(c) crown copyright

Catalogue Reference:CAB/129/92 Image Reference:0027

Printed for the Cabinet. April 1958

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued

for the personal use of

T O P S E C R E T C o p y N o .

C. (58) 77 10th April. 1958

C A B I N E T

A N G L O - A M E R I C A N R E L A T I O N S

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I c i rcu la te a p a p e r on the effects of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e on the l o n g - t e r m interests of the Un i t ed K i n g d o m , toge the r wi th a s u m m a r i s e d version ( A n n e x ) , w h i c h has b e e n p r e p a r e d in m y D e p a r t m e n t .

2. In view of the de ta i led re fe rences in the p a p e r t o the J o i n t W o r k i n g - G r o u p m a c h i n e r y es tab l i shed at the t ime of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s visit t o W a s h i n g t o n

in O c t o b e r 1957, I w o u l d ask tha t th is p a p e r be h a n d l e d w i th the u t m o s t d iscre t ion a n d t ha t its c i r cu la t ion b e severely res t r i c ted .

3. I wou ld not suggest tha t this p a p e r shou ld b e p laced o n the Cab ine t a g e n d a o r be the subjec t of a n y fo rmal d iscuss ion by Min is te r s . If, however , any of m y co l leagues have a n y c o m m e n t s t o m a k e o n thfc p a p e r I s h o u l d be very g lad t o receive t h e m fairly s o o n , in o r d e r t h a t I m a y t a k e t h e m i n t o a c c o u n t in cons ider ing the ac t ion to b e t a k e n to i m p l e m e n t t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s in p a r a g r a p h 38 (a) a n d (c) of the pape r .

Foreign Office, S.W.1, 9th April, 1958.

T H E E F F E C T S O F A N G L O - A M E R I C A N I N T E R D E P E N D E N C E O N T H E L O N G - T E R M I N T E R E S T S O F T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M

A . — D E F I N I T I O N

I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is bo th a fact a n d a pol icy. It is a fact not only in A n g l o - A m e r i c a n re la t ions bu t in the m u t u a l re la t ions of all n o n - C o m m u n i s t coun t r i e s . T h e r e a r e t w o sides t o this . T h e first is t ha t all sovere ign Sta tes h a v e a lways been to s o m e ex ten t i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , e.g., in t r a d e , a n d tha t t h e g rowing complex i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l life is rap id ly d imin i sh ing the ex ten t to wh ich they c a n act w i t h o u t affecting and being affected by the ac t ions of o t h e r P o w e r s . T h e s econd is tha t the p re sen t C o m m u n i s t th rea t is such tha t all n o n - C o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s a r e d e p e n d e n t u p o n each o the r ' s mil i tary, pol i t ical a n d e c o n o m i c s t r eng th in o r d e r t o resist it. T h e e x t e n t t o wh ich the s econd po in t is recognised varies f rom c o u n t r y to c o u n t r y , a n d , wi th it, t he wi l l ingness of each G o v e r n m e n t t o a d o p t i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as a policy. T h e r e a r e a lso, e.g., in E u r o p e , consc ious a n d de l ibe ra t e m o v e m e n t s t o w a r d s un i ty wh ich a re to s o m e ex ten t i n d e p e n d e n t of these t w o fac tors .

2. T o a d o p t i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as a pol icy is to recognise i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as a fact and to d e c i d e t o p r o m o t e it as the only m e a n s of p rogress a n d safety. I t involves t ak ing a p rocess which is h a p p e n i n g a n y w a y a n d t u rn ing it to a d v a n t a g e by e x t e n d i n g , acce le ra t ing and p roc l a iming it. It was this decis ion tha t the U n i t e d States and the U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t s t o o k at the W a s h i n g t o n ta lks in O c t o b e r 1957.

B . - S C O P E

3. T h e Pres iden t and the P r i m e Min i s t e r in tended this pol icy to b e e x t e n d e d to the i r f r iends a n d allies a n d c o n t e m p l a t e d its u l t ima te ex tens ion to the en t i r e free w o r l d . ("'" T h e coun t r i e s of the F r e e W o r l d a re i n t e r d e p e n d e n t a n d on ly in genu ine p a r t n e r s h i p can p rogress a n d safe ty b e f o u n d F o r ou r p a r t we h a v e ag reed t ha t o u r t w o coun t r i e s will hence fo r th act in a c c o r d a n c e wi th this p r inc ip le W e bel ieve t h a t t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s we h a v e r eached will be increas ing ly effective as they b e c o m e m o r e w i d e s p r e a d b e t w e e n the free n a t i o n s . " D e c l a r a t i o n of C o m m o n Purpose . ) But t h e s cope of this p a p e r is conf ined t o the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . T h e r e a re th ree r e a s o n s for t h i s : ­

(a) A l t h o u g h the c o m m u n i q u e issued a t the end of the N A T O mee t ing in D e c e m b e r e n d o r s e d the pr inc ip le of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , the U n i t e d K i n g d o m has no t yet u n d e r t a k e n a n y n e w c o m m i t m e n t s t o N A T O in p u r s u a n c e of this pr inc ip le . S o m e m a y e m e r g e la ter , e.g., in the p o o l i n g of scientific and technica l r e sources for defence p u r p o s e s , in the app l i ca t i on of the d o c t r i n e of b a l a n c e d col lect ive forces a n d the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a single A i r Defence for E u r o p e , bu t it is no t ye t poss ib le to foresee their f o r m a n d t h e impl i ca t ions for U n i t e d K i n g d o m in te res t s wh ich they will ca r ry . T h e s a m e c o n s i d e r a t i o n appl ies wi th even g r e a t e r force t o o u r o t h e r al l iances and connec t i ons .

(b) W h e r e a s the pol icy of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e w a s i m m e d i a t e l y pu t i n t o effect w i th the se t t ing u p of W o r k i n g P a r t i e s in W a s h i n g t o n , i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e in the N A T O s p h e r e is still a p r inc ip le r a t h e r t h a n a p r o g r a m m e . Because of this a n d b e c a u s e the A n g l o - A m e r i c a n d e c l a r a t i o n c a m e first, t h e r e is an impres s ion in s o m e q u a r t e r s in E u r o p e t ha t A n g l o - A m e r i c a n c o - o p e r a t i o n is m o r e i m p o r t a n t to t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m t h a n N A T O c o - o p e r a t i o n a n d tha t we a r e d e t a c h i n g ourse lves f rom the c o n t i n e n t in o r d e r to b e c o m e exclus ively t h e first l i e u t e n a n t of the U n i t e d S ta t e s . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t p r e s e n t s p r o b l e m s for U n i t e d K i n g d o m pol icy w h i c h are a d i rec t resul t of A n g l o -A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a n d need e x a m i n a t i o n in tha t c o n t e x t .

(c) A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is likely to h a v e m o r e f a r - r each ing effects o n U n i t e d K i n g d o m in te res t s t h a n a n y m o r e gene ra l l i n k - u p

for a t least t w o r e a s o n s . F i r s t , w h e r e two par t ies a l o n e are c o n c e r n e d , dec i s ions c a n b e t a k e n secre t ly a n d qu ick ly , a n d t h e p r o c e s s of in te r lock ing c a n go a h e a d m o r e r a p i d l y and t h o r o u g h l y t h a n w h e r e a d o z e n o r m o r e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s h a v e to be p e r s u a d e d or cajoled in to a g r e e m e n t . S e c o n d l y , t h e r e a l r e a d y exists a l onge r t r a d i t i o n o-. assoc ia t ion a n d a g r e a t e r fund of m u t u a l t rus t b e t w e e n the U n i t e d S ta t e s a n d the U n i t e d K i n g d o m t h a n b e t w e e n a n y o t h e r co l lec t ion of S ta tes . I n the intell igence" field, in pa r t i cu l a r , t h e r e l a t i ons b e t w e e n o u r respec t ive o r g a n i s a t i o n s h a v e b e c o m e increas ing ly c lose.

C . — T H E R E S U L T S O F T H E W A S H I N G T O N T A L K S

4 . In the p r e sen t wor ld s i t u a t i o n , the U n i t e d S ta tes and t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m h a v e in a n y case been d e p e n d e n t u p o n each o t h e r for s o m e t ime . T o s o m e e x t e n t th is d e p e n d e n c e has b e e n one - s ided , for a t b o t t o m we h a v e n e e d e d the U n i t e d S ta t e s m o r e t h a n they us , b u t the b a l a n c e h a s b e e n at least pa r t i a l l y r e s to red by R u s s i a n technologica l a d v a n c e s wh ich h a v e m a d e A m e r i c a n bases in Br i t a in (and e l sewhere ) essent ia l to t h e h o m e defence of the U n i t e d S ta tes and h a v e p e r h a p s a l so u n d e r m i n e d A m e r i c a n conf idence in the i r t echnolog ica l self-sufficiency. Since i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e was a l r e a d y so fa r a d v a n c e d , w h a t c h a n g e s h a v e the W a s h i n g t o n t a lks in fact b r o u g h t a b o u t ?

5 . T h e a n s w e r is. at least superf icial ly , a g r e a t e r r ecogn i t i on b y the A m e r i c a n s of t h e fact of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a n d a g r e a t e r wi l l ingness to a d o p t it as a po l icy . T h e p rac t i ca l resu l t s h a v e b e e n : —

(a) T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e W o r k i n g G r o u p s , cove r ing defence , pol i t ica l , e c o n o m i c a n d i n f o r m a t i o n p r o b l e m s . T h e r e n o w exists , for t h e first t i m e s ince the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , m a c h i n e r y for the c o n t i n u o u s jo in t e x a m i n a t i o n of ce r t a in i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s , w h i c h c a n be e x t e n d e d to dea l wi th n e w p r o b l e m s as they ar i se (as has a l r e a d y b e e n d o n s in t h e case of I n d o n e s i a ) . T h r o u g h it we shou ld be ab le to e n s u r e —

(i) in gene ra l , t ha t w e have a g r e a t e r k n o w l e d g e of w h a t A m e r i c a n policy o n a n y m a j o r p r o b l e m is, t h o u g h the F a r E a s t and mi l i t a ry s t ra tegy a r e l ikely to b e excep t ions and w e c a n n o t expec t t h e A m e r i c a n s to b e over -consc ien t ious a b o u t k e e p i n g us i n f o r m e d ;

(ii) tha t o u r views a r e k n o w n to t h e m ; (iii) t ha t we h a v e a chance of inf luencing A m e r i c a n policy at its

f o rma t ive s tages .

(b) T h e d r a w i n g u p of p l a n s for the poo l ing of b ra ins a n d re sources in the field of de fence and for the a l loca t ion of r e sea rch a n d p r o d u c t i o n t a sks .

(c) T h e U n i t e d S ta tes u n d e r t a k i n g t o seek ce r ta in a m e n d m e n t s t o the A t o m i c E n e r g y Act .

(d) T h e e n g a g e m e n t of U n i t e d S ta tes in teres t in t h e de fence of H o n g K o n g .

6. T h e a b o v e list s h o w s t h a t i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is by n o m e a n s c o m p r e h e n s i v e as yet , e i ther as an a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o r even a n objec t ive . M o s t of it is still a h o p e for t h e fu ture , a n d t he re h a s b e e n n o p o o l i n g of defence re sources yet. O n t h e e c o n o m i c s ide we shall ce r t a in ly w a n t t o a i m a t a g rea t e r d e g r e e of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e in fu tu re . Whi l e o u r e c o n o m i c re la t ions wi th the U n i t e d Sta tes a re in m a n y respec t s i n t i m a t e and cons t ruc t i ve , r ecen t con tac t s wi th t h e p re sen t U n i t e d S ta tes A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a v e s h o w n t h a t there is a cons ide rab l e g a p beween the t h i n k i n g of t hose r e spons ib le for t h e d i r ec t ion of Un i t ed Sta tes e c o n o m i c pol icy a n d t h e wel fa re of t h e s ter l ing a r e a .

7. T h e r e is a t p resen t n o r e a s o n t o d o u b t tha t t h e U n i t e d S ta tes G o v e r n m e n t a r e s incere in the i r i n t en t ion t o m a k e a success of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . P r o v i d e d the re fo re t h a t the m o m e n t u m is m a i n t a i n e d ( p a r a g r a p h 10 below) w e m a y expec t consu l t a t i on a n d c o - o r d i n a t i o n of policy to go on ove r a n ever - inc reas ing r a n g e of subjec ts , a n d o u r effort, pa r t i cu la r ly as r e g a r d s defence , t o b e c o m e increas ing ly in te r locked wi th tha t of t h e U n i t e d S ta tes .

D . - T H E I M P L I C A T I O N S O F I N T E R D E P E N D E N C E

(a) T h e A d v a n t a g e s 8. T h e r e is n o d o u b t tha t in the m a i n the Un i t ed K i n g d o m s t a n d s to ga in

g rea t ly f r o m this p r o c e s s : — (i) T h e Un i t ed Sta tes is so much the mos t powerful na t ion in the W e s t e r n

c a m p tha t o u r abil i ty to h a v e o u r w a y in the wor ld d e p e n d s m o r e t h a n any th ing else u p o n o u r influence u p o n her to act in c o n f o r m i t y wi th o u r in teres ts . Aga ins t her oppos i t i on we can d o very little (e.g., Suez) a n d o u r need for A m e r i c a n s u p p o r t is a fact which we c a n n o t ignore . It follows t ha t o u r pol icy shou ld cer ta in ly be to p u t ourse lves in t h e posi t ion in which we c a n elicit f rom her the g rea tes t poss ib le s u p p o r t . T h e policy of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is well des igned t o achieve this a im .

(ii) O u r re la t ionsh ip wi th the U n i t e d Sta tes plays a g rea t p a r t in o u r r e l a t i onsh ip wi th th i rd coun t r i e s . W e s t a n d to lose if we a p p e a r , t o th i rd c o u n t r i e s , e i ther t o be a satell i te o r t o be o u t of t o u c h wi th t h e U n i t e d S ta t e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , wi th a g r e e m e n t o n b o t h s ides t o differ o n ind iv idua l po in t s , gives us t h e best pos i t ion we c a n h o p e to have .

(iii) It is only to the g o o d tha t there s h o u l d be an agreed A n g l o - A m e r i c a n pol icy in , e.g., the Midd le E a s t , i n s t ead of t w o policies pu l l ing in different d i rec t ions . T h i s is t r ue even if c o - o r d i n a t i o n m e a n s s u b o r d i n a t i n g o u r o w n interes ts a t least in non-essen t ia l m a t t e r s ; t he force for s tabi l i ty a n d secur i ty wh ich s u c h a pol icy will p r o v i d e is well w o r t h m i n o r sacrifices, t h o u g h if a n agreed pol icy is to have real i ty t he r e will have t o b e A m e r i c a n concess ions t oo .

(iv) O n the defence s ide , we s t a n d to gain cons ide rab ly f rom A m e r i c a n techn ica l i n f o r m a t i o n a n d resources .

(v) I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e in m a n y cases m e a n s tha t the m o n e y w e spend and t h e effort w e m a k e p r o d u c e very m u c h m o r e v a l u a b l e resu l t s . If we ac t a lone o u r efforts and resources m a y no t b r i n g c o m m e n s u r a t e benefi ts . Ac t ing wi th the U n i t e d Sta tes we far m o r e of ten get full va lue o r even m o r e for ou r efforts.

(h) Poss ib le D i s a d v a n t a g e s 9. T h e r e a re h o w e v e r a n u m b e r of poss ib le a n d ac tua l difficulties t o be

o v e r c o m e . T h e y m a y b e d iv ided in to t w o c la s ses : — T h e difficulties of keep ing u p the m o m e n t u m of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a n d the d a n g e r s of

its a b a n d o n m e n t b y e i ther s i de ; T h e d a n g e r s of b e c o m i n g or s eeming to b e c o m e a n A m e r i c a n sate l l i te .

(i) Keeping up the momentum 10. T h e pol icy of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e to s o m e ex ten t goes

aga ins t the gra in for b o t h sides. C o n s u l t a t i o n is i r k s o m e a n d c o - o p e r a t i o n of ten i nconven i en t . T h e admin i s t r a t i ve m a c h i n e in W a s h i n g t o n is u n u s e d a n d i l l -adap ted in m a n y respects to c o - o p e r a t i o n of a n y k i n d . W e m u s t m o r e o v e r a lways b e p r e p a r e d for shocks a n d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s i nhe ren t in the h ighly p e r s o n a l n a t u r e of t h e U n i t e d Sta tes a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; we c a n never a s s u m e t h a t the A m e r i c a n m a c h i n e will w o r k wi th a well-oiled cohes ion a n d t h e o p e r a t i o n of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , the re fore , m a y be subjec ted to a n n o y i n g and a p p a r e n t l y cap r i c ious i n t e r r u p t i o n s for wh ich some t imes there will be n o i m m e d i a t e r emed ie s . T h e n a t u r a l t e n d e n c y of all n e w ini t ia t ives , w h i c h involve e x t r a w o r k , to flag a n d t h e n d ie will t he re fo re be agg rava t ed . I t will be of the grea tes t i m p o r t a n c e to p r even t this h a p p e n i n g , b e c a u s e if it does w e shall c o n t i n u e to incur t h e u n p o p u l a r i t y wh ich is b o u n d to resu l t in s o m e q u a r t e r s f r o m the belief t h a t we are in a special r e l a t i o n s h i p w i th t h e U n i t e d S ta tes , whi le ceas ing to enjoy the benefi ts . W e shall t h u s get the wors t of b o t h w o r l d s .

11. H o w is this t e n d e n c y to b e o v e r c o m e ? T h e first w a y is t o k e e p t h e m a c h i n e r y of consu l t a t i on con t inuous ly fed wi th a c o n s t a n t flow of subjec ts for d iscuss ion and to m a k e the fullest use of t h e n o r m a l c h a n n e l s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n — i.e., F o r e i g n Office, U n i t e d Sta tes E m b a s s y a n d Bri t ish E m b a s s y - S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . W h e n , for any r e a s o n , it is des i red to b r i n g in a wider circle of D e p a r t m e n t s o n t h e Br i t i sh o r A m e r i c a n s ide, or w h e n , for a n y o t h e r r e a s o n , these c h a n n e l s a r e n o t

a p p r o p r i a t e , t hen full use s h o u l d be m a d e of the W o r k i n g G r o u p m a c h i n e r y . It is n o t h o w e v e r necessary o r des i rab le t o refer every p r o b l e m to a W o r k i n g G r o u p . T h e y are chiefly useful w h e r e W a s h i n g t o n D e p a r t m e n t s o t h e r t h a n the S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t (e.g., C . I .A. a n d Pen tagon) a re involved . O the rwi se n o r m a l E m b a s s y c o n t a c t s a r e a d e q u a t e a n d indeed qu icke r . It is also the case t ha t , as s o o n as ac t i on is needed , a n y i m p o r t a n t dec is ion has t o be t a k e n u p a n d o u t of the W o r k i n g G r o u p level. But, s ince the c o n t i n u e d ex is tence of this pa r t i cu la r m a c h i n e r y is for us a n i m p o r t a n t end in itself, it will be des i r ab le to let it deal wi th as m a n y of the real crises as poss ib le , a n d , w h e r e o t h e r t r e a t m e n t is necessary , t o r e t u r n t h e h a n d l i n g of t h e p r o b l e m to it at t he ear l ies t poss ible m o m e n t . Th i s involves foresight a n d p l a n n i n g .

12. T h e s econd way is t o ex tend the m a c h i n e r y so as to m a k e c o n s u l t a t i o n a h a b i t u a l r eac t ion to a n y p r o b l e m in the widest possible circle wi th in bo th g o v e r n m e n t a l m a c h i n e s . In p a r t i c u l a r it w o u l d be useful t o d o this in the case of F a r E a s t e r n ques t i ons , w h e r e the conflict be tween the two foreign pol icies t o w a r d s C h i n a r educes effective c o - o p e r a t i o n (see p a r a g r a p h 23 belo\v)7 I t will the re fore b e v a l u a b l e to i n t r o d u c e n e w subjec ts for d iscuss ion, no t on ly in o r d e r t o c o - o r d i n a t e po l i cy u p o n t h e m but a lso to i n t r o d u c e n e w peop le to c o n s u l t a t i o n . In add i t ion t o civil ian c o n s u l t a t i o n b e t w e e n the E m b a s s y and the S ta t e D e p a r t m e n t , it might b e for c o n s i d e r a t i o n w h e t h e r we s h o u l d seek to i n t r o d u c e a m e a s u r e of mi l i tary c o n s u l t a t i o n , w h i c h migh t in d u e c o u r s e lead t o i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e c o - o r d i n a t i o n of mi l i t a ry p lans . T h i s is a subject o n w h i c h there a re g a p s in o u r k n o w l e d g e of U n i t e d S ta tes t h ink ing .

13. It will a lso be des i rab le to w i n d u p w o r k i n g g r o u p s as s o o n as they s t o p b e i n g useful. W e s h o u l d e n s u r e t ha t the p a t t e r n of ou r consu l t a t i on c h a n g e s wi th the w o r l d s i tua t ion .

14. W e m u s t , h o w e v e r , recognise tha t h o w e v e r h a r d we w o r k to k e e p u p the m o m e n t u m , i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e has ce r t a in l imi ta t ions . In the last ana lys i s , t h e policies of H e r Majes ty ' s G o v e r n m e n t a n d the U n i t e d S ta tes A d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e p e n d on the s u p p o r t of pub l i c and p a r l i a m e n t a r y (or congress iona l ) op in ion . T h i s m a y l imit the abi l i ty of the t w o G o v e r n m e n t s to f o r m u l a t e and p u r s u e joint pol icies . It will be v e r y difficult for the S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t t o over r ide ob jec t ions in C o n g r e s s in o r d e r t o al ign the i r pol icy w i t h ou r s . N o r w o u l d it b e easy for H e r Majes ty ' s G o v e r n m e n t t o b e r e a d y to defend a pol icy wh ich r a n c o u n t e r t o publ ic o p i n i o n o n the g r o u n d s t h a t it w a s t h e necessa ry c o n s e q u e n c e of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .

15. T h e r e is t h e re la ted q u e s t i o n of cons t i tu t iona l a n d legislat ive l imi ta t ions . I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is p r e s u m a b l y l imi ted to s o m e ex ten t by t h e U n i t e d States C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d by poss ib le difficulties b o t h he re and in the U n i t e d S ta tes of e n a c t i n g n e w legis la t ion a n d r epea l ing or modify ing exis t ing legis lat ion (e.g., the M a c M a h o n Act) w h e r e this is necessa ry to give p rac t i ca l express ion to i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .

(ii) The Dangers of Abandonment 16. H o w e v e r f irmly t h e p r e sen t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s of the U n i t e d S ta tes and

t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m are c o m m i t t e d to t h e policy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , t h e r e is a lways a risk tha t the i r successors m a y wish to a b a n d o n it. I t is no t necessa ry he re t o cons ide r t h e pos i t i on of t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m if such a dec is ion c a m e f rom this s ide , for it w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y only be t a k e n if it we re c o m p a t i b l e wi th t h e na t i ona l in teres t in t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the t ime . But it is poss ible t h a t a U n i t e d S ta tes A d m i n i s t r a t i o n host i le o r indifferent to this c o u n t r y migh t a t s o m e t ime c o m e to p o w e r , o r t ha t the d e v e l o p m e n t of i n t e r - con t inen ta l missiles m igh t conce ivab ly lead t h e U n i t e d S ta tes t o a d o p t a pol icy of " F o r t r e s s A m e r i c a , " o r t ha t a c h a n g e of G o v e r n m e n t in this c o u n t r y migh t h a v e a f u n d a m e n t a l a n d d a n g e r o u s resu l t for the A n g l o - A m e r i c a n p a r t n e r s h i p . A U n i t e d Sta tes w i t h d r a w a l f rom A n g l o - A m e r i c a n c o - o p e r a t i o n w o u l d h a v e ser ious c o n s e q u e n c e s for this c o u n t r y .

17. T h e y w o u l d be pa r t i cu l a r ly se r ious in the field of n u c l e a r c o - o p e r a t i o n , if, for e x a m p l e , the A m e r i c a n s w i t h d r e w f rom thei r p re sen t pol icy of co l l abo ra t i ng o n ques t i ons c o n c e r n i n g t h e nuc l ea r side of d i s a r m a m e n t a n d nuc l ea r tests . It is h igh ly i m p o r t a n t t o us t ha t the A m e r i c a n s , w h o a re far a h e a d o n w e a p o n d e v e l o p m e n t , shou ld no t agree to t h e cessa t ion of tests unless they h a v e m e a n w h i l e so revised the A t o m i c E n e r g y A c t t ha t t hey can and will give us t h e fruits of all the i r d e v e l o p m e n t w o r k so far.

18. T h e r e a re two sides to this ques t ion . O n the one h a n d , the fur ther the p rocess of in ter locking had g o n e , pa r t i cu la r ly in the fields of defence a n d the p ro tec t ion of ou r essential interests overseas , the m o r e A m e r i c a n w i t h d r a w a l wou ld leave us helpless. It mus t be recognised tha t in a pa r tne r sh ip be tween t w o Powers of very unequa l s t r eng th , it is far m o r e ser ious for the weake r t han for the s t ronge r if t he p a r t n e r s h i p conies to an e n d . A l t h o u g h the A m e r i c a n s as well as w e s t a n d to ga in a g o o d deal from in t e rdependence in technical and o the r fields, t h e Uni ted S ta t e s can , so to speak , u n d e r w r i t e the c o m m i t m e n t which co -ope ra t i on wi th us r ep re sen t s for t h e m , while the Un i t ed K i n g d o m c a n n o t . F u r t h e r , it a p p e a r s a t p re sen t t ha t the Uni ted States will n o t in fact, to any significant degree , c a r ry t h r o u g h the joint a l l o tmen t of tasks to the po in t at which a n y i m p o r t a n t task is o u r sole respons ib i l i ty ; they a re likely to m a i n t a i n the full a p p a r a t u s r e q u i r e d by an i n d e p e n d e n t coun t ry . T h e Un i t ed K i n g d o m in all p robabi l i ty c a n n o t afford to d o th i s—indeed o n e of the pr inc ipa l a d v a n t a g e s of i n t e rdependence from o u r po in t of v iew is tha t we shall no t have to . But this m e a n s tha t the a b a n d o n m e n t of the p re sen t policy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e wou ld have far m o r e ser ious c o n s e q u e n c e s for u s t h a n for the A m e r i c a n s .

19. O n the o the r h a n d , t h e fu r the r the p rocess of in te r locking goes , t he less p r o b a b l e A m e r i c a n w i t h d r a w a l will become . If i n t e rdependence is t o b e c o m e rea l , the risk is one we mus t accept , bu t the m o r e real it b e c o m e s , the m o r e t h e r isk will d imin ish . In the first p iace t h e A m e r i c a n s , given their genera l ly decen t w a y of th ink ing , wou ld be less likely to w i t h d r a w if they realised tha t b y do ing so they wou ld put us in a hopelessly d a n g e r o u s pos i t ion . Secondly , as long as the wor ld s i tua t ion r ema ins m o r e o r less as it is at p resent , it wou ld clearly b e agains t the U n i t e d S ta tes ' o w n interest to let us be ser iously weakened . Th i rd ly , in spite of the cons ide ra t ions out l ined in the last p a r a g r a p h it should be poss ib le for us to engage t h e U n i t e d Sta tes so deeply in i n t e rdependence tha t w i t h d r a w a l wou ld be ser iously inconvenien t for t h e m , a n d the m o r e this is done , t h e smal ler the d a n g e r will be . If on the o the r h a n d we t ry t o g u a r d aga ins t it by m a k i n g rese rva t ions to o u r pol icy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and by seeking not to c o m p r o m i s e o u r essential in teres ts , we shall e n d a n g e r the policy itself.

20. T h e conc lus ion to be d r a w n f rom this is t ha t there is n o hal f -way house b e t w e e n a degree of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e so slight as no t to be real ly i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e at all, a n d involving ourse lves so closely wi th the A m e r i c a n s t ha t w i t h d r a w a l on e i the r s ide will in fact cease to be prac t ica l policy. Whi le b o t h courses h a v e the i r d a n g e r s , the la t te r seems to be the only poss ible one to choose .

(iii) The clangers of becoming an American Satellite 2 1 . T h e Uni ted K i n g d o m , in its relat ively weak pos i t ion , is a l r eady grea t ly

d e p e n d e n t u p o n U n i t e d S ta tes s u p p o r t . It wou ld be surpr is ing if the U n i t e d States d id no t exact a price for this s u p p o r t , and to s o m e extent she does so. T h e policy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e will necessar i ly increase the ex ten t to which the U n i t e d Sta tes can m a k e us p a y for this s u p p o r t , for the m o r e we rely u p o n t h e m , t h e m o r e w e shall be hur t if they wi thho ld it.

22. T o o m u c h need no t be m a d e of this s ince it does no t seem at p resen t t h a t t he r e a r e m a n y i m p o r t a n t fields in w h i c h A m e r i c a n and Brit ish policies conflict a n d in wh ich we migh t be forced to give way . I n d e e d , if there h a d been m a n y such cases , t h e D e c l a r a t i o n of C o m m o n P u r p o s e cou ld h a r d l y have been issued, but t h e ques t i on m a y arise, e.g., over B u r a i m i .

23 . T h e r e is a lso the conflict of British and A m e r i c a n policies over C h i n a . Whi i e we could b r ing o u r policy in to line wi th tha t of the A m e r i c a n s , to d o s o w o u l d cause poli t ical difficulties at h o m e , p ro long t h e s t a l ema te over C h i n a a n d d imin i sh U n i t e d Sta tes respect by m a k i n g it a p p e a r tha t we were willing to sacrifice o u r firmly-held views in o r d e r t o o b t a i n the i r favour . W e m u s t therefore face the fact tha t whi le w e shou ld consul t fully over C h i n a , a g r e e m e n t c a n n o t a t present b e r e a c h e d and t ha t this mus t l imit t h e ex t en t of the co -ope ra t i on in the F a r Eas t .

24. Th i s aspect of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n re la t ions will r equ i re careful w a t c h i n g . But the re is n o reason to d o u b t t ha t we shou ld be able to hold o u r o w n w h e n A n g l o - A m e r i c a n in teres ts d iverge , p rov ided t ha t we m a k e clear t o the U n i t e d S ta tes , w h e n necessary , t h a t a l t h o u g h i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is the c o r n e r s t o n e of o u r pol icy, w e c a n n o t be expec ted to sacrifice all o u r o t h e r in teres ts to it.

(iv) The danger of exclusive Anglo-American interdependence 25. Since ou r in teres ts and t h o s e of the U n i t e d S ta tes d o not in fact m u c h

d iverge , there is re la t ively little d a n g e r of a s i t ua t i on ar is ing in wh ich we h a v e to c h o o s e be tween b reak ing a w a y a n d b e c o m i n g an A m e r i c a n sate l l i te . But the d a n g e r of (i) seeming t o b e c o m e one , and (ii) s eeming to t ry to set u p a n exclus ive A n g l o -A m e r i c a n re l a t ionsh ip , is grea ter . If we give this impress ion we shall suffer on t w o c o u n t s :

(a) we shall d a m a g e o u r re la t ions wi th o u r o t h e r f r iends , pa r t i cu l a r ly the E u r o p e a n s ;

(b) we shall lose influence wi th the A m e r i c a n s themse lves , because this d e p e n d s u p o n the extent of o u r inf luence e l sewhere .

T H E UNITED KINGDOM AND HER OTHER FRIENDS

26. O u r re la t ions wi th o u r fr iends m a y be cons ide red u n d e r th ree h e a d s : —

The Commonwealth

27. H e r e the p r o b l e m is not acute . So long as we c o n t i n u e full c o n s u l t a t i o n a n d c o - o p e r a t i o n wi th t h e m , the C a n a d i a n s a re no t likely to th ink of us in this l ight o r w o r r y o v e r m u c h a b o u t this possibi l i ty . T h e i r anx ie ty is the r eve r se—tha t the U n i t e d Sta tes a n d the U n i t e d K i n g d o m migh t one d a y d iverge so far tha t C a n a d a h a d to c h o o s e b e t w e e n t h e m . T h e s a m e appl ies to A u s t r a l i a a n d N e w Z e a l a n d . In genera l for all three the c loser the U n i t e d K i n g d o m is to the U n i t e d S ta tes , t he be t te r . S o u t h Afr ica is p r o b a b l y n o t in te res ted . P a k i s t a n we l comes A n g l o - A m e r i c a n sol idar i ty . W i t h Ind ia , C e y l o n and p r o b a b l y also G h a n a and M a l a y a , the pos i t ion is r a t h e r different. P a r t of t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m ^ s t r eng th in S o u t h a n d S o u t h - E a s t As ia der ives f rom t h e fact t ha t we are n o t r e g a r d e d there as ident if ied w i th the U n i t e d Sta tes . T h e U n i t e d S ta tes a re widely r ega rded as b rash , bel l icose a n d dominee r ing , and t he re is a t e n d e n c y ( m a r k e d a t the t ime of the I n d o - C h i n a crisis in 1954) to respect the U n i t e d K i n g d o m for not s h a r i n g these qua l i t i e s . Ind ia a n d Cey lon at least are l ikely to reserve j u d g m e n t ove r A n g l o -A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , to like it if it s eems t ha t we a re increas ing o u r influence o v e r the A m e r i c a n s and to disl ike it if it seems t ha t they a re increas ing the i r inf luence over us.

Western Europe

28. H e r e the p r o b l e m is m u c h m o r e se r ious , in t ha t the re is a l r eady a w i d e s p r e a d feeling in E u r o p e t ha t the re a r e t w o a l t e rna t ive policies for the Un i t ed K i n g d o m , to en te r E u r o p e a n d to s t and ou t s i de it in a n " A n g l o - S a x o n " c l ique , and t ha t , by a d o p t i n g the policy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , we h a v e p l u m p e d for the second . I t is n o t so m u c h t ha t we a r e r e g a r d e d as h a v i n g o p t e d to b e c o m e a n A m e r i c a n sa te l l i t e ; the E u r o p e a n s c o u l d accept th i s even if they reg re t t ed it. W h a t they resen t is the impress ion tha t we a r e t ry ing to s t a n d a p a r t f r o m b o t h A m e r i c a a n d E u r o p e and to profi t at t h e e x p e n s e of b o t h by a r r o g a t i n g to ourse lves a special pos i t i on in A m e r i c a n eyes by v i r tue of o u r w o r l d pos i t i on . T h i s is a m i s c o n c e p t i o n of " i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e " w h i c h v/as i nven ted as a n e x p a n d i n g r a t h e r t h a n as an exclus ive idea, bu t t h e r e a r e g o o d r easons for its a p p e a r a n c e . T h e susp ic ion t ha t Br i t a in is s t a n d i n g aloof f r o m E u r o p e a n d is indifferent o r even hos t i le to E u r o p e a n un i ty is an o ld one . T h e fact tha t we , a lone of the W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n P o w e r s , h a v e m a d e the h y d r o g e n b o m b , j o ined t h e A m e r i c a n nuc lea r d i r e c t o r a t e a n d a re n o w seeking to p r e v e n t a n y " four th c o u n t r y " f r o m possess ing it, impl ies to m a n y E u r o p e a n s , especial ly t h e F r e n c h , tha t we a re seeking to es tabl i sh a n d m a i n t a i n a two-level P o w e r sys tem in the free wor ld , wi th Bri ta in a n d A m e r i c a in c o m m a n d and the rest in the r a n k s . T h e r e is also t h e susp ic ion t h a t the U n i t e d K i n g d o m is t ry ing to edge out of he r c o m m i t m e n t to m a i n t a i n t r o o p s on the C o n t i n e n t . F ina l ly , the first m a j o r act of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n c o - o p e r a t i o n after the W a s h i n g t o n talks w a s to supp ly a r m s t o T u n i s i a , an ac t ion in wh ich we a p p e a r e d to be over - r id ing the wishes and u n d e r m i n i n g t h e in teres ts of the F r e n c h . These , and o t h e r fac tors , h a v e u n f o r t u n a t e l y a d d e d u p to c r ea t e t h e impre s s ion at the p resen t t ime in m a n y influential q u a r t e r s in E u r o p e tha t i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is a e u p h e m i s m for an exclusive A n g l o - A m e r i c a n l ine -up i n v e n t e d for o u r o w n p r iva t e c o n v e n i e n c e , and t h a t ta lk of its e x p a n s i o n is hypoc r i sy .

IAS H

29. A l t h o u g h susp ic ions of t o o close A n g l o - U n i t e d S ta tes sol idar i ty will p r o b a b l y a lways exist , especial ly in F r a n c e , the present e x t r e m e mani fes ta t ion of this feeling may p r o v e to b e compara t ive ly shor t l ived, p rov ided we recognise its d a n g e r s a n d act accord ing ly . F o r it would indeed be d a n g e r o u s for the Uni ted K i n g d o m a n d for the Wes te rn wor ld as a who le if this impress ion were a l lowed to g r o w a n d to persist . A s far as the Uni ted K i n g d o m is conce rned , we c a n n o t afford t o bui ld u p a pos i t ion as the First L i eu t enan t of the Uni ted S ta tes in a w a y which severely d a m a g e s o u r pos i t ion in E u r o p e . T h e emergence of the S i x - P o w e r c o m m u n i t y m a k e s this d a n g e r m o r e acu te . Playing o u r p rope r pa r t in E u r o p e , we shou ld be an inva luab le ally to the U n i t e d States . Isolated from E u r o p e , o u r va lue , a n d therefore our influence, wou ld fall a w a y very great ly . Unless we are careful , it is poss ib le tha t a s i tua t ion might ar ise in which , if Britain were isolated from the pol i t ical l eadersh ip of E u r o p e , the Uni ted Sta tes might , in spite of i n t e r -dependence , dea l direct with E u r o p e over o u r heads .

The Rest

30. Slightly different cons ide ra t ions app ly to o u r o t h e r f r iends, e.g., the m e m b e r s of the Baghdad Pac t , s ince here the d a n g e r is the m o r e s t r a igh t fo rward o n e of s eeming to be an A m e r i c a n satell i te. W h i l e they a re glad to see the Un i t ed K i n g d o m a n d the Uni ted S ta t e s pul l ing toge ther they would be sor ry to see the U n i t e d S ta tes in c o m p l e t e con t ro l . But in such a s i tua t ion they wou ld cer ta in ly t ransfer the i r a l legiance whol ly to the U n i t e d Sta tes and in any c o n s e q u e n t a r r a n g e m e n t s be tween t h e m a n d the A m e r i c a n s , U n i t e d K i n g d o m interes ts might be ignored .

T H E UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES

3 1 . It follows f rom this that o u r influence wi th the A m e r i c a n s will a m o n g o the r th ings d e p e n d u p o n the ex t en t of o u r influence e l sewhere and t h a t we shall e scape a p p e a r i n g t o b e c o m e a satell i te on ly by pu t t ing ourse lves in a posi t ion t o increase it. Such a pos i t ion o n o u r pa r t , m o r e o v e r , wou ld surely be we l come to t h e U n i t e d Sta tes . I n d e e d the A m e r i c a n s have a lways w e l c o m e d moves des igned to d r a w t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m closer to E u r o p e , a n d w o u l d have i iked t h e m to have been m o r e n u m e r o u s and far - reaching t h a n has been poss ible h i the r to . T h e d a n g e r s of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n exclusiveness indeed d o no t der ive from the A m e r i c a n a t t i t ude to i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e at all. P rov ided they a re conv inced tha t o u r des i re is genuinely to b r ing the free wor ld toge ther a long agreed A n g l o - A m e r i c a n l ines, and no t t o i m p r o v e o u r o w n pos i t ion by p laying off o u r va r ious fr iends aga ins t each o the r , they a re l ikely to w e l c o m e a n y moves which will e n h a n c e o u r genera l pres t ige a n d inf luence a n d thus enab le us "to m a k e a dis t inct ive c o n t r i b u t i o n to the un i ty of the free wor ld .

(c) C o n c l u s i o n 32. If the a b o v e analysis is b road ly accep ted , it a p p e a r s t ha t one of the U n i t e d

K i n g d o m ' s pr inc ipa l p r o b l e m s in the con tex t of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , b o t h in the long a n d in t h e shor t t e r m , is to avoid the a p p e a r a n c e of seeking to set u p a n exclusive A n g l o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t ionsh ip o r of b e c o m i n g an A m e r i c a n satel l i te , a n d to s t r e n g t h e n ra the r t h a n w e a k e n o u r ties wi th o u r o t h e r f r iends— i .e . , to p lay a n act ive p a r t in t h e widen ing of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . H o w is this to be d o n e ?

33. T h e i m m e d i a t e a n d p e r h a p s the ma in p r o b l e m is in E u r o p e . W e h a v e t o c o n v i n c e the E u r o p e a n s , and pa r t i cu la r ly the F r e n c h , tha t we are no t t ip toe ing o u t of E u r o p e , a n d t ha t we are not p r o p o s i n g to deser t the i r in teres ts in o r d e r to conso l i da t e o u r pos i t i on as A m e r i c a s exclusive p a r t n e r . T h e two p r inc ipa l b o n e s of c o n t e n t i o n at p r e s e n t a re the w i t h d r a w a l of forces f rom G e r m a n y a n d the F r e e T r a d e A r e a . I t is difficult to assess their c o m p a r a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e in E u r o p e a n eyes, b u t it seems c lear t h a t it is necessary to e x a m i n e w h a t concess ions the U n i t e d K i n g d o m can afford to m a k e in o r d e r t o s t r eng then a posi t ion in E u r o p e w h i c h h a s de t e r io ra t ed bad ly over the last few m o n t h s . It is fair t o say t h a t t h e m a i n ­t e n a n c e of Bri t i sh forces o n the C o n t i n e n t a n d a firm a t t i t ude t o w a r d s R u s s i a n p r o p o s a l s for t h e neu t ra l i sa t ion of E u r o p e , t oge the r wi th o u r wil l ingness to mee t t h e in teres ts of t h e Six in the F r e e T r a d e A r e a negot ia t ions a re the t o u c h s t o n e by w h i c h o u r a t t i t u d e to E u r o p e will be tested in E u r o p e a n eyes d u r i n g the next few m o n t h s . In the i m m e d i a t e fu ture , however , we shall h a v e to press on wi th the F r e e T r a d e A r e a nego t i a t ions , desp i te F r e n c h desires for d e l a y — a n d concess ions will h a v e to be m a d e o n b o t h sides before we c a n es tabl ish a r ight re la t ion w i th E u r o p e in the long t e r m .

34. T h e ques t i on also a r i s e s : is it a lways in the best interests of the Un i t ed S ta tes a n d the Un i t ed K i n g d o m toge the r tha t we s h o u l d speak and ac t in c o n c e r t ? Cases m a y ar ise in the fu ture in which o u r jo int in teres ts may be be t te r served by o n e o r the o t h e r act ing indiv idual ly . If, for e x a m p l e , the cohes ion of the A t l an t i c C o m m u n i t y is in ques t ion , there m a y well be occas ions on which it will be be t t e r p r e s e r v e d if t he Un i t ed K i n g d o m behaves as a E u r o p e a n r a t h e r than as an " A n g l o -S a x o n " m e m b e r . Similar ly , in S o u t h a n d S o u t h - E a s t Asia the Wes t as a w h o l e m a y ga in if t he Un i t ed Sta tes a n d the Un i t ed K i n g d o m , as c i r cums tances d ic ta t e , a d o p t a d ivergent t one . P rov ided tha t the U n i t e d K i n g d o m a n d the Un i t ed S ta tes r e m a i n f u n d a m e n t a l l y in p a r t n e r s h i p , it m a y b e be t t e r that s incere d i s ag reemen t s h o u l d be publ ic ly reflected t h a n tha t o n e s ide shou ld d r o p its o w n view in the c a u s e of u n b r o k e n un i ty .

35. Such d ive rgence should only be a l lowed to h a p p e n af ter consu l t a t i on , a n d , if possible , by a g r e e m e n t . It m a y seem difficult to a l low for it whi le p rese rv ing full c o - o p e r a t i o n ove r the long t e r m . But it m a y be observed tha t bo th sides a r e in a n y case a l r eady p lay ing this g a m e . T h e Uni t ed S ta tes abs ta ined from vot ing in t h e Un i t ed N a t i o n s d e b a t e over C y p r u s , p r e s u m a b l y in o r d e r to m a i n t a i n their pos i t i on in the eyes of Greece a n d of t h e an t i -Co lon ia l Power s ; t h e d e b a t e t ook p l ace after the W a s h i n g t o n ta lks . Similar ly we a d o p t a d ivergen t l ine ove r C h i n a a n d s t ra teg ic con t ro l s , it is highly des i rab le , b o t h in o u r own pr iva te in teres ts , a n d in t hose of the Un i t ed K i n g d o m and the U n i t e d S ta tes toge ther , t h a t we shou ld c o n t i n u e to reserve the right to speak a n d act i n d e p e n d e n t l y o n occas ion . By do ing so we m a y be ab le t o d o m u c h t o w a r d s p reserv ing a n d p r o m o t i n g o u r prest ige as a P o w e r in o u r o w n right .

36. In conc lus ion , it must be s ta ted t h a t t h e policy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e p r o b a b l y c a n n o t , if t h e Un i t ed K i n g d o m ^ essential in teres ts a re t o be p rese rved , p r o d u c e g rea t savings in m o n e y . Whi le we h o p e in t h e long t e rm t h a t the c o n c e p t of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e will b r ing us cer ta in e c o n o m i e s t h r o u g h the sha r ing of b u r d e n s w h i c h a re t o o h e a v y for us to ca r ry a lone , it will necessar i ly involve us in m a k i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o w a r d s the execu t ion of ag reed policies if we a re t o m a i n t a i n a n y subs t an t i a l influence over the A m e r i c a n s a n d o u r o t h e r friends in a r e a s w h e r e we h a v e i m p o r t a n t in teres ts .

37. Th i s is no t t o say tha t the U n i t e d K i n g d o m c a n n o t afford i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , it is p e r h a p s the only pol icy to hold ou t hopes of the s tabi l i ty a n d secur i ty w i t h o u t wh ich we c a n n o t p rosper . It is a necessary inves tmen t and t h o u g h it will not be c h e a p o r easy to m a k e , it could if w e p lay it right br ing us grea t benefi ts .

E . - R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

38. I t is r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t : —

(a) A s tudy shou ld be m a d e of w a y s a n d m e a n s of ex t end ing A n g l o - A m e r i c a n in te r lock ing in the field of pol icy p l a n n i n g , wi th special re fe rence to the possibi l i ty of e x t e n d i n g poli t ical c o n s u l t a t i o n to F a r E a s t e r n p r o b l e m s , t h o u g h full a g r e e m e n t c a n n o t be r eached over C h i n a ( p a r a g r a p h s 11, 12 a n d 23).

(/;) T h e possibi l i ty migh t a lso be cons ide red of i n t r o d u c i n g a m e a s u r e of mi l i ta ry consu l t a t i on ( p a r a g r a p h 12).

(c) A s t udy shou ld b e m a d e of poss ible ini t ia t ives which the U n i t e d K i n g d o m could t a k e in o r d e r t o s t r e n g t h e n he r pos i t ion in the res t of t h e w o r l d a n d to inc rease h e r inf luence as a n " i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , " wi th special re ference to E u r o p e ( p a r a g r a p h s 32 and 33).

A N N E X

T H E E F F E C T S O F A N G L O - A M E R I C A N I N T E R D E P E N D E N C E O N T H E L O N G - T E R M I N T E R E S T S O F T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M : S U M M A R Y

A.—Def in i t ion T o a d o p t i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as a pol icy is t o recognise i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as a

fact a n d to dec ide to p r o m o t e it as the only m e a n s of p rogress a n d sa ie ty . It involves t ak ing a p r o c e s s wh ich is h a p o e n i n a a n y w a y a n d t u r n i n g it t o a d v a n t a g e by ex t end ing , acce le ra t ing a n d p roc l a iming it. It was this decis ion t ha t the Un i t ed Sta tes a n d U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t s t o o k at the W a s h i n g t o n ta lks in Oc tobe r , 1957.

B .—Scope 2. T h e Pres iden t a n d the Pr ime Min i s t e r conce ived i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as

ex tend ing to the en t i r e free wor ld . But the s cope of this p a p e r is conf ined to A n g l o -A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e b e c a u s e : ­

(a) vve have s o far u n d e r t a k e n no new c o m m i t m e n t s as p a r t of the policy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , excep t wi th the A m e r i c a n s ;

(b) A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e has a l r eady c rea t ed p r o b l e m s for Un i t ed K i n g d o m pol icy in re la t ion to E u r o p e :

(c) A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is likely to affect the U n i t e d K i n g d o m m o r e t h a n a n y m o r e genera l l i nk -up .

C . - T h e Resu l t s of the W a s h i n g t o n T a l k s 3. T h e W a s h i n g t o n ta lks have a p p a r e n t l y b r o u g h t a b o u t a g r ea t e r r ecogni t ion

by the A m e r i c a n s of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as a fact a n d a g r ea t e r wil l ingness to a d o p t it as a pol icy. T h e p rac t i ca l resul ts h a v e b e e n : —

(a) T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e W o r k i n g G r o u p s . T h e r e n o w exists , for the first t i m e s ince the Second W o r l d W a r , m a c h i n e r y for the c o n t i n u o u s jo in t e x a m i n a t i o n of i n t e rna t iona l p r o b l e m s .

(b) T h e d r a w i n g u p of p l ans for the p o o l i n g of b r a i n s and resources for defence .

(c) T h e U n i t e d S ta tes u n d e r t a k i n g t o seek ce r ta in a m e n d m e n t s to the A t o m i c E n e r g y A c t .

(d) T h e e n g a g e m e n t of U n i t e d S ta tes in teres t in the defence of H o n g K o n g .

4. A l t h o u g h mos t of the a b o v e is still a h o p e for t h e fu ture , a n d e c o n o m i c c o - o p e r a t i o n falls far s h o r t of the ideal , there seems n o r e a s o n to d o u b t U n i t e d States s incer i ty . P r o v i d e d the m o m e n t u m is m a i n t a i n e d ( p a r a g r a p h 10 below) we m a y expec t c o n s u l t a t i o n a n d c o - o r d i n a t i o n of pol icy to g r o w a n d o u r effort, pa r t i cu la r ly as r e g a r d s defence , to b e c o m e increas ing ly in t e r locked w i th tha t of the U n i t e d Sta tes .

D . — T h e A d v a n t a g e s of I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e 5. T h e U n i t e d S ta t e s occupies a pos i t ion of such p o w e r , t h a t we need t o

p u t ourse lves in a p o s i t i o n to elicit f r o m he r the g rea tes t poss ib le s u p p o r t . T h e pol icy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is well des igned to achieve this a im.

6. Visible A n g l o - A m e r i c a n c o - o p e r a t i o n e n h a n c e s o u r inf luence, p rov ided t h a t we c o n t i n u e t o u p h o l d ou r o w n d ive rgen t v iew o n occas ion .

7. I t is on ly to the g o o d t h a t t he r e s h o u l d b e a jo in t A n g l o - A m e r i c a n pol icy, e.g., in t h e M i d d l e E a s t , r a t h e r t h a n t w o policies pul l ing in different d i rec t ions! E v e n from a pu re ly n a t i o n a l po in t of v iew un i ty is w o r t h m i n o r sacrifices.

8. O n the defence side we s t and to gain f rom A m e r i c a n k n o w l e d g e a n d r e sou rce s .

9. Jo in t efforts will p r o d u c e g r ea t e r va lue for m o n e y .

2 ( 3 Jc

E . — P o s s i b l e D i s a d v a n t a g e s

(a) The difficulty of keeping up the momentum 10. C o n s u l t a t i o n is i r k s o m e a n d c o - o p e r a t i o n often i nconven ien t . T h e

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a c h i n e in W a s h i n g t o n is i l l - adap ted to i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , pa r t i cu la r ly because of its highly p e r s o n a l n a t u r e . T h e r e is t h u s a d a n g e r tha t this new ini t ia t ive will Hag. If it does we shal l cease to get the benefits of close c o - o p e r a t i o n while still i n c u r r i n g o d i u m , e.g., in E u r o p e , b e c a u s e of the belief that it exists (see p a r a g r a p h 17 below).

11. T o p reven t this we mus t d o th r ee t h i n g s : —

(i) K e e p the m a c h i n e r y of consu l t a t i on cons t an t ly fed with a flow of subjec ts for d iscuss ion m a k i n g full use of n o r m a l E m b a s s y c o n t a c t s , a n d , w h e r e a p p r o p r i a t e , of the W o r k i n g G r o u p s ;

(ii) E x t e n d t he m a c h i n e r y so as t o m a k e consu l t a t i on a hab i tua l p rac t i ce in the wides t poss ib le circles in W a s h i n g t o n (in pa r t i cu la r it w o u l d be useful to d o this ove r F a r E a s t e r n p r o b l e m s and p e r h a p s mi l i tary c o n s u l t a t i o n ) ;

(iii) W i n d u p W o r k i n g G r o u p s as s o o n as they s t o p being useful.

12. But we must recognise t ha t t he r e a re limits t o the poss ible ex ten t of pol icy c o - o r d i n a t i o n . Publ ic o p i n i o n o n bo th sides a n d cons t i t u t iona l difficulties in the U n i t e d S ta tes a re l imit ing fac tors . I t w o u l d not b e easy for H e r Majes ty ' s G o v e r n m e n t t o defend a n u n p o p u l a r policy as a necessary c o n s e q u e n c e of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .

(b) The clangers of abandonment 13. T h e r e is a lways a risk t ha t a fu tu re U n i t e d Sta tes A d m i n i s t r a t i o n m a y

wish t o w i t h d r a w f rom i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . T h i s w o u l d h a v e far m o r e se r ious c o n s e q u e n c e s for the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , pa r t i cu la r ly in the nuc lea r field, t h a n for t h e U n i t e d S ta tes .

14. But the fu r the r in te r lock ing goes , the iess likely such a w i t h d r a w a l will b e c o m e . T h e A m e r i c a n s w o u l d p r o b a b l y no t willingly p u t us in a hopeless ly d a n g e r o u s s i t ua t ion by a b a n d o n i n g u s ; it w o u l d not be in the i r o w n interest to d o s o ; a n d , in sp i te of the d i spa r i ty of o u r r e sources , we shou ld be ab le to engage t h e U n i t e d S ta tes so deep ly in i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e that w i t h d r a w a l w o u l d be at least se r ious ly inconven ien t for t h e m .

15. W e shou ld the re fo re seek to involve ourse lves so closely wi th t h e A m e r i c a n s t ha t w i t h d r a w a l o n e i ther s ide ceases to be prac t ica l pol icy.

(c) The danger of becoming an American Satellite 16. A l t h o u g h i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e will inc rease t h e effectiveness of the p r e s s u r e

A m e r i c a c a n exer t o n us if she wishes , t he d a n g e r of h a v i n g to sacrifice o u r in te res t s t o h e r s is no t g r e a t . T h e in te res t s of t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s d o not g rea t ly d ive rge a n d w e s h o u l d be ab le to m a k e c lear tha t , whi le i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is indeed f u n d a m e n t a l t o o u r pol icy , we c a n n o t b e e x p e c t e d t o sacrifice all o u r o t h e r in te res t s t o it.

(d) The danger of exclusive Anglo-American interdependence 17. If we give the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t w e a re b e c o m i n g an A m e r i c a n sa te l l i te

o r t ry ing t o set u p a n exc lus ive A n g l o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i onsh ip , we shal l d a m a g e o u r r e l a t i ons w i th o u r o t h e r f r iends , p a r t i c u l a r l y the E u r o p e a n s , a n d the re fo re lose in f luence w i t h t h e A m e r i c a n s t hemse lves . As far as o u r o t h e r f r iends a r e c o n c e r n e d : —

(i) The "old" Commonwealth w o u l d no t b e u n d u l y w o r r i e d a b o u t th is , so long as we c o n t i n u e d full c o n s u l t a t i o n and c o - o p e r a t i o n w i th t h e m . In the i r v iew, t he closer w e a re to the U n i t e d S ta te s , t he be t t e r . O u r re la t ions wi th t h e " n e w " C o m m o n w e a l t h h o w e v e r w o u l d suffer if t hey t h o u g h t t h a t A m e r i c a n inf luence over u s h a d g r o w n m o r e t h a n o u r inf luence ove r the U n i t e d S la tes .

(ii) Western Europe w o u l d not objec t so m u c h to o u r s eeming to b e c o m e an A m e r i c a n sate l l i te as to o u r c l a iming a specia l p l a c e as A m e r i c a ' s p r i n c i p a l al ly b y v i r t ue of o u r wor ld pos i t ion . T h e r e is a l r e a d y a w i d e s p r e a d susp ic ion t h a t we a r e " t ip- toe ing " o u t of E u r o p e in o r d e r t o d o t h i s ; o u r n u c l e a r po l icy , t h e w i t h d r a w a l of s o m e U n i t e d K i n g d o m

m forces f rom G e r m a n y a n d a r m s for T u n i s i a h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d to it. T h i s is d a n g e r o u s , s ince , i so la ted from E u r o p e , o u r va lue to the U n i t e d S ta tes w o u l d fall a w a y very g rea t ly and we might find t h e A m e r i c a n s , in spi te of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , dea l ing direct wi th E u r o p e ove r o u r h e a d s ,

(iii) The rest of o u r f r iends , e.g., t h e m e m b e r s of t h e B a g h d a d Pact , a r e no t very sensi t ive a b o u t o u r c l a iming a special pos i t ion . But if they t h o u g h t the A m e r i c a n s to be in c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l , they wou ld t r ans fe r the i r a l leg iance whol ly to t h e U n i t e d S ta t e s a n d o u r in teres ts migh t c o n s e q u e n t l y be ignored .

18. It follows f rom p a r a g r a p h 17 a b o v e t ha t o u r influence wi th t h e A m e r i c a n s largely d e p e n d s u p o n o u r influence e l s ewhere . O n t h e w h o l e , a n y inc rease in the l a t t e r will be w e l c o m e to the A m e r i c a n s . T h e y h a v e a lways u r g e d us t o d r a w c loser t o E u r o p e . I n d e e d t h e d a n g e r s of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n exc lus iveness clo no t ar ise f rom the A m e r i c a n a t t i t u d e at all, a n d they w o u l d w e l c o m e a n y moves which will i m p r o v e o u r gene ra l p re s t i ge a n d inf luence.

F . — C o n c l u s i o n s

19. O u r p r o b l e m s a r e : — (a) t o m a i n t a i n a n d ex t end the m a c h i n e r y of c o n s u l t a t i o n ; (b) t o e n g a g e the A m e r i c a n s so deep ly in i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e t ha t w i t h d r a w a l

ceases t o be p rac t i ca l p o l i c y : (c) t o avoid the a p p e a r a n c e of b e c o m i n g an A m e r i c a n satel l i te a n d , m o r e

pa r t i cu la r ly , of seek ing to es tabl ish an exclusive A n g l o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t ionsh ip .

20. (c) a b o v e is p e r h a p s the mos t i m m e d i a t e p r o b l e m . It a m o u n t s t o b a l a n c i n g o u r c loser r e l a t i o n s h i p w i th the U n i t e d S ta t e s by a closer r e l a t i onsh ip wi th o u r o t h e r f r iends, i.e., p lay ing an act ive pa r t in the w iden ing of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . I t app l ies pa r t i cu l a r ly to E u r o p e w h e r e we are at p resen t u n d e r a c l o u d . T h e t w o p r inc ipa l b o n e s of c o n t e n t i o n a r e the F r e e T r a d e A r e a a n d t h e w i t h d r a w a l of forces f rom G e r m a n y , a n d we need to e x a m i n e w h a t concess ions we can afford to m a k e (while m a i n t a i n i n g o u r d r ive to get the F r e e T r a d e A r e a es tab l i shed as qu ick ly as possible) in o r d e r to s t r e n g t h e n o u r pos i t ion .

2 1 . W e shou ld a lso c o n t i n u e to m a i n t a i n ou r o w n v iewpoin t w h e r e Bri t ish a n d A m e r i c a n policies d iverge o n i m p o r t a n t ques t i ons . Whi le m i n o r sacrifices a r e w o r t h w h i l e in the cause of un i ty ( p a r a g r a p h 7 above) it is in ou r jo int in teres t t h a t b o t h sides shou ld speak a n d act i n d e p e n d e n t l y o n occas ion .

22. T h e pol icy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is unl ikely to resul t in large sav ings of m o n e y . Whi l e we h o p e tha t it will b r ing u s e c o n o m i e s t h r o u g h the s h a r i n g of b u r d e n s w h i c h a r e t o o heavy for us to b e a r a lone , we mus t c o n t r i b u t e to t h e e x e c u t i o n of jo int policies if we a re t o m a i n t a i n a n y subs tan t i a l inf luence over t h e A m e r i c a n s and o u r o t h e r fr iends in a reas w h e r e we h a v e i m p o r t a n t in te res t s .

23 . I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is p e r h a p s the only pol icy to ho ld ou t h o p e s of the s tabi l i ty a n d p rospe r i ty w i t h o u t w h i c h w e c a n n o t p rospe r . It will no t b e c h e a p or easy , b u t if we play it r igh t , it can b r ing us great benefi ts .

G . — R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 24. I t is r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t : — (a) A s tudy shou ld b e m a d e of w a y s a n d m e a n s of e x t e n d i n g A n g l o - A m e r i c a n

in te r lock ing in the field of policy p l a n n i n g , wi th special re ference to t h e possibi l i ty of ex t end ing poli t ical c o n s u l t a t i o n to F a r E a s t e r n p r o b l e m s .

(b) T h e possibi l i ty migh t a lso b e cons ide red of i n t r o d u c i n g a m e a s u r e of mi l i t a ry c o n s u l t a t i o n ( p a r a g r a p h 11).

(c) A s tudy shou ld b e m a d e of poss ible ini t ia t ives wh ich the Un i t ed K i n g d o m cou ld t ake in o r d e r to s t r e n g t h e n her pos i t ion in the rest of t h e wor ld a n d t o inc rease h e r inf luence as an " i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , " wi th special re fe rence to E u r o p e ( p a r a g r a p h 20).