Cambrai - David Cavaleri

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“And therefore I consider that wewere not beaten by the genius of Mar-shal Foch, but by ‘General Tank,’ inother words, a new weapon of war...”

General der Infanterie A.D.H. von Zwehl, Die

Schlachten im Sommer, 1918, am der Westfront .

On September 15, 1916, the BritishExpeditionary Force under the com-

mand of General Sir Douglas Haig em-ployed tanks in support of infantry op-erations during the Battle of theSomme. In a previous article ( ARMOR,November/December 1995), I dis-cussed the decision-making process be-hind Haig’s commitment of tanks atthat time. This article analyzes the Brit-ish development of mechanized doc-trine leading up to the November 1917Battle of Cambrai and the impact of the lessons learned from that operation.In the final analysis, the British selec-tively applied certain lessons to imme-diate tactical problems, but failed to

grasp the implications of mechanizedoperations for the future.

At the end of September, 1916, Lieu-tenant Colonel Hugh Elles took com-mand of the British Tank Detachment.He was described by his primary staff officer, Major J.F.C. Fuller, as “boyishand reckless in danger; perhaps a bettersoldier than a strategist, yet one whocould profit from the cooperation of hisadvisors, and one who was universallyloved and trusted by his followers.”1

Historian Douglas Orgill looked be-yond Elles’ personality and wrote thatElles represented a “bridge between the

new military knowledge and the oldsoldierly virtues.”2 Despite Elles’ per-sonal leadership qualities, however,Major Fuller was the one responsiblefor developing doctrine and trainingprograms.

At their first meeting in late 1916,Elles stated that “this show [the Tank Detachment] badly wants pulling to-gether; it is all so new that one hardlyknows which way to turn.”3 Ellescharged Fuller with creating a sense of

discipline and esprit de corps in the de-tachment. Fuller regarded this missionas a three-part problem. First, he had toinstill a sense of discipline, which hepursued via a series of lectures on thesubject. Second, he had to instruct theofficers in new doctrine. And third, hehad to reorganize the detachment so asto maximize the use of its equipment.

Fuller was an infantry officer with areputation for being a highly efficientstaff officer. In February 1917, he pub-lished a training manual entitled“Training Note #16,” designed tostandardize all training practices in thedetachment.4 Fuller organized the man-ual in nine sections: detachment or-ganization, operations, tactics, coopera-tion with other arms, preparations foroffensives, supply, communication, re-inforcements, and camouflaging. Call-ing the tank “a mobile fortress, whichcould escort the infantry into the en-emy’s defenses, and from behind whichthey could sally forth and clean up histrenches,”5 he believed that tanks werecapable of a more offense-oriented rolethan had been demonstrated during theSomme operation.

In June, 1917, Fuller produced a docu-ment entitled “Projected Bases for theTactical Employment of Tanks in1918.” In this study, he drew on the re-sults of ineffective tank employmentduring the battles of the Somme (Sep-tember 1916), Arras (April 1917), andMessines (June 1917). Fuller advancedthree points based on his analysis. The

first was that the tank’s effectivenesswas related directly to the terrain overwhich it operated. The second was that,if properly employed, tanks were capa-ble of executing a penetration whichcould allow for a breakthrough by fol-low-on cavalry and infantry forces. Thethird principle was that the success of any tank penetration required a surpriseartillery bombardment not to exceedforty-eight hours in duration.6 Fullerexpanded on Ernest D. Swinton’s con-cepts in his belief that tanks were capa-

ble of more than strongpoint and wireobstacle reduction. “He soon becamethe leading advocate,” wrote B.H Lid-dell Hart, “of the tanks’ wider potenti-alities — as a means to revive mobilewarfare, instead of merely as a mod-ernized ‘battering ram’ for breakinginto entrenched defenses.7

Later in 1917, Fuller proposed an op-eration to British General Headquartersdesigned to test the validity of hisideas. Fuller’s initial recommendationproposed a raid of no more than a fewhours duration, designed to penetrateenemy defenses, capture prisoners, andshake up the defenders. In an August1917 paper entitled “Tank Raids,” hesummarized the objectives of just sucha limited raid as “Advance, hit and re-tire; its objective being to destroy the

26 ARMOR — November-December 1996

The British Tank Detachment at

CambraiLessons Learned and Lost Opportunities

by Major David P. Cavaleri


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enemy’s personnel and guns, to demor-alize and disorganize him, and not tocapture ground or hold terrain.”8

Unfortunately, such a plan had littleto recommend it to GHQ; the limitedtactical gains were outweighed by thepotential loss of surprise and vehicles.However, the Third Army Commander,General Julius Byng, read the proposaland recognized its potential. He devel-oped a plan which incorporated Full-er’s basic concepts but which hadmuch larger objectives, especially re-garding the capture of territory.

Byng wanted the focus of the opera-tion to be the communications center atCambrai; once that town was capturedhe could then release his cavalry to thenorthwest to raid behind German lines.Byng’s plan relied on the tanks to

penetrate the defense and assumed thatsuch a break-in would automatically re-sult in a cavalry breakthrough. His planmeticulously prepared for the initialbreak-in, but discounted the fact that atthat stage of the year, he lacked ade-quate reserves to follow through. Evenif the operation was successful in ef-

fecting a break-in of the “outpost” and“battle” zones, he would not be able topenetrate into the “rearward” zone tolaunch his cavalry.9

Haig ultimately decided on an ad-vance with limited objectives in the vi-cinity of Cambrai, but not necessarilyfocused on the town itself. He revisedByng’s plan to concentrate on theBourlon Ridge which, if captured,would provide British forces with ex-cellent observation of the “battle” and

“rearward” zones. Unwilling to dis-count completely the possibility of abreakthrough, Haig nevertheless re-tained the option to terminate the op-eration at the end of forty-eight hoursunless clear progress was evident.10 ByOctober, 1917, Fuller had revised hisoriginal “Tank Raids” proposal to in-

corporate Byng’s and Haig’s guidance.These new plans featured the tank in aspearhead-type role.

By mid-November 1917, the staff atGHQ had finalized the plans for theCambrai attack. The sector was con-stricted by two canals, the Canal duNord on the left and the Canal de l’Es-caut on the right, six miles apart. Theinitial attack area included a number of small villages and two dominant ridge-lines, the Flesquieres and Bourlon. The

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Hindenburg trench system in this sectorwas over five miles deep, completewith dugouts, machine gun posts, wireobstacles, antitank ditches in excess of twelve feet wide, and supporting artil-lery batteries.11

The Hindenburg Line proper ran in anorthwesterly direction for almost sixmiles from the Scheldt Canal at Ban-

teux to Havrincourt. The line thenturned north for four miles to Mouvres.Roughly one mile behind this first linelay the Hindenburg Reserve Line, andan additional three and a half miles be-hind that lay the Beaurevoir, Masnieresand Marquian Lines.12

The final plan called for the tanks topenetrate the Hindenburg Line betweenthe two canals, pass the cavalrythrough the gap, then continue forwardand assist the infantry in seizing Bour-lon Wood and the town of Cambrai.The tanks and infantry would continueto expand the penetration while the

cavalry raided support units in the“rearward” zone and beyond.13 Fullerexpressed concern over the suitabilityof the terrain beyond the “battle” zoneand over the lack of reserves availableto exploit any breakthrough, but theplan stood as written.14 The Cambraiplan was a mixture of traditional opera-tion and innovative thinking. The planof attack dispensed with the traditionallong duration artillery bombardmentand instead, the 1,003 supporting artil-lery guns were to conduct a brief sup-

pressive bombardment, concentratingon counter-battery and smoke-screenfire. Once the assault began in earnest,the artillery would shift to the creepingbarrage pattern similar to that designedby General Rawlinson for the 1916Somme operation. The tanks were as-signed the mission of breaching thetrenches and wire obstacles and leadingthe attack, precluding the need for an

intense preparatory bombardment.Byng anticipated a breakthrough

which would allow the cavalry to passthrough to the “rearward” zone in order“to raid the enemy’s communications,disorganize his system of command,damage his railways, and interfere asmuch as possible with the arrival of hisreinforcements.”15 The final plan re-flected the level of development whichBritish mechanized doctrine hadreached under Fuller; Haig was willingto commit the tanks to a crucial roleand expected them to accomplish morethan obstacle reduction. At the same

time, the exploitation and disruptionrole stayed with the cavalry who re-mained vulnerable on a battlefield re-plete with machine guns and artillery.

Fuller divided the six-mile-wide of-fensive sector into a series of objec-tives, each of which was further subdi-vided, based on the number of strong-points, into “tank section attack areas.”He assigned a three-tank section, alongwith an infantry section, to each attack area. Each tank carried a bundle of

wood three or four feet in diameter andweighing over one ton. These were af-fixed to the front of each vehicle withchains. The wood was carried to fill inantitank ditches, thereby allowing thetank-infantry teams to negotiate threeditches as they leapfrogged through thedefenses.16

On November 20, 1917, at 0620

hours, British artillery commenced asuppressive barrage along the six-mile-wide front. Unlike previous preparatorybarrages, this forty-five minute barragewas predominantly smoke and high ex-plosive. The artillery concentrated onsuppressing the defenders’ artillery andmasking the tanks’ advance. After lessthan one hour, the artillery began thecreeping barrage and the tanks movedforward. The absence of a traditionalpreparatory bombardment probablycontributed to the defenders’ surpriseand to the tanks’ success in breachingthe first defensive lines.

GHQ allocated 476 tanks to Byng’sThird Army for the Cambrai attack.Out of this total, 378 were fightingtanks; 44 were devoted to communica-tions, command and control; and theremaining 54 were assigned resupplyduties. These last tanks each carriedtwo tons of supplies and hauled an ad-ditional five tons on sledges over thebreached obstacle networks. Fuller esti-mated that it would have required over21,000 men to carry a similar resupplyload, which represents a significant



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savings in fighting troops who were notdiverted from actual combat duties.17

The tanks were accompanied and fol-lowed by elements of six infantry divi-sions. Waiting behind the safety of theBritish trenches were the five divisionsof cavalry which Byng hoped to launchforward.

The opening stages of the attack weresuccessful. Masked by smoke and thecreeping barrage, the tanks tore holesthrough the wire obstacles and filled inditches with the wood. Less than twohours after the attack began, the Britishcaptured the Hindenburg Main Lineover the six-mile front between the twowoods. By 1130, the Hindenburg Sup-port Line, with the exception of theridge at Flesquieres, was in Britishhands as well. By the end of the day,the BEF had penetrated to a depth of just over four miles, capturing over5,000 prisoners, with a loss of just over

4,000.18 The first day’s operation dem-onstrated the effects of coordinatedtank, infantry, and artillery tactics oversuitable terrain within the parametersof a well thought-out tactical plan.

But the success of November 20 wasmitigated by several failures. The Brit-ish lost 179 tanks that day to a combi-nation of enemy fire and mechanicalbreakdown. The tank/infantry teamspenetrated to a depth of over fourmiles, but not deep enough to qualifyas a breakthrough into the “rearward”zone. The cavalry divisions in mostsectors never even made it into the bat-tle, and the few cavalry units commit-ted failed to accomplish anything sig-nificant in terms of rear area exploita-tion. In addition, the operation experi-enced several instances of degraded co-ordination between the tanks, infantry,and artillery. The 51st Infantry Divisionfell so far behind the assaulting tanksthat, when the tanks reached the Fles-quieres Ridge, the infantry could notdetect the breaches in the wire.

A short while later, 16 tanks, withoutthe protection of their own infantryteams, were destroyed by a battery of

German field guns which were out of range of the tanks’ weapons.19 This in-cident illustrates clearly that Fuller’stactics needed refinement. While hehad proven that tanks were capable of rapid penetration, they were by nomeans capable of independent opera-tions.

Haig terminated the Cambrai attack on November 22, just as he had prom-ised if the offensive failed to result in abreakthrough. He recognized that the

BEF lacked the reserves needed to con-tinue the attack because of the previousdiversion of five divisions to the ItalianFront at Caporetto.20 One week afterthe attack began, he wrote, “I have notgot the necessary number of troops toexploit our success. Two fresh divisionswould make all the difference and

would enable us to break out....”21 Thislack of reserves, combined with thecavalry’s inability to achieve a break-through on their own, convinced Haigto end the attack after only limitedgains. It is clear that no one, with per-haps the exception of Fuller himself,anticipated the extent or rapidity of success. Swinton reacted to the initialreports on November 20 with this com-ment: “I’m pleased all right, but I’mwondering. I bet that GHQ are just asmuch surprised by our success as theBoche is, and are quite unready to ex-ploit it.”22

The lack of available reserves re-sulted in the loss of British momentumat Cambrai. The Germans were able tofall back, regroup, and on November30 launch a counterattack to eliminatethe new British salient. The Germansbegan their attack at 0700 with an in-tense one-hour-long artillery bombard-ment, similar to the one used by theBEF on November 20th. Using provensturmabteilung tactics, they succeededin reducing the salient on an eight-milefront in just over three hours. Severalminor successes followed, but theywere unable to execute a rapid or vio-

lent breakthrough due to inadequate re-serves, British reinforcements, and gen-eral troop exhaustion. The counterat-tack forced the BEF to withdraw par-tially to stabilize the lines, resulting inpractically no net gain based on thesuccess of November 20th. By Decem-ber 7, the lines had stabilized. The Ger-mans had, between November 20 andDecember 7, lost 41,000 men and 138guns. The British had lost 43,000 men,158 guns, and 213 of their availabletanks.23

In strategic terms, the BEF had gained

nothing. But from a tactical and devel-opmental viewpoint, the battle of Cam-brai represents a transition in BEF op-erations. Because of the complete tacti-cal surprise and significant gains madein less than 12 hours, several contem-poraries mark November 20, 1917, as alandmark of sorts in the history of war-fare. Lloyd George later said that thebattle “will go down to history as oneof the epoch-making events of the war,marking the beginning of a new era inmechanized warfare.”24 Haig credited

the use of tanks at Cambrai with mak-ing it possible “to dispense with artil-lery preparation, and so to conceal ourintentions from the enemy up to the ac-tual moment of attack,”25 and statedthat the tanks’ penetration of the Hin-denburg Line had “a most inspiringmoral effect on the Armies I com-

mand... the great value of the tanks inthe offensive has been conclusivelyproved.”26 Swinton, not surprisingly,claimed some credit for the success of November 20th. “It has an added inter-est,” he wrote, “in that it was upon thelines here laid down [reference made tohis February 1916 ‘Notes on the Em-ployment of Tanks.’] that the epoch-making Battle of Cambrai wasfought....”27

The combination of surprise, suitableterrain, adequate numbers of tanks, co-ordinated artillery bombardment, re-sourceful preparation and, most impor-

tantly, comprehensive planning resultedin a major penetration of enemy lines.The lessons learned in the areas of economy in men per weapon, in menper yard of front, in casualties, artillerypreparation, cavalry personnel, ammu-nition, and battlefield labor were im-portant.28 While there was no denyingthe significance of the event, the Brit-ish failed to convert the early successof November 20th, and Fuller set out todetermine exactly why. Fuller and theGeneral Staff of the Third Army devel-oped a list of lessons learned based onthe Cambrai operation.29 Six of the

most significant lessons, several of which remain applicable to present-daycombined arms operations as well, ap-pear below:

1. “Tank units and infantry units mustmaintain close liaison during offensiveoperations.” Haig used the incident atFlesquieres Ridge as an example of thislesson: “This incident shows the impor-tance of infantry operating with tanksand at times acting as skirmishers toclear away hostile guns....”

2. “Keep large reserves of tanks to re-place unexpected losses in any sector.”

3. “The present model tank is me-chanically unable to deal with enemyparties in upper stories of houses.”

4. “Tanks must not outdistance sup-porting infantry — this allows enemyto hide and reappear.” This was a con-tributing factor in the cavalry’s failureon November 20th.

5. “Infantry must not expect too muchfrom tanks — they must assist thetanks with protection — this requirescontinuous combined arms training.”

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6. “Tanks used in small numbers areonly ‘frittered’ away. If it is desired tocontinue the advance with tanks on thesecond day, a completely new forma-tion of tanks should be earmarked.”30

Historian John Terraine alluded to thiswhen he stated “the tanks [at Cambrai]had shown their effectiveness for

breaking into even a very elaborate andstrong trench position. Breakingthrough was another matter.”31

In May, 1918, Fuller published an im-portant doctrine study entitled “TheTactics of the Attack as Affected by theSpeed and Circuit of the Medium DTank,” more commonly referred to assimply “Plan 1919.”32 His analysiscalled for the initial penetration of the“outpost” and “battle” zones by tanks.Once into the “rearward” zone, thetanks would seek out the enemy’s com-mand and control systems and artillerysupport, thereby assuming the role of

the cavalry.33 This plan represented afurther innovation on tactics beyondthose employed in September 1916 andNovember 1917. Fuller advocated thedestruction of systems, rather than theelimination of enemy troop concentra-tions, and believed the end resultwould be the same: the crippling of theenemy’s will and capacity to fight. Hisfuturistic concept was based on thespeed, maneuverability, and firepowercapabilities of the Medium D tank, andhe assumed, mistakenly, that the mili-tary establishment would agree withhim. In order to execute his plan, Fuller

required a force of over 5,000 tanks, anincrease in Tank Corps personnel from17,000 to 37,000, and a willingness onthe part of the military to replace thehorse-mounted cavalry with tanks.34

Despite the success of November 20,1917, Fuller’s “Plan 1919” was tooradical for the leadership to endorse,and it never progressed beyond thetheoretical stage. What “Plan 1919”represents is the continuing develop-ment of mechanized doctrine. The lim-ited success of November 20th demon-strated the capabilities of tanks; in July1918 at the Battle of Hamel, and later,

in August, 1918, at the Battle of Amiens, the British Tank Corps hadopportunities to demonstrate the poten-tial for tank operational success on anincreasingly greater offensive scale.

The Battle of Cambrai provides a pic-ture of the tanks’ development from in-fantry support weapons with limited of-fensive potential to weapons employedon the point of the offensive. They hadproven capable of clearing a path forthe infantry into the main defensive

zone and demonstrated the potential toadvance further. During the inter-warperiod, mechanized doctrine wouldvacillate between those who believedtanks should remain auxiliary to the in-fantry and those who were willing totake the doctrine to a higher level. In-terestingly enough, it was the British

who elected to revert back to the earlyphilosophy, while the Germans, underGeneral Heinz Guderian, explored thepotential for expanded mechanized op-erations. In retrospect, the decision byboth sides is logical. The British hadwon the war using traditional strategiesaugmented by innovative equipmentand tactics, and therefore had little in-clination to change. The Germans, onthe other hand, had lost; their tacticshad proven ineffective on the largescale of the Western Front, and theyhad everything to gain by adoptingnew equipment and strategies.

Notes

1J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional

Soldier, (London: I. Nicholson and Watson,1936), p. 88.

2Douglas Orgill, The Tank: Studies in the De-

velopment and Use of a Weapon, (London:Heinemann Publishing Co., 1970), p. 31.

3Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Sol-

dier, p. 87.

4 Ibid., p. 96ff.

5 Ibid., p. 97.

6 Ibid., pp. 129-130.

7B.H. Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain

Liddell Hart, Vol. 1, (London: Cassell andCompany, Ltd., 1965), p. 87.


dier, pp. 172-175; see also Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, (New York: B. Black-well, 1986), p. 488.

9Orgill, pp. 35-36; see also Wilson, p. 488.

10Wilson, pp. 488-489; see also J.H. Boraston,

Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches, Dec 1915-April1919, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,1927, pp. 152-153.

11 Ibid.

12

Boraston, pp. 153-154.13

Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Sol-dier, pp. 181-182.

14 Ibid.

15Boraston, p. 153.

16J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, (Lon-

don: John Murray, 1920), pp. 136-153; see alsoWilson, p. 489.


dier, p. 198.

18Boraston, p. 157; see also Wilson, p. 490.


dier, p. 209.

20Robert Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of

Douglas Haig, 1914-1919, (London: Eyre andSpottiswoode, 1952), p. 265.

21 Ibid.

22Ernest D. Swinton, Eyewitness: being per-

sonal reminiscences of certain phases of theGreat War, including the genesis of the tank,(New York: Arno Press, 1972), p. 266.

23Wilson, p. 492; see also David Eggenberger,

A Dictionary of Battles (New York: Thomas Y.Crowell Company, p. 1967), p. 73.

24David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of

David Lloyd George, (Boston: Little, Brownand Company, 1933), p. 102.

25Boraston, p. 157.

26 Ibid., p. 173.

27Swinton, pp. 171-172.

28Arch Whitehouse, Tank, (New York: Dou-

bleday and Company, Inc., 1960), p. 93.


dier, pp. 218-219.

30Blake, p. 269.

31John Terraine, White Heat: The New War-

fare 1914-1918, (London: Sidgewick and Jack-son, 1982), p. 242.


dier, pp. 332-335.

33Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the

Theory of Armored Warfare, 1918-1940, (NewYork: University of Delaware Press, 1984), p.90; see also Orgill, p. 89; see also Fuller, Mem-oirs of an Unconventional Soldier, p. 321.

34

Orgill, p. 89; see also Fuller, Memoirs of anUnconventional Soldier, Appendix I, pp. 334-335.


Major David P. Cavaleri holdsa B.A. from Eastern NazareneCollege at Quincy, Massachu-setts (1982) and an M.A. in His-tory from the University of Mis-souri at Columbia, Missouri(1993). He earned his commis-sion in 1983 through the Officer

Candidate School at Fort Ben-ning, Ga. He is a graduate ofseveral Department of the Armyschools, and is now attendingthe U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College at Ft.Leavenworth, Kan. He justcompleted serving as an Assis-tant Professor of History at theU.S. Military Academy at WestPoint, New York.

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