The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 16 | Issue 14 | Number 4 | Article ID 5176 | Jul 15, 2018

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Bury Me With My Comrades: Memorializing Mao's Sent-DownYouth

Magnus Fiskesjö

Abstract

Over the last decade or so, China has seen anunprecedented building boom of museums andmemorials. One curious new genre is themuseums for Mao-era "Cultural Revolution"youth "sent down" to the countryside by Maoduring the 1960s and 1970s. After Mao's death,they struggled to return to the cities. Survivingreturnees have recently established severalmuseums commemorating their suffering andsacrifice, even though the topic is politicallyfraught and the period's history is strictlycensored in official museums and histories. Onemuseum, the Shanghai Educated YouthMuseum, doubles as a memorial site and acollective cemetery for former sent-down youthwho wish to be buried together. This paperlocates these memorials and burial grounds intheir historical and political context. It alsoreflects the Shanghai institutions' copying ofthe design and architecture of the Korea andVietnam war memorials in Washington D.C.

Keywords

China, sent-down youth, museums, memorials,cemeteries

Introduction

I first discovered the Shanghai Sent-Down [orEducated] Youth Museum [Shanghai zhiqingbowuguan] on a map of the far suburbs inFengxian district, on Hangzhou Bay, about anhour by car south of the city. This new form ofinstitution, which combines museum, memorial,and cemetery — is run as a business, completewith a crematory service. This combinatory

arrangement may seem strange, but mixingcategories that elsewhere might be keptseparate isn't uncommon in today's China —compare the new Shanghai "Safari Zoo" whichconsists of a safari zoo, where you travel by caror bus; an old-style zoo with caged animals;plus, a circus(!) complete with trained animalsthat perform a classical circus show, severaltimes a day.

The sent-down youth museum is located next tofunerary offices and a cremation facility,through which the newly dead are processed ontheir way to burial lots in the huge cemetery,which in turn also functions as a memoriallandscape, dotted with statues and otherdisplays.

The train engine in Fig. 1, located at amemorial plaza in the middle of the cemetery,is a real locomotive named Youth, No. 1748 ofthe Shanghai home depot, which was used intransporting Mao's sent-down youth out toremote provinces. This engine is both anauthentic museum artifact, a decorativeadornment of the cemetery that surrounds it,and a memorial, here seen with a group ofnostalgic former sent-down youth, now middle-aged, gathering around the iconic train duringan outing.

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Fig. 1. Authentic 1960s locomotive, namedYouth. Photo: Private source, n.d.

Historical Background: Sent-Down Youth

What is usually called Mao's "sent-down" youthin English (or, sometimes, "lost" youth), isofficially called zhiqing 知青 (short for zhishiqingnian 知识青年) in Chinese, in literaltranslation "educated youth." These weremainly big-city youth, from Shanghai, Beijingand other major cities, urged and pressured byMao himself to go to the countryside to help inits revolutionary transformation and to betransformed themselves through contact with"the masses." Sometimes the term isawkwardly translated as the "rustication" ofsent-down youth.

To go to the countryside is traditionally knownin Chinese as going "down" — based on thelongstanding, common understanding of citysuperiority and rural inferiority, not just interms of convenience, lifestyle, and access toeducation, but above all in terms of a hierarchyof prestige. One goes "up" to the city. Theoriginal Mao-era formulation tried to workaround these notions with the slogan "Zhishiqingnian shangshan xiaxiang 知识青年上山下

乡," or, "Educated youth go up the mountains,and down to the countryside" (see e.g.Bernstein 1977). Here "mountains" carries anambivalent meaning, including the potentiallydesirable (in the past, lauded for prestigioustemples, as the abode of immortals, and so on).In Mao's formulation, the mountains alsosuggest challenges to be overcome.

Those who were there often speak of theexperience as simply being "sent down" (inChinese, xia fang, with connotations to older,involuntary, practices such as sendingdissidents into exile in remote places). Publicly,however, they often switch to the official termxia xiang ("going down to the countryside")which suggests they went voluntarily. In thefollowing, I will use the official translation"educated youth" in the official names ofmuseums, etc., but otherwise I will call them"sent-down youth," since I think that is whatthey were. The authorities mounted largelogistical operations to ship them out, includingspecial trains and coordination with localauthorities.

The sent-down youth were under enormouspressure to go: At the Shanghai museum, onephoto shows a People's Daily editorial using aheadline purportedly citing a youth's words:"We also have two hands. We won't stay in thecity, and eat for free!" [我们也有两只手，不在城里吃闲饭], — a kind of insidious, coercivelanguage that would have been very difficult toargue with publicly, especially as it blames cityunemployment on the unemployed youth (a.k.a.students! —"Eating for free" implies beingunemployed because lazy).

The precise total number of "sent down" youthis unclear. Most estimates suggest between 17and 20 million. The campaign started as earlyas 1955, only a few years after the founding ofthe Communist People's Republic in 1949, butpeaked during the Cultural Revolution of1966-68 before finally ending in 1980. Theconcept of sending youth to the countryside

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originated with Mao Zedong (1893-1976),during most of this period the unquestionedCommunist Party and state leader. In 1946,before seizing power, Mao is said to have senthis own son away from his revolutionarymountain base in Yan'an, to a nearby village,where he would learn from the peasants.

The notion that the youth would both bringsomething (such as technical, scientific as wellas political knowledge acquired in the city), andat the same time learn something from thecollective farmers, would be presentthroughout. (For more on these issues, on thesent-down youth, and the history of their"movement," see Bernstein 1977; Scharping1981; Pan 2003, 2006; Liu 1995, 2004, 2009;Gu et al 2009; Wang 2011; Rene 2013;Martinez et al. 2013; Bonnin 2013; Honig andZhao 2015; Yang 2003, 2016).

The phenomenon of sent-down youth partlycoincided with, but was also distinct from, theMaoist "Red Guards" (红卫兵), the loyalistyouth movement launched by Mao in 1966,during the "Cultural Revolution," as a vehicle ofpermanent revolution and as a means ofassuring a loyal support base for himself. Themost violent part of the "Cultural Revolution"was in 1966-69, when many people weretormented to death as counter-revolutionaries,and untold numbers of cultural heritage andreligious sites were destroyed. But it was notformally declared over, until Mao himself diedin 1976. (On Mao's "Cultural Revolution," thereis an even larger literature. See Wang Youqinn.d.; also the 1981 classic by Simon Leys;MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006; Eshericket al 2006; Dikötter 2016; Pang 2017; also,Rosen 1981).

The high tide of sending down city youth was in1968-69. In December 1968, Mao appealed formore youth to go out and help revolutionize thecountryside, and urged peasants and cadres toaccept them. At this time, massive numbers ofyouth were dispatched, and it was during this

time that special trains were commissioned,like that featured in Fig. 1.

There are several theories that explain whyMao wanted to send out more youth at thistime. One leading theory is that it was to put anend to the violent excesses of the Red Guardgangs that had been terrorizing the cities, inMao's name — by dispatching them to remoteplaces. Other possible (and earlier) motivationsare linked to how the movement served as asolution to under-employment in the cities cutoff from international trade, under earlyCommunist rule.

Fig. 2. Sent-down youth arriving at a rurallocation, celebrating by reading quotationsfrom Mao (Jiang Shaowu n.d.). (The date is1968, well before 1971, when Mao'sonetime chosen successor Lin Biao, seen ina proudly displayed framed photo,mysteriously vanished — an event thatshocked and shook many sent-down youthout of their Mao worship; cf. Ah Cheng2017)

From early on, the movement was presented asthe revolutionary re-education of city people —and in this regard, one can compare with PolPot’s Cambodia, which was in some ways anextreme version of Mao's China. On Pol Pot'svictory in 1975, based on a class calculus,

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Cambodian cities were altogether emptied ofpeople, who were marched to the countrysideand forced to work, for the most part inagriculture, and for the most part, regardless oftheir previous profession or expertise. Moneywas abolished, with a view towards leap-frogging to Communism (Kiernan 2008; Tyner2017).

Fig. 3. Arranged photo of sent-down youthtaking part in hard labor (canal-building?).The sign says, "Submit to re-education bypoor-lower-middle peasants; be a farmerall your life." The second part caused thegreatest anxiety in the sent-down cityyouth (From "ST: Questions About China'sCultural Revolution Answered," 2016).

In China, the overall impression is that towardsthe end, almost no-one really supported theprogram. Many of the sent-down youth werethemselves initially enthusiastic, but later lostthe fervor and the powerful sense of adventureand participation that they once harbored (cf.Ah Cheng 2017). But peasants often saw themas an extra burden, people who had to be fedand had few farming skills. Party and armyofficials, as well as educators, saw it asdisruptive (schools and universities were shutdown, etc.); and so on (cf. Shirk 1978). Theinitiative, and the responsibility for themovement, rests squarely with Mao himself.

After Mao’s death in 1976, college educationwas restored and rapidly expanded, replacing atruncated vocational curriculum set up duringthe "Cultural Revolution." Formal entranceexams re-opened in 1977. Among sent-downyouth, there was a huge surge of demand forthe right to return to home cities and catch upwith such educational opportunities. A series ofprotests took place (Yang 2009; see also Fig.23), including actions like blockading railroadsout of Shanghai, carried out by sent-downyouth on New Year furlough who weredemanding the right to return to live in thecity. Eventually, millions were able to return.The sending-down policy was formallyterminated in 1980, at which point perhaps twomillion remained in the countryside (Gold 1980;Scharping 1984). Some never returned.

In the aftermath of the movement, even amongthe returnees (most of whom were not able toresume formal study — they are also known asa "lost generation"), there were hugeoutpourings of regret, anger, nostalgia, andlingering pride, contributing to the 1980s so-called “scar literature” (shanghen wenxue 伤痕文学; Cao 2003; Wang 2011; Yang 2016).

In 1981, as a foreign student in Shanghai, Ivisited Chongming Island at the mouth of theYangtze river, where some Shanghai youth hadbeen sent (counting themselves lucky not to bedispatched to distant hard-scrabbledestinations in Heilongjiang Province in theNortheast, or Yunnan Province, in theSouthwest), but now were not permitted toleave. (The strict system regulating citydwelling permits that was in place under Maowas not relaxed until later, and is still partiallyenforced).

Meeting these short-distance sent-down youthon the state farm, I got the sense that they nowsuffered more than many others: the envy theyfelt towards my Chinese classmates waspalpable. (The island today has its ownconcrete monument memorializing the sent-

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down youth: Fig. 4).

Fig. 4. The Educated Youth Memorial Wall[知青纪念墙] in Chongming, a farawaysuburban island of Shanghai, with a largeinscription: 青春无愧 or "No Regrets for OurYouth" (Chongming County 2017).

Today, the remaining sent-down youth havecome of age, and some have passed on. Also, inthe course of China's turn to a market economyover the last few decades, many have turned tobusiness, and some have became wealthy.There has been a stream of not only novels andstories based on their experiences, but alsomovies such as female director ZhangNuanxin's remarkable 1985 feature film Qingchun ji [Sacrificed youth] (Fig. 5) . In the film, asent-down Han Chinese girl abandons her drab,Communist-era uniform, instead embracing thebeautiful feminine clothing worn andappreciated by ethnic minority girls in herarea. Because it was sparsely distributedinternationally, this film is less well knownthan, for example, Joan Chen's Xiu Xiu: TheSent-Down Girl (1998), but it deserves wideattention, and earned much praise in China forits nuanced perspective on the complexemotional world of sent-down youth (on which

more below).

Fig. 5. Poster for Zhang Nuanxin's 1985feature film Qing chun ji [Sacrificedyouth].

The Communist regime still struggles tocontain open criticism of Mao and his CulturalRevolution, which remains a major taboo. Asthe Communist Party's supreme leader, Maocannot be criticized. The fear is that criticismcould grow to threaten the Party's hold onpower. In increasingly neo-authoritarian post-Soviet Russia, it has long been difficult to erectmemorials and dedicate museum to Stalin'svictims, yet a few have been established —largely because in 1990-91, there was a clearbreak with the Communist system. In China,however, in the absence of any open reckoningwith Mao's Communism — even as the countryhas moved to a state-led capitalism dominatedby the same Party elite — there are nomemorials to the millions that perished asdirect victims of Mao or as a result of his GreatLeap Forward of 1958-60 or the CulturalRevolution (cf. Wang Youqin 2007; on officialmuseums, see Denton 2014; Fiskesjö 2015).

One dedicated private Chinese museum of theCultural Revolution was shut down in 2016(Tatlow 2016). Some private museums stillhave Cultural Revolution-era art or artifacts,including the ultra-wealthy Long Museumwhich has displayed a large collection ofCultural Revolution-era paintings in Shanghai

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as well as in Chongqing (Movius 2016), and theJianchuan Museum Cluster outside Chengduwhich is also both a sent-down youth museumand a Cultural Revolution museum (Matuszak2012; Frank 2014; on private collections ofMao-era paraphernalia like badges, seeHubbert 2006; also Barnes 2014; see Pang2017: 192-193 on collecting as a means of self-construction, both during and after the Maoera, at Jianchuan and beyond). The authoritieskeep a close watch. They have prohibited thecirculation abroad of Cultural Revolution items(see e.g.., Kaufman 2008), and the collectivememory of Mao era and the Cultural Revolutionis generally closely policed.

However, sent-down youth may have theirmuseums! This is because of the millions ofpeople involved as a "volunteer" forcesummoned by Mao, who continues to enjoyofficial status as a founding Communist father.For this reason, the topic of the sent-downyouth and their concerns and feelings, cannotbe shut down entirely. The voice-less victimscan be silenced, but Mao's volunteers — eventhough they too often have felt victimized —cannot be entirely silenced in the same way"enemies" are silenced.

Importantly, in the current era of capitalistentrepreneurship in the service of the state, inaddition to the books and movies of the 1980sand onwards there are now also TV series,websites, and even themed restaurants(Hubbert 2005) which feature the ambiance ofthe Mao era. Some of this entrepreneur-curated nostalgia forms part of a state"manufactured nostalgia" of Mao era socialism.This isn't necessarily related to the actualexperience of the aging members of the sent-down youth generation. At times, it seemsdesigned to harness and channel their existing,however mixed feelings in support of thegovernment — by covering up the anguish, andinstead emphasiz ing the undeniableenthusiasm which also did exist at the time, atleast early on. I will return to this theme in my

conclusions.

The former sent-down youth feel that by"sharing the fate of the Republic," they earnedthe right to memorialize themselves, includingto express their anguish. They think thatbecause they never protested Mao and theregime, but sacrificed their youth for therevolution and the new state, their ownexperiences and feelings (including regrets)cannot be covered up in the way that the massviolence, persecution, labor camps and killingsof others have been covered up and madetaboo.

All these aspects form part of the complexsetting in which sent-down youth haveorganized exhibits, museums, memorials, andeven cemeteries — to which we now turn.

Glimpses of Sent-Down Youth Museums

The sent-down youth museum and memorialjust outside Shanghai, China's biggest city, isprobably the most substantial such museum,but there are several more around China that Ihave not myself visited. I list some of them inan Appendix. All of these sites offer excitingopportunities for new research.

One of these, the Ningbo Educated YouthMuseum, in Ningbo city, Zhejiang Province, hasembraced the digital era and includes asophisticated web collection of artifacts ondigital display (cf. Baidu, n.d.). Like the one inShanghai, it is based in a sending city, not in areceiving rural destination.

One interesting example of a smaller museumat a rural destination is the Zhiqing yuanbowuguan 知青缘博物馆 "Links BetweenEducated Youth Museum" (Fig. 6) in ChangtaiCounty, Fujian Province (长泰县坂里乡). The"links" in the name is an emotionally chargedword that suggests auspicious connections(especially among those that happened to besent there; but also perhaps between them andthe local people).

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Fig. 6. This museum building in FujianProvince preserves murals typical of theMao era, that have otherwise disappearedalmost completely from China (ChangtaiTourism Network 2013).

Another much larger museum is the Heihesent-down youth museum, in the Aihui districtof the city of Heihe, in NortheasternHeilongjiang Province, where many fromShanghai were also sent. Like the one inShanghai, this museum is a substantialinvestment, probably with support both fromprivately wealthy sent-down youth, and thelocal government. Accordingly, this museum issometimes called the Shanghai zhiqingbowuguan — having been initiated by peoplefrom Shanghai).

In Fig. 7, we see the sumptuous openingceremony of the Heihe museum; in Fig. 8, abulldozer display; and in Fig. 9, an intriguingscene wi th v i s i tors to the museum,representing different generations taking in atraveling exhibit (also featured in Fig. 10).

The socialist-era Soviet-model bulldozer onoutdoor display was used in clearingagricultural land. But the website displayingthis (Yododo.com 2012) also shows, through ahands-on indoor diorama of life-size humanfigures, that the land was tilled using onlyhuman muscle power, without machinery ordraught animals. This is also re-enacted by

museum-goers, apparently enjoying themselves(cf. Fig. 10). For the sent-down youththemselves, the contrast between machineryand human muscle power would illustrate theirshared hardship and sacrifice as well as thecamaraderie this situation is often said to haveinvolved. For a general audience, it mightsimply signify "Progress" at all costs, an almost-incomprehensible illustration of the poverty ofthe past.

A similar primitive bulldozer is on display at theShanghai museum (alongside one of the pathsin the cemetery-garden; also etched into thememorial wall, cf. Fig. 35). At Heihe, too, thereis a locomotive such as that seen at Shanghai,indicating the iconic status of these imposingobjects associated with the journey, and withon-site labor — despite their rarity, at the time.

Fig. 7. The 2011 opening of the museum inHeihe, Northeastern China (Zhiqingbowuguan, n.d.).

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Fig. 8. Socialist-era bulldozer at themuseum in Heihe, Northeastern China(Yododo.com 2012).

Fig. 9. The national traveling exhibit,"Sharing the Fate of the Republic" ["与共和国同命运"] on show at the originatingmuseum, in Heihe, Helongjiang Province(Zhiqing bowuguan, n.d.).

Fig. 10. At one of the touring stops of thisexhibit, in Tianjin, visitors don Mao era-garb, and pretend to labor the way it wasdone then, by human draught animals.(Zhiqing bowuguan, 2014; on thecontroversies surrounding this exhibit, seeSouth China Morning Post 2015.

The smaller everyday artifacts on display in theHeihe museum, part of a government-approvedtraveling exhibit, are highly significant, andsimilarly would mean different things todifferent generations; to sent-down youththemselves, and to others. Fig. 9 shows a hotwater bottle, a bag, and clothing, all of a1960s-70s style. A grandfather appears to try toexplain the significance of these items, whichwould hold great emotional and nostalgic valuefor him, as they evoke his own experiences (thistype of bag was used back then — in theabsence of other style choices! —but not anymore). They would not mean much at all for hisgranddaughter, however: The bag would justbe another bag. It is possible to read thispicture as an indication of the wide generationgap between those whose lives were shaped byexperiences in the Mao era, and those whohave grown up in a very different time (andmight be more receptive to official re-writing ofthe history). One can readily imagine thefrustration felt by the grandpa, when realizingthe difficulty of explaining why a simple waterbottle or a green cloth bag had been so

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significant — to him.

The Shanghai Sent-Down Youth Museum

The remainder of this essay focuses on theShanghai sent-down youth museum and itssetting, drawing on my own pictures andimpressions as well as on other sources.

First, the museum building itself (Fig. 11): It isa substantial building, with museum exhibitspaces on two floors. In the background areadministrative buildings, and, further behind,the crematory where the dead are prepared forburial.

Fig. 11. Main entrance to the Shanghaimuseum (Baidu 2011).

Inside the museum, the visitor first encountersan elaborate, life-size scene with a traindeparting the station, and people sending offthe youth. This is complete with life-sized wax-figure people dressed in the garb of the day.Visitors see a station platform with relatives onone side, and the departing train on the other,full of excited youth (Fig. 12, 13).

In one picture (Fig. 12), my son Loke poseswith mannequins of the departing youth. Manyvisitors similarly take selfies and photographsin the exhibit space specially created here,

hidden just inside the main gate, instantlytransporting visitors in the know back to "thatera," cleverly launching the journey into theland of the sent-down youth.

Note the pseudo-military uniforms worn by thedeparting youth: These were common, if notuniversal, and represent the symbolic, military-style de-sexualization of Maoist youth. Theiruse in this display instantly transports thevisitors back to this era. (On the silencing ofsexuality and gender inequality issues amongsent-down youth see Honig 2003; Li 2010; Yangand Yan 2017).

The platform (Fig. 13) is full of parents andrelatives, as well as more youth waiting to besent down themselves. They are all cheeringthe departure of the train, on the opposite side.The banner says "Warmly send off the educatedyouth, going up to the mountains, down to thecountryside, to make revolution." There maywell have been an element of cheerfulness, notonly because it was expected, but as the youthwere fulfilling the command of Chairman Mao.At the same time, many parents, and someyouth, would have been deeply worried aboutthe fate of the departing youth. (Compare thesomber faces of young women departing fromShanghai to Yunnan in the real-life exhibitphoto captured in Fig. 14; as well as the sadscene rendered in statue form at the memorialwall, in Fig. 35). To me, these not-yet censoredimages conveying sadness but testify to therelative freedom granted to the sent-downyouth in shaping the displays to reflect theirown conflicted feelings and memories.

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Fig. 12. The train is about to leave thestation. Photo by the author, 2015.

Fig. 13. The painstakingly recreated trainplatform, representing the real-life Pengpu

Station (in Shanghai's far suburbs). Photoby the author, 2015.

Fig. 14. Inside the exhibit: Somber, real-life faces of departing youth. Photo by theauthor, 2015.

Inside the museum halls, visitors encounter aseries of evocative photo exhibits tracing theexperiences of the sent-down youth from citylife, to the journey, their life in remote rurallocations, and the eventual return of many, atleast, to the cities. In addition, there aremultiple life-size recreations of rural life andlabor of the sent-down youth.

Fig. 15 and 16 show another train display a bitfarther into the exhibit. It is an open car wagonin which visitors can sit down and relive theanxious and excited feeling of the long journey,

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which often would take many days. The picturehere again includes my then-11 year old son,Loke, sitting on the hard seats of this trainexhibit (Fig. 15). Also visible are a series of era-appropriate museum exhibit props: army-stylewinter coats, a bag, and a suitcase, cookingutensils, as well as a broad wash basin forpersonal hygiene and laundry. Inside thecarriage, a modern-day digital display has beenadded (Fig. 16) specifying that this is the traindeparting Shanghai at ten o'clock in themorning of November 13, 1969, with Sankeshu,Harbin, in distant northeast China, as thedestination. From there, passengers wouldhave continued by truck or other means,eventually reaching remote, pre-planned finaldestinations in rural areas.

Fig. 15. Train carriage display, interior.Photo by the author, 2015.

Fig. 16. Train carriage display, interior,with the 1969 departure time (Baidu Tieba2011).

Fig. 17. Sent-down youth arriving at a newhome. In a main exhibit hall. Photo by theauthor, 2015.

As a representation of the final leg of theoutward journey, Fig. 17 shows several wax-figure young men riding and pushing a push-cart full of their belongings, en route to theirremote destination. A hot water bottle sticksout from the pile — an essential life-line item,

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again in the style that was ubiquitous then, butis rarely seen nowadays. The winter hats alsosuggest the harsh environment. The boys carrya banner which cites one of Mao's mostfrequently quoted key pronouncements: "WideOpen Land; Great Contributions" — Mao hadused these phrases about the vastness ofChina's countryside, which the sent-down youthwould help transform.

The exhibits include a number of life-sizescenes that represent agricultural and otherwork, as well as the struggles of daily life. Fig.18, below, shows pioneering construction andcooking in the field. This photo gives a goodidea of the exhibit halls, which are spacious,rich in content, rather well-constructed, andcapable of accommodating sizeable crowds.

Fig. 18. One of the main permanent exhibithalls. Photo by the author, 2015.

In the exhibition halls, contemporary visitors,often themselves former sent-down youth, canbe seen taking their time to slowly absorbevery memory prompted by kitchen utensils,agricultural tools and other items on display(Fig. 19, 20, 21 and 22). Sometimes, they canbe seen explaining an item to a relative lackingthe experience, but on the few visits I made thecomments I overheard seemed more like

expressions of mutual recognition andaffirmation ("Remember these?" people wouldsay).

The question of whether these people's workpushing carts and digging ditches, farming, andthe like, really was worthwhile and productive,or wasted, is probably moot. For former sent-down youth visitors, at least, the main motivesfor visiting are therapeutic and self-defining: Torelive the memories for themselves, and fortheir peers.

When encountering the recreated sent-downyouth outdoor cinema, in Fig. 22 many mightgasp when recalling their own youthfulexperience of watching movies in such asetting, together with other volunteers. Thisexhibit, perhaps more than many others, wouldprovoke the torn sense both of adventure,camaraderie, and sacrifice, which many seemto have come away with.

Finally, among the many aspects of the indoorexhibits, visitors also catch glimpses of theprotests, or "remonstrations," made towardsthe end of the sent-down youth era. In Fig. 23,the caption says "Some educated youth [sentto] Yunnan went to Beijing to remonstrate; andissued a Strike Manifesto." In the photo itself, abanner reads "We want to meet [Chairman]Hua" (Mao's immediate, handpicked successor,who was quickly sidelined by other Partyleaders but was briefly in charge during1976-77). Showing spontaneous popularprotests is something unusual for Chinesemuseums, but as mentioned, these protesterscould still claim that they had followed Mao'scommand, and that they were not protestingMao or the Party, but only wanted to beg theauthorities to restore their city residencepermits.

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Fig. 19. One of many corners with toolsand implements. Photo: Private source,n.d.

Fig. 20. Exhibit with everyday utensils in abedroom that is authentic — except for theair purifier. Photo: Private source, n.d.

Fig. 21. Visitors discussing agriculturalimplements. Photo: Private source, n.d.

Fig. 22. Recreated makeshift cinema forrural sent-down youth. Photo by theauthor, 2015.

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Fig. 23. Remonstrating sent-down youth.One of many displayed photos. Photo bythe author, 2015.

Next, let us look again at the outdoor environs.The area (Fig. 24) is very large, and includesvast cemetery areas, parts of which have notyet been sold or allocated to new graves. Someareas farther away from those dedicated(through public art, etc.) to the sent-downyouth are not even named yet; it appears thatthe for-profit cemetery welcomes both formersent-down youth as well as those without aconnection to this cause; those hoping to beburied with their former comrades will preferthe clearly dedicated areas, in some cases withcollectively inscribed tombstones.

The entire area is enclosed by fences, as istypical in China; the land is, I believe, leasedfor profit by private entrepreneurs licensed to

carry out cremations and burials as well asarranging museum exhibits. The vast cemeterygrounds do not reach the coastline, whichinstead is lined by a road outside the fence, inturn buttressed by a dyke to protect againststorm surges, which often occur here. In thecenter is a north-south axis, which takesapproximately twenty minutes to walk. Itbegins at the museum and the crematory andfunerary offices near the south end, andreaches the Educated Youth Plaza at the northend.

Fig. 24. Map of the cemetery, crematoryand outdoor exhibits and memorials.Adapted by the author from a companybrochure.

In between are numerous scattered monumentsdedicated to the deceased and their generation,dotting the cemetery areas, and converging onthe Educated Youth Plaza with its keycenterpieces: the locomotive (Fig. 1), and,above all, the massive Zhiqing jinian qiang orEducated Youth Memorial Wall (Fig. 29-36).

Fig. 25-26 depict the cemetery. Statuespositioned at strategic locations in thecemetery mimic the style of the CulturalRevolution, and are sure to elicit mixed feelingsamong those who visit. Some are generic, some

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specific, such as the statue of Jin Xunhua, theShanghai former Red Guard who was sentdown to Heilongjiang in northeast China anddrowned during a rainstorm, apparently whiletrying to prevent a telegraph pole from beinglost in a torrent. After his death, at 20 years oldin 1969, he was made a hero, and appeared oncountless posters. On the one hand, this newinstallation of the statue showing Jin Xunhua'sdying moment points to the tremendous wasteof human life that was the entire project ofsending down the youth, frequently noted bycritics of the movement (who would say Jin'ssacrifice was meaningless). On the other hand,for sent-down youth survivors today, andespecially for the fellow Shanghainese who visit, the statue also evokes precisely theremembrance of suffering which binds themtogether today. It is easy to imagine thedifficulty a grandfather must have, explainingthe significance of Jin Xunhua’s death to hisgrandson (Fig. 26). But for the grandfather,regardless of the overblown social-realist styleand official message that may be off-putting tosome (who see it celebrating a pointless,politicized self-sacrifice), the statue carries thedeep significance of personal experienceregardless of the official orthodoxy, and in thissense, while much more dramatic, evokes thesame nostalgia as that prompted by Mao-erahot water bottles and green cloth bags.

Fig. 25. Generic statues at stone memorialto deceased sent-down youth. Photo by theauthor, 2015.

Fig. 26. Statue of the drowning Jin Xunhua,a s e n t - d o w n y o u t h m a r t y r e d i nHeilongjiang Province, in 1969. Photo:Baidu Tieba.

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Fig. 27. Another cemetery-area statue,here evoking something genericallyidealistic. Promotional photo from thecemetery-company using the image toattract customers (Sunwell, n.d.).

Fig. 28. Promotional photo illustratingboth the design and expense levels ofgravestones, including similar statuary,and "real views" of the site, including theMemorial Wall (Sunwell, n.d.).

The Zhiqing jinian qiang or Educated YouthMemorial Wall is located at the Zhiqingguangchang, the Educated Youth Plaza (Fig.

29-36), about a 20 minutes walk from themuseum and the crematory building. The Wallappears to mimic and combine at least threedifferent US designs. The most obvious is theVietnam War memorial in Washington, D.C.designed by Maya Lin. It does not "sink into"the landscape in the same powerful way, butboth the color and feel of the stone, and theconcept of etching the names of the honorabledeceased into the stone face, is similar (Fig. 29,30, 32-35).

Another "inspiration" is the Korean Warmemorial, also in Washington, D.C. — mostobviously in the inclusion of portraits of humanfigures inlaid into the stone, combined with life-size statues walking on the side. In the KoreanWar memorial, those statues are Americansoldiers. Here they are sent-down youth —"soldiers" in Mao's army — and their relatives(Fig. 30, 32-35).

The monument also draws on that Hollywoodsidewalk where famous stars leave theirfootprints, though here it is sent-down youthwho can pay to do so (Fig. 31). The brazenborrowing (or perhaps even — for the walldesigns — plagiarizing) that takes place here isstriking, as is the combinatory craze usingthese three different American monuments asmodels. As in the many other cases of suchborrowings around China, most Chinesevisitors will be unaware of the original sources.

Fig. 29. The memorial wall. The photo isfrom the cemetery-company website, where

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it is used as part of the promotionalcampaign to sell cemetery lots (Sunwell,n.d.).

Fig. 30. Ageing sent-down youth marvelingat their signatures, on the memorial wall.Photo from People.com.cn, 2010.

Fig. 31. The Hollywood sidewalk-styledfootprints next to the memorial wall,inscribed as "Unforgettable revolutionary

era; Impressive Educated-Youth spirit."Photo: Private source, n.d.

Fig. 32. The memorial wall with inscribednames of sent-down youth, plus images ofdeparting sent-down youth inlaid in thewall, as in the US Korean War memorial.Photo: Private source, n.d.

Fig. 33. The memorial wall imageryproudly promoted in cemetery advertising(Sunwell, n.d.).

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Fig. 34. One of the sculpture sets placedalong the memorial wall, with visitors.Photo: Private source.

Fig. 35. Sculptures showing a sad farewell.Photo by the author, 2015.

Fig. 36. Statue at the memorial walldepicting a lonely sent-down girl perhapsreading a letter from home. Photo by theauthor, 2015.

Conclusion

The sent-down youth museums offer a conduitfor the collective memory for a specific groupof people; an arena in which the ageinggeneration of sent-down youth can bothremember and commiserate, and also expressthemselves. In the case of the particularlyingenious Shanghai museum-cemetery, thisself-expression even extends to shaping one'simage after death. Generally these museumsmainly serve to channel and soothe thecomplex emotions of the still living people whowere made to sacrifice their youth for Mao andthe Party. Indeed, Xi Jinping and a number ofother national leaders were sent-down youth.

There is official tolerance and support for sent-

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down youth museums and memorials — atleast, there is official licensing and permissionfor their construction and existence, includingthe collecting and exhibition of artifacts, and inthe Shanghai case also for the work ofcremations, burials, and presentation of publicart.

In contrast, there are (almost) no suchmuseums or memorials for the actual victims ofMao and the Cultural Revolution. If the sent-down youth can have them, why not thosesurviving direct persecution? The answer isthat because the sent-down youth can say they"gave their youth" to Mao and the Party, andpresent themselves as supporters of his regime,this becomes an insurance policy of sorts,which affords the former sent-down youth theright to speak — unlike those who perishedbecause condemned by Mao. However, if andwhen former sent-down youth or theirmuseums express regrets over the sufferingand the real sacrifices they made (such as byexhibiting pointless hardship, or the protests bypeople asking to be allowed to return home,after Mao's death), official tolerance might wellrun out. Such tolerance is no doubt contingenton the museums not going too far with criticismof Mao, or of the Party during the Mao era. Theauthorities expect support for the still-standingofficial orthodoxy that Mao was a great leader— at least there can be no open disagreementwith this, no attack on policies central to Maoor the Party in his time. Instead, Chineseofficialdom promotes the notion of sharedsacrifice, as in the officially-sponsored travelingexhibit "Sharing the Fate of the Republic."

In the current era of market capitalism, somesent-down youth have made enough money tosupport memorial sites, including the collectionof artifacts, hiring staff to create wax-figuredioramas, and the like; some no doubt in thehope of also making more money, such asthrough the funeral and cemetery business.Much of this is driven by the lingering presenceof the sent-down youth in contemporary

Chinese social life, and it may fade or vanishwhen they are gone, particularly the greatmajority who were sent down in the 1960s andare now in their seventies and eighties. But atthis time, whether as entrepreneurs or asvisitors and participants in memorial events,they are using these sites as instruments bothfor soothing their own feelings and highlightingsome of their experience as victims, while alsopromoting their own social standing asmembers of the Cultural Revolution generation,based on their unassai lable, loyal istcontributions to Mao's project.

For former sent-down youth and their families,visiting these museums may evoke deepemotions, especially so at the unique cemetery-memorial that is the Shanghai sent-down youthmuseum. Here, visitors are confronted not justwith the raw materials of history (as reflectedin photos and artifacts evoking the era), andtheir emotions provoked by such assemblages,but also with their own present circumstances,and with their future death. The prospect ofdeath and burial here, alongside one'serstwhile "comrades", cannot but provokemixed feelings. It speaks in a curious way tothe age-old conundrum of people anticipatingtheir own death, and trying to influence whatone's persona will mean to coming generations,after one's fragile body is burned and erased inthe crematory and the ashes installed in atomb. While it is possible that for some, theburial at this site is an expression of willingnessto follow one's lord in death (as in ancienttimes; now projected towards the lateChairman Mao), I also want to propose that thereason many former sent-down youth choosethis site for their eternal rest is because it can,at least potentially, convey to future visitors acritical perspective on events that shaped theirlives. Here is a multifaceted site that opens forrecognition their mixed feelings or even deepregrets; a sense that those buried here livedhonorably and did their duty, yet also claim theright to speak and even disagree.

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The danger is that this capacity of thememorial to serve as a critical space fore v a l u a t i n g t h e M a o e r a , m i g h t b eovershadowed in the present-day increasinglytotalitarian China, by new state-defined"truths" about shared sacrifice, devised onceagain mobilize people as the cannon fodder offuture Party-State policies, and projects. Asmentioned above, there is a new, officially-endorsed trend afoot to portray the legacy ofMao and his Cultural Revolution not asdisasters that wrecked the lives of many, as isthe truth, but as wholly necessary and worthysteps towards building today's powerful China,regardless of the "sacrifices" made. Severalscholars have explored how, not least inliterature and film, this new over-writing of thelegacy of the Mao era is often misleading andregressive (see, for example, Gao 2013; Cai2016; Yue 2005; and Hung 2015). The closelypoliced state-constructed nostalgia can serve toforeclose any critique or debate over thereasons why things went so horribly wrong —and thereby make it more difficult to prevent itfrom recurring in the future.

The officially-sanctioned Mao-era nostalgia notonly covers up the violence and the many livessenselessly lost, but aims to shape and channelthe sense of regret on the part of those whowere there, into acceptance, acquiescence, andsilence. This is very much on display in thepresent, when the post-Mao Communist Partyinstitutions of 'collective leadership' and termlimits on top posts, meant to prevent arecurrence of the Mao-era madness, have beenabolished. The recent scrapping of term limits,thus permitting the current Party chief toassemble a power similar to the one-man rulethat Mao exercized, provoked an unusualoutpouring of popular criticism — but theformidable Party-State apparatus was able tosilence it (The Globe and Mail 2018). This doesnot bode well for the future of the sent-downyouth museums as potential sites for criticaldeliberation, breaking the taboo on discussingwhat went wrong. But they will continue to

carry such potential at least through thepassing of the last of their generation.

Acknowledgements

I visited the Shanghai sent-down youth museumseveral times while teaching at New YorkUniversity-Shanghai, in 2014-15. Part of thismaterial was presented as a lecture for theFinger Lakes Chapter of the New York StateArchaeological Association, Ithaca, New York,February 2, 2017. I thank the audience, as wellas several helpful colleagues, for their valuablesuggestions on the article, also Asia-PacificJournal editor Mark Selden.

Appendix: Sent-Down Youth Museumsoutside Shanghai (incomplete list)

* Zhiqing bowuguan [知青博物馆, EducatedYouth Museum], in Aihui district, Heihe 黑河city, Heilongjiang Province, NortheasternChina, where many sent-down youth fromShanghai were sent; also called the Shanghaizhiqing bowuguan = initiated by people fromShanghai)

* Xichang zhiqing bowuguan [XichangEducated Youth Museum, located in a formerstate farm near Xichang 西昌, western SichuanProvince

* Zhiqing bowuguan [Educated YouthMuseum], a small museum in the BananDistrict 巴南区 of Chongqing City (possiblyclosed?)

* Jianchuan bowuguan [建川博物馆, JianchuanMuseum Cluster], in Anren, near Chengdu city,in Sichuan Province (includes one section withsent-down youth memorabilia)

* Zhiqing bowuguan [Educated Youth Museum]in Kunming, Yunnan Province (closed?)

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* Zhiqing bowuguan [Educated Youth Museum]in Mengding, Gengma County, YunnanProvince (closed?)

* Yan’an Beijing zhiqing bowuguan [延安北京知青博物馆, Beijing Educated Youth Museum inYan'an], in Yan'an, Shaanxi Province, in Mao'swartime base area (doubtless named becausemostly Beijing youth were sent down there)

* Zhiqing yuan bowuguan 知青缘博物馆 "LinksBetween Educated Youth Museum"], in BanliTownship, Changtai County (长泰县坂里乡),Fujian Province

* Ningbo zhiqing bowuguan [Ningbo EducatedYouth Museum, 宁波知青博物馆], may besimilar to the one in Shanghai, since it is alsobased in a sending city, not in a receiving ruralarea (cf. Baidu, n.d.; note the sophisticated webcollection of artifacts on digital display)

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Magnus Fiskesjö teaches anthropology and Asian studies at Cornell University. His researchhas mainly focused on the politics and histories of ethnic relations in China and SoutheastAsia, as well as Asian archaeology, critical museum studies, and global heritage issues. Hispublications in these fields build on his experiences as director of the Museum of Far EasternAntiquities, in Stockholm, Sweden, in the years 2000-2005. Among his recent publicationstouching on Chinese politics is "The Return of the Show Trial: China’s Televised 'Confessions(http://apjjf.org/2017/13/Fiskesjo.html),'" in Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 15.13.1 (2017).