Calder jones

Gravity Probe B • A Management Study STANFORD•

Calder-Jones - 1February 7 2007

Gravity Probe B: Lessons from a Management Study

Brad JonesJohnson Space Center (formerly Stanford University)

&Ned Calder

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

“Always be suspicious of news you want to hear.”– Francis Everitt, Stanford University ~ GP-B Principal Investigator



How Einstein Got Physics Out of Two Problems & into a Third!

• Special Relativity (1905) -- very well tested– Reconciled Maxwell’s 1865 electromagnetics with Newton’s

mechanics by changing Newton’s theory at high speeds – “E = mc2” comes from special relativity

• General Relativity (1916) -- very incompletely tested– Einstein’s theory of gravity

– Solved inconsistency between special relativity and Newton’s theory of gravity by replacing Newton’s force with curved space-time

• The fix Einstein landed us in -- unsolved after 90 years!– General relativity can’t be reconciled with quantum mechanics -- our

theory of atoms and elementary particles



Purpose of Gravity Probe B

• To measure with respect to framework of distant Universe, two tiny drift effects on gyros in orbit around the Earth– geodetic 6,614.4 mas/yr– frame-dragging 42.0 mas/yr

• Effects predicted by Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity

• 1 mas (milliarc second) = width of human hair seen at 10 miles



Management Study Overview• Project Purpose: To examine the

impact and effectiveness of having a university prime contractor on a large scale NASA program

• Project Objective: Extract a set of best practices for managing NASA-University-Industry relationships

• Research Conducted with Over 40 Interviews:– Stanford University– NASA Marshall Space Flight Center– NASA Headquarters– Lockheed Martin (Sunnyvale & Palo

Alto)– NASA Kennedy Space Center @

Vandenberg Air Force Base– Independent Review Team



Why GP-B?• GP-B was a perfect case study

because…– One of the first programs with a

university prime“How did it work out?”

– NASA-University-Industry all represented

– Technical complexity stressed the management environment

– One of NASA’s longest mission“What took so long?”

• Management Experiment– Originated in 1985 from a comment

by then NASA Administrator Mr. James Beggs :GP-B will be an interesting management experiment in addition to an interesting scientific experiment.

– Vast difference of opinion on success of the Management Experiment



Best Practices Summary1. Organizational Asymmetries – Strategically leveraging

capability asymmetries while managing cultural differences.2. Contextual Transitions – Recognizing and managing

transition points when programmatic requirements and processes change significantly.

3. Adaptive Program Management – Recognizing the need for emphasis on different aspects of the program management’s competencies at different stages of the program life cycle.

4. ‘Aerospace Knowledge’ at Universities – Establishing the importance for the university to acquire aerospace experience and for NASA to ensure that key personnel are treated as investments as opposed to costs.

5. Managing Risk – Providing proper oversight for the unique management challenges encountered on university programs through the use of risk management techniques.



Organizational Asymmetries

-Hierarchical-Mission focus

-Flat -Knowledge focusEnvironment

-Radical Innovation-Efficient

-Individuality-Informal-Entrepreneurial

Universities

-Incremental Innovation-System/ProcessCapability

-Teamwork-Formal-Cost conscious

Culture

Industry/Government

Leveraging Capability Differences and Managing Cultural Differences:



Organizational Asymmetries

-Hierarchical-Formal

-Flat -InformalEnvironment

-Radical Innovation-Efficiency

-Focus on Individuality-Focus on Knowledge-Entrepreneurial

Universities

-Incremental Innovation-System/ProcessCapability

-Focus on Team Work-Focus on CostCulture

Industry/Government

Leveraging Capability Differences and Managing Cultural Differences:

NASA MSFC: “It was extremely difficult to get the university personnel to stop tinkering and start producing.”

SU: “Lockheed is only out to make a profit!”

NASA HQ: “Universities excel at radical innovation – something industry generally lacks.”



• Facilitators with understanding of the cultural, capability, andprocess differences between the collaborating organizations.

• Either substantial previous experience with each organization ordevelop needed skills on the job.

• Boundary agents developed through exchanging team members

Boundary Spanning Agents

University

Organizational/Knowledge Boundary

NASABoundary

Agent



Contextual Transitions

Phase A:Preliminary Analysis

Phase B:Definition

Phase C:Design

Phase D:Development

Phase E:OperationsNASA Definition:

NASA Guided

PI & Scientist LedAerospace

ManagementLed

GP-B ManagementDivision:

ScientistLed

Aerospace Management

Led

Management ExperimentContextual Transition:Procurement of Flight Hardware

Conceptual Definition, Technology Development, Specification Development & Innovation

Hardware Development, Integration, & Testing

Science ProgramDefinition:

Contextual TransitionManagement Division:

Led by PI or PM with Strong Science Technology Background

Led by PM with Strong Aerospace Management

Background



Adaptive Program ManagementM

anag

eria

l Abi

lity

Science Technical A

bilityHigh

HighLow

Low

Phase A Phase B Phase C Phase D Phase E

Procurement ofFlight HW

Potential ProgramManagement Shift(s)

Launch

• Multi-Talented Program Manager (Sci. & Mgmt.) may not require any changes• Critical for NASA to make university aware of the potential management shift early• Management team should embody relevant competencies not just the Program Manager



Adaptive Program ManagementM

anag

eria

l Abi

lity

Science Technical A

bilityHigh

HighLow

Low



Potential ProgramManagement Shift(s)

Launch

• Multi-Talented Program Manager (Sci. & Mgmt.) may not require any changes• Critical for NASA to make university aware of the potential management shift early• Management team should embody relevant competencies not just the Program Manager

LM: “There was a substantial period of time where Stanford’s management didn’t appear to know how to complete a space program.”

NASA MSFC: “Lockheed over-powered Stanford’s contract management capabilities.”

IRT: “At one point, it was recommended that LM become the prime since they had experience developing spacecraft.”



Implementing/Maintaining Aerospace Knowledge



Launch

Uni

vers

ity O

pera

tions

Invo

lvin

g A

eros

pace

Pr

actic

es (%

)

100%

50%

15%Maintain AerospaceExperience at University

Gravity Probe B

Ideal Transition

• Implementation too early impairs productivity, while too late leads to ineffectiveness and rejection

• NASA needs to conduct early training sessions on procedure writing, quality assurance, part tracking, etc. for university employees to aid in an efficient transition.



Implementing/Maintaining Aerospace Knowledge



Launch

Uni

vers

ity O

pera

tions

Invo

lvin

g A

eros

pace

Pr

actic

es (%

)

100%

50%

15%Maintain AerospaceExperience at University

Gravity Probe B

Ideal Transition

• Implementation too early impairs productivity, while too late leads to ineffectiveness and rejection

• NASA needs to conduct early training sessions on procedure writing, quality assurance, part tracking, etc. for university employees to aid in an efficient transition.

SU: “It took us awhile, but in the end we had a very competent team, in terms of ability to build flight hardware.”

NASA MSFC: “SU was testing flight HW without test procedures, by the end they were as savvy as any contractor at utilizing aerospace processes.”

NASA HQ: “Stanford doesn’t realize the resources it has developed.”



Efficiently Managing Risk


Procurement ofFlight HW Launch

NA

SA S

uppo

rt

High

Low

Not Necessarily HighNumber of Personnel

Note: Actual Number ofPersonnel Based onRisk Management

GP-B NASA Support

Ideal NASA Support

Risk ManagementSystem Implemented

• Overwhelming positive response by all organizations on effectiveness of the system• Implement risk management system early to aid management• Avoid: Man-loading & fluctuating personnel



Efficiently Managing Risk


Procurement ofFlight HW Launch

NA

SA S

uppo

rt

High

Low

Not Necessarily HighNumber of Personnel

Note: Actual Number ofPersonnel Based onRisk Management

GP-B NASA Support

Ideal NASA Support

Risk ManagementSystem Implemented

• Overwhelming positive response by all organizations on effectiveness of the system• Implement risk management system early to aid management• Avoid: Man-loading & fluctuating personnel

NASA MSFC: “After the risk system was introduced, the relationship felt much more like a partnership.”

SU: “The new approach to risk management really helped us work with Marshall to identify what the real concerns were.”

LM: “The risk system provided us the ability to gauge NASA’s response to any situation.”



Implementation and Other Applications• Implementation of these practices

is a joint effortPartnershipMutual awareness and understanding at all levelsNASA should provide leadership, but universities must have autonomy

• Other ApplicationsResults can be generalized to situations that:

• Involve organizational asymmetries• Involve contextual transitions

Examples• Center-to-Center collaboration• Internal NASA development programs



Backup Slides



Justification for University Prime Contractors

• Interdependent space vehicle – Science payload must be a

significant portion of overall vehicle development

• Novel, path-dependant technology development– Specifications depend on

development– Exploit university capabilities

• Program management capability– Aerospace processes– Risk management

Gravity Probe B

LISA



GP-B

Thruster

Thruster

ProbeTelescope

(inside)

Quartz Block Assembly (inside)Dewar

Telescope Quartz Block Assembly

SENSOR(Payload)CONTROLLER

(Payload/Spacecraft)ACTUATOR(Spacecraft)

• Interdependent Payload and Spacecraft• Path-dependent development process, integrated spec derivation • High-level of novel technology development



GP-B: The Main Systems

Gyroscope Telescope Science Instrument

Cryogenic Probe Payload Space Vehicle



Operations2004~2010

Apr. 2004. GPB launch

July 2004.End IOC

Sept. 2005. End SM

2006. Publishresults, end NAS8-39225

2005-2010.Potential for further GPB experiments

2010. End battery life

Development1993-2003

1995. NASA says go directly to flight, begin contractNAS8-39225, STU ends

1990-1991. FIST

1991-1994. GTU-0

1994-1995. GTU-1

1996. End NAS8-36125

1997. GTU-2

1999. PL Test 1

2000. PL Test 2

2001. PL integrated with spacecraft

2002. SV Acoustic & Thermal VacTests

2003. SV moved to VAFB

Conceptual Definition and Design1959-1983

1959. Conceptually realized (Beginning of GPB)

1961. First contact with NASA

1964. NASA grant begins, retroactive 1963

1977. End NASA grant

Shuttle Test1984-1992

1984. Begin STORE

1985. Begin contractNAS8-36125

1986. Challenger accident, STORE becomes GPB Tech

1990. STU begins

Gravity Probe B: Technological Development

1959 2000 2010

100% Space Vehicle Usable

0%

Funding(Million $)

0

70

60

40

2019801970 1990

Launch

End SM



Risk Management System



Risk Management System Cont’d



Where Does NASA Go From Here?• Conclusions

– NASA should concentrate early & continuously on:• Foster collaborative, not contractor, relationships• Implement management best practices• Provide oversight through risk management techniques

– Develop a set of guidelines for universities– When certain criteria present, universities are the

prudent choice as prime contractor• Limitations

– Single organizational arrangement– Single academic institution– Idiosyncrasies of GP-B



Benefits of Stanford University

• Practical Aerospace Training– Aerospace Project Management Experience– Spacecraft Development & Flight Experienced Personnel

Trained by NASA– Excellent Facilities Including a Flight Proven Mission Operations

Center (MOC)• Technology Advancement Capabilities

– Proven Research Capabilities & Technology Advances– One of a Kind Teaming & Collaboration between Engineering &

Science Departments – Nationally Ranked Programs in Science, Engineering, &

Business Perfect Formula for Successful Collaboration



About the Authors

Ned CalderResearch Scientist Massachusetts Institute of [email protected]

GP-B Experience:– Technical liaison and cryogenics

specialist Education:

– M.S. Technology and Policy Massachusetts Institute of Technology

– B.S. PhysicsNorthwestern University

Brad JonesPayload Safety Engineer Johnson Space [email protected] (work)650-278-0928 (cell)

GP-B Experience:– Flight director and launch

team leadEducation:

– M.S. (in progress) Aero/AstroStanford University

– M.E. Management and Systems EngineeringCornell University

– B.S. Civil EngineeringTexas A&M University

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