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Cabinet of the Republic of Turkey Topic I: Protection of Civilians in Northern Syria
Topic Overview:
Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 2011, hundreds of thousands have died
before the guns of the Assad regime and dangerous extremist militants that thrive in the power
vacuum created by this chaotic and violent conflict. This instability threatens the safety of the
Turkish people, as the Islamic State has repeatedly targeted civilian targets in Istanbul and
Ankara for cowardly suicide bombing attacks. Throughout the conflict, the Turkish state has
assisted NATO and the International Coalition to provide air support and supplies to groups
fighting for a democratic and free Syria, one free of oppression and torture. We have also worked
tirelessly towards a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the war. Despite our efforts, fear still
stalks the destroyed streets of Syria’s cities and families are being separated from each other,
dislocated from their homes, and some destroyed by the chaos. As a consequence of the violence
against civilians, millions of refugees from Syria and Iraq are overwhelming our ability to
provide for them, and although we continue to work with the European Union and the United
Nations to improve conditions for them, the only permanent solution to the flood of humanity
crossing our borders is to bring stability back to Syria.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 1289 civilians, including 263
children under the age of eighteen, and 191 female citizens over the age of 18 were killed in
Syria in August 2016. However, it is difficult to truly count the number of civilians who have 1
died and who are dying every day and every night, as many nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) gave up in 2014 and 2015, as the chaos of the situation on the ground quickly
1 http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=50111
overwhelmed their ability to acquire accurate information. The 2015 estimate from the
Violations Documentation Center (VDC) states that 111,000 civilians have been killed in total
since the beginning of the Syrian civil war. 2
The Islamic State and the Assad regime appear to be responsible for thousands of
executions, mass killings, and chemical attacks on civilian targets. It is unacceptable to allow 3
this to continue. Although the Islamic state is a band of dangerous extremists and will be
exterminated in time, the Assad Regime’s ability to hide behind the veneer of respectable
statehood is morally repulsive to the Turkish people and to the world community as a whole.
These statistics are sobering, and should provide the proper context for the necessity of a
measured military intervention by the Turkish military into the border regions of Northern Syria
to achieve the goal of protecting Syrian civilians from the chaos of warfare and sectarian
violence.
This intervention has three
explicit goals: Assist the allies of the
Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other
moderate rebel groups to secure the
areas from the Islamic State, Jabhat
Fatah alSham (Formerly Jabhat
AlNusra), and other dangerous
extremist groups; Remove the
occupying Kurdish terrorist militias
2 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/14/world/middleeast/syriawardeaths.html?_r=0 3 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/25/assadregimeisischemicalattackssyriauninvestigators
from the area; and provide a buffer area between Turkey’s civilian populations and the disorder
of the Syrian conflict.
Historical Context:
After the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya began in earnest in early 2011, Syrians
began to protest the repression and violence of the Assad regime. The military fired on a protest
in the city of Homs, killing four civilians. The protests grew from there as policemen and 4
members of Assad’s own military regime defected in large numbers to the rebels. Rebel groups
proliferated as the Assad regime’s harsh military crackdown began. Fighting continued through
2012 and 2013, as rebel groups took control of the Western Syrian frontier and made major
inroads in Homs and Aleppo, the end appeared to be coming for the government. The United
States called for Assad’s resignation and an end to the violence. The Syrian military first
deployed chemical weapons in an attack on Ghouta, Syria, a suburb of Damascus. This
indiscriminate attack killed hundreds of civilians. United Nations inspectors quickly surveyed the
area and determined the government had fired missiles containing the nervegas Sarin into
heavily populated civilian areas. The United States threatened to intervene against the Syrian 5
regime quickly after this attack.
After the attack on Ghouta and the United States’ threat of a “red line”, the United
Nations Security Council passed a resolution to condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria
by any combatant. In response to the US threat, the Russian Federation, Assad’s strongest ally,
convinced the government to dismantle their existing chemical weapons supplies. Syria signed
onto the Chemical Weapons Convention, and by October 31, it had allowed UN inspectors to
4 http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/lafgsyriatimeline20160314story.html 5 http://www.refworld.org/docid/53182eed4.html
inspect all reported chemical weapons caches and it was reported that the regime had
successfully disarmed. This was a farce however, as the Assad regime kept other chemical sites
secret from inspectors and has continued to attack civilian and military targets with chemical
weapons. By October 2013, 2 million Syrians were registered as refugees, many escaping to 6
Turkey, Jordan, and Europe.
As the civil war escalated, the Assad regime released jihadists from prison in an attempt
to undermine the power of the rebel movement. These jihadists swept through the Syrian 7
conflict, leading to the founding of the Jabhat AlNusra and giving momentum and manpower to
what would become the Islamic State. The group AlQaeda in Iraq then sent leaders to the Syrian
front to coalesce extremist Islamic groups under one banner, becoming the Islamic State after
breaking relations with Al Qaeda’s central control. This group took control of large swathes of
the Syrian countryside beginning in June of 2014, creating a pseudostate with territory in Iraq
and taking important towns along the Turkish border. The Islamic state indiscriminately
murdered civilians,
massacred moderate
rebel groups, and
declared a selfstyled
Islamic Caliphate. 8
In the summer of
2015, the United
6 http://news.yahoo.com/exclusiveweaponsinspectorsundeclaredsarinvxtracessyria170616455.html 7 http://www.wsj.com/articles/theriseofislamicstate1454976369 8 https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/3/13/timelinesyria4yearsofdevastation
States and other coalition partners began airstrikes against Islamic State targets across Syria,
targeting oil facilities and supporting YPG assaults on Islamic State controlled areas.
One important battle to note was the liberation of Kobane, a small border town taken by
YPG forces in 2012 after the Syrian state lost control of the eastern frontier. In the summer of
2015, Islamic State militants laid siege to the city, forcing civilian Kurdish refugees over the
border into Turkey. Hundreds of civilians were killed during the first stages of the siege. 9 10
Border facilities in the region were wholly unequipped to deal with the rush of humanity as
130,000 refugees streamed across the border. The battle continued for months with great losses 11
and brutal fighting between the Islamic State and YPG forces. Finally, American air power was
brought to bear on Islamic State and the city was liberated in February of 2016. Although
liberated from Islamic state control, refugees face a difficult path back to normalcy, as their cities
are completely decimated by fighting. With no political solution in sight for the Syrian conflict,
there is no clear solution to move refugees back to Syria and allow them to rebuild their lives.
In October 2015, the Russian Federation entered the conflict directly, assisting the Assad
regime with cruise missile strikes, air support to the Assad regime, and rarely, direct military
engagement. Hezbollah and Iran, Assad’s strongest ally in the region, also escalated their
assistance to the Assad regime around this time, helping him to retake large parts of Syria against
thenfragmented rebel groups.
By November 2015, Russia, Syrian government forces, and International coalition air
forces were sharing the skies over the Syrian battlefield without any coordination between the
belligerents. A conflict was inevitable. In late November, after repeated violations of Turkish
9 http://carnegiemec.org/diwan/59061 10 http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddleeast33285699 11 http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddleeast29314647
airspace by Russian air forces and after 10 warning radio messages, a Russian fighter was shot
down by Turkish air forces. 12
RussianTurkish relations soured in the aftermath. The Russians denied violating Turkish
airspace, despite our release of the radar images showing their planes in Turkish territory and
radio calls broadcast to their planes. In response to our assertiveness, Russia stalled our mutual 13
development of the TurkStream natural gas pipeline across the Black sea, installed
stateoftheart air defense facilities in Syria to intimidate us. After seven months of tension, 14
President Erdogan decided in the interest of the Syrian people’s safety and in the spirit of
international cooperation to apologize for the downing of the Russian plane. It was not long after
the President’s apology that rogue elements in the military attempted to destroy democracy and
forever altered the path of the Turkish nation and Turkish democracy.
Current Situation:
Shortly after the apology, on July 15th, the forces of Fethullah Gülen, a former ally of the
President turned subversive terrorist, launched a coup against the democratically elected
government of Turkey. 270 people were killed in that night of fighting, civilians and 15
insurgents. Rogue elements of the military, media, and judicial system, loyal to Mr. Gülen and 16
not to the people of Turkey, failed in their bid for power, being toppled in a few hours by the
overwhelming might of democracy and the desire of the Turkish people. The insurgents were
bent on destroying the institutions of state and replacing them with military fiat. After the coup
was crushed, President Erdogan and his allies set out on a mission to rid the Turkish government
12 http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddleeast34912581 13 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/analysisrussiapilingpressureturkey160207065649214.html 14 See 10 15 http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope36809083 16 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/turkeyfreesprisonersroomcoupdetainees160902112516346.html
of the Güllenist virus. Thousands of traitors have been removed from their positions in
government and private business. A state of emergency is still in effect until Turkey is cleansed 17
of subversive and dangerous revolutionaries.
July 16th was a new day for the Turkish republic, as our allies and colleagues in Europe
and the United States were noticeably absent during the coup. The United Nations Security
Council could not issue even a nominal resolution in support of democracy due to Egyptian
opposition. The coup showed that the United States and Europe, although valued strategic 18
partners, were prepared to accept a military junta in Turkey rather than democracy. The United 19
States has refused to extradite the leader of the coup, Fethullah Gülen, and our socalled
European allies are more concerned with our elimination of rogue elements of society than the
violence and threat to democracy that created it. The Russian Federation and the Islamic 20
Republic of Iran were immediately supportive, however their support of Mr. Assad’s
authoritarian regime make them an unlikely longterm partner for the Turkish republic.
The human tragedy of this war in Syria is unfathomable: the UN calculates 11 million
Syrians have been
displaced in five years of
conflict. The Islamic 21
State has perpetrated
genocide against
Christians and Muslims
17 See 13 18 http://www.haaretz.com/middleeastnews/turkey/1.731367 19 http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2016/07/erdoganstabilityturkey160721080458766.html 20 http://www.reuters.com/article/usturkeysecurityrussiaidUSKCN10H05A 21 http://syrianrefugees.eu/
across Syria and Iraq. Through coalition airstrikes by the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom, and through the military campaign led by the Russian Federation, the Islamic State’s
control of the Turkish border has been severely curtailed since its’ peak in 2014. In August 2016,
the Turkish military began its intervention in Syria with operation Euphrates Shield assisting
trained rebel groups in taking the
Islamic state town of Jarabulus. 22
There were two strategic goals in
Jarabulus: rooting out Islamic
State terrorists and taking control
of their last lifeline for foreign
fighters migrating from Europe
and the rest of the Middle East.
The second goal was to keep
Kurdish terrorist affiliated groups from taking the important border town and consolidating their
gains from the border regions west of Kobani and in the eastern pocket near Gaziantep. These
Kurdish People’s Brigade (YPG) forces are being assisted by coalition airstrikes, but they are
also allied with the Kurdish People’s Party (PKK), a terrorist group that has been active in killing
hundreds of Turkish civilians through bombings and attacks throughout Turkey and Iraq since
1984. These operations will free civilians from the yoke of Islamic State oppression and protect
the southern border from the threat of rocket attacks and other constant features of life since the
war in Syria began.
22 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turksresistanceagainstcoupsetaglobalexampleunsfeltmansays.aspx?PageID=238&NID=103561&NewsCatID=409
Although the Turkish military is purely acting in a support role at this time, the situation
in Northern Syria is unstable, as Russiansupported regime troops are still besieging the major
city of Aleppo to the south, Islamic state troops still operate in the Euphrates valley to the east,
and Kurdish troops also operate in the area, and control the vast majority of the SyrianTurkish
border. Although as of September 5th, 2016, The Turkish military and our allies have cut off the
Islamic State from their last outpost on the Syrian border, the battle is not over. These groups 23
are still vital and dangerous, and they pose a fatal threat to the longterm peace and stability of
the region and to the Turkish republic as a whole. As the Turkish cabinet, it is your prerogative
to decide the most effective ways to keep the Turkish military mission limited and tactical, and
not to be pulled into the Syrian conflict without a meaningful way to exit.
Bloc Positions:
United States: The US has been a staunch ally of the Turkish nation since the end of World War
II, and has been a valued NATO partner in the Syrian campaign. Despite the strain caused by
their inaction during the coup and their support of Kurdish YPG terrorist affiliates, they must be
consulted to coordinate military action in the theater to avoid further strain to our relationship.
Russia: The Russian Federation’s relationship to Turkey is complicated. Although a partner in
the TurkStream gas pipeline and a valued trade partner and source of tourist and technology
income, the Russian Federation has propped up Bashar AlAssad’s rule for years and has been
complicit in their reign of terror on the Syrian people. We must walk a thin line with Russia
cooperate enough to accomplish our limited shared goals but there are limits to our friendship.
23 http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddleeast37272895
Iran: The relationship between Iran and the Republic of Turkey has become strained due to the
conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and the installation of NATO antiballistic missile systems in 2011.
Iran’s Shia government supports Bashar AlAssad, who is a member of the Alawites Shia
minority group, as his power creates a Shia power bloc in the Levant, provides a bulwark against
Israeli and Sunni Arab influence. Assad’s grip on power is an absolute necessary for Iran to
exercise control over Lebanon and Hezbollah forces. Despite the power dynamics present since
the beginning of the war in Syria, Iran and Turkey maintain strong bilateral trade relations and
coordinate antiterrorism action, as both nations are affected by the destabilizing forces of
Kurdish insurgency.
European Union: In the post July 15th world, the European Union has failed to provide the trust
necessary to be a truly strong partner of Turkey. The EU has dragged its’ feet repeatedly on
providing asylum and support for the millions of refugees who cannot return to their homes in
Syria and must be relocated. Good faith by Turkey has been greeted by distrust by both eastern
European nations also overwhelmed with refugees, legal and illegal, but also by the reticence of
the Western European powers to evenly distribute refugees and not leave Turkey and the Balkan
nations to take the brunt of feeding, clothing, and housing the overwhelming tide of humanity.
The dream of Turkish membership in the European Union dwindles as the relationship between
us is strained under the weight of these crises.
Key Terms:
Fethullah Gülen: Exassociate of President Erdogan and leader of the July 15th Coup
August 15th Coup: The attempt by Gülenist forces in the military to remove President
Erdogan from power and topple the democratically elected government of Turkey.
Islamic State (Daesh): Developed from the Sunni terrorist group AlQaeda in Iraq, the
Islamic State became a major player in the Syrian conflict by consolidating huge amounts
of territory and performing terrorist attacks on France, the United States, and Belgium. It
has declared itself an Islamic Caliphate and has undertaken numerous acts of wanton
violence against civilians, takes part in the slave trade, and has committed numerous acts
of genocide against nonSunni Arab peoples.
Fatah alSham / Jabhat AlNusra: Formerly the official AlQaeda franchise in the
Syrian theater, Jabhat AlNusra became Fatah AlSham when it made a show of
disconnecting from the AlQaeda organization. Most analysts do not find this change
convincing, as they are still heavily connected to AlQaeda at every level of the
organization. This change is more likely a gambit to convince other moderate rebel
groups to work with them and to avoid continued airstrikes by the Russian Federation or
the United States.
Hezbollah: A political organization and terrorist paramilitary group supported and
trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Headquartered in Lebanon, but with deep
ties to the Syrian state, Hezbollah has been active in fighting AntiAssad rebels and the
Islamic State.
Bashar AlAssad: President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Assad’s government has been
under criticism from the international community and his own neighboring states for his
brutal execution of the Syrian Civil War and allegations of atrocities, mass killings, and
use of chemical weapons. Supported by Iran and the Russian Federation, he is the central
question in how to resolve the Syrian conflict, as rebel groups will not tolerate his
continued rule and Iran and Russia will not agree to a transitional political government
with his involvement.
Free Syrian Army: The Free Syrian Army was first founded from Syrian government
soldiers who defected in the aftermath of the atrocities they were asked to perform. These
rebels were pushed into Turkey in the first years of the war and have only recently
returned to the state after being trained and armed in Turkey.
Kurdish People's Defense Units (YPG): The YPG is the military arm of the Kurdish
minority enclaves in the East of Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. They are capable fighters,
but are also allied with the Kurdish People’s Party (PKK), a dangerous terrorist group
and separatist movement that seeks to split Turkey into two states, one Turkish and one
Kurdish. The PKK has killed thousands of Turkish civilians throughout a 32 year reign of
terror.
Resources:
http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2015/09/15/therealitiesofusingforcetoprotectciviliansins
yria/
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCom
mission.aspx
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/magazine/behindthebarricadesofturkeyshidden
war.html?_r=0
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/world/middleeast/syrianrebelsisiskurdsturkey.ht
ml
http://syriancivilwarmap.com/
https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/geopoliticssyriancivilwar
https://theconversation.com/vacuumbombsinsyriathelatestchapterinalonghistory
ofatrocityfromtheskies63733
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/combatinggenocidereassessin
gthefightagainsttheislamicstate
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/undocuments/syria/
http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddleeast35695648
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/whatcausedtheturkishcoupattempt
214057
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/10/isisimmigrationoperationturkeysyria
borderpassengermanifeststelabyadislamicstate
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Cabinet of the Republic of Turkey Topic II: Kurdish Terrorism
Topic Overview
With an average estimate of 20 percent of the Turkish population as ethnic Kurds, the
Kurdish objective of selfdetermination remains a continual threat to the preservation of cultural
homogeneity in the
Republic of Turkey’s.
Over the past three
decades, Kurdish
militancy has been met
with lethal Turkish
reciprocity. As the largest
minority group in the
Middle East, the movement for Kurdish autonomy only gains momentum despite being met with
constant political and military opposition. It has been nearly a year since the ceasefire between
Turkey and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) dissolved in figurative and literal flames, and the
violence is predictably escalating.
Between a fleeting ceasefire, President Recep Erdogan’s merciless political agenda, and
growing Kurdish autonomy abroad, an end to the TurkishKurdish conflict remains wishful. So
long as the insurgent Kurds endanger the foundations of Turkish democracy, domestic affairs
will remain tense and fragile. Yet it is the nation’s position as an international ally that
complicates matters further. As acts of terror in Syria escalate and the extent of Western
involvement becomes more pressing, Turkey’s unrelenting occupation with Kurdish terrorism
convoluted its obligations to its NATO allies. Although the international community scrutinizes
Turkey’s lack of devoted action against the Islamic State (IS), efforts that divert resources away
from quelling Kurdish rebels are contrary to decades of Turkish policy and identity.
Although eliminating the Islamic State sits at the Western world’s primary goal, to the
government of Turkey, it is only secondary to cultural preservation. Rebel Kurds domestic and
abroad have forced military response that could otherwise be avoided. Although Turkey is under
international criticism for such operations, they are merely a defense against that which is
dismantling the country’s political order.
Historical Background
While nationalism has gained popularity on the global front in the last decade, Turkey’s
ideological history has long been defined by efforts to maintain social, ethical and political
purity. The Kurds, an ethnic group most closely related in culture and language to the people of
Iran, occupy a significant minority in Turkey, with estimates ranging between 15 and 25 percent
of the population. They are also considered the fourth largest ethnic group within the Middle
East. However, their historic political, social, and cultural nonexistence perpetuated by the 24
Turkish government has invigorated rebellious
efforts to achieve greater autonomy and rights to
selfdetermination within Turkey.
The statelessness of the Kurdish people and
animosity toward the Turkish government can be
24 https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/culturalsurvivalquarterly/turkey/kurdishrepressionturkey
traced to the beginning of the 20th century. Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the
Turkish state was established on the principles of a homogenous national identity, one that would
strengthen and preserve the new Western republic. With this ideology, little to no room was left
for the Kurdish people who were ostensibly integrated into Turkish society. Despite this attempt
at cultural assimilation, the growth of Kurdish ethnonationalism in face of Turkey’s political
secularization continued to pose a serious threat to the government’s perception of its centralized
political power. 25
For the past thirty years, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) has been the representative
militant organization engaging the Turkish government in a terrorist war for greater political
rights and autonomy. The armed rebellion has carried out numerous suicide bombings,
assassinations, and kidnappings against Turkish government authorities and tourists, in addition
to police and military combat. Despite a temporary ceasefire between the Turkish government
and the PKK between 1999 and 2004, violence increased following its dissolution, with
casualties moving closer to Istanbul and the capital Ankara. In light of this conflict, key Turkish
allies such as NATO, the European Union, and the United States have declared the PKK as a
terrorist organization. The United Nations, Russia, China, and India have not. 26
Ethnonationalism is a founding feature of both the Kurdish and Turkish identity. The
heart of Turkish resentment is the fear of political opposition, and efforts to suppress Kurdish
culture have been means by which the government has sought to effectively eliminate the
group’s presence and anything else considered nonTurkish. Legal justifications within Turkish
25 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/troubleturkeyerdoganisisandkurds 26 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/troubleturkeyerdoganisisandkurds
penal code exonerate the government’s actions to protect their national institutions through
technicalities that approve force against those aiming to destroy the country’s political order. Yet
this political and cultural suppression, such as forced relocations and language and cultural
censorship, remain merely auxiliary to the guerilla warfare. 27
In 2013, an agreed ceasefire seemed to conclude nearly three decades of fighting that
claimed over 40,000 lives. With agreement from the Turkish government, PKK members were to
peacefully emigrate from Turkey into Kurdish Iraq. However, this peace was expectedly fleeting,
as the peace talks were disagreeable and the burgeoning Syrian civil war led to accusations
against the Turks for supporting antiKurdish rebels in Syria. In 2014 the PKK began
counterattacks against the Islamic State, effectively breaking the ceasefire with Turks on the
Syrian border and igniting criticism against the government’s lack of involvement in engaging
with IS. 28
Current Situation:
The ceasefire officially dissipated in
2015. In a refusal to acquiesce to Kurdish
demands, the PKK has vowed to move the
conflict eastward toward Kurdishmajority cities
and further into Istanbul. The PKK has accused 29
27https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/culturalsurvivalquarterly/turkey/kurdishrepressionturkey
28 http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope35403260 29 https://www.thenation.com/article/turkeyisfightingadirtywaragainstitsownkurdishpopulation/
the Turkish army for instigating the agreement’s demise by bombing its presence in Iraq. 30
Southeastern Turkey remains in fullfledged conflict, as hundreds of Turkish soldiers and
policemen have fallen victim to the renewed rebellion. The cities of Cizre and Diyarbakir, 31
considered the capital of Turkish Kurdistan, have been particularly severe sites of violence, with
the Turkish government actively carrying out campaigns to stifle any PKK uprisings. 32
President Erdogan is greatly occupied by the idea of Kurdish independence within
Turkey. Autonomous gains abroad, such as Iraqi Kurdistan and Syrian Rojava, have made this
prospect more likely. The Kurdishnationalist Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the primary 33
representative of Kurdish political interest, has exceeded expected voting results against Erdogan
and his AKP party, in part due to its greater consolidation of leftist and rightist Turkish Kurds.
The HDP’s performance initially denied the AKP party’s majority before a revote concluded
with vote percentages as intended. 34
Unfortunately, Kurdish insurgencies are not limited to within Turkey’s borders.
Instabilities in Syria have furthermore brought the Kurdish conflict to a second front. Tensions
on the TurkishSyrian border are quickly rising, as Turkey has been accused of shelling the
Popular Protection Units (YPG) – the armed Kurdish wing in Rojava, Syria – who Turkey
considers to be an active terrorist extension of the PKK despite being supported by Turkish allies
30 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/troubleturkeyerdoganisisandkurds 31 http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope35403260 32 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/turkeyisisrussiapkk/408988/ 33 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/troubleturkeyerdoganisisandkurds 34 https://www.thenation.com/article/turkeyisfightingadirtywaragainstitsownkurdishpopulation/
for actively fighting the Islamic State. As of now, Turkish airstrikes against the PKK have 35
outweighed those against IS. 36
This position has become particularly problematic
for Turkish foreign relations, as the United Nations, United
States, and European Union have unhesitatingly backed the
YPG for their antiIS efforts. However, in light of Syria’s
instabilities, Syrian Kurds have been gaining greater territorial control along the TurkishSyrian
border, a fact that only heightens severe fears of greater Kurdish autonomy. Because 37
succumbing to terrorists is not an option, reconciling foreign policy with foreign relations seems
nearly impossible without loss.
As terrorism becomes a greater threat both domestic and abroad, national strength is more
important than ever. However, the nation’s current political and economic climates are
particularly unfavorable at a time where the government most desperately needs Turkish
solidarity. With trade and tourism in decline and a failed coup attempt earlier in the year, the
Turkish government faces a myriad of issues that will undoubtedly grapple with overstretched
resources, policy, and pride.
Bloc Positions:
Under the control of standing Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, the Turkish cabinet has
been described as one of the most compliant and efficient in the nation’s history. With each
35 http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope35403260 36 http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope35403260 37 http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/08/28/world/middleeast/apmlsyria.html?_r=0
minister an avid Erdogan loyalist, Yıldırım has created a body that expectedly operates under the
ideology of Erdoganism – commitment to the creation of a “New Turkey” founded on
democracy, secularism, and national solidarity. That the Kurdish presence in Turkey threatens
these principles is collectively agreed upon.
However, the fact that Turkey is engulfed in a wide array of both domestic and foreign
issues makes prioritization a serious conversation among cabinet members. Between a pressed
economy, ravaged infrastructure, active military involvement, and vulnerable foreign relations, it
is impossible to discuss all facets thoroughly while making swift and decisive decisions on
events that call for immediate attention. While each obstacle is arguably of equal importance as
the other, the cabinet must compromise on where it allocates its time and resources while
upholding Turkish policy and efficiency.
Discussion Questions:
1. How can the Turkish government effectively protect its policemen, soldiers, and
civilians from terrorist conflict?
2. How should the cabinet address the growing support for the HDP in recent elections?
3. In what ways are the political and economic climates in Turkey contributing to its
vulnerability to Kurdish terrorism?
4. To what extent should Turkey involve itself in the Syrian conflict, and in what way
should it divide its efforts to oust Assad and fight both the Islamic State and Syrian
Kurds?
5. How, if at all, can Turkey reconcile the differences between its foreign policy and its
foreign relations?
Key Terms:
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): – Kurdish militant organization based primarily in
Turkey seeking greater autonomy, selfdetermination and political rights for ethnic Kurds
within the nation
People’s Democratic Party (HDP): – The proKurdish political party within Turkey
advocating nonviolence among Kurdish rebels; considered the political representative for
PKK efforts
Justice and Development Party (AKP): – Turkey’s largest political party and currently
holding office
Recep Tayyip Erdogan: – Founder of the AKP and current President of the Republic of
Turkey; known for his conservatism and advocate of strong secularization and
centralization
Diyarbakir: – The unofficial capital of Turkish Kurdistan located in southeastern Turkey
Rojava: – Syrian Kurdistan; an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria
Popular Protections Unit (YPG): – Armed unit of Rojava; considered a terrorist
organization by Turkey
Resources:
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/08/28/world/middleeast/apmlsyria.html?_r=0
http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope35403260
https://www.thenation.com/article/turkeyisfightingadirtywaragainstitsownkurdish
population/
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/troubleturkeyerdoganisisandkurds
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/turkeyisisrussiapkk/408988/
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/culturalsurvivalquarterly/turkey/kurdishr
epressionturkey
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Cabinet of the Republic of Turkey Topic III: Special Topics in Domestic Affairs
Topic Overview:
The Turkish cabinet finds itself at a time of domestic crisis, escalated to the point of
alarm beyond Turkish borders. The Turkish military is reeling from a failed coup, wherein
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s authority in the country was challenged by treasonous
Gulenist plotters and their international henchmen. The Islamic State is all the while becoming a
more concerning threat to the daily safety of Turkish citizens. Concurrent to the country making
world news for radical terrorism and instability, the Turkish bid to join the European Union
hangs in limbo. Should the nation decide that EU membership is what’s best for the future of
Turkey, issues such as the millions of refugees streaming into the country from Syria and Iraq,
but to the geopolitical future of Turkey in Europe. With violence becoming a seemingly daily
occurrence in Ankara and all around Turkey, the domestic state of affairs for the Turkish cabinet
is anything but simple.
Historical Background:
The modern Turkish state came to be at the conclusion of World War I, in the early
1920’s. Led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish nationalist movement returned control of the
country to Turks from Sultanate rule. With his newfound independence, Ataturk made major 38
changes to lay the foundation for the Turkey that the world knows today. He took great strides to
provide a degree of liberation unknown to women at the time, removing religious influences
from the government and cultivating his ideal secular state. Preserving secularity in politics was,
38 http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/ataturk_kemal.shtml
in Ataturk’s mind, a key step in westernizing the newfound Turkish Republic. Another of
Ataturk’s views was that of an entirely unified nation, one that refused to recognize fractured
ethnic and cultural identities. As such, the major Kurdish population of Turkey saw itself as
being oppressed by the government, sowing the seeds for decades of political unrest. Upon
Ataturk’s passing, the westernization process continued for Turkey, as they were admitted to the
United Nations in 1945 and NATO in 1952, an alliance produced by their acceptance of a
democratic system of governance in the 1940’s. Turkey’s place as a westernized, secular state 39
came into question through a series of military coups in the later part of the 20th century.
Amidst the governmental coups in Turkey, the aforementioned animosity from the
Kurdish population of Turkey was growing. The Kurdistan Workers Party (KPP) staged a series
of violent rebellions in the 1980’s, including suicide bombing of major tourist locations,
kidnapping of government officials, and direct violent confrontations with guards and
government police forces. A group founded on leftist secularism, the PKK was countered 40
through government sanctions and denunciations of separatism in the 1982 Constitution, with the
government going so far as to adopt a grassroots ‘village guard’ system to try to prevent the
violent insurgency at a local level. The size of the Kurdish presence in Turkey, though, made it 41
impossible for the government to suppress entirely (see image below). 42
Following a temporary ceasefire with the PKK in the early 2000’s, the Kurdish militants
again began to violently clash with Turkish military forces in 2004. Increasingly violent direct
and civiliantargeted terrorist attacks plagued Turkey until 2013, when a ceasefire was secretly
39 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa 40 Cordesman, Anthony. Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction. 41 http://www.khrp.org/latestnews/646turkeysvillageguardsystemstillinplacestillanobstacle.html 42 Image from http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddleeast29702440
negotiated with the PKK.
Kurdish insurgent groups
began to leave Turkey,
though their retreat
screeched to a halt later
that year when Cemil
Bayik, then leading the
PKK, threatened to renew the warfare should Turkey’s peacemaking processes not continue. 43
In 2014, the presence of ISIS was becoming a significantly more prevalent threat in and
around Turkey. The PKK, during the Syrian civil war, took an active stance in combating the
threat that IS presented in the region; they were, however, displeased with a perceived lack of
urgency in the response from the Turkish government. As the territory nearest the ISIS
insurgency was predominantly Kurdish, the Kurds protested to try to get more support from
government forces in defending the area. This led, yet again, to deadly clashes between Kurdish
protesters and Turkish police. The violent tension between Kurds in Turkey and their 44
government has continued to grow even as Turkey has militarily engaged with ISIS in the time
since 2015; the cultural tensions are as much of an issue as ever.
During the summer months of 2016, President Erdogan’s power underwent the most
serious threat to date. On July 15th, military tanks and helicopters went rogue, attacking police
holding in and around Ankara. Those staging the coup then moved into the national Turkish
43 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/10/pkkthreatensrenewfightturkey201310226444407255.html 44 http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddleeast29518448
broadcasting station, wherein they forced a news anchor to broadcast a message bemoaning the
erosion of secularity in government and Erdogan’s Islamist policies. During this Erdogan was 45
on vacation in Southern Turkey. His administration attempted to reassert their power to the
country via repeated decrees and interviews, but violence waged on into the night and early
morning. Eventually, Erdogan was able to return to Istanbul and convince the citizens of Turkey
that the group leading the coup had no legitimacy. The military groups were eventually
neutralized, and Erdogan reassumed his position with a renewed sense of power. While the coup
had tapped into rampant and existing animosities, it did so with no clear leadership or unity
among the ranks of the rebels. In addressing the country and the world, President Erdogan used
religious conviction and ceremonies to craft a narrative of the triumph of an Islamist rule. 46
Erdogan has repeatedly moved to distance his administration from the secular influence and
legacy of Ataturk, instead celebrating the Ottoman past of the country. And now, with his power
as solidified as ever, Erdogan’s image of the country is settling in after what many are calling a
‘Second Turkish War of Independence’.
Current Situation:
In the immediate aftermath of the failed coup d’état, the global community has been
trying to piece together exactly what happened in Turkey. The international community was
noticeably absent from supporting Erdogan and democracy when it was threatened by violence
and subterfuge. At the time, Twitter was filled with conflicting account of what was happening
in the early hours of July 16th, who was responsible for the violence, and who was truly in
45 http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/worldnews/turkeycoupliveupdatesexplosion8431256#rlabs=1%20rt$category%20p$4 46 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/world/europe/turkeyerdogancoupataturk.html?_r=0
charge. Once it became clear the Erdogan was to maintain his power, the fate of the wouldbe
traitors became of global concern.
Erdogan was widely expected to be
extremely vengeful in dealing with those
who had attempted to take control of
Turkey, and American media outlets
investigated what punishments and trials
would be dealt to the “virus” in the
military who had risen up against
Erdogan. Quoted as stating “This 47
uprising is a gift from God to us because this will be a reason to cleanse our army,” Erdogan’s
Turkey is currently in a temporary state of emergency, with over 60,000 people (police officers
to military leaders to civilians) having been detained. Alongside all of the tumult from the failed
coup, Turkey is still in the process of attempting to join the European Union. The purging of
Turkish citizens and leaders accused of supporting the failed coup has raised alarm with
European Union leaders, who have been quick to condemn Erdogan for his potentially dangerous
consolidation of power. Despite their disapproval, these European socalled “leaders” were 48
quiet as democracy was threatened in Turkey, and now have decided it is time to register
discontent, as the treasonous villains are forced into the light of justice. While the international
community is watching Turkey closely, the refugee crisis that is ongoing in the area has required
47 http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21702511failedputschwasbloodiestturkeyhasseenbacklashworryingaftercoup 48 http://www.reuters.com/article/useuropemigrantseuturkeyidUSKCN1181IC
and continues to require Turkish support. Turkey’s proximity to Syria makes it a required
gateway to prevent continued influx into other European nations (see image). Turkey’s role in
the refugee crisis gives it sizable leverage in diplomatic relations with the EU, but credibility that
Erdogan’s response to the coup is in good faith is paramount to future relations with the body. It
is this major question that has led EU leaders to push Turkey further than before, and it is the
responsibility of the Cabinet to address the concerns of a body that Turkey wishes to join. 49
Bloc Positions:
As a whole, the Turkish Cabinet has a vested interest in preventing an autocratic state
from taking shape in Turkey. This is why clearing the military, educational institutions, and
government of Gulenists and other treasonous plotters is absolutely necessary. Some
implications of a powerless Cabinet are the country losing a chance at EU membership,
something that it has been working for some time to achieve, as well as increasing the likelihood
of already toxic ethnic relations worsening domestically. With tensions running high due to the
global awareness of the refugee crisis, the Turkish Cabinet would do well to ensure that it can
serve as a leader in deescalation, rather than worsen an already vulnerable region.
Discussion Questions:
1. The Turkish Cabinet is responsible for overseeing the longterm and shortterm success
of the nation. It has to consider whether Erdogan’s reaction to the coup and to those
involved is appropriate, motivated by honest and benevolent reasoning. It must consider
whether the actions taken by Erdogan put the nation’s bid to join the EU at a risk greater
49 http://www.politico.eu/article/euministersreassessturkeymigrationdealeuroperefugeecrisisasylumerdogan/
than the benefits provided by their being carried out. The Cabinet must also consider
what role it envisions
2. Should Turkey act as the leader of the region with regards to the refugee situation?
Should it defer on a problem that is largely nondomestic in nature?
Resources:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/03/governmentresponseturkeyscoupaffrontdemoc
racy
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/swissturkishrelations_topswissdiplomatdefends
turkishcoupresponse/42364396
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/08/01/whichbiggerthreatturkeycoup
erdoganresponse/8ZMHF3HfMNhYuxn2PCO4LL/story.html
http://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/1.731310
http://www.haaretz.com/middleeastnews/turkey/1.736145
https://www.stratfor.com/geopoliticaldiary/turkeyscoupputseuropeawkwardspot
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/brokentrusthowfailedcoupweakensturkey
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/whatcausedtheturkishcoupattempt
214057
http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/07/turkeygovernment/491579/
http://blogs.cfr.org/cook/2016/08/01/turkeysfailedcoupandtheunitedstates/