Can There Be a Written Constitution

Can There Be a Written Constitution?

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OxfordScholarshipOnline

OxfordStudiesinPhilosophyofLaw:Volume1LeslieGreenandBrianLeiter

Printpublicationdate:2011PrintISBN-13:9780199606443PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:September2011DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606443.001.0001

CanThereBeaWrittenConstitution?

JohnGardner

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606443.003.0005

AbstractandKeywords

Theexistenceofunwrittenconstitutions,suchasthatoftheUK,strikessomeaspuzzling.Howevertheexistenceofunwrittenconstitutionsturnsouttobeeasiertoexplainthantheexistenceofwrittenconstitutions,suchasthatoftheUS.Thischapterexploressometrickyconceptualquestionsthrownupbywrittenconstitutions.Thebiggestoftheseis:Whatisaconstitution?Thischaptersuggests(a)thataconstitutionisnotonlyanimportantpartofthelawbutalsoasetofextra‐legalpoliticalconstraints;(b)thatthefactthataconstitutioniswrittenallows,andindeedrequires,thattheconstitutionalsohasalifeinthecaselawandcustomarylawofthesystem;(c)thatwhatH.L.A.Hartcalledtherulesofrecognitionofalegalsystemarenotbestregardedaspartofitsconstitution,atanyratewhentheconstitutioniswritten.Asthechaptergoesonthecriteriaforregardingcertainpropositionsoflawasbelongingtoconstitutionallaw(asopposedtoadministrativelaworotherpartsofpubliclaw)areprogressivelyrefined.ThereisalsodiscussionofsomeparticularrulesofconstitutionalamendmentthatapplyintheUKand


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theUS,whichshowtheallegeddifferencesbetweenthetwoconstitutionstobelessradicalthantheyaresometimesimaginedtobe.

Keywords:constitution,comparative,ruleofrecognition,H.L.A.Hart,amendment,delegation,interpretation

I.DoestheUnitedKingdomhaveaconstitution?Somepeopledoubtit.Butthereisnoroomfordoubt.Aconstitutionisaconceptualnecessityofeverylegalsystem.Ineverylegalsystemtherearerulesthatspecifythemajorinstitutionsandofficialsofgovernment,anddeterminewhichofthemistodowhat,andhowtheyaretointeract,andhowtheirmembershiporsuccessionistobedetermined,andsoforth.Withoutsomesuchrules,asH.L.A.HartexplainedinTheConceptofLaw,thereisnolegalsystem.1Theseruleswithoutwhichtherewouldbenolegalsystem(orsomeofthem,invariablyincombinationwithsomeotherrules)makeuptheconstitutionofthatsystem.SincetheUnitedKingdomundeniablyhassomelaw,andsincealllawisnecessarilythelawofoneoranotherlegalsystem,theUnitedKingdomnecessarilyhasatleastoneconstitution.

Isay‘atleast’becausetheUnitedKingdomhasthreedistinctmunicipallegalsystems(thelawofEnglandandWales,thelawofScotland,andthelawofNorthernIreland).Doesitcorrespondinglyhavethreeconstitutions?Andifithasthreedoesn'titinevitablyhavefour,forsurelytheremustalsobeanoverarchingconstitutionofthewholeunionthatdeterminestherelationsamongtheotherthree?Ordothethree(p.163) distinctlegalsystemssharejustoneconstitutionbetweenthem?Isthataconceptualpossibility?Canitbesquaredwiththepropercriteriaforindividuatinglegalsystems?Thesequestionsarevigorouslydebated,andnotonlybytheorists.2Someofthemarepoliticalhotpotatoes.Forpresentpurposes,however,Iwillignorethem.Attheriskofbeinghijackedfortheunionistcause,Iwillspeakbrazenlyof‘theUnitedKingdomconstitution’(or‘theUKconstitution’forshort).ForthequestionsIwanttotacklehereareunaffectedbythepossibilitythattheUKhasaclusterofinterrelatedconstitutions.Whetherthereisoneconstitutionorseveral,eachalikeexhibitsthefeaturethatcausespeopletodoubtwhethertheUKhasanyconstitutionatall.

Thefeaturethatprovokesthedoubts,notoriously,isthattheUKconstitutionisanunwrittenone.Whentheyaskwhattheconstitutionofsomecountryorstatehastosayonsomesubject,peoplenowadaystypicallyexpecttobedirectedtoacanonicalconstitutionalmaster‐textonthemodeloftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica(completewithitsamendments).Thusthepoliticalfuroreabouttheproposed‘ConstitutionforEurope’wasnotaboutwhethertheEuropeanUnionshouldhaveaconstitution—asitalreadyhasalegalsystem,necessarilyitalreadyhasaconstitution—butwhetheritshouldacquireacanonicalconstitutionalmaster‐texttomatch.3

IntheUK,thereisnocanonicalconstitutionalmaster‐text,andnoliveproposaltohaveone.Thisdoesnotmean,Ihastentoadd,thattherearenorulesoftheUKconstitutionthathavecanonicaltexts.Onthecontrary,therearemany.Totakeafewfamous


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examples,thereareconstitutionalprovisionsinMagnaCarta1297,theLawsinWalesActs1535–42,theHabeasCorpusAct1679,theBillofRights1689,theActofUnion(withScotland)1707,theActofUnion(withIreland)1800,theJudicatureActs1873and1875,andtheStatuteofWestminster1931.(p.164) Moredebatableexamples,amongmany,includetheGreatReformActof1832anditssuccessorRepresentationofthePeopleActs,theParliamentActs1911and1949,andtheEuropeanCommunitiesAct1972.Butnoneofthese,norallofthemstapledtogether,is‘theUKconstitution’,inthesensethatmanyinquirershaveinmind.Theyareonlysomewrittenfragmentsoftheotherwiseunwritten(andsomaybeweshouldsay‘uncodified’ratherthan‘unwritten’)UKconstitution.Thisisnotalteredbythefactthattwoofthem—theActsofUnion—arefoundingdocuments,inthesensethattheyestablishtheUKasaunion.Forwhatestablishesaunionisnotnecessarilyitsconstitution.Aunionmaybeestablished(asinthecaseoftheUK)byunitingitspartscompletewithelementsoftheirexistingconstitutions,andwithout,intheprocess,reducingthoseelementstowriting.Inthatcasethefoundingdocumentoftheuniononlyaddsanotherfragmenttoitsconstitution.4

NoticethatalloftheconstitutionalfragmentslistedaboveareActsofParliamentthatwerepassedandpromulgatedintheordinaryway.Theirstatusaspartoftheconstitutionisnotdeterminedbysomespecialoriginorprocessofenactment.Theydonothave‘constitutional’printedorstampedonthematpointofissue.Eveniftheydid,itisnotclearthatthisbyitselfwouldhaveanylegaleffect.5TheUKconstitutiondoesnotprovideforParliamenttoactasaprimarylegislatorotherthanbypassinganActofParliamentintheordinaryway.NoristhereanyotherprimarylegislatorconstitutedbytheUKconstitution6whoseenactmentsbindParliament.7Thatisonereasonwhythereisnolive(p.165) proposaltohaveacanonicalconstitutionalmaster‐textintheUK.Evenifonewerethoughtdesirable,itisfarfromclearhowanyonewouldsetaboutcreatingone.TheUKconstitutionincludesnoprocedureforitsowndeliberateamendment,nevermindforitsownencapsulationinacanonicalmaster‐text.

IftheUKconstitutioncontainsnoprocedureforitsowndeliberateamendment,howdocertainActsofParliamentcometohaveconstitutionaleffect?Theirconstitutionaleffectisnotdeterminedbyhowtheyarecreatedbutratherbyhowtheyarereceived,bytheirtreatmentineitherthecustomsorthedecisionsofcertainlaw‐applyingofficials,principallythecourts.TheActsinquestionareregarded,usuallyonlysometimeafterenactment,asplacingconstitutionallimitsonwhatvariousmajorpoliticalinstitutions,includingthecourtsthemselves,cando(i.e.areempoweredorpermittedtodo)bylaw.Inthatsense,eventhoughwritten,theyremainpartofanunwrittenconstitution,fortheirconstitutionalstatus—theirentryintotheconstitution—comesoftheunwrittenlawofthelaw‐applyingofficialswhosubsequentlytreatthemashavingthatstatus.Thedebatablecases,meanwhile,aredebatablepreciselybecauseofacontinuingindeterminacyinthewaytheyaretreatedbytherelevantlaw‐applyingofficials.Theindeterminacymaycomeofofficialdissensusorofficialcircumspection.Ortheissuemayneverhavecomeupforofficialdetermination.Thisisnottodeny,ofcourse,thattheActsinquestionaredeterminatelyrecognisedasvalidActsofParliament.Itisonlytheirconstitutionalstatusthathasyettobeputtoadecisivetest.


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Whencommentatorsarethinkingaboutwhatmightcountasadecisivetest,theyoftenfocusonwhethertheActinquestioncouldvalidlyberepealedbyafutureParliament.WouldapurportedrepealoftheEuropeanCommunitiesAct1972belegallyvalid,evenifitwereinbreachoftheTreatyofRome?HowaboutapurportedrepealoftheStatuteofWestminster1931,aimedatrecolonizingvariousformerBritishcoloniesovertheheadsoftheirownconstitutions?Theseareintriguing,althoughsadlyimponderable,questionsoflaw.8Astestsfor(p.166) theconstitutionalstatusofanActofParliament,however,theyaretoostrict.EvenifacertainActAcouldvalidlyberepealedbyParliamentintheordinaryway,i.e.bysubsequentlypassingActBtorepealit,ActAmaymeanwhileberecognizedashavinganeffectontheoperationofotherpartsoftheUKconstitution.Mostimportantly,withoutyetbeingrecognizedbytheUKcourtsaseitherrepealableornotrepealable,ActAmayberecognizedbytheUKcourtsasimmunefromthenormaldoctrineofimpliedrepeal.Bythenormaldoctrineofimpliedrepeal,intheeventofaconflictbetweenActAandActB,thelaterActBprevailsevenifParliamentdidnotnotice,andhenceinActBdidnotmakeanyprovisionforresolving,theconflict.ThisisaruleoftheUKconstitution.SoifActAistreatedbythecourtsasanexceptiontoit(onthebasisthatActAprovidesforitselftobeanexceptionorforanyotherreason),ActAistherebyelevatedbythecourtstoaspecialconstitutionalstatus.TheEuropeanCommunitiesAct1972,forexample,haswhateverconstitutionalstatusithasintheUKbecauseandtotheextentthatthecourtshavehelditimmunefromimpliedrepeal.9ThatitcouldstillbeexpresslyrepealedbyParliament,ifitcould,doesnotstripitofthatconstitutionalstatus.ItonlygoestoshowthatatleastsomepartsoftheUKconstitutionarelessdeeplyentrenchedthanareatleastsomepartsof,say,theUSconstitution.Theyarenotimmunefromthenormalprocessofdeliberatelegislativechangeeventhoughtheyareimmunefromsomeformsofaccidentallegislativechange.10

IhaveemphasizedthecourtsasprincipalarbitersoftheconstitutionalstatusoflegislationintheUK.Todosoistoinvitefurtherpoliticalcontroversy.RichardBellamycautionsagainsta‘legalconstitutionalism’thatpresentsthecourtsasthetrueguardiansoftheUKconstitution.Headvocatesinsteada‘politicalconstitutionalism’accordingtowhich‘theconstitutionisidentifiedwiththepoliticalrather(p.167) thanthelegalsystem,andinparticularwiththewayspoliticalpowerisorganisedanddivided’.11This,however,isafalsecontrast.MyemphasisonthecourtsdoesnotpreventmefromendorsingBellamy'sviewoftheconstitution.Letmementionjustafewreasonswhy.

(i)Ialreadyagreedthatconstitutions,notjustintheUKbuteverywhere,areconcernedwith‘thewayspoliticalpowerisorganisedanddivided’.TobeexactIsaidthataconstitution,evenwhenthoughtofaspartofalegalsystem,isthepartthatspecifiesthe‘majorinstitutionsandofficialsofgovernment’andhowtheyaretofunction,interact,beappointed,etc.(ii)AsBellamyseemstoagree,12thecourtsthemselvesarepoliticalplayers.IntheUK,aselsewhere,theyjockeyforpowerandpositionnolessthantheothermainpoliticalinstitutions.(iii)AttheheartoftheUKconstitutionisthedoctrineofParliamentarySovereignty.Asalegaldoctrine,thishasbeendevelopedprincipallybythe


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courts.Someoftherulesthatgotomakeitup(thoseconcerningexpressandimpliedrepeal)havebeensketchedabove.Thedoctrine,aswesaw,severelyrestrictsthewaysinwhichandtheextenttowhichParliamentcanbinditssuccessors,forActAcannotanticipatorilyimmunizeitselfagainstitsrepealbyafutureActB(evenifsometimesthecourtsmaylatergrantActAalimitedimmunity).13ButParliamentarySovereigntyalsolimitstheextenttowhichParliamentisboundbythecourts.Asthedoctrineisappliedtoday,thecourtsdeterminethelegaleffectofActsofParliamentbut(p.168) Parliamentmayalwaysrelegislatetooverrulethecourts,subjectagaintothecourts’determiningthelegaleffectsoftherelegislation.Parliamentcanalwaysgetitswayintheendbyprogressivelymoredefinitereiteration.UnlessParliamenttiresoftheprocess,thecourtsonlygettopostponetheirowndefeat.(iv)Thecourtsaretheprincipallaw‐applyinginstitutionsthatdeterminethelegaleffectofActsofParliamentandotherlegislation,buttheyarenottheonlyones.Therearealsovarioustribunals,commissions,regulatoryagencies,andquangosthatshareatleastsomeoftheworkofthecourts.Insmallpockets,workofthistypeisalsoundertakenbythepolice,immigrationstaff,planningofficers,etc.Whatdistinguishesthisworkisthatitinvolvesauthoritativeapplicationsofthelaw,i.e.determinationsoflegaleffectthatothersarelegallyboundtofollow.14(v)Theruleofthecourts,suchasitis,isdependentonthesubmissiontothatruleofnumerousothers,includingotherofficials,suchaspoliceandmilitarycommanders,andthesubmissiontothosecommandersofordinarysoldiersandpoliceofficers,andultimatelythesubmissiontotheseofthewiderpopulation.15Italsodependsondétentewithotherinstitutionstowhomtheremaybegreaterofficialorpopularloyalty.The$64,000questionabouteveryconstitutionisthis:Inasevereconstitutionalcrisis,whoseloyaltieswillliewhere(andwhohastheweaponsandwhohasthenumbersontheirside)?16(vi)Finally,thecourtsandotherlaw‐applyinginstitutionsareonlytheguardiansofconstitutionallaw.Noconstitutionisexhaustedbyitslaw.IntheUK,forinstance,therearealsowhatDiceydubbedthe(p.169) ‘conventionsoftheconstitution’:customaryconstitutionalruleswhichthecourtsmaynote,relyupon,andaccommodateinapplyingthelawbutofwhichthecourts’applicationsarenotauthoritative,evenfortheimmediatepurposesofthecasebeforethem.17Theseextra‐legalcustoms,likeanyotherrules,couldbetransformedintolawbythecourtsthemselvestreatingthemaslaw.Butthecourtshavemanyreasonstobeself‐denyinginrespectofsuchachange,includingbutnotlimitedtotheriskofbreakingthedétentementionedin(v),andtherebyoccasioningacoupagainstthemselves.18

Whenthinkingabouttheconstitutionofanycountry,theoristsoflawarenaturallymostinterestedinitsconstitutionallaw,whichleadstheminturntoemphasisethecourtsasarbitersofconstitutionality.Itdoesnotfollow,asBellamyseemstoassume,thattheyregardconstitutionallawasthemostsociallyimportant,letalonethemostsociallydesirable,partoftheconstitution.19Theymayeventhink,asItendtothink,thatsomethingisamissinthepubliclifeofasocietywhenconstitutionalquestionsoftenhave


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tobesettledinthecourtroom.Indeed,onemightadd,thereissomethingamissinthepubliclifeofasocietywhenquestionsofanytypeoftenhavetobesettledbythecourts.Atheoristoflawneednotbeanenthusiastforlaw,letaloneformoreofit.Withthatcaveatentered,Iwillcontinueheretopursuemyinterestasatheoristoflaw.SoIwillpersistinfocusingonthelegalaspectofconstitutionsexceptwhereotherwiseindicated.Mytalkof‘writtenconstitutions’shouldbeunderstoodaccordingly.

II.IntheUK,torecap,whatdeterminesthestatusofcertainlawasconstitutionallawisitsreceptionintoconstitutionallawbycertainlaw‐applyingofficials,principallythecourts.Couldn'tthisclaimbe(p.170) extendedtoconstitutionsgenerally?Couldn'titbearguedthat,ineveryjurisdictionandateverytime,whatreallydeterminesthestatusofsomethingaspartoftheconstitutionishowitisreceivedbyitsofficialusers,principallythecourts,nevermindwhetherithas‘constitutional’stampedonitatpointofissue?Ifsothetablesareturned.FornowthedoubtsdonothangoverthepossibilityofanunwrittenconstitutionliketheUK's.Insteadtheyhangoverthepossibilityofawrittenconstitution.Oncloserinspection,itmayseem,itispartofthenatureofaconstitutionthatitisunwritten,andthatitsso‐calledwrittenpartsareonlypartsofitbecauseoftheirreceptionintotheunwrittenlawthatismadebythecustomsanddecisionsofthecourtsandotherlaw‐applyingofficials.Ifthatmuchistrue,then‘TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica’isaseriousmisnomer,forinasmuchasitisanamegiventoadocumentcontainingcanonicalformulationsoflaw,itinvolvesacategorymistake.Constitutionscannotbe,orbecontainedin,documents.That,atanyrate,isthehereticalviewthatIwillbeexploringhere.AlthoughIwillrejectitinduecourse,someaspectsofitstrikemeassalutary.Theyhelpustoseetheexaggerationsoftheoppositeviewaccordingtowhichawrittenconstitutionissomehowamorenormalcase.

Letmebegintheargumentinearnestbyputtingthechallengetothepossibilityofwrittenconstitutionsinaslightlymoreelaborateform.AsastudentofUKconstitutionallawIwasgiventounderstand—ormaybesimplycametounderstandbymyself—thatthedistinctionbetweenquestionsofconstitutionallawandquestionsofordinarypubliclaw(alsoknownasadministrativelaw)liesinthetypeofinstitutionsthattheserespectivepartsofthelawregulate.Administrativelawregulatesinstitutionswhosepowersaredelegated.Constitutionallawregulatesthosethatdothedelegating,i.e.institutionswhosepowersarenotdelegatedbutare,asitissometimesput,inherentororiginal.20Thus,intheUK,constitutionallawregulatesParliament—ortheQueeninParliamentastheinstitutionismoreacuratelyknown—(p.171) togetherwiththehighofficesoftheCrown(mainlygovernmentministers),thePrivyCouncil,21andtheQueenherselfinherofficialcapacity.ItalsoregulatestheHighCourtandthejudicialbodiesknownastheAppellateCommitteeoftheHouseofLordsandtheJudicialCommitteeofthePrivyCouncil.Constitutionallawdoesnot,however,regulatetheCourtofAppeal,whichisacreatureofstatute.22Itsjudgesareconstitutionalofficialsonlyinvirtueofthefactthattheyremain,constitutionallyspeaking,judgesoftheHighCourtevenaftertheyhavebeenelevatedtotheCourtofAppeal.Nordoesconstitutionallawregulatethepolice,thearmy,localcouncils,magistratesandtheircourts,tribunalsandpublicinquiries,quangos


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orarms‐lengthgovernmentagencies,industry‐wideregulators,taxinspectors,orothersimilarinstitutionsandofficials.23Theseinstitutionsandofficialsholdtheirlegalpowersbydelegation,usuallyfromParliamentalthoughsometimesbyRoyalPreogative(i.e.fromtheinherentconstitutionalpowersoftheCrown,exercisedonbehalfoftheQueenbygovernmentministersorthePrivyCouncil).

Itdoesnotfollow,ofcourse,thatthesedelegateinstitutionsandofficialsareuntouchedbythelawoftheconstitution.Mostobviously,theycanonlyhavedelegatedpowersinlawiftheoriginalpowersaretheretodelegate,whichmeansthatdelegateinstitutionsaresubjecttowhateverrestrictionstheconstitutionplacesontheexerciseofthesamepowersbythosewhodelegatedthem.Moreover,theconstitutionmayregulatewhichdelegationsaretotakeplace,bywhatmeans,towhom,underwhatconditions,andsoforth.Thatadelegateinstitutionispickedoutformentionintheconstitutioninthiswaydoesnot(p.172) transformitintoaconstitutionalinstitution.ConsiderthearmedforcesintheUK.ThankstoaprovisionoftheBillofRights1689,theCrownlostitsconstitutionalpowertoenlistandmaintainastandingarmyintheabsenceofParliamentaryconsent.ThisisanaspectoftheRoyalPrerogativeofnationaldefencewhichcameunderearlyParliamentarycontrol24andwhichalreadyputsthearmyatthecentreofanimportantconstitutionalrelationship.Butitdoesnotturnthearmyintoaconstitutionalinstitution.TheprovisionregulatestheCrownandParliament,notthearmyitself,whichgetsitslegalpowers,ifany,onlybyParliamentaryorPrerogativedelegation.

This1689provisionalsohelpstoforestallothercommonmisunderstandings.Aninstitutionofinherentororiginalpowerissometimesunderstoodtomeananinstitutionthatdeterminesitsownpowers,25or(moreradicallystill)aninstitutionwithunlimitedpowers.26Butthesedefinitions,wecannowsee,aretoodemanding.TheCrowndidnotceasetobeaninstitutionofinherentpowermerelybecauseitlostitspowerunilaterallytomaintainastandingarmy.NordidtheCrownceasetobeaninstitutionofinherentpowermerelybecauseitwasParliament,throughtheBillofRights1689,thatrestrictedthepoweroftheCrowntomaintainastandingarmy.NordidParliamentitselfceasetobeaninstitutionofinherentpowermerelybecauseitwasthecourtsthatgavetotheBillofRightsitsconstitutionalstatus,andsomadeitthecasethatParliament,byenactingtheBillofRights,hadalteredtheconstitutionalpowersoftheCrowninrelationtothemaintenanceofastandingarmy.Sothepointcannotbethatinstitutionsofinherentpowerarenotsubjecttolegallimitationsimposedby(p.173) others.Thepointisonlythattheirpowersarenotdelegatedtothembyothers.

Whetherthereisadelegationisnottobedecidedbylookingatthehistoryoftheinstitutionsinquestion.Historically,intheUK,bothParliamentandtheHighCourt(oratleastpartofit)hadtheirconstitutionalpowerscarvedoutoftheconstitutionalpowersofthemonarch.TheKingorQueenfromtimetotimedelegatedsomeofhisorherpersonalpowerstothemortotheirpredecessors.Butthesepowers,althoughtheyweredelegatedatthetime,arenotnowtoberegardedasdelegatedpowers.Thelegalposition—thepositionundertheUKconstitutiontoday—isthatbothParliamentandtheHighCourthaveinherentororiginalpowers.TheyarenotdelegatesandtheQueen


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cannot,constitutionally,revoketheirpowers.IftheQueenpurportedtorevoketheirpowerstheycould,constitutionally,ignoretherevocationandcontinuetosit.Theymightlosesomeoralloftheirpowersinsomeotherway—asthe1689exampleshows,constitutionalinstitutionsarenotimmunefromhavingtheirpowersrestrictedbyothers—buttheycannotlosetheirpowersbyrevocation.Thisisahallmarkofinstitutionsthatfallunderconstitutional,asopposedtoadministrative,law.

Theconstitution,asIsaid,iswhatregulatesinstitutionsofinherentpower.Theemergingproblemisthis.TheinstitutionsofinherentpowerinanylegalsystemarealsothosethatareidentifiedbywhatH.L.A.Hartcalled‘rulesofrecognition’.Tobeexact,theyareidentifiedbytheultimaterulesofrecognitionofthatlegalsystem.27Andtheultimate(p.174) rulesofrecognitionofalegalsystem,asHartexplained,cannotbeenacted,orotherwisecanonicallyformulated.Theycannotexistinlegislation.Theycanexistonlyinthepracticesofofficials.Puttingitmoretechnically,theycanonlybecustomarylawsinforo.28Why?Togreatlysimplify:Anyattempttocreateanultimateruleofrecognitionbylegislationrequiresthattherebeasuperiorlegislatorwiththepowertoconferanoriginalorinherentpower.Butthatisacontradiction.Ifthereisasuperiorlegislatorconferringthepower,itfollowsthatthepowerconferredisnotoriginalorinherentbutdelegated.Theruleofrecognitioncreatedisnot,inotherwords,anultimateruleofrecognition.Itfollowsthatanultimateruleofrecognitioncannotbealegislatedrule.29Andonemayconcludefromthisthataconstitution,asthepartofthelawthatregulatesinstitutionsoforiginalorinherentpower,can'tbelegislatedeither.Itcan'ttaketheformofwrittenlaw,existingincanonicalformulation.AllconstitutionsmustthereforebeunwrittenliketheUKone.

Manylegaltheoristsembracesomethinglikethisargument.Mosttakeittobeareductio.30Theyregarditasaxiomaticthattherearewrittenconstitutions,suchastheUSconstitution,andthereforetreattheargumentascastingdoubtonwhatHarthastosayaboutrulesofrecognition.Either,paceHart,somelegalsystemsdonothaveultimaterulesofrecognition,orelseanultimateruleofrecognitioniscapable,paceHart,ofbeingalegislatedrule.Bothoftheseconclusionsare,however,inadequatelysupportedbytheargumentjustsketched.FortheargumentfailstoestablishanyincompatibilitybetweenaHartian(customary)ruleofrecognitionandawrittenconstitution.Itisafaultyargument.Letmefocusonthreeofitsfaults.

(p.175) III.(1)Therulesidentifyinginstitutionsofinherentpowerdonotexhausttherulesthatregulatethoseinstitutions.Indeedsomerulesthatidentifyinstitutionsofinherentpowerdonotregulatethosesameinstitutionsatall.Hartoccasionallyencouragedtheviewthattheultimaterulesofrecognitionofeachlegalsystemarethosethatconferthesystem'sinherentpowers.31IfthiswaseverHart'sviewitshouldnothavebeen,foritisincompatiblewithHart'sowncarefulenumerationanddifferentiationofthetypesofrulesonthepossessionofwhichtheexistenceofanylegalsystemdepends.Hartdistinguishedrulesofrecognitionfromrulesofadjudicationandrulesofchange,andarguedthateverylegalsystemhasdistinctrulesofallthreetypes.32Rulesofadjudicationandof


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changeconferpowerstoapplythelawandtochangethelawrespectively.33Intheconstitution—wherewefindtheultimaterulesofadjudicationandchange—theyconferinherentpowerstoapplythelawandtochangethelaw.Butifthelegalsystem'sultimaterulesofrecognitionhavealreadyconferredthesepowersonthesameinstitutions,whyarerulesofadjudicationandchangeneeded?Aren'ttheyjustduplicative?

Theansweristhattheyareneededbecausearuleofrecognitiondoesnotconfertheseoranyotherlegalpowers.Aruleofrecognitionisaduty‐imposingrule.34Itimposesalegaldutyonlaw‐applyingofficials.OneoftheUK'sultimaterulesofrecognition—Hart'sstockexampleofaruleofrecognition—istherulebywhichwhattheQueeninParliamentenactsislaw.35Thisrulegiveslaw‐applyingofficialsthe(p.176) duty,inlaw,toapplywhateverrulesParliamentenacts.DoesitimposethatdutyonParliamentitself?No.Exceptonanarrowrangeofmattersconcerningtheprivilegesofitsownmembers,andleavingasidetheanomalouspositionoftheAppellateCommitteeoftheHouseofLordsasajudicialbodysittingwithinParliament,Parliamentdoesnotmake(andhasnolegalpowertomake)bindingrulingsonthelegaleffectofitsownlaws.Itisnotalaw‐applyinginstitutionbutonlyalaw‐makingone,andcannotbeboundbytheruleofrecognition.36Sojustasthearmyisidentifiedbythe1689BillofRightsbutnotregulatedbyit,soParliamentisidentifiedbythisfamousruleofrecognitionbutnotregulatedbyit.Itisregulatedinsteadbyacounterpartruleofchangewhichconfersonitthelegalpowertopassenactments,intheprocessimposing,bytheruleofrecognition,alegaldutyonlaw‐applyingofficialstoapplytherulescontainedinthoseenactments.SoHart'sargumenttotheeffectthattheultimaterulesofrecognitionofalegalsystemcanonlybecustomaryrulesdoesnotentailthatonlycustomaryrulesregulateinstitutionsofinherentpower.Itleavesopenthepossibilitythatinsomelegalsystemstheconstitutionalrulesofadjudicationandchange—therulesthatendowtheinstitutionsofinherentpowerwiththeirinherentpowers—couldbenon‐customary.Thusthereremainsapossiblesubject‐matterforawrittenconstitution,namelytheallocationofinherentlegalpowerstomatchthedutiesimposedbythesystem'sultimaterulesofrecognition.

JeremyWaldronresiststheideathatthe(duty‐imposing)ruleofrecognitionhereisgenuinelydistinctfromthe(power‐conferring)ruleofchange.‘Theideaofapower,’hewrites,

istheideaofacapacitytochangepeople'sduties.SoiftheruleofchangeempowersCongress[or,weshouldadd,Parliament]tolegislate,itnecessarily(p.177) enablesittodosomethingthatwillchangethedutiesofotheractorsinthesystem.37

Waldronisnotquiterightabouttheideaofapower.Onemayhaveapower,yetnoabilitytochangeanyduties.One'sabilitymaybelimitedtochangingotherpowers.38ButitistruethatthepowersofParliamentandCongressdoincludetheabilitytochangelegalduties,andthatsomeonewhodoesn'tknowthisbythattokendoesn'tunderstandthepowersofParliamentorCongress(asthecasemaybe).Thisdoesnotshow,however,thatthepower‐conferringruleisalsotheduty‐imposingone.Itshowsonlythatthe


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power‐conferringrulepresupposestheexistenceoftheduty‐imposingone.Actually,wecouldgofurther.Theduty‐imposingrulealsopresupposestheexistenceofthepower‐conferringone.Yetthepointremains.Tworulesthatpresupposeeachother'sexistencearenotthesamerule.

ThiswasoneofhisseveralbattleswithHansKelsenthatHartwondecisively.Thepower‐conferringruleenablingacourttopasssentenceforcarelessdrivingisincompletetothepointofunintelligibilityunlessthereisalsoaduty‐imposingrulemakingcarelessdrivingacriminaloffence.Thatisbecausetherebeingacriminaloffenceofφingisbuiltintotheveryideathatφingissomethingthatattractsasentence.39Conversely,aduty‐imposingrulemakingitacriminaloffencetodrivecarelesslyisincompletetothepointofunintelligibilityunlessitisjoinedbyapower‐conferringruleenablingacourttosentencetheoffenderforcommittingtheoffence.40Thatisbecausetherebeingapowertosentenceforφingisbuiltintotheveryideathatφingisacriminaloffence.Findingjustoneoftheserulesinthelaw,acompetentlaw‐applierwillholdtheotherruletoexistbynecessaryimplication(sothat,ifitdoesnotexistalready,hewillhavetobringitintoexistencehimself,(p.178) orelseputouttopasturethebereftrulethathestartedwith).41Thefactthatthereisanecessaryimplicationheredoesnotentail,youcannowsee,thatthereisonlyonerule.Infactitentailstheopposite:arelationshipofnecessaryimplicationbetweenrulescanholdonlyifthereare(atleast)tworulesforittoholdbetween.

Aswiththerulesinadefectivelydraftedcriminalstatute,sotoowithalegalsystem'sultimaterulesofrecognition,change,andadjudication.Theycannotbutcross‐refer,andhencedependoneachotherfortheirintelligibility,yeteachhasitsownnormativeforce.42Eachregulatesdifferentactions,ordifferentagents,orthesameactionsofthesameagentinadifferentway.Eachisthereforeadistinctrule.43Sothefactthatalegalsystem'srulesofrecognitionmustbecustomaryrulesdoesnotshowthatthesystem'srulesofchangeandadjudicationcannotbelegislatedrules,laiddown,perhaps,inawrittenconstitution.

(2)Aconnectedpoint.Hartisuncertainwhethertoclassifytheultimaterulesofrecognitionofalegalsystemasthemselveslegalrules.44Heisrighttobeuncertain.Ashesays,forsomepurposesandonsomeoccasionsitisharmlessandnaturaltoclassifythemaslegal.Theyare,afterall,rulesspecifictothatlegalsystem.Theypertainexclusivelytoit.Butdotheyquitebelongtoit?Forpresentpurposesitisperhapsbettertothinkthattheydonot.Why?Becauseinawaytheyliebeyondtheconstitution.Oneneedsrulesofrecognitioneveninordertoidentifytherulesoftheconstitution.Oneneedstoknow,evenoftheserules,thattheysatisfytheultimatecriteriaoflegalvalidityforthelegalsystemoneislookingat,beforeonecanidentifythemastheconstitutionalrulesofthatsystem.Puttingthepointratherparadoxically,onemight(p.179) saythateventheconstitutionneedstobeconstitutedsomehow.Isitconstitutedbylaw?Kelsenthoughtthatitmustbe,andendedupfacinganewversionoftheoldproblemofinfiniteregress,endedonlybywhathelatterlycametocallthe‘fiction’ofthevalidityofsomehistoricallyfirstlegalact.45Hartavoidedthesameproblembypresentingtheultimate


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rulesofrecognitionoflegalsystemsasborderlinecasesoflegalrules.46TheyarerulesprovidingwhatHartcallsthe‘criteria’bywhichlaw(thelawofaparticularsystem)canberecognizedaslaw(thelawofthatsystem).Butbytheirnaturetheyneednotthemselvesmeetthosecriteria.Theyarefoundinthecustomoflaw‐applyingofficialsbutitdoesnotfollowthattheymust(althoughtheymay)identifythecustomoflaw‐applyingofficialsasasourceoflaw.Inthatsensetheyareabovethelawratherthanpartofit.Thisallowsustorecognizethatthereareultimaterulesofrecognitionthatare,sotospeak,abovetheconstitutionwhileatthesametimeagreeingthatthereisnolawthatisabovetheconstitution.Constitutionallawisashighasthelawgoes.Correspondingly,awrittenconstitutionmayexisteventhoughtheremustbeacustomaryruleofrecognitionaboveit,onethatidentifiesitastheconstitution,andbindsthelegalsystem'slaw‐appliers,qualaw‐appliersofthatlegalsystem,tofollowit.

Harthimselfunfortunatelycastsdoubtonthishealthywayofthinkingaboutwrittenconstitutionswhenhewrites:

Ifaconstitutionspecifyingthevarioussourcesoflawisalivingrealityinthesensethatthecourtsandofficialsofthesystemactuallyidentifythelawinaccordancewiththecriteriaitprovides,thentheconstitutionisacceptedandactuallyexists.Itseemsaneedlessreduplicationtosuggestthatthereisafurtherruletotheeffectthattheconstitution(orthosewholaiditdown)aretobeobeyed.47

Itiscertainlytrueoflegalsystemswithunwrittenconstitutionsthattheylackaruleofrecognitionwithanythinglikethiscontent.ButHartseemstothinkthatthesamecouldalsobetrueoflegalsystemswith(p.180) writtenconstitutions,constitutionswhichare‘laiddown’.48AsRazsays,‘theconstitution,insuchcases,shouldpresumablyberegardedascreatedbothbylegislation[quawritten]andbycustom[quaruleofrecognition],apositionwhich…needssomeexplaining’.49Isitexplicable?Idoubtit.Ofcoursethereareexamples,aswesaw,ofconstitutionsmadeupofsomewrittenandsomeunwrittenlaw.Probablymostconstitutionsarelikethis,albeitinvariousconfigurationsthatallowustothinkofsomeasbasicallyunwrittenandothersasbasicallywritten.Butthatisbesidethepoint.ThepicturethatHartseemstobetryingtoconjureupisofaconstitutioncontainingsomelawthatisbothwrittenandunwritten—legislatedandcustomary—atthesametime.Theonlypicturehesucceededinconjuringupforme,however,isofwrittenlawwhichwasdisplaced,perhapsonestepatatime,byunwrittenlaw,sothattheformerlylegislatedconstitutionlostitsforceinfavourofcustomaryruleswithsimilarcontent.Hartmayhavethoughtthatthisiswhathappenswhenthelawofawrittenconstitutionisdevelopedovertimebythecourts.Thewrittenconstitutioneventuallybecomesadeadletter,referredtoonlyhonorifically.AswewillseetowardstheendofSectionIV,however,the‘livingreality’ofawrittenconstitutioncallsforadifferentanalysis,oneconsistentwithandindeedconducivetotheviewthattheruleofrecognitionisindeedacustomaryrulelyingbeyondtheconstitutionitself,arule‘totheeffectthattheconstitution(orthosewholaiditdown)aretobeobeyed’.AsIjustpointedoutonHart'sbehalfinreplytoWaldron,thisisnot‘needlessreduplication’oftherulesinthewrittenconstitutionbutaseparateruleofrecognitionwithoutwhichthereisno


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writtenconstitutiontocontainthoserules.50

(p.181) (3)Finally,myargumentforregardingtheUKParliamentandHighCourtasinstitutionsofinherentratherthandelegatedpowerrestedinpartonthepropositionthattheirpowersarenot,astheconstitutionallawoftheUKnowstands,revocable.Themonarchcannotlawfullystepbackinandreclaimthepowersthat,inthemiddleages,weredelegatedbyherpredecessorstoParliamentandto(whatisnow)theHighCourt.Thissuggestsapossiblewayofthinkingaboutconstitutionalpowerswhichisconsistentwiththeirhavingbeenendowedbyanotherthroughlegislation,andconsistentwithconstitutionallawrecognizingthatendowmentasthesourceofthepowers.Onemaysaythatitispossibleforconstitutionalinstitutionstohavebeenendowedwiththosepowersbyahigherlegislativeinstitutionsolongasthatinstitutioncannotrevokethem.Theeasiestwayforthatconditiontobemetisfortheinstitutioninquestionnolongertoexist.Thisisindeedstandardpracticeinconstitution‐buildingtoday.Atemporaryconstitutionalcaucusorassemblyisconjuredupwhichthenendowsconstitutionalpowersuponotherinstitutionsdesignedtobepermanent.Thelawthenrecognizesthatthepowerwasendowedbutaddsthatthemethodofendowmentisnotreusable,withintheconstitution,asamethodofrevocation,forthedelegatingbodyhaswounditselfuporhasbeenwoundup.Thedelegationisrenderedirrevocable.Thissuggestsapossiblerevisionofmyoriginalproposalfordeterminingthescopeofconstitutionallaw,asdistinctfromadministrativelaw.Constitutionallawregulatesthoseinstitutionsthat,accordingtothelaw,haveeitherinherentorirrevocablydelegatedpowers.Overtimeinstitutionswithirrevocablydelegatedpowersmaycometoberegarded,inlaw,ashavinginherentpowers.Butstrictlyspeakingitneednotbeso.

TheUSconstitutionillustratesthatitneednotbeso.Itisawrittenconstitution.Itisapieceoflegislation.Thelegislatorwasatemporaryinstitution,aConventionofdelegates(yes,delegates)fromtwelvestatesmeetingatPhiladelphiain1787.WithonlytheratificationofsubsidiaryadhocConventionsintheStates,thisConventioncreatedthestandinggovernmentalinstitutionsoftoday'sfederalUnitedStates,includingnotably(butnotonly)thePresidency,Congresswithitstwinhouses,andtheSupremeCourt.Thepowerswithwhichtheseinstitutionswere(p.182) endowedweredelegatedtothembythe1787Convention,whichhelditselftoholdallthepowersofthenewFederallegalsystemthatitwascreating,includingthepowertodelegatethosepowers.51HowevertheConventiondidnotmakeprovisionforitsownfutureexistence.Insteaditmadealternativeprovisionforlateramendmentstotheconstitution,inwhichtheamenderswouldbeinstitutionscreatedbytheconstitutionitself,operatingunderspecialproceduresdesignedforthepurpose.ThusalltheinherentpowersthattheConventiontookitselftohave,andistakenbycurrentfederalUSlawtohavehad,weredelegatedawaytothenewinstitutionsthatitcreated.TheConventionitselfwaswoundup,puttinganendeventoitsownlegalpowertoreconveneandhencetorevokethedelegation.

Orsooneversionofthestorygoes.WearestrayingintoanotherpoliticalminefieldwiththisvignetteofUSconstitutionalhistory.TwinamendmentproceduresaresetoutinArticleVof(the1787enactmentnowknownas)theUnitedStatesConstitution.Thefirst


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isthewell‐knownandmuch‐usedpowerofCongresstoproposeamendments(byatwo‐thirdsmajority)whichtakeeffectuponratificationbythree‐quartersoftheStates.Thesecondisthislesswell‐knownone:

TheCongress…ontheApplicationoftheLegislaturesoftwothirdsoftheseveralStates,shallcallaConventionforproposingAmendments,which…shallbevalidtoallIntentsandPurposes,asPartofthisConstitution,whenratifiedbytheLegislaturesofthreefourthsoftheseveralStatesorbyConventionsinthreefourthsthereof.

Accordingtosome,thisisapowertoreconvenetheoriginal1787Convention.52ItisirrelevanttothisclaimthatanArticleVConvention(p.183) hastobecalledbyCongressontheapplicationoftheStates,andthatitsproposalsthenhavetoberatifiedbytheStates.The1787ConventionwasitselfcalledundertheoldArticlesofConfederationbyCongressontheapplicationoftheStates,anditsproduct—theconstitutionalenactmentinwhichArticleVappears—wasalsoratifiedbytheStatesbeforecomingintoeffect.ItisofequallyscantassistancetonotethatanArticleVConventionislimitedtoproposingamendmentstotakeeffect‘asPartofthisConstitution’.Thesewordsobviouslythrowuptheclassicproblemoftheidentityofwholeswithfungibleparts,whichthreatenstorenderthemvacuous.53Buteveniftheyaddsomething,thereisanotherproblem.Does‘thisConstitution’refertotheinstitutionalarrangementsoftheUSconstitutionordoesitrefertotheircanonicalformulationinthe1787enactmentasamended?Thisisimportantbecausethe1787Conventionpreservedpartsoftheinstitutionalset‐upfromtheArticlesofConfederationunderwhichitwassummoned(e.g.theexistenceofCongress,theconstitutionalrecognitionoftheStatesasratifiers).Sothe1787Conventiontoocanbearguedtohaveenactedthenewconstitution‘asPartof’theold(nevermindthatthenewthentookonalifeofitsownandwasheld,legallyspeaking,nottooweitsvaliditytotheold).InwhichcasethereisnothinginthesewordstodistinguishanArticleVConventionfromthe1787Convention.

Itistrue,ofcourse,thatanArticleVConventioncanonlyamend—taking‘amendment’todesignatealawfulmodeofconstitutional(p.184) change—ifitactswithinitsconstitutionalpowers.Butthatonlybringsusbacktoouroriginalquestion.Whatarethoseconstitutionalpowers?Aretheydelegatedpowersoraretheyacontinuationoftheinherentpowersbywhichthe1787Conventionitselfisnowregardedashavingacted?DoestheUSconstitutionrecognizeandrequirethecontinuingexistenceofitsownsuper‐legislator,alegislatorwhich,althoughdormant,couldbestirredbacktoconsciousnessbyCongressontheapplicationoftwo‐thirdsoftheStatesandcouldvalidlyrevoke—andrevoke,perhaps,totabularasaexceptforitsowncontinuingpowers—thevariouslegalpowersconferredupontheinstitutionscreatedatitsownpreviousmeetingin1787?54

Theanswerisnowherecloseathand.Ifthetriggeringconditionismet—ifavalidapplicationisreceivedfromtheStates—itisprobablymandatoryunderArticleVforCongresstocallaConvention.55Butwhetherthetriggeringconditionhaseverbeenmetisamatterofsomedispute.ItdependsonhowStateapplicationsaretobeindividuated


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andcounted.WhenStatesapplyseverallyratherthanjointly,perhapswithdifferentlywordedanddifferentlyscopedapplicationsmanyyearsapart,aretheirvariousapplicationstobeaggregateduntilthetwo‐thirdslineisreached?Or,asmostconstitutionallawyersassume,ismorecoordinationorconvergenceamongStatesrequiredbeforetheirpetitionscometogethertoqualifyasanapplicationunderArticleV?Whatevertheanswer,CongresshasnevercalledanArticleVConvention,andtheSupremeCourthasneverruledonthelegalityofCongress'snothavingdoneso.NorisitclearthattheSupremeCourtwouldruleonthismatterifitwerepetitioned.TheSupremeCourthasruledinthepastthatotherCongressionaldecisionsconcerningtheamendmentprocessunderArticleVarenon‐justiciable,i.e.notsubjecttothecourt's(p.185) authoritativerulingsontheirconstitutionality.56OtherfederalcourtshaveextendedthesameruletothecallingofanArticleVConvention.57ThismaymeanthatconstitutionalquestionsaboutthecallingofanArticleVConventionarenon‐legalquestions.Theyaretobesettledelsewhereinthepoliticalprocess,regulatednotbylawbutatmostbywhatDiceymighthavecalledtheconventionsoftheUSconstitution.58ThisleavesusseveralfrustratingstepsawayfromachievinganylegaldeterminacyonthevexedquestionofwhetheranArticleVConvention,wereonetobecalled,wouldhavetheoriginalpowersofthe1787Conventionormerelydelegatedpowersconferredbyorunderthe1787Convention.

Can'twefindtheanswertothisvexedquestioninanotherway?SurelyUSconstitutionallawisbynowamplydeterminateinclassifyingthePresidency,Congress,andtheSupremeCourtasconstitutionalinstitutions.Ifthe1787Conventionweremerelysleeping,wouldn'tthepowersoftheseinstitutionshavetobereclassifiedasrevocablydelegatedpowers,andhenceasnon‐constitutional,powers?Inwhichcase—shock,horror!—thesefamousinstitutionswouldnotbeconstitutionalinstitutionsafterall.Indeedthe1787constitution(thedocumentthatcallsitself‘TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica’)wouldnolongerqualifyastheUSconstitution,fornowitwouldbemerelyrepealabledelegatinglegislationmadeunderthepre‐1787constitution.AndmostofwhatisknowninUSlawschoolsas‘constitutionallaw’wouldbenothingofthekind.

Thingsaregettingoutofhand.Apowershouldnotbeclassifiedasrevocable,forourpurposes,merelybecauseitsrevocationisimaginable.EvenifCongressandtheSupremeCourttogethercontrolandalwaysconspiretodenyaccesstotheonlyprocessbywhichtheirownpowerscouldimaginablyberevoked,thenthosepowers,albeitdelegated,areirrevocableenoughtoqualifyasconstitutionalpowers.Atthispoint(p.186) attentionreturnstothequestionsofloyalty—theloyaltyofpettyofficialsandtheloyaltyofthewiderpopulation—whichwetoucheduponinSectionI.UnflinchingrefusalofCongressandtheSupremeCourttograntanapplicationforanArticleVConventioncouldimaginablybeovercome,butonlybymassdefectiontorivalinstitutions.Ifweregardthe1787constitution—theoneheaded‘TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica’—asthetrueUSconstitution,thenthatmassdefectionwouldqualifyasanewAmericanrevolution.If,ontheotherhand,wedenythatthe1787documentisthetrueUSconstitution,treatingitasameredelegatingact,thensuchmassdefectionwould


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arguablybenomorethanacoup.59Eitherway,however,itwouldbeausurpationoflegalpowersundertheconstitution,foroneitherviewitisonlybyusurpationthatthepowertocallanArticleVConventioncanbewrestledfromthehandsofaperistentlyrefusnikCongressandCourt.Andoncethepossibilityofusurpationhasbeenopenedup,wearenolongertalkingaboutamendment,understoodasalawfulmodeofconstitutionalchange.Wearechangingthesubject.60

Wemayconclude,withasighofrelief,thatthePresidency,Congress,andtheSupremeCourtarenotmereadministrativebodiesregulatedbyajumpedupkindofadministrativelaw.Theyareconstitutionalbodiesandtheyareconstitutionalbodiesbecausetheirpowers,althoughdelegatedtothemandhencenotstrictlyspeakinginherentororiginal,aredelegatedtothemirrevocablybythe1787constitution,asamended.ThisturnsouttobetrueirrespectiveofwhetheranArticleVConvention,ifcalled,wouldbeareawakeningofthe1787Convention.

WehavetakenalongdetourintothedimmerrecessesoftheUSconstitution.Thepointwasmainlytoillustratearealisticpossibility.Thepossibilityisthattheultimaterulesofrecognitionofalegalsystemmayidentifydifferentinstitutionsfromthosementionedinitsultimaterulesofadjudicationandchange.ThisseemstobethecaseintheUS.TheultimaterulesofrecognitionofthefederalUS,likeallultimate(p.187) rulesofrecognitionaroundtheglobeandthroughouthistory,areindeterminateinnumerousrespects.61ButfederalUSlawisbynowentirelydeterminateintreatingthe1787constitution,asamended,asitsconstitution.ThisisthecustomoftheSupremeCourtandofalltheotherfederalcourtsandofotherauthoritativelaw‐applyingagencies.Thereislittledoubt,then,thatoneoftheultimaterulesofrecognitionoftheUSsayssomethinglike:‘Whateverislaiddownintheconstitutionproducedbythe1787PhiladelphiaConvention,asamended,islaw.’NoticethatthisruledoesnotmentionCongress,thePresident,ortheSupremeCourt.Theyarementionedforthefirsttimeonlyintherulesofchangeandadjudicationthatareinthe1787constitution.

Soconstitutionalauthorities—togobacktoouroriginalproblem—neednotbeidentifiedinthesystem'sultimaterulesofrecognition,eveninthatruleofrecognitionbyvirtueofwhichtheyareconstitutionalauthorities.Iftheconstitutionisawrittenone,only(theauthorof)62thewrittenconstitutionneedbeidentifiedintherelevantruleofrecognition,whilethemainconstitutionalinstitutionsarethoseidentifiedinthewrittenconstitution.Bythisroutetoowefindthatacustomaryruleofrecognitioncanbesquaredwithawrittenconstitution.

IV.WhatIhavesaidsofarwasdesignedtofendoffacertainsetofobjectionstotheideathatconstitutionscanbewritten.Itdidsobytweakingthescopeofconstitutionallawtocoverirrevocablydelegatedpowersaswellasinherentororiginalpowers,bydistinguishingtherulesthatidentifyaconstitutionalinstitutionfromthosethatregulateit,andbyplacingtheruleofrecognitionofalegalsystemoutside(above)theconstitutionitself.Actually,tobemoreexact,weonlyplacedtheruleofrecognitionabovethelawoftheconstitution.


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WeshouldalwayskeepinmindtheimportantwarningattheendofSectionIandrepeatedmore(p.188) thanoncealready.Constitutionsarenotexhaustedbytheirlaw.Ineverycountrywithaconstitution,andhenceineverycountrywithalegalsystem,therearealsoconstitutionalruleswhicharedistinguishedfromtherestoftheconstitutionpreciselyinbeingrulesofwhichtheauthoritativelaw‐applyinginstitutionsdonotgettomakeauthoritativeapplications.Thismakesspacefortheretobeactionswhichareunconstitutionalbutwhichareneitherillegalnorlegallyinvalid.Theroleofthisfactmayvaryfromlegalsystemtolegalsystem.IntheUKitisafairlyprominentaspectoftheconstitution.IntheUSitislessprominent,but—aswejustsawinsubsectionII.3—itiscertainlynotabsent.

Isanultimateruleofrecognitiononeofthoserulesofwhichthelaw‐applyinginstitutionsdonotgettomakeauthoritativeapplications?Isitinthatway(althoughplainlynotinotherways)akintoaDiceyan‘conventionoftheconstitution’?Hartseemstohavethoughtasmuch.63Ofcourse,heinsistedthateveryultimateruleofrecognitionisarulemadebytheauthoritativelaw‐applyinginstitutionsofthatlegalsystemofwhichitisaruleofrecognition.Buthethoughtthatitwasmadebythecustomsoftheofficialsofthoseinstitutionsinthecourseofexercisingtheirauthorityoverotherthings,notinexercisingauthorityovertheultimaterulesofrecognitionthemselves.64Authoritativelaw‐applyinginstitutions,typicallycourts,gettodecidecasesauthoritatively.Inallbutthemostrudimentarylegalsystems,whentheydecidecasesauthoritativelythehighercourts(notonlyandnotalwayscourtsofinherentjurisdiction)alsogettomakeakindoflawknownascaselaw.Thisisakindofunwrittenlawthatisfoundinthepremissesoftheargumentsthathighercourtsusetoarriveattheirauthoritativedecisions.Itdiffersinseveralwaysfromtheircustomarylawinforo.65Forastart,case‐lawcanbemadebyonelaw‐applyingofficial(oronecommitteeofsuchofficials)inonecase—byasingleexerciseofjudicialauthority—whereascustomarylawinfororequiresforitsexistenceatemporallyextendedpatternofrelevantlyconvergentbehaviourbymultiplelaw‐applyingofficials.Whycouldn'tanultimateruleofrecognitionbemadebythecase‐lawmethodinsteadofbythecustomary‐lawmethod?Hartdidnotexplain.Maybehedidnotappreciatethatcase(p.189) lawdiffersfrombothlegislatedlawandcustomarylaw.Certainlyhetendedtospeakofjudge‐madelaw,whennotcustomary,aslegislated.66Subsequentdiscussionoftheissuehasbeenhamperednotonlybyrepetitionofthiserror,butalsobythetendency(towhich,aswesaw,Hartalsogavesomesuccour)toconfuserulesofrecognitionontheonehandwithrulesofadjudicationandchangeontheother.

Itwouldtakeustoofarafieldtopursuetheseproblemsabouttheruleofrecognitionhere.Butourremarksaboutjudge‐madelaw,includingjudicialcontributionstotheconstitutionalrulesofadjudicationandchange,provokeanewquestionaboutwrittenconstitutions.Perhapstherecanbewrittenconstitutions—Ihavejustarguedthattherecan—butcantherebeentirelywrittenconstitutions?TomaketheissuelesscomplexIwillsetasidethosepartsoftheconstitutionthatarenotconstitutionallaw(theDiceyan‘conventionsoftheconstitution’)aswellastheultimaterulesofrecognitionofthesystem.Somyquestionisthis:Can(therestof)constitutionallawbeentirelywritten?Ormustitalwaysalsoincludesomecustomarylaworcaselaw?


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Theanswerseemsplainenough.Onthedayitisenactedanewconstitutioniswhollywrittenlaw.Butthatdaydoesnotlast.Assoonasripedisputesbegintoarisethatconcernthemeaningofconstitutionalprovisions,writtenconstitutionallawinevitablyneedstobefilledoutwithcaselawand/orcustomarylaw.Whatiswrittenintheconstitutionneedstobeinvestedwithmoredeterminatemeaning,andbyandlargethishastobedoneatthepointofitsauthoritativeapplication,principallybyjudges.Withthepassageoftime,suchjudge‐madelawtendstopredominateoverthepartsofconstitutionallawthatexistapartfromit.Withthepassageoftime,oneknowsanever‐smallerproportionofthelawoftheconstitution—oratanyrateanever‐smallerproportionofthematerialthatgoestomakeupthelawoftheconstitution—simplybyreadingtheconstitutionaltext.

Likeotherthingswehavesaid,thisplainanswermaystrikesomeaspoliticalexplosive.ItmayseemtoleadusstraightintothebigcontroversiesofcontemporaryUSconstitutionallaw.Intheredcorner,(p.190) ladiesandgentlemen,thosewhoinsistthattheconstitutionisfoundinwhatwaswrittenandnothingbutwhatwaswrittenbythe1787foundersandtheirauthorizedlegislativeamenders.Andinthebluecorner,thosewhosaythattheconstitutionisalivingbodyoflawandshouldnotberegardedasfrozenintimeatthemomentofenactment.Isthisthefightwearegettinginto?No.NothingIhavejustsaidtakessidesinthisoranyotherdebateabouthowtheUSconstitutionshouldbeinterpreted.Idonotdoubt,ofcourse,theprofoundpoliticalsignificanceofsuchdebatesand—especiallywhenthedisputantsareSupremeCourtjudges—theirhugepotentialconsequencesforthefuturedirectionofAmerica.Myonlypointisthis.InasmuchasthesedebateshavehugepotentialconsequencesforthefuturedirectionofAmerica,thatisbecausetheyhavehugepotentialconsequencesforthefuturedevelopmentofAmericanconstitutionallaw.AndtheyhavehugepotentialconsequencesforthefuturedevelopmentofAmericanconstitutionallawpreciselybecause,inbothcorners,wehavepeoplewithproposalsforhowAmericanconstitutionallawshouldbedeveloped.Bothsidesareassumingthatitwillbedeveloped,andthatitwillbedevelopedbyjudges.Theonlyquestionis,howwillitbedeveloped?Whichwayarethejudgestotakeit?Bothsides—orsinceitisnotreallyatwo‐cornerfight,Ishouldreallysayallsides—mustbeinagreementthatUSconstitutionallawisnotjustwhatiscontainedinthetextofthewrittenconstitution.Forallofthemitmustalsoincludejudge‐madelaw.Forifitdidnotincludejudge‐madelawtherewouldbenopointinfightingoverhowjudgesshouldmakeconstitutionaldecisions.TheonlypossiblereasonforchoosingatextualistSupremeCourtnomineeoverapurposivist,oranoriginalist‐textualistoverastrict‐constructionist‐textualist,oraoriginal‐intent‐originalistoveranoriginal‐meaning‐originalist,orindeedabaggistoveraraggist,isthateachofthem,oratanyrateeachofthemincombinationwithsomelike‐mindedjudges,willhavethepowertochangethelawoftheconstitutionbygivingtheconstitutionameaningdifferentfromtheonethatitwouldhaveundertheauthorityofajudgeoracombinationofjudgesfromsomerivalcamp.

Aren'tthereafewelaboratetheoreticalpositions,inthesedebatesoverconstitutionalinterpretation,thatgenuinelyincludethepropositionthatjudgesdon'tchangethelaw?Doesn'tRonaldDworkinfamouslysayexactlythat?Atanyrate,doesn'thesaythatwhen


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judges(p.191) gettheirdecisionsonpointsofconstitutionallawright—whentheygive‘rightanswers’—alltheyaredoingisapplyingthelawthatisalreadyintheconstitution,albeitmaybeimplicitlyratherthanexplicitly?67IdoubtwhetherDworkinstillholdsthisview.68Possiblyheneverheldit.69Butconsideritsimplications.Itsimplicationsincludethatjudgesonlychangethelawoftheconstitutionwhentheygettheirdecisionswrong.Itfollowsthat,accordingtothisview,constitutionallawmayonlyeverbechangedfortheworsebyjudges,foreachchangenecessarilyintroducesyetanothererror.Better,then,ifthelawdoesn'tchangeatall.Butthenifitshouldneverchangeatall,judgesshouldneverhaveaddedallthecaselawthattheyaddedduringthecoupleofcenturiesthattheyhavedoneso.Betteriftheyhadansweredeachquestionoflawbysaying:‘Justusewhatyoualreadyhave,it'sallthere.Don'tcomebotheringus.’Onthisreadingofhis‘rightanswer’thesis,Dworkindoesnotbecomeamereclosettextualist.HedepartsevenfromthemainstreamtextualistviewinholdingthatjudgesshouldnotdevelopUSconstitutionallawineitheratextualistoranopposing,moreinnovative,direction.TheyshouldnotdevelopUSconstitutionallawatall.Ateachmomenttheygivethe‘rightanswer’onlyiftheyleavethelawexactlyasitis,completewithallthepreviousaccumulatederrors.

Thisisacrazyview,whichexplainswhyIamreluctanttoascribeittoDworkin.Evenifheonceheldthiscrazyview,however,itwouldhavebeenhardforhimtodenythat(worseluck!)therehasbeenahugejudicialcontributiontoUSconstitutionallaw.Evenifthejudgesshouldnothaveaddedtoit,theyhaveaddedtoit.Thankstothemthereisalotmoreofitnowthantherewasin1790,orin1832,orin1896,orin1926,orevenin1964.Andsincejudgesarefalliblehumanbeingsliketherestofusithadtobethatway.Soevenifonesays,crazily,thatjudiciallaw‐makingisalwayserroneous,onecannotavoidreachingthesameresult:Anyconstitutionthatprovidesforauthoritativeadjudicationsregarding(p.192) itsownapplicationcannotbutbetosomeextentalivingconstitution,i.e.cannotbutcontainlesslawatitsinceptionthanitcomestocontainlater.

Itistemptingtoconcludefromallthisthataconstitutioncannotbeentirelywritten.Fromsoonafteritsbirth,itseems,thewrittenconstitutionmustconstituteonlypartoftheconstitution,therestbeingmadeupofjudge‐madelaw.70Butdoesthatfollow?Letmesuggesttwowaysinwhichitisapttomislead.

First,possiblythelawoftheconstitution(orconstitutionallaw)shouldnotbethoughtofasidenticalwiththeconstitutionitself,evenifwerestrictourattentiontothepartsoftheconstitutionthatformpartofthelaw.Wecanbearthisthoughtoutsomewhatbyconsideringtwowaysofrespondingtothequestion:Whatdoestheconstitutionhavetosayaboutthis?Oneresponsewouldbetohandoverthedocument,thecanonicaltext,assumingoneisinacountrythathasone.Arivalresponsewouldbetomentionacase,ajudicialdecisioninconstitutionallaw,whichisrelevanttotheissue.Bothareintelligibleresponsesbuttheirrivalryshowsthatthereare,whereconstitutionsareconcerned,atleasttworivalobjectsofinterpretation.Thereistheconstitutionaldocument,thetext,asonepossibleobjectofinterpretation.Andthenthereisconstitutionallaw,therules,asanotherpossibleobjectofinterpretation.Theyarenotthesamebuttheyoftenbearthe


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samename.Manyconfusionsinconstitutionaltheorycomeofafailuretoclarifywhichobjectofinterpretationisatstakeinwhichdebates.Ihazardaguessthatmuchofthedebatebetweenthedifferent‘‐isms’ofUSconstitutionalinterpretationiscrippledbysuchconfusions,andwouldbebetterabandonedandrestartedinentirelydifferent(andIdaretohope,lessphilosophicallypretentious)terms.

Second,onepossiblelinkbetweenthetwopossibleobjectsofinterpretationjustmentioned—constitutionallawandthecanonicalconstitutionaltext—isthattheformermaypresentitselfasaninterpretationofthelatter.Inotherwordsinterpretingconstitutionallawispartlyasecond‐orderactivityinwhichoneinterpretstheattemptsandclaimsofothers,mainlyjudges,tobeinterpretingacanonicaltext.(p.193) Interpretingatextisexplaining(orexhibiting)somemeaningthatithas.71Thistruthaboutinterpretationhasledsometothinkthat,inasmuchasconstitutionalcaselawhasinterpretedtheconstitutionaltexttoincludenormsthatarenotalreadypartofitsmeaning,thatcannotcountasinterpretation.Butitisnopartoftheconceptofinterpretationthatthemeaningoneexplainsbyinterpretingmustalreadybepartofthetextbeforeonesointerpretsit.Onemayalsointerpretatextbygivingitsomemeaning,suchthatithasthatmeaningfromnowoninvirtueofone'shavinggivenit.72Thereareundoubtedlymoralandpoliticalquestionsabouthowinnovative,orhowretrievalist,oneshouldbeonacertaininterpretativeoccasion,butnoneoftheseissettledbytheconceptofinterpretation.Thissuggeststhatwecanaffordtotakeamoreexpansiveviewofwhatawrittenconstitution,andwrittenlawmoregenerally,is.Wecanincludeundertheheadingof‘writtenlaw’boththetextanditsmeaning(forwithoutmeaningthereisnolawinthetext)andweshouldincludeinitsmeaningwhatevermeaningithas,legallyspeaking.Thisincludesmeaningthatwasauthoritativelyextractedfromitbyinterpretativeretrieversaswellasmeaningthatwasauthoritativelyattachedtoitbyinterpretativeinnovators.

Ofcoursetheremaybesomemeaningsthatwereauthoritativelyattachedtoitandthenauthoritativelyremoved(bythejudicialoverrulingordistinguishingofanearliercase,orbyachangeinjudicialcustom).Butuntilsucharemovaltakesplace,allthemeaningisthere.Totheextentthatitconflicts,andthoseconflictsarenotresolvedbylegalrulesforrankingtheconflictinginterpretations(suchasrulesofstaredecisis),itleavesthelawoftheconstitutioncorrepondinglyindeterminate.Theindeterminacycomesnotoftherebeingtoolittleconstitutionallaw,butoftherebeingtoomuch.Notonlyarethereinconsistentbutcoexistinglegalrulesaboutjudicialreviewoflegislation,constitutionalamendment,thedomesticreccognitionofinternationallaw,andsoon.Therearealsoinconsistentbutcoexistinglegal(p.194) rulesfordeterminingwhattheconstitutionsaysaboutsuchthings,i.e.forinterpretingtheconstitution.73

Thinkingthiswayputscontroversiesaboutinterpretativetechniqueintheirplace.Theyarestraightforwardmoralandpoliticaldebatesaboutwhatjudgesshoulddowhentheyinterpret,debateswhichconcedeonallsidesthatwhicheverwayjudgeslean—moreretrievalistormoreinnovative—theychangethemeaningofthetextaccordingly.Forourpurposesthemoststartlingimplicationofthisisalsoasimpleone.Wherethereisawrittenconstitution,thereisnologicalobstacletothewholelawoftheconstitutionbeing


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writtenlaw.Forthereisnologicalobstacletoitsallbeingcontainedinthetext,eitherbecauseitwasfoundtherebysubsequentjudgmentsofcourtsorbecauseitwasputtherebysubsequentjudgmentsofcourts.Writtenconstitutions,inshort,maybeentirelywrittenconstitutions,fortheirdevelopmentsincaselaw,bywayofinterpretation,cannotbutbecomepartoftheirmeaningquawritten.74

Notes:

ThischapterisdedicatedtothememoryofNeilMacCormick1941–2009.Averyearlydraftwaspresentedasapubliclecturetocelebratethe25thAnniversaryofSouthernMethodistUniversity'sLawPrograminOxford.LaterdraftsofthepaperwerepresentedattheUniversitiesofPalermoandGirona.Manythankstomyhostsandaudiencesontheseoccasionsforinspiringdiscussion.ThanksespeciallytoJohnAttanasioofSMUforvaluablepointsthataretakenupinsubsectionIII.3below.InfinalizingthetextIalsobenefitedfromthedetailedandexpertcommentsofNickBarber,LesGreen,andananonymousreviewer.

(1)TheConceptofLaw(Oxford,1961),95–6.HereafterabbreviatedasCL.

(2)Forapredictablyexcellenttheoreticaltreatment,seeNeilMacCormick,QuestioningSovereignty(Oxford,1999),ch4.ForasimilarlyexcellentdiscussionofthelikeproblemoftheindividuationoflegalsystemsintheEuropeanCommunity,seeJulieDickson,‘HowManyLegalSystems?SomePuzzlesRegardingtheIdentityConditionsof,andRelationsBetween,LegalSystemsintheEuropeanUnion’,Problema2(2008),9.

(3)Forthenow‐abandonedconstitutionaltextseeOfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunitiesC310/01(2004).MadsAndenasandItriedtointroducesomeofthetheoreticalissuesunderlyingthepoliticaldebatein‘CanEuropeHaveaConstitution?’,King'sCollegeLawJournal12(2001),1—inparticulartheideaofa‘capital‐CConstitution’,whichIwillnotmakeuseofhere.

(4)ContrastNeilMacCormick,‘DoestheUnitedKingdomHaveaConstitution?ReflectionsonMacCormickvLordAdvocate’,NorthernIrelandLegalQuarterly29(1978),1.

(5)Thusthegrandly‐titledConstitutionalReformAct2005hasyettoestablishitsconstitutionalcredentials.LikewisetheConstitutionAct1982,whichdidnothaveconstitutionaleffectatthetimeofitsenactmentbutonlylater:seeManuelvAttorneyGeneral[1983]Ch77,discussedbelown.8.

(6)Isay‘constituted’ratherthan‘recognized’becausearguablytheEuropeanCommission,whichisconstitutedbytheEuropeanCommunityconstitutionnottheUKconstitution,hasneverthelesscometoberecognizedbytheUKconstitutionasaprimarylegislatorwhoseenactmentsarecapableofbindingParliament.SeeFactortamevSecretaryofStateforTransport[1991]AC603at658–9perLordBridgeforastrongjudicialstatementtothateffect.


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(7)WhichisnottosaythatnootherprimarylegislatorisconstitutedbytheUKconstitution.ThereisalsothePrivyCouncil,whichmakesOrdersinCouncilasaprimarylegislatorunder(whatisleftof)theRoyalPrerogative:CouncilofCivilServiceUnionsv.MinisterfortheCivilService[1985]AC374at399,perLordFraserofTullybelton.Isay‘whatisleftof’becausetheseOrdersdonotbindParliament.TheymaybeandoftenhavebeencountermandedandsupersededbyActsofParliament,andwiththemthosepartsoftheRoyalPrerogativetowhichtheypertained.Therearealso,aseparatematter,OrdersinCouncilthatserveasdelegatedlegislationunderActsofParliament.

(8)SeeManuelvAttorneyGeneral[1983]Ch77at87–9perMegarryVCforinterestingobiterdiscussionofthesecondquestion.At89,MegarryVCdistinguisheswhatisitispossibleforParliamenttodo‘asamatterofabstractlaw’fromwhatitispossibletodo‘effectively’.Onereasonwhythequestionisimponderable,however,isthatthisdistinctioncollapsestooquickly.Theremustbeasupportingpractice(ameasureofeffectiveness)amonglaw‐applyingofficialsbeforealegislaturecandoanything,evenasamatterofabstractlaw.Here,asHartrathercrypticallyputit,‘allthatsucceedsissuccess’:CL,149.

(9)ThoburnvSunderlandCityCouncil[2002]QB151at186–7perLawsLJ;JacksonvAttorneyGeneral[2006]1AC262.

(10)Howdoestheexpress/implieddistinctionrelatetothedeliberate/accidentalone?IamassumingthatParliamentalwayshastheabilitytosaywhatitmeans,sothatifitintendsacertainchangenottotakeplace,itmayalwayssayso.Forfurtherdiscussionofthesedistinctionsasappliestolegislatedlaw,aswellastocaselaw,seemy‘SomeTypesofLaw’inDouglasEdlin(ed.),CommonLawTheory(Cambridge,2007).

(11)PoliticalConstitutionalism:ARepublicanDefenceoftheConstitutionalityofDemocracy(Cambridge,2007),5.Bellamy'smainaiminthisbookistodefendtheUKdoctrineofParliamentarySovereigntyagainstthosewhowouldliketheretobeajudicialpowertoinvalidateheld‐to‐be‐odiousprovisionsofActsofParliament.Thisdebateabout‘constitutionaljudicialreview’willbeofnoconcerntoushere.Itisonlyveryindirectlyrelatedtothequestionofhowmuchoftheconstitutionshouldbelegalized.AndeachofthesequestionsisonlyveryindirectlyrelatedtothequestionofwhethertheUKcouldorshouldhaveawrittenconstitution.Awrittenconstitutionisnotthesameas,andneednotinclude,abillofrights,letaloneonethatallowsforjudicialinvalidationofprimarylegislation.Bellamyseemstomixthesequestionsup.

(12)Ibid.5,citingMartinShapiro's‘PoliticalJurisprudence’,KentuckyLawJournal52(1964),294.

(13)Arevisionistviewofthedoctrine,defendedbyIvorJenningsinTheLawandtheConstitution(London,1959)andbyR.V.HeustoninhisEssaysinConstitutionalLaw(London,1964),andrecentlyrevivedbyJeffreyGoldsworthyinTheSovereigntyofParliament(Oxford,1999)wouldhaveitthatsovereigntyispartly‘self‐embracing’:Parliamentcanbinditssuccessorsastothe‘mannerandform’offuturelegislationbut


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notastoitscontent.IdoubtwhetherUKlawdrawsoreverdrewsuchadistinction,butmyformulationofthedoctrinehereisintendedtoremainagnosticonthepoint.

(14)InPracticalReasonandNorms(London,1975),at134–7,JosephRazcallstherelevantlaw‐appliersthe‘primarylaw‐applyingorgans’ofthesystem.

(15)Inanunfortunatelymuch‐quotedpassage,Hartboiledallthisdownto‘acomplex…practiceofthecourts,officials,andprivatepersons’(CL,107).Butashepromptlymadeclearinless‐quotedpassages(110–11,113),hewasreferringtoseveralrelatedpractices.Weshoulddistinguish(a)thecourts’practiceofapplyingcertainrulesasrulesoflaw;(b)apracticeamongpettyofficialsofsubmittingtotherulingsofthecourts;and(c)apracticeofthewiderpopulationofsubmittingto,oratleastnotdefying,thosepettyofficials(whetherbecausetheyareofficialsoflaworotherwise).If(b)and(c)go,sotoodoes(a):withoutwidespreadefficacy,thesearenolongerthecourts,andthisisnolongerthelegalsystem.

(16)AsDwightEisenhowerfamouslyshowedon24Sept.1957inLittleRock,Arkansas,invokingpowersunderArticleIoftheUSconstitution,togetherwiththemightofthe101stAirborneDivision,tocompelthefidelityoftheArkansasNationalGuardtotheorderofafederaljudge.Aperhapslessheroicexample,fromUKcoloniallawandpolicy,isMadzimbamutovLardner‐Burke[1969]1AC645,someofthebackgroundofwhichisdiscussedinH.H.Marshall,‘TheLegalEffectsofUDI(basedonMadzimbamutovLardner‐Burke)’,InternationalandComparativeLawQuarterly17(1968),1022.

(17)A.V.Dicey,IntroductiontotheStudyoftheLawoftheConstitution(London,1885),23–4.

(18)RvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironmentexparteNottinghamshireCountyCouncil[1986]AC240at250–1perLordScarman,wherethisself‐denialisitselfelevatedtothestatusofconventionoftheconstitution.

(19)Orthattheyregardtheconstitutionasthemostsociallyimportant,letalonesociallydesirable,partofpublicculture.ArguablyBellamyandotherswithsimilarviewsdecryexcessivelegalismabouttheconstitutiononlytofallintoasimilartrapatthenextlevelbybeingexcessivelyconstitutionalistaboutpolitics,oratthenextlevelstillbybeingexcessivelypoliticalaboutlife.

(20)Boththesetermsalsohaveothermeanings.Insomecontexts,e.g.inArticleIIIoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,‘originaljurisdiction’iscontrastedwith‘appellatejurisdiction’.Inthesenseintendedhere,however,anappellatejurisdictionmayalsobeanoriginalone.Itisoriginal,orinherent,inbeingajurisdiction‘which,asthenameindicates,requiresnoauthorizingprovision’:RvForbesexparteBevan(1972)127CLR1at7perMenziesJ.

(21)TheexampleofthePrivyCouncilshowsthatsomeinstitutionsfallunderbothheadings.Dependingonthesubject‐matter,thePrivyCouncilactseitherasa


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constitutionalinstitution,makingprimarylegislationundertheRoyalPrerogative,orasadelegateinstitution,makingsecondarylegislationontheParliamentaryauthorityoftheStatutoryInstrumentsAct1946(seen.7above).

(22)TheCourtwascreatedfromscratchbytheJudicatureAct1873.SeeLordJusticeCohen,‘Jurisdiction,PracticeandProcedureintheCourtofAppeal’,CambridgeLawJournal11(1951),3.AcriminaljurisdictionwasaddedbytheCriminalAppealAct1966,transferringthepowersoftheCourtofCriminalAppeal,itselfcreatedbytheCriminalAppealsAct1907:RvCollins[1970]1QB710at713–14;RvShannon[1975]AC717at745–8and756–7.

(23)HereIonceagainstressthatwearetalkingaboutconstitutionallaw.Thehumblelegalpositionofthepolice(whichisbelowtheconstitutionalradar)iscounteractedbypowerfulconstitutionalconventions(whichlendthepoliceavastconstitutionalimportance).Forbrilliantanalysis,seeGeoffreyMarshall,ConstitutionalConventions(Oxford,1984),ch.8.

(24)ThesedaysthearmedforcesarepredominantlyregulatedbyActofParliament.Howeverthepowertodeploytroops,andtodeclarewarorpeace,stillbelongstotheRoyalPrerogative,albeitwithanemergingconstitutionalconventionthatParliament'sconsentisrequiredfordeployment:HouseofLordsSelectCommitteeontheConstitution,WagingWar:Parliament'sRoleandResponsibility,voli(HL236.1,London2006),34–5.

(25)CanadaTrustCovStolzenberg[1997]4AllER983perMillettLJat989.

(26)JohnLaws,‘Illegality:TheProblemofJurisdiction’,inM.SupperstoneandJ.Goudie(eds.),JudicialReview(1stedn.,London1991),69–70.AsHartshows,usingtheUKdoctrineofParliamentarySovereigntytoillustrate,thereisnosuchthingasaninstitutionwithunlimitedpowers:CL,145–6.(Butnotethat‘unlimitedjurisdiction’isusedbymanylawyersasamisleadingbutotherwiseinnocentsynonymforwhatIamcallinginherentororiginaljurisdiction.See,e.g.R(ontheapplicationofCartetal)vTheUpperTribunaletal[2009]EWHC3052,perLawsLJ.)

(27)InthisformulationIamguardingagainsttwoerrors.(a)AsinHart'smostcarefulformulations(e.g.CL,112)Ispeakofultimaterulesofrecognitionbecausethereareplentyof(hereirrelevant)lower‐levelrulesofrecognitionineverylegalsystem,e.g.thoseidentifyingapoliceofficerasanissueroflegallybindingtrafficsignals,thoseidentifyingalocalcouncilasthesourceoflegallybindingplanningdecisions,etc.(b)Ialsospeakofultimaterulesofrecognition(plural).Hartsometimessuggestedthateachlegalsystemhasonlyoneultimateruleofrecognition.Notso.Allbutthemostrudimentarylegalsystemshaveseveralultimaterulesofrecognition,theinevitableconflictsbetweenwhichmaywellcometoaheadonlyonrareoccasionswhentheyhaveimplicationslowerdownthesystem.Hartsometimessuggestedthattherecouldbenosuchconflicts.Theremustbeatransitiverankingofthevariousvalidity‐criteriaofeachlegalsystem,andhenceasingleruleprovidingtheranking:CL,103.HoweverHartisnotentirely


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consistentaboutthis.SeeCL,92fortalkofasystem's‘rulesofrecognition’inthepluralandtheconcessionaryremarkthat‘provisionmaybemadefortheirpossibleconflict’(emphasisadded).ForthepurposesofthispaperIwilloverlookHart'sapparentindecisiononthispointandtalkasifheheldthecorrectpluralistview.HowevermostofwhatIsaycouldbeadaptedtositnolesscomfortablywiththerivalmonistview.

(28)JeremyBentham,ACommentontheCommentariesandAFragmentonGovernment,ed.BurnsandHart(London,1977),182–4.

(29)CL,103–7.

(30)Seee.g.LaurenceH.Tribe,‘TakingTextandStructureSeriously:ReflectionsonFree‐FormMethodinConstitutionalInterpretation’,HarvardLawReview108(1995),1221at1246–7;CharlesFried,‘Foreward:Revolutions?’,HarvardLawReview109(1996),13at26n.66;FrankI.Michelman,‘ConstitutionalAuthorship’,inLarryAlexander(ed.),Constitutionalism:PhilosophicalFoundations(Cambridge,1998)at70–2.Foranon‐reductiouse,seeMichaelDorf,‘ConLawin12,008’,〈http://www.michaeldorf.org/2008/06/con‐law‐in‐12008.html〉.

(31)Seee.g.CL,95,whereHartspokeofaruleofrecognition‘confer[ring]jurisdiction’.Formoreanalysisofthispassage,seen.43below.

(32)CL,95:the‘heartofalegalsystem’is‘thecombinationofprimaryrulesofobligationwiththesecondaryrulesofrecognition,change,andadjudication’.

(33)CL,93and94.

(34)JosephRaz,TheConceptofaLegalSystem(Oxford,1970),198–9;NeilMacCormick,H.L.A.Hart(London,1981),103–6.

(35)KentGreenawaltreportsthat,incorrespondence,Hartconfessedto‘aslip’inpresentingthisasacompletestatementoftherule,omittingthefurthercriteriaconcerningcaselaw,customarylaw,andothertypesofprimarylegislation:Greenawalt,‘TheRuleofRecognitionandtheConstitution’,MichiganLawReview85(1987),621at631n.30.ButthiswasnotHart'sslip.Hewasrighttoregardthisasacompletestatementoftherule.Hewaswrong,however,toregardthisruleastheUK'sonlyultimateruleofrecognition,forthereareseveralotherrulesrelatingtocaselaw,etc.Seen.27above.

(36)ItdoesnotfollowthatParliamentcannotbeboundinitslaw‐makingbyotherduty‐imposinglaws,includingduty‐imposinglawsoftheconstitution.However,theonlyexamplesIknowofarefoundinEuropeanCommunityLawthatisincorporatedintoUKlaw,e.g.thecompensationdutyinJoinedCases46/93&48/93,BrasserieduPècheurSAvGermanyandRvSecretaryofStateforTransportexparteFactortameLtd(1996)1CMLR889.ThesituationwhereParliament‘binds’itssuccessorParliaments,iftherecanbesuchasituation,isnotacaseofdutiesimposedbutofpowersremoved.


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(37)Waldron,‘WhoNeedsRulesofRecognition?’,inM.AdlerandK.Himma(eds.),TheRuleofRecognitionandtheUSConstitution(NewYork,2009),343.

(38)Ortograntingpermissions.Noteverygrantofpermissionaffectstheincidenceorforceofaduty.Insteaditmayconflictwithaduty.Formorediscussionofpowerstoempowerandpermit,seemy‘JustificationunderAuthority’,CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence23(2010),71.

(39)InHart'sterms,theoneidea‘involves’theother:CL,39.AtthispointHartisdismantlingKelsen'sview,setoutinGeneralTheoryofLawandState,trans.Wedberg(Cambridge,Mass.,1945),53–4,thatthereisonlyonelegalnormhere,andthatwhatlookslikeasecondismerelyafragmentofthefirst.

(40)CL,35–41.

(41)Acommonmistakeistothinkthateveryrule,theexistenceofwhichisentailedbyalegalruleisalsoalegalrule.Whyisthisamistake?SeeJ.Raz,‘LegalRights’,OxfordJournalofLegalStudies4(1984),1at9–12.

(42)SeeMacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,108–11,showingthatasearchforlogicalprioritybetweenthethreetypesofrulesisill‐fated.ThisledMacCormicktosuspectaviciouscircularity.Buthelatercametoseethatthesuspicionwasunfounded:seehisH.L.A.Hart(2ndedn.,Stanford,2008),151.

(43)ThisreturnsustothepassageatCL,95whereHartsaysthattheremaybearuleofrecognitionthatis‘also’aruleofadjudicationconferringjurisdictiononsomelaw‐applyingbody.Thissuggestsidentity,notentailment.HoweverHartquicklygoesontospeak,morecarefully,oftwo‘inseparable’rules,onearuleofrecognition,theotheraruleofadjudication.

(44)CL,108.

(45)Kelsen,GeneralTheoryofNorms(Oxford,1991),256.IamnotdenyingthatKelsen'sfictitiousbasicnormmightsupplyagoodanswertosomeotherphilosophicalquestion.Possiblyithelpsustounderstandthenormativityoflaweventhoughitfailsasanattempttoexplainthepossibilityoflegalvalidity.

(46)CL,108.

(47)CL,246.

(48)Hesaysthatitis‘particularlyclear’ofunwrittenconstitutions,notthatitisparticulartothem:CL,246.

(49)Raz,TheConceptofaLegalSystem,198.

(50)ItisworthrememberingthatwhenhewritesthesewordsHartisbendingover


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backwardstodistinguishhisultimaterulesofrecognitionfromKelsen'sbasicnorm.Hemaywellbebendingtoofar.HerightlypointsoutthatKelsen'sbasicnormalwayshasthesamecontent,roughly:‘oneshouldalwaysandonlyobeythehistoricallyfirstconstitution’.Hartisrightthat,unlikethisbasicnorm,ultimaterulesofrecognitionhavediversecontent,varyingfromtimetotimeandfromlegalsystemtolegalsystem:CL245–6.Itdoesnotfollow,however,thattherearenoultimaterulesofrecognitionanywherewithcontentakintothatoftheKelsenianbasicnorm.Norwouldtheredundancyofthiscontentquacontentofabasicnormentailitsredundancyquacontentofanultimateruleofrecognition,sinceaKelsenianbasicnormandanultimateruleofrecognitiondodifferentjobsandarenotrivalsforthesameexplanatoryspace.SeeStanleyPaulson,‘ChristianDahlman'sReflectionsontheBasicNorm’,ArchivfürRechtsundSozialphilosophie91(2005),96at105.

(51)Althoughnotofcourseallthepowersofthevariousstatelegalsystems,allofwhichhavetheirownultimaterulesofrecognitionandchangeandadjudication.SeeGreenawalt,‘TheRuleofRecognitionandtheConstitution’,at645–7.Curiously,havingexplainedthatstateinstitutionsarenotdelegatesoffederalinstitutions,andsoenjoyrecognitionalindependenceoffederallaw,Greenawaltgoesontoformulateasinglelistofcriteriaofrecognitionfor‘theAmericanlegalsystem’asseenfrom‘someplacewithintheUnitedStates’,consolidatingfederalandstatecriteria:ibid.659.Healsopresentsthesecriteriaasaddinguptoasingleruleofrecognition,soperhaps(likeHart,seeaboven.27)heresiststheideathattherecouldbeconflictsbetweenultimaterulesofrecognition;perhapshealsoextendsthatresistancesothatitappliesnotonlytotherulesofrecognitionofasinglelegalsystembutalsototherulesofrecognitionofmultiplelegalsystemsapplicableinthesameterritory,suchasstateandfederalUSlaw.

(52)ThediscussionisgenerallycastasoneaboutthetermsofreferenceofanArticleVConvention.Canitbelimitedastosubject‐matterofamendmentormustithavearovingbrief?Ifthelatter,whatstands(constitutionally)inthewayofafullConstitutionalConventionlikethatof1787?Fordefenceofthe‘rovingbrief’viewseeCharlesBlack,‘AmendingtheConstitution:ALettertoaCongressman’,YaleLawJournal82(1972),189;WalterDellinger,‘TheRecurringQuestionofthe“Limited”ConstitutionalConvention’,YaleLawJournal88(1979),1623.AsBlacksaysat199,hisview‘doesnotimplythata“runaway”[ArticleV]conventionispossible,for…noconventioncanbecalledthathasanythingtorunawayfrom’.The1787Conventionliveson!

(53)Plutarch,Lives,voli,trans.Perrin(Cambridge,Mass.,1914),49:‘TheshiponwhichTheseussailedwiththeyouthsandreturnedinsafety…waspreservedbytheAtheniansdowntothetimeofDemetriusPhalereus.Theytookawaytheoldtimbersfromtimetotime,andputnewandsoundonesintheirplaces,sothatthevesselbecamestandingillustrationforthephilosophersinthemootedquestionofgrowth,somedeclaringthatitremainedthesame,othersthatitwasnotthesamevessel.’Iwillnotattempttosamplethevastmodernliteratureonthis‘mootedquestion’,excepttonotethatitissometimesrecastasthe‘problemofconstitution’:seee.g.MichaelRea,‘TheProblemofMaterialConstitution’,PhilosophicalReview104(1995),525.


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(54)CoulditevenamendthevotingpowersofthestatesintheSenate,amatterexplicitlyexcludedfromitsamendingpowerbyArticleV?WhynotbeginbyamendingArticleVtoremovetheexclusion?Forvaluablereflections,seeAkhilReedAmar,‘PopularSovereigntyandConstitutionalAmendment’,inSanfordLevinson(ed.),RespondingtoImperfection:TheTheoryandPracticeofConstitutionalAmendment(Princeton,1995),90–2.Noticethatweareraisingherethequestionofwhetherthepowerofarevived1787Conventionwouldbe‘self‐embracing’(n.13above).Theissueofself‐embracingnessisnotuniquetothedoctrineofUKParliamentarySovereigntybut,asHartsaid,‘canariseinrelationtoultimatecriteriaoflegalvalidityinanysystem’(CL,148).

(55)UnitedStatesvSprague282US716(1931).

(56)ColemanvMiller307US433(1939).

(57)WalkervUnitedStates,unreportedC00–2125C,USDistrictCourtWesternDistrict(2001);WalkervMembersofCongress,unreported,USDistrictCourtWesternDistrictC04‐1977RSM(2004);USCourtofAppeals9thCircuit05–35023(2005);certiorarideniedSupremeCourt06–244(2006).

(58)OntheroleofDiceyeanconventionsintheUSconstitution,seeH.W.Horwill,TheUsagesoftheAmericanConstitution(NewYork1925)whichinsomewaysparallelsMarshall'sworkontheUK,ConstitutionalConvertions.

(59)Ontheproblematicdistinctionbetweenrevolutionsandcoups,seeJ.M.Finnis,‘RevolutionsandtheContinuityofLaw’,inA.W.B.Simpson(ed.),OxfordEssaysinJurisprudence:SecondSeries(Oxford,1973).

(60)ButcfBruceAckerman,‘DiscoveringtheConstitution’,YaleLawJournal93(1984),1013,fordoubtsabouttheamendment/usurpationdistinctionasitappliestotheUSconstitution.AckermantendstothinkthattheUSconstitutionsomehowinvitesorcompassesitsownoverthrow.

(61)AsHartexplainedatlength:CL,144–50.

(62)Ontheparentheticalwords,seeGreenawalt,‘TheRuleofRecognitionandtheConstitution’,640.Greenawaltleanstowardstheviewthat‘thelegalauthorityof…theoriginalConstitutionisestablishedbyitscontinuedacceptance’,notbyitshavingbeenvalidlyenactedin1787.Onarivalview,itisthevalidityofitsenactmentin1787thatisnowaccepted,andthatgivestheConstitutionitslegalauthority.Forthepurposesoftheargumentherethepointisnotcrucial.Hencetheparentheses.

(63)CL,107–8.

(64)CL,99.

(65)Ihaveexploredsomeofthemaindifferencesin‘SomeTypesofLaw’.


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(66)Seee.g.CL,131–2.At149–50,Hartseemstosuggest,collapsingtwodistinctionsthatareonlyveryindirectlyrelated,thattheabilityofthecourtstomakelawiseithercustomary‐and‐inherentorlegislative‐and‐delegated.Butcf.93and98wherehedistinguishesbothcustomandprecedentfromlegislation.

(67)TheleastequivocalrenditionisDworkin,‘NoRightAnswer?’,inP.M.S.HackerandJ.Raz(eds.),Law,Morality,andSociety(Oxford,1977).MyformulationismostinfluencedbyHart'sfamoussummaryin‘LegalDutyandObligation’,inH.L.A.Hart,EssaysonBentham(Oxford,1982),147–8.

(68)SeeDworkin,Law'sEmpire(Cambridge,Mass.,1986),255–63,wherea‘rightanswer’seemstoberelativizedtotheconvictionsofeachjudge.

(69)SeeDworkin,JusticeinRobes(Cambridge,Mass.,2006),266n.3,wherehedeniesthathehaschangedhismindaboutthethesis.

(70)Thus—totakeoneexamplefromahugeselection—ThomasC.Grey's‘TheUsesofanUnwrittenConstitution’,Chicago‐KentLawReview64(1988),211hasasitsmaintopiccreativejudicialinterpretationofthewrittenconstitution.

(71)J.Raz,‘InterpretationWithoutRetrieval’,inAndreiMarmor(ed.),InterpretationinLaw(Oxford,1995),155.

(72)Ibid.169–72,explaininghowsuchmeaning‐givingisconstrainedbypropertiesofitsobject,andhencestillqualifiesasinterpretation.

(73)Ingeneraltheserulesarepermissive,notmandatory.Americantheoriststendtoassume,mistakenly,thatthemainUSrulesoflegislativeandconstitutionalinterpretationmustbemandatoryrules,suchthatincasesofdissensus,atleastoneofthedissentientsmustbeinbreachoflegalduty(ifonlywecouldworkoutwhich).Britishtheorists,bycontrast,almostuniversallyacknowledgethepermissivecharacterofthemainUKrulesoflegislativeinterpretation:seee.g.theclassicformulationsbyRupertCrossinhisStatutoryInterpretation(London,1976),43.Suchrulesconflictonlyinthat,asauserofthem,onemustsometimeschoosebetweenlegalpermissionsthatwouldgiverivalmeaningstotheobjectofinterpretation.Onemakesone'schoiceonothergrounds,usuallymoralgroundsthatarelocaltoaparticularobjectofinterpretation,i.e.aparticularprovisionorAct.ThusoneneednotbepredisposedtousethesamemethodinsuccessivecasesinvolvingdifferentprovisionsorActs.Stilllessneedonehavea‘theory’ofinterpretation,withinevitablymonopolisticaspirations.

(74)IamnotsuggestingthattheUSconstitutionfallsintothiscategory.DoubtlesssomepartsofUSconstitutionallawarejudge‐madebutnotbywayofinterpretationofthecanonicaltextorofpreviousinterpretationsofit.TheyareindependentjudicialorlegislativecontributionstoconstitutionallawofthekindthatarecharacteristicofUKconstitutionallaw.Foraveryilluminatingifoverstatedaccount,seeDavidStrauss,‘TheIrrelevanceofConstitutionalAmendments’,HarvardLawReview114(2001),1457.Isay


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‘overstated’because,ashistitlehints,StrausssometimesslipsintotherivalanalysisevokedbyHartatCL,246(seetheremarksattheendofIII.2above).

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