Calvert 2002 - Academic Research

MAKING ACADEMIC RESEARCH USEFUL Scientists’ responses to changing policy demands

Jane Calvert

SPRU - Science and Technology Policy ResearchUniversity of Sussex

Brighton, BN1 9RF, UK

First draft - Comments welcomeEmail: [email protected]

Paper for the NPRNet Conference 2002 ‘Rethinking Science Policy: Analytical Frameworks For Evidence-Based Policy’ 21-23 March, 2002, SPRU, University Of Sussex, Brighton, UK

Outline

1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 12. The changing nature of academic research ....................................................................... 23. Scientists’ responses.......................................................................................................... 3

3.1 Basic research: historical associations with purity and value ..................................... 33.2 The status of basic research......................................................................................... 43.3 Justifications for funding basic research ..................................................................... 4

3.3.1 An over-emphasis on economic benefits ............................................................. 53.3.2 A broader notion of ‘use’ ..................................................................................... 6

3.4 The erosion of scientific autonomy and threats to basic research............................... 73.5 ‘Tailoring’ ................................................................................................................... 93.6 Basic research as a protective resource ..................................................................... 12

4. Conclusions: consequences for policy and theory .......................................................... 13

1. IntroductionGovernments intend that the academic research they fund will be useful for wider society,and many policies have been implemented to further this goal. This paper examines theeffects of such policies on the behaviour of scientists, focusing especially on the role of ‘basicresearch’ and its importance to scientists. The paper starts by outlining the changing natureof academic research, and the types of pressures and demands that are facing scientists today.To understand the reactions of scientists to these pressures it is helpful to examine briefly thehistorical roots of basic research and the values attached to this concept. In-depth interviewmaterial is then drawn upon to demonstrate that scientists attach considerable importance tobasic research and that they have a range of justifications available to argue for its funding.Scientists are clearly worried about the future of basic research, although they can presenttheir own research as either basic or applied depending on the situation and the fundingrequirements. They can also use the concept to protect themselves against external demandsfor their research to result in commercial or applicable outcomes. The paper argues that onlyby recognising the importance attached to basic research and the complex responses of

Jane Calvert Making academic research useful

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scientists to policy demands can we gain a better understanding of the potential contributionof academic research to broader social and economic objectives.

2. The changing nature of academic researchToday social and economic goals have an important place in most countries’ researchagendas and policies for science are increasingly placing pressures on academic research tobe more directly and clearly useful. Several historical factors have contributed to thisemphasis. The end of the Cold War saw decreased funds for many fields of academicresearch, leading to requirements for the research that was funded to be more closelyscrutinised. Increased pressures for global competitiveness during the 1980s led to the onsetof the ‘competitiveness agenda’ (Slaughter and Rhoades 1996), where economic growthbecame a major motivation behind the funding of research. Most countries had entered a‘steady state’ of research funding by the 1990s (Ziman 1994), where funding was not keepingup with the rapid pace at which research costs were growing, and R&D funding overall wasdeclining as a percentage of GDP.1 For all these reasons, the primary justification forfunding research is no longer the pursuit of knowledge ‘for its own sake’ but the pursuit ofknowledge which promises to further some social or economic objective. Ziman summarisesthis situation by complaining that “The only arguments that now seem to carry any weight forthe expansion of science are those that emphasise its promise of future wealth or othertangible benefits” (Ziman 1994:85). We are also seeing increased pressures foraccountability and relevance, which are apparent on a Europe-wide scale (Senker 1999), withmuch greater demands for scientists to show that they are spending the public’s money wisely(Ziman 1994).

Although an emphasis on wealth creation is an important constituent of the current fundingclimate, we find pressures for research to be useful coming from other quarters as well. Evenadvocacy groups who may be opposed to research conducted to increase competitiveness(e.g. those who want less military research or more environmental research), championscience which does something. They “want more applied science and technology or at leastfairly goal-directed research, accountability and pragmatism” (Slaughter and Rhoades1996:333-334). We are simultaneously seeing the rise of the importance of the public indecision-making about science, with the emergence of an ‘extended peer community’(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993), and this development also leads to the incorporation of‘external’, non-scientific goals into research agendas.

1 In the UK, for example, non-defence R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP declined from 1.84 in 1990 to1.78 in 1995 (OECD 1997).


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Literature in science policy has picked up on these trends and elaborated them into theoreticalschemes. Gibbons et al. (1994) describe ‘Mode 2’ where knowledge takes place ‘in thecontext of application’, often involving players from different institutions and scientificdisciplines. The ‘Triple Helix’ model also analyses the changing nature of the relationshipsbetween university, industry and government (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000). Nowotny etal. (2001) examine wider social transformations which attend the changes we are seeing inthe production of knowledge, often involving a diverse group of actors in the scientificprocess.

3. Scientists’ responsesThe question being asked here is what effects do changing policy demands have on academicresearch? Scientists’ responses and reactions to changing funding priorities will be exploredhere, focusing on biologists and physicists. The majority of material for this paper is drawnfrom nearly fifty in-depth qualitative interviews with scientists and policy makers in the USand the UK (see Calvert 2001 for further details). But to help interpret this interview materialwe must first go further back into history to examine the historical attachments that ‘basic’research - research which is not directed towards a useful outcome - carries with it.2

3.1 Basic research: historical associations with purity and valueIt may seem rather extreme to trace the ideas behind basic research back to the ancientGreeks, but this is where we first see value attached to the pursuit of knowledge ‘for its ownsake’, with no other motives involved (Stokes 1997). Importantly, at this time we also firstsee an association between the pursuit of knowledge and social class, because practical workwas given to lower class people to do, and those of high status were able to spend time onmore cerebral pursuits. These deep-seated ideas can be traced through the history of basicresearch. Before the professionalisation of science, scientists were traditionally priests oraristocrats with no ‘sordid’ material motives because they did not need external sources ofmoney (Shapin 1999). They had to finance themselves, whereas technology itself led toeconomic returns. In this way the social status of basic scientific researchers contributed toattachments to virtue and purity. Even after the professionalisation of science in the latenineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the pursuit of knowledge was still seen as a‘vocation’ rather than simply a job. Weber (1947) famously talks about science as a

2 This is a rather simplistic definition of basic research. Calvert (2001) demonstrates that there are manydifferent definitions of basic research in circulation, and what is interesting about this concept is that it isflexible, and can be used for different purposes in different situations. In this way basic research is used for‘boundary work’ (see Gieryn 1983, 1995 and 1999).


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vocation, describing the attitude that scientists approach their work; “For nothing is worthy ofman as man unless he can pursue it with passionate devotion” (p.135). These ideals attachedto basic research can even be found in recent literature. A Nature article explains the drivebehind undirected research as “a motivation, if not a compulsion, quite distinct from thedetermination to invent, to create wealth or to enhance the quality of life” (Nature 1996:1).We can see that basic research carries historical baggage with it that must be taken intoaccount in an analysis of the responses of scientists to today’s policy demands.

3.2 The status of basic researchInterview material affirms that basic research is a highly valued cultural activity that isimportant in the self-image of many scientists. For example, status often came up indiscussions about the relation between basic and applied research. The crude position,described by a UK physicist, is that “people who do the fundamental stuff are the high browsand people who do the less fundamental stuff are the lower brows”. A US biologist alsonoted that

“the elitism of basic science still hangs around. There’s still a lot of people, mainlyolder people, who still look on industrial collaborations as being slightly tainted anddirty, and it’s prostitution to do applied research”.

A UK biologist used the same metaphor, saying that he was glad when industrialists took theinitiative and contacted him for help with their research projects because he did not have to“prostitute himself” by approaching them himself.

A UK biologist who was previously a physicist describes how there is a similar difference instatus between basic and applied in both physics and molecular biology:

“There was a tendency for people who saw themselves as pure physicists and notapplied perhaps as somehow better, an ivory tower mentality...and there’s probably abit of that in molecular biology, there’s some people who just don’t want necessarilyto be forced into any particular application of their research”.

These associations of basic research with status indicate that there are still deep culturalvalues embedded in the notion of basic research that should not be overlooked.

3.3 Justifications for funding basic researchInterviews with scientists and policy makers show that they hold basic research in highesteem, and this is also clearly apparent when they discuss the reasons why governments


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need to fund basic research. They put forward a barrage of reasons, many of which arecultural justifications, but with a strong emphasis on economic justifications, showing thatthe changing funding conditions outlined in section 2 above are influencing the argumentsthat are made by scientists and policy makers.

Justifications for the funding of basic research on cultural grounds were most often foundamong physicists. For example, I was told that basic research was something that adeveloped country should do “as a civilised society” along the same lines that countriesshould finance the arts, because it “captivates the human spirit and elevates it to a higherlevel” (US physicist). This reminds us of the values associated with basic research.

The majority of justifications were phrased in terms of the economic benefits of the research.The argument most interviewees used to provide a rationale for the government funding ofbasic research was the ‘market failure’ argument which identifies basic research as a publicgood. The linear model often played an important role; one UK biologist stated that we“cannot have applied research without basic and that is a fact”.

There was one US policy maker who worried about the validity of these models, models thathave been criticised by theoretical literature (e.g. Mowery and Rosenberg 1989, Freeman1974). Her worry was that a criticism of the linear model is also a criticism of the standardmarket failure justification. She pointed out that if basic research does not feed directly intoapplied research, then we lose one of our arguments for funding it. However, this was theonly criticism of the linear model that was raised in the interviews.

3.3.1 An over-emphasis on economic benefitsIronically, one of the implications of the justifications based on economic benefits, whichemphasise the connection between academic science and wealth-creation, is that thesearguments can be self-defeating, because they result in demands for basic research to be moreand more tightly linked to industrial success and innovation. A problem here is that theeconomic benefits of science and technology can hardly be concealed, since it is becausescientific research has been so successful in producing new and exciting technologies thatmore is constantly demanded of it. As Elzinga says, “the sciences by their own success de-pedestalize their own autonomy” (Elzinga 1997:420). Because science has been the motor ofeconomic growth in the past it is increasingly pushed to demonstrate that it still is such amotor in the present (Nowotny 1997).


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Some interviewees recognised this point by mentioning that it could actually bedisadvantageous in the long term to stress the economic benefits of basic research. They saidthat if scientists emphasise potential economic benefits then they are continually required toshow that these benefits do actually arise from their research, and pressures towardsdemonstrating the applicability of their results are increased. In this way basic research is a“victim of its own success” (US biologist). A US policy maker was acutely aware of theproblem of over-emphasising the economic benefits of research:

“If you start making that case, you find yourself being pushed into a shorter andshorter time line. If you’re going to make the case that this is going to have aneconomic payoff, they want you to show them how”.

3.3.2 A broader notion of ‘use’In this paper so far ‘use’ has been equated with relevance to broader social or economicgoals, but it is interesting that in discussions of the funding of basic research this assumptionwas not made by all interviewees. I found an interesting re-interpretation of the idea thatbasic research should be justified in terms of its potential use among several intervieweeswho echoed Weinberg (1963) by noting is that it is possible to adopt a broader definition ofexternal ‘use’ than economic or social use. Weinberg argues that one of the criteria whichcan be used to decide which science to fund is ‘scientific merit’. He explains; “that field hasthe most scientific merit which contributes most heavily to and illuminates most brightly itsneighbouring scientific disciplines” (p.166 emphasis in original). Interviewees similarlyargued that research could be useful if it could be used in another area of science, whichcould itself be basic. As a UK policy maker reflected, “‘useful’ is quite an interesting word”because “you can define interesting as useful”. A US biologist defined ‘useful’ as“information” that could feed into other basic research.

Alongside this wider definition of ‘useful’ came a wider definition of ‘applied’. A UKbiochemist described himself as doing applied science because he was literally applyingchemistry to try to understand and manipulate biological systems. A UK physicist also said“there’s no doubt that I work on things that are applied, but my applications tend to be toother academic areas”, such as basic astronomy.

A broader understanding of ‘useful’ is also found in the social shaping of technologyliterature (e.g. Pinch and Bijker 1984). We might think that technologies develop in the waythey do because they are useful and serve certain needs, but Pinch and Bijker in theirhistorical analysis of the development of the bicycle demonstrate that there were many


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different forms of bicycle which could have developed, different forms being more ‘useful’for various interested social groups in different ways. The reason why a particular form ofbicycle came to predominate was because of contingent social interactions and interests. Sohere it seems that ‘use’ is something which cannot be identified a priori and in isolation fromcertain social groups. Mulkay (1979) argues that this is also the case with science. We cansee that what it is to make academic research useful is open to various interpretations. Thereare underlying normative judgements involved, and these will vary depending on the context.

Having examined the justifications that scientists give for funding basic research, whichdemonstrate the importance they attach to this type of research, I will now turn to howinterviewees see current funding demands affecting their research and their autonomy.

3.4 The erosion of scientific autonomy and threats to basic researchAutonomy is highly valued by scientists and often closely associated with basic research. Apolicy maker described the motivation behind basic research, saying that it is usually adriving curiosity on the part of the scientist, combined with a freedom to “just follow theirnose” (UK policy maker).

Scientists and some policy makers were worried that the changes discussed above, in section2 are eroding scientific autonomy, with detrimental consequences for the quality of theresearch and ultimately for its utility to industry. For example, a US policy maker talkedabout “basic research creep”, saying that everything has to have more of a “tinge ofapplicability” nowadays. A UK biologist recognised the same trend and complained, “I thinkis rather an unfortunate trend, but it is politically driven. They’re desperate to engender anatmosphere of entrepreneurialism”.

There are worries that this push towards applicability has changed the ambience of universityresearch. A UK policy maker argued that doing research which has to include an awarenessof its potential uses will change the mindset of the researcher, and that this will not result inthe best (i.e. the most unconstrained and unpredictable) science. There were also worriesabout delayed publication and suppression of publication, and fears that the very nature offree inquiry might be bent out of shape subtly and unintentionally (US policy maker).

Interviewees were concerned that science is becoming less risky, and more short-term (UKphysicist). A UK policy maker for a research council voiced the concern that research was


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becoming ‘safer’. He said that “over the past few years we think we have less adventurousspeculative research in our portfolio”. This was also noted by a US policy maker;

“there is a tendency for people to propose less adventuresome things. To take some ofthe risk out of the process - your proposal is more likely to get funded if it isperceived to be less risky”.

Several commentators also worry that the riskiness of the research itself is decreasing. Senker(1999) says that an emphasis on industrial innovation will tend to favour short-term researchover longer-term work. Geuna (2001) argues that there is a lack of incentives for path-breaking and risky research. Risk in science is usually associated with some type of novelresearch, where, because it has not been done before, the outcome is not known and the resultscannot be predicted, making it unsuitable for a short-term project. Geuna says that a reductionin novel research leads to a reduction of the knowledge base from which new technologicalinnovations can draw. Part of the reason why risky research avenues might be becoming lessattractive is because risky research is, by necessity, difficult to measure. It is very difficult toevaluate the outcomes of a research project without knowing what outcomes to expect.

The current emphasis on the outcomes of research was noted by many interviewees. One USbiologist complains that

“the emphasis now is on ‘OK, well, you’ve done this research, how does thishelp?...How does it help a certain illness? How does it help a certain environmentalproblem? What’s the direct accountability? What’s the direct result, what’s thedirect benefit of this research now?’ and so there’s sort of an immediacy that’sdemanded”.

He worries that this short-term perspective and desire for immediate gratification “will in thelong run be detrimental to science”. A UK biologist notes how it is necessary to show thatone can apply and ‘exploit’ (“that is the word they use”) your work. A UK physicistcomplains that “everything must be clearly useful and identifiable as useful now”.

There are extreme worries amongst scientists about the health of basic research. A UKphysicist comments, “because of the pressures from the government to highlight relevance ofthe work to industry and to the end users, I think there has been a general under-funding ofwhat I term truly basic research”. Another UK physicist warns:

“I think basic research in the UK is not being nurtured and may well not survive. Ithink to an extent the UK is living on the fat and momentum built up in periods whenthat sort of research was more valued”.


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However, although scientists may say they are worried about these changes, in practice theyare fulfilling the requirements of the funding applications and stressing the links toapplication in their own research, as will be shown below (section 3.5).

Some policy makers were worried about the future of basic research, as can be seen from thequotations above, but it is necessary to point out that several policy makers did not share thisconcern. They argued that although there is a shift towards “making people think just a littlebit more about how what they’re doing could be used in the future” (UK policy maker), theythought that this did not pose any real threat to basic research. They said that the researchhad not really changed in character, “but the people have just become more savvy about itspotential for applications” (US policy maker). Although it is admitted that, “the emphasis ison getting ideas from the lab to the stock exchange” (UK policy maker), it was argued thatthis did not affect what was going on in the lab. Moves towards increasing the awareness ofscientists about the applicability of their work were looked on by these interviewees as “agood thing” (UK policy maker). Many UK policy makers praised the US for leading the waytowards ‘innovative entrepreneurialism’. The US was seen to have a culture of producing‘spinouts’, which was “a model which is much admired” (UK policy maker).

One UK policy maker described how he thought these values had already become absorbedinto the values of the academic community:

“I’ve heard it said that now, in the corridors, the really successful scientists are sayingto one another not only ‘Have you got some good research council grants? Have yougot your FRS? Have you got your spin-off company?’ And now, one of the things thathas changed is that it’s certainly not infra dig to be commercially active”.

Etzkowitz et al. (2000) also support this point by noting that they have observed manyacademics engage in these types of entrepreneurial activities, alongside “the failure to definethis new role as deviant” (p.315). This integration of a new set of values is probably notoccurring across the board, because, as shown above, many scientists appear to be resentfuland worried about the current funding arrangements. The next section will demonstrate,however, that scientists are actually quite good at integrating new demands into their existingwork - albeit in ways which were not necessarily intended by the policies themselves.

3.5 ‘Tailoring’It is important to note that policies aimed to increase the utility of academic research do notnecessarily have predictable effects on scientific behaviour. Interviews demonstrated that


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scientists responded to pressures to make their research more clearly relevant to commercialobjectives by ‘tailoring’ the way they presented their research, while maintaining that this didnot affect the character of the research itself.

I was given many examples of situations where scientists changed the way they presentedtheir research to make their work appear more applied to gain resources. I originally labelledthis activity ‘manipulation’ but this carries negative connotations of deceitfulness, so Idecided to adopt the ‘tailoring’ label introduced by several of my interviewees. What wasinteresting about these tailoring activities was the frankness with which scientists wouldadmit to them - they would often even complain about having to do them.

Some scientists mentioned how they had to talk about the potential applications of their workin grant proposals, saying “it actually is a waste of paper as far as I’m concerned, but youknow, it’s a hoop you have to go through” (UK physicist). The process of ‘jumping throughthe hoop’ was said to involve “changing our priorities to match where the next pot of moneyis coming from...and everybody does that” (US physicist). A US biologist said it is oftennecessary to ‘bend’ the original research idea: “you take your basic research idea, and thenyou squeeze it into the programs that are available, because it’s not always a good fit”.

An example of tailoring which scientists described in surprisingly frank terms was howresearch can be described as either basic or applied depending on the circumstances. A UScondensed matter physicist who specialises in foams explains:

“You emphasise the importance of foams to industry and then you propose doingsomething. Whereas if it’s for NSF you emphasise the analogies with metals andbiological tissues...You can play it any way you like, it’s the same research. For meit’s very beautiful fundamental physics but it’s so close to a lot of industrial processesthat it’s very easy to write a grant that looks strictly applied”.

A US biologist similarly describes his response when the funding agency’s focus changes:

“We change the way we talk about what we are doing, we change the words we useto describe what we’re doing. We’re still doing the same thing, we just, we just nowsay instead of bioremidiation we’re looking at biocatalysis. Same difference”.

Presenting their scientific work in a particular way to fit with constraining circumstances issomething which is very familiar to scientists. A UK biologist described how his Hungariancolleges during the communist regime maintained their basic research activities through“creative lying”. This example is interesting because it draws attention to the fact that


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scientists were ‘protecting’ their research by portraying it in a way that was politicallyacceptable.

A UK physicist says he found it necessary to generate his own label for the widely practisedactivity of dressing up research to make it appear more potentially fundable. He calls this“applied hypocrisy”, which is,

“where you put some nice words at the beginning of everything you do which links itto something which sounds applied, but really you don’t do anything whatsoeverwhich is really applied and has any effects”.

However, it is difficult to tell if many of my scientists were guilty of this ‘applied hypocrisy’or whether their work actually did have both basic and applied elements to it, and that it iseasy to make their research appear either basic or applied, or both, depending on thecircumstances. A US biologist suggests that the latter is the case; he describes how aproposal he wrote:

“had good applied aspects to it because it deals with a real problem, the problems ofdeclining salmon in streams and rivers, but it was good basic ecology and so wesubmitted it to the agency and they very much liked the idea because they perceived itas being solid basic research but having a good applied element to it as well”.

Several scientists play down the extent to which they have to alter the way they portray theirresearch. For example a US biologist says, “usually it’s a very mild side-step you have tomake. I’ve never had a problem with it”. Another describes how he only has to “re-package”his work. A US physicist stresses that his priorities really do overlap with those of thefunding agency:

“so on the one hand the research is being tailored to suit the agency, on the otherhand the agencies are facilitating the kind of research I want to do so it isn’t all anegative thing”.

It is interesting that this scientist is using the ‘tailoring’ terminology, in the context ofemphasising that the changes he actually has to make to his research are not dramatic. Iheard lots of language similar to this, including thinking about “whether you want to put anypolitical spin on it” (UK physicist), having to “dress yourself according to what the agencydesires” (UK physicist), “hand waving” (US biologist) and “bending” the research (USbiologist). What is important about all these terms is that they do not imply that the nature ofthe research is being changed substantially. As a UK biologist says; “I don’t think it changes


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the research being done at all!”. The ‘tailoring’ terms, by their very superficiality, appear tobe protecting the activity of basic research itself from the changes scientists are making inorder to emphasise certain features of their research to get funding.

Rip (1997) argues that pressures on scientists to demonstrate the relevance of their work willnecessarily be more than merely ‘tailoring’. He says that if scientists claim some kind ofpotential relevance for their work this will place requirements on them to demonstrate it, andthat completely spurious claims of relevance cannot be made. He thinks that because “thepositioning of research at the beginning of innovation chains influences the research agendaof the field”, there will be an “internalisation of relevance” (p.631), where the values ofrelevance will actually become part of the scientific research itself.

3.6 Basic research as a protective resourceWe have seen that scientists can change the way they portray basic research to make it appearmore applied. Another interesting feature of the way the term ‘basic research’ is used, is thatscientists can describe their research as basic in certain situations to protect themselves and todelimit what should be expected from their research. This was often found in situationswhere there was an interaction between scientists and an external group. A US biologistexplained how he would use term to isolate himself from those who he thought might betrying to find applicability in his work:

“If I’m talking to someone who’s from a commercial concern I will very quickly inthe conversation use the term ‘basic’, just because I just want to make it clear to themthat I don’t foresee I’m going to have something patentable or anything else duringsome reasonable time span of my grant”.

If he describes his research as ‘basic’ it will immediately be understood that he will not haveanything commercially profitable to offer. Describing research in this way can act as a shieldagainst applicability, and against the unwanted involvement of an external group.

This phenomenon was even apparent at the broader programme level. One US policy makergave the example of the US Department of Energy whose “fusion program used to be appliedand now it’s all basic”. When I asked why this was, I was told “they think that there’s notgoing to be any fusion power - there will not be an application for it in 40 years”. It wasbecause the Department realised that the practical outcomes were not forthcoming that itseemed easier to classify their research as basic research. Furthermore


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“if a program is evaluated as applied research it’s going to get evaluated on the basisof how soon they achieve the goal of making things practical, so by making it ‘basic’they can perhaps defer the evaluation somewhat”.

In these situations the term ‘basic research’ seems to be used as a protective resource byscientists, which becomes useful in circumstances when they might otherwise be pushed todemonstrate the applicability of their research.

4. Conclusions: consequences for policy and theoryIn summary, the above empirical findings have revealed that scientists react in complex waysto demands to demonstrate the potential utility of their research. It has been shown that basicresearch is associated with status and value by scientists, who demonstrate their attachment tothis type of research by providing many arguments in favour of its funding. Scientists alsonoted that it could be disadvantageous to over-emphasise the potential economic benefits ofbasic research because this can lead to a vicious circle where these benefits have to bedemonstrated more quickly. They also made the point that we do not have to think of ‘use’only in terms of use to some realm that is external to science, but that research can be usefulif it contributes to another area of science. Scientists were very concerned with the changingemphasis of funding agendas and think that this could have negative consequences for basicresearch, leading to less risky and novel research being funded, although some intervieweesalso mentioned that commercial objectives could become integrated into scientists’ value-schemes. It was interesting that despite their worries, scientists do attempt to make theirwork appear more applied in certain circumstances by ‘tailoring’ it because they perceive thiswill get them more resources. Finally, it was shown how the term ‘basic research’ can beused as a protective resource, to shield scientists against demands for applicability andevaluation from external bodies.

This empirical material demonstrates that even in these changing circumstances it isimportant for scientists to retain an ideal of ‘basic research’. They share a common imagewhich defines how they perceive their own work, which builds on a historical tradition ofbeing a credible and revered activity. By defining themselves as doing basic research,scientists are making their actions meaningful for themselves (see Geertz 1973). Similarbehaviour was noted by Campbell and Slaughter (1999) who showed that when scientists arecompelled to take on funding which is industrially oriented they change their conception ofthe situation in order to perceive themselves as persisting in a familiar basic research activity.Like my interviewees, they are maintaining their commitment to the values of basic research.This prevalence of values attached to basic research also explains some of the unexpected


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phenomena I came across in my interviews, for example, the “the elitism of basic science”and the feeling that “it’s prostitution to do applied research”. These extreme espousals ofscientific values are an indication of the pressures that scientists are feeling in the currentfunding situation - they may be overcompensating for the challenges that they feel basicresearch is facing. It seems that ‘basic research’ is intricately tied up with notions of what itis to be a scientist. Since it is so central it is likely to persist, even in the face of changingdemands and funding arrangements.

The persistence of the fundamental scientific ideals attached to basic research hasconsequences for the theoretical literature. It can be argued that even in ‘Mode 2’ (Gibbonset al. 1994), where research is carried out in the ‘context of application’, the ideal of basicresearch will persist. In order to improve our understanding of the changing nature ofknowledge production we should be more aware of the complexity of actors’ reactions insituations where values and interests are involved.

The argument of this paper is that the responses of scientists to policy demands can beaddressed more productively with a greater understanding of the value of the concept of basicresearch in the self-image of scientists, the worries scientist have about the future health ofbasic research, and the reaction of scientists to funding demands by ‘tailoring’.

Recognising the value of the concept of basic research in the self-image of scientists meansthat we will not overlook this important aspect of scientific identity. Being aware of the fearsscientists have concerning the future health of basic research allows these fears to be dealtwith more effectively. It is especially important for scientists to retain the idea that they aredoing basic research when this activity appears to be under threat. With this knowledge,changes to the policy agenda could be undertaken in a way which was more sensitive to theparticular concerns of scientists. In addition, my work on ‘tailoring’ has shown that externalpressures on scientists (for example to make their work more relevant to externally imposedgoals) do not necessarily have any predictable impact on research practices since scientistsare actors who react to the pressures on the basis of their perceptions, values, and interestsrather than in any predictable and mechanical manner. This is why we see scientistsengaging in elaborate tailoring activities so that they can retain a meaningful conception oftheir work, and of their idea of what it is to be a scientist. An awareness of these perceptions,values and interests could help policies achieve their desired impacts.


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The message of this paper is not a simple recommendation - instead the aim has been to‘uncover’ aspects of scientific behaviour in response to changing policy demands. I hope tohave shown that this uncovering is a valuable exercise, and can enable us to re-think someaspects of science policy. Chubin and Restivo (1983) similarly point out that often in sciencepolicy “The sheer multiplicity of actors, views, and interests militates against elegantsynopses and quick-fix policy recommendations” (p.72). In this case, bringing thecomplexity of actors’ responses to light does not make the policy maker’s world any simpler.I have shown the important values attached to basic research, and the complex responses ofscientists to policy demands, and in raising these points I hope to have provided a betterunderstanding of the issues involved in making academic research useful.


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References

Calvert (2001) Goodbye Blue Skies? The Concept of ‘Basic Research’ and its Role in aChanging Funding Environment DPhil Thesis, Brighton: SPRU, University of Sussex

Campbell, T and Slaughter, S (1999) ‘Negotiating the Parameters of Faculty’sEntrepreneurial Research’ Paper presented to 4S conference 28/10/1999, San Diego,California

Chubin, DE and Restivo, S (1983) ‘The ‘Mooting’ of Science Studies: Research Programmesand Science Policy’ in Knorr-Cetina, Karen and Michael Mulkay (Eds) Science Observed:Perspectives in the Social Studies of Science London: Sage Publications

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