Cambridge IGCSE HistoryThe Twentieth Century: International Relations since 1919

Why had international peace collapsed by 1939?

Dr. John Levan Bernhart

Framing Questions

•What were the long-term consequences of the peace treaties of 1919-23?

•What were the consequences of the failures of the League of Nations in the 1930s?

•Why and how did the international order collapse in the 1930s?

•Why and how did Germany, Italy, and Japan become increasingly militaristic?

•What was Hitler’s foreign policy to 1939 in regards to the Saar; to the remilitarization of the Rhineland; to

the Spanish Civil War; to Anschluss with Austria; to Czechoslovakia; to the USSR; and to Poland?

•Was the policy of appeasement justified?

•How important was the Nazi-Soviet Pact?

•How far was Hitler’s foreign policy to blame for the outbreak of was in 1939?

•Why did Britain and France declare war on Germany in September 1939?

The Peace Treaties of 1919-23, the League of Nations, and the Great Slump

•By totaling repressing Germany and by totaling outlawing the Soviet Union, the peace treaties of 1919-23 made war almost inevitable. On 9 May 1918, Scottish schoolteacher John Maclean predicted with great accuracy both the outbreak in Europe of a second global war and the war between the USA and Japan.

•What little chance there was for international peace disappeared during the world depression that started in the USA in 1929. The economic crisis brought to power, both in Germany and in Japan, the political forces of militarism and the

extreme right committed to a deliberate break with the status quo by confrontation. By 1931, the public expected international peace to collapse.

John Maclean’s Scottish Labour College

•From 1931, the League of Nations failed to act to maintain international peace, permitting the Japanese invasions of Manchuria in 1931 and of China in 1937; the Italian invasions of Ethiopia in 1935 and of Albania in 1939; the unilateral German denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles and its military reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936; the German and Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War; the German annexation of Austria in 1938; the German conquest of Czechoslovakia in 1938-39; and, the German demands on Poland. The outbreak of global war moved closer when Josef Stalin, refusing to stand alone against

Adolf Hitler, signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. And the global war, which no one wanted, broke out after the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939.

Adolf Hitler Salutes Troops(Warsaw, Poland, 5 October

1939)

The Collapse of the International Order

•The Great Slump of the 1930s led to tensions between states. The rulers of each country sought to ease the pressure on themselves at the expense of their rivals abroad. One after another, they tried to expand the sales of domestically produced goods by devaluating their currencies and raising tariff boundaries. The widespread tendency was towards “autarchy”—the production of as many goods as possible within the boundaries of the national state.

•The state was also more involved than ever before in peace time in

direct economic activities—rationalizing some industries by forcing the closing of inefficient firms, and establishing direct state ownership of some sectors so as to enhance the prospects of others.

Contraction of World Trade, 1929-33

•Even the Conservative “national” government in Britain nationalized the electricity supply, the national airlines and coal mining rights. A right wing government in Poland laid down a long-term economic plan, and Benito Mussolini in Italy set up state-run companies in an attempt to dampen the impact of the world economic crisis.

•There was a contradiction between the use of the state to bolster each national group of capitalists and the desire of all capitalists for access to resources beyond the narrow boundaries of the individual state. The only way to reconcile this contradiction was to expand the area that the state controlled. Formal empires and informal “spheres of influence” became all-important. The autarchywas that of “currencyblocks” dominated by themajor powers—the USA’sdollar block, the UK’ssterling block, France’sgold block, Germany’smark block, and the USSR. Colonial Empires (1936)

•Economist Alvin Hansen (1932): “Each country strives to develop spheres of influence where the encroachment of capitalists of other nations is resented. At times, the USA has prevented the European powers collecting their debts in Latin America by naval blockades…. Similarly, the long struggle (not yet terminated) between European powers over domination of Africa, the Near East, and, indirectly, by economic, financial and military patronage to control the Balkan states, is a record of international strife and friction that the penetration of foreign capital has entailed.”

•The spheres of influence were notsymmetrical. The rulers of Britain,France, the USA, and the USSR eachcontrolled vast areas. Germany, themost powerful industrial power incontinental Europe, had no coloniesand was constrained by the narrowborders imposed on it by the otherpowers in the Treaty of Versailles atthe end of WWI. Alvin Hansen (Harvard

University)

•The effect of the crisis was to swing German big business to campaign vigorously to break the restraints imposed by Versailles. It wanted to recover German territory lost to Poland at the end of the war, absorb the German-speaking Austrian state and Czech borderlands (the “Sudetenland”), and resume the drive for hegemony in southeast Europe. Hitler’s victory was not only a victory of capital over workers. It was also a victory for those forces that wanted to solve the crisis of German capitalism by a policy of military expansion at the expense of the other Great Powers.

•Germany’s major industrial groups agreed, more orless willingly, to coordinate their efforts and acceptincreasing central allocation of investment, statecontrol of foreign trade and state rationing of rawmaterials. The one major capitalist who objectedstrongly, Fritz Thyssen—who had been one of the firstto finance Hitler—was expropriated by the Nazi Partyand forced to flee abroad. The others continued ahighly profitable collaboration with the Nazis rightthrough until Germany’s military collapse in 1945. Adolf Hitler and

Fritz Thyssen(1935)

•The establishment of an autarchic economy based on military state capitalism encouraged, in turn, the drive to armed expansion. The arms industry needed raw materials and resources. The Nazi regime, with recent memories of the revolutionary upsurge of 1918-20, was reluctant to pressurize German workers too much. It extended working hours and intensified workloads, but it also increased the output of consumer goods to contain the level of discontent among workers and the lower middle classes. The only way to obtain the resources it needed was to grab extra territory. The agricultural output of Austria, the arms industry of the Czech lands, the iron and steel capacity of Alsace-Lorraine, the coal of Poland, and the oil of Romania could fill the gaps in the Germaneconomy—as could workers from these lands,paid at much lower rates than German workersand often subject to slave-labor conditions. Therewas a convergence between the requirements ofbig business and Nazi ideology, with its conceptsof Lebensraum (“living space”) and Unter-menschen (non-Germans as sub-human). Adolf Hitler and

the Volkswagen(1934)

•The German approach was matched in East Asia by Japan. It had already taken Taiwan and Korea as colonies and controlled substantial concessions in northern China. In 1931, it reacted to the world economic crisis by seizing the north Chinese region of Manchuria. Then, in the late 1930s, the

government formed after an attempted military coup in Tokyo invaded China and began to cast its eye over bits of the Western empires in southeast Asia—the Dutch East Indies, the British colonies in Malaya, Borneo and Singapore, the French colonies in Indochina, and the US-run Philippines.

Rebel Japanese Troops Returning to Barracks after Failed Military Coup

(29 February 1936)

Japanese Troops in Manchuria

(1931)

•On a smaller scale, Mussolini’s Italy sought to expand its colonial empire by grabbing Ethiopia to add to Somaliland, Eritrea, and Libya, and hoped for an opportunity to grab Albania and the Adriatic coast of Yugoslavia.

Italian Troops in Ethiopia (1935)

•The established imperial powers—Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, and the USA—were confused as to how to respond. They had divergent interests: Britain and France were jostling for hegemony in the Middle East; a section of the US ruling class was keen to displace Britain as the predominant international power and had already established a decisive influence in oil-rich Saudi Arabia; and France was mainly concerned to hold together a patchwork of allies in Eastern Europe, so as to divert Germany from any movement against its borders.

Henry Ford Receives Grand Cross of the

German Eagle from Nazi Officials (1938)

•The confusion within the imperial powers was shown clearly in 1935. On 14 April 1935, Britain France, and Italy formed the Stresa Front to oppose German Aufrüstung (the growth of the German military in contravention of the Treaty of Versailles), yet, on 18 June 1935, Britain signed a bilateral agreement with Germany, authorizing Hitler to violate the Treaty of Versailles and to develop a navy up to 35 percent of the size of the British navy. Italy, taking advantage of Britain’s contradictory foreign policy, invaded Ethiopia on 3 October 1935, and Mussolini formed a coalition with Hitler, creating the Rome-Berlin Axis on 25 October 1936.

•There were powerful groups in all of them that regarded Nazism as a positive ally in an international onslaught on working class organizations and the left. As far as they saw themselves as having a foreign enemy, it was Russia, rather than Germany, Italy, or Japan.

•The fact that the Western Powers, Germany, and Italy saw communism —not fascism—as the real enemy was shown clearly during the Spanish Civil War (17 July 1936 to 1 April 1939), when the rulers of the Western “democracies” were content for Hitler and Mussolini to flout a “non-interventionist” pact,

since Franco was no danger to their empires. Japan, which—like Italy—had taken advantage of confusion within the imperial powers to occupy Manchuria and to invade China, was also anti-communist, signing the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany on 25 November 1936.

Kintomo Mushakoji and Joachim von Ribbentrop

(25 November 1936)

Adolf Hitler and Francisco Franco (October 1940)

•In 1946, the Chairman of the Classics Department at Yale University coined the phrase “premature ant-fascist” to describe those who opposed Hitler in 1936. The fact that Hitler was not opposed (and even supported) by segments of the ruling classes within the Western Powers encouraged him to act in 1938. When he annexed Austria in March and then demanded the German-inhabited border areas of Czechoslovakia in the summer, the dominant sections of the British and French ruling classes did not see any reason to risk war by opposing him.

Antonio Gramsci Battery of the XIII International Brigade

(1 May 1937)•Hitler was a racist psychopath, with

ambitions to establish an ethnically “cleansed” Germany as the central force in Europe and a dominant world power. But his strategy in the late 1930s was rational from the point of view of German capitalism. Pragmatically, he tested the extent to which the other imperial powers would allow him to expand Germany’s sphere of influence.

•Hitler showed the same rationality when he threatened Poland in the summer of 1939 after secretly agreeing to divide the country with Stalin in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. He knew Germany did not have the resources for an all-out military campaign lasting more than a couple of months. But he assumed that Britain and France would not support Poland any more than they had supported the Czechs. After all, as recently as December 1938, the British government had accepted that Poland should be a German satellite, and the British general staff had recognized that Poland could not be defended. Hitler knew he could conquer the country in a Vyacheslav Molotov Signs

Nazi-Soviet Pact(23 August 1939)

matter of days. He also believed that if France and Britain did intervene he would be able to defeat France very quickly, and then both its and Britain’s rulers would come to terms with him if he promised not to touch their empires.

•Hitler was mistaken about one thing. A group had emerged in the British ruling class around two hardened imperialists, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, which believe German dominance in continental Europe was a threat to the British Empire. For instance, the old German dream of hegemony extending through the Balkans to the Middle East threatened the oilfields and the Suez Canal connecting Britain to its empire in India. Hitler’s move led others to begin to share their fears, creating sufficient pressure to bring about a declaration of war by both Britain and France after the German attack on Poland, and then, nine months Winston Churchill and

Anthony Eden(Quebec, August 1943)

later, prevented the British government accepting Germany’s conquests in Europe. Hitler’s other calculations, however, were correct.

•The French ruling class and an important section of the British ruling class entered the war reluctantly. They did nothing to help the Poles—although they did evacuate a section of the Polish army to serve their own purposes later on. Britain then spent the vital winter of 1939-40 backing a Finnish

Finnish Ski Troops with Reindeer (c. 1940)

government (friendly to Germany) in a war against Russia. Germany was able to use this “phoney war” period to prepare for a Blitzkrieg offensive on France, through Holland and Belgium, with the aim of defeating its army before Germany’s own limited resources ran out.

Evacuation of the Polish Army in France (June 1940)

Japanese Embassy in Berlin Celebrates Signing of the Tripartite Pact (September

1940)

of the month, and the German army entered Paris on 14 June 1940. This victory was the spur Mussolini needed to come into the war on Germany’s side and left Hitler in undisputed control of Western and Central Europe.

German Troops Enter Paris (June 1940)

•Hitler was also right in his expectation of a quick victory against France. A German attack broke the back of the “Allied” armies in Belgium and northern France in two weeks in May 1940, forcing the British army’s evacuation from Dunkirk at the end

Hitler’s Foreign Policy to 1939

The Saar Plebiscite

•The Treaty of Versailles placed the Saar under the administration of the League of Nations, while giving France control of its coalmines, for 15 years, after which a plebiscite was to be held to determine its future. Saarlanders resented this foreign occupation, but after Hitler came to power in 1933, many German dissidents relocated to the Saar, causing the 1935 plebiscite to be contested. Sarah Wambaugh, one of the members of the Plebiscite Commission, heard complaints from non-Nazi Germans and from the foreign press that Nazis were

engaged in a “reign of terror” to influence the vote, including “espionage, secret denunciations, kidnappings…., …interception of letters and telegrams, [and] listening in to telephone conversations.”

The Saar

•The Saar Governing Commission, headed by Geoffrey Knox, “promulgated several restrictive decrees for the maintenance of public order.” In the plebiscite, the Saarlanders were given three choices: unification with Germany, unification with France, or remaining a mandate under the League of Nations. Nearly 98 percent of registered voters cast a ballot in the plebiscite. The Saarlanders voted overwhelming for unification with Germany. Hitler used this victory in a free, democratic election to gain moral authority for pressing for the rights of Germans in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to be allowed to reunite with Germany.

The Saar Plebiscite

Unification with Germany (477,089 votes)League of Nations Mandate (46,613 votes)Invalid/Blank Votes (2,161 votes)Unification with France (2,124 votes)

Votes Cast: 527,987Registered Voters: 539,542

90.8%

8.8%

Bargainhunter: “Which do you recommend?”Shopwalker: “We don’t recommend, Madame. Our job is to see you

safely upstairs. Sidney “George” Strube (Daily Express, 12 January 1935)

The Fruit Gathering Season

Sidney “George” Strube (Daily Express, 19 September 1939)

Remilitarizationof the Rhineland

•By diktat, the Treaty of Versailles prohibited German militarization both on the left bank of the Rhine and within 50 kilometers of the right bank of the Rhine. Germany, however, voluntarily signed the Locarno Treaty of 1925, agreeing to the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland. The occupying British and French soldiers left the Rhineland by June 1930, five years earlier than stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles.

•In March 1935, Hitler denounced Pact V of the Treaty of Versailles, which had disarmed Germany.

The Rhineland

•On 21 May 1935, Hitler promised to “uphold and fulfill all obligations arising out of the Locarno Treaty, so long as the other parties are on their side ready to stand by that pact.” German diplomats, however, called the Franco-Soviet Pact, which went into effect on 27 March 1936, a violation of the Locarno Treaty as it militarily encircled Germany.

•British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden opened secret negotiations with Germany that allowed for the remilitarization of the Rhineland in exchange for Germany agreeing not to forcibly enlarge its borders and to sign an “air pact” outlawing bombing. Eden signaled to Hitler that remilitarization of the Rhineland was not considered a security threat but a policy to be won through negotiation.

•Hitler decided to bypass negotiations and unilaterally remilitarize the Rhineland. The Italo-Ethiopian War had broken up the Stresa Front. And Germany was suffering a major economic crisis in

German Troops Crossing the Rhine (7 March 1936)

1935-36. Hitler could have achieved remilitarization of the Rhineland through diplomacy but unilaterally remilitarized the Rhineland to score a foreign policy triumph that would distract the German people from the economic crisis, restoring his popularity within Germany.

•On 7 March 1936, German troops entered the Rhineland, possibly as part of Hitler’s stufenplan (stage-by-stage plan) or as an ad hoc response to the economic crisis.

•Hitler: “The forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-racking in my life. If the French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance.”

•When German troops marched into Cologne, a vast cheering crowd formed spontaneously to greet the

German Troops

March in front of Cologne

Cathedral(7 March

1936)

soldiers, throwing flowers onto the Wehrmacht while Catholic priests offered to bless the soldiers. British historian Ian Kershaw wrote: “People were beside themselves with delight.... It was almost impossible not to be caught up in the infectious mood of joy.”

The Return of the German War DrumsInvitation to the League Membership Form—The Society for piously hoping there will not be any unnecessary noise—Sign here............

David Low (Evening Standard, 2 February

1934)

E. H. Shepard (Punch, 1936)

The Goose-Step“Goosey Goosey Gander,Whither dost thou wander?”“Only through the Rhineland—Pray excuse my blunder!”

The Spanish Civil War

•When fascist General Francisco Franco launched a military revolt against the democratically elected Spanish Republican government, which included socialists and communists, on 17 July 1936, Britain, France, Germany, and the USA (unofficially), along with other nations, signed a Non-Intervention Agreement, embargoing military assistance to Spain. Hitler simply ignored the embargo, and the Allied Powers ignored Germany’s violation of the Non-Intervention Agreement. After all, the Nazis were fighting communists, a common enemy. In effect, the Allied Powers supported Hitler’s foreign policy in Spain. The Spanish Civil War

•In the Spanish Civil War, Germany provided $215 million in military assistance to the Nationalists, sending 16,000 German troops to Spain, including air and armored units.

•The Germans trained 56,000 Nationalist soldiers and provided the Nationalists with 600 planes and 200 tanks. German forces in Spain, organized as the Condor Legion, engaged in air strikes and tank assaults, including the bombing of Guernica on 26 April 1937, in which 300 civilians were killed. The Condor Legion was supported by the Kriegsmarine. Thus, Hitler was able to provide combat experience for his army and navy, using the latest military equipment. With German support, Franco defeated the Republican forces, establishing a fascist government in Spain that would be a formally neutral nation but an informal German ally in WWII.

Above: German Troops of the Condor Legion;

Below: German HE 111-E Bomber (Spain, c. 1939)

•Those who voiced dissent, calling for the support of Republican Spain, were considered prematurely anti-fascist. On 24 June 1937, the prematurely anti-fascist Paul Robeson performed in a benefit at the Albert Hall in London for the children of Guernica.

Paul Robeson, “How Long, Brethren, How Long?”

(Albert Hall, London, 24 June 1937)

•Robeson: “I am deeply happy to contribute to this cause of Spanish culture and of the Basque children in particular—a cause which must concern everyone who stands for freedom, for progressive democracy and for humanity. Today, the artist cannot hold himself aloof. Through the destruction in certain countries of the greatest of man’s cultural heritage, through the propagation of false ideas of racial and national superiority, the scientist, the writer, and the artist is challenged. The challenge must be taken up for this culture, a legacy from our predecessors, is the foundation upon which we build a higher and all-embracing culture. It belongs not only to us, not only to the present generation; it belongs to our posterity, and it must be courageously defended. The forces of reaction have made no distinction between combatants and non-combatants. The beautiful village of Guernica, nestled in the Basque hills, with its blood-soaked streets, is proof of that. These victims must be given every possible aid. This common humanity demands. ‘How long, brethren, how long / Must these people weep and mourn? / How long, how long, brethren, how long? / So long now these people been asleep; / Other folks plowin’ their souls down deep. / How long, how long, brethren, how long? / Too long, brethren, too long, / They jus’ barely miserin’ on. / Too long, too long, brethren, too long!’”

“Correct Attitudes” in Spain“Heah, I say, fair play! You shouldn’t encourage the aggressor, you know. After all, my friend and I aren’t trying to help his victim.”

David Low (Evening Standard, 5 August 1936)

The non-intervention committee decide to wait until the war ends before taking a firm stand. David Low (Evening

Standard, 23 December 1936)

Anschluss with Austria

•The Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St. Germain prohibited the unification of Germany and Austria, despite popular opinion in both nations in favor of unity. The constitutions of the Weimar Republic and the First Austrian Republic included the political goal of unification through democratic means. The League of Nations opposed unification.

•The rise of Hitler’s National Socialism in Germany altered the relationship between Austria and Germany. Austrofascists, both nationalist and Catholic, considered themselves “better Germans” and Austria a “better German state.” They desired independence fromGermany and developed closer ties withfascist Italy. For his part, concernedthat Hitler would demand the Austrianterritories ceded to Italy after WWI,Mussolini opposed German-Austrianunification until Hitler gave assurancesthat Germany would not demandterritorial concessions from Italy.

Anschluss (1938)

•In June 1933, Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss banned the Austrian National Socialists Party. Dollfuss banned other political parties and governed Austria as a dictator. Dollfuss pledged not to unite Austria with Hitler’s Nazi Germany.

•On 25 July 1934, Dollfuss was assassinatedby Austrian Nazis in a failed coup attempt.Kurt Schuschnigg, the new AustrianChancellor, suppressed the Austrian Nazis,imprisoning them in internment camps. TheNazis used terror to pressure the Austriangovernment to move toward unification,leading to the deaths of more than 800Austrians between 1934 and 1938. Giving into German pressure, Schuschnigg signedthe Austro-German Agreement on 11 July1936, releasing the imprisoned Nazis andappointing Nazis to positions within hisgovernment.

Cardinal Theodor Innitzer,

Kurt Schuschnigg’s Son, and

Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss

•On 12 February 1938, Schuschnigg met with Hitler, who promised to reaffirm publicly his support for Austria’s national sovereignty. One week later, however, Hitler publicly said, “The German Reich is no longer willing to tolerate the suppression of ten million Germans across its borders.”

•On 9 March 1938, Schuschniggannounced a 13 March plebiscite on theissue of unification. He promised tolegalize the Social Democratic Party andits labor unions in return for its supportfor Austrian independence. He also setthe minimum voting age at 24, believingyounger Austrians favored unification.Hitler declared that the referendum wouldbe subject to major fraud and thatGermany would not accept it, sendingSchuschnigg an ultimatum on 11 March,demanding that he hand over all power tothe Austrian Nazis or face an invasion. Ernst Rüdiger Camillo

Starhembergand Kurt Schuschnigg

•Schuschnigg, realizing that Britain and France would not support him, resigned, and, on 12 March 1938, the 8th Army of the German Wehrmacht crossed the border into Austria. The troops were greeted by cheering German-Austrians with Nazi salutes, Nazi flags, and flowers. No fighting took place. On 13 March, Germany and Austria renounced the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St. Germain, declaring Anschluss (political “annexation” or “connection”). In a plebiscite held in Austria on 10 April, 99.7 of voters supported Anschluss.

Right: German and

Austrian Border Police Dismantle a Border Post (15 March

1938);Far Right: German

Postcard (c. 1938)

Springtime in EuropeAustria: “But didn’t you ask us all to love one another?”[Aristide] Briand: “Oui, mes enfants—but not in the manner so exclusive.”

David Low (Evening Standard, 5 August 1936)

Increasing Pressure“Why should we take a stand about someone pushing someone else when it’s all so far away .. ”

David Low (Evening Standard, 18 February

1938)

Czechoslovakia

•After Anschluss, Hitler turned his attention to the more than 3 million ethnic Germans living in Sudeten-land, along the borders of western Czechoslovakia. On 28 March 1938, he met with Konrad Henlein, the leader of the pro-Nazi Sudeten German Party (the second largest political party in Czechoslovakia). Hitler instructed Henlein to demand German autonomy from the Czechoslovakian government, headed by Edvard Beneš. While Beneš agreed to protect the rights of Germans as a minority within Czechoslovakia, he refused Henlein’s demand for autonomy, creating a crisis. Sudetenland Germans in

Czechoslovakia (1935)

•British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, believing that the Sudetenland Germans had a right to self-determination, advised Beneš to concede. France adopted Britain’s position. But Beneš stood firm, mobilizing for a German invasion. In Germany, Hitler had plans drawn up for an invasion of Czechoslovakia to be launched no later than 1 October.

•In July 1938, the British demanded that Beneš agree to a mediated arrangement acceptable to the Sudetenland Germans, and the French informed Beneš that they were not prepared to go to war over Czechoslovakia. The German media published propaganda stories reporting maltreatment of the Sudetenland Germans, and Hitler sent 750,000 troops to the border in August. On 12 September, Hitler gave a speech calling for the rights of Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Slovaks, and Ukrainians to self-determination.

•Chamberlain met with Hitler in Berchtesgaden on 15 September 1938 to discuss a peaceful President Edvard Beneš of

Czechoslovakia

resolution to the crisis. Chamberlain then met with French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier on 16 September in London. Chamberlain and Daladier agreed on a proposal to cede Czech territories with a German population of at least 50 percent to Germany.

Chamberlain that he would not invade Czechoslovakia or make any other demands on the territory of Czechoslovakia if Chamberlain agreed to Germany’s immediate annexation of the Sudetenland.

•On 23 September 1938, Czecho-slovakia mobilized for war, and the USSR informed Czechoslovakia of its willingness to provide military assistance. Beneš, however, refused to go to war without the support of Britain and France. Then Hitler issued an ultimatum to Czecho-slovakia to cede the Sudetenland to Germany on 28 September before 2:00 PM or face war.

•On 18 September 1938, Benito Mussolini announced his support for the German position. And on 21 September, Beneš capitulated to the British-French plan.

•Chamberlain met with Hitler again on 22 September 1938 in Cologne to inform him that Czechoslovakia agreed to his demand for the Sudetenland. With agreement reached, however, Hitler made new demands, insisting that Germans in Hungary and Poland also be granted self-determination. He threatened to invade Czechoslovakia unless the country was dismembered by Germany, Hungary, and Poland. Hitler then backtracked, telling

•Through Mussolini, Chamberlain asked Hitler for a 24-hour delay so that Britain, France, Italy, and Germany could meet in Munich to resolve the crisis short of war. US President Franklin Roosevelt telegraphed his support of Chamberlain’s plan.

•On 29 September 1938, in Munich, Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini, and Hitler reached an agreement that was signed on 30 September (Britain and Germany also signed on 30 September a bilateral peace treaty).

•The Munich Agreementallowed the German army tooccupy the Sudetenland by10 October, established aninternational commission todetermine the fate of otherdisputed territories in Czecho-slovakia, and gave de factocontrol of Czechoslovakia toGermany provided Hitler madeno more territorial demands. The Munich Agreement (29

September 1938)

•Into the bargain, Poland demanded on 30 September that Czecho-slovakia cede the city of Bohumín to Poland. The Germans supported the Poles because it lent credence to Hitler’s position that Germany was not conquering part of Czecho-slovakia but championing the rights of minorities to self-determination. After being told to accept the terms of the Munich Agreement or fight Germany alone, Czechoslovakia conceded to both the German and Polish demands on 30 September and on 1 October respectively.

•Following the Munich Agreement, in the Vienna Awards (2 November 1938 and 30 August 1940), Germany and Italy returned Czechoslovakian German Troops in the

Sudetenland (3 October 1938)

territory to Hungary that it had lost in the Treaty of Trianon. And then, on 15 March 1939, Hitler seized the remaining Czech territory and welcomed an independent, pro-Nazi Slovak Republic as an ally.

Czechoslovakia after Munich1. Germany occupies the Sudetenland (October 1938).2. Poland annexes Zaolzie (October 1938).3. Hungary occupies border areas (November 1938).4. During the German invasion of the remaining Czech territories, Hungary annexes Carpathian Ruthenia (15 March 1939).5. Germany establishes the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia with a puppet government (16 March 1939).

6. During the German invasion of Czech territories, a pro-Hitler Catholic fascist government splits off the remaining territories of Czechoslovakia and declares the Slovak Republic, an Axis client state.

Mein Kampf

David Low (Evening Standard, 24 September

1938)

Why cut down the tree when you can use the steps?

Sidney “George” Strube (Daily Express, 28 September 1938)

The Nazi-Soviet Pact

•Soviet leader Josef Stalin was not invited to participate in the Munich Agreement. In the aftermath of Munich, Stalin concluded that Britain and France would not stand against Germany and would even support a German war against the USSR. In 1939, to protect Russian interests, Stalin sought a firm military alliance with Britain and France. Stalin demanded that any German aggression in Eastern Europe be considered an act of indirect aggression against the USSR, triggering a two-front war on Germany. France was willing to negotiate with the USSR on this point, but Britain would not.

Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov(3 July 1937)

Chamberlain believed a military alliance with the USSR would push Eastern Europe closer to Germany, would justify Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe, and would drag Britain into a war that could still be avoided.

•When the public negotiations with Britain and France stalled—Poland would not allow Soviet troops on Polish territory if invaded by Germany—Stalin replaced his pro-Western Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, who was a Jew married to an English woman, with Vyacheslav Molotov, giving him greater flexibility to enter into secret negotiations with Hitler’s Germany.

•Nazi Germany desperately needed access to Russia’s oil, iron ore, manganese, rubber, food fats and oils, and other raw materials for its war machine, and Stalin believed he could force Germany to sign a military treaty with the USSR by offering an economic treaty in

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and German Foreign Minister

Joachim von Ribbentrop (28 September 1939)

exchange. An economic deal would pave the way for closer economic ties between Germany and the USSR, although Hitler privately believed a future German invasion of the USSR was inevitable.

•On 19 August 1939, the Nazis and Soviets came to terms on an economic treaty: the USSR would supply Germany with 180 million Reichsmarks of raw materials and Germany would supply the USSR with 120 million Reichsmarks of industrial goods and a line of credit of 200 million Reichsmarks that could be used to purchase German manufactured goods. Then, on 21 August, Stalin broke off negotiations with Britain and France, inviting German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to Moscow to discuss a military treaty.

•On 23 August 1939, the USSR andGermany concluded the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, alsoknown as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pactor the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The publicprovisions of the treaty pledged eachnation neither to make war on the othernor to ally or aid an enemy of the other.Thus, Germany did not support Japan inits undeclared war against the USSR.

Signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact

(23 August 1939)

•The Nazi-Soviet Pact also consisted of secret provisions, dividing Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence.

“If the British Don’t, Maybe We Will.”

David Low (Evening Standard, 29 June 1939)

Wonder How Long the Honeymoon Will Last?

Clifford K. Berryman (Evening Star, 9 October

1939)

•One week after signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. On 8 October, Germany annexed western Poland and Danzig and designated central and southern Poland as an occupied area of colonial administration known as the General Governorate. Hitler’s intent was to colonize 5 million German settlers in the General Governorate, reducing the 12 million Poles living there to the level of serfs or exterminating them. The USSR occupied northern and eastern Poland. Although Britain and France, having pledged to defend Poland, declared war on Germany, they provided very little assistance to the Poles. World War II officially began.

German and Soviet Troops in Poland (September 1939)

German Invasion of Poland (1 September 1939)

Little Goldilocks Riding Hood

Herb Block (1939)

RendezvousHitler: “The scum of the earth, I believe?”Stalin: “The bloody assassin of the workers, I presume?”

David Low (Evening Standard, 20 September

1939)

From Appeasement to War

•After the 19 September 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the opening battle of World War II, it would not be for another ten years, after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, that support for a war against fascism was mobilized. From 1931, however, there was an understanding that fascism meant war, and the outbreakof war was expected. Yet,from 1933 to 1939, Britainand France (unassisted byan isolationist USA)responded to Germany withappeasement, makingconcessions to Hitler at theexpense of other nations.Moreover, the Allied Powersdid not adequately preparefor war. Why was this so? German Expansion to 1933-39

•The communists were the first to stand consistently against fascism, which accounted for the public popularity of the USSR from 1933 until August 1939, when Stalin surprised the radical left by making peace with Hitler. In fact, in January 1939, when polled on who they would like to see win a hypothetical war between Germany and the USSR, 83 percent of Americans favored a Soviet victory over Nazi Germany.

•Within the League of Nations, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Maxim Litvinov championed collective security, but the divided interests of the member states proved Maxim Litvinov (1933)

insurmountable. Not the least of the divisions was caused by the Allied Powers viewing the USSR as a subversive state. And Britain’s primary concern was its global empire, while US interests lay largely in Asia and Latin America.

•The Western Powers were reluctant to enter into negotiations with the USSR even after Hitler’s 1939 invasion of Poland. Conservatives hoped for a war between Germany and the USSR that would weaken both nations, even though the only effective anti-fascist alliance had to involve the USSR. As the crisis of the 1930s unfolded, doomsayers saw global fascism as a lesser evil than possible social revolution.

•Nevertheless, by 1935, the communists, under the direction of Georgi Dimitrov’s Third Comintern (1934-43), stopped bickering with other leftist parties and organized the left in a United Front against Georgi Dimitrov

fascism. Once unity on the left was achieved, the communists moved to create a Popular Front—joining with democrats and liberals—and even a National Front in alliance with non-fascist conservatives on the right.

•The radical left, even though opposed on principle to liberals and conservatives saw fascism as such a threat that it was willing to ally itself with capitalist ruling classes. The communists were successful at mobilizing a minority of artists, intellectuals, and journalists against fascism, but their anti-fascism did not advance the left in the Western Powers. And Eastern Europeans were wary of any arrangement with the USSR that would put Red Army troops on their soil.

•Within the Western Powers, some liberals and conservatives saw Hitler’s Germany as an economically flourishing country with a few unattractive aberrations. In Britain, Italian fascism was particularly attractive to conservatives, such as Winston Churchill, accounting for British attempts to separate Italy and Germany and to ally with Italy. But within all Western Powers, there were fascist elements. For example, Henry Ford and Adolf Hitler admired one another.

Communist Party of Canada National

Front Poster (c. 1934)

•Neville Chamberlain epitomized the appeasement policy. And from the moment he signed the Munich Agreement, Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier felt shame, but both were greeted with cheers upon their return to London and Paris, respectively. The public feared war and felt overwhelming relief that war had been averted at Munich. The memory of World War I weakened France and Britain. Within the liberal democracies, popular opposition was used as an excuse not to start or to delay a war against fascism. More than this, the policy of appeasement was sensible to Britons who were not anti-German or anti-fascist on principle.

Above: Reporters Question Daladier (n. d.)

Below: Britons Fête Chamberlain (October 1930)

•Chamberlain’s appeasement policy was based on rational realpolitik. The British (and the French) were too weak to defend the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. At Munich, Britain had no historical ties with Eastern Europe generally or Czechoslovakia particularly. Britain could not financially afford a war, especially if the British Empire was to be defended. War would ruin the British economy and lead to the collapse of the British Empire. The British had everything to lose from war and nothing to gain. The French were more nervous about the policy of appeasement, but they were too weak to militarily engage Germany independent of Britain. France could Adolf Hitler

not defeat Germany alone. Thus, the only suitable foreign policy was one of negotiations and concessions in the hopes of creating a stable peace. Chamberlain’s mistake was in dealing with Hitler as if he, too, was practicing realpolitik.

•Nazi Germany was a nation state governed not by self-interest but by ideology. Hitler’s irrational and unlimited objectives precluded realpolitik. Any peaceful solution was illusory. This was demonstrated after Hitler violated the Munich Agreement, conquering Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain’s delay in preparing for war after Munich was inexplicable. Not committed to fighting fascism on principle, the supporters of appeasement after Munich half-heartedly prepared for war with an air of pessimism and defeatism. Even as Hitler took Poland and Stalin secretly pleaded for joint Anglo-Soviet actions in the Baltic, Chamberlain steadfastly stood ready to appease Hitler.

German Troops Crossing the Soviet Border

(22 June 1941)

•In the USSR, Stalin feared that the West would leave him to face Hitler alone, so he signed the Soviet-Nazi pact and withdrew into neutrality. In the USA, Franklin Roosevelt could not pursue his desired anti-fascist policy until Pearl Harbor gave him the necessary public support.

Chamberlain Announces War (3 September 1939)

•Hitler’s conquest of Czecho-slovakia galvanized British public opinion in favor of resisting fascism. When Hitler invaded Poland, the British public forced a reluctant Chamberlain to declare war on Germany, which forced the French to follow suit.

Roosevelt Declares War (8 December 1941)

Harold Rome’s “Four Little Angels of Peace” (1937)

Harold Rome’s “Four Little Angels of Peace Are We” (1937)

Four little angels of peace are we, / Loving our neighbors so peacefully. / There’s really no harm / If we do not disarm / For we’re always in close harmony. / Four little angels of peace are we. / There is one thing on which we agree: / With foe or with friend, / We will fight to the end / Just for peace, peace, peace!Chamberlain: Though we butchered the Boers / On their own native shores / And slaughtered the Irish no end, / Though on India we poured, / Slaying horde upon horde, / We were playing the part of a friend. / Yes, our arms, we increase, / But we’re really for peace / Except in the case of a crook. / We conquered both spheres. / Now, we’re up to our ears / Just trying to keep what we took!Three little angels of peace are we, / Living together so blissfully. / Oh, we never fight / Unless we’re in the right, / And we’re always in the right, you see. / Three little angels of peace are we. / There is one thing on which we agree: / Until we are wrecks, / We’ll break each other’s necks / Just for peace, peace, peace!Hirohito: In Japan, we delight / In our generals might, / But the emperor knows peace is finer. / It isn’t our fault. / It’s a case of assault. / We are picked on and bullied by China. / Oh, how we deplore / Our great need for a war. / We’re a nation of poets and thinkers. / Though we bomb without pity / And lay waste to each city, / It’s because all the Chinese are stinkers!

Two little angels of peace are we, / Living together in amity. / We’ll sign any pact, / Saying we won’t attack, / But that’s just a mere formality. / Two little angels of peace are we. / There is one thing on which we agree: / We try to keep calm / When we gas and we bomb / Just for peace, peace, peace!Mussolini: Now, I know that war / Is a thing to abhor / And that peace will fill our cornucopia. / With love from the start, / I just did my part / To civilize dear Ethiopia. / Though you call me sadistic, / I’m imperialistic. / My armies require a quarry. / And though we may slay / Hordes of Spaniards each day, / After all, don’t we say that we’re sorry?Hitler: Though I fall for the urge / Of a nice bloody purge / And leave in my wake piles of carrion / Though I clean up my schmutz / With a real Nazi putsch, / It is all for the sake of the Aryan. / My ambitions are small. / I want nothing at all. / My plans couldn’t be any littler. / Now that Austria’s Nazi, / It would be hotsey totsey / To put all the world under Hitler!Four little angels of peace are we, / Reeking with odor of sanctity. / Though we slaughter the meek, / We confer every week, / And we talk it over peacefully. / Four little angels of peace are we. / There is one thing on which we agree: / With shot and with shell, / We give each other hell / Just for peace, peace, peace!

Frank Capra’s “Why We Fight: Prelude to War” (1942)

Frank Capra’s “Why We Fight: The Nazis Strike” (1942)