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Bureaucratic Politics and Administrative Reform:

Why Politics Matters

Bidhya Bowornwathana, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand bidhya.b@chula.ac.th

Ora-orn Poocharoen, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore

spppo@nus.edu.sg

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Bureaucratic Politics and Administrative Reform: Why Politics Matters Bidhya Bowornwathana Ora-orn Poocharoen Key word: bureaucratic politics, administrative reform, politics, administration Abstract Administrative reform is a political, not managerial, issue. This study argues that administrative reform is highly influenced by realities of bureaucratic politics. Reforms usually mean the struggle over power between involved actors. There are evidences of patterns of power struggle among and between politicians and bureaucrats. Including contestation among bureaucrats that are responsible for public management reform. These power struggles and contestations explain the decision-making processes for designing and implementing administrative reform policies and shifts of power relations. This article proposes a new framework to advance the concept of bureaucratic politics, with reference to administrative reform policy. It highlights the missing link between public policy and public management reform literature by revisiting the power of politicians and bureaucrats in making reform policies.

INTRODUCTION

A country’s administrative reform policy and its politics are deeply interconnected.

The making of reform policies is politically-driven. The implementation of reform

policies produces far-reaching political consequences to all parties concerned.

Administrative reform programs reallocate the power balance among government

agencies, in particular, among politicians and bureaucrats and among bureaucrats

themselves. Throughout the years, streams of reform fashions have come and go.

Today’s fashions of administrative reform such as governance and new public

management are political instruments for reformers to satisfy their domain-expansion

ambitions, power aggrandizement and consolidation. From a political perspective, the

question about administrative reform is ‘which actors have eventually acquired more

power and which actors have less power, once a reform has been implemented, and

why is it so. These enquiries fall under the concept of bureaucratic politics.

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This paper aims to elaborate on a more advanced framework of bureaucratic politics

to use for explaining administrative reforms. The framework has three aspects of

focus: different pairing of actors’ relations – politicians vs. politicians, politicians vs.

bureaucrats, bureaucrats vs. bureaucrats; different levels of reform policy elements –

the rhetoric, policy, legislative level and the managerial tool level; and different

results of reform – based on shifts in power domain and the chosen management

tools. Examples of bureaucratic politics of administrative reform in several countries

such as Thailand, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Australia, and Canada

are drawn to show the dynamics of the bureaucratic politics framework.

THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS FRAMEWORK (BPF)

Studies in public administration and public policy have long argued that governments

are not one entity. Rather they are made up of many bureaus and departments that are

constantly trying to protect their turf and maintain or increase their power (Allison,

1971; Halperin, 1974; Allison and Halperin, 1972; Kingdon, 1995; Peters, 2001). The

most well-known description of a “bureaucratic politics model” is the one proposed

by Graham T. Allison (1971) to explain foreign policy decision-making in the Cuban

Missile Crisis of October 1962. Subsequently, by illustrating cases of foreign policy

decision-making in the U.S. during the Cold War era, Halperin (1974) introduced the

politics within a government as the concept of bureaucratic politics. Garry Clifford

(1990: 168) argues that by focusing on bureaucratic politics, which emphasizes

individual values and the tugging and hauling of key players we are able to

understand who wins and why. Akin to public choice theories in public administration

(Down, 1967; Niskanen, 1971), bureaucratic politics is an important factor to explain

the policy decision-making process. Building from the classical model, political

scientists have modified and develop the concept throughout the years. An example is

the ‘adaptive model of bureaucratic politics’ by Bendor and Moe (1984), where they

proposed a new framework built on neoclassical approaches of Niskanen (1971) and

Peltzman (1976). The distinctness of their model is the incorporation of Simon’s

(1947) behavior tradition, in addition to identifying three actors: bureaus, politicians,

and interest groups.

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In order to further advance the concept of bureaucratic politics and explore its

usefulness in analyzing administrative reforms, the authors would like to propose a

framework to study bureaucratic politics in the setting of administrative reforms. In

linking the two concepts of bureaucratic politics and administrative reforms, one can

use both concepts as an independent or dependent variable. That is to say, the

phenomenon of bureaucratic politics can be used to explain aspects of administrative

reform policies. While, at the same time, the phenomenon of administrative reform

can, also, be used to explain the changes in power relations of bureaucratic politics.

Discussions of administrative reform, in general, have sporadically but not

systematically included this important, domestic institutional variable of bureaucratic

politics into its theories.

Compared to Allison’s classical bureaucratic politics model, this paper proposes a

broader interpretation of the bureaucratic politics framework. The notion of

bureaucratic politics is used to explain the political process of administrative reform,

not just single decisions in a crisis situation. It goes beyond a policy making focus to

cover policy implementation and impact studies of administrative reform. In this

regard, the BPF proposes to examine a longer time-frame perspective than the

classical bureaucratic politics model. In addition, the classical model identifies actors

as a small group of individuals holding key government positions. The BPF,

however, covers a broader range of actors who are politicians and bureaucrats that are

involved and affected by administrative reform. Lastly, the proposed BPF

incorporates not only high level public officials but also mid and low level public

officials as well.

The proposed BPF consists of three aspects. The first aspect focuses on the types of

actors and relations between the actors. The second aspect examines how

administrative reform policies and tools are used as instruments in bureaucratic

politics relations. And the third aspect discusses the results of reform in terms of shifts

in power relations and changes in managerial practices of the public administration.

Each aspect is described in detail as follows.

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Figure 1: The Bureaucratic Politics Framework (BPF)

I. RELATIONS BETWEEN ACTORS

Administrative reform is a struggle for power and control among various politician

and bureaucrat actors. The victorious side in the battle for power ends up expanding

their domain and turf in government. While the losers’ relative power lessened.

Thus, the word bureaucratic politics in administrative reform is used to describe the

political games of bargaining, pulling and hauling, that goes on among and between

politicians and bureaucrats to push for administrative reforms in government which

would increase one’s relative power in government.

In this bureaucratic politics framework, there are several types of power relations

among and between politicians and bureaucrats. First is the relation between

politicians and bureaucrats. Second is the relation among bureaucrats, which can

further be divided into relations between central agencies; between core agencies and

line agencies; between line agencies; between high-level bureaucrats and mid/low-

level bureaucrats; and between old-timer bureaucrats and new faces that have been

assigned to the agency as part of the reform. And third is the relation among

politicians. All three relations are interrelated and all effect the direction of reform

policies and the types of managerial tools chosen. The details and examples of each

type of bureaucratic politics relation are elaborated as follows.

Relations

Politician vs. Bureaucrat

Bureaucrat vs. Bureaucrat

Politician vs. Politician

Reform

Policy level

Tool level

Results

Power Shift

Managerial Changes

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1. Politicians vs. Bureaucrats (PB)

As important as politicians’ power is the notion of bureaucratic power (Meier, 1987;

Dunleavy, 1991; Peters 2001). In their study public management reform in ten

countries, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) confirm the importance of understanding the

relationship between administration and politics, and administrators and politicians.

The bureaucratic politics of administrative reform can be seen as the struggle between

politicians and bureaucrats for power and control of the state machine. Reform

policies and tools are introduced to alter the power balance between politicians and

bureaucrats (Bowornwathana, 2001a, 2001c, 2000a, 1999, 1996a, 1996b, and 1994).

This refers to the relationships between politicians such as the prime minister and

ministers on the one hand, and high-ranking bureaucrats such as under-secretaries,

director-generals, state enterprise CEOs on the other. This is especially true in cases

where the goal of reform is to reduce the power of bureaucrats, such as in the U.K.,

Japan, Thailand and Italy. An example of an estimation of the power relations

between politicians and bureaucrats is outlined in Table 1.

TABLE 1: Politician-Bureaucrat Power Relationships

Politicians Weak Strong

Weak U.K., Japan, Thailand, Italy (After)

Bur

eauc

rats

Strong U.K., Japan, Thailand, Italy (Before)

In general, the politician-bureaucrat power relationships in the U.K. governments

have been characterized as having “weak politicians and strong bureaucrats.” The

“Yes Ministers” are said to be under the influence and directions of career

bureaucrats. However, administrative reforms introduced since the Thatcher

Governments (1979-1990) have reduced the power of bureaucrats. These reform

programs are, for example, the next step’s executive agencies program, performance

agreement frameworks, the citizen’s charters and quangos were intended to produce

“weaker bureaucrats, and stronger politicians” (Jarvis, 2002; Massey and Pyper, 2005;

Bowornwathana, 2001b, 107-168). Some scholars, however, contended that the

change from government (or the Westminster model) to governance (or Rhodes’s

“differentiated polity model”) might have gone too far resulting in a hollowed-out

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state with self-organizing networks that are beyond the control of the executive core

(Rhodes, 1996, 1997; Richards and Smith, 2005). In other words, the elected

governments are unable to control and coordinate policy across all of Whitehall.

Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Labour Party’s antidote to departmentalism is “joined-up

government,” which under the “Modernizing Government” Program, a strong central

control from Number 10 and the Cabinet Office is advocated (Richards and Smith,

2005, 4-7; McAnulla, 2006, 143-164; and Bogdanor, 2005).

The Japanese polity has a long tradition of strong bureaucrats, weak politicians. As

Vogel (1979, 54) explained: “The politicians make many important political

decisions, but compared to the American government the top politicians have little

leverage over the bureaucracy. The prime minister may appoint one politician to be

minister and another parliamentary vice-minister in each minister, but there are no

other political appointments in the ministry, and the person who really runs it is the

administrative vice-minister, the highest career officer in the ministry. The key

decisions in the ministry are made by the permanent bureaucrats rather than by the

politicians of the Diet and the Cabinet.” One aim of the January 2001 Reform of

Central Government was to strengthen the power of the prime minister through

several initiatives such as changing the cabinet law to allow the prime minister to

propose policies in cabinet meetings; and making the prime minister head of the new

Cabinet Office (Bowornwathana, 2001b, 28-42; Neary, 2002, 121-129; Stockwin,

2005, 57; Rothacher, 1993; Woronoff, 1986).

The tradition of “strong bureaucrats, weak politicians” can also be observed in the

Thai polity. Since the overthrow of absolute monarchy in 1932, Thai bureaucrats

have wielded tremendous policy making and implementation power. Elected

coalition governments were short-lived, and military rule was the rule, not the

exception. Changes have been taken place during the last two decades with elected

politicians becoming more powerful, while the career bureaucrats less powerful.

Under the Thaksin Governments (2001-present), various administrative reforms

undertaken have consolidated power in the hands of the Prime Minister Thaksin at

the expense of bureaucrats and other politicians (Bowornwathana, 2002a, 2002b,

2004a, 2005a, 2005b, 2006b, 2006d).

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In Italy, there is the tradition of the separation of the administrative system from the

political domain. The 1948 Constitution reserved the power to determine the

structure and the functions of the administration to the parliament rather than to the

government. The ideology of administrative neutrality and impartiality of bureaucrats

is practiced in the Italian polity (Lewansky, 2000, 233-234). In this regard, Italian

bureaucrats are strong. On the other hand, politicians are weak because of the nature

of unstable coalition governments of Italy which brings together political parties and

factions with diverse ideologies. Recent administrative reform policies undertaken by

Italian Governments such as the Amato and Ciampi governments in 1992 and 1993

had moved into the direction of “stronger politicians, weaker bureaucrats.” Examples

of reform are: the legislative decree no. 29 of 1993 changed the legal basis of public

employers’ contracts by undermining job security; and the effort to reduce the cost of

administration through reform of structures and administrative procedures such as by

amalgamating the Ministries of Transport and Merchant Shipping together (Bull and

Newell, 2005, 150).

The four-country cases clearly indicate a common trend in administrative reform to

move away from the tradition of “weak politicians, strong bureaucrats” to a new

paradigm of “stronger politicians, and weaker bureaucrats”. We understand this

because we have incorporated the relations between politicians and bureaucrats as an

element in this bureaucratic politics framework.

2. Bureaucrats vs. Bureaucrats (BB)

The bureaucratic politics of administrative reform is very intense among the

bureaucrats themselves, especially those from different government agencies. A

common manifestation of politics among bureaucrats is the struggle among central

agencies for turf and domain expansion (Bowornwathana and Poocharoen, 2005).

Bureaucracies constantly build empires and they constantly struggle to survive (Peters

2001). Especially in states with large number of agencies with relatively little

coordination, competition becomes an important part of the agencies’ lives and very

important for their survival (Peters, 2001).

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There are five general types of politics among bureaucrats. The first type refers to the

competition among core or central agencies. The second type is the contestation

between core and line agencies. The third type is the struggle for superior power

between bureaucrats of different line ministries. The fourth type is the politics

between high and mid/low levels of bureaucrats. And the fifth type is the competition

within an agency between old bureaucrats and new bureaucrats, who are usually

politically appointed. The following is an elaboration of each type within the context

of administrative reform.

A. Central vs. Central

Firstly, there are constant games of bureaucratic politics among a handful of central

agencies in the area of administrative reform. These contestations usually occur

among: the agency responsible for financial issues or the budget; the agency

responsible for human resources management or the civil service commission; and the

agency responsible for planning and evaluation of reform or overall management of

the civil service system.

An example is the case of Canada. After the Glassco Commission report in 1960, the

Civil Service Commission (CSC) and Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) within the

Department of Finance raced to lead the reform strategies. In 1967, CSC set up the

Bureau of Management Consultant, which later became the Department of Supply and

Services (DSS). TBS set up the Management Improvement Branch, after it took over

the responsibilities of the Bureau of Government Organizations, which was set up to

lead reforms. The bureaucratic politics between CSC and TBS to control reform

created confusion and duplications of reform efforts (Saint-Martin, 2000: 127).

In the U.K., David Lipsey (2000: 45-55) recorded the battles that went on between the

Treasury and Civil Service Department (CSD), which was created in 1968. After

which, there were battles between the Treasury and with the Efficiency Unit, which

was created in 1979, within the Cabinet Office. Later on the Treasury gave up most of

their power on human resource management to the Office of Public Service and

Science (OPSS). These are the evidences of contestation between central agencies

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over reform strategies in the U.K. before its implementation of reform policies in the

1980s.

Another example is the case of Malaysia. In late 1960s, the Development

Administration Unit (DAU) initially was assigned to undertake four tasks: personnel

administration and training: planning, budgetary, and financial administration;

management services, incorporating the former organization and methods technicians;

and the state and local administration (Esman 1972: 157). The DAU led several

reform initiatives in the beginning, but it lacked the support of central agencies. Soon

there were tensions between the DAU and the Treasury to have power over reform of

budgetary issues. In the end, the Treasury was able to hold on to its turf, essentially it

won the battle to lead reform and DAU was dismantled (Esman, 1972: 194-208).

Under the initiative of Mahathir Mohamad, then Deputy Prime Minister under Prime

Minister Razak, the DAU was transformed into MAMPU in 1978. The DAU in

Malaysia did not last because the advisors did not separate between human resources

and financial resources reforms. The DAU was assigned to do both, while in reality

the Treasury had the real power on budget issues. This was because the advisors were

used to the U.S.’ OMB model and thus expected budget issues to be aligned with

management issues. Up until today, the Treasury still takes full responsibility for

performance-based budgeting or modified budgeting system (MBS), as what the

Malaysians call it.

Similarly in Australia from 1984 to1987, the powerful Public Service Board was

gradually replaced by the less powerful Public Service Commission. The control of

the number of staffs was transferred to the Department of Finance. The responsibility

for adjudicating grievances was transferred to the Merit Protection and Review

Agency. Some personnel management powers and functions were also delegated to

departments (Holmes and Wileman, 1997). This case shows that the Public Service

Board, which was mainly in charge of management and human resources, has lost its

turf and power to another central agency responsible for financial issues.

In the case of Thailand, prior to 2003, there were consistent tensions and struggles to

dominate reform policies between the Office of the Civil Service Commission

(OCSC) and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) (Bowornwathana and Poocharoen,

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2005). However, when administrative reform policies, including giving government

advice, implementation and evaluation responsibilities, was separated from the human

resources agency – the OCSC, and put under the Office of the Public Sector

Development Commission (OPDC) in 2002, the tensions became triangulated. That

is, the OCSC against the OPDC for human resources work and at the same time,

OPDC against BOB, for overall public sector reform policies. In a World Bank report

(1999), the BOB and OCSC were to coordinate closely to develop and implement the

core of the reform program, which is performance-based management. They must

first implement this concept in their respective agencies because they are the central

agencies in financial and human resource management. However, when the OPDC

was created, this disturbed the coordination expected between OCSC and BOB. The

agencies are again back to square one in terms of struggling for power to control the

direction and momentum of reform.

All of these five cases reveal this classic type of bureaucratic politics of competition

between central agencies, which are usually responsible for man – human resources

and money – budget. And, as the cases point to, there is a third central agency, which

is usually newly created to specifically lead reform in the area of overall management

issues. Thus, the hauling and pulling goes on among the three ‘M’ agencies: man,

money, and management.

B. Central vs. Line

The second type is the power struggle between core agencies and line agencies in the

process of reform. Core central agencies have tendencies to increase their

standardization power over line ministries and departments. Meanwhile, line agencies

consider themselves to be experts in their work and want to be autonomous from

central agencies. From the perspective of administrative reform, this tug of war

between central and line agencies mean that both sides would try to change the course

of reform to their own advantage. Central agencies are usually closer to the center of

power in government such as the prime minister than the line agencies. Line

ministries and departments can have power over reform decisions if their minister

boss is very powerful in government who can influence reform choices of

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government. Table 2 demonstrates an example using this type of bureaucratic politics

to analyze administrative reform in Thailand.

TABLE 2: Central-Line Bureaucrats Power Relationships

The above table shows how the relationships between central bureaucrats and line

agencies in the Thai Government have evolved during from1932 to 2006. From 1932

and before the Field Marshall Sarit Period of the 1950s, central bureaucrats were

weak and line bureaucrats were strong. From the Sarit Period onwards to 2000,

central bureaucrats became much stronger with the establishment and upgrading of

several central agencies. Under the Thaksin Government (2000-present), central

officials retain their strength, while line officials are becoming weaker.

Opposite to the current Thai situation, an example of central agencies being pressured

to reduce and devolve their administrative powers to line agencies is the case of

Australia. In 1976, the Fraser government weakened the Treasury Department by

establishing the Department of Finance (Campbell and Halligan, 1992). The Treasury

had overwhelming powers over budgetary and financial issues over line ministries. By

splitting off financial issues to the new Department, the power of the Treasury was

broken down and devolution of authority was passed on to line ministries and

agencies. Thus, the line ministries and agencies were able to develop their skills and

expanded their area of power, without being dominated by the Treasury. Also, the

Public Service Board’s power was reallocated to the line ministries. It was perceived

to be “overstaffed, over-intrusive, unhelpful, more an impediment to improving

administration than a benefit” (Holmes and Wileman, 1997). The Board had 780

staffs in 1987 but was reduced to only 130 staffs and changed its name to Public

Service Commission. Excluding some powers went to the Department of Finance,

almost all other responsibilities of personnel matters were devolved to individual

departments (Holmes and Wileman, 1997).

Central Bureaucrats Weak Strong

Weak Thaksin 2000-present Li

ne

Bur

eauc

rats

Strong 1932- Sarit Sarit-2000

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C. Line vs. Line

The third type is the struggle for superior power among bureaucrats in different line

ministries. After a reform, the power of a particular ministry vis-à-vis other ministries

may change. For example, in a major restructuring of government, bureaucrats from

different ministries may fight for the inclusion of a bureau under their structural

domain. Or the creation of new ministries may ignite a fierce battle among

bureaucrats in old and new ministries to incorporate as many agencies as possible into

their turfs.

In several countries, there is what one can call the phenomenon of a “super ministry.”

In the traditional Thai bureaucracy, the Ministry of Interior has been the super

ministry. Recent reforms have gradually reduced the power of the Interior Ministry

by splitting off several agencies such as the Police Department, the Office of the

Attorney-General, and the Department of Labor from the Interior Ministry.

In Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was described by

Chalmers Johnson as “an elite bureaucratic department with no precise equivalent in

any country.” Johnson attributed Japan’s economic miracle after the Second World

War to the success of MITI in collaborating Japan’s “capitalist developmental state’s”

role in the economy with the private sector (Johnson, 1982, see back cover; Johnson,

1995; see also Vogel, 1979, 53-96). Another powerful ministry in Japan is the

Ministry of Finance. Some call the mandarins of the Finance Ministry as “the elite of

the elite” (Rafferty, 1995). Peter Hartcher argued that The Ministry of Finance in

Japan is “a political, economic and intellectual force without parallel in the developed

world. Claiming a divine right which supersedes elected governments, it enjoys a

greater concentration of powers-formal and informal-than any comparable body in

any industrialized democracy (Hartcher, 1997).

D. High vs. Low

The fourth type is the politics between high and mid/low levels of bureaucrats. This

type has been examined in the literature of public policy in general but not

specifically on administrative reforms. Ralph S. Brower and Mitchel Y. Abolafia

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(1997) studied political activities among lower level bureaucrats. They formulated a

model of politics from below that contrasts with Graham Allison's model of

bureaucratic politics among those at the top. They found that lower participants

engage in political activities that are primarily about the pursuit of identity rather than

specific organizational outcomes. Another example would be O’Leary’s (1994)

examination of the bureaucrats at the middle and lower levels in the U.S. Department

of Interior and the Nevada Department of Wildlife, while they were pushing for a new

legislation. It was found that these career public managers were shaping the

organizational environment and that most public servants have many masters and

multiple directors of accountability. To some they are entrepreneurs, while to others

they are deviant insubordinates.

In the realm of administrative reform, there are also similar situations where mid/low

level bureaucrats are quietly fighting to maintain their turf and power with high level

bureaucrats. For example, an indication that low bureaucrats are losing power is when

the gap between high bureaucrats and low bureaucrats in terms of salary and reward

widens after a reform, and low level bureaucrats show signs of low motivation and

resentment towards the agency. In a study of rewards of high public office,

Bowornwathana (2006c) concluded that reform initiatives approved by governments

in the 1990s involving the systems of rewards for bureaucrats have substantially

widened the income gap between high and low bureaucrats. Under programs such as

brain-drain prevention schemes and special allowances, high bureaucrats are

proportionally rewarded more than mid and low bureaucrats. Under the Thaksin

Governments the income gap between high and low bureaucrats continues to widen

with the introduction of unfair reform programs such as a new bonus system for high

performing high bureaucrats.

E. Old vs. New

The fifth version of the bureaucrat vs. bureaucrat type of politics is when reform

disrupts the balance of power within the organization or within the sphere of power in

policy-making. This could be the competition between old bureaucrats and new

bureaucrats, who are usually politically appointed. It could also be competition when

the power of insiders to select their agency head may be taken away by outsiders

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under the new rules of public management reform through business ideas such as the

CEO model.

Such as in the case of Australia after 1972, the reformists decided to add different

groups to give policy advice, in order to open-up ideas from outside the civil service,

including: task forces and committees of enquiries using external experts,

commissions, a priorities review staff, think tanks for long-term advice, and

ministerial advisors. This removed the important role of old bureaucrats to be in the

hands of new bureaucrats, thus causing contestation between the groups.

In the case of Thailand, until OPDC was established in 2003, the OCSC was taking

the lead in formulating and advocating public sector reform policies. When the OPDC

was set up, it used a part of OCSC’s building complex as their office and all of its

officials were made up of former OCSC officials, except for the top positions.

Interestingly, because the top positions were political appointees from outside of

OCSC, it had upset some senior level officials in OCSC that were hoping for the

positions. Thus it became the case of old-timers against newly appointed heads of

central agencies.

3. Politicians vs. Politicians (PP)

The third type of power relations that is affected by the bureaucratic politics of

administrative reform is the power balance among politicians, mainly the prime

minister and cabinet ministers. Chosen administrative reform measures can change

the relative power of the prime minister vis-à-vis cabinet ministers. For example, in

Thailand, Thaksin’s administrative reform policies have strengthened the prime

minister’s power position over the rest. In Italy, former PM Silvio Berlusconni had

tried to introduce constitutional reform measures that would increase his power

(Bowornwathana, 2005b).

There are other forms of power relationships among politicians such as the

relationships between the political executive and members of parliament that can be

altered through the introduction of administrative reform measures. For example, the

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proliferation of executive agencies in the U.K. has put into doubt the question whether

a minister should be responsible for the wrongdoings of executive agency CEOs.

Table 3: Politician-Politician Power Relationships Ministers

Weak Strong

Weak Short-living coalition government

Long-living coalition government Pr

ime

Min

iste

r Strong Short-living single

party government Long-living single party government

From Table 3, the Thai case is used to illustrate how power relationships among

politicians can change as a result of administrative reform. Traditionally,

governments in Thailand have been characterized by coalitions of several political

parties and cliques that weakened the prime minister’s power (Bowornwathana,

2001c). The longer a coalition government lasts, the more the power of the ministers.

However, reforms introduced by PM Thaksin have made him a stronger prime

minister and ministers weaker. Thus Thaksin’s government would fall under the left-

bottom hand side of the table.

II. REFORM POLICY AND TOOLS AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS

Factors such as economic crisis, internal political ideologies, and external forces of

globalization do explain the diffusion and import of rhetorical aspects of public

management reform policies. However, these factors do not explain why some

managerial techniques were chosen over others in the reform policy package. The

authors propose to use the bureaucratic politics framework to help explain why certain

reform policies and tools are chosen over others. The bureaucratic politics framework

sees administrative reform as a political battle among actors: politicians and

bureaucrats, for superior power. Both bureaucrats and politicians use management

reform policies and tools as their political instruments to acquire more power in

government.

In studies of public policy, it is found that after rhetorical policies are advertised by

the politicians, in general, the details of programs, instruments and tools of a policy

are usually left to the bureaucrats to plan and decide on their own (Meier, 1987). It is

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here that there are attempts to expand or maintain power and political turf. Peters

(2001) note that bureaucracies engage in competition when their core interests are

threatened. In his explanation of bureaucratic powers to influence agency level

policies once higher national policies have been adopted at the top by politicians,

competition between agencies is usually confined to a small number of issues in

which the basic interests of one or more agencies overlap.

Similarly, in the area of public management reform, a handful of central agencies who

are usually the key bureaucrats who design the reform policy and tools, would be the

major players to use managerial tools as political instruments. Olsen and Peters

(1996) call these central agencies ‘system designers’. Thus, for the second aspect of

this bureaucratic politics framework, the authors propose to divide between two levels

of elements of reform: the rhetoric, policy, or legislative level; and the managerial

tools level of reform. The former are used as political instruments by politicians and

the latter are used as political instruments by bureaucrats.

1. Rhetorical Reform Policy as Politicians’ Political Instrument

The most prevalent occurrence in using rhetorical reform policies for political

advantages is the wide and loose usage of the concept of ‘Governance’ by politicians.

While bureaucrats fancy new management tools from the business school, politicians

are less excited about the management fashions, and more interested in the principles

of democratic governance such as accountability, transparency, and a smaller central

government. Accountability and transparency principles demand that the work of

government bureaucrats and the political executive be check and balance by external

independent accountability mechanisms such as the national counter corruption

commission, the state audit commission, the senate, the administrative court system.

In Thailand, Governance principles were guidelines for members of parliament to

pass a new 1997 Constitution. In theory, the 1997 Constitution reduces the power of

the political executive and the bureaucrats, and indirectly increases the power of the

citizens to monitor government through these new governance institutions. In

practice, Prime Minister Thaksin has managed to exert his influence over senators in

their selections of member of accountability mechanisms such as the National

Counter Corruption Commission (Bowornwathana, 2005c) and the Constitutional

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Court. “Governance” principles felt victim to the political supremacy and

manipulation skills of Thaksin. Bureaucrats who are regarded as being disloyal to

Thaksin have been harshly and unfairly treated by members of some new

accountability mechanisms such as the national counter corruption commission and in

particular by the new government-controlled mechanisms such as the Anti-Money

Laundering Office and the Department of Special Investigation.

Another interesting rhetorical reform policy is the principle of a smaller government.

Under the new wave of administrative reform principles, all liberal democracies are

likely to support the policy of a smaller government (Bowornwathana, 2006a). Newly

elected governments usually profess the policy of streamlining the bureaucracy. Since

a smaller government means the reduction of government size, personnel and budget

cuts, such reform decisions are not popular among bureaucrats and politicians. A

smaller government not only reduces the power of affected bureaucrats, it can also

reduce the overall power of the politicians in power. Less ministries and government

agencies also mean that the Prime Minister and cabinet members have less “land to

rule.” Nevertheless, this general rule is by-passed by relevant politicians and

bureaucrats under the condition that “the cut” can provide specific benefits to them.

For example, in Thailand, privatization of the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PAT)

was carried out because cabinet members, their relatives and friends made huge

profits by being granted special privileges in acquiring the PAT shares at a low price.

At the same time, all PAT officials, from members of the Board and the CEO to the

company drivers were handsomely rewarded with free and low-cost PAT shares. The

case of PAT privatization was a win-win situation for politicians and bureaucrats.

“Small government” has been the central theme in the history of administrative

reform of Japan (Ito, 1995). The principle of a smaller government was recently

pushed into the extreme by the Koizumi Government’s plan to privatize the postal

services. Before that in 2001, there was a major reduction in the number of ministries

from 23 to 14. The former Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) was

amalgamated with the Ministry of Home Affairs. The MPT was a large ministry

consisting of approximately 300,000 bureaucrats (Bowornwathana, 2001b).

Postmasters are an influential pressure group that traditional exerted influence on the

Liberal Democratic Party. These postmaster bureaucrats opposed the privatization

plan. In August 8, 2005, the bill on privatization of the postal services was rejected by

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the Upper House in plenary session. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi responded, as

he had pledged, by dissolving the Lower House. Privatization of the postal services

became the key policy issue in the elections, and those candidates that supported the

reform bill won. Under Koizumi, the LDP-Komeito coalition won by a landslide.

Koizumi was designated head of government. On October 2005, the bill on

privatization of the postal services was passed by the Diet (Masujima, 2006, 81-82).

The case of privatization of the postal services in Japan represents the loss of power

of postmaster bureaucrats, and the increase in power of Koizumi’s faction in LDP.

Another prime example of rhetorical policy level is the notion of ‘reinventing

government’ used in the U.S. This movement has been widely covered by U.S.

scholars, thus, the authors will not elaborate here.

2. Managerial Tools as Bureaucrats’ Political Instrument

Bureaucrats find innovations from the management school attractive because the

techniques invented in the business world have the ultimate goal of tightening control

of management over the company and employees so that efficiency can be achieved

and more profit made. For example, central agencies have tendencies to introduce

management reform innovations that strengthen their power vis-à-vis other

bureaucrats in other government agencies. High level bureaucrats use the reform

process to remove themselves from routine responsibilities, and try to become

‘strategists and policy advisors, redesigning, evaluating, and monitoring the

operational organizations below them (Dunleavy 1991 in Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004:

182). Management reform tools from the management school are brought in to justify

the proposed reform policies in the name of more productivity and better

performance. Interestingly, each agency search for management techniques in their

“field of expertise.” For example in the case of Thailand, the Civil Service

Commission brings in all kinds of human resources management techniques. The

Bureau of Budget wants to implement performance-based budgeting. The Public

Sector Reform Commission borrows ideas about performance contracts and indicators

and worships the balanced-scorecard.

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The expectation from the political executives that central agencies are to produce

outputs and outcomes for reform has pushed these agencies to become alert and active

in trying to come up with various reform ideas. These ideas, when thought of and

formulated, without integrating with other ideas might become isolated island policies

or might become a weird hybrid of different species of management tool. These

hybrid tools require political debates and negotiation to be accepted and maintained.

All new managerial tools need a lot of nurturing and protection before it can survive

and live in this harsh political world, where all the other central agencies are aiming to

destroy it. The managerial tools which are seen as behavior control mechanisms of

other agencies by central agencies are prone to fail, especially in the midst of tough

battles to lead reform. In Thailand, cases in point are the termination of: the Public

Standards scheme (PSO), which was an imitation of ISO standards in the private

sector; and the Seven Hurdles approach to budgeting, which was suppose to be a

comprehensive performance-evaluation system but required all central agencies to be

‘friends’ and cooperate.

For example is the case of the U.K., when its version of PPBS – Program Analysis

and Review (PAR) was originally to be installed by the Civil Service Department

(CSD), which had authority over reform policy, but the Treasury opposed. The

Treasury saw it as their jurisdiction and soon was able to move PAR to be under its

power (Saint-Martin, 2000: 91).

As for the case of Thailand, the OCSC was established as early as 1932, to ensure a

merit system in the civil service systems. Of the many initiatives of OCSC, Results-

Based Management (RBM) was the one that laid the foundations of performance-

based management type tools. OCSC first proposed the Public Sector Reform Master

Plan for 1997-2001. After which, the Office of Public Sector Development

Commission (OPDC) was established at the end of 2002, and their role was to oversee

reform strategies, its implementation, and unavoidably, also oversee performance

evaluations in the public sector. So naturally, the OPDC prepared another plan called

the Thai Strategic Plan for Public Sector Development (2003-2007) and the OCSC’s

plan was abandoned. The managerial tools that OCSC proposed in the plan went out

the window as well.

21

As when OCSC’s role was diminishing, the tension between the OPDC and the

Bureau of Budget (BOB) began to rise. Marking the beginning of another tide of

budgetary management reform in Thailand, in 1996, BOB began to draft the

budgetary plans for 1997-2001, called Strategic Performance-Based Budgeting

(SPBB). BOB felt the need to keep ahead in the reform game, thus made various

efforts to introduce managerial tools and techniques to be used with line ministries.

Experts such as Allen Schick were brought in to give consultation. These experts left

remarkable impact on the bureau’s top-managers.

The OPDC began to design and implement performance evaluation tools, especially

for provincial governments, which resembles a balanced scorecard. OPDC plans to

expand its role to evaluate the performance of bureaus as well. This surely crosses

over into some of the BOB’s core turf. BOB faces challenges because its Evaluation

Department has been relatively weak and now BOB was facing tough competition

from OPDC. The BOB was striving to come up with something new and to show that

they were on track with development of a comprehensive performance-based

budgeting system. One of the plans to remedy the problem was to install a new

management tool called PART. PART is the acronym for Performance Assessment

Rating Tool. It is a hybrid of two tools from the U.S., the Program Assessment Rating

Tool (also called PART) 1 and the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) balanced

scorecards.2 This tool is to be used together with other tools in the Strategic

Performance-Based Budgeting (SPBB) initiative. Some argue that PART overlaps

with the evaluation tool, which is a mix of TQM and the balanced scorecard that the

OPDC had developed. Thus line agencies are left confused and frustrated because

they have to answer the seemingly duplicating questionnaires from these two

agencies.

1 PART (Program Assessment Rating Tool) of the U.S. was developed in 2002. It is a tool for evaluating programs within a department or among a couple of departments. The unit of evaluation is a program – that can only be one program or 2-3 closely related programs combined. PART scores are divided into four brackets (85%-100%: Effective), (70%-84%: Moderately Effective), (50%-69%: Adequate), and (0%-49%: Ineffective). 2 For details see http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budintegration/scorecards/agency_scorecards.html). The scorecard focuses on five areas: strategic management of human capital; competitive sourcing; improved financial performance; expanded electronic government; and budget and performance integration. The scorecard uses the traffic light system of red for unsatisfactory, yellow for mixed results, and green for success. It was announced by OMB in 2001.

22

In Malaysia, the usage of managerial tools by bureaucrats to lead reform was

prevalent since it the end of 1960s’. Esman (1972) recorded the start-up budgetary

reforms that, after realizing the necessary changes that were about to happen from the

Esman-Montgomery Report (1966), the Treasury, afraid of losing its turf and control

to the Development Administration Unit (DAU), autonomously initiated its own study

for budgetary reforms. Treasury quickly called in Thomas Mugford, former Director

of Finance for California, for 4 months to make a recommendation report. Mugford’s

report was in agreement with the Esman-Montgomery Report. After Mugford, the

Treasury then hired Max Medley, who had prior experience with the United States

General Services Administration. This was at the same time that “Planning and-

Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) was sweeping the United States” (Esman,

1972: 202). After touring several countries to study financial management practices

such as the U.K, the U.S, Pakistan and the Philippines, the Treasury concluded that

financial management in the U.S. was feasible for Malaysia if it were slowly

introduced and adapted to the local context (Esman, 1972: 203). These events mark

the few first transfers of budgetary reform policies from the U.S., which were

‘fashionable’ at that time.

From the above experiences, we shall briefly narrate how the game is played by

bureaucrats from central agencies. First, the central bureaucrats of a central agency

will try to increase their power in government by creating a new domain, steal the

work of other agencies, replicate or overlap the work already done by other

bureaucrats in other agencies. It is imperative for central bureaucrats to be accepted

by powerful figures in government that they are the pioneering focal actor of the

proposed reform innovation.

Second, the central bureaucrat reformers will explore the management techniques

from abroad that are the “fashions” in the management school. Foreign consultants

may be hired. Loans from the World Bank and the United Nations to carry out

administrative reform in line with those management fashions may be accepted by

government. Public officials, go on field trips abroad to study how other developed

countries such as the U.K., New Zealand, and the USA are using particular

management innovations to reform their governments.

23

Third, the central bureaucrats select the management techniques to be used. It is at

this stage that the hybridization of a reform innovation from abroad takes place. The

reform prototype devised will contain elements that give a lot of monitoring and

control power to the focal central agency (Bowornwathana, 2006e, 2004b).

Fourth, the focal central agency will try to convince the political leaders responsible

for administrative reform to legalize the reform process under the proposed

management technique by making it a cabinet resolution, prime minister’s order or

legislation through parliament. The legal framework approved should grant power to

the focal agency to carry on a particular reform by requiring all agencies to comply.

Fifth, the focal central agency will then issue rules and regulations so that they can

enforce the implementation of that particular management reform technique in the

government bureaucracy. The focal central agency will standardized the

implementation procedures, command all related agencies to follow. Compulsory

training sessions may be conducted for this purpose. Bureaucrats in other agencies

may be identified and appointed as agents of the central agency in charge of reform.

The above cycle of domain expansion by central agencies may become a serious

burden to other bureaucrats if every central agency creates new turfs in the name of

new management techniques all the time. One should also note that while bureaucrats

may use managerial tools as political instruments to exercise control, the politician

who controls the government agency that the bureaucrats are affiliated also stand to

gain from the increasing power of the respective bureaucrats. For example, the prime

minister may assign a deputy prime minister to be in charge of the national

administrative reform office that consists of self-interested bureaucrats who are driven

by domain expansion ambitions.

III. RESULTS OF REFORM

The BPF suggests that bureaucratic politics affect the decision-making of reform

policies and managerial tools, which in turn affects the power shift between and

among politicians and bureaucrats. The framework is dynamic, meaning, that the

24

affects are continuous and works as a cycle throughout the attempts for administrative

reform in all governments over time.

When one speaks about the political consequences of reform one is referring to the

balance of power among and between politicians and bureaucrats. Have the power

relationships between and among themselves changed? Did the reform initiatives

alter the balance of power among actors? Following the BPF, we should examine the

political consequences of reform in the power relations between politicians and

bureaucrats, among bureaucrats, and among politicians. Questions asked are: Are the

politicians more powerful than bureaucrats after reform? Has power changed hands

among bureaucrats such as power being moved from line officials to central officials?

After reform, is the prime minister more powerful than other ministers?

Any effort to measure the results of reform on power relations between and among

politicians and bureaucrats has to take into consideration three important aspects of

the studies of reform impact. First, the study of reform consequences must adopt a

long-term perspective. We should observe how the power relations among actors

change during a long time-frame perspective. Second, there is the difficulty of

attributing the changes one observes in the power relations among actors to a

particular reform initiative. There are many other reform initiatives under way and

exogenous factors that may cause the power relations among actors to change. Third,

one should be reminded that power structures are means rather than ends. We have to

link the changed power relations with the performance of government. Questions

asked are: Has public services improved after the reform or not? Does reform matter

if it is only a power struggle phenomenon?

CONCLUSION

Throughout this paper, the proposed bureaucratic politics framework has emphasized

why ‘politics’ matter in the context of administrative reforms. The authors propose

three interdependent aspects to analyze the relations between bureaucratic politics and

administrative reform. These dynamic relationships serve as useful analytical

frameworks to understand the power plays among the actors in the setting of

administrative reforms. For all public administration scholars, when we ask questions

25

about public sector reforms, whether it be structural reform, managerial reform, or

behavioral and cultural reform, it is of great concern to pay attention to the struggle

for power among actors. Only when we begin ask who wins and who loses in a

reform, is when we are showing true understanding that politics is administration and

administration is, forever, politics.

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Simon, Herbert (1947). Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan. Stockwin, J. A. A. (2005). “Governance, democracy and the political economy of the Japanese state.” In Glenn D. Hook ed., Contested Governance in Japan: Sites and issues. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, Taylor & Francis Group, 54-70. Vogel, Ezra F. (1979). Japan as No. 1: Lessons for America. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co. Woronoff, Jon (1986). Politics: The Japanese Way. Tokyo: Yonan Publications, Inc. ------------------------------- About the Authors Bidhya Bowornwathana (PhD) is an associate professor of the Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. His recent articles appear in international journals such as Public Administration and Development, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, Public Organization Review: A Global Journal, Asia Journal of Political Science, Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, Asian Survey, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Public Administration Quarterly, Asian Review of Public Administration, and Public Administration: An International Quarterly (a book review). He has chapters in Christopher Pollitt and Colin Talbot eds. Unbundled Government (Routledge, 2004), and Eric Otengo and Nancy Lind, eds. Comparative Public Administration (The United Kingdom: Oxford: Elsevier, 2006); He co-edited (with John P. Burns) Civil Service Systems in Asia (Edward Elgar, 2001). He is a member of the editorial board of International Review of Administrative Sciences (2006-present), Public Administration and Development (2003-2005), Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration (2005-present). He is member of IPSA-SOG Executive Board (2006-present). He is member of the Advisory Board of the Asia Pacific Governance Institute (2006-present). He served as reviewer for several journals such as Public Management Review, Governance, and Public Organization Review. He was chairman of the Department of Public Administration, Chulalongkorn University (1991-1994). He served as the Secretary and Member of the National Administrative Reform Commissions (1993-1995, 1997-1999). Ora-orn Poocharoen (PhD) is an assistant professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, the National University of Singapore. She received her PhD in Public Administration from, the Maxwell School in Syracuse University. Her interests are public management reforms, comparative public administration, and public policy. She has co-authored and published in Public Administration Review, Public Organization Review: A Global Journal and has presented papers at the Association of Public Policy and Management (APPAM), American Society of Public Administration (ASPA), International Research Symposium on Public Management (IRSPM) and Mid-west Political Science Association (MPSA). Her recent publication is Ora-orn Poocharoen and Patricia Ingraham. “Integration of Management Areas” in Ingraham (ed.), Managing for Performance: The Government Performance Project. John Hopkins University Press, 2006.