town hall. More generally, it was common for mayors, councilors and

departmental heads to insist that the comptroller be an accountant, that the director of public works be an architect

or an engineer, that lawyers staff specific offices, and so on. Even in the southern state of Oaxaca, far from theinfluence of the business-oriented PAN, a former municipal treasurer acknowledged that he was appointed because

the mayor believed that someone with private sector experience would be able to do a better job with public

finances than anyone else.32

The effect of greater professionalisation in many municipalities was to increase the flow of new ideas and

practices into town hall. Changing personnel in one municipality was credited with a four-fold increase in the

income from municipal services and a 40 percent improvement in fiscal accounts. 33 Some municipalities became

more aware of the benefits of planning for their future development, and strategic plans became a common

reference point for mayors, directors of public works, economic development managers, and others.34 At the

same time, however, professionalisation in most municipalities was undertaken through a simple process of

appointment. Only in a few cases were new job descriptions, qualification codes, and hiring processes made a

permanent part of municipal operations.

Training and technology

Closely aligned with bringing more professionals into public offices were activities aimed at up-grading the

performance of officials and offices. Municipal officials regularly reported that their initial introduction to their

jobs was through training courses on municipal regulations and scopes of authority. Newly elected or appointed

officials would then turn their attention to their own departments. A police commissioner, for example, discovered

on taking office that police officers had little or no training when they were hired and began to send his agents off to

state-level training courses.35 For departments like the police, where job turnover was often significant when a new

administration came into office, on-going training activities became the norm.36 In other departments, such as in

the treasury and the comptrollers office, training courses were a regular part of the activities undertaken by depart-

ment heads.

29Interviews, various dates, Progreso, Yucatan.30Interview, 19 June 2004, Escuinapa, Sinaloa.31Interview, 22 June 2004, Rosario, Sinaloa.32Interview, 22 July 2004, Acatlan de Perez Figueroa, Oaxaca.33Interview, 12 August 2004, San Luis de la Paz, Guanajuato.34Interviews, 30 July 2004, Santa Cruz de Juventino Rosas, Guanajuato; 23 July 2004, Progreso, Yucata n; 13 July 2004, Valladolid, Yucatan.35Interview, 15 June 2004, Abasolo, Guanajuato.36Interview, 21 June 2004, Coronango, Puebla; 27 June 2004, Aldama, Tamaulipas.




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Surprisingly, much of the training given to municipal officials was not technical, but oriented more towards

effective service provision, team building, and morale boosting. The municipal leadership in one site worked to

impress upon employees the need to be service-oriented and responsive to customer demand. In fact, the bulk of

the training received in that municipality had to do with time management, motivation, getting along with others,

working in teams, and leadership.37 Elsewhere, a department head argued that because most of the people working

in town hall were qualified for their jobs, training needed to focus on motivational and service-oriented courses. 38

In another municipality, a training course was concerned with how to shape empowered organisations.

39

Othersfocused on human resource management, leadership, and organisational change, at times complemented by the

introduction of new management techniques, such as total quality measurement.40

In addition to a multitude of training courses, computerisation was being widely adopted in the research

municipalities. Above all, tax and civil registry offices were transformed by the use of computers to manage

information and process documents and payments. In Oaxaca, a councillor spoke approvingly of the reduction

of processing time in the civil registry from at least two weeks to only one.41 During a research visit, two

officials in another site were busy monitoring international weather patterns on-line in order to provide information

to local farmers about arrival of rain and appropriate planting times.42 In one municipality, digitised aerial maps

provided a more accurate basis for property assessment; local farmers were given GPS devices to walk their land

and establish property lines.43 An official in another site explained how easy it was to pay taxes now that all

the relevant information was on a computer.44 In yet another municipality in the same state, the director of

public works expressed his satisfaction with having introduced computers to the project designers in hisdepartment, who formerly relied on pencils to design projects.45 Elsewhere, property tax receipts could be reported

daily.46

For a few municipalities, computerisation was a step along the way towards visions of e-government. One muni-

cipality won an award for on-line government, in which information was provided about how to obtain municipal

services and what kinds of documentation were required for them. Computers were available for citizen use not

only in town hall, but at community centres scattered around the municipalities. Virtual Fridays allowed citizens

to have direct Internet contact with municipal officials who would answer questions and respond to problems.47

Other municipalities also introduced computer centres for citizens to use.48 Some municipalities were paying their

employees directly through their bank accounts by using software provided by local banks.49 A municipal treasurer

spoke of the effort to become a paperless office with the use of technology.50

Standards for performance

The fourth way in which municipalities were working to improve their performance was through the introduction

of new systems for measuring performance. While only a few of the research municipalities were implementing

37The director of professional development there spoke of courses called Only for Champions and God Forgives, but Time Does Not(interviews, 22, 23 July 2004, Chignahuapan, Puebla).38Interview, 21 June 2004, Gonzalez, Tamaulipas.39Interview, 29 June 2004, Manuel Doblado, Guanajuato.40Interview, 29 July 2004, Santa Cruz de Juventino Rosas, Guanajuato.41Interview, 26 June 2004, Santo Domingo Tehuantepec, Oaxaca. Even here, however, municipalities differed in the extent to whichcomputerisation could decrease the time necessary to carry out municipal activities. In a municipality in Puebla, civil registry responses werereduced to one hour or less.4223 July 2004, Mocorito, Sinaloa.43Interview, 4 August 2004, Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas.44Interview, 16 July 2004, Tula, Tamaulipas.45Interview, 23 August 2004, San Fernando, Tamaulipas.46Interview, 27 June 2004, Escuinapa, Sinaloa.47Interviews, 13, 14 July 2004, Mocorito, Sinaloa.48Interview, 12 August 2004, Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas.49Interview, 22 June 2004, Valladolid, Yucatan50Interview, 6 August 2004, Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas.

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such systems, what they were doing was impressive. One municipal secretary explained that on taking office, the

administration had set out objectives and measures for a plan of workfor example, reducing petty crimes, better

management of the informal sector, and limiting clandestine business activities. Every departmental director was

expected to produce a plan; weekly meetings were called to evaluate how each was doing. In the same munici-

pality, citizen surveys measured results, which were then tabulated and presented to the directors of various depart-

ments for action.51 Surveys were also used internally in another municipality to assess the morale of public

workers.

52

Two municipalities adopted international standards to plan and implement quality management systems. When

appropriate processes were in place for measuring performance and customer needs and satisfaction, the munici-

pality would receive certification by the International Organisation for Standardisation.53 For one municipality,

this effort led to a new organigram, definition of responsibilities, elimination of duplication, and a new schedule

that made it possible to save electricity. In the second municipality, the system was first implemented in the police

department, before being expanded to the treasury, public works, and municipal services.54

Indeed, police commissioners were among those most concerned about performance measuring systems, and,

as one indicated, I was given the instruction to make sure the system worked.55 In the language of efficiency and

effectiveness, such officials spoke of developing measures of response time, the number of urgent calls, and the

number of arrests and fines that were made over the course of a day, week, or month. With better measures in place,

they stated, the municipality would be able to cross-reference crimes with other municipalities and with state and

federal agencies and would also be able to know which areas needed work and where there were success stories.56

Much ado about modernisation

The extent to which municipalities took up modernisation was often surprising. Even poorly performing and highly

politicised municipalities attempted to adopt new organisational forms, new procedures, and new technologies. Of

course, the sophistication of new initiatives ranged from very basic to quite complex, and there were clear differ-

ences among municipalities in terms of what they were taking on. Moreover, that change initiatives were under-

taken does not necessarily mean that change occurred. In a much-vaunted administrative reform in one

municipality, for example, a number of public officials and well-informed citizens claimed to know nothing about

it.57 Elsewhere, the mayor began as a firm supporter of change, but then withdrew his support, and change initia-

tives faltered.58 While many municipal officials spoke in glowing terms of the changes they had introduced, few

seemed concerned to assess their effectiveness.

Yet, whether they paid off or not in terms of improved performance, undertaking reorganisations, improvinghuman resources, introducing new technology and training, and at least discussing the importance of measuring

performance were very widely adopted in the research municipalities. Much ado about modernising town hall

how and why did these initiatives come about? Analysis of leadership preferences, electoral cycles and political

institutions indicate important responses to these questions.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

Across 30 town halls, there were significant similarities in terms of why and how capacity building initiatives came

about. Chignahuapan, a municipality of 50,000 people in the state of Puebla, offers a good example of the political

dynamics behind almost all of the change initiatives. The story of one administration in this municipality began in

51Interview, 27 July 2004, Santa Cruz de Juventino Rosas, Guanajuato.52Interview, 30 July Santa Cruz de Juventino Rosas, Guanajuato.53Interviews, 13 July 2004, Mocorito, Sinaloa; 30 July 2004, Santa Cruz de Juventino Rosas, Guanajuato.54Interview, 30 July 2004, Santa Cruz de Juventino Rosas, Guanajuato.55Interview, 15 June 2004, Abasolo, Guanajuato.56Interview, 13 July 2004, Valladolid, Yucatan.57Interviews, 22, 23, 28 June 2004, Rosario, Sinaloa.58Interview, 23 August 2004, San Fernando, Tamaulipas.




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1993, when a chapter of the Junior Chamber of Commerce was inaugurated. Soon, the organisation had a com-

mitted membership of local businesspeople and professionals, and it met regularly to explore topics related to lea-

dership, personal development, organisational management and communication. Over many years of common

experiences, members developed close ties and deep commitment to the ideals of the chamber.

In 2000, a member of this close-knit group sought to be nominated by the PRI as its candidate for mayor. This

was a logical step for any aspiring politician in Chignahuapan, given that the PRI had long held monopoly power

in local politics. But the chambers candidate did not win the party nomination. Nevertheless, soon after thisdisappointment, the local PAN organisation offered him the top position on its electoral list. Then, in a surprise

toppling of the old order in 2001, the PAN triumphed in the local elections; the PRI won only 20% of the seats on

the council.

The newly elected mayor selected five close associates from the Junior Chamber of Commerce for important

jobs in town hall and each of them also selected new appointees. The team quickly committed itself to bring a

different style to town hall. From the beginning of the administration, we decided that this would not be like

the previous administration.59 Instead, the team would work for a professional and service-oriented administra-

tion. It wanted the activities of town hall to be transparent and focused on results. 60 These officials felt under great

pressure to introduce change quickly.

Soon, a local government that was best described as mediocre began to change dramatically. Large signs

appeared outside departments within the building to inform citizens about where to go for specific services; a mis-

sion statement was placed at the entrance; suggestion boxes appeared in the marketplace and other locations whereresidents were likely to congregate; employees received extensive training about how to do their jobs better; coun-

cil meetings were opened up to the public; the town budget was made available to citizens so they could monitor

expenditures; garbage collection improved. Impressively, within 3 months of taking office, the civil registry was

computerised; to speed service, customers obtained a numbered ticket from a machine so they would be attended

in the order of their arrival; the number of the person currently being helped was displayed electronically. The

waiting period for obtaining documents from the registry declined from a week or more to as little as twenty min-

utes, depending on the number of people in line. The need to bribe officials to get service disappeared.

Chignahuapans experience, while more successful than many others in the extent and effectiveness of change,

demonstrates more generally how political contexts shape capacity building initiatives. First, it shows the impact of

democratisation on opportunities for the alternation of political elites. While in the past, governors had anointed

most PRI candidates for mayor the only candidates with any chance of winning elections competition for local

positions of leadership increased dramatically in the 1990s. In the research municipalities, it was common for thosepassed over by the PRI to shop for other parties to champion their candidacies; parties increasingly shopped for

candidates they thought would be appealing to voters.

More competition opened up opportunities for those with good governance concerns to compete for election,

not surprising given an extensive backlog of public disgust about the corruption, cronyism and injustice of the long

period of PRI hegemony. Even where the PRI continued to win elections, its margins of victory declined consider-

ably. Thus, in the research municipalities, some candidates backed by the PRI also emerged as champions of good

governance; they were increasingly concerned that the party might lose the next election. Candidates from all par-

ties believed that better governance would enhance the opportunities for their parties to win subsequent elections

or for their local achievements to carry them to higher-level political office.

Second, in Chignahuapanas elsewheremunicipalities attempted to modernise when politicians were ready

to promote it. How specific officials became ready was a result of many different factors influencing their priori-

tiessome had previous experience that taught them to value administrative and managerial efficiency and effec-tiveness; some were influenced by their belief systems; some learned serendipitously of new ideas and decided to

pursue them; some gained insight from courses and workshops; some came by it casually, in conversations with

59Interview, 23 July 2004, Chignahuapan, Puebla.60Interview, 26 July 2004, Chignahuapan, Puebla.

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colleagues from other municipalities or state level officials; some searched for it on the Internet. In addition to

electoral concerns, then, local leaders had personal preferences that affected whether change would be sought

or not. Capacity building activities thus emerged as tools of effective leadership, not as independent sources of

change.

Third, as in Chignahuapan, almost all capacity building initiatives were introduced within the first months of

taking office, suggesting the importance of electoral calendars to the activities of municipal officials. And, because

of constraints on immediate re-election, the time frame for achieving results was shortened to 3 yearsperfor-mance-oriented leaders needed to work fast in Chignahuapan and elsewhere if they expected to make any impact.

To add to the pressure, they believed that the longer new initiatives were in place, the more likely it was that they

would be sustained beyond a three-year incumbency. The first few months of a new administration was therefore a

critical time for the reform-oriented to act.

Fourth, political institutions were important in providing the scope necessary for introducing change. Similar to

a large number of other countries, Mexico has no civil service or administrative cadre that staffs town halls inde-

pendently from electoral cycles. Jobs in local governments are important to party support building and extensive

rotation of personnel after elections is universal. When the reform-oriented mayor of Chignahuapan assumed

office, then, there were few formal limits on his ability to appoint officialsdepartment heads, the chief admin-

istrative officer, the secretary of the government, sub-departmental officials, secretaries, office workers, labourers

and others.61 This allowed him considerable opportunity to bring people who shared his perspective into positions

of authority; in turn, his appointees had the capacity to select their own teams. More generally, then, new admin-istrations meant significant changes in personnel, which in turn could bring like-minded teams to important posi-

tions of authority and also help overcome the resistance to change that is characteristic of entrenched

bureaucracies.

A final generalisation that can be drawn from Chignahuapan and 29 other municipalities in this study is a more

sobering one. Possibilities for capacity development were built upon an institutional base that rewarded change

initiatives but worked against their institutionalisation. Thus, the larger problem many of the initiatives faced was

that of their sustainability. In this regard, the very flexibility that allowed for significant change the non-program-

matic nature of political parties, the impact of the personal preferences of those in leadership positions, the exten-

sive opportunity to appoint officials and initiate new activitiesraised barriers to its institutionalization over time.

Administrations with new priorities and new appointments in town hall would come and go, and what they left

behind could not always be ensured, even if it provided a reasonable solution to a problem.

Too often in the research sites, new capacity initiatives were introduced informally, they were based primarilyon exhortation or the commitment of a person or small group, it was difficult to hold officials accountable for their

correct functioning, a culture of service was limited by personnel changes every 3 years, and citizens did not have

sufficient information to be able to insist on their rights to appropriate service. Moreover, modernisation initiatives

in several municipalities were derailed by partisan politics, by informal institutions and norms, and by proponents

who lost sight of capacity building as a priority. For those who propose capacity building as a tonic to poorly per-

forming organisations, then, the research municipalities indicate the importance of political contexts to the intro-

ductionand demiseof reform initiatives.

CONCLUSIONS: THE POLITICS OF CAPACITY

Capacity building initiatives were ubiquitous in many of Mexicos municipalities in 2004. The actions undertaken

spanned organisational and personnel changes, technical and managerial up-grading, the introduction of more cli-ent friendly modes of operation, and new incentives for officials. Some of these initiatives were more successfully

implemented than others, and new policies, programmes, projects and procedures did not necessarily pay off in

61On average, about a third of employees in the research municipalities were unionised, meaning that they did not lose their jobs whenadministrations changed. Twelve municipalities, however, had no unionised workers at all. Unionised workers were found at the lower level oforganisational hierarchies, among custodians, town maintenance workers, secretaries, and clerks.




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terms of improved performance. Yet in some cases they did, and Mexican citizens reaped the benefit of more effi-

cient, effective and responsive town hallsat least for a while.

Capacity building initiatives were undertaken by local officials who represented a range of political parties;

contrary to much popular belief, at least in the research municipalities, the business-oriented PAN did not have

a monopoly on concern about good governance. Yet, it was clear that, although not necessarily partisan, capacity

building initiatives were political in the sense that they responded to the preferences of political leaders, they were

dependent on electoral cycles for their timing and rationale, and they were facilitated and constrained by politicalrules of the game about the scope of action available to municipal leaders.

In Mexico, and in many other countries, local political leaders have a relatively free hand to set directions for

policy and performance in town hall. The newness of decentralisation in many countries, as well as the incomplete

institutionalisation of local governments, means that there is considerable room to manoeuvre for reform-

orientedand also venalpublic officials who assume leadership roles at that level. Even in cases in which state

and federal governments set standards and timetables for Mexican municipalities, for example, some mayors

decided to comply, while others ignored such mandates.62 Importantly, the research municipalities produced little

evidence of local government being reorganised, professionalised, computerised, or monitored by citizen groups

demanding such changes. This suggests that civil society has not yet been effective in organising around local

demands for good governance.63

There are, then, constraints on the ability of capacity builders at other levels of government to mandate change.

In Mexico, at least, the initiative to improve the capacity of local governments was universally a demand-drivenphenomenon, set in motion by municipal leaders as part of taking charge of municipal government. The initial

months of an administration were critical ones for decisions and actions to up-grade the functioning of town hall.

New ideas arrived with new administrations and were facilitated by long traditions of executive prerogative. In

such a context, modernisation initiatives supported by those outside of the local government are likely to be suc-

cessful only when they meet committed champions within those governments.

The political context in Mexico was a two-edged sword in promoting change in how local governments per-

formed. On the one hand, it encouraged change, providing incentives to incumbents to introduce it and reducing

the incidence of bureaucratic inertia and resistance at the same time. Thus, the political context meant significant

room to manoeuvre. On the other hand, it also set constraints on the ability to institutionalise performance

improvements in local government, thus undermining the relevance of reforms for addressing problems over

the longer term.

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Beer CC. 2003. Electoral Competition and Institutional Change in Mexico. University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN.Burki SJ, Guillermo P, Dillinger W. 1999. Beyond the Center: Decentralising the State. The World Bank: Washington, DC.Cabrero Mendoza E. 2003. Politicas de modernizacion de la adminsitracion municipal. Viejas y nuevas estrategias para transformar a los gobier-

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Foster GM. 1967. Tzintzuntzan: Mexican Peasants in a Changing World. Little, Brown: Boston, MA.Garca del Castillo R. 2003. La poltica de servicios municipales en Mexico: Casos y tendencies recientes. In Polticas publicas municipales:

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Capacity building with a political twist Grindle

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