Building Bridges of Trust: A Proposal for

Interfaith Conflict Transformation in Northern Nigeria

Nma Winnie Okafor GVPT 808 J/K

A Proposal for Funding to the United States Institute of Peace

(USIP)

Submitted by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland

Local Partners Interfaith Mediation Center

(Kaduna, Nigeria) Catholic Bishops Conference

of Nigeria

Prepared by

Executive Summary

Around the globe, the eruption of violent conflicts rarely cause government leaders to pause and

reflect on the available tools to solve them. Governments often react with force, without considering

peacebuilding alternatives. The case of the recent spell of violence in Northern Nigeria between Christians

and Muslims is no different. With a population of 174,507,539 (est 2013) – 50% Muslim, 40% Christian,

and 10% Indigenous beliefs – Nigeria continues to suffer from the “divide and rule” tactics of the British

Empire which placed Muslim Northerners in positions of leadership over Christian Southerners. That

system paved the way to a Muslim majority in the military and sowed the seed for tension among

Nigerians. In the advent of democratic rule in 1999, autocratic practices reigned supreme with economic

and political opportunities being reserved for a few connected individuals. Thus, the current levels of

institutional instability, lack of economic openness, and disregard for the rule of law have contributed to

on-going religious conflict and created an opening for terrorist activity.

Terrorist activity in Nigeria is on the rise with Christians and moderate Muslims as targets. Most

of the violence, such as the 2011 Christmas Day bombings, have been perpetrated by Boko Haram, an

extremist Islamic terrorist organization. Boko Haram demands the abolishment of “western-styled

education, the practice of Sharia law, conversion of all Nigerians to Islam, and the establishment of an

Islamic State. While their demands are at odds with the mainstream Nigerian perspective, I believe that

their needs are similar. Both the extremist and average Nigerians share a need for security, economic

opportunity, collective identity and recognition for their language, culture, and way of life.

Therefore, as an academic practitioner at the Center for International Development and Conflict

Management (CIDCM), I offer this proposal for funding to the United States Institute for Peace (USIP).

Given USIP’s previous involvement with the Interfaith Mediation Center (IMC) in Kaduna, Nigeria, I

believe your organization understands the potential for conflict transformation in Northern Nigeria.

Through time-tested conflict resolution workshops, I plan to engage Catholic Bishops, Christian Pastors,

and Muslim Imams, selected by the IMC, in a one week peacebuilding seminar. These partners need an

opportunity to build trust, brainstorm ideas, and take feasible action steps; my program can provide that

opportunity. The partners in conflict will also develop suggestions for the Nigerian government to curb

retributive violence against terrorist, uphold the rule of law, promote education for Muslim youth and

establish a peacebuilding curriculum for primary and secondary schools. I hope you will favorably

consider funding this project. Thank you for your kind consideration. Yours Sincerely, Winnie Okafor

1

Part I – Diagnosis of Problem

1.1 Risk Factors

The conflict between Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria is a recent phenomenon that

began after the dissolution of the military regime in 1999. The first democratically held elections of the

late twentieth century ushered in a fragile democracy which functioned more like an anocracy. Research

on the topic of anocracies shows that they are least favorable condition for preventing conflict and

instead foster conflict behavior. Unlike several countries in the Middle East today which arrived at

democratic governments through a wave of pro-democracy protests, Nigeria reverted to democracy after

the death of a dictator, General Sani Abacha who was allegedly poisoned. Regimes with a mix of

democratic and autocratic features are inherently more unstable than governments that are consistently

autocratic or democratic (Ted Robert Gurr et al, 2012). As a new and fragile democracy, Nigeria finds

herself in that middle ground of being an anocracy as the leadership structure consists of the same old

boys club from the same leading political party – Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP).

Nigeria is at risk for violent conflict both according The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger:

Ranking States on Future Risks, the country has a high risk score of 20.7 and is ranked number eighth in

the list of Highest Estimated risk Instability, 2010-2012. In normative terms, Nigeria suffers from a lack

of economic openness, institutional inconsistency, a history of militarization, and neighborhood

insecurity. The unavailability of resources to engage in business transactions promotes a closed

economy with only a few wealthy individuals gaining access to profitmaking enterprises. Additionally,

elected officials and appointed heads of agencies often practice nepotism by reserving government

contracts for friends and allies. In an economy where friendship curries favors, there is no incentive for

individuals to play by the rules. Hence, the economy progresses based on the input of a few untalented

entrepreneurs whose singular claim to expertise is their connection to someone in government. The

nepotism also perpetuates the single-product oil economy and removes the incentive for Nigerian to

develop other sectors of the economy.

Nigeria also endures a highly volatile democracy whereby the institutions comprising the

country’s political system are inconsistently and combine autocratic and democratic practices.

Institutional consistency remains a challenge for Nigeria both in the economic, political, and social

sectors. As stated above, the oil economy which is in the hands of a few wealthy individuals prevents the

development of any other sectors such as agriculture or technology. The political sector remains Erica

2

Frantz (2012) argues that anocracies have the potential to convert to democracies or revert to

autocracies. Nigeria is on the verge of converting to a pure democracy but in the meantime, its

instability is a breeding ground of intrastate conflict and terrorism.

Militarization and neighborhood insecurity work together to create greater risk for violent

conflict as the heavy-handed practices of the military regime led to a distrust for one’s neighbor.

Consequently, neighborhood killings and vigilante practices were rampant during military rule.

Christian pastors preached against military practices and condemned the Muslim generals who led these

institutions thus engendering distrust and tension in the neighborhoods (Wuye and Ashafa, 2005).

1.2 Parties Involved in Conflict

The recent spell of violent conflict in Northern Nigeria has caused analyst to question if there is

any hope for stability in Nigeria. Before the increase in violent conflict between Christians and Muslims

(see figure 1.4), both religious groups lived in harmony. According to the CIA.gov website, Nigeria has

50% Muslims, 40% Christian, and 10% indigenous beliefs with a population of 174,507,539 as of July

2013.1 It is popularly held belief that the Christian population is split down the middle with 20%

Protestants and 20% Catholics since the conversion rate is so high, it is difficult to pinpoint at any time

the true ratio of Protestants to Catholics. John McDonald (2003) describes the Empire theory as one of

the reasons that intrastate violence broke out at the end of World War II. He argues that the increased

intrastate violence can be attributed to the breakup of empires which ruled by force and fear. While the

Nigerian military government was no empire, it definitely ruled with an iron fist and thus curtailed any

potential violent religious conflicts.

However, in the wake of democratically elected government in Nigeria, there has been an

increase in ethnic and religious intrastate violence due to the risk factors of inconsistent institutions and

lack of economic openness. The violence has existed between two major groups, the Christians and

Muslims in Northern Nigeria. Both side have perpetuated violence against the other and caused

tremendous loss of life and property to each other. The aspects of Northern Nigeria which have endured

some amount of violence include Kano, Jos, Kaduna, and Abuja (see figure 1.1 and 1.2 for a map of

Nigeria showing these cities). While the violent clashes between Christians and Muslims in Northern

Nigeria have historical precedent which dates back to 1995 in Kaduna, Nigeria, the most recent increase

in Christian-Muslim conflict has been perpetrated by Boko Haram.

3

Boko Haram, an extremist Islamic group which formed in 2007, has taken responsibility for

inciting fear and terror in the lives of Nigerian Christians and moderate Muslims. Book Haram is made

up of extremist whose primary demand is the annihilation of western-styled education in Nigeria

insisting that any education that is not based on the Qur’an is sinful and un-Islamic. One of their

demands includes the practice of Sharia law and the spread of Islam to bring about a united Islamic

Caliphate which they achieve through the use of violence. Boko Haram has ties to Al Qaeda’s North and

West African affiliates, sharing tactics, techniques, training and financing with other Qaeda affiliates in

Africa including Shabab in Somalia and East Africa. In November 2013, Boko Haram was labeled as a

terrorist group by the U.S. State Department in order to allow the United States freeze assets and impose

travel bans on known members and affiliates.1 Part of the increased threat of Boko Haram is its strategy

of conducting attacks against the international targets. On August 26, 2011, a suicide bomber killed 21

people and injured several more in an attack on the United Nations building in Abuja which raised the

visibility of the group on the world stage. (Fiure 1.3 and 1.4 are graphs which show and increase in

violent attacks by Boko Haram.)

1.3 The Track Two Environment

As a result of the blanket use of violence by Boko Haram, there are various parties in this

conflict. In the track one environment, there are the officials of the Nigerian government and

representatives of Boko Haram. In the track two environment, there are concerned private citizens who

have lost friends and loved ones. Davies and Kaufman (2003) define second track diplomacy as follows:

“Second track, or ‘citizens’ diplomacy may be broadly defined as the bringing together of professionals,

opinion leaders or other currently or potentially influential individuals from communities in conflict,

without official representative status, to work together to understand better the dynamics underlying the

conflict and how its transformation from violence (or potential violence) to a collaborative process of

peace building and sustainable development might be promoted” (2). They argue that track one

diplomacy between official representatives can take a long time, be less creative, and contribute to

conflict. The culture of track one tends to be formal and bureaucratic, male dominated, rewarding

loyalty, conformity, and low-risk behavior in its practitioners (Davies and Kaufman, 2003). All these

factors make the track one partners the least likely to engage in peaceful dialogue to seek conflict

transformation.

4

There are several partners, outside of the official representatives, who can be assembled into a

team to promote conflict transformation. These partners such as business professionals, media

personnel, academics, and religious leaders form the track two environment. Track two activities can

“facilitate communication between parties, build trust and relationships, break down stereotypes, and

develop new ways of seeing and solving vexing problems” (Burgess 2010, 13). Working together as

partners from the same region, these partners understand their predicament and are the best to provide

mutually agreeable resolutions. In my plan to promote conflict transformation, I will I have chosen to

work with religious leaders of the Christian and Muslim faith who jointly view Boko Haram as a threat

to the security and safety of all Nigerians. To be more specific, my track two partners will be Catholic

Bishops, Christian Pastors and moderate Imams in Northern Nigeria selected by the Interfaith Mediation

Center (IMC). The IMC was formed by Pastor James Wuye and Imam Muhammed Ashafa whose

respective militia groups were once responsible for killings in Northern Nigeria. However, today both

leaders have overcome their bitterness and now work together in community peacebuilding.

With the help of IMC as a local partners, the Bishops, Pastors and Imam would be selected from

around the country and groomed into a constituency of peace to counter the attitudes of the spoilers of

peace. The influence and potential for these leaders to affect peace in their places of worship will help

inoculate the grassroots communities from the dangers of sporadic violence and thus prevent setbacks

(Burgess, 2010, 20). The religious partners in conflict whom I have selected to work with are influential

private citizens who have connections to the official track one leaders and can also wield their positive

influence over the people.

Not only is positive influence over the people a criteria for the partners in conflict, they also need

to have the moral imagination to be peacemakers and track two practitioners. According to John Paul

Lederach, The Moral Imagination, partners in conflict need to be peacebuilding visionaries. First, they

need to have the ability to imagine oneself in a positive relationship with the other. In Northern Nigeria

this could be difficult to achieve given the contentious nature of the current conflict and the rhetoric

from the extremists. However, if a few peacemakers within the constituency of the Muslim North can

reach out to other Christian neighbors with whom they can imagine having a good relationship. Second,

these peacemakers must have a solid understanding of the complexity of the problem and have a deep

curiosity about what is and what could be. This second attribute of a peacemaker requires creativity and

a new perspective of seeing the people who are in conflict with each other. In the case of Nigeria,

5

citizens who form the constituency of peacemakers need to be able to re-imagine their neighbors as

people with whom they can share food, holidays, and festivals. They also need to be able to identify the

ancestral differences which have contributed to the current struggles.

Thirdly, these peacemakers must be creative. Lederach (2005) defines creativity as follows: “[It]

moved beyond what exists toward something new and unexpected while rising from and speaking to the

everyday.” (75). In other words, this definition of creativity proposes that solutions come from the

bottom-up as opposed to from the top-down. Creative solutions should start by identifying the unique

elements of a conflict and work from those elements to propose alternative ways of dealing with the

everyday aspects of the conflict. This method is much more preferable to a solution which is imposed

from outside because it worked well in other conflicts. A creativity that is borrowed from a different

conflict might not account for the nuances of the conflict at hand.

Finally, these peacemakers must willingness to take risks. Risk-taking is an essential aspect of

any entrepreneurial endeavor so consequently, it is integral to the conflict resolution process. In a terrain

of violence where there are no rules, no roadmaps, and no guarantee of success, these peacemakers need

to be able to forge a clear vision for the future. Peacemakers need to be able to take risks and sometimes

might need to put their lives on the line in peaceful ways to spread the message of peace, solve the

problem at the root, and avoid escalating violence. As the IMC begins to draw up a list of potential

participants, each of the selected partners in conflict would be screened to ensure that they possess the

moral imagination to build peace.

1.4 Needs, Communication Channels, Past Interaction

The perception of mutually incompatible goals or demands can often stall the process of conflict

resolution. When parties confront each other with demands, these demands often present a zero-sum

scenario where there are winners and losers. However, in peacebuilding conflict transformation

strategies, everyone is a winner. We at CIDCM developed an integrative process of discerning human

needs which can be fully satisfied for both parties. Human needs are the most fundamental desires of the

human heart. According to Edward Azar (2003), human needs are “universal and nonnegotiable” (15).

In the same research Azar argues that second track diplomacy is best suited to promote political

development which ensures the provision of human needs for security, distributive justice, and identity.

Since both the Christian and Muslims in Northern Nigeria have a need for security and safety with

assurances that their lives will not be threatened by the other. Human needs are such that they can be

6

universally satisfied without harming the other; assuring for one group or the other requires the same

tools and creative thinking.

Additionally, the increased tension in the atmosphere has led to hostile attitudes between

Christian and Muslim neighbors. As a result these partners in conflict share the need to live in freedom

and security within their neighborhood. The only conflicting need might be the need for recognition,

separate identity and the role of women in society. The partners in conflict each assert in their official

religious documents that their way of worship is what guarantees access to heaven. The Christian and

Muslim faith promote an evangelistic spirit which seeks to convert others to their belief system.

Nonetheless, I believe that this an area where both partners can creatively find common ground.

The need for recognition of their separate cultural and religious identity is also shared by both

parties. Most Muslim Northerners are from the Hausa-Fulani tribe which is a nomadic, cattle-rearing

tribe. Ancestrally, they traveled miles on foot in search of green pastures for their flock. It is necessary

to understand that there are also Hausa-Fulani Christians who share the same ancestry but now practice

different religions. Consequently, the potential for conflict between these two groups abounds. There is

yet another ethnic group of people known as the “Middle Belt” tribes who form an ethnic minority in

Nigeria. The Middle Belters seek autonomy, access to the economy and political participation as they

are neither part of the Hausa-Fulani tribe in the North or the Igbo or Yoruba tribe in the South. The

Middle Belt tribe has its own language, norms of behavior, and indigenous religious practices. Some

Middle Belters also practice Christianity. Moving past the demands of both groups to their non-

negotiable human needs, it is clear to see that both groups share similar human needs which can be

satisfied without taking resources away from the other.

Past track two interactions include a joint initiative by a Christian pastor and Muslim Imam in

Kaduna, Nigeria. Pastor James Wuye and Imam Asafa both led gangs who killed members of each

other’s folk. Pastor James also lost his hand in the crisis. After three years of plotting to kill each, both

men experienced a change of heart and sought reconciliation. They established the Interfaith Mediation

Center which uses community based conflict resolution techniques to address inter-communal violence.

In chapter 10.2 of the volume People Building Peace, Pastor James and Imam Ashafa note five

objectives of their organization: “to reestablish relationship that have been damaged due to recurring

violence over the last five years, to minimize the reoccurrence of violence in the community, to initiate

programs and projects that require and encourage the involvement of Christians and Muslims in

7

dialogues, workshops, cultural events, and the establishment of a resource center), to enhance

interreligious relationships and cooperation with the state, to support and build the capacity of local

partners who are involved in peacemaking” (228). The United States Institute of Peace continues to fund

the community building workshops organized by the IMC while also funding resettlement efforts for ex-

combatants in the Niger-Delta. These initiatives continue to make an impact on a small scale in local

communities. However, this proposal aims at inviting more influential track two partners to build trust

and brainstorm ideas that would impact the whole nation.

Part II – Prognosis

2.1 Future Scenarios

If the violent conflict in Nigeria rages on without any diplomatic intervention, the consequences

would be dire. Already the Nigerian government seems overwhelmed by their responsibility to maintain

peace and security for its citizens. The government has failed to negotiate with Boko Haram or even

engage them in dialogue since it views the group as an illegitimate organization. It can be very difficult

for first track actors to work with an “illegitimate party” as such interactions might send the wrong

message to the public; the government could be misunderstood as promoting violence. The ability of

track one to meet with an illegitimate party could also be prohibited by the law which makes such

meeting illegal. However, peace is rarely achieved until these so called “illegitimate” parties have been

heard and their needs have been met. Therefore track two actors can help solve these conflict in two

primary ways: “through back channels to ensure that the interests and demands of an illegitimate party

are clearly understood and brought to the table, convince the illegitimate parties that talking is more

likely to get their interests met than is violence” (Burgess 2010, 14).

Given that Boko Haram has been labeled a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department, it

further complicates the ability of the Nigerian government to publicly negotiate with them. According to

a New York Times report, twenty-five scholars disagreed with the terrorist designation as “[it] would

internationalize Boko Haram, legitimize abuses by Nigeria’s security services, limit the State

Department’s latitude in shaping a long-term strategy and undermine the U.S. government’s ability to

receive effective independent analysis from the region.”2 By this act of designating Boko Haram a

terrorist organization, the U.S. State Department has unofficially tied the hands of Nigerian track one

officials who wish to negotiate with the group. Often time illegitimate parties have needs and concerns

which are universal human needs. But in the absence of dialogue, it is impossible to discover what those

8

needs are or how to meet them.

As a result of this designation, Boko Haram has been labeled an illegitimate group and one can

expect increased violence targeting of Christians, moderate Muslims in Nigeria and the international

community. This prognosis is especially likely since both sides – the Nigerian government (basked by

the international community) and Boko Haram – still feel that they can “win” the battle. Both sides are

yet to arrive at a saturation point of violence known as “mutually hurting stalemate.” This is where all

sides of the conflict agree that they are in downward spiral, they need a “way out” and cannot sustain

conflict any longer (Burgess, 2010). William Zartman discussed in Timing Mediation Initiatives, that

“mutually hurting stalemates” are a timely way to resolve the conflicts between officials in track one.

However, when a conflict has not reached the “mutually hurting stalemate,” it is not ripe for track one

negotiations and is best resolved by a third-party or track two intervener.

In the current situation in Northern Nigeria, several tactical and legal matter make the conflict

unripe for track one intervention but ready for track two diplomacy. Given the legal challenges, it would

be impossible for an official member of the Nigerian government or the international community to

engage in talks with Boko Haram representatives. At this point the respective track one officials are at

logger heads with each other and they both seem to believe that they can win it all. The Nigerian

government relies on its arsenal of weapons and heavy-handed attacks to consistently strike down the

Boko Haram fighters. Neither of the parties are willing to find a “way out.”

As a third party expert who has been invited to work with Catholic Bishops, Christian Pastors

and moderate Imams to resolve the conflict at the religious level, I am hopeful that trust building

workshops can ameliorate the tension between citizens who have to fear each other as enemies. Without

such a peacebuilding program, within a few years, I project that the Nigerian government would

continue to use force in dealing with Boko Haram which would bolster their activities nationally and

internationally. Additionally, if economic opportunities remain closed to the majority of Nigerians,

increased economic stress would lead to angst in the population and would cause several youth to find a

way to express their frustration through extremist religious ideology and terrorism. Furthermore, without

a workshop on conflict resolution, religious leaders may unknowingly continue to fan the flame of anger

and hate for the other. Thus, Northern Nigeria would become an unsafe place with the potential to ignite

civil war through the whole country.

Without a workshop on conflict negotiation, the risk factors as mentioned above would choke

9

out any possible solutions for peace and force Nigeria in more violent conflict. As mentioned earlier, the

two most pressing risk factors facing Nigeria are economic openness and institutional inconsistency.

Nigeria oscillate between an autocratic and a democratic government and thus is best understood as an

autocracy. In Erica Frantz (2012) article Trends in Democratization: Unpacking Anocracies she argues

that anocracies have the potential to convert to democracies or revert to autocracies. Nigeria is at a

critical point where certain risk factors can either push the country back several years or begin to work

toward achieving a pure democracy.

On the other hand, if we at CIDCM were to receive funding to conduct this week-long workshop,

religious tolerance would heighten to a point where Christians and Muslims would be able to live in

harmony. The implementation of this proposal would not just help reduce the conflict but would lead to

conflict transformation. Notice here that we are not using the term conflict management or solutions to

conflict but rather conflict transformation. Kaufman and Davies (2003) note their preference for the

term conflict transformation since it “highlights the shift in perceptions and attitudes which often takes

place among those engaged in citizen’s diplomacy, empowering them to build working relationships

across community lines and actively take responsibility for moving the peace process forward” (3). Our

long-term goal for the Northern Nigeria conflict is to transform the lives, minds, and hearts of the

parties; to build on their fragile trust so they can continue to work together to rebuild their communities

of faith, sustain economic growth, and promote political involvement.

Part III – Treatment

3.1 Partners In Conflict

One Catholic Bishop and Muslim Imam have interacted publicly with each other on an isolated

basis without the explicit goals of resolving the broader conflict in Northern Nigeria. After a massive

flood swept through a Jos town and drowned about 40 people, swept houses and displaced thousands

more. Most of those affected were Muslim so Archbishop Kaigama took grifts and material goods to

visit Sheikh Dawud. The Archbishop’s visit was a good will visit to “dispel the notion that Muslims and

Christians in Plateau State cannot meet.”3 The meeting between these two religious leaders encouraged

the community to work toward peaceful reconciliation. Archbishop Kaigama also received the Archivio

Disamo for Peace Golden Doves in 2012 in Italy for his dedication and commitment to peace and

harmony in Nigeria.

10

Given Archbishop Kaigama bravery in meeting with Sheikh Dawud, both of these leaders will be

requested to join the peacebuilding workshop. Archbishop Kaigama serves as the current President of

the Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria (CBCN) and would be in a good position to select fellow

Catholic Bishops to attend the week-long workshop. Sheikh Dawud alongside the Interfaith Mediation

Center would, likewise, be tasked with selecting suitable Christian Pastors and Imam. Strong local

connections have already been formed in Northern Nigeria which give me a lot of hope. The relationship

between Pastor Wuye and Imam Ashafa, Archbishop Kaigama and Sheikh Dawud, has already planted

the seed of cooperation and peaceful coexistence in Northern Nigeria. My job as a third party mediator

would be establish an atmosphere and opportunity for greater trust through a week-long workshop at an

undisclosed location. At this workshop, these partners in conflict will learn about nonviolent

communication and reestablish the strong cultural ties which unite them. Through the skills building

workshop, they will learn to establish and maintain relationships, engage in effective communication

and problem-solving.

Having decided on thirty-five participants with the help of the IMC and through the screening

process of moral imagination and risk taking, the participants will be assembled in Accra, Ghana for a

week-long workshop on trust building. The number thirty-five is ideal because it is small enough for the

participants to get to know each other, yet big enough to expand the network of influence. We at

CIDCM propose several meetings over the course five years to help partners break down barriers.

3.2 Rundown of the Workshop

Preconditions and barriers to negotiation – the barriers to negotiation remains the fear and mistrust

among the followers of Christianity and Islam in Northern Nigeria. While the leaders are ready to talk

and negotiate, the people remain skeptical. To avoid any violent attacks against the lives of these

partners, participants may not discuss their involvement with the training workshops with anyone in the

community except fellow religious leaders. This parameter ensures the safety of all involved in the talks

and the success of the program.

Venue and location – the location would be in Accra, Ghana, a metropolitan city in West Africa which is

accessible by road and air. This establishes a neutral ground with an objective criteria for political and

religious plurality to flourish. Since their lives could potentially be in danger, we would hold the

workshops at the British Council in Accra, Ghana. With the necessary funds, we can bring all thirty-five

participants together in Accra, Ghana to build trust. Given the active involvement of the British Council

11

in Ghana and Nigeria with local peacebuilding efforts, their facilities would be a likely option for

hosting the group.

Levelling the playing field – It helps our cause that the parties involved are all part of religious class. But

to ensure equality, participants would be asked to select a name without a title which they would like to

be called.

Resourcing the negotiations – The most important resource in the conflict negotiation process is money

to bring these participants together in a safe space. Additionally, the funds to pay for a team of expert

third-party facilitators would help the negotiations. (See Table 1.1 for budget)

Form of negotiations – In the first year, the group will focus on trust building. However, in subsequent

years, the group mediation strategy also known as ARIA would be used to resolve the conflict. ARIA

refers to the four steps of group negotiation – Adversarial, Reflexive, Integrative, and Action. The

preface to the ARIA is trust building.

Timeframes – The workshop will take place over a one week (7-day) period in the summer including the

weekend. Follow-up session via conference calls and separate committee meetings throughout the year.

3.3 Group Conflict Resolution

The second track initiative involves a three step peacebuilding strategy. The first step is trust

building where participants learn more about each other and break down stereotypes they have harbored

against the other. The goal of group negotiation strategy is to get both parties past their control-based

approach into a needs-based approach to conflict resolution. It is expected that both parties will arrive

with certain demands of the other. However, after completing the trust building stage, the hearts of the

participants would be softened to engage in the reflexive, integrative, and action steps.

I. Trust Building Activities: In this segment, the participants will learn about each other through a

series of activities.

a. Pairing participants in two by where they are sitting and asking them to make name tags

for the other participant.

b. Ups and downs – that is identifying the people who share a particular trait. Those who

share such a trait stand up and the other clap for them.

12

c. Arranging the participants in the room according to their birthdays.

d. Learn about stereotypes and identifying situations where participants have acted as

perpetrators, victims, bystanders, and enablers or stereotypes.

II. Skills Building Activities – Participants learn the skills of non-violent communication, active

listening, group mediation, and interpersonal mediation. In the non-violent communication,

participants learn to establish ground rules for communicating with opponents, they learn to

avoid “Hot Button” words, words that stall the negotiation process. In actively listening, they

learn to paraphrase main ideas back to each other, they learn to use “I feel” statements and

“because I” statements. They learn to speak about their values and why things are important to

them. In the group and interpersonal mediation sessions, the participants will perform the

Reflexive of putting themselves in another’s shoes and practice other newly learned skills to

achieve understanding.

With the trust and skills building activities, it is important to debrief the activities with the

participants by highlighting the goals of trust building. These trust building skills are meant to help to

treat all participants with respect and dignity, create an environment that makes participants feel

comfortable, let each party know that the trainer or facilitator is listening to their problems or

commonalities.

III. Consensus Building Activities – At this phase, the partners in conflict have mastered the

Adversarial and Reflexive stages of the ARIA and will begin to brainstorm integrative ideas.

Upon first glance, the integrative or collaborative style of conflict resolution seems contradictory

because it assumes that both parties can satisfy more than 50% of their needs. Through creative thinking,

parties can come up with integrative ideas to solve their conflict. Having gained trust and confidence in

each other, we are confident that their proposals for action will be along the lines of ideas listed below.

3.4 Proposed Ideas

As part of the workshop action initiative, here are some ideas that could potentially be generated and

implemented by participants. These ideas are separate from initiatives which would be suggested to the

Nigerian government.

• Joint Declaration of Peaceful Coexistence – signed by all attendees since many followers of

Christianity and Islam believe that both religions cannot live together, it would be a great step

forward for the religious leaders of these groups to sign a document stating their peaceful

13

coexistence referencing peaceful eras of the past.

• National Food Sharing Month in February – The riots in Kaduna in 1992 were triggered by the

moving of the market square from a Muslim area into a Christian area. A National Food Sharing

Month would commemorate this event by asking all Nigerians to share food with their

neighbors.

• Text for Peace: Religious Texting Campaign

• Faith Friday and Sacred Sunday – given Nigeria’s reliance on cellular technology, such a

proposal would not be difficult to implement.

• Righteous Radio Initiative – Joint radio appearances

• Faith Television – Bishops, Pastors and Imams insist on appearing together when interviewed.

• National Sorry Day – Public reconciliation where Christians and Muslims apologize to each

other for the violence they have caused.

• National Peace Tour – travel around together on a peace campaign bus to promote coexistence.

• Neighborhood Terrorism Watch through members of their respective Churches and Mosques.

These initiatives would be sub-divided into committee which would take on the responsibility of

administering implementation of the most feasible ideas. Other ideas would be taken to the Nigerian

government for review:

• National Tribunal for Terrorist Activities to replace 1992 Civil Disturbances Tribunal – Instead

of the brutal tactics of killing terrorists, the Nigerian government can capture them alive and try

them in a military tribunal. The gesture will promote the rule of law and reduce recruiting

opportunities for Boko Haram.

• Institute for Peaceful Coexistence – A Nationally funded institute for peace which offers

Certificate program in Peacebuilding, Peacebuilding curriculum for High School and College,

and Nigerian Youth Service Program.

• National Law to mandate the closing of all business on Fridays and Sundays during times of

worship since Nigerians already adhere to this informally. A law making a formal proclamation

would solve the need for recognition for Muslim and Christian identity.

• Funding for Madrasas (local Muslim schools in the North) in order to have an input in the

curriculum and promote indigenous cultural identity of the local practice of Islam.

• Include three major languages as Nigerian National Language to promote recognition.

3.5 Action Steps

14

The action step and evaluation step of the ARIA are perhaps the most important steps. In this phase, the

partners each decide on aspects of the plan that they would implement. The partners form committees to

ensure the fruitful completion of their project; they can also reconstitute themselves as a joint party to

lobby track one government officials into action. Here is a list of action steps:

• Commit to five years of working together

• Meet once a year with conference call every three months and more frequent committee

meetings

• Committee to monitor integrative ideas and monitor track one.

• A celebration of milestones achieved and evaluation of failed ideas.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the effort of peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria is no easy task. After establishing

the demands and needs of each group, working through the group negotiation workshop and listing

potential integrative solutions, the possibilities of peace seem endless. All it takes some creative thinking

which put aside demands, plays down adversarial negotiating, and displays collaborative effort. At the

start of the process, parties might be skeptical which is why it take about five years to help parties feel

comfortable enough to think integratively. To help the parties overcome their skepticism, we will build

trust through non-threatening activities to establish commonalities among the group. Additionally, the

parties will be led in nonviolent communication exercises such as paraphrasing and active listening.

Through the practice of reflexivity participants would be asked to reflect on the opposing viewpoints by

owning them in character.

The time frame for moving to the integrative stage of the ARIA model depends on how quickly

the parties are able to gain each other’s trust. After sufficient trust building, the process of integrative

negotiation and creative thinking can begin. Given the desire to end the violence in Northern Nigeria

and the proven track record of collaboration of the participants who would be in attendance at the

workshop, the solutions have the potential to resolve the conflict and transform Nigeria. We at CIDCM

hope that the United States Institute of Peace will consider our proposal favorably and fund us with the

necessary resources to bring a peaceful end to the conflict in Northern Nigeria.

Thank you.

15

Appendix

Figure 1.1 Map of Nigeria

16

Figure 1.2. Map of Nigeria political boundary markers of various states.

17

Armed Assault Tactics Armed Assault Target Types

Figure 1.3

Shows armed conflict from terrorist groups Boko Haram and MEND from 2006 to 2011.

Armed Assaults Over Time Armed Assault Casualties

Incident Type / Date Armed Assault

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

3

4

14

11

60

35

11

18

1

2 1 1

Incident Type / Date Armed Assault

0

50

100

150

200

25

107

127

35

219

7 0

10

0

188

Group Boko Haram MEND Other

Group / Attack/ Operation Tactic Boko Haram MEND Oth..

0

50

100 88

5 2 2 1 1 1

26

3 2 2

Incident Type / Target Type Armed Assault

0

50

5 10 20

14

22

80

4 1 1

18

Events Over Time

Casualties Over Time

Figure 1.4 Events attributed to the Boko Haram group have been increasing since 2007 and casualties

are up from last year. Website: http://www.tableausoftware.com/public/gallery/terrorism-nigeria

19

Bombing Target Types Bomb Types

Figure 1.5 Shows increased bombings by Boko Haram over time.

Event Type Casualties per Event Type

Bombings Over Time Bombing Casualties

Incident Type / Date Bombing

0

10

20

30

35

1 1

1

14

25

17

3 1

1 1

1

Incident Type / Date Bombing

0

100

200

7

233

127

62

15 0

0 0

3

Group Boko Haram MEND Other

Incident Type / Target Type Bombing

0

20

40

2 11

11 15

45

20

3 1 1 1

Group / Bomb Type Boko Haram D MEN Other

0

20

40 41

3 2 1

49

3 4 2

20

Building Bridges of Trust Budget 2014-2016

Totals for Years 2014 2015 2016 three years

Participants 35 35 35 Travel $ 17,500.00 $ 17,500.00 $ 17,500.00 $ 52,500.00 Food $ 7,000.00 $ 7,000.00 $ 7,000.00 $ 21,000.00

Lodging Total for One

$ 7,000.00 $ 7,000.00 $ 7,000.00 $ 21,000.00

Year $ 31,500.00 $ 31,500.00 $ 31,500.00 $ 94,500.00

Table 1.1 Proposed Budget

Works Referenced

"Civil Society in Nigeria." U.S. Agency for International Development.

http://results.usaid.gov/nigeria/democracy-and-governance/civil-society. Accessed 19

Jan. 2014.

Erica Frantz, "Trends in Democratization: Unpacking Anocracies." In Peace and Conflict, eds. J.

Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ted Robert Gurr, and Birger Heldt. University of

Maryland, CIDCM, 2012.

Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess Conducting Track II Peacemaking. Washington DC: US

Institute of Peace Press (Peacemaking Toolkit Series), 2010 and 2012 (access via

www.usip.org).

J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr with Birger Heldt, Peace and

Conflict, CIDCM, Executive Summary, 2012.

John Davies and Edy Kaufman (eds.) Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and

Techniques for Conflict Transformation. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield 2003.

John Davies and Ey Kaufman, Second Track Ccitizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques

for Conflict Transformation. 2003.

21

John McDonald, “The Need for Multi-Track Diplomacy,” in Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy:

Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation, edited by John Davies and

Edward (Edy) Kaufman, 2003.

John Paul Lederach, Reina Neufeldt, and Hal Culbertson, Reflective Peacebuilding:A Planning,

Monitoring, and Learning Toolkit (Mindanao, Philippines: Joan B. Kroc Institute for

International Peace Studies and Catholic Relief Services Southeast/East Asia Regional

Office, 2007), 51; http://crs.org/publications/showpdf.cfm?pdf_id=80.

John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. New York:

Oxford University Press, 2005

Pastor James Wuye and Imam Muhammed Ashafa, “The Pastor and the Imam: The Muslim-

Christian Dialogue Forum in Nigeria” in People Builidng Peace II: Successful Stories of

Civil Society edited by Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema and Juliette

Verhoeven. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005.

"Nigerian Nightmare: Visualizing Terror in Africa’s Most Populous Nation." The Institute for

the Study of Violent Groups. N.p., 7 Nov. 2011.

http://www.isvg.org/follow/blog/2011/11/07/nigerian-nightmare-visualizing-terror-in-

africas-most-populous-nation/ Accessed on 19 Jan. 2014.

Staff, CNN Wire, Josh Levs, Richard Allen Greene, Esprit Smith, Karen Smith, Amir Ahmed,

and Hamdi Alkhshali. "Christmas Carnage in Nigeria; 5 Churches Bombed." CNN. Cable

News Network, 25 Dec. 2011. Web. 19 Jan. 2014.

1 Eric Schmitt. State Department Calls Group in Nigeria Terrorists. November 13, 2013. New York Times. 2 Eric Schmitt. State Department Calls Group in Nigeria Terrorists. November 13, 2013. New York Times. 3 Alao, Onimisi, Isa Sa'idu, and Vanessa Offiong. "Nigeria: Christian, Muslim Leaders in Bridge-Building Moves." All Africa.com. N.p., 4 Nov. 2012. http://allafrica.com/stories/201208040374.html?page=1. 20 Jan. 2014.

22