Caleb Descartes Final

7/27/2019 Caleb Descartes Final

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Caleb Castaneda

Professor Easton

Descartes' Theory of Mind

18 December 2013

Can Descartes Reject the Princile of !"fficient Reason#

Abstract

Spinoza challenges Descartes as to the implications of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

(PSR) and, it seems to me, sufficiently demonstrates that the PSR will lead to a monism

rather than Descartes' dualism !he challenge for Descartes, presuming he wishes to "eep

his dualistic metaphysical principles, is to respond to Spinoza on this point #ichael Della

Rocca has con$incingly argued that there is a demar"ation problem facing anyone whowishes to deny uni$ersal e%plicability demands, such that the denier of the PSR is ne$er

entitled to use an e%plicability demand, e$en in local circumstances &f this is true, then if

Descartes wishes to deny the monistic implications of Spinoza's metaphysics, he will be

forced to e%orcise his metaphysical principles of any appeal to the PRS &t is my contention

that, if Descartes were to underta"e such a proect, his proect would fare surprisingly well

!he upshot of such a scheme will be that Descartes is not forced to yield ground to Spinoza

he can simply deny the PSR, while "eeping his metaphysics Such a mo$e would ha$e

surprising implications, howe$er ltimately, he would lose the force of his conclusion that

there is a real union at all !his is not entirely a loss for Descartes, because by ma"ing such

a mo$e he simultaneously disarms criti*ues that his system cannot e%plain the real union,

but probably at a cost that Descartes would find unpalatable & would argue that this doesnot put Descartes at any greater disad$antage than any other system that denies the PSR

$ ha%e heard it said that hilosoher Rene Descartes is the father of modern hilosohy&

n most acco"nts( his hilosohy mar)ed a radical deart"re from the scholasticism that *as

then re%alent( oenin+ " ne* *ays of thin)in+ that *o"ld ermit "s to reach +reater scientific

achie%ements& ,is hilosohy( *hich came to be called -Cartesian d"alism.( *as the thesis that

there are t*o tyes of finite s"bstances( thin)in+ -st"ff. and e/tended -st"ff.( and that(

moreo%er( in the h"man bein+ these t*o s"bstances had come to form a "nion& E%en in his day(

he faced resistance from the establishment as *ell as from freethin)ers& This essay loo)s at the

imlications of the tho"+ht of one of those in the ne/t +eneration after Descartes *ho raised


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"estions abo"t Cartesian d"alism enedict de !inoa& E/aminin+ the rincile of s"fficient

reason as "sed by !inoa and determinin+ that Descartes *ill be recl"ded from "sin+ the

rincile if he *ishes to retain his d"alism( $ *ill attemt to reform"late the ar+"ments in

Descartes'Meditations*here%er he aears to "se the rincile of s"fficient reason& 4ltimately( $

*ill hoe to sho* that Descartes +ets s"rrisin+ly far by rejectin+ the rincile of s"fficient

reason ,e *ill be able to retain his d"alism and most asects of his metahysics5 he *ill

"ltimately( ho*e%er( ha%e to sacrifice his ar+"ment that there is a real "nion bet*een mind and

body&

!inoa( of co"rse( is famo"sly a monist rather than a d"alist& Moreo%er( he is a monist of

the most e/treme sort& ,e ar+"es( not j"st that there is only one kindof st"ff( b"t in fact that there

is "ltimately only one thin+& E%erythin+ that e/ists is merely a mode of this "ltimate bein+&

!inoa e/lains it this *ay

PRP& 6l7 Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

Proof& 9s :od is a bein+ absol"tely infinite( of *hom no attrib"te that e/resses the

essence of s"bstance can be denied ;by Def& %i&( ==

abs"rd"m ar+"ment to sho* that( if there *ere t*o s"bstances sharin+ an attrib"te( some

abs"rdity *o"ld follo*& ,o*( he *ants to )no*( *o"ld *e be able to tell these t*o attrib"te

sharin+ s"bstances aart# $t m"st be either by their attrib"tes or their modes& "t( it cannot be by

their attrib"tes beca"se they share an attrib"te( and for !inoa as for Descartes the entire

essence of a s"bstance m"st be )no*n thro"+h an attrib"te ;>B=( ==


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Philosoher Michael Della Rocca has an ar+"ment that it is notossible to ma)e local

e/licability demands in artic"lar cases *hile sim"ltaneo"sly denyin+ "ni%ersal e/licability&

,e first notes that *e ro"tinely do accet local e/licability demands& ,e as)s "s to ima+ine( for

instance( t*o objects that -are in the same *orld and that are cate+orically e/actly ali)e& They

each ha%e ;"alitati%ely< the same molec"lar str"ct"re and ha%e all the same cate+orical hysical

feat"res. ;Della Rocca 2


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f co"rse( aprincipledline *o"ld not be+ the "estion a+ainst the rincile of s"fficient

reason& "t +i%en that *e seem to *ant to ma)e e/licability demands of e%erythin+ but

e/istence itself( $ am not otimistic that s"ch a rinciled line *ill e%er be la"sibly forthcomin+&

Therefore( for my "roses in this essay $ *ill ass"me based on Della Rocca's ar+"ment that

anyone *ho *ants to deny the rincile of s"fficient reason is rohibited from e%er ma)in+ any

e/licability demands "nless she also resents a rinciled method by *hich she discerns

le+itimate from ille+itimate e/licability demands&

,a%in+ sho*n that if Descartes *o"ld *ish to )ee his d"alistic metahysics he o"+ht to

ma)e no aeal to the rincile of s"fficient reason( $ am no* reared to e/amine Descartes'

ar+"ments as resented in hisMeditations to loo) for any o%ert aeal to the rincile of

s"fficient reason& ,a%in+ identified s"ch ar+"ments( it remains to be seen if any s"ch ar+"ments

co"ld be reform"lated so as to ma)e no aeal to the rincile of s"fficient reason&

There are( $ belie%e t*o assa+es *here Descartes ma)es a tacit aeal to the rincile of

s"fficient reason&3These assa+es occ"r in the third and si/th meditations& $n the third

meditation( after obser%in+ that he has an idea of :od( Descartes *rites

Io* it is manifest by the nat"ral li+ht that there m"st be at least as m"ch JrealityK in the

efficient and total ca"se as in the effect of that ca"se& ?or *here( $ as)( co"ld the effect

+ets its reality from( if not from the ca"se# 9nd ho* co"ld the ca"se +i%e it to the effect

3 $n the first and second meditations( Descartes is rimarily introd"cin+ his methodolo+y of "sin+ s)etical do"bt

to determine *hat is ind"bitable( and introd"cin+ his famo"s co+ito ;1223


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"nless it ossessed it# $t follo*s from this both that somethin+ cannot arise from nothin+(

and also that *hat is more erfect that is( contains in itself more reality cannot arise

from *hat is less erfect& ;28 There is the f"rther "estion as to *hether the rincile of s"fficient reason is itself a standalone rincile or*hether it rests on the rincile of noncontradiction& 9ccordin+ to Michael Della Rocca( !inoa e/licitly sa*

the rincile of s"fficient reason as red"cible to the rincile of noncontradiction ;Della RoccaRationalist

Manifesto BB


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claim that *e do not )no* *hat an ar+"ment in its fa%or *o"ld loo) li)e& $t *o"ld seem that

there can be no logicalar+"ment in behalf of the rincile of noncontradiction& This is beca"se

the rincile of noncontradiction is also a la* of lo+ic *hich is res"osed in any attemt to

"se lo+ical ar+"mentation& To form"late a logicalar+"ment in its behalf *ill al*ays be "estion

be++in+& "t( *hile there may be no argumentthat re"ires "s to accet the rincile of non

contradiction( the rincile has s"ch int"iti%e aeal that most of "s readily accet it as a basic(

a/iomatic rincile&

f co"rse( the abo%e reasonin+ only alies to rational rinciles that are also la*s of

lo+ic& 9r+"in+ for( say( the rincile of s"fficient reason *ill not necessarily create the sort of

"estionbe++in+ scenario that la+"es the rincile of noncontradiction( for the simle reason

that the rincile of s"fficient reason is not also a la* of lo+ic& "t it still seems diffic"lt to

ima+ine *hat a really stron+ ar+"ment in its fa%or mi+ht loo) li)e& @e accet it( if *e do(

beca"se in o"r e/erience it is al*ays the case that thin+s re"ire e/lanations& "t if that is the

case( it is an ind"cti%e ar+"ment& The concl"sion *ill not follo* *ith certainty& $t *o"ld th"s

seem that o"r int"itions resectin+ the ar+"ment are stron+er than the ar+"ment itself in the case

of the rincile of s"fficient reason&

$f Descartes' aeal to the rincile of concei%ability is to *or)( it m"st be somethin+ li)e

the rinciles of noncontradiction and s"fficient reason in this resect& $t m"st be +ro"nded in its

o*n int"iti%e aeal rather than +ro"nded in some other rincile( li)e the rincile of s"fficient

reason& Th"s( *hile Descartes doesattemt to e/lain concei%ability in terms of the rincile of

s"fficient reason( my ar+"ment relies on an "nderstandin+ that( in order to ma)e his system

*or)able( the rincile of concei%ability m"st be "+raded to a f"ndamental rationalist rincile(

on ar *ith the rinciles of s"fficient reason and noncontradiction&

@hile the "sa+e of the rincile of concei%ability as an alternati%e to the rincile of


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s"fficient reason seems to hel Descartes o"t of his roblems *ith in%o)in+ the rincile in

behalf of :od's e/istence( $ do not belie%e that the rincile of concei%ability can offer Descartes

any alternati%e form"lation in his second "sa+e of the rincile of s"fficient reason& $n the si/th

meditation( after establishin+ that body m"st e/ist( Descartes ma)es the follo*in+ comment

Iat"re also teaches me( by these sensations of ain( h"n+er( thirst( and so on( that $ am

not merely resent in my body as a sailor is resent in a shi( b"t that $ am %ery closely

joined and( as it *ere( intermin+led *ith it( so that $ and the body form a "nit& $f this *ere

not so( $( *ho am nothin+ b"t a thin)in+ thin+( *o"ld not feel ain *hen the body *as

h"rt( b"t *o"ld ercei%e the dama+e "rely by the intellect& ;=H& Print&

!inoa( enedict& !he #hief $orks of Benedict "e %pino&a ol. II. !rans. R.(.M. )lwes.

London :eor+e ell and !ons( 2001& Print&

Caleb Descartes Final

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