Cannabis condemned: the proscription of Indian hemp_Kendell

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ADDICTION HISTORY

2003 Society for the Study of Addiction to Alcohol and Other Drugs Addiction, 98, 143151

EDITORIAL NOTE

Blackwell Science, LtdOxford, UKADDAddiction0965-2140 2002 Society for the Study of Addiction to Alcohol and Other Drugs982Original Article

It is with the greatest sadness that I find myself at a late

proof stage having to report that Robert Kendell died sud-

denly on 19 December 2002. He had recently been

elected President of the Society for the Study of Addiction.

To his wife and family go our profound sympathies. A full

obituary notice will be published in a later issue of this

journal.

GRIFFITH EDWARDS

Editor-in-Chief97Original ArticleCannabis condemnedRobert Kendell

Correspondence to:

R. E. Kendell

3 West Castle Road

Edinburgh EH10 5AT

UK

Tel.: +44 131 229 4966

Fax: +44 131 228 7547

Submitted 7 August 2001;

initial review completed 5 November 2001;

final version accepted 24 July 2002

Cannabis condemned: the proscription of Indian hemp

Robert Kendell

University of Edinburgh Department of Psychiatry, Royal Edinburgh Hospital, Edinburgh, UK

ABSTRACT

Aims To find out how cannabis came to be subject to international narcotics

legislation.

Method Examination of the records of the 1925 League of Nations Second

Opium Conference, of the 1894 Report of the Indian Hemp Drugs Commissionand other contemporary documents.

Findings Although cannabis (Indian hemp) was not on the agenda of the Sec-

ond Opium Conference, a claim by the Egyptian delegation that it was as dan-

gerous as opium, and should therefore be subject to the same international

controls, was supported by several other countries. No formal evidence was pro-

duced and conference delegates had not been briefed about cannabis. The only

objections came from Britain and other colonial powers. They did not dispute

the claim that cannabis was comparable to opium, but they did want to avoid a

commitment to eliminating its use in their Asian and African territories.

KEYWORDS Cannabis, international controls, League of Nations.

INTRODUCTION

Cannabis is regarded formally by the United Nations and

its agencies as a dangerous and addictive narcotic, and is

subject to the same stringent international controls as

opiates and cocaine, despite the fact that its pharmaco-

logical effects are different from and its objective dangers

much less than those of heroin and cocaine. This was not

always so, however. The decision to subject cannabis, or

Indian hemp as it was then known, to international leg-

islation was taken, unexpectedly, in 1925 at a conference

in Geneva arranged by the League of Nations to

strengthen the controls on opium and cocaine which had

been negotiated at The Hague in 1912. In view of the cur-

rent widespread use of cannabis, and increasing doubts

about the wisdom of subjecting it to the same draconian


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144 Robert Kendell


legislation as heroin, it is interesting to look back to see

how cannabis achieved its status as a dangerous narcotic,

and what the arguments were that persuaded represen-

tatives of the worlds most powerful countries that they

should do everything in their power to restrict the use of

cannabis to a few limited medical and scientific purposes.

THE SECOND OPIUM CONFERENCE

OF 192425

The conference in question, known as the Second Opium

Conference, opened in Geneva on 17 November 1924. It

had this title because the Assembly of the League of

Nations, under whose auspices it was held, had decided

the previous year to mount two simultaneous and inde-

pendent conferences, the first being concerned solely

with the suppression and eventual elimination of traffic

in prepared opium in the Far East, much of which wasthen governed by European powers. Forty-one nations

were represented at this Second Conference, and because

it was suspected that there might be serious differences of

opinion between Britain and the other European colonial

powers and the United States of America, several were

represented by political or diplomatic heavyweights. The

United States was represented by The Hon. Stephen Por-

ter, the long-serving Chairman of the Committee on For-

eign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and Bishop

Charles Brent, who had presided previously over both the

original Shanghai Commission of 1909 and the 1912

International Conference at The Hague. The BritishEmpire was represented by Sir Malcolm Delevingne KCB,

a senior Home Office official, and eventually by the Mar-

quis of Salisbury (a member of Stanley Baldwins Cabinet

and soon to become Conservative leader in the House of

Lords) as well. Australia, Canada and India were repre-

sented separately, the latter by British members of the

Indian Civil Service.

A description of these key figures by a contemporary

American historian (McAllister 2000) is invaluable to an

understanding of the outcome of the conference. McAl-

lister describes Stephen Porter as a bombastic man who

had acquired the status of czar over American drug pol-icy, behaved in a manner appropriate to the appellation

and was regarded even by his own government as a loose

cannon. Bishop Brent, a man of evangelical fervour and

righteousness, took an extreme prohibitionist position

and regarded any non-medical use of opium as immoral.

Sir Malcolm Delevingne, although intelligent and proba-

bly better informed than anyone else about drug issues

world-wide, was a cantankerous little man whose sharp-

ness of tongue often caused difficulties in face to face

negotiations. There were also serious, unresolved differ-

ences between the British and Indian delegations. Delev-

ingne himself almost certainly favoured strict controls, at

least on opium, but Indias British administrators were

determined to resist any intrusions on their authority

which might have undesirable political or financial con-

sequences, and because the Labour Government of Ram-

say MacDonald had fallen unexpectedly in October 1924,

the new Conservative administration had not had time to

resolve these differences and agree a coherent policy in

the few weeks before the Conference started. The fact that

Sun Yat Sens Chinese government was no longer in con-

trol of several of its provinces and was visibly tottering,

was a further unspoken influence, particularly on the

outcome of the First Conference.

The agenda of the Second Conference was deceptively

simple: Consideration of the measures which can be

taken to carry out the Opium Convention of 1912 (the

Hague Convention, whose protocol had by then been

signed by some 40 nations) (League of Nations 1925).

This was to be achieved by limitation of the amounts ofmorphine, heroin or cocaine to be manufactured; limita-

tion of the amounts of raw opium and coca leaf to be

imported for that and other medicinal and scientific pur-

poses; and limitation of the production of raw opium and

coca leaf to the amount required for such medicinal and

scientific purposes. Although this agenda was adopted

without dissent Mr Porter gave notice that, if the First

Conference failedas it didto agree satisfactory mea-

sures for suppressing the traffic in prepared opium in the

Far East, the United States reserved the right to move an

amendment.

Hashish (which was referred to in all formal docu-ments as Indian Hemp rather than cannabis) was first

mentioned at the 5th meeting of the conference on 20

November. The Egyptian delegate, Dr Mohamed Abdel

Salam El Guindy, a physician and Secretary of the Royal

Egyptian Legation at Paris and Brussels, described it as at

least as harmful as opium, if not more so (vol. 1, p. 37)

and asked for it to be included in the list of narcotics the

use of which is to be regulated by this conference. He

repeated his request at the 7th meeting two days later and

was supported by the Greek and Turkish delegates, but Sir

Malcolm Delevingne expressed doubts about the compe-

tence of the conference to consider a substance whichwas not on its agenda and suggested that it might be bet-

ter for hashish to be discussed in Committee, if at all (vol.

1, p. 54).

Although it was undoubtedly true that hashish was

not on the conference agenda, and as a result few if any

delegates would have been briefed on the subject, Dr El

Guindys proposal was not entirely out of the blue. Italy,

motivated by hashish smuggling in its north African col-

onies, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, had raised the issue of

international controls during the preparations for the

Hague Conference in 1911. Indeed, that Conference had


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Cannabis condemned 145


actually adopted a resolution on hashish, namely that

The Conference considers it desirable to study the ques-

tion of Indian hemp from the statistical and scientific

point of view, with the object of regulating its abuses,

should the necessity thereof be felt, by international leg-

islation or by an international agreement (Bruun, Pan &

Rexed 1975, p. 182). In 1923 the South African govern-

ment (which was not represented at the 1924 Opium

Conferences) had suggested to the League of Nations that

Indian hemp should be regarded as a habit-forming drug

and brought within the scope of the Hague Convention.

The suggestion had been referred to the Leagues Advi-

sory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Danger-

ous Drugs, which had recommended 3 months before the

start of the Second Opium Conference that in the first

instance, the Governments should be invited to furnish to

the League information as to the production and use of,

and traffic in, this substance in their territories, and that

the issue should be considered further at the 1925 meet-ing of the Advisory Committee in the light of this infor-

mation (League of Nations 192325).

In the event, Dr El Guindy was allowed to present the

Egyptian governments case at the 16th meeting of the

Opium Conference on 13 December. He described hash-

ish as a problem of capital importance for a large number

of Eastern peoples (vol. 1, p. 132). He conceded that

taken occasionally and in small doses, hashish perhaps

does not offer much danger, but stressed that there is

always the risk that once a person begins to take it, he will

continue. He acquires the habit and becomes addicted to

the drug, and, once this has happened, it is very difficultto escape. He then described the manifestations of both

acute and chronic hashishism. The former, he said, con-

sists of a state of inebriation or delirium. . . which takes a

violent form in a person of violent character. The latter

is extremely serious, since hashish is a toxic substance, a

poison against which no effective antidote is known.

Indeed, intellectual faculties gradually weaken and the

whole organism decays. The addict very frequently

becomes neurasthenic and, eventually, insane. He then

claimed that the proportion of cases of insanity caused by

the use of hashish varies from 30 to 60% of the total num-

ber of cases occurring in Egypt. He also described themeasures already taken by his government to combat the

abuse of hashisha ban on cultivation dating back to

1884, a ban on imports, and closure of the mashhashas

(hashish smoking cafs). At the same time he conceded

that, despite these strict controls, over 5.5 million kg

(over 5400 tons) of hashish had been seized by the Egyp-

tian Customs and Coastguards in 1924 alone, in addition

to an unknown but certainly. . . greater quantity

impounded by the police. Finally, Dr El Guindy pleaded

that hashish should be added to the list of narcotic drugs

with which the conference should deal and insisted that

he was voicing the views of the entire Egyptian people,

from His Majesty King Fuad . . . down to the humblest

fellah of the Nile valley (vol. 1, p. 135), apparently obliv-

ious to the difficulty of reconciling this claim with the vast

quantities currently being confiscated by the Egyptian

authorities.

No one questioned El Guindys chilling description of

the dangers of hashish and he was supported strongly

by both the Chinese and American delegates (Mr Sze,

vice president of the conference, and Stephen Porter),

although the former had the grace to admit that he knew

next to nothing about the subject and the latter that his

knowledge was quite limited. The delegates from India

(Mr Clayton), the British Empire (Sir Malcolm Delev-

ingne) and France (M. Gaston Bourgois) all expressed

sympathy for Dr El Guindy but then argued that, as his

government had not given prior notice to the secretariat,

the Conference was not competent to apply the provisions

of the Hague Convention to hashish and that the onlypossible course was to refer the issue to a subcommittee

for further study. Eventually, after much lobbying, a

unanimous but ambiguous decision was taken to refer

the matter to Sub-committee F (vol. 1, p. 138).

This subcommittee existed to deal with a variety of sci-

entific and technical issues and all its members, apart

from the British representative (Mr Kirwan, a Home Office

official), were physicians, pharmacists or chemists. On

learning of its new and unexpected task it decided to set

up a subsub-committee chaired by the French represen-

tative, Professor Perrot (Vice-dean of the Faculty of Phar-

macy in Paris), on which Britain was represented byanother Home Office official. When Professor Perrots

group met, the Greek representative, Professor Emman-

uel, described the problem of hashish as being as grave as

that of opium and the Brazilian representative, Dr Per-

nambuco, described it as more dangerous than opium

(vol. 2, p. 297). Again, no one challenged these state-

ments, possibly because both were speaking on behalf of

countries where hashish use was endemic (in Brazil

under the name of diamba). As a result of these and Dr El

Guindys representations, the groups report concluded

that abuse of hashish and charas (the resin) and the smok-

ing of the drug are specially dangerous, since theirimmoderate use due to addiction leads to troubles at least

as serious as those caused . . . by the use of opium and its

derivatives (vol. 2, p. 318). The group was very con-

cerned, however, to produce a definition of Indian hemp

which would not interfere with the production of hemp

from the cannabis plant for rope and matting, for the

Indian and British delegates emphasized that this was a

vital industry for India, involving exports of some

100 000 tons (101 600 metric tonnes) of hemp fibre a

year. Eventually, after much discussion with those two

delegates, it was agreed to define Indian hemp as the


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146 Robert Kendell


flowering or fecundated tops of the female plant of Can-

nabis sativa L, from which the resin has not been

extracted, under whatever denomination it is employed

in commerce (vol. 2, p. 318).

The conclusions of Professor Perrots subsub-commit-

tee were emphatic. The use of Indian hemp and the prep-

arations derived therefrom may only be authorised for

medical and scientific purposes. The raw resin (charas),

however, which is extracted from the female tops of the

Cannabis sativa, L., together with the various preparations

(hashish, chira, esrar, diamba, & c.) of which it forms the

basis, not being at present utilised for medical purposes

and only being susceptible of utilisation for harmful

purposes . . . may not be produced, sold, traded in, & c,

under any circumstances whatever (vol. 2, p. 318). The

report was adopted by Sub-committee F without formal

dissent, although the delegates of the British Empire,

India and the Netherlands abstained and Mr Kirwan

stated that he was unable, without giving the mattermore careful consideration, to accept the conclusions.

The Indian delegate (Mr Walton) also submitted a formal

Note stating that, although The Government of India are

in full sympathy with the proposal to bring the interna-

tional traffic in the drug Indian hemp under interna-

tional control, and could undertake to restrict exports to

cases covered by import certificates issued by the Govern-

ments of the importing countries, there were various

serious difficulties of an administrative order in confining

the use of hemp drugs to medical and scientific purposes

(vol. 2, p. 319). Domestic consumption and its regulation

were matters for Provincial Governments and PrincelyStates which there had been no time to consult, and

there are social and religious customs which naturally

have to be considered. The French delegate, M. Bourgois,

had previously expressed similar reservations in more

colourful language when referring to the Congo,

where there were several tribes of savages and even can-

nibals among whom the habit is very prevalent (vol, 1,

p. 137).

Sub-committee Fs report on Indian hemp was consid-

ered by the plenary Conference at its 31st meeting on

February 12,1925. It was presented by Professor Perrot

and accepted with little discussion, but it was pointed outthat it was a purely technical document and that no text

providing for the application of these principles has yet

been prepared for inclusion in the International Conven-

tion (vol. 1, p. 262). Accordingly, another ad hoc subcom-

mittee was hastily convened, again chaired by Professor

Perrot and with representatives from Egypt, Turkey, the

British Empire, India and three other countries. This

subcommittees conclusions, effectively the section of the

Draft Convention relating to Indian hemp, were presented

to the plenary Conference within 48 hours for a first

reading, and again 4 days later on February 18 for a final

reading. Apart from some discussion of the definitions of

Indian hemp and the resin, and the distinction between

the two, they were adopted unchanged. As a result,

Indian hemp, as defined above, and the resin prepared

from it, were to be subject to the same restrictions on

international trade, and the same surveillance by the

newly established Permanent Central Board, as opium

and cocaine and their derivatives. Galenical preparations

(extract and tincture) of Indian hemp were also to be sub-

ject to the same internal controls as manufactured drugs

derived from opium and cocaine. In addition, there was to

be a ban on the export of all preparations of Indian hemp

or its resin to countries prohibiting their use, and on

exporting to any country without the production of a

special import certificate testifying that the substance is

required exclusively for medical or scientific purposes

(vol. 1, p. 352).

The following day, on 19 February 1925, the Second

Opium Conference finally closed, after 38 plenary ses-sions and over 100 committee and subcommittee meet-

ings. In his closing speech the President, M. Herluf Zahle,

described the conference, without exaggeration, as the

most difficult in the history of the League of Nations and

also the longest. After a surprisingly frank account of the

disagreements between the United States and the Euro-

pean colonial powers he insisted that this Conference has

struck a most powerful blow at the drug evil . . . we have

started on a road which eventually can lead only to

success . . . the Conference has greatly strengthened the

Hague Convention of 13 years ago (vol. 1, p. 361). Refer-

ring to the decision to establish a Permanent CentralBoard, he predicted that The first step has been taken

towards the constitution of that international control

which will eventually destroy the evil aspects of the drug

traffic. [Professor Perrot expressed similarly optimistic

views a few months later (Perrot 1925), and although

others held less sanguine views, even doubting whether

anything worthwhile had been achieved, this was not the

judgement of Bruun et al. (1975, pp. 276277) 50 years

on.] Amid the closing courtesies and felicitations of the

Conference Dr El Guindy could still think only of hashish,

rising to his feet to argue that the question is not entirely

settled . . . I entreat you, gentlemen, to assist me . . . by vot-ing a recommendation for submission to the Council of

the League of Nations . . . with a view to the complete sup-

pression of the use of Indian hemp as a narcotic, and even

as a medicine (vol. 1, p. 364).

The Conference had been open to journalists from the

beginning and their attention, like that of most delegates,

had been focused throughout on the looming disagree-

ments between the United States and the colonial powers

of Western Europe. Having declined to join the League of

Nations, the United States was not well placed either to

understand its procedures or to influence its decisions


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and, whether or not that was the intention, the Leagues

decision (taken at Britains instigation) to hold two simul-

taneous Opium Conferences, with no provision for joint

discussion or cross-reporting, effectively excluded the

American delegates from discussing or even commenting

upon the ineffective attempts of the First Conference to

agree on a timetable for suppressing the smoking of

opium in the Far East. America, supported strongly by

China, wanted the colonial powers to be committed firmly

to eliminating the use of opium in their Asian territories

within 15 years, as the Hague Convention had envisaged.

Britain, France and the Netherlands agreed that this goal

was highly desirable, but they insisted that it was impos-

sible to achieve while smugglingmainly but not exclu-

sively from rebellious Chinese provinces where opium

production was estimated to have risen to over 15 million

kg a year (Perrot 1925)was still rife. They maintained

therefore that the 15-year countdown could not start

until the smuggling had been brought under control. TheMarquis of Salisbury, who was not conspicuously well

informed on the issue, even argued that opium smoking

has nothing whatever to do with the question of drug-

addiction (vol. 1, p. 149). America regarded the elimina-

tion of opium smoking as a moral imperative and was also

deeply suspicious of the motives of the Colonial Powers,

particularly Britain. Harsh words were exchanged

beneath a veneer of diplomacy, and Bishop Brent

observed that he feared that support would be given to

the accusation that Western nations with possessions in

the Far East were indifferent to the welfare of the inhab-

itants of those possessions, and were content to have onelaw for the protection of their home population and

another for the exploitation of dependent races (British

Medical Journal Editorial 1925). Indeed, in the Appeal to

my Colleagues which he circulated he even asserted that

Christ and His religion are brought under reproach and

put to open shame (Willoughby 1925).

Despite an impromptu Christmas recess to allow tem-

pers to cool and delegates to consult their governments,

all attempts to achieve a compromise foundered and on 6

February 1925 the American delegation withdrew from

the Conference, as it had been committed to doing if it

failed to achieve its objectives by a rather ill-judged Con-gressional resolution the previous May. The next day the

Chinese delegation also withdrew. This confrontation and

its dramatic dnouement dominated most contemporary

accounts of the Conference. [Willoughby (1925) gives a

detailed account from the American perspective.] As a

result, the decision to treat Indian hemp with the same

severity as opium and cocaine received little attention, at

least in Western Europe and North America. Perhaps

because drug abuse was then regarded mainly as a polit-

ical or forensic rather than a medical problem, few med-

ical, psychiatric or even public health journals made any

mention of the conference. There were editorials in the

British Medical Journal (Editorial 1925) and the Lancet

(Editorial 1925) but only the latter made even a passing

reference to the inclusion of Indian hemp.

COMMENTARY

The role of the Egyptian government and its senior dele-

gate, Dr El Guindy, was clearly crucial. Without the

Egyptian initiative and Dr El Guindys single-minded

determination, Indian hemp would never have been

brought under the controls of the 1925 Convention. In

his original speech to the conference Dr El Guindy gave

three main reasons for regarding hashish as a dangerous

narcoticthat intoxication with hashish takes a violent

form in persons of violent character (although he admit-

ted that in persons of a cheerful disposition intoxication

merely produced a kind of hilarious and noisy delirium);that it was highly addictive (there is always the risk that

once a person begins to take it, he will continue. He . . .

becomes addicted to the drug, and, once this has hap-

pened, it is very difficult to escape); and that it was a

potent cause not only of intellectual and physical decline

but of insanity. Indeed, he claimed that it was responsible

for 3060% of all cases of insanity in Egypt (vol. 1, pp.

133134).

At the time none of these claims was contested, but

none of them would now be accepted without serious

qualification. Police experience in the contemporary

western world, as in 19th century India, suggestsstrongly that cannabis is much less likely to be associated

with violence than alcohol (Goldstein 1997). There is

also a consensus of expert opinion that the health and

psychological hazards of cannabis are almost certainly

less serious than those, not only of opiates and cocaine,

but of the legal drugs alcohol and tobacco as well. Recent

reviews commissioned by the Australian (Hall, Solowij &

Lemon 1994), American (Institute of Medicine 1999)

and British (Johns 2001) governments have all come to

broadly the same conclusions. Although dependence on

cannabis undoubtedly occurs, and is accompanied by a

well-defined but mild withdrawal syndrome, it developsmainly in people who have been heavy users for several

years and the risk is considerably less than that associated

with tobacco or heroin. Other adverse effects are modest

and except for the harms associated with smoking . . .

within the range of effects tolerated for other medica-

tions (Institute of Medicine 1999); and although can-

nabis certainly produces short-lasting psychotic states,

and may be responsible for an increase in the frequency

and severity of psychotic relapses in people already suf-

fering from schizophrenia, it is very doubtful whether it

ever leads on its own to a state of chronic psychosis.


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148 Robert Kendell


Dr El Guindy also claimed that hashish was at least as

harmful as opium, if not more so, and again no one chal-

lenged this statement. Indeed, he was supported in this

view by the Greek and Brazilian delegates, and as a result

the statement that the abuse of these preparations . . .

leads to troubles at least as serious as those caused. . . by

the use of opium and its derivatives appeared in the for-

mal report from Sub-committee F to the Conference (vol.

2, p. 318). Although this judgement may now seem ill-

informed, it is understandable in the light of the circum-

stances of the time. Few if any of the conference delegates

had been briefed about Indian hemp beforehand because

it had not been on the agenda, and there was a superficial

plausibility to the argument. Both opium and hashish

were mysterious Eastern drugs, used mainly by the illit-

erate poor in distant Oriental countries. Both were gener-

ally smoked, and both were said to lead to mental, moral

and physical decline. On moral grounds the case seemed

clear enough, and it can safely be assumed that none ofthe delegates foresaw the day when their own grandchil-

dren would be nonchalantly smoking cannabis in their

own cities. As a result, the only objections came from

the European Colonial Powers and India. They foresaw

potentially serious problems in their dependent territories

if they were forced to ban long-established customs which

were not only a source of pleasure but in some cases

imbued with cultural and religious significance as well.

They therefore tried repeatedly to prevent hashish getting

onto the agenda, or to divert the issue into a subcommit-

tee from which it would not emerge. At no stage, however,

did they argue that its dangers were being exaggerated.The Western powers had a further reason for agreeing

to the pleas of the Egyptian and Turkish delegates. Turkey

and other Eastern nations were being required by the rich

countries of the West to stop growing opium poppies,

largely for the sake of others, at a considerable economic

cost both to their governments and their farmers. Ban-

ning hashish, which would please the Turkish govern-

ment, would therefore be a quid pro quo and Stephen

Porter was quick to see the potential benefits. We are ask-

ing them (the Egyptian and Turkish people) he said in

response to Dr El Guindys speech to help us to destroy

the vice of opium, coca leaves and their derivatives, and Ibelieve this is a good time to practice a little reciprocity . . .

many countries of the world have their own problems; by

helping each other we can make the world much happier

and much better (vol. 1, p. 135).

Although both had important allies, the debates over

hashish in the conference essentially represented a con-

flict of interest between a newly independent Egypt, and

Britain and India. It may therefore be worthwhile to

explore in more detail their respective experiences of and

attitudes towards the drug.

EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES TO CANNABIS

Hashish (an Arabic word variously translated as grass,

fodder, the herb, or the weed) was introduced into Egypt

by the Arabs some time between the 9th and 11th centu-

ries AD, probably by Sufi mystics, and was used widely,

particularly by the rural poor, the fellahin, from then on.Repeated attempts were made to abolish its use as far

back as the 13th century, first by the governor of Cairo in

the closing years of the Ayyubid dynasty and then a gen-

eration later by Babar, the founder of the Mameluk

dynasty. In general, rulers with martial or economic

ambitions such as Babar, and later Napoleon, sought to

suppress its use, mainly because of its debilitating effects

on their armies or their commerce, while those who were

content to enjoy the pleasures of power, such as the dis-

solute Circassian and Turkish rulers of the later Mameluk

and Ottoman eras, tolerated it. As a result the attitudes of

the ruling and educated classes towards hashish (andwine) were in a constant state of flux. It was both reviled

and praised by theologians, lawyers, poets and storytell-

ers alike, leading Nahas (1982, p. 824) to remark that

from the 13th to the 16th centuries the controversy over

cannabis amongst the Islamic intelligentsia dwarfs the

debate among American intellectuals of the last part of

the 20th century.

From the 13th to the 20th centuries, none of the

repeated attempts to control the use of hashish had suc-

ceeded for long, at least in the countryside. Even in the

1900s, despite strict controls, every one who wants to

smoke (hashish) seems to have no difficulty in obtainingit (Warnock 1903). Life was hard both for the urban poor

and thefellahin of the Nile valley and hashish was cheap

and easily grown or smuggled in from Greece or else-

where. It was also, at least in their eyes, tolerated by the

Koran. The intoxicating properties of the cannabis plant

had been unknown to the Arabs until the 9th century,

two centuries after the death of Mohammed. As a result,

the original Koranic ban on the use ofkhamrapplied only

to wine and other intoxicants and Moslem theologians

and lawyers argued for centuries about whether hashish

should be regarded as khamr. Although three of the four

schools of Islamic law decided eventually that it should,this failed to convince the Egyptian peasantry, and a frag-

ment of ancient verseDeclaring forbidden what is not

forbidden is forbiddenwas often quoted, particularly at

times when Egypts rulers were openly drinking alcohol

(Rosenthal 1971; Nahas 1982, 1985).

This long experience of hashish had, of course, given

the Egyptians ample opportunity to observe its effects. Its

medicinal properties were widely respected by their phy-

sicians and many writers and poets extolled its psycho-

logical effects. But many of Egypts rulers, from Babar to


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Napoleon, were alarmed by its ef fects on the uneducated

masses, sapping their energy, their abilities and their will-

ingness either to work or to fight. It was also believed

widely, even by its apologists, that long continued use

often resulted in insanity. Nor was this simply a lay belief.

Warnock, the British medical director of the Egyptian

Hospital for the Insane outside Cairo, had no doubt that

hashish was a potent cause of insanity, and several other

British physicians responsible for native populations in

India or the Caribbean shared this view (e.g. Barnes

1892; Ireland 1893). Although at least one of Warnocks

contemporaries disagreed with him, arguing that there

is no country in the world where lunacy is so rare as in

Egypt, and yet . . . the use of Indian hemp is almost uni-

versal (Pyramid 1893), and Warnock himself admitted

that the problems of both insanity and crime would prob-

ably be worse if hashish were to be replaced by alcohol

(Warnock 1903), his opinion was taken seriously by

Kraepelin, then the most eminent psychiatrist in theworld. Indeed, Kraepelin had taken the trouble to visit

Warnock and to take a large lump of hashish back to

Heidelberg for research, and was only prevented from

returning to Cairo and visiting India to find out more

about hashish psychoses by the First World War

(Kraepelin 1987). The views expressed by Dr El Guindy

were therefore broadly consistent with contemporary

Egyptian beliefs, even though many of those beliefs had

been prone to change from generation to generation for

600 years. However, his dramatic claim that 3060% of

all cases of insanity in Egypt were attributable to hashish

was not supported by the statistical data published by hisown government. The annual report of the Abbasiya Hos-

pital the larger of the countrys two mental hospitals

for 192021 records 715 admissions, of which only 19

(2.7%) were attributed to hashish, considerably less than

the 48 attributed to alcohol; and even this modest num-

ber is qualified by the comment that many of the factors

mentioned in the preceding table are not, strictly speak-

ing, causes, but conditions associated with the mental

disease (Lunacy Division 1921).

Despite the firm international action promised by the

(1924) Conference, huge quantities of hashish continued

to enter Egypt, mainly from Syria and Lebanon (El Hadka1965). The country also found itself faced with an

unforeseen and much more dangerous epidemic of intra-

venous heroin abuse that by 1929 was estimated to

involve half a million of the countrys 14 million inhabit-

ants (Russell 1949). Although Russell, the commandant

of the Cairo police, eventually succeeded in eliminating

the heroin smuggling, this involved an unholy pact with

the drug trafficers, allowing them to continue to smuggle

hashish into Egypt in exchange for information about the

devious import pathways for heroin.

BRITISH AND INDIAN ATTITUDES TO

CANNABIS

In Britain, extract and tincture of cannabis had been

widely prescribed by physicians in the latter half of the

19th century. Indeed, the tincture was actually used as a

treatment for insanity (Clouston 1904). Although hash-ish had been smoked in the 1890s for its mind-expanding

effects by intellectuals and poets such as W. B. Yeats, its

use except as a medicine had always been rare and was

never perceived as a problem (Berridge & Edwards 1981).

The drug had, however, been used for centuries in several

parts of the British Empire, particularly in India where it

was widely used by both Hindus and Moslems, mainly as

ganja (prepared from the dried flowering tops of cultivated

female plants and usually smoked) or bhang (a drink pre-

pared from the dried leaves of the plant, male or female,

cultivated or uncultivated). In 1924, 5 years after the

Amritsar massacre and faced with an increasingly trou-blesome Congress Party, the Government of India would

have been very anxious to avoid any interference with

traditional cultural and religious mores that might cause

further social unrest. Indeed, it had been warned 40

years before that the use of bhang is considered essential

in some religious observances by a large section of the

community and that interference with the use of hemp

in connection with the customs and observances above

referred would be regarded by the consumers as an inter-

ference with long established usage and as an encroach-

ment upon their religious liberty (Indian Hemp Drugs

Commission 1894, vol. 1, p. 166).A generation before the (1924) Opium Conference the

Government of India had commissioned what was prob-

ably the most extensive and well-documented investiga-

tion of the effects of cannabis ever carried out, not

because of any concern or disturbances in India itself, but

in response to a question by the antidrug campaigner, W.

S. Caine, in the House of Commons in London. The Indian

Hemp Drugs Commission was appointed in 1893 and

published its report, in seven volumes, the following year.

It had seven members, three of whom were native non-

official gentlemen and one the professor of chemistry at

the Calcutta Medical College, and they travelled widelyand took evidence from over 1000 people, British and

Indian. The Commission considered the physical, mental

and moral effects of hemp drugs separately, and also dis-

tinguished between moderate and excessive use. They

concluded that moderate use had no significant ill ef fects

in any of these three spheres. Excessive use, on the other

hand, tends to weaken the constitution and to render the

consumer more susceptible to disease (particularly bron-

chitis). It also indicates and intensifies mental instability.

It tends to weaken the mind. It may even lead to insanity,


8/9

150 Robert Kendell


and it both indicates and intensifies moral weakness or

depravity (vol. 1, p. 263264).

The report emphasized that the moderate use of these

drugs is the rule, and that the excessive use is compara-

tively exceptional. It also emphasized that In respect to

his relations with society. . . even the excessive consumer

of hemp drugs is ordinarily inoffensive. His excesses may

indeed bring him to degraded poverty . . . but for all prac-

tical purposes it may be laid down that there is little or no

connection between the use of hemp drugs and crime

(vol. 1, p. 264).

The Commission was particularly keen to determine

whether hemp drugs caused insanity as this was an

ingrained popular belief in India as in Egypt, and they

heard much contradictory evidence on the subject. The

central problem was that, although a high proportion of

those admitted to mental hospitals were undoubtedly

hashish users, hashish was widely used by the Indian

populace, and there appeared to be nothing distinctiveabout the phenomena of hashish insanity. The door was

therefore wide open to thepost hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy

and, as Samuel Johnson had observed long before, It is

incident to physicians, I am afraid, to mistake subse-

quence for consequence (Johnson 1734). To compound

the problem, relatives or other informants were rarely

available for questioning because most cases of insanity

were brought to the asylum by the police on a magis-

trates order and, as the Commission observed in its

Report, The inquiry into the history of the case is not an

inquiry conducted by a professional man from the per-

sons likely to know most about the lunatic. The informa-tion consists often merely of the guesses of police officers

as to the history and the habits of a friendless and home-

less wanderer (vol. 1, p. 231). Moreover, as one of their

medical witnesses explained, the patients themselves

belong nearly always to the lower and grossly ignorant

classes, to whose minds the relations of cause and effect,

except in very ordinary affairs of life, are, more or less,

unknown (Walsh 1894).

The Commission examined the admission statistics of

all 24 mental hospitals in British India, but judged them

to be worthless because the attributions were usually

those made by police or magistrates before admission.They therefore asked the superintendents of the 24 hos-

pitals to examine all the cases attributed to hemp drugs

admitted in 1892. Two hundred and twenty-two of the

1344 patients studied (16.5%) were attributed to hemp

drugs by their physicians, but only 61 of these (4.5%)

were accepted as genuine by the Commission. On the

basis of this somewhat ambiguous evidence the Commis-

sion commented that with non-medical witnesses the

mere use of the drug along with the fact of insanity. . . has

as a rule been accepted as cause and effect, and that the

usual mode of differentiating between hemp drug insan-

ity and ordinary mania was in the highest degree uncer-

tain, and therefore fallacious. The Commission was also

convinced that there is no evidence of any brain lesions

being caused directly by hemp drugs. Even so, their final

conclusion was that admitting (as we must admit) that

hemp drugs as intoxicants cause more or less of cerebral

stimulation, it may be accepted as reasonably proved, in

the absence of evidence of other cause, that hemp drugs

do cause insanity (vol. 1, p. 250).

Having reached these conclusions about the harm

attributable to hemp drugs, the Commissions final deci-

sion was that total prohibition of the cultivation of the

hemp plant for narcotics, and of the manufacture, sale or

use of the drugs derived from it, is neither necessary nor

expedient. Instead, it recommended continuing the exist-

ing policy of control and restriction, aimed at suppress-

ing the excessive use and restraining the moderate use.

This was to be achieved by a combination of (a) adequate

taxation; (b) prohibiting cultivation, except underlicence, and centralising licensed cultivation; (c) limiting

the number of shops; and (d) limiting the extent of legal

possession (vol. 1, pp. 359361). All seven members of

the commission signed the report. However, two of the

three Indian members also submitted lengthy Notes of

Dissent (vol. 1, pp. 363477). Both regarded charas (a

potent preparation of cannabis resin mainly imported

from Yarkand in SW China) as very deleterious and

wanted it banned immediately. Both also wanted to see

ganga banned (and one of them referred disparagingly to

its users as bad characters, low class people and beg-

gars), although they recognized that this would have tobe achieved slowly and cautiously. Bhang, on the other

hand, they regarded as virtually harmless and they

deplored the proposal to tax it.

It is surprising that no mention was made of this com-

prehensive and authoritative report at any stage by either

the British or the Indian delegates to the Opium Confer-

ence. The latter at least must have been well aware of its

existence and had ample opportunity to get the key find-

ings and recommendations telegraphed to Geneva from

India. The report could have been used to rebut the claims

of the Egyptian and other delegates that Indian hemp was

a highly dangerous and addictive drug, but it was not,and it must be assumed that this was a deliberate deci-

sion. Perhaps Sir Malcolm Delevingne and his Indian Civil

Service colleagues hoped until a late stage that it would

be possible to divert Dr El Guignys proposals into a pro-

cedural cul de sac; perhaps they wanted to avoid offend-

ing a country that had until 2 years before been a British

Protectorate; perhaps they wanted to avoid laying Britain

open to the chargewhich would certainly have been

levelled by the American delegatesthat they were indif-

ferent to the welfare of the citizens of a country for which

they had been largely responsible for the previous 40


9/9



years. They might also have suspected that the Commis-

sions conclusions could have been discredited by the sim-

ilarly reassuring conclusions of the Royal Commission on

Opium (189495), by the dissenting views of two of its

Indian members, or simply by its 19th century prove-

nance. Only one thing is certain: that in 1925 an author-

itative international conference decided formally, without

any attempt to examine the relevant evidence, that

Indian hemp was as addictive and dangerous as opium,

and should be treated accordingly in international law,

when what was at the time the most thorough and best

documented investigation of its dangers had found these

to be rather modest.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Dr Nasser Loza for access to several Egyp-

tian documents.

REFERENCES

Main sources

(NB: All text references to individual volumes that are not

identified further are to one or other of these primary

sources.)

Indian Hemp Drugs Commission (1894) Report of the

Indian Hemp Drugs Commission.Simla, India: Govern-

ment Central Printing Office (Volumes IIII); Calcutta:

Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing

(Volumes IVVII).

League of Nations (1925) Records of the Second Opium

Conference, 2 vols. Geneva: League of Nations.

Further references

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Journal of Mental Science, 38, 120.

Berridge, V. & Edwards, G. (1981) Opium and the People: Opiate

Use in 19th Century England. London: Allen Lane.

Bruun, K., Pan, L. & Rexed, I. (1975) The Gentlemens Club: Inter-

national Control of Drugs and Alcohol. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.

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Editorial (1925) British Medical Journal, i, 83 and 226227.

Editorial (1925) Lancet, i, 878879; ii, 11351136.

El Hadka, A. A. (1965) Forty years of the campaign against nar-

cotic drugs in the United Arab Republic. Bulletin on Narcotics,

17, 112.

Goldstein, P. J. (1997) The relationship between drugs and

violence in the United States of America. In: United Nations

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Lunacy Division (1921) Twenty-sixth Annual Report on the Gov-

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McAllister, W. B. (2000) Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Cen-

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Medicine, 61, 428444.

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449453.

Pyramid (1893) Indian hemp as a cause of insanity. British

Medical Journal, ii, 710.

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Society. Leiden: E. J. Brill, p. 101.

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Russell, T. (1949) Egyptian Service 19021946. London: John

Murray.

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