EXCONDE V. CAPUNO

Dante Capuno was a 15 year old boy who was a pupil of Balintawak Elementary School. In March 1949, he attended a boy scout parade for Dr. Jose Rizal. While they were inside a jeep, he took control of the wheels which he later lost control of causing the jeep to go turtle thereby killing two other students, Isidoro Caperina and one other. Isidoro’s mother, Sabina Exconde, sued Dante Capuno for the death of her son. Pending the criminal action, the mother reserved her right to file a separate civil action which she subsequently filed against Dante and his dad, Delfin Capuno.

ISSUE: Whether or not Delfin Capuno, as the father of Dante is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the “duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means”, while, on the other hand, gives them the “right to correct and punish them in moderation”. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage which Delfin failed to prove.

On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the law, “teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody”, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.

JUSTICE J.B.L. REYES Dissenting:

Delfin Capuno should be relieved from liability. There is no sound reason for limiting the liability to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as, concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil.

MERCADO V. CA

1. DAMAGES; ARTICLE 2180 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE NOT APPLICABLE TO ACADEMIC EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; SITUATION CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE. — Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which provides that "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody", applies to an institution of arts and traders and not to any academic institution and contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersede those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher, and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.

2. ID.; MORAL DAMAGES; WHEN THEY SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED. — While moral damages include physical suffering, which must have been caused to a boy wounded by another boy in a fight, they should not be awarded if the decision of the court does not declare that any of the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or occasioned the physical injury. In the case at bar it does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented, since the offender was nine years old, and it does not appear that he acted with discernment when he inflicted the physical injuries. Even if it be assumed that the court considered the offender guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages, the award should not be sustained since it is apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to the offended party was his own fault or negligence.

D E C I S I O N

LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, which condemned petitioner to pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 for medical expenses, for a physical injury caused by the son of petitioner, Augusto Mercado, on a classmate, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., both pupils of the Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City. The case had originated in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, presiding, which dismissed the complaint filed by Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and his father against petitioner, father of the above-mentioned Mercado. The facts found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co- plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City. A ‘pitogo’, which figures prominently in this case, may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a ‘pitogo’. As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.

x x x

"The facts of record clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who started the aggression. Undeniably, the ‘pitogo’ belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the ‘pitogo’ belonged to Augusto, because right after Benedicto gave it to him, Benedicto ran away to get a basket ball with which they could play. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the ‘pitogo’ belonged to Augusto. He thought it was the ‘pitogo’ of Benedicto P. Lim, so that when Augusto attempted to get the ‘pitogo’ from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the ‘pitogo’. However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.’s remark and he aggressively pushed the latter. The fight started then. After Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr. and the latter was clutching his stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto’s anger, Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position, cut him on the right check with a piece of razor.

x x x

"Although the doctor who treated Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., Antonio B. Past, testified for plaintiffs-appellants, he did not declare as to the amount of fees he collected from plaintiffs-appellants for the treatment of Manuel, Jr. The child was not even hospitalized for the wound. We believe that the sum of P50.00 is a fair approximation of the medical expenses incurred by plaintiffs-appellants.

x x x

"The damages specified in paragraphs C and D of the aforequoted portion of plaintiffs-appellant’s complaint come under the class of moral damages. The evidence of record shows that the child suffered moral damages by reason of the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado. Though such kind of damages cannot be fully appreciated in terms of money, we believe that the sum of P2,000.00 would fully compensate the child.

"As second cause of action, plaintiffs-appellants pray for P5,000.00 covering the moral damages they allegedly suffered due to their son’s being wounded; and the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The facts of record do not warrant the granting of moral damages to plaintiffs-appellants Manuel Quisumbing and Ana Pineda.’In law mental anguish is restricted, as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another’s suffering or which arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused

by his or her sympathy for the other’s suffering. Nor can a parent recover for mental distress and anxiety on account of physical injury sustained by a child or for anxiety for the safety of his child placed in peril by the negligence of another.’ (15 Am. Jur. 597). Plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to attorney’s fees, it not appearing that defendant-appellee had wantonly disregarded their claim for damages."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the first, second and third assignments of error, counsel for petitioner argues that since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the father. This precise question was brought before this Court in Exconde v. Capuno and Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, but we held, through Mr. Justice Bautista:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law abovequoted, ‘teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody’, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953 Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557)"

The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable, is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 2180. . . .

"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."cralaw virtua1aw library

It would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without merit.

We next come to the claim of petitioner that the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are excessive. We note that the wound caused to respondent was inflicted in the course of an ordinary or common fight between boys in a grade school. The Court of Appeals fixed the medical expenses

incurred in treating and curing the wound at P50. Said court stated that the wound did not even require hospitalization. Neither was Mercado found guilty of any offense nor the scar in Quisumbing’s face pronounced to have caused a deformity, unlike the case of Araneta, Et. Al. v. Arreglado, Et Al., 104 Phil., 529; 55 Off. Gaz. (9) 1561. Petitioner’s counsel argues that if death call for P3,000 to P6,000, certainly the incised would could not cause mental pain and suffering to the tune of P2,000.

In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court pronounces that the child Quisumbing suffered moral damages "by reason of the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado." While moral damages included physical suffering, which must have been caused to the wounded boy Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil Code), the decision of the court below does not declare that any of the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or occasioned the physical injury. The only possible circumstance in the case at bar in which moral damages are recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been committed.

It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented. The offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years old and it does not appeal that he had acted with discernment when he inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.

It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto’s resentment, which motivated the assault, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." This is, according to the decision appealed from, the reason why Mercado was incensed and pushed Quisumbing who, in turn, also pushed Mercado. It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing’s own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)

After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown to have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not justified.

For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the petitioner is declared exempt or free from the payment of moral damages. The award of P50 for medical expenses, however, is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

PALISOC V. BRILLANTES

In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable “so long as they [the students] remain in their custody.” And that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other officials of the school – which Daffon was not.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.

HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual findings of the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their students.

AMADORA V. CA

In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school’s negligence.

The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the incident happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.

The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to the changing times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.

The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.

For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are more hands on to their students.

For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of school.

The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school

authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.

In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.