C KESTELOOT - Brussels, a truncated metropolis

8/7/2019 C KESTELOOT - Brussels, a truncated metropolis

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GeoJournal 58: 5363, 2002. 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Brussels, a truncated metropolis

Christian Kesteloot1, & Pieter Saey2

1Institute of Social and Economic Geography, Catholic University of Leuven, B-3001 Leuven, Belgium; 2Departmentof Geography, Ghent University, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium; Author for correspondence (Tel: 32 016 322432;

Fax: 32 016 322980; E-mail: [email protected])

Received and accepted

Key words: Brussels Capital Region, Brussels metropolitan area, divided city, reform of the Belgian state

Abstract

This paper describes and analyses the geographical development and the governmental, budget and administrative structureof Brussels. It defines the place Brussels occupies among the cities of Europe and assesses the value of its RegionalDevelopment Plan. Brussels appears to be highly successful in international inter-city competition, but it also appearsto be unable to develop a strategy for dealing with the problems of the divided city it has become in the late-20th century.Key factors in explaining this paradox are a discrepancy between the political delimitation of the Brussels Capital Region(a member state of the federal state of Belgium) and the geographical urban region, and the administrative fragmentationof the Brussels Capital Region. These factors are strongly related to the reform of the Belgian state and the forces behindthis reform. In the absence of a strategy based on solidarity within the metropolitan community, one has to fear for thedevelopment towards a repressive city.

Introduction

Geographically speaking, the metropolitan area of Brussels

coincides with the Brussels urban region (1,614 km2), com-posed of the physical agglomeration (a continuous built-uparea) and a series of suburbs and functionally urbanizedmunicipalities that show strong relations with the centralcity and the agglomeration through commuting, journeys toschool, shopping and migration. Politically speaking, themetropolitan area of Brussels is restricted to the BrusselsCapital Region (BCR), one of the three regions of the fed-eral state of Belgium, consisting of Brussels and 18 othermunicipalities. This federal entity (161 km2) is considerablysmaller than the urban region or even the agglomeration.Thepurpose of this paper is to analyse a paradox that charac-

terizes Brussels: on the one hand it is a highly successfulmetropolis in terms of international inter-city competitionbut on the other it appears not to be able to deal adequatelywith the problems of the divided city it has become. Keyfactors in this paradox are the discrepancy between the polit-ical delimitation of the BCR and the geographical extensionof the metropolitan area as well as the administrative frag-mentation of the BCR. These factors are strongly related tothe reform of the Belgian state and the forces behind thisreform. The part-informative, part-analytical sections thatfollow present first a socio-geographical and economic pro-file of Brussels and its development towards a divided city(i.e., the geographical development of Brussels), second, a

description of the governmental structure of Belgium andBrussels, third, an examination of the budget structure andadministrative structure of the BCR (metropolization by re-

gionalization), and fourth, a discussion of the success ofBrussels in inter-city competition and an assessment of theurban project as elaborated in the Regional Development

Plan (a truncated metropolis in expansion without strategy).In the concluding section a synthesis is made, pointing outthe main political challenge Brussels as a social fabric has tocope with in the near future.

The geographical development of Brussels

A socio-geographical profile

The municipality of Brussels reached its maximum popu-lation eighty years ago, in 1923 (215,000 inhabitants asagainst 134,000 in 2000). The BCR as a whole recordedits maximum population of 1,079,200 inhabitants thirty-fiveyears ago, in 1968 (Jouret, 1972; Van der Haegen, 1982). Inthe three decades between 1967 and 1997 the population ofthe BCR declined from 1,074,586 to 950,597. An increase inthe number of foreigners from 140,056 to 284,038 (net resultof an excess of births over deaths of 103,704, a positive mi-gration balance of 124,256 and 83,978 naturalizations) didnot compensate for the decline of the number of Belgian-born from about 934,530 to 666,559 (net result of excessof deaths over births of 110,539, negative migration balanceof 241,410) (De Lannoy et al., 1999, p. 105). The negativenet migration rate was the main cause of the decline of the

population. Since 1986 this has been counteractedby a smallexcess of births over deaths, due to an ethnic minority ef-fect (a relatively young age structure and a relatively small


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drop in fertility). This positive natural growth has becomelarge enough to cause an increase of the population from1996 on, thereby compensating for a decreasing negative netmigration rate. Most recently the migration balance has be-come positive. Nearly 30% of the population is of a foreignnationality (Table 1). In spite of the positive natural growth

and the positive net migration rate of the foreign population,this percentage is stabilizing. An increase is not to be expec-ted because of the easy naturalization procedure introducedin 2001 as an alternative for the politically unattainable rightto vote of non-EU citizens. More than half of the foreignersare EU citizens, while 30% are Moroccans and Turks. In1961 the population of foreign nationality was only 6.8% oftotal population, and nearly 60% of them were EEC-citizens(Table 2). At that time, the total number of Moroccans andTurks in Belgium was 865.

The Brussels urban region has 1,750,000 inhabitants. Incomparison with the rest of the agglomeration and the urban

region, the BCR is characterized by a weak demography,a high percentage of foreigners (particularly from Moroccoand Turkey), a high percentage of dwellings lacking basicconveniences, a high percentage of persons unemployed andregistered for employment, a low income per inhabitant anda low standard of living. As regards the 19 municipalit-ies that make up the BCR, fourteen of them belong to twoextreme categories, being either: (i) municipalities with alarge or moderate number of foreigners from Morocco andTurkey, characterized by very high percentages of dwell-ings that lack basic conveniences, very high percentages ofpersons unemployed and registered for employment, verylow incomes per inhabitant and very low standards of living;

or (ii) municipalities with a majority of non-Mediterraneanforeigners from within the EU, characterized by very lowpercentages of dwellings that lack basic conveniences, lowor moderate percentages of persons unemployed and re-gistered for employment, very high incomes per inhabitantand very high standards of living. (Figure 1) All municip-alities of the first ring of municipalities around the city ofBrussels, of which the territory has been built up entirelyor largely during the 19th century (henceforth called theInner City) belong to the first category. All the municipalit-ies of the second category are situated in the south-easternpart of the Region. This presents a picture of a divided

city, in which spatial segregation is coupled with increasingsocio-economic polarization.

Development towards a divided city

The spatial structure and the social structure of a city do notnecessarily coincide. It may be that socio-economic polar-ization manifests itself by inequalities within urban zonesrather than between urban zones. It may also be that spa-tial polarization occurs without a corresponding increase insocio-economic polarization (the case of a segregated city).If they do coincide, and spatial and socio-economic polar-izations reinforce each other, the city may be described as

a divided city. Making use of these terms, the geographicaldevelopment of Brussels can be summarized as the gradualtransformation of a city with an unequal structure first into a

segregated city before the 1960s and then into a divided cityafterwards (Kesteloot, 1999).

The unequal structure is rooted in the industrial revolu-tion and the ensuing diversification of social classes. Thespatial differentiation is effectuated according to a dual-ist scheme, based on the interaction between the medieval

functions and the natural environment of the city. The poorsettled in a small swampy valley in the west, while the no-bility settled on the wooded hills in the east. In the secondhalf of the 19th century subdivisions appear: in the west-ern part the NNE-SSW manufacturing and working-classaxis, brought into existence by industrial development alongthe Senne and the Antwerp-Brussels-Charleroi canal; in theeastern part two prestigious axes of high social status, theAvenue Louise and the Avenue de Tervuren, leading to theForest of Soignes. Segregation was enhanced by a num-ber of initiatives, such as the building of large avenues andboulevards covering the Senne (which had gradually become

the central sewer of the city), the construction of the LeopoldQuarter (the first prestige quarter outside the walls of thecity) at the end of the 19th century; the lay-out of socialhousing in the form of garden districts outside the city; andthe construction of the first high standing blocks of flats nearthe centre during the inter-war period. However, the segreg-ation induced by this differentiation of the residential spacefor historical reasons remained superficial and unsystem-atic. There was a feeling of belonging to a common space:although a national capital, Brussels behaved rather like aprovincial city.

These sectoral structures and peripheral social housingare still recognizable in the socio-spatial organization of the

city, but their significance has considerably changed. Onthe one hand, the internationalization of the city, character-ized by the arrival of guest-workers as well as well-to-doforeigners employed in the international organizations loc-ated in Brussels, has reinforced the contrast between thewest and the east and between the labour axis NNE-SSWand the bourgeois axes E-SE. On the other hand, a massivesuburbanization has superimposed an even more significantconcentric configuration on this scheme. To the degree thatsuburbanization moves towards the periphery, this concent-ric structure has first generated a contrast between the InnerCity and the other municipalities of the present-day BCR

(henceforth called the Outer City). Afterwards, the contrastbetween the BCR as a whole and the rest of the urban re-gion became prominent. The basic explanation for thesecontrasts is well known. Since the middle of the 20th cen-tury, the skilled and affluent population groups have movedfrom the congested and unsafe central city towards the morecongenial and spacious residential areas in the suburbs andthe countryside. The unskilled and poor population groups such as elderly people, working-class families, margin-alized population groups, singles and one-parent families remained in the old city districts of the Inner City, most ofwhich were working-class areas dating from the19th-centuryperiod of industrialization. In many cases, Mediterraneanguest-workers and their families took the place of the youngpeople who had become more affluent and left these areas.


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The transition to a divided city occurred in three phases.In the 1960s and early 1970s the city posessed a segregatedstructure. Increasing levels of education and the develop-ment of tertiary activities made it possible for Belgians tomove up the social scale. The majority of the Brussels popu-lation became middle class and started to spend a large part

of their higher income buying building land in the peripheryof the city. The unskilled guest-workers filled gaps in thelabour market in labour intensive activities. They landed upin the residual rent sector of the housing market in the InnerCity districts.1 The strong suburbanization in this period waslinked to the success of keynesianism, reflected in full em-ployment and income security. Therefore it is not surprisingthat in the following period of economic crisis (19741985)the migration balance of Belgians became less negative,whereas the positive migration balance of foreigners sankto a low level. The crisis also nullified the possibilities ofupward social mobility of the guest-workers, as Belgians

postponed loans on mortgage or settled in districts whichotherwise guest-workers would have moved to. The share ofthe guest-workers in the Inner City districts increased dueto demographic factors: higher fertility, younger populationand, in spite of the migration stop imposed in 1974, continu-ing migration (chain migration based on family reunificationand family creation), albeit at a much slower pace. However,as unskilled and poor Belgian population groups kept onliving there, these districts did not develop into ghettos.

The economic revival after 1985 did not check the de-velopment towards a divided city. On the contrary, the neweconomy is characterized by lack of employment for the un-skilled and, as a consequence, it does not offer opportunities

for upward social mobility. It also creates enclaves of mar-ginalized labour markets.2 In the housing market a residualpurchase sector comes into existence. Turks and, to a lesserdegree, Moroccans buy houses in their concentration areasas safeguarding against the uncertainties of the flexible neweconomy, i.e., raising housing prices and the danger of beingdisplaced to other areas (Kesteloot et al., 1997). Chain mi-gration, increasingly based on imported grooms and brides,contributes heavily to the mutual reinforcement of spatialand socio-economic (and cultural) polarization. The positivemigration balance of foreigners rose again to a high levelmainly as a result of this chain migration and of high refugee

migration into Belgium in general (Table 3). By 1990, themigration balance of Belgians had become strongly negat-ive. Since then net emigration is slowly diminishing. TheOuter City appears to become more international in a morevaried way than the Inner City. The Inner City also appearsto lose inhabitants to the Outer City, but both lose inhabitantsto the rest of the urban region.

Gentrification has been occurring in downtown Brusselssince the 1970s, but only on a small scale, and it is ofmarginal importance in comparison with the settlement ofofficials of European institutions and employees of multina-tional corporations. In the late-1980s EU citizens settled inthe central city as well as in the southeastern Outer City,but afterwards only the latter part of the BCR shows a pos-itive net migration rate for these expatriates (Table 3). In

1961 two thirds of the non-MediterraneanEEC citizens livedin the Inner City (proportional to the Belgian population),but already then the Mediterranean EEC citizens (Italians)were overrepresented in the Inner City (just as UK citizenswere overrepresented in the Outer City). The location ofthe regional headquarters of multinational corporations in

Brussels began after the acts of 1959 on economic expan-sion and regional development and this has transformed thecentral city into an international CBD, and at the same time acentre of political decision making, composed of three coredistricts: the areas adjacent to the Brussels Park where thenational institutions are located, Schuman Square and Leo-pold Quarter with its European institutions (started in 1958),and North Quarter with most of the institutions of the feder-ated entities. The NATO headquarters were transferred fromParis to Evere in 1967. At present the BCR is the home ofmore than 120 international government organizations, 1400international non-governmental organizations and a number

of world and European interprofessional organizations. Theinstitutions of the EU now employ 19,000 people.

Economic profile of the BCR

Since the 1960s the economy of the BCR has been increas-ingly dominated by the tertiary sector. In 1961, 170,000people or nearly 30% of total working population wereactive in manufacturing industry (Table 4). Brussels wasmentioned on Chardonnets map of the most important in-dustrial complexes of Western Europe (Chardonnet, 1953,p. 19), although at that time the share of manufacturing intotal employment was already significantly lower than the

Belgian average (location quotient: 0.83). In 1999, the num-ber of industrial employees had decreased to 40,000 (andthe location quotient was only 0.38). The proportion of em-ployment in financial institutions and services has doubledfrom 36.5% to 72.9%, and each of these two secors recor-ded an increase of 100,000 employees between 1961 and1999. Also company directors and liberal professions areoverrepresented in the BCR (see the location quotients inTable 5). The Brussels economy accounts for 19% of theBelgian volume of trade and value added, and attracts 21%of the investments. Table 6 shows the values of these eco-nomic indicators for the different activity sectors. The BCR

with 9% of the population of Belgium accounts for 16% ofthe working population. In 2000 658,788 people (resident inBelgium) were active in the BCR, of which 45% lived in theBCR itself, 36% in Flanders and 19% in Wallonia. 51,164inhabitants of the BCR were working outside the Region, ofwhich 68% in Flanders, 25% in the Wallonia and 7% abroad(Ministerie, 2001, p. 66).

Government structure of Belgium and Brussels

Federated and local governments in Belgium and the BCR

The Belgian federal state is made up of three regions andthree language communities. The regions are the BCR, the


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Flemish Region and the Walloon Region. The BCR is com-posed of 19 municipalities, one of which is the municipalityof Brussels. This municipality is also the capital of theEuropean Union, the Kingdom of Belgium, the BCR, theFlemish Community and the French Community.3 The Bel-gian state is also divided into four language regions, the

boundaries of which were determined in 1963. These lan-guage regions have no powers, but delineate the regionsand communities: the Flemish Region coincides with theDutch language region, the Walloon Region coincides withthe French and German language regions, and the BCR co-incides with the fourth language region, the bilingual regionof Brussels-Capital. The regions have powers relating toterritorial matters: town and country planning, the envir-onment, housing, agriculture, energy, employment, publicworks, transport, regional economic policy, external trade,organic legislation, financing and administrative control ofthe provinces and municipalities, and from 2004, develop-

ment aid. The communities (the Flemish Community, theFrench Community and the German-speaking Community)have powers in four categories: cultural issues, personal mat-ters (health and social assistance), education, and the useof language in administrative matters, education and socialrelations between employers and employees. Each regionand community has a parliament (the Council), and an ex-ecutive (the Government), and can issue decrees or, inthe case of the BCR, ordinances that have the force oflaw. However, the councils and governments of the Flem-ish Region and of the Flemish Community have mergedinto a single Flemish Parliament and a single Flemish Gov-ernment. Because some of its general legal rules (those in

the areas of town and country planning, public works andtransport) are subject to legal controls by the central state,all general legal rules of the BCR are called ordinancesrather than decrees. The 75 members of the Brussels-CapitalCouncil are divided into a Dutch and a French linguisticgroup. The number of Dutch-speaking and French-speakingmembers depends on the results of the elections. The Brus-sels Capital Government consists of a minister-president, 2Dutch-speaking ministers and 2 French-speaking ministers.It is assisted by three regional state secretaries. The parityin the number of ministers in the Brussels Capital Govern-ment is linked to the parity in the number of ministers in the

Belgian Government. Both parities are part of the safeguard-ing of minorities: the Flemings are a minority in the BCR,the Francophones are a minority in Belgium. The FlemishCommunity exercises power in the Flemish language region,the French Community in the French language region andthe German-speaking Community in the German languageregion. The French Community may transfer certain powersto the Walloon Region, and the Walloon Region may trans-fer certain powers to the German-speaking Community. Inaddition, the Flemish Community covers the Flemish insti-tutions established in the bilingual region of Brussels Capitaland the French Community covers the French-speaking in-stitutions established in that region. However, the decrees ofthe Flemish and French Communities do not have the forceof law with regard to bilingual institutions or to individu-

als in the bilingual region of Brussels Capital, because theprinciple of subnationality in Brussels has not been accep-ted. The corresponding community powers are exercised byother organizations, the Commission of the Flemish Com-munity, the Commission of the French Community and theCommission of the Joint Communities, each of which has

its own assembly and college. The Commission of the JointCommunities can pass ordinances, which have the force oflaw, but its power is restricted to personal matters. The Com-missions of the French and the Flemish Communities, whichcan also act as organizers of unilingual institutions, can issueby-laws, which are lower in the hierarchy of legal rules thandecrees or ordinances, and are comparable to the by-lawsissued by provinces or municipalities. However, the FrenchCommunity may transfer certain powers to the Commissionof the French Community, and, as a consequence, the latterhas the power to issue decrees on the matters concerned.

Formerly the bilingual region of Brussels Capital was

part of the province of Brabant, which was divided intotwo provinces, Flemish Brabant and Walloon Brabant, in1995. As the region of Brussels Capital no longer belongsto a province, the provincial powers in the 19 municipalitiesare exercised by the Communities, the Commissions and theRegion.

As the successor of the Brussels Agglomeration, theBCR also discharges certain responsibilities elsewhere as-signed to the municipalities, such as fire-fighting and emer-gency medical assistance, removal and processing of waste,urban public transportation, and coordination of municipalactivities. The Brussels Agglomeration (composed of the 19municipalities) was set up in 1971 and is the only case in

which use is made of the possibility, created by the Con-stitution, of setting up agglomerations and federations ofmunicipalities as an alternative to large-scale amalgamationof municipalities.4 Yet a few years later large-scale amal-gamation had become politically feasible and the Belgiangovernment passed on to a major merger operation. The2,379 municipalities of Belgium were consolidated into thepresent 589 municipalities by the Act of 30-12-1975. Com-munity tensions and the stubbornness of local politicianshave prevented the application of the Act to the 19 mu-nicipalities of Brussels. Afterwards the foundation of theBCR in 1989 and the turn of thought concerning amalgam-

ations pushed the issue into the background. Nowadays,and learned by experience (the example of Antwerp, wherethe Act became effective only in 1983 and where, after-wards, a subdivision in districts imposed itself), attention ispaid to the democratic quality of municipal government andadministrative structures tailored to the needs of the localcommunities rather than to the enlargement of governingpower and the improvement of efficiency of provision ofservices through specialization (Deschouwer and Buelens,1999).

In summary, from the administrative viewpoint, theBrussels metropolitan area or urban region is composed of(i) municipalities that are part of the provinces of FlemishBrabant and Walloon Brabant and Hainaut, of the Flem-ish Region and the Walloon Regions, and of the linguistic


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regions in which the Flemish and the French Communit-ies exercise power, and (ii) 19 municipalities that make upthe BCR, coinciding with the bilingual region of BrusselsCapital. The BCR is a member state of the federal stateof Belgium. The bilingual region of Brussels Capital is thelinguistic region in which the Flemish and French Com-

munities, and the Commissions of the Flemish, French andJoint Communities, exercise power. The BCR, the Flemishand French Communities and the Commission of the JointCommunities are federated entities. The Commission of theFlemish Community is a decentralized division of the Flem-ish Community. The Commission of the French Communityis at the same time a federated entity and a decentralizeddivision of the French Community. Thus, there are two ad-ministrative tiers in Brussels Capital, only one of which ison the level of local government (the municipalities). Thenearest equivalent to a genuine metropolitan government isthe Brussels Agglomeration, but its (very limited) respons-

ibilities are discharged by the BCR. It should be kept inmind that the Brussels metropolitan area (and even the Brus-sels morphological agglomeration) extends far beyond theboundaries of this two-tier entity.

Origin and bearing of the federalization of Belgium

This complicated administrative structure has been set up tomeet two aspirations, the guarding and promotion of culturalidentity of linguistic communities and the disposal of a ter-ritory in which an own-policy can be pursued (Corijn et al.,2000). The Flemings aimed rather at cultural autonomy andheaded for a federalization in two entities with a special stat-

ute for Brussels, where they are in a minority position. TheFrancophones headed for a federalization in three entitieswith Brussels on the same footing as Flanders and Wallo-nia. This difference can be explained by the long-lastinginferior position of the Dutch-speakers in the Belgian stateand society, and by changes in the geography of economicdevelopment, which were perceived as a change in the eco-nomic fortunes of Flanders and Wallonia, putting the latterin an economically subordinate position since the crises inthe steel industry and coal mining after World War II.5 Al-though Flemish politicians stressed the necessity of culturalautonomy, there is no mistaking that Flemings wanted their

political power to match their recently acquired economicpower (Saey et al., 1998). The result of a series of consti-tutional reforms (1970, 1980, 1988, and 1993) to meet thetwo aspirations is the twofold federalization in three com-munities and in three regions. The constitutional reformswere worked out in the Special Acts of 1980 on the insti-tutions of the Flemish Community, the Flemish Region, theFrench Community and the Walloon Region (amended in1988, 1989, 1993, 2001), the 1989 Act on the institutionsof the BCR (amended in 1989, 1993, 2001), the1989 Acton the financing of communities and regions (amended in1993, 2001), and in the Act of 1983 on the institutions of theGerman-speaking Community (amended in 1990, 1993).6

Each amendment enlarged the powers of the communitiesand regions. Someof the matters involved were the exclusivedomain of the federated entities from the beginning, others

have become their exclusive domain and still others are stilldivided among the federal state and the federated entities.At present, the federal state has residual powers and noneof the federated entities has the right to draw up an own-constitution. On the other hand, regions and communitiesare entitled by the Belgian constitution to conclude interna-

tional treaties in the domains which are inside the scope oftheir powers without interference of the federal state. Withregard to personal and related matters, the bilingual regionof Brussels Capital is governed by the Flemish and French-speaking Communities and their Brussels divisions. Withregard to territorial matters, the region forms a member state.However, although the Brussels Capital Region has the samepowers as the Flemish and the Walloon Regions, it is not theequal of these two other member states: it issues ordinancesand not decrees, and it has no constitutive autonomy.7 Thepolitical limitation of the metropolitan area to the bilingualregion of Brussels Capital complies with the demand of the

Flemings to block the frenchifying of the surroundings ofBrussels.

The Belgian welfare state

The BCR and the other federated entities and their divisionswhich govern the bilingual region of Brussels Capital parti-cipate in the general system of provision of collective goods.In Belgium, collective goods are provided at all governmentlevels by central, federated and local governments. The sys-tem of social services is regulated by the public authorities,but professional social organizations, trade unions, med-ical insuranceassociations, employers federations, farmers

associations and associations of small business operatorsparticipate in policy-making, management and execution bymeans of a network of deliberative, advisory and governingbodies and conceded administrative executive services andlocal initiatives. The state creates the legal framework, butsocial organizations formulate and implement initiatives toa large degree. This model typifies education (community,provincial, municipal and private education), social housing(local social housing companies), health care (medical in-surance associations, public and Catholic hospitals), welfare(municipal Public Centres for Social Welfare, responsiblefor relief and promoting social integration, and non-profit

associations) and especially social security. This reflects thedevelopment of the Belgian welfare state from 19th-centurylocal initiatives, mainly workers organizations (Deleeck,1992, p. 189190).

Metropolitanization through regionalization

The circumscription of the BCR as the third region of Bel-gium brought with it a de facto metropolitanization. Thebudget structure of the BCR and its 19 municipalities and thebudget structure of the other regions and their municipalitiesshow some typical differences that are connected with the

functioning of Brussels as a metropolis in both senses oflarge city and of capital city. With regard to public services,the federalization of Belgium involved not only the setting


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up of regional administrations, but also the regionalization and thus, in the BCR, metropolitanization of a number ofpublic interest organizations. Finally, the transfer of powersfrom the central state to the regions implied, in the case ofthe BCR, a metropolitanization of corresponding responsib-ilities, such as planning or housing (which are exclusively

regional powers, i.e., there is no longer town and countryplanning or housing policy at the national level).

Budget structure

Suburbanization led to a decline in the fiscal capacity ofthe BCR where it concerns personal income taxes. This de-cline continues in spite of the recent demographic changes(Table 7).8 However, the BCR is now entitled to the federalsolidarity contribution for the regions with a lower fiscalcapacity than the national average. Furthermore the fiscalcapacity of the BCR as regards other types of taxes is muchhigher than that of the other regions. As a result, the fiscalreceipts per inhabitant of the BCR are considerably higherthan those of the Flemish and Walloon Regions (by 17 and10%, respectively in 1998) (Heremans and Philipsen, 1999,p. 240). Nevertheless, the BCR has resorted to debt fin-ancing to the extent that the ratio of outstanding debts tototal receipts had mounted to 2.10 in 1994 (ibidem, p. 227).Since then this ratio has declined to about 1.15, partly due tothe changes in the financing mechanisms of the regions andcommunities which made higher receipts possible and highdebt repayment feasible.

There are four sources of finance for the regions and forthe French and Flemish Communities. These are as follows:

shared taxes (regions and communities receive a portion offederal tax in proportion to the part of this tax levied onthe territory of the region or community concerned); re-gional and community taxes; non-fiscal revenues (receiptsfrom property and activities); and loans. Shared taxes arethe Value-Added Tax (VAT), which is shared by the federalgovernment and the communities, and the income tax, whichis shared by the federal government, the regions and thecommunities. The shared taxes are by far the most importantsource of revenue for the regions and communities, exceptfor the BCR since 2002. The share of income tax (includingthe above-mentioned solidarity contribution) accounted for

about 60% of the revenue of the BCR until 2002, when itwas reduced to one-third. This share is low in comparisonwith the Walloon Region (two-thirds, reduced to 50% in2002), the French Community (90%, including VAT) andthe Flemish Community/Region (90%, reduced to 75% in2002, including VAT). Regional taxes can be autonomoustaxes, levied by a region in its own right, or transferredtaxes, which are levied by the federal state and transferredto the regions. The latter include traffic tax, registration fees,death duties and a number of taxes of minor importance, anda small share of the more significant land tax. Until 2002,the transferred taxes accounted for 20% of the revenue ofthe BCR, in 2002 they accounted for 44%. This increase is

a result of the extension of transferred taxes by a revisionof the Special Act of 1989 on the financing of regions andcommunities, which implied a change of the ratio between

shared and transferred taxes.9 In the BCR, autonomous taxesaccount for only 5%, and 7% is derived from taxes levied byor transferred to the BCR in its capacity as an agglomeration(Boon et al., 1990).

The total amount of the budgets of the 19 municipalit-ies is as large as the total of the budgets of the region and

the commissions. Municipalities obtain revenue from fivesources: municipal taxes and surtaxes; funds, including gen-eral grants (of which the Municipal Fund is by far the mostimportant), and specific grants of the block type; subsidies(specific grants of the matching type); property and pay-ments for municipal services; and profit sharing in local stateenterprises. As capital city of Belgium, the municipality ofBrussels receives an additional endowment, registered in thebudget of the federal Finance Department. Taxes account for45% of the revenue of the 19 municipalities of the BCR,funds for 18%, specific grants for 18% and profit sharingfor 7%. About 20 years ago (in 1980), the grants from the

Municipal Fund still exceeded the revenue from taxes, butby 1990, the share of the funds was reduced to 24% andthe share of the taxes had risen to the present level. Theincreasing importance of taxes is a general trend occurringin the other two regions as well, but what sets the BCR apartis the share of revenue provided by surtaxes on land. Thesemade up 26% of the total revenue of the 19 municipalities,compared to 11% from the additional tax on income and 7%from the municipal taxes. The corresponding values in theWalloon Region are 15%, 15% and 8%, and in the FlemishRegion 19%, 18% and 8%, respectively. (Claerhout, 2000;Flohimont, 1999; Van Hecke and Cardyn, 1984).

Because of its metropolitan character, total expenditure

per inhabitant of the Region itself and of the 19 municipalit-ies is much higher than in the other regions. As far as it con-cerns the municipalities, this is largely due to the expenditureof the municipality of Brussels (amounting to nearly 3,500euro per inhabitant). In general, total expenditure per inhab-itant of the other municipalities does not deviate significantlyfrom that of strongly urbanized municipalities of the samepopulation in the other regions. The Brussels municipalit-ies allocate very little of their expenditure to roads and tosanitation and urbanization, but this is compensated by thelarge expenses of the Region for equipment and transportand for housing and urban planning via among other things

regionalized public interest organizations (Table 8). On theother hand, expenditures for economy and employment areconspicuously low despite higher unemployment rates. Thiscan be explained, on the one side, by the fact that the BCRis not an economic region, and, on the other side, by themismatch between the dominance of the tertiary sector andthe poor schooling of especially foreign workers.10

Administrative structure

Regional policies concerningcertain matters were madepos-sible for the first time by the Act of 1974, which pertainedto the following: housing, town and country planning and

nature conservation, environment and water management,economy, employment and energy policy, local authorities,finance and budget. After the foundation of the BCR in 1989,


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regional policies were based on appropriate ordinances. Themain tool for implementing the policies of the Brussels Gov-ernment is the Brussels Capital Region Ministry, dividedinto five administrations, the Local Authorities Administra-tion, the Finance and Budget Administration, the Equipmentand Transport Administration, the Housing and Urban Plan-

ning Administration and the Economy and EmploymentAdministration. Like the Belgian state and the other memberstates, the BCR entrusts various public missions to publicinterest organizations and to non-profit organizations of, inthis case, regional interest.

There are several types of public interest organizations:organizations which depend directly on the Ministry, organ-izations run by a board of directors or by a management unitunder the authority of one or several concerned Minister(s),and organizations with a larger degree of autonomy. Theformer includes, e.g., the Regional Agency for Cleanliness,the Brussels Institute for Management of the Environment,

the Brussels Regional Fire Brigade and Medical EmergencyService. The second includes the Brussels Regional Employ-ment Office, the Brussels Regional Housing Corporationand the Port of Brussels Regional Corporation.11 The latterincludes the Brussels Regional Development Agency, theBrussels Regional Investment Company and the BrusselsPublic Transport Company. Most of these regional publicinterest organizations came into existence through dissolu-tion of national organizations or were founded as such in thecourse of the federalization process since the late 70s. TheBrussels Public Transport Company, responsible for trans-port by underground, tram and bus, was foundedin 1954, butits present statute dates from 1990.12 It was the first public

interest organization in Belgium to conclude a managementcontract with a regional government.

Non-profit making organizations of regional interest are,e.g., Technopol (offers services to the enterprises that de-velop technology in the areas of communication, health,agrofood and the precision tool industry), Teleport (pro-motes access to advanced telematics applications for smalland medium-sized enterprises and trains multilingual callcentre operators), Brussels Congress (department of Brus-sels International Tourism and Congress, promoting theBCR as an international conference location), The Brussels-Europe Liaison Office (ensures a quality welcome for in-

ternational and, in particular, European institutions), Brus-sels Energy Agency (consulting service with regard toany question dealing with energy), Guarantee Fund of theBrussels Region (aimed at facilitating the access of smalland medium-sized enterprises to business credit), Eurore-gio (group of economic interest uniting five regions: BCR,Flemish Region, Kent, Nord-Pas de Calais and the WalloonRegion).

The BCR also tries to mobilize private capital by meansof public-private partnerships, but without much success upto now, although some partnerships have been realized in thefield of urban renewal and of waste and water treatment.

A truncated metropolis in expansion without a strategy

A medal with two sides

Brussels is one of the most successful metropolises in theworld in terms of international inter-city competitiveness. In

these times of sectoral and spatial volatility of capital andthe accordingly increasing porosity of national boundaries,regions and cities enter into fierce international and nationalcompetition with each other, trying to attract R&D and high-tech production or productionwith high value added, to raiseconsumption (through immigration of well-to-do people andsupply of tourist attractions, cultural and sporting events,conferences) and to obtain political and economic decisionpower (Harvey, 1985). Brussels has succeeded in all thesefields to such a degree that it can be classed in a category ofits own, a specialized world city in the European economicspace, after London and Paris, but ahead of secondary inter-national cities such as Frankfurt, Madrid, Rome or Zurich.This outstanding position is primarily based on its role ofinternational political centre of decision-making, but alsoon its role of international business centre.13 Although thepresence of EU-institutions undoubtedly has a pull ef-fect on the locational choice of multinational corporationsand banks looking to establish European headquarters andsubsidiaries, the image of an advanced urban economy with a central location in Europe, excellent internationaltransport links (HST and other railway connections, air-port, motorways), good telecommunications, competitivecost for property and for living, educated and multilin-gual labour force, favourable tax arrangements is of at

least equal importance in this respect. (Elmhorn, 1998). Asalready implied in Chardonnets concept of industrial com-plex, Brussels is characterized by a whole of local assets andinterdependencies which attracts international agents.

The regional administration, the relevant organizationsof public interest and the non-profit making organizations ofregional interest play their part in this success story, but theirrole is overshadowed by the Belgian government, not onlywith regard to the location of NATO and the EU-institutions,but also with regard to the development of Brussels as aninternational business centre. General measures taken bythe Belgian government to attract investment automatically

benefit Brussels because it simply is the first metropolis ofthe country. A clear example is the special tax arrangementfor co-ordination centres (introduced in 1982), allowingmultinational corporations to carry out a large number offinancial and other operations virtually tax free. More thanhalf of these centres were established in Brussels (Vander-motten, 1983). Oddly enough the ascent of Brussels as aworld city has not been hampered by the fragmented govern-mental structure. The explanation is rather straightforward.The revenue of the Region and the municipalities dependsfor the greater part on taxes and grants that are directlyor indirectly linked to household income, and, in the caseof the municipalities, on surtaxes on land revenue. As a

consequence a municipality has everything to gain by at-tracting wealthy people and corporations and organizationsthat enhance the value of property. The result is some kind


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of alliance/collusion of politicians of all government levels(including the European one) with real estate agents, prop-erty developers and speculators.14 This alliance/collusionmay be held responsible for the reinforcement of the socialand spatial polarization of the BCR. Already in the 70s thesearch for space to build offices has led to heavily contested

urban development projects and operations. Since the late80s the expansion of four areas (the CBD/North Quarter, theEuropean district, the canal zone and the South Quarter withthe HST rail station) generates spatial pressures in a waythat reminds of the Burgess model (Kesteloot, 1992; Meert,1992). The result is a sharpening of the contrast between theeastern and western parts of the city, on top of the classicalproblems of insecurity, environmental pollution and trafficcongestion.

The urban project

In principle, the BCR disposes of an instrument of all-embracing socio-economic planning to meet the challengesof international competition and sustainable development aswell as the challenges of a more local nature, namely the Re-gionalDevelopment Plan.15 Its legal basis is the ordinanceof1991 on the organization of urban planning. This ordinancedefines two levels of spatial planning and development, theregional and the municipal. The Region and each of the mu-nicipalities draw up a development plan and a land use plan.A land use plan conforms to a development plan and the mu-nicipal plans conform to the regional plans. Land use plansare binding, development plants are binding upon the publicauthorities. The first Regional Land Attribution Plan came

into effect in 2001. It is based on the first Regional Devel-opment Plan, dating from 1995. This RDP presented itselfas an answer to two challenges: stabilization, or even in-crease, of a diversified population and increase of economicactivities and investments guaranteeing social progress andquality of life. The main objective was to realize a mixedurban community by replacing the selective emigration to-wards the suburbs by a selective immigration, both as an endin itself and as a means to enhance the fiscal capacity of theRegion. The most striking characteristic was its defensiveattitude toward the developments that explain the successof Brussels as an international administrative and business

centre. This attitude was made concrete in the measuresto control the expansion of offices and to valorize manu-facturing industry. It can be explained by fear of pressureon the real estate market and by traumas caused by someurban development operations in the past which were verydestructive to the urban tissue or by the architectural povertyof the CBD. (Vandermotten, 1994). Since 1995 populationincreases, but for other reasons than the RDP preconceived(as can be deduced from the relative decrease of fiscal capa-city and the spatial concentration of poverty). The economynoted a revival, but more to the benefit of the commuters thanthe inhabitants. A third challenge, besides a diversified pop-ulation and a sustainable economic development (avoiding

overspecialisation in administrative functions), was addedin the second RDP of 2002: integration of the internationaland cultural character of Brussels in projects which realize

sustainable development based on a strong identity. Thissecond RDP formulates twelve priorities: strengthening res-idential attractiveness and promotion of social equilibrium,stimulation of economic activities in view of local employ-ment, social housing, urban renewal aiming at a mixture ofurban functions and population groups, land use policy, city

marketing, meeting social needs (education, family policy,health care, relief, care of the disabled), increase of the shareof urban public transport in total transport and integration ofthe regional express network into the urban transport net-work, environmental protection, image building by meansof prestige projects stressing the intercultural, internationaland European character of Brussels, safety, and R&D.16

All kinds of existing institutions, instruments and plans aremobilized to realize this urban project, e.g., the public in-terest organizations and the non-profit making organizationsof regional interest, the Brussels Institute of EnvironmentalManagement, the Cleanliness Plan, the Regional Waste Plan,

the IRIS Plan (mobility and transport plan), cleanlinesscontracts, neighbourhood contracts, safety contracts, com-munity contracts. The BCR has the intention to observethe international agreements concluded or to be concludedby the Belgian government concerning environmental issues(theKyoto Protocol, the Convention of Geneva, the Treaty ofVienna), largely by means of measures in the transport sector(reduction of motor traffic) and measures of rational energyconsumption. It also wants to participate in the EuropeanINTERREG-programme and in the European and Beneluxspatial planning and development projects. As a matter offact, consultation between the three Belgian regions takesplace not on the national level, but on these supra-national

levels. (http://www.gewop.irisnet.be).

Assessment

The RDP is presented as a strategic plan. Actually it func-tions as a framework for physical planning only (cf. Van-dermotten, 1994). This is no surprise as its legal basis isthe ordinance on town and country planning. Neverthelessthis limited bearing of the RDP is also a sign of impotence(cf. Baeten, 2001). Apparently there is no hegemonic bloccapable of developing a consensus on the future identity ofBrussels as a world city, e.g. a cosmopolitan city which

renders account of its cultural diversity, allowing amongother things the empowerment of (ethnic) neighbourhoods,or a European metropolis in the sense of a District of Europe.The absence of such a consensus explains why, e.g., the dis-cussion of the issue of the approaching extension of the EUis limited to a cordial welcome, coupled with a reassuringcalculation of the required m2 of office surface area. Theconsensus fails to occur because of the community tensionsbetween Flemings who are in the majority in Belgium andFrancophones who are in the majority in Brussels and theconfinement of the BCR to 19 municipalities as a meansof pacification. This confinement turns a large part of theinhabitants of the Brussels urban region into users instead

of residents of the metropolitan area. The residents are Bel-gians and EU citizens mainly living in the Outer City, andthe poor non-EU citizens mainly living in the Inner City.


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The latter are politically and culturally voiceless. The in-habitants of the rest of the urban region together with thecommuters from outside the urban region are not directlyinvolved in Brussels policymaking. Nonetheless they actu-ally exercise influence via the federal policymaking17 andthe strong connections between the Brussels and other politi-

cians through their membership of the same subnationalparties.18 In these circumstances the forming of a hegemonicbloc able to think of Brussels as being a world city becomesa Sisyphean task. The Democratic Front of French-speakers(a formation of Brussels interest groups which seeks to pre-serve the French character of Brussels) has the plurality in anumber of municipalities and forms since 1995 an alliancewith the Liberal Reformation Party on the regional level,being by far the largest political group in the BCR. TheWalloons have chosen Namur as their capital. The Flem-ings nourish a distrust of the big city, that goes back tothe Christian-democratic policies pursued from the end of

the 19th century, which were directed at the preservation ofthe values of the Christian family and at the protection ofthe working class against socialism.19 The chain migrationwhich contributes in a not inconsiderable way to the increaseof the number of poor non-EU residents strengthens cultural(ethnic and religious) conservatism (Lesthaeghe et al., 2001,pp. 2829). The situation is worsened by the rise of extreme-right wing parties which show electoral success especially inthe cities on the basis of an anti-urban programme directedagainst cultural diversity. The National Front may remaina small party, crumbling away after its relative success in1995, but the Flemish Bloc (which has won the pluralityin Antwerp, the largest city of Flanders) has become the

largest Flemish party in the BCR (Table 9). The Burgess-likeproblems and the rise of right extremism necessitate a visionon Brussels that should be more than a mere frameworkfor physical planning. However, as political things stand,the elaboration of such a vision is something like trying tosquare the circle.

Conclusion

In terms of metropolitan government, Brussels is a specialcase due to the embeddedness of the capital city in the

Belgian socio-spatial fault lines. When the Brussels CapitalRegion was created, the institutional structure was largelyinfluenced by the complex equilibrium between the Flemishand the Francophone communities. Inside the Region, theDutch speaking population is a well protected minority andthis is balanced on the national level by equal political powerfor the French speaking population despite its minor demo-graphic weight. Another, related, source of the Brusselspeculiarities is the joint effect of the development of the cap-ital city and the very strong postwar suburbanization processin Belgium. When Brussels became the Capital of Belgiumin 1831, the elite was completely French speaking, whateverthe geographical origin or social class of its members. Thus

Flanders had an urban French speaking bourgeoisie and theDutch language (at that time merely a collection of localdialects) was regarded as the language of the lower class.

Brussels grew rapidly both as a consequence of the indus-trial revolution and the development of the Belgian stateand many immigrants in the city became French speaking.This process of acculturation has been overwhelming untilthe 1960s when Flanders experienced a strong economic im-pulse through foreign investments and saw the emergence of

a more self-conscious Flemish elite.Since the Brussels Capital Region forms an enclave in

the Flemish Region, the suburbanization of French speakingmiddle class households outside the urban agglomerationmeans that Flemish territory is gradually turned into Frenchspeaking area, a question to which the Flemings are verysensitive since they fought during several generations fortheir cultural emancipation and equal rights for the Dutchlanguage in the Belgian state. The Flemish majority at thenational level, would never agree with the extension of theBrussels Capital Region, because it would mean the con-version of a Flemish into a bilingual territory.20 This makes

the creation of any form of government of the Brusselsmetropolitan area a very difficult task.One more socio-political problemis further complicating

the issue. The 800,000 inhabitants of the Brussels metropol-itan area living outside the Brussels Capital Region, are intheir large majority there as a result of suburbanization. Inthe Belgian context, this means their presence results from adeliberate choice to leave the city for an open, but socio-economically very homogeneous middle class residentialenvironment. They are in other words city users but no citydwellers any more. The long history of anti-urban feelingsin Belgium (Kesteloot and De Maesschalck, 2000) helps tounderstand they are not prepared for great solidarity with the

inner city inhabitants. In fact they use the city without payingfor it since they pay their taxes in the Flemish or the WalloonRegion. Enlarging the territory of the Brussels Capital Re-gion to encompass the whole metropolitan area would thusmean to strengthen the political parties that tend to managethe city more according to the interests of its users than tothose of its inhabitants, or more for the urban periphery thanfor the heart of the city.

Considering the rather rigid character of the limits of theBrussels Capital Region, the salient political problem is thatBrussels, like the other large cities in Belgium, continuesto loose affluent inhabitants, despite the temporarily slow-

down of the suburbanization process during the crisis and theweak signs of gentrification during the postfordist revival.The remaining population increasingly becomes poorer inrelative terms. In the long run, this undermines the finan-cial basis of the urban government, both at the regional andthe municipal level. Brussels appears in a complex catch 22situation. In order to have more financial means to sustainexpansion, to fight the urban divisions, to develop urbanprojects, Brussels has to bring middle class households tothe city. But exactly this policy will have negative effects onthe poor (social displacement and overconcentration in thepoorest neighbourhoods), reinforce socio-spatial polarisa-tion and will ask for even more financial means (and space)to restore the fiscal basis. This negative cycle could onlybe broken by interregional solidarity, which could easily be


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justified by the fact that suburbanization creates three typesof negative redistribution of financial means for the BrusselsCapital Region and its municipalities. Indeed selective out-migration means a relative rise in poverty in the centre andcreates more needs; the same process creates less incomefor the Region and for its 19 municipalities since a large part

of it depends on local taxes on personal income of their in-habitants and on land income; the suburban population usescollective amenities in the centre for which it does not pay.Thus the city in its present state appears as socially unstableas long as more solidarity within the metropolitan com-munity is not achieved. But in turn this would imply a veryunlikely form of political voluntarism from the politiciansrepresenting the suburban population (today they tend to ex-plain the problems of the large cities more in terms of theirlack of competitiveness than in terms of the socio-economiceffects of suburbanization). In such a situation, one couldpredict a more repressive city. The confrontation between

poor and rich, inhabitants and customers of the city offers noopportunities for confrontation, negotiation and consensusabout a common urban future if the latter turn their backto the urban problems. The response to growing tensions ismore repression, in order to secure the use of the inner cityby the suburbans. Ironically, the costs of repression wouldbe borne by the city itself, not by the suburban city users.Such a gloomy scenario could only be broken up by a strongurban project, calling for the support of all members of themetropolitan community.

Notes

1 The residual rent sector is composed of old dwellings, inwhich the owners do not invest anymorebecause the originalinvestment costs are already recovered (Kesteloot, 1986). Itis the only segment of the housing market which is access-ible to households who cannot pay the prices asked in theother sectors of the housing market or who are excluded forsome reason from the social housing sector (less than 8% ofthe total supply of dwellings in Brussels).2 The most vulnerable labour market in Cookes classi-fication for spatially discontinuous labour markets (illegalimmigrants, criminalized, male and female non-citizens,

located in regional-metropolitan and primate city ethnicenclaves, inner city; main determinants: demand forsweated labour, growth of informal or black economy)(Cooke, 1983, p. 223).3 More accurately, Brussels is the seat of the Council (to-gether with Luxemburg), of the Parliament (together withStrasbourg), of the Commission, of the Economic and So-cial Committee and of the Committee of the Regions. Asa number of these institutions are located in Etterbeek, itmay be argued that Brussels means the BCR rather thanthe municipality.4 Federations of municipalities at the edge of the BrusselsAgglomeration have also been set up, but they were abol-

ished in 1976. The Brussels Agglomeration still exists as aninstitution possessing legal personality. Consequently, whenthe BCR adoptsregulations concerning the above-mentioned

responsibilities, she acts not as a federated entity, issuingordinances, but as an agglomeration, issuing by-laws.5 The first area on the continent to adopt the industrial re-volution was located in Wallonia, whereas Flanders waslargely a economically backward area until the end of the19th century.6 A special act requires a majority of votes in both linguisticgroups of both Chambers of Parliament and a 3/4 majorityof total votes.7 Constitutive autonomy means that the communities andregions are entitled to regulate themselves some aspectsof the election, the composition and the functioning oftheir councils and executives. Only the Flemish Parliament,the Walloon Regional Council and the French CommunityCouncil possess constitutive autonomy.8 In 1963 the average taxable income per inhabitant in theBrussels agglomeration was 60% higher than the Belgianaverage, in 1975 it was 28% higher, in 1985 6%, in 1995

it was 7% lower (Kesteloot, 1999, p. 167).9 In the Walloon Region the share of the transferred taxesin the regional revenue increased from 10 to 29%, in theFlemish Community/Region from 7 to 17% (Boon et al.,2002, actuele ontwikkelingen, nr.1).10 15% of the full unemployed entitled to a benefit inBelgium live in the BCR. 38% of them are foreigners (Min-isterie, 2001, pp. 50, 54).11 Brussels possesses a seaport, accessible to ships weighingup to 4,500 tonnes. Shipping traffic amounts to 5.9 milliontonnes. The port provides 12,000 jobs, of which 8,000 directjobs (http://www.brussel.irisnet.be).12 Public transport by train is organized by the National

Company of Belgian Railways and part of the Brussels pub-lic transport by bus is organized by the Flemish and Walloonpublic transport companies.13 Brussels is by far the leading city in the world meas-ured in number of secretariats of international organizations(Elmhorn, 1998, p. 94). With 159 embassies and 2500diplomats it is the second largest diplomatic city in theworld (http://www.brussel.irisnet.be). It appears to be a betaworld city in the GaWC-roster of world cities. FollowingSassen, the GaWC-ranking uses corporate service criteria(the presence of global legal services and global servicesin accountancy, advertising and banking) and results in a

classification of 10 alpha, 10 beta and 35 gamma world cities(Beaverstock et al., 1999) (GaWC stands for Globalizationand world cities study group and network, based in Lough-boury University, Department of Geography). For anotherassessment of the position of Brussels in the European in-termetropolitan competition, see Vandermotten et al., 1999;Vandermotten, 1999.14 To call this a national (European) urban growth coalitionin the sense of Terhorst and van de Ven, 1995 would be agreat exaggeration (see also Swyngedouw, 1999). For therole of real estate agents, property developers and speculat-ors (which may include public interest organizations, suchas the National Society of Belgian Railways), see Timmer-mans, 1991; Decorte, 1992.15 Of course the BCR also disposes of instruments to tackle


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all kinds of problems separately, but a discussion of theseinstruments is outside the scope of this article.16 The (yet to be realized) regional express network is anetwork of fast trains intended to facilitate commuting andother traffic covering an area even larger than the Brusselsurban region.17 The bilingual region of Brussels-Capital and the districtof Halle-Vilvoorde in the Flemish Region form a single con-stituency for the federal elections.18 There are no national parties in Belgium. Also the non-regionalist parties are either Flemish or Francophone.19 These policies promoted individual property and facilit-ated commuting. Together with the absence of an efficienturban planning, they must be held responsible for the excess-ive proportions of suburbanization in Belgium (Kesteloot,1999).20 But see also Terhorst and Van de Ven (1997) for a moregeneral explanation of the internal fragmentation and the

external confinment of Brussels.

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