Camouflaging of areas occupied by units of the Soviet Army ...

1. Introduction

In order to explain the secrets of camouflaging on topographic maps of military facilities, it is necessary to outline the political and military con-ditions which accompanied their development.

After World War II, as a result of the decisions of the leaders of world powers, Poland found itself within new borders. The country’s area, in relation to its pre-war territory, was reduced and moved west by several dozen kilometres. Poland also did not regain full sovereignty, since belonging to the Eastern Bloc meant that the Soviets and the Polish Communists decided about the future of the country. Even though the war was over, many units of the Red Army were stationed in western Poland. Followed by a gradual militarization of the country, the arms race between the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc meant that most sectors of the national economy were aimed at satisfying the needs of the army. Until 1956, all important positions in the Polish Army were held by Soviet officers, supported by several hundred specialists and “advisers” (E. Sobczyński 2017).

These Soviet activities also extended to the area of mapping. In the countries of the Eastern Bloc, within one to two years, legal acts modelled on Soviet solutions were intro-duced. The first such act, which limited the free development of mapping in Poland, was the decree of April 26, 1948 on the right to take aerial photos. In the following year (October 26, 1949), a decree was issued on the protection of state and official secrets, which made maps subject to strict supervision by the government apparatus. This was to ensure the implemen-tation of the Soviet imperial political and military doctrine. The decree introduced a division into state and official secrets. State secrets con-stituted “all messages, documents and other items which, due to the defence, security or important economic or political interests of the Polish State or its allied countries, may be made available only to authorized persons”.

The conferences of surveying services of socialist countries and conferences of the heads of military topographic services of the Warsaw Pact countries had the greatest impact on the changes in geodesy and cartography in countries of the Soviet bloc. They were held in various

Polish Cartographical ReviewVol. 52, 2020, no. 3, pp. 124–139

DOI: 10.2478/pcr-2020-0011EUGENIUSZ SOBCZYŃSKI Received: 2.11.2020 Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń Accepted: 28.12.2020 Faculty of HistoryToruń, Polandorcid.org/0000-0002-4092-940X; [email protected] SZULCZEWSKIŻyrardów, Polandorcid.org/0000-0002-2519-4513; [email protected]

Camouflaging of areas occupied by units of the Soviet Army Northern Group of Forces (NGF) on Polish and Soviet military

topographic maps

Abstract. The authors present the political conditions in Poland after World War II which influenced the development of military topographic maps. The article shows examples of camouflaging on topographic maps of garrisons and field facilities occupied in Poland by the Northern Group of Forces of the Soviet Army (NGF).

Keywords: military topographic maps, camouflaging military facilities, Northern Group of Forces of the Soviet Army (NGF)

125Camouflaging of areas occupied by units of the Soviet Army Northern Group of Forces..

countries in the years 1952−1989. After each conference, individual countries issued legal acts obliging civil and military surveying services to undertake organizational work and activities in accordance with Soviet recommendations. The most important arrangements were adopted at the first conference held in Sofia from June 22 to July 1, 1952. At that time, Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries were obliged to adopt geodetic coordinate systems and map standards used in the Soviet Union.

The introduction of the Soviet in “1942” coordinate system1 in Poland was also asso-ciated with a great obstacle, which consisted in making topographic maps and geodetic coordinates secret and restricting access to these maps for civil services2. Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 570/52 of July 9, 1952 on the classification of topographic maps and the Order of the Prime Minister No. 60 of July 29, 1964, as well as the instructions issued on the basis of them on the protection of clas-sified information limited the access of civil services to topographic maps and general geographical maps up to the scale of 1:500,000 included (geological up to 1:1,000,000). This order reads: “Topographic maps at the scale 1:100,000 (1:50,000) compiled in the period 1930−1954 and at scales greater than 1:100,000 published in the years 1920−1954 are confiden-tial”. Only schematic tourist maps and sche-matic administrative and communication maps shall remain public.

During the conference of surveying services of socialist countries in Moscow in 1965, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, General Anatoly Gribkov, categorically ordered all heads of state delega-tions to take decisive actions (within 3 years) to limit the “1942” system only for the army and state security services (Historie... 1993, p. 81; D. Unverhau 2006, p. 59).

In Poland, the withdrawal of the “1942” system from civil geodesy and cartography was a con-sequence of the Resolution of the National

1 The “1942” system was introduced on the territory of the USSR by the decision of the Council of Ministers No. 760 of April 7, 1946, but had been used in the production of maps in decimal scale systems since the 1920s.

2 Although the civil services had limited access to military maps, Head Office for the Control of Press, Publications and Performances, established in 1946, also censored civil topo-graphic maps.

Defense Committee of September 25, 1969 on the increased protection of geodetic and carto-graphic materials, forbidding civil entities to use the “1942” system and the interwar “Borowa Góra” system. Simultaneously with this resolu-tion, Order of the Prime Minister No. 102 was published on the list of typical geodetic, carto-graphic, geological and gravimetric documents constituting a state secret. This regulation already in the preamble ordered “increased protection” of maps and geodetic documents, significantly increasing the number of documents and maps classified as secret and confidential. Another document that led to the complete cut-off of the civil services from topographic maps was the Ministry of National Defense Order No. 4/MON of February 17, 1971. Under this order, the topographic maps of the “1942” system in the possession of the civil services had to be destroyed. In its place, for the needs of geodetic measurements and civil topogra-phic mapping, the “1965” system developed by military surveyors3 was introduced, while keeping its mathematical foundations secret. All civilian topographic maps were derived from military maps and were heavily censored, and their content was distorted and falsified. Despite such restrictions, most of these maps were still confidential. B. Konopska (2012) and W. Gry-gorenko (1991) have extensively written about the influence of the government apparatus in the years 1944−1989 on Polish cartographic publications for general use, especially about the censorship and deformation of civil maps.

The Order of the Prime Minister No. 75 was issued on December 31, 1976 and listed in detail geodetic data, cartographic, photogrammetric, gravimetric and magnetic materials subject to special protection. Thus, it concerned most cartographic materials produced in the country, e.g. even sheet indexes of maps in the “1965” coordinate system were subject to protection. This order also concealed most of the geodetic data and cartographic materials, and listed several dozen types of field facilities that were forbidden to be displayed on confidential to-pographic maps, e.g. high-voltage lines, water intakes, pumping stations, pipelines, equipment at railway stations, and state triangulation points. Open topographic maps were not in civilian use.

3 In the Soviet Union, the “CK-63” system had been intro-duced into civil surveying two years earlier.

126 Eugeniusz Sobczyński, Adam Szulczewski

On December 14, 1982, another act on the pro-tection of state and official secrets was issued, which stated that: “... a state secret is a mes-sage, the disclosure of which to unauthorized persons may endanger the defence, security or important interests of the state, concerning in particular: data in the field of geodesy, carto-graphy, topography, (...), aerial and photogram-metric photographs...”. Despite these restrictions, military maps were also subject to strict inven-tory and distribution control. Each year, special commissions checked all the maps, and used copies were destroyed by a commission.

An additional safeguard of military secrets4 on secret maps was the camouflaging of military facilities and others important for the security of the state. Not only garrisons and facilities oc-cupied by units of the Polish Army were camou-flaged, but also Soviet units stationed in Poland. The camouflaging concerned maps at scales from 1:10,000 to 1:200,000, and consisted in fictitious representations of the field situation of military facilities and omitting names and descrip-tions suggesting the existence of such facilities. The greatest censorship interference concerned large-scale maps: 1:10,000, 1:25,000 and 1:50,000. The number of camouflaged facilities has changed over the years, but in 1980 in Po-land there were several thousand facilities oc-cupied by the Polish Army and the Soviet Army.

The methods of camouflaging the facilities occupied by NGF in Poland on the maps issued by the Topographic Board of the General Staff of the Polish Army and the General Staff of the Soviet Army differ. The camouflaging was ineffec-tive as it concerned most of the facilities built before and during the World War II by the Third German Reich for the needs of the Wehrmacht. During the war, the Wehrmacht was stationed in Polish pre-war military facilities and facilities in the western areas of the USSR, using the training grounds of these countries. After the war, most of the German documents were in the hands of the Americans and the British. Moreover, the Americans launched the “Coro-na” satellite program in 1958, which made it possibile to monitor changes in the military in-

4 Masking – a type of combat security covering all activi-ties aimed at misleading the opponent or concealing own troops (combat readiness, completion, activities), combat equipment, fortification and rear facilities as well as actions and intentions of the command (Słownik... 1977, pp. M 6-7).

frastructure of Russia, China and other Eastern Bloc countries using remote images.

The control of the distribution of military maps and the camouflaging of militarily important facilities are characteristic not only of the “Cold War” times and of Soviet and Polish cartography. In the history of military cartography, numerous examples are known in this regard, and some date back to the 16th century. The most famous concerns the King of Prussia, Frederick II the Great (1712−1786), who was almost paranoid in controlling access to his Plankamer. The king ordered a secret instruction to be drawn up for the use of the maps, and each viewing required his personal consent.

In the interwar period, 1:25,000 and 1:100,000 maps, issued by the Polish Military Geographi-cal Institute, did not show the full content of the military sites either. Today, in some countries, the camouflaging of important military and in-dustrial facilities is still used on topographic maps, although in the age of widespread access to satellite images and the mass use of unmanned spy devices, it seems unjustified and ineffective.

In this article, for the first time in Poland, the authors analyse the methods of camouflaging facilities occupied by the Northern Group of Soviet Forces on Polish and Soviet military maps. The camouflaging of facilities occupied by the Polish Army on Polish maps was not analysed.

2. Bases, barracks and training grounds occupied by the Northern Group of the Soviet Army (NGF)

In order to realize how many areas and faci-lities were camouflaged on the maps, it is nec-essary to provide at least basic information about the state of Soviet troops stationed in Poland after World War II. Although not all fa-cilities were completely camouflaged, the inter-ference of censorship and the generalization of content applied to most of them. It should be remembered that the garrisons and training grounds where NGF was stationed and trained were extraterritorial, and therefore excluded from the administrative division of Poland. Military topographers were not allowed to visit these facilities during fieldwork and map updates.

Immediately after World War II, the number of Soviet troops in Poland was, according to various sources, from 300,000 to 400,000 sol-diers. In the first years after the end of the war,


there were no legal regulations concerning the stay of the Red Army in Poland5 and only on December 17, 1956, the governments of Po-land and the USSR signed an agreement “On the legal statute of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Poland”. Nevertheless, the Polish government did not know the actual data on the state of the Soviet troops and it was the Polish--Soviet Inventory Commission established in 1958 that finally prepared a record of the oc-cupied areas and facilities. The largest areas were occupied by military training grounds with garrisons in Przemków-Trzebień, Świętoszów, and Borne Sulinowo. The vast majority of these facilities were located in forested or undeveloped areas. In the 1960s, all barracks and training grounds were expanded, and the area occupied by the Soviet army was enlarged. A full inventory of the real estate occupied by NGF became possible only after 1989, as a result of political changes.

The number of garrisons occupied by the Soviet army changed: in 1958 it amounted to 74, in 1985 it decreased to 42, and in the autumn of 1990 to 34. The size of the garrisons varied, some had areas of up to tens of square kilo-meters. They were mostly located in western and north-western Poland. Only the most im-portant and the largest will are presented in this article (fig.1).

Until 1984, Legnica played a key role among the garrisons. It housed the command and staff of NGF, later transferred to Świdnica6. The command of the 4th Air Army and a brigade of operational and tactical missiles were also stationed here. In Legnica, the Russians owned 1,203 facilities covering about 430 ha, of which 228 ha was occupied by an airport which had been built by the Germans.

The largest tactical unit, the mechanized divi-sion, was based in Borne Sulinowo. An oper-ational and tactical missile brigade was also stationed there. In this garrison, which was a separate city, there were 10−12 thousand soldiers and more or less twice as many of their families and civilian employees, and the nearby training ground covered 18,573 ha. The second large garrison was Świętoszów, where

5 In 1946, the name was changed to the Soviet Army. 6 Data on the number of garrisons, their area, manpower

and equipment are based on: M.L. Krogulski (2001) and M. Czulicki (2014).

an armored division was stationed in a city in-habited by approx. 12 thousand soldiers and their families, and the nearby training ground covered 15,896 ha. Both garrisons were not included in the list of places administered by Poland. They were completely camouflaged and removed from Polish topographic maps.

Two regiments – mechanized and armoured – were stationed in the Pstrąże (Trzebień) gar-rison, and the nearby Przemkowo training ground with an area of 23,133 ha was the largest in Poland.

The 24th Missile and Torpedo Brigade of the Baltic Fleet was stationed in Świnoujście and occupied 4,340 m of the coast, 3 ha of port quays, and two port basins.

Air bases were of great importance among the Soviet garrisons, 7 of which were places where air regiments were permanently stationed, and 6 were used as backup facilities, shared with the Polish army. Air bases usually covered an area of several hundred hectares.

We should also mention the facilities ada-pted to the storage of weapons of mass de-struction (WMD), i.e. nuclear weapons. In the years 1967–1970, three such facilities were built:

• Podborsko near Białogard (facility 3001), • Brzeźnica-Kolonia near Borne Sulinowo

(facility 3002), • Templewo near Trzemeszno (facility 3003). In total, NGF used approx. 70.5 thousand ha,

half of which was covered by forests7.In the years 1990−1993, approximately 56

thousand soldiers and 7.5 thousand civilian employees left Poland, accompanied by approx. 40 thousand family members. In addition, large amounts of weapons were withdrawn. The last transport with Russian soldiers and military equipment left Poland on September 17, 1993, on the 54th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s aggression against Poland.

3. Examples of camouflaging and presenting the field situation on Polish and Soviet 1:25,000 military topographic maps in areas occupied by Soviet troops

The camouflaging of protected areas and fa-cilities on military maps8, in accordance with the

7 M. Czulicki (2014, p. 18) and M.L. Krogulski (2001, p. 56). 8 These are the so-called closed areas, classified as con-

stituting a state or official secret.


provisions on the protection of classified infor-mation, consisted in its fictitious presentation, as well as excessive generalization. Facilities were partially or completely camouflaged. They in cluded airfields, military ports, armament and ammunition depots, command bunkers, fuel depots, military railway sidings, water intakes, telecommunications facilities and devices9. The infrastructure of military training grounds was camouflaged or simplified on maps. The removed facilities were often replaced with forests, groves, meadows, wetlands and roads. There were no legal acts or strict instructions on camouflag-ing, just general guidelines for map editors. This method of camouflaging applied to garri-sons and facilities occupied by both the Polish Army and NGF. The map authors did not have

9 Much more masking of military facilities concerned civi-lian topographic maps. B. Konopska (2012) writes in more detail about it.

complete information about Soviet facilities. Such information was in the possession of the Polish Government Plenipotentiary for the Stay of Soviet Forces in Poland and the General Staff of the Polish Army. The Topographic Board of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, which was responsible for the development and pub-lishing of maps, agreed twice a year with the Camouflaging Division and the Military Censor-ship Division which facilities should be camou-flaged and to what extent. These arrangements were also the basis for further camouflaging and deformation of maps for civilian use.

Topographers who prepared topographic surveys or updated maps in the field, took into account the full terrain situation in the areas occupied by the Polish Army, but were not allowed to perform measurements on the sites occupied by the NGF. Exceptionally in the 1970s, Polish topographic units carried out a cursory update of the topographic maps of 1:25,000

Fig. 1. The location of Soviet bases in Poland


military training grounds occupied by NGF. On maps of the territory of Poland, the Soviets used the method of camouflaging Polish facili-ties adopted by Poles, while camouflaging the facilities occupied by their army in a different way. As a result, map users perceived the camou-flaging as errors in their development, raising reservations and comments to the publisher − the Topographic Board of the Polish Army. Supervision over the protection of classified information in the Armed Forces of the Polish People’s Republic was exercised by the Secret Protection Division of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (formerly the Military Cen-sorship Division, established in 1944) and the Military Counterintelligence. It was on their ini-tiative that legal acts concerning the classifica-tion of topographic maps and the camouflaging of facilities important for the security and defense of the country were prepared (Zarys... 2002). The methods of camouflaging military facilities have changed in accordance with the changes in the regulations on the protection of classi-fied information. This can be traced in sub-sequent map editions.

Maps for the “General Staff” edition (1954−1960)

Soviet garrisons in Poland were located mostly in the areas previously occupied by the German Reichswehr, and then by the Wehr-macht, and the ready barracks and training grounds infrastructure was used. Probably for this reason, some of the first post-war maps show all military facilities without camouflaging, e.g. the garrisons of Świętoszów and Toruń.

The Świętoszów garrison and the nearby training ground were one of the largest German military facilities from World War I. The 20th Zve-nigorodskaya Armored Division was stationed in them from 1951. The map at the scale of 1:25,000, sheet M-33-19-D-d from 1956 shows the full range of social and living facilities (1), barracks buildings, armored equipment gara-ges (2), ammunition storage (3) and technical infrastructure of the training grounds (4). It also included the ruined buildings of the former Ger-man POW camp from World War I and II (5). Both here and on the Soviet sheet from 1979, no military facilities were camouflaged (fig. 2).

Fig. 2. Parts of maps at the scale of 1:25,000 of the Świętoszów garrison (sheet M-33-19-D-d): on the left − the Polish map, 1956, on the right − the Soviet map,1979


Fig. 3. The Soviet base in Toruń shown on the Polish map 1:25,000 (part of sheet N-34-98-C-c Toruń, General Staff of the Polish Army, 1956, second edition) and on an American satellite

image from July 28, 1969

Fig. 4. A comparison of camouflaging of the same facility on maps at different scales: on the left − a part of the Polish map 1:25,000 (sheet N-33-98-C-c Toruń), 1988, updated from 1986–1987; on the right − a part of the Soviet map 1:10,000, 1986, updated from 1982. Neither map shows the Soviet base, and despite the

different scales of the maps, the same camouflaging method was used


It was similar in the case of the Toruń garrison. Before World War I, warehouses for arma-ments plants and an ammunition factory were built in the northern part of the city. In the inter-war period, the facility was taken over by the Polish army, and after World War II by the Soviet army, which placed a depot of ammunition and aviation weapons here. On the Polish map at the 1:25,000 scale from 1956, this facility is shown in its entirety, without camouflaging (fig. 3), while on maps from the 1980s – Polish 1:25,000 and Soviet 1:10,000 the facility was completely camouflaged (fig. 4).

Airports were camouflaged slightly differently on the maps. The Soviet army took over a dozen or so airports in Poland built by the Germans. The way of presenting these facilities can be seen on the example of the airport in Chojna (fig. 5). In 1951, the airport was expanded by dismantling the old runway and replacing it with a new, concrete one along with taxiways and a parking place for planes. The works were completed in the mid-1950s, that is during the preparation of the Polish and Soviet 1:25,000 scale maps, sheet N-33-113-B-b Chojna.

Both maps (fig. 5) have camouflaged the run-way, the taxiway and the plane of the aircraft parking, while the facilities outside the runway, including the railway siding and aircraft revet-ments, are presented in detail (1). The maps also take into account the entire hangar infrastruc-ture left by the Germans (2), the barracks with the head quarters of the unit (3) and buildings (4).

On the Soviet map, some of the buildings were presented as “ruins”. Most of the fences around the base have been removed, no description of the purpose of the facility is provided. Both maps do not differ in cartographic design, except for the replacement of Polish names with Cyrillic names on the Soviet map.

This method of camouflaging is also charac-teristic of other Soviet airports located in Po-land. Table 1 contains a comparative list of the infrastructure of the most important Soviet air bases on the Polish maps of the General Staff edition. The presentation of NGF airfields on these maps and on analogous Soviet maps consisted of camouflaging only the most im-portant airport infrastructure and omitting infor-mation about the purpose of the facilities.

Maps of the “Polish People’s Republic Edition” and others from 1960–1990

From the second half of the 1960s, the devel-opment of new topographic surveys at the scale of 1:10,000 and the publication of maps of “Polish People’s Republic Editions” based on them began in Poland. An interesting example of camouflaging NGF facilities on these maps is the Pstrąże (Strachów) garrison, one of the largest in Poland, with an area of 20.7 thousand ha, where the Soviet armored forces were sta-tioned. On the map at the scale of 1:25,000 (sheet M-33-20-C-a Leszno Górne) “First edi-tion of the Polish People’s Republic”, 1967, and the second edition, 1976, the garrison was com-

Table 1. List of the contents of the maps of the “General Staff” edition concerning the most important Soviet military air bases

Map sheet,publication year Airfield Runways

and taxiwaysAircraft hangars

Technical facilities (sidings, fences)

Barracks and staff facilities

Residential facilities

in the bases

N-33-113-B-b,1955 Chojna not presented presented partially

presented presented presented

M-33-19-B-b,1957

Stara Kopernia not presented presented partially

presented presented presented

M-33-32-A-b,1957 Krzywa not presented presented presented presented presented

M-33-47-B-d,1957 Brzeg partially

presented presented partially presented presented presented

N-33-68-A-d, 1955 (temporary ed.) Bagicz not presented not presented not presented not presented not presented


pletely camouflaged, including the residential part, by removing the buildings (fig. 6). The tech-nical infrastructure of the nearby training ground was generalized, and the tactical training strips were replaced with dirt roads, leaving only the

characteristics of the forests and the access road. Although the entire garrison was camou-flaged in the first edition of the map, in the se-cond edition some embankments, training ground roads and a railway siding were removed. The

Fig. 5. The method of camouflaging the Chojna airfield on the Polish and Soviet maps from 1956

Fig. 6. The method of camouflaging the Pstrąże (Strachów) garrison on maps 1:25,000 (sheet M-33-20-C-a Leszno Górne): 1) the “First Edition of the Polish People’s Republic” map, 1967, 2) the Soviet map, 1978


1:25,000 Soviet map, published in 1978, is significantly different from the Polish map. It shows the complete buildings of the garrison town (1), armoured equipment garages (2), fuel and lubricant storage areas (3), ammunition storage areas (4), tactical training strips (5), and partially a special zone to hide armoured

missile transporters (6). The hiding places for the rocket launchers were “Granit” type rein-forced concrete crossing bunkers, covered with earth and camouflaged with vegetation. Figure 7 shows a part of the Soviet map at the scale of 1:25,000 from 1979, a satellite image from the construction period of the facility and a Lidar

Fig. 7. Camuflaging of the “Granit” shelter in the Pstrąże (Stachów) garrison

Fig. 8. Removed name of the Polish topographic map 1:25,000 sheet Borne Sulinowo. The barracks were completely camouflaged on the Polish map, and the relief on the Soviet one was excessively generalized


image with the “Granit” shelters (1) and main-tenance buildings (2) marked.

Another place where troops were stationed was the barracks and training ground area of Borne Sulinowo. It was the largest and most numerous base of Soviet troops in Poland, housing the command and staff of the 6th Guards Vitebsk-Novgorod Motor Rifle Division with subordinate units and the 116th Orshanskaya Brigade of Operational and Tactical Missiles, whose launchers were adapted to launch mis-siles with nuclear warheads. On the 1:25,000 map of the 1970 “First Edition of the Polish People’s Republic”, a deep camouflaging of this base was carried out, covering both the training ground infrastructure, technical facilities and the entire garrison town. Despite the complete camouflaging of the base, numerous training ground roads were left. On the Polish map, even the name of the map was changed. “Borne Su-linowo” (as on the Soviet map) was replaced with the name “Warnia Góra”, derived from the name of a nearby hill (fig. 8). On the Soviet map from 1979, compiled on the basis of aerial photographs from 1978, less camouflaging was

carried out, showing much more field details. Figure 9 presents parts of both maps: the

Soviet map contains detailed buildings of the town (1), garages and technical facilities (2) and tactical training strips (3), while the topogra-phy is highly generalized; it does not show nu-merous pits (holes after artillery firing). Although it seems that this map has complete field con-tent, a comparison with aerial photographs in-dicates that the ground buildings used to store tactical missiles were camouflaged (4).

Particularly noteworthy is the Polish map of Borne Sulinowo at the scale 1:25,000, the “Krągi” sheet, developed in the years 1985−1986, published in 1988. Figure 10 shows a part of the map with the complete military infrastruc-ture of the garrison, including tactical missile warehouses (4) and a military railway siding. This is the only known case of a complete abandonment of the camouflaging of Soviet mi-litary facilities on the Polish map prior to 1990.

South of Borne Sulinowo, in Brzeźnica-Kolo-nia, there was a military facility of particular importance for Russians, code-named 3002. It was a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Fig. 9. The garrison of Borne Sulinowo with a training ground on the maps 1:25,000: on the left – the Soviet map, 1979, on the right – the Polish map, 1975


storage unit, in which nuclear warheads were stored in two underground shelters. The building with an area of 147 ha was put into operation

in December 1969, giving it a camouflaging name “3016 Depot of Armored Equipment”. The magazine is located on the Soviet map 1:25,000 sheet N-33-94-C-a Sypniewo (updated 1978). The entire unit with access roads was camou-flaged. Figure 11 shows a part of this map with a satellite photo from 1969, which shows the warehouse in the final stage of construction.

In the 1960s, the Russians expanded all the airports they used, which resulted from the adoption of supersonic aircraft and rockets. At the Chojna airfields, the runway was extended to 2,500 m, a separate technical area for rocket weapons was built, as well as a new fuel and lubricant storage facility. A large expansion of the airport took place in the years 1968−1970, then 38 aircraft shelters were built located on the outskirts of taxiways and apron areas. The infrastructure of this base is visible in the aerial photo. On the maps of the First and Second Edition of the Polish People’s Republic, the air-port in Chojna and other NGF air bases were completely camouflaged, showing meadows or pastures in their place (fig. 12). This concerned the entire map series 1:25,000 − 1:200,000. Airfields were also not shown on city maps at

Fig. 10. Part of the Borne Sulinowo garrison on the 1:25,000 map (Krągi sheet) with complete military

infrastructure

Fig. 11. Camouflaged WMD storage unit (object 3002) near Borne Sulinowo on a Soviet map 1:25,000 from 1979. Next to it, a satellite image of this warehouse from 1969 and a nuclear weapons warehouse diagram from a CIA note,

based on satellite images


the scale of 1:10,000 issued by the Topographic Board of the Polish Army and the General Staff of the USSR.

Analogous Soviet studies for the area of the German Democratic Re-public contained in most cases the complete topographic content of mili-tary facilities.

All Polish maps of the “Edition of the Polish People’s Republic” were characterized by exceptional meticu-lousness when disguising military facilities, all content suggesting the military purpose of facilities was re-moved from them. The Soviet maps published at that time contained the full content of military garrisons, only the most important facilities of the base were camouflaged (rocket warehouses and launchers, runways and taxiways, special weapons stores).

Maps of the “Model 1990” edition from 1990–1995

A breakthrough in camouflaging on Polish topographic maps took place in the early 1990s. After 30 years, Soviet military garrisons were again presented on newly issued maps. The Russians stayed in Poland until 1993, and by that time only some of the maps had been updated. Slightly earlier, on May 18, 1992, the M-33-19-D-b sheet

Fig. 12. Camouflaged airfield in Chojna: on the left – the Soviet map 1:50,000 (1972), on the right – the Polish map 1:50,000 (1986) and an aerial image from 1969 with visible airfield infrastructure

Fig. 13. A part of the map 1:25,000 (“Model 1990”, 1992) of the Świętoszów garrison with full barracks and training ground

infrastructure


of the map at the scale 1:25,000 was issued, based on the materials from 1983, without a field update (fig. 13). A comparison of this sheet with previous editions (fig. 8), especially the Soviet one from 1979 and the Polish one from 1956, leads to interesting conclusions. The map was developed from scratch − the relief and other field details were taken from the map at the scale of 1:10,000 (after generalization). It features numerous craters after explosions, and the characteristics of forests and surface waters were changed. Details of the technical facilities

of the training ground, as well as the garrison buildings, were presented without camouflaging. The artillery warehouse (marked in red) is shown without camouflaging, with the double fence and the warehouses after expansion. Compared to the Soviet map, the entire sheet has richer content, and the barracks buildings are presented in more detail. The Soviet map contains only slightly more details of the training ground infrastructure, a denser network of dirt and field roads.

The differences in the camouflaging of military facilities can be seen in figure 14. On the 1:25,000 scale Polish maps with the same validity (1983): on the 1985 map the facility was completely camouflaged (up), and on the later map (model 1990) it is shown with full details.

NGF aviation remained in Poland until 1992. In the years 1990–1992 the Topographic Board of the Polish Army updated sheets on which there were Soviet airports in Stara Kopernia (sheet M-33-19-Bb) and in Krzywa (sheet M-33-32-A-b). The newly released maps contain a complete picture of runways, taxiways and aprons. This is a novelty compared to all previous map editions in the “1942” layout. Technical buildings (including weapon storage area), barracks and housing estates of military families also “returned” to the maps. The 1993 map of the Krzywa airport also shows the surface-to--air missile division protecting the airport. This is previously unseen on the maps of this series, as well as on modern maps, because active missile units are still subject to information pro-tection. It can be presumed that after the Rus-sians left Poland, the camouflaging of facilities of this type ceased to apply. An issue that requires in-depth analysis is the lack of aircraft shelters on the new 1:25,000 maps. These massive fa-cilities with an area of over 300 m2 were intended to protect combat aircraft. The shelters, although camouflaged with a 2-meter-thick layer of earth, are perfectly visible from the air due to their di-mensions, yet the map “Model 1990” at the air-port in Krzywa does not show shelter hangars. An interesting exception is the attempt to mark aircraft shelters on the M-33-19-B-b Stara Ko-pernia map (fig. 15) published in 1993 (updated from 1983), where they are presented as mounds. Considering that the map was devel-oped while the area was still occupied by the Soviet army, it can be assumed that its update was based solely on aerial photos from 1983.

Fig. 14. The “Trzebień” facility in the Pstrąże garrison on Polish maps of various editions at the scale of

1:25,000


* * *

Despite the fact that the Soviet troops left Poland, the legal situation regarding the pres-entation of abandoned facilities on military maps was still ambiguous. These facilities, mostly under the management of the Polish Army, were treated as closed areas. After the amendment of the regulations on the protec-tion of classified information in 1999, military maps were still supposed to be confidential, because they contained the characteristics of field facilities (including bridges, roads, hydro-technical devices) and presented military faci-lities classified as secret. Even in the order of the Minister of Regional Development and Con-struction of May 18, 2001, the loads on bridges and viaducts, the voltage of overhead power lines and the efficiency of water intakes re-mained confidential.

This problem had to be resolved because since 1995, Polish military maps were often made

available to other countries participating in the NATO “Partnership for Peace” program. The confidentiality of these maps made it difficult to share them with NATO partners during joint mili-tary exercises. Therefore, the Military Geography Board decided to remove the characteristics of the facilities from the maps and preserve the camouflaging of facilities important for the defense and security of the state. Confidential post-Soviet facilities seized by the Polish Army were still camouflaged. In the 1980s, there were approximately 2,000 camouflaged military faci-lities on Polish topographic maps, and by the end of the 1990s this number decreased to 200.

4. Summary

In Poland and in the countries of the Eastern Bloc after World War II, the preparation of topo-graphic maps and their distribution was strictly

Fig. 15. The differences between the ways of presenting the aircraft shelters on the maps “Model 1990”: on the left − the marking “mound” at the Stara Kopernia airfield, on the right − no markings at the Krzywa

airfield. Below are images of the airfields taken by the KH-7 satellite in the late 1970s


controlled by the state administration. The So-viets imposed their spatial reference systems and mapping patterns on the satellite states for field measurements and mapping. At the same time, they banned the use of these maps for civilian purposes. All topographic maps were secret and confidential, and each map sheet was kept under strict records. Despite these conditions, military facilities were camou-flaged on them. It did not matter much when iden-

tifying military facilities by potential opponents, because from the 1960s, world powers placed reconnaissance satellites in orbits around the Earth, which made it possible to track changes in military infrastructure. The analysis and com-parison of Polish and Soviet maps shows that the approach to camouflaging was different. The Russians camouflaged the facilities in which they were stationed to a lesser extent, limiting camouflaging only to key buildings.

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