Brustein.berntson.interwarFascistPopularity.(ESR)

7/30/2019 Brustein.berntson.interwarFascistPopularity.(ESR)

1/21

Interwar Fascist Popularity in Europe and the Default of the LeftAuthor(s): William Brustein and Marit BerntsonReviewed work(s):Source: European Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 159-178Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/522498 .

Accessed: 01/02/2012 06:25

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toEuropean

Sociological Review.
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/522498?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/522498?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup


2/21

EuropeanSoctiologicaleview,Vol. 15 No. 2, 159-178

I n t e r w a r F a s c i s t Popularity i n E u r o p e a n d t h eD e f a u l t o f t h e L e f tWilliamBrusteinndMaritBerntsonMore than fifty years have passed since the end of World War II and the collapse of interwar fascistregimes. Yet many questions persist regarding the allure that interwar fascism had for millions ofEuropeans. Why fascism succeeded in attracting a sizeable following in Italy and Germany but notin England and France is one question that has received considerable scholarly attention. Explana-tions for national variation in interwar fascist popularity abound. However, while each thesis mayexplain the success or failure of interwar fascism in one or two countries, each proves unsatisfactorywhen extended beyond a few cases. Of the five general explanations of fascist popularity, the 'redmenace' theory has the greatest potential to become generalizable. The failure of the 'red menace'argument to offer a more systematic explanation of fascist popularity derives from scholars' restric-tive interpretation of that argument. Scholars have tended to place the emphasis on the 'fear ofsocialism' interpretation while neglecting the fact that fascism grew where leftist parties refusedto abandon their maximalist revolutionary rhetoric. In particular, what was critical to interwar fas-cist popularity were the positions the political left held on property rights.

IntroductionMore than fifty years have passed since the end ofWorld War II and the collapse of interwar fascistregimes. Yet many questions persist regarding theallure that interwar fascism had for millions of Eur-opeans.Why fascism or national socialism succeededto attract a sizeable following in Italy and Germanybut not in England and France is one question thathas received considerable scholarly attention. Forinstance, between 1919 and 1939 fascist movementsand parties varied significantly in terms of theirpopular support. Take the cases of Germany andFrance. The Nazi Party of Germany became thelargest mass party in Weimar Germany, capturingnearly 38 per cent of the popular vote in the Reich-stag elections of 31 July 1932, whereas the notablyfascist French Popular Party of Jacques Doriot in itstwo electoral competitions won a meagre 2.7 percent and 1.6 per cent of the vote in the two partiallegislative elections of August 1936 and April 1938,? Oxford University Press 1999

respectively.1Explanations for national variation ininterwar fascist popularity abound. However, whileeach thesis mayexplain the success or failure of inter-war fascism in one or two countries, each provesunsatisfactory when extended beyond a few cases.One of the prevailing explanations for the rise ofinterwar fascism emphasizes outcomes of WorldWarI. According to this argument, fascism emergedearliest and made its greatest gains in countrieswhich had lost territoryor had their territorialambi-tions thwarted or had been disappointed by thepeace terms at the end of World War I (Collins,1995; Linz, 1976; Macherer, 1974; Milza, 1987).While the revenge factor can help to explain fas-cism's success in Italy and Germany and fascism'sfailure in France and England, territorial revendica-tions fail to enhance our understanding of fascism'sprominence in Belgium. In the 1936 Belgian legisla-tive elections, Belgian fascism (Rexists and Flemishnationalists) stunned the Belgian electorate bywinning 37 of 202 parliamentary seats. This feat

159


3/21

WILLIAMRUSTEINNDMARITERNTSON

was remarkable since the newly founded Rexistmovement (which won 31 parliamentary seats) hadno party organization or prior legislative experience(Hojer, 1946: 248). However, Belgium emerged asone of the victors in World War I and escaped thedeprivation and humiliation associated with thepost-war period.Another widely-held explanation for the rise ofinterwar fascism in western Europe is that fascismgained a stronghold in countries suffering massiveeconomic dislocations between the two WorldWars. Linz (1976: 97) observes that Italy's post-World War I economic crises of high unemploy-ment, labour unrest, and inflation played a hugepart in the Italian Fascist Party'ssuccess, especiallyin northern Italy. Relatedly, much has been writtenabout the role the Great Depression performed inthe rise of the German Nazi Party from an obscurepolitical movement to become the leading politicalparty in Germany. In the 1928 German nationallegislative elections, the Nazis garnered less than 3per cent of the vote, while by the July 1932 nationallegislative elections, the party's share had risen tonearly 38 per cent. But why did the economic crisisspur the rise of fascism in Germany and Italybut notelsewhere? Italy and Germany were not alone interms of suffering major economic dislocations.The national economies of England and the USAwere especially hard hit. For instance, during thedepths of the worldwide depression there were 13million unemployed in the USA. However, sizeablefascist movements did not develop in either the USAor England (Berstein, 1984: 93). Also, why should aneconomic crisis be more helpful to the fascists thanto leftists? The economic crises occurred in anumber of industrial societies without producingthe rise to power of fascism. In fact, the effects ofthe economic depression may have contributed tothe leftist Popular Front's rise to power in France in1936.

The absence of a democratic tradition is oftencited as a major contributor to the rise of fascism.One of the better known theories of the rise ofNazism is the 'Sonderweg' theory or Germany'sparticular path toward modernization (Moore Jr.,1966). The 'Sonderweg' explanation emphasizesGermany's failed bourgeois revolution and thecontinuity of German anti-democratic featuresthroughout the period of the Second Reich (1871-

1918) and the Weimar Republic (1919-33). In otherwords, Nazism was a logical outcome of Germanhistory. Like Germany, Italy came to democracyrelatively late, and like Germany, a major fascistmovement emerged afterWorld WarI.Milza (1987: 224-5) claims that a principalobstacle to the success of French fascism resided inthe institutions and culture of the republican model.The great majority of French citizens were weddedto the value system and institutions of a republic. InFrance, both the conservative right and the radicalleft had a tradition of holding to a parliamentaryrepublic. Berstein (1984: 93) supports Milza's pre-mise. According to Berstein, the key to explainingthe rise and success of interwar fascist movementsis the degree to which a democratic regime is rootedor institutionalized in the political culture. Insocieties such as Italy and Germany, democraticinstitutions were a recent facade without firmfoundation, while in France democracy was wellestablished and could withstand the shocks of theinterwar period.While the lack of democratic traditions as anexplanation may account for fascism'spopularity inItaly and Germany it appears less convincing whenapplied to other countries where democracy had nolong tradition and fascism never emerged. InRomania the fascist Iron Guard obtained less than3 per cent of the vote in the national elections of1927, 1931, and 1932. Only in 1937 did the IronGuard gain a sizeable share of the vote with 15.6percent (Linz, 1976: 89). In Spain's1936 national elec-tions, the clearly fascist Falange Espafiola receivedless than 1 per cent of the popular vote (Linz, 1976:91). Equally, it is certainly accurate to characterizeFrench and British institutions as democratic, butwhat of Belgium's democratic institutions? Democ-racy had a long and rich history in Belgium, yet amajor fascist movement emerged in that country inthe mid-1930s.

An additional explanation purports that a key tofascist popularity was the presence of a charismaticleader whose personal dynamism and magnetismcould arouse the masses to follow (Carsten, 1982:231) or aleader'sspecial organizing genius (Berstein,1984: 92-3). Much has been written of Mussolini'sand Hitler's powers to mesmerize audiences andtheir superb organizing skills. But other interwarfascist leaders seem to have possessed similar

160


4/21

INTERWARASCISTOPULARITYN EUROPE ND THEDEFAULTF THELEFT

characteristics and traits but their movements neverattained the popularity of Mussolini's and Hitler's.Berstein (1984: 92-3) aptly notes that if charismaand organizational prowess were so instrumental tofascist success why didn't France have a great move-ment? La Rocque was a remarkable organizer andDoriot was a most charismatic and dynamic speaker.The theory of fascist popularity which appears tohave garnered substantial support is the 'redmenace'theory of fascism. The 'red menace' theory attributesthe rise of European fascism between the two worldwars as a reaction to the rise of socialism. Linz (1976:26) observed:

Whileit ishistoricallyalse hatCommunistrevolu-tions weredefeatedbyfascism, t is true hatfascismwas more successful n those societiesin which thebourgeoisiehad been deeplyscaredby revolution-aryattempts,howeverunsuccessful,and wherethelabourmovement held on to a maximalistrevolu-tionary rhetoric, even when it was unable tomobilize for revolution.The Raterepublik nd theSpartakist ttempts n Germany, he occupationoffactoriesand the Red domination of the country-side in the PoValley n Italy, he Bela Kun regimein Hungary, herevolutionaryttemptsof thework-ing class n Finland,certainlyeft such a heritage.

The connection between socialism and fascism hasbeen most forcefully articulated in studies of Italy.Snowden (1972), Lyttelton (1973), Szymanski (1973),Corner (1975), Demers (1979), Farneti (1979), andCardoza (1982) argued that between 1918 and 1922fascism's greatest successes occurred in areas thathad previously voted overwhelmingly for the ItalianSocialist Party.Between 1919and 1921, Italy seemedon the verge of following Soviet Russia and Hun-gary, where the Socialist left had gained power. InJuly 1919 the Italian Socialist Party called for ageneral strike in support of the Russian andHungarian Soviets (Demers, 1979:135).The nationallegislative elections of 1919clearlydemonstrated theleft's growing popular support in Italy.Whereas theSocialists had won 18 per cent of the popular voteand 10 per cent of the seats in the Chamber ofDeputies in the 1913 election, by 1919 Socialiststrength had climbed to 31 per cent of the seats inthe Chamber of Deputies (Salvemini, 1973: 232).No other Italian political party could match theSocialists in popular support or elected deputies.Fearing an eventual Socialist takeover, as had

occurred in Russia and Hungary, much of the Italianurban and rural middle class turned to Mussolini'sFascists as a last defence. Fascism received substan-tial support in the socialist strongholds ofLombardy, Emilia, Tuscany, and Apulia, while itmade few inroads in such regions as Abruzzi,Molise, Sicily, Basilicata, and Calabria.

Similarly the scholarship on the rise of theGerman Nazi Party before 1933 highlights thecrucial role of the fear of the 'red menace' Nazispeeches and writings were frequently pepperedwith references to the threat of communism. The'fear of Bolshevism in Germany' theme was drama-tized in conjunction with the growth of communistsupport in Germany: 1.7 million votes in 1925, 4million votes in September 1930, and 7 to 8 millionvotes in February and March 1932 (Carsten, 1982:127; Stokes, 184: 276). Much like the Italian FascistParty, the NSDAP presented itself as a bulwarkagainst the spread of communism.

Proponents of the 'red menace' explanation offascism emphasize how the fear of socialism fuelledthe reaction of the propertied middle classes thateventually culminated in large-scale support forfascism. Though fascist popularity as a reaction tosocialism may be particularly applicable to thecases of Italy and Germany (where both strongfascist and strong socialist movements arose) andGreat Britain and the USA (where weak fascist andweak socialist movements coincided), it cannotexplain the failure of a major Fascist movement toemerge in France. The French interwar socialistmovement could in many ways rival the Italian andGerman movements in terms of popular support. Infact the socialist-led Popular Front gained power inJune 1936 through its electoral victory. But unlikewhat occurred in Italy and Germany, in France thefear of the rising Left failed to encourage the riseof a major fascist movement. Certainly, French fas-cist movements like Georges Valois's Faisceau,FranFoisCoty's Solidarite Franpaise,MarcelBucard'sFrancistes, and Jacques Doriot's Parti PopulaireFranpais went to great lengths to play the 'redmenace' card. However, fear of the left failed tomobilize significant popular support for them(Milza, 1993:171-79; Griffin, 1995:10).The principal explanations of variation ininterwar fascist popularity arecertainly theoreticallyplausible and are able to muster empirical

161


5/21

WILLIAMRUSTEINND MARITERNTSON

verification from a limited number of cases.Yet noneof the general explanations appears to provide thatsingle common denominator to explain why fascistmovements attracted large-scale mass support insome countries and not in others. Of the fiveexplanations of fascist popularity presented here,the 'red menace' theory has the greatest potential tobecome generalizable.We propose that the failure ofthe 'red menace'argument to offer a more systematicexplanation of fascist popularity derives from orresides in, scholars' restrictive interpretation of thatargument. Scholars have tended to place theemphasis on Linz's 'fearof socialism' interpretationwhile neglecting Linz's observation that fascismgrew where leftist parties refused to abandon theirmaximalist revolutionary rhetoric. It is this short-coming that this paper proposes to address. Inparticular,what was critical to interwar fascist popu-larity were the positions the political left held onproperty rights. We suggest that where the politicalleft championed the maximalist or revolutionarystance on property-ownership, calling for collectiveownership of property, the opportunity for fascistparties to mobilize the large class of smallproperty-holders rose. In contrast, where thepolitical left stood for the minimalist or non-revolutionary stance on property-ownership,advocating a defence of small property-ownership,the opportunity for fascist parties to garner a size-able following among small property-holdersdecreased.

The class of small property-owners in interwarEurope constituted one of the two principal classesalong with the class of blue-collar labour. Bothclasses increased in size dramatically in the after-math of World War I. While the blue-collarworking class grew by virtue of Europeanindustrialization, the class of small property-ownersexperienced a massive expansion from huge govern-ment-imposed transfers of land into peasantownership (Pfenning, 1933: 18-22; Cardoza, 1982:232;Treptow, 1996: 200-1). Governments were ful-filling promises made to the lower classes duringWorld War I of land reform and voting rights inexchange for active participation in the war effort.In Italy, Snowden (1972: 280-1) reports thatapproximately one million hectares of land wereacquired by five hundred thousand first-timepeasant property-owners between 1918 and 1921,

whileTreptow (1996: 200-1) notes that, in Romania,the agrarianreform law of 1921resulted in 1.4millionpeasant families receiving 3.7 million hectares ofarable land. The combination of a sudden increasein the population of small property-owners and theexpansion of the voting franchise to the lowerclasses throughout post-World WarI Europe madethe class of small property-holders increasinglyattractive to the competing political parties. Thepolitical left and the fascists were not the onlycompetitors for these new voters. Parties across thepolitical spectrum tried to woo the small property-holders to their ranks. However, as the political,social, and economic turmoil of the interwar periodintensified and smallholders experienced an erosionof their livelihood, they steadily abandoned themore moderate traditional parties for the parties atboth ends of the political spectrum.It iscertainlythe casethatthe more successful inter-war fascist parties gained sizeable followings fromacross the social spectrum, including the blue-collarlabourforce. However, no fascistmovementbecame amajor political party without having mobilized theclass of small property-owners. This suggests that anessential ingredient in fascist success was the supportof small property-owners.Where fascistparties failedin their efforts to mobilize these small property-own-ers, fascist parties never built a national and mass-based following.If mobilization of small property-owners was soimportant to fascist success, why didn't all fascistparties pursue the effort? This paper contends thatwhile all fascist parties tried to win over the smallproperty-owners many failed because they wereunable to develop and disseminate a coherent pro-gramme addressing the material interests of smallproperty-holders and/or the fascist parties foundthe path to mobilizing the class of small property-owners blocked by other political parties perceivedby this class to be the defenders of their interests.Interestingly, the political left played a crucial rolein determining the outcome of fascist mobilizationefforts. That is, where the left abandoned smallproperty-holders by taking a maximalist stand ondefence of small property, an opening occurred foranother party to defend small property rights (e.g.fascist parties). By contrast, where the left took upthe defence of small property, new parties couldnot establish a foothold.

162


6/21

INTERWARASCISTOPULARITYN EUROPENDTHE EFAULTFTHE EFT

Our explanation of the popularity of interwarfascism in Europe may appear somewhat similar tothe provocative thesis advanced by Luebbert (1991).For Luebbert, the composition of class coalitionsrather than ideological intransigence - that is theleft's positions on property-ownership - dictatedfascism's fate in the European countryside. Luebbertasserts that where socialist parties were able to buildcoalitions comprising the family peasantry and theurban working class, fascism failed to establish arural foundation (e.g. Denmark, Sweden, andNorway). On the other hand, according to Luebbert,fascism gained a rural constituency where socialistparties failed to build a coalition between the familypeasants and the urban working class (e.g. in Spain,Italy,and Germany).The critical factor in Luebbert'sargument is who organized the agrarianproletariat.In Germany, Spain, and Italy the socialists took thelead in organizing the agrarian proletariat while inSweden, Norway, and Denmark the socialists hadno choice but to ignore the ruralproletariat becausethey had alreadybeen organized by other parties. InLuebbert's view, where the socialists took theinitiative to organize the agrarian proletariat, theyinvariably made commitments to that class whichalienated them from the family peasants. A fascistsocial order, according to Luebbert, dependedupon a coalition between the urban middle classesand the family peasantry (Luebbert, 1991).The empirical evidence for Germany appears tosupport Luebbert's claim that the family peasantry(self-employed farmers) rather than the agrarianproletariat formed the backbone of the Nazi Party'srural constituency (Brustein, 1996). But Luebbertnever convincingly explains why the familypeasantry turned to the Nazi Party rather thananother political party.Whatis missing in Luebbert'sexplanation of the popular support of fascism is anexamination of the programmes of the competingpolitical parties. Why did so many family farmerssupport the Nazi Party ratherthan another politicalparty? Between 1925 and 1933 German farmers hadseveral political choices.Fascist and leftist party efforts to mobilize smallproperty-holders in Italy, Germany, Belgium, andFrance is the focus of this paper.2Our rationale forselecting these four countries is twofold: First,during the interwar period each had democraticelections contested by multiple political parties

including fascist parties. Second, for each case wehave been able to locate aggregate empirical dataon key variables, thus enabling a partial test of ourhypothesis. In future research we plan to extendour analysis to include North America, easternEurope, and the United Kingdom.3We shall see that within these four countries, onlyin France did the left erect a solid barricade againstfascism'sefforts to build apopular movement amongsmall-property-owners (Linz, 1976: 29). The left inGermany, Italy,and Belgium failed to fashion a pro-gramme that addressed the material interests of alarge part of the class of small-property-holders. Inparticular, the left in Germany, Italy, and Belgiumnever saw fit to abandon a call for land collectiviza-tion and public ownership of the means ofproduction, while the left in France supported landredistribution and private property. As a result,millions of small property-owners in Germany,Italy, and Belgium who might have been attractedby the left's attackon large property and leftist pleasfor greater social equality abhored the left's rejectionof private property. We will support with empiricalevidence our principal argument that where thepolitical left failed to mobilize the class of smallproperty-owners, fascist parties succeeded inattracting a sizeable popular following.

Leftistarties,ascistarties,ndProperty-OwnershipItalyThough the Italian left had amassed a considerablefollowing among poor agricultural labourers andsharecroppers in the aftermath of World War I byadvocating wage increases, a programme to alleviaterural unemployment, and a programme of agrariancollectivization with the purpose of eliminatingprivate property, it alienated potential adherentswho aspired to own property or expand their hold-ings (Vaini, 1961: 55-6; Cardoza, 1982: 277). TheItalian Socialist Party forcefully argued against thecultivation of land for personal profit or advance-ment (Corner, 1975: 162; Maier, 1975: 310). TheSocialist programme considered it reactionary tocreatesmall privateproperties through land redistri-bution (Zangheri, 1960: 401;Luebbert, 1991:243). At

163


7/21


the 17th Party Congress in January 1921, NinoMazzoni, a Socialist Partyleader, argued that ItalianSocialists should not repeat the mistake ofRobespierre who created a small-holding class ofpeasants during the French Revolution. Landshould be given to the peasant collective, not toindividual peasants (Magno, 1984: 253). The ItalianSocialist Party aimed to transform tenants andowners into proletarian members of the agriculturalco-operative (Tasca, 1966: 94). The Italian SocialistParty opposed individual ownership and stronglyadvocated land collectivization, a policy that cost itthe support of many sharecroppers and agriculturallabourerswho had supported the partyin 1919-1920,when it forced landlords to provide higher wagesand better contracts.In no small measure could Italian fascism havesucceeded without first securing a foothold in thefarming regions of north-central Italy (Snowden,1972; Lyttelton, 1973; Szymanski, 1973; Corner,1975; Demers, 1979; Farneti, 1979; Cardoza, 1982).The Fascists did not come to power as the result ofan electoral victory - they received only one-tenthof the national vote in 1921. However, the party'spolitical impact was quite dramatic, given that itwas a political newcomer. It gained nearly one-quarter of the popular vote in several provinces.The provinces in which fascism had the greatestelectoral success were all primarily agricultural.

By 1921, the Italian sharecroppers and labourerswanted to climb the social ladder towards landownership, and they began to search for a politicalparty that would allow them to achieve this long-range goal. The Italian Fascist party had made clearits opposition to agrarian socialism and landcollectivization.

The Italian Fascist party first offered an agrarianprogramme in early 1921. During the first half of1921, articles appeared in the fascist press proclaim-ing 'land to the peasants','to every peasant the entirefruit of his sacred labour', and 'we want the land tobelong not to the state but to the cultivator' (Snow-den, 1986: 180-2; Lyttelton, 1973: 64). The Fascistparty proposed to transform agricultural labourersinto sharecroppers, sharecroppers into tenant farm-ers, and eventually all three into landowners (IlPopolod'Italia, 1 April 1921: 1; Cardoza, 1982: 336). Toaccomplish these transformations, the Fascistspromised to reopen the land market. They would

convince large landowners to transfer land to theFascist land office (UffcoTerre),which would thenallocate or sell the land to interested cultivatorswho would have a specified time period to pay offtheir debts (Corner, 1975;146-7, 163; Cardoza, 1982:316). Unlike the Socialists, the Italian Fascistsaddressed the aspirations of those who wanted landas well as landowners who wanted more land.

The Fascists' major hurdle was to convince largelandowners to place their land on the market oragree to lease it. The Fascists won over many largelandholders by defending the economic importanceof large commercial farming, and by convincing theowners of large farms that a larger and stronger classof sharecroppers, tenants, and small owners wouldprovide a buffer between the large landowners andthe Socialist labour unions, and would greatlyreduce the socialist threat of class revolution(Corner, 1975: 147-55). However, the Fascists didnot treat all landlords alike. They defended large-scale commercial farms whose owners directlysupervised their estates, but vigorously opposedthe system of latifundiacharacterized by absenteelandlords, which the Fascists considered contraryto farming's social purpose of direct involvementof the cultivator, economic profitability, andstrengthening the national community (I1 Popolod'Italia,11May 1921;Cardoza, 1982: 326-7).

By 1921the Fascists had made clear their opposi-tion to agrarian socialism. They promised to liberatesharecroppers, tenants, and owners from the eco-nomic restrictions imposed by the SocialistFederterra.The party vehemently opposed land col-lectivization, Socialist strikes and boycotts, and theforced hiring of additional labourers (IlPopolod'Italia,2 June 1921:1,I/Popolod'Italia, 0 June 1921:1).4

Comparing the agrarian programmes of theSocialist and Fascist parties, we would not expectowner-cultivators to vote Socialist given the Left'sstand against privately owned property.The Fascistsshould receive their greatest support from farmersexpecting to benefit from opportunities to ownproperty and from farmers wishing to enlarge theirexisting holdings.

GermanyAn examination of the political programmes of thevariousWeimar parties raises a question that should

164


8/21

INTERWARASCISTOPULARITYN EUROPE NDTHEDEFAULTOFHELEFT

have tremendous relevance for the study of the riseof interwar European fascism. Given the aversion ofmany farmers, artisans, and small shopkeeperstowards big business, and the central antipathy forbig business held by the left, could the German lefthave mounted a viable challenge to the Nazi Partyinthe German countryside and maybe have thwartedthe Nazi rise to power (Gourevitch, 1986: 145)?Weshould not forget that the Nazi Party's initialelectoral breakthrough occurred in the Germancountryside, which may have contributed substan-tially to the party's ultimate electoral successes in1932. The NSDAP's ability to establish a footholdamong German farmers was greatly enhanced bythe left's ideological dogmatism. The German leftforfeited the potential backing of many farmerswho could never feel comfortable in a party whichattacked private property and, thus, rejected thefarmer's dream of social advancement. The SPD(Social Democratic Party)had many strikes againstit as a prospective choice of Germany's ruralcommunity. Not least among the albatrosses thathung around the party's neck were its Marxistlegacy of antagonism towards private property,its favouritism of the industrial working class, andits consistent attacks on protective tariffs foragriculture.The efforts of party moderates in 1895, 1920, and1921 to get the SPD to abandon its traditionalistMarxist moorings on agriculture were unsuccessful.SPD leaders argued that independent small farmers,like the rest of the petty bourgeoisie, constituted adoomed social class and would eventually begobbled up by more efficient large-scale estates.Moreover, the benefit of such a transition would bethat farm labourers left landless, along with theirurban counterparts, could be more easily mobilizedby the SPD (Hunt, 1964: 138-40). Prior to 1927, theSPD applied an industrial model to agriculture inwhich agrarianworkerswould be collectively organ-ized and share the same labour-market and social-policy rights available to industrial workers(Luebbert, 1991: 299). The SPD argued that anincrease in wages and taxes would weaken theJunkers (former-noble owners of large estates ineastern Germany), preserve large units of produc-tion, prevent food shortages, and stop the increasein the number of peasant families - goals consis-tent with traditional Marxist ideology.

Not until the 1927 Kiel party congress did theSPD develop a comprehensive agrarianprogramme.Dropping its call for the appropriation of small-holdings, the SPD proposed to confiscate largeholdings (with compensation) to be redistributed tosmall-holders for intensive cultivation. The SPDlegitimized small private property, proposed theregulation of grain prices and imports through thecreation of a government monopoly, and promisedfree legal aid and technical advice to Germanpeasants (Hunt, 1964: 138-40; Schumacher, 1978:351-3; James, 1986; 260) in an attempt to gain thesupport of rural Germany. However, Schumacher(1978: 351-3), Gessner (1981: 146), and Linz (1976:29) contend that the Kiel programme came too lateto help the SPD among small farmers and that theparty failed to follow up with specific legislationassisting farmers.The KPD (German Communist Party), on theother hand, held steadfastto its opposition to privateproperty. Although the KPD's attention centred onattracting the industrial working class, the partytried to attract peasants by promising a SovietGermany controlled by a government of bothworkers and peasants. To gain the support of smalland middle-sized farm-owners, the KPD promisedthat it would request (not demand) that they agree tocombine their holdings into larger units more suit-able for the use of modern agricultural equipment(DieRoteFahne,22 August 1930).There is obvious agreement that the German ruralcommunity was a mainstay of the Nazi constituency.Kaschuba (1986: 235) has referred to rural Germanyas the fountainhead of Nazism. The literature on theNazi party's rural programme highlights a disjunc-ture between the pre-1928 period and the post-1928period, leaving the impression that the Nazis, to takeadvantage of the agrarian crisis, did not discover therural community until 1928. This literature, webelieve, has overstressed the degree to which 1928signals a shift or a turnaround in the NSDAP's ruralprogramme. Rather, we argue that farming issuespreoccupied the NSDAP since the party'sinceptionin 1920, and that the party's post-1928 pronounce-ments on these matters were generally consistentwith the party's earlier positions (Brustein, 1996).The NSDAP's long-standing attention to the con-cerns of the rural community - the redistributionof vacant land, idle estates, and state-owned land to

165


9/21

WILLIAMRUSTEINND MARIT ERNTSON

the landless; support of productive (profit from one'sown labour) capitalism; and protection againstunproductive or loan capitalism - allowed it tograduallyand successfully stake out its space betweenthe parties of the left, centre, and right.The 1930 NSDAP Agrarian Programme stands asthe party's major pronouncement on agriculturalmatters before 1933. The Agrarian Programme(ParteiamtlicheundgebungberdieStellung erNSDAPuwm andvolkund ur Landwirtschaft)ppeared in thegl1kischereobachter n 6 March 1930. The pro-gramme embodied both specific proposals toimprove the agricultural situation in Germany andan ideological statement praising the virtues of theNordic or Aryan race (Pridham, 1973:124;Lane andRupp, 1978: 117-18). Many of the proposals con-tained in the Agrarian Programme were not new:the NSDAP, the DNVP (German Nationalist Peo-ple's Party), and various agricultural regionalgroups had voiced them earlier (Pridham, 1973:125: Lipset, 1981: 143; James, 1986: 261). However,the NSDAP displayed innovation in the manner inwhich these proposals were combined into a singlecoherent programme and were linked to the party'sgeneral economic and social strategy (Farquharson,1976: 57). Furthermore, the programme containedsome novel and politically savvy suggestions oninheritance and resettlement.

In Germany'spredominantly Catholic Rhinelandand South-west, partible inheritance (division of theland among the heirs) had progressed further thanelsewhere in Germany. The Nazis argued that thismade the farmer susceptible to the threat of theworld market and capitalistic speculation. TheNSDAP proposed a Law of Hereditary Entailmentallowing only the eldest child to inherit land. Thislegislation was designed to prevent the fragmenta-tion of the farm; to ensure that Germany'sfarmland remained in the hands of pure Germansand to guarantee that farms specified as hereditary-entailed continued in the same family in perpetuity;and to limit the bank foreclosures that had driventhousands of farmers from their hearth (Sering,1934: 82, Tracy, 1964: 200; Farquharson, 1976: 13-15;Lane and Rupp, 1978).

Closely linked to the NSDAP's inheritanceproposals were the party's pronouncements onresettlement. Realizing that the elimination ofpartible inheritance would produce a sea of dis-

inherited heirs, the party sought to entice themwith new land in the east. The NSDAP resettlementpolicy called for the establishment of large-scalesettlements along the eastern frontier, comprisingprimarily disinherited farmers' sons and aspiringlandowners. Here the Nazis claimed that the statehas the obligation to seize land that large estate-owners fail to farm themselves and the recipients ofthese farms would receive hereditary leaseholds.Arguing that the creation of farms alone was in-sufficient for economic viability, the Nazis calledfor the establishment of rural cities alongside thenew farms to provide farmers with local marketsfor their produce, as well as easy access to requirednon-agricultural commodities (Farquharson, 1976:143-45; Lane and Rupp, 1978:120-21).Wefind throughout the 1930Agrarian Programmethe promise of a better economic future. The pro-gramme discussed the need to improve the lot ofthe agricultural labourers by raising them to thestatus of farmer.This becomes possible through theresettlement programme, whose objective was alsoto stem the flight of these labourers from the landand to reduce the demand for imported agriculturallabour (Farquharson, 1976: 13-15; Lane and Rupp,1978: 121-2). Additionally, the resettlement pro-gramme offered the hope of a brighter future to thenon-inheriting sons of farmers. In many of the eco-nomically depressed farming regions, older farmersdid not have sufficient cash to pay off their younger,non-inheriting sons, which was the tradition inGermany's impartible inheritance regions. By pro-mising to set aside land in Eastern Germany for thedisinherited, the Nazi programme offered both par-ents and children an appealing exit from theirdilemma (Noakes, 1971:127;Farquharson, 1976:240).We expect the Nazi Party support should be highamong Protestant owner-cultivators. In particularwe would expect that farmers residing in Protestantareas more than those residing in Catholic areaswould have voted for the Nazi Party. Farmers inCatholic farming communities, whose interestswere consistent with the NSDAP's positions onprivate property, tariffs, credit, foreclosures, andgovernmental subsidies, nevertheless objected tothe party'sinheritance proposals which would forcethem to abandon the practice of partible inheri-tance. Moreover, farmers residing in Catholiccommunities had a viable alternative to the Nazi

166


10/21


Party. The agricultural positions of the CatholicCentre Party and its ally, the Bavarian People'sParty, mirrored the NSDAP's positions and, what ismore, the Centre Partypromoted the interests of theCatholic Church in Germany, making it a betterchoice than the Nazi Party for many Catholic Ger-mans. On the other hand, voting support withinthe farming community for the German Left (SocialDemocrats and Communists) should have been lowby virtue of the Left's opposition to private property.

BelgiumThe left in Belgium during the interwar period con-sisted of both a Socialist left and a Communist left.The Communist Party failed to amass substantialpopular support during the interwar period. Formost of the interwar period the party won no morethan 2.8 per cent of the national vote. The partyreached its interwar high point in the 1936 Nationallegislative elections with 6 per cent of the vote(Hojer, 1946: 54). The principal leftist party inBelgium between 1919 and 1940 was the SocialistPartyor POB (BelgianWorkers Party),which consis-tently garnered between 30 and 40 per cent of thenational vote. The Belgian Socialists pursued apolicy in the interwar period of participating incoalition cabinets (1918-21, 1925-7, 1935-9, and1939-40). The POB believed that it could come topower through the legislative process (Hojer, 1946:50-1). Emile Vandervelde, a long-time president ofthe International, influenced the policy of the POBfrom the end of the nineteenth century to the 1936-7period. He maintained the party's unity and strictadherence to its Marxist programme (Hojer, 1946:51-2). After 1936 an opposition group to Vander-velde, and the parliamentary majority, emergedunder the direction of H. de Man and P. H. Spaak.This group opposed the socialism of Vanderveldeand proposed a version that emphasized socialismin a national context (n socialisme national) whichwould abandon the party's anticlericalism and itsexclusive focus on class struggle while promoting acollaboration of workers, peasants, and middleclasses against big business (Hojer, 1946: 52-3).The Socialists advocated a reformist rather thanrevolutionary strategy to achieve workers' goals.According to party leaders, power could be attainedthrough the electoral process. On religious issues,

the Socialists, like the Liberals, advocated reducingthe Catholic Church's influence over educationalmatters. On economic matters, the Socialists werethe principal advocates of lower indirect taxes,social insurance, an eight-hour workday, a mini-mum salary,affordablehousing, and restrictions onthe free-enterprise system. Importantly for thepurposes of this paper, the Socialists opposed thelegitimacy of the right to own private property andsupported collective ownership (Hojer, 1946: 43).In the 1936 Belgian legislative elections fascists(Rexists and Flemish nationalists) stunned the Bel-gian electorate by winning 37 of 202 parliamentaryseats. This feat was remarkable since the newlyfounded Rexist movement (which won 31 parlia-mentary seats) had no party organization or priorlegislative experience (Hojer, 1946: 248). Belgiumseemed so unsuitable for fascism. Linz (1976: 7) hasnoted that fascism is usually seen as a novel responseto crises brought on by such post-war dislocations asdefeat, ambivalence about a nation's entry into thewar, disappointment with the peace terms, or un-successful revolutionary attempts. But Belgiumemerged as one of the victors in World War I andescaped the deprivation and humiliation associatedwith the post-war period. Moreover, Belgium had astable and well-established parliamentary system, notradition of indigenous right-wing groups, andminerally rich central African colonies (Chertok,1975: 1). Weber (1964: 122) has described thisapparent mismatch: '[Belgium], a country whoseproblems were in no way dramatic and whosepeople, solid and often stolid, inclined neither toexcesses nor to histrionics.'

The relative stability of Belgium's tripartitepolitical landscape was severely shaken in 1936 withthe unprecedented electoral success of the Rexistparty The Rexists emerged from the ranks of theCatholic Union. Accusing the Catholic Union ofweakness and inactivity in the face of a corruption-ridden society, Rexist founder Leon Degrelle and hisfollowers promised bold measures to restore order.At the heart of the Rexist programme was a call for acorporate state modelled on fascist Italy (Chertok,1975:77-8). According to Leon Degrelle, corporat-ism was the best means to overcome the chaos ofclass struggle. The Rexist corporate state would beauthoritarian and fully imbued with Christianvalues. As its first political act, the Rexist state

167


11/21


would carry out a physical and moral reform of theBelgian nation (Denis, 1936: 106; Etienne, 1968:90-5; Scheppens, 1980: 507).The Rexists opposed the parliamentary systemand called for the complete elimination of politicalparties. Rexists felt that political parties had sownnational discord and their leaders were to blame forthe numerous politico-financial scandals that hadriddled the country during the 1930s (Etienne,1968: 45-9; Chertok, 1975:86-8).On economic issues, the Rexists were decidedlyanti-communist, seeing communism as the chiefdestructive force in the world (Denis, 1936: 106;Weber, 1964: 125; Schepens, 1980: 507). They wereequally opposed to big business: they blamed themajor financial institutions for the worldwide eco-nomic depression and the impoverishment ofsmall- and medium-scale family-run businesses(Etienne, 1968: 90-5; Chertok, 1975: 86-8). Butthey were not opposed to private property or tocapitalism, and they demanded that the state aidsmall- and medium-sized business and farms(Etienne, 1968: 90-5; Carpinelli, 1973: 78; Wallef,1980: 520-1). In particular, they called for moreaccessible agricultural credit and restrictions onlarge agro-businesses (Daye, 1937; Degrelle, 1938:107-9; Chertok, 1975;103).

Among the competing political parties, theRexists most strongly favoured the family-ownedfarm. Since the Rexists presented themselves as thesaviours of the family-owned farm, we shouldexpect to find considerable support for the Rexistparty among farm owners. By contrast, the smalltenant farmers and salaried agricultural labourersshould have been more inclined to favour theSocialist Party because the Socialists advocated animprovement in tenant leases and a minimum wagefor labourers. Moreover, the Belgian Left shouldhave done poorly among farm owners.

FranceIt may seem paradoxical that a leftist policy supportsprivate property, but it has been the case in France.French Marxists have frequently advocated onepolicy for industry - nationalization of the meansof production - and another policy for agricul-ture - championship of small private property(Fabra,1958: 85;Barral,1968:154). Since the French

Revolution, when the Montagnards implementedthe Code rural, the French left has increasinglysupported the rights of small peasant cultivators(Lefebvre, 1954: 115;Barral, 1968: 155-6). Over onehundred years ago, Ledru Rollin, a notableDemocratic Socialist, eloquently stated the FrenchLeft's position on property: 'Property is liberty.Wewill therefore respect property, but on conditionthat it will be infinitely multiplied. We do not wantit for some; we want it for all' (Price, 1972:202).The French Left continued to hold to the defenceof small private property throughout the nineteenthcentury and into the twentieth century. In 1921 thenew French Communist party joined the Socialistparty in making the defence of small property partof its own agrarian programme (Price, 1972: 202;Gervais, Jollivet, and Tavernier, 1976: 404-5). Dur-ing the 1930s, in response to the concern of manysmall-scale independent farmersabout their vulner-ability to falling grain prices, the French Socialistspromised to establish a national wheat office tomonitor price fluctuations (Passmore, 1995: 88).Moreover, the Socialist-led French Popular Frontgovernment initiated a number of specific measuresto aid small farm-owners including the approval ofprotectionist agricultural legislation, the funding ofrural electrification projects, and the provision ofgovernment-subsidized farm credits (Soucy, 1995:63-4). It should come as little surprise that ColonelLa Rocque, leader of the far right Croix de Feu,commented that one of his principal reasons fornot launching a major offensive against the Frenchgovernment on 6 February 1934 was the inability ofhis movement to recruit followers in France's ruralareas (Machefer, 1974:22).There is considerable debate among scholarsregarding interwar fascism in France. Some scholars(Irvine, 1991;Passmore, 1995;Soucy, 1995)claim thatFrance had at least two mass-based fascist move-ments or parties during the interwar period whilemost (Remond, 1968; Sternhell, 1983; Milza, 1987;Jackson, 1988; Griffin, 1995;Payne, 1995) assert thatLa Rocque's Croix de Feu/Parti Social Frangaiswasnever fascist but rather a social-christian and a tradi-tional nationalistic movement. However, there isconsensus among scholars that Jacques Doriot'sPPF (Parti Populaire Francais) constituted a majorFrench fascist movement. We do not want to enterthe debate about which French interwar movements

168


12/21

INTERWARASCISTOPULARITYN EUROPE NDTHEDEFAULTFTHELEFT

were truly fascist. What is certainly clear is that noneof these movements (George Valois's Le Faisceau,Bucards's Francisme, Deat's RassemblementNational Populaire, Coty's Solidarite Francaise,d'Halluin's (or Dorgeres) Defense Paysanne, La Roc-que's Croix de Feu, and Doriot's Parti PopulaireFrancais) ever managed to win a significantproportion of the popular vote. Even if we includethe PPF and the PSF (formerly the Croix de Feu) asfascist parties, the extent of popular electoral sup-port for these movements was minimal. InGoguel's (1977:46-52) study of the partial legislativeelection results of August 1936 (16 circonscriptions)ndApril 1938 (18 circonscriptions)either the PPF or thePSF did very well. On the first ballot in the August1936 elections, the PPF gained 2.71 per cent of thevote and the PSF gained 3.57 per cent. In the April1938 elections the PPF garnered 1.6 per cent and thePSF gained 9.3 per cent of the vote during the firstround.

Many of France's far right movements tried tomobilize France'sfarming community but ran intothe formidable presence of the French left. Henrid'Halluin (or Dorgeres) called for a dictatorshipwith the peasantry on top (Machefer, 1974: 29).Dorgeres's programme was limited to attacks ongovernment bureaucrats, communism, fiscal con-trols on small indebted tenants farmers, and thepromotion of strong family values and fascistcorporatism (Hazo, 1975: 59; Milza, 1993: 162-3).By Hazo's (1975: 55-57) account, the movementfound its greatest backing in the areas of Chateau-briant, Redon, and Presqui'le Guerandaise (parts ofthe departements f Loire-Inferieure and Ille-et-Vilaine). These areas are, not surprisingly, strong-holds of medium-scale tenant farming. Founded in1928, the Croix de Feu had the largest popularfollowing during the interwar period. In autumn1935 the movement launched a campaign to pene-trate France's rural constituencies in which itpromised to restore to the land the spiritual valuewhich had been corrupted by international capital,parasitic political committees, and revolutionaries.In spite of these efforts the movement's leader,Colonel La Rocque, was well aware of his move-ment's difficulty in attracting rural adherents(Machefer, 1974: 2). Doriot's PPF (Parti PopulaireFran~ais) attempted to attract French farmingsupport in 1937and 1938 (Burrin, 1986: 292). Doriot

stressed a rebirth of a strong peasantry, denouncedthe decline in French fertility levels and excessiveurbanization, and called for a return to the pro-vinces. Doriot appealed to the landowningpeasantry for support by attacking agriculturallabourers'claims for higher wages and by promisingthat the PPF favoured the creation of new creditfacilities for smallholders and assistance to small-holders to enable them to specialize in products ofquality and to expand their markets in France'scolo-nies (Soucy, 1995: 251).Was the PPF's failure to mobilize widespreadfarming support a consequence of the paucity of itsagrarian programme or the result of an inability tomake inroads into the French Left's hold on theFrench small peasant proprietors? While both fac-tors may have played a role in fascism's difficultiesin building a mass rural base in France, it appearsthat fascist parties in Belgium, Italy, and Germanysucceeded in establishing substantial popularsupport from smallholding farmers. Unlike thepolitical Left in France, the Left in Italy, Germany,and Belgium refused to defend the right of privateproperty.

PropositionsThe conventions of social science research dictatethat the hypotheses developed from a theoreticalargument should be tested along with the hypo-theses of alternative theories. In a perfect world, wewould systematically apply tests of alternativetheories of interwar fascism to France, Germany,Belgium, and Italy.However, we do not because wearerestrictedby the kinds of historical dataavailable.It is for this reason that we devote so much attentionin the earlypart of the paper to the weaknesses of thefear of socialism, lackof democratic traditions, influ-ence of charismatic leaders, and the outcomes ofWorld War I theses to explain fascism's large-scalepopular support. As it is, we perform only partialtests of our theory.Weareunable to incorporate vari-ables such as gender, religion, and age into ouranalyses.The measures we devise are the best, giventhe limited (censusand electoral) datagathered in theearly twentieth century, before more sophisticatedand thorough surveys of populations were per-formed or even technologically possible.

169


13/21


Below we list the specific hypotheses to be tested:1. We should expect to find a low Left vote amongItalian farm-owners due to the Left's support forland collectivization.2. A high fascist vote in Italian agrarian provincesis related to the presence of a large proportion ofowner-cultivation due to the fascists'proposal to

expand property-ownership.53. High support for the NSDAP in heavily Protes-tant German agricultural counties (Kreise) srelated to the presence of a large proportion ofagricultural property-owners because of theNazi Party'sdefence of private property and theparty's provisions for property-owners.4. We expect German Catholic farmers, on theother hand, to support the Catholic CentreParty,for it had long served the interests of Ger-man Catholic farmers and continued to supportpartible inheritance.5. A high Rexist vote in Belgian agrarian cantonssrelated to the presence of a large proportion ofagricultural property-owners, due to Rexist sup-port for ownership of private property.6. Conversely, a low Left vote in Belgium is relatedto the presence of a large proportion of agricul-tural property-owners, due to the Belgian Left'sadherence to Marxist principles on propertyrights.7. A high Left vote in French agrariandepartenentsis related to the presence of a large proportion ofagricultural property-owners because of theLeft's long-standing support of privateproperty.8. A study of the failure of the Left in Italy,Germany, and Belgium to appeal to the interestsof property-owners during the interwar periodrequires a standardized comparison of the data.We argue that the French left did appeal toproperty-owners' material interests, therebysecuring substantial electoral support. TheItalian, German, and Belgian left, however, inrefusing to abandon the maximalist position onproperty rights, failed to attract substantialsupport from property-owners.

DatandMeasuresIn each of the cases, individual-level data on votingbehaviour and farm ownership are not available.Therefore, analyses must be based on aggregate

electoralresults and agricultural ensusesgatheredat the community or regional level - the Italianprovincia,GermanKreis,Belgiancanton,nd Frenchdepartement.he size of the aggregateunit in eachcasebest meets the criterionof systematicanalysesthat the unit be small enough to reduce internalvariation of key variables,but large enough toconstitute a whole. Inferring the individual-levelrelationshipbetween any two variablesrequiresseveral strong assumptions about the statisticalproperties of their joint distribution to avoidcommittingan ecologicalfallacy.Nevertheless,wewill suggest individual-levelinterpretations romgroupdatabecausethesedata arethe best availablecoveringthe interwarperiod. In anycase, ecologi-cally based inferences, although risky,are morelikelyto be correct hanfalse(Brustein,1991:659).Since our theory concerns the agriculturalprogrammes of political parties, we focus onregionsin which at least 33percent of the popula-tion inItaly,6Germany,7ndFrance,8nd25percentof thepopulation n Belgium9s engaged n agricul-ture. We measurepopular support for the majorpoliticalpartiesusing election data from the 1921Italiannationalelection,10 he July 1932Reichstagelection in Germany,11he 1936 Belgian nationalelections,12and the 1936 French legislative elec-tions.13 The measure of agricultural property-owners is the ratio of the surface of owner-cultivator land or the number of owner-cultivatorfarmsor farmers o the totallandsurfaceor numberof farmsor farmers n Italianprovinces,'4GermanKreise,15elgian cantons,16nd French departements.7To test these propositions, the proportion ofvotes for eachpartyis correlatedwith the propor-tion of agricultural roperty-ownersn agriculturalregions.In addition,to standardize he comparisonof the effectthe level of local property-ownershiphas on supportfor Leftistpartiesin each country,we performa dummy-variableegressionanalysiswith interaction erms.

ResultsTable a shows the resultsfor the Italiancase. Asproposed,thehighertheproportionof ownerculti-vators,the lower the support for the left (-0.05).However,this relationship s not significant.Our

170


14/21

Table la. Votingndpropertywnershipn Italianagrarianprovinces,921(N=62)Communists/ LiberalVariable Communists Socialists Socialists Popular Republicans Democrats

Owner-cultivators (correlation) 0.15 -0.10 - 0.05 0.33* -0.19 0.04%vote in agrarian provinces 4 27 31 23 3 13% vote in all provinces (N=71) 4 27 31 23 3 13*p< 0.05; *p< 0.01;**p 0.001.Sources: rustein, 1991; Censimento ellaPopolazione,1921, 1927; CensimentoGeneraleAgricoltura,1930; Statisticadellaelegioni,1921.

Table Ib. ot ing ndpropertywnershipnItalianagrarian orthern,entral, ndsouthernrovinces, 921(correlations)Communists/ LiberalVariable Communists Socialistsoci alist ocialists Popular Republicans Democrats

Northern owner-cultivators 0.21 (28) - 0.24 (28) - 0.12 (28) 0.29 (27) - 0.24 (28) 0.39**Central owner-cultivators - .09 (11) - 0.33 (11) -0.31 (11) - 0.12 (6) 0.11 (11) 0.53* (1Southern owner-cultivators -.26 (23) - 0.39* (23) - 0.41** (23) 0.49 (8) -0.28 (23) -0.12 (21)Note: numbers in the sample are given in parentheses.*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05.Sources:Brustein, 1991;CensimentoellaPopolaEione, 921,1927; CensimentoGeneraleAgricoltura,1930; StatisticadellaeleEioni,1921.


15/21


Table 2a. /otingandpropertywnershipnProtestantagrarianreise in Germany, 932(N=246)Variable KPD SPD KPD/SPD ZX DNVP NaziFarmowners(correlation) -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.21*** 0.11 --0.34*** 0.34***%vote forProtestant,agrarianKreis 9.5 21.3 30.8 1.4 9.1 52.7*p< 0.05;**p< 0.01;***p< 0.001.bources:. Falter,Weimar Republic County Data Collection; StatisticdesDeutchenReichs,1925;1933.

Table 2b. Voting ndproperty wnershipn CatholicagrarianKreise in Germany, 932(N= 139)Variable KPD SPD KPD/SPD ZX DNVP NaziFarm owners (correlation) --0.23** --0.08 --0.02 0.25** -0.48*** -0.30***% vote forCatholic,agrarianKreis 7 7.8 14.8 53.2 2.6 21.1*p< 0.05;**p< 0.01;***p< 0.001.Sources:J. Falter,Weimar Republic County Data Collection; StatisticdesDeutchenReichs,1925;1933.

proposition that the proportion of owner-cultiva-tors will be positively related to support for theFascists is not supported. Instead, we find an insig-nificant, negative relationship (- 0.01).18The Italianfascists concentrated their organizing efforts on thenorthern Italian regions. Thus, a regional break-down on the correlation between the level ofproperty-ownership and electoral support wouldshow the effect of Fascist organizing efforts on sup-port for the Italian left and the Fascists. The resultsshow that in the north, property-ownership wasnegatively correlated with the socialist vote. This isconsistent with our hypothesis (though statisticallyinsignificant). However, the correlation betweenproperty-ownership and fascist support in thenorth is also negative (and not significant). In thecentral provinces, we find a similar result for thesocialist vote, but a positive correlation between fas-cist support and property-ownership. The results areboth insignificant. The hypothesis about the defaultof the left is supported only in the southern regions.As property-ownership increased, support for theleft decreased (r=-0.41) and support for theFascists increased (r= 0.37).The results for the German case are found inTables 2a and 2b. As hypothesized, in Protestantagricultural regions, we find a strong positive corre-lation between electoral support for the NSDAP andfarm-owners (0.34). Likewise, farm-owners inCatholic agricultural regions did not support the

NSDAP (- 0.30), but instead turned to the CatholicCentre Party (ZX) (0.25). Moreover, in Protestantareas the relationship between farm owners andvotes for the Social Democratic (- 0.37) and Com-munist (-0.36) parties is negative, as predicted.Also, the relationship between farm-owners andvotes for the combined left (-0.21) is negative. InCatholic counties, the relationship between farm-owners and votes for the Social Democratic(-0.08) and Communist (-0.23) parties is nega-tive, as predicted. But the relationship is notsignificant for farm-owners and votes for the SocialDemocratic Party or for farm-owners and votes forthe combined left in Catholic counties.19

Table 3 contains the results for the Belgian case.Our propositions that the presence of a largeproportion of property-owners will be positivelycorrelated with support for the Rexist party (0.51)and negatively correlated with support for the Left(-0.67) are supported.20The results for the French case are found in Table4. As expected, we find that the higher the propor-tion of owner cultivators in agrarian departements,hehigher the support for the Left (0.23).21The results of dummy-variableregression analysiswith interaction terms22 support the propositionthat the French left succeeded in attracting prop-erty-owners whereas the German,23 Italian, andBelgian left did not. We find that property-owner-ship explains 41 per cent of the variance in support

172


16/21

INTERWARASCISTOPULARITYNEUROPENDTHE EFAULTFTHE EFT

Table 3. Voting ndpropertywnershipnWallonianagrarianantons inBelgium, 936(N=41)Communists/Variable Communist Socialist Socialists

Owner-cultivatorcorr.) - 0.31 - 0.23 - 0.67***%vote foragrarian antons 2.1 25.1 27.2% vote in all cantons 9.4 41.3 50.7

Liberal-0.17

15.112.3

Rex0.51**22.315.2

CatholicUnion

0.1031.617.5

*p< 0.05;**p< 0.01; **p< 0.001.Sources: e Smet etal., 1958; Statistique e a Belgique,RecensementGenerate elAgriculturede1929 (1937); Statistiquedea Belgique1947 (1949).

Table 4. V/itingndpropertywnershipn Frenchagrarian 6partements, 1936(N= 72)Communists/ Moderate Moderate FarVariable Communist Socialist Socialists left right right

Owner-cultivatorcorr.) 0.16 0.21 0.23* 0.23* -0.22 - 0.24*%vote in all agrarian epts. 10.3 20.7 31.0 25.7 25.7 17.6%vote in alldepts.N=90) 11.6 20.2 31.8 25.4 25.4 17.5*p< 0.05;**p< 0.01;***p< 0.001.Sources:Electionslegislatives 6 avril et 3 mai 1936: resultatsoffciels (1936); Enquiteagricole 1929).

Table 5. Predictionequationsfromummy-variableegressionsith nteractiontermssfor ermany, elgium,France, ndItalj, showingheeffect f heproportionfproperty-ownersnsupportforheleftIndependent GermanyIntercept 0.70***Proportion of property-owners (b) - 0.81***Predicted eft vote

if 50%propertyownership 29.5%if 100% property ownership - 11%

Belgium0.79**- 0.53**

52.5%26%

France0.35***0.30***

50%65%

Italy0.59**

--0.06***56%53%

Note:b is the regressioncoefficient.*p< 0.05;**p< 0.01; **p< 0.001.Sources:ee the preceding ables orsourcesfor eachcountry.

for the left (R2-0.41, p< 0.001). The effect ofproperty-ownership on support for the left is posi-tive only in France, as predicted.

Using the prediction equations in Table 5,24 wefind that the French Left receives increasingly moresupport in agrarian regions as the level of property-ownership increases. By comparison, as propertyownership increases, support for the left decreasesin German, Belgian, and Italian agrarian regions.As property-ownership in France increases from 50per cent to 100 per cent in counties, support for theleft jumps from 50 per cent to 65 per cent. In theother countries, support for the left drops asproperty ownership increases. The effect is the weak-

est in Italy and the strongest in Germany. Leftistparties that advocated property rights received sub-stantial support from property-owners who mightnormally have supported other parties, while leftistparties that held to the maximalist position on prop-erty rights attracted much less support fromproperty-owners.

DiscussionThe interwar left in Italy, Germany, and Belgiumadvocated communal property whereas the Frenchleft held to its traditional position of supporting

173


17/21


private farms. Our argument has been that leftistparties that took a maximalist stand on propertyrights will have failed to win the support of prop-erty-owners in agrarian regions. Because theychampioned private farms, support for the Fascistparties would have been high in these regions. How-ever, when the Left supported property rights, aswas the case in France, it attractedproperty-owners.Our results support this argument. As predicted, inItaly, Germany, and Belgium the relationshipbetween private property and votes for the left wasnegative, though in Italy this relationship was signif-icant only in the southern region.The absence of a significant relationship in north-ern and southern Italy may be due to a number offactors including the small number of cases and thelevel of political violence surrounding the 1921 elec-tion. In France, the relationship between privateproperty and votes for the left was, by contrast, posi-tive and significant, as predicted. These resultssuggest that farm ownership or private property isa key factor in explaining variation in support forthe left and interwar fascism'spopularity in WesternEurope. Additionally, our preliminary results sug-gest that the default of the traditional right mayalso explain interwar fascism'spopular support. Fas-cist parties denounced the right's economicconservatism. The right championed large land-owners, business and agricultural monopolies, andfinance capitalism, all of which fascist parties viewedas threats to the small property-owner. Like the left,the right's failure to attract small property-ownersmay have led to fascism's popular support in theagrarian regions of Italy, Germany, and Belgium.This thesis merits further consideration.

Notes1. Bysuccesswe arenot attempting o offeran explana-tion of why some fascistpartiessucceeded n takingcontrol of the statewhile others failed to come to

power. Rather our intent is to explain why some fascistpartiesmobilizedmillions of followers while othersattracted relatively few supporters.2. Fascism, in protecting the rights of the small prop-erty-holder, challenges the left and the right. Fascistideology,in criticizingcommunalpropertyandlandcollectivization, depicts the left as a threat to privateproperty. Fascism views the right's advocacy of

financecapitalism,monopolies,and arge andownersas athreat o smallproperty-owners.Althoughfascistand leftist partyefforts to mobilize small property-holders n eachcountry s the focus of this paper,werecognizethatthe economic conservatism f the tra-ditional right may also be responsible for fascism'selectoral support. The right traditionally supportedthe interests of large property-owners over smallproperty-owners. For an in-depth study of the posi-tions of the French right on small and largeproperty-ownership between 1849 and 1981 seeBrustein 1988).We do not testpropositionsconcern-ing the default of the right in this paper. However,preliminary results (see nn. 18 to 21) indicate that thisthesis merits further attention.

3. We arepresently ooking at the politicalmobilizationof interwarFinnish smallholders.Alapuro's 1988:217) and Karvonen's (1988: 38, 54) research on Finnishinterwar party politics suggest that the failure of thefascist Lapua Movement and the Finnish IKL (Patrio-tic People'sMovement) o mobilize significantruralsupport during the interwarperiod maybe directlyrelated to the minimalist orientation of the FinnishSocial Democratic Party,a partywhich enjoyed strongsupport in the farming regions of Southern andSouth-western Finland.

4. In many respects the Fascist agrarian programmemirrored the Popular Party'spositions on agriculture:It called for an agrariandemocracy, the elimination ofagricultural wage labour, better conditions for tenantsand sharecroppers, the development of a landowningpeasant class, and the creation of rural credit institu-tions (IlPopolo 'Italia,1 April 1921:1;Tasca,1966: 133-4).The major differences between the Popular and Fas-cist Parties were that the Fascists favoured the creationand maintenance of large-scale holdings, claimingthat redistribution of large estates into small holdingswould reduce Italian agricultural productivity; andthe Fascists more strongly encouraged unfettered pri-vate initiative (Piva, 1977: 197-9, 254; Cardoza, 1982:321-2).5. Because we are conducting a systematic comparativeanalysis, here we test the hypothesis that owner-culti-vators will be more likely to support the Fascists inItaly.However, we are aware that many aspiring land-owners among Italian agricultural labourers,sharecroppers, and tenants should have also beenattracted to the fascist party's call to help transformthem into landowners by reopening the land marketand by the fascist party's promises to liberate themfrom the economic restrictions imposed by the Socia-list Federterra (Cardoza, 1982: 31-2, 336; 11Popolod'Italia,1April 1921:1).

174


18/21


6. We collectedprovincia-level data on Italian provincesusing the CensimentoellaPopola?ioneelRegnod'Italiaal1Dicembre921(1927).7. Kreis-level data comes from J. W. Falter's WeimarRepublic County Data Collection (WRCD). TheWRCD consists of demographic, economic, social,and political information on 865 German counties forthe period 1924 to 1933. The raw data for the WRCDwere taken from volumes of the StatistikdesDeutschenReichs(Berlin, 1920-34) and various printed sourceslike unemployment statistics and fiscal reports.8. Wegathered departement-levelata from the 1929 agri-cultural census (Enqieteagricole, 929).9. We examined data on all Wallonian cantonsusing theStatistiquedelaelgique,RecensementdelaPopulatione1947.10. See Brustein (1991) for the method by which electionresults were tallied and confirmed using provincialnewspapers and the official Statistica della eleZionigenerale oliticheper la XXVI legislatura 1921). In 11cases, the voting results of the 1921election were pub-lished for Italian colleges ather than for individualprovinces. A collegeusually comprises two or threesmall neighbouring provinces. For this study, eachcollege was separated into its constituent provinces.Each resulting province was assigned its college'svalues on the variables. The provinces of Trento,Trieste, and Casertaarenot included because of miss-ing data. Votes for the Socialist and CommunistParties were combined because: the Communistsdid not get on the ballot in many provinces in 1921;the Communists received only 2.8 per cent of thenational vote in 1921;and the Socialists and Commu-nists held similar positions on agriculture in the 1921election.

11. Our data on the German 1932 Reichstag electioncomes from J. W Falter'sWeimar Republic CountyData Collection (WRCD).12. Data were gathered on support for the Communist,Socialist, Liberal, Rex, and Catholic Union partiesfrom Roger E. de Smet, Rene Evalenko, and WilliamFraeys, Atlas desElectionsBelges191-1954 (UniversiteLibre de Bruxelles, Brussels, 1958).

13. The parties were clustered into six groups (Commu-nists, Socialists, two moderate left groups, themoderate right, and the far right) when presented inthe official election results. For the names of thoseparties, see Electionslegislatives 6 avril et 3 mai 1936:Resultatsoffciels Le Temps, Paris, 1936): 328. Becauseof their ideological similarity with respect to theiragricultural programmes, we combined the Commu-nist and Socialist candidates into one left group, andthe two moderate left groups into one moderate leftgroup.

14. These ratios were computed in the 1921Italian censususing the occupations of household heads in com-munities of 15,000 or more inhabitants.15. This is a ratio of self-employed farmers to the totalemployed in agriculture, using data from the 1925StatistikdesDeutschenReichs.

16. This is a ratio of owner-cultivators to all employed inagriculture, using the 1929 Belgian census.17. This is a ratio of owner-cultivator farmers to allfarmers using the 1929 French agricultural census.18. Although statistically insignificant, there is a nega-tive relationship between support for the rightistNational Bloc and the proportion of farm owners inItaly (-0.10), thus suggesting the right's failure toattract farm-owners.

19. In Germany, we find strong, statistically significantcorrelations that lend support to the default of theright thesis. In both Protestant (-0.35) and Catholic(-0.47) agricultural regions, voters turned awayfrom the rightist DNVP.20. Unlike in Italy, Germany, and France, there is apositive relationship between support for the right-ist Catholic Union party and the proportion ofproperty-owners in Belgian agrarian regions(0.10). The positive relationship may result fromthe prominence of the Catholic Union's liberalwing (Ligue Nationale des Travailleurs Chretiens),which appealed more to an anti-big businessconstituency.

21. As expected, due to the left's minimalist position onproperty rights, the far right failed to attractFrenchvoters in agricultural regions (- 0.24).This is a statis-tically significant correlation.22. In order to meet the assumption of linearity inregression analysis, we performed an arcsine trans-formation of the dependent variable, support forthe Left. The census and electoral data we have arebinomial so the arcsine transformation is appropri-ate, given the non-linear nature of the relationshipbetween the variables, in the analysis, in eachcountry.23. In the German case, the left is the SPD.

24. These prediction equations are derived from thedummy-variableregression analysisusing interactionterms. The full equation is Proportion of Vote for theLeft = 0.70 - 0.81 PropOwn -0.09 Belgium -0.35France -0.11 Italy + 0.28 Belgian PropOwn + 1.11French PropOwn + 0.75 Italian PropOwn. The mea-sure for the proportion of private property(PropOwn) is constructed in the same way in thismodel as measures found in Tables la through 4. Asis explained in the methods section, this measure iscomputed differently in each country. See nn. 14-17.

175


19/21


AcknowledgementsPresented at the Joint Conference of the Rational ChoiceSection of the American Sociological Association and theResearch Committee on Rational Choice of the Interna-tional Sociological Association, 15 August 1996, NewYork. We would like to thank Julia Adams, Risto Ala-puro, Brian Ault, Siegwart Lindenberg, Stanley Payne,and the anonymous reviewers of ESR for helpfulcomments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. Thisresearchwas supported by a Fulbright Western EuropeanRegional Research award, an Andrew W. Mellon award,two University of Minnesota Graduate School Grant-in-Aid of Research awards, and two National Science Foun-dation grants (SES-9009715 and SES-9270211).

ReferencesAlapuro, R. (1988) State andRevolution n Finland. Univer-

sity of California Press, Berkeley, Calif.Barral,P. P. (1968) LesAgrariensFranfaisdeMelineaPisani.Presses de la Fondation Nationale, Paris.Berstein, S. (1984) La France des annees trente allergiqueau fascisme. VingtiemeSiecle, 12, 83-94.Brustein, W. (1988) The Social Origins of Political

Regionalism:France,1849-1981. University of Califor-nia Press, Berkeley, Calif.Brustein, W. (1991) The 'red menace' and the rise of Italianfascism. American SociologicalReview,56, 652-664.Brustein, W. (1996) TheLogic of Evil: The Social Originsofthe Nazi Party, 1925 to 1933. Yale University Press,New Haven, Conn.Burrin, P. (1986) La derivefasciste:Doriot, Deat, Bergery,1933-1945. Editions du Seuil, Paris.Cardoza, A. L. (1982) Agrarian Elites andItalian Fascism:The Province of Bologna, 1901-1926. Princeton

University Press, Princeton, NJ.Carpinelli, G. (1973) Les interpretations du Rexisme.CahiersMarxistes, July-Sept., 71-82.Carsten,F. L. (1982) TheRiseofFascism,2ndedn.Universityof California Press, Berkeley, Calif.Censimento ella Popolagionedel Regnod'Italia al I Dicembre1921 (1927), vols. 1-18. Stabilimento Poligrafico,Rome.CensimentoGeneraleAgricoltura(1930), vol. 2. Ministry of

Agriculture, Rome.Chertok, R. H. (1975) Belgian fascism. PhD diss.

Washington University.Collins, R. (1995) German-bashing and the theory ofdemocratic modernization. Zeitschrift fir Sooiologie.

24/1, 3-21.

Corner, P. (1975) Fascism in Ferrara 1915-1925. OxfordUniversity Press, London.

Daye, P. (1937) Leon Degrelle et le Rexisme. Fayard,ParisDegrelle, L. (1938) Revolution des Ames. Fayard,Paris.Demers, F. J. (1979) Le origine delfascismo a Cremona.Laterza & Figli, Bari.Denis ,J. (1936) PrinciplesRexistes. Rex, Brussels.L'Enqueteagricole 1929). Ministry of Agriculture, Paris.Etienne, J. M. (1968) Le MouvementRexistejusqu'en 1940.

Colin, Paris.Fabra, P. (1958) La SFIO. In Fauvet, J. and Mendras, H.

(eds), Lespaysanset lapolitiquedans a Francecontempor-aine. Armand Colin, Paris, pp. 80-101.Farneti, P. (1979) The crisis of parliamentary democracyand the takeover of the fascist dictatorship: 1919-1922. In Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A. C. (eds), Breakdownand Crisis of Democracies.Johns Hopkins Press, Balti-

more, Md., pp. 3-33.Farquharson, J. E. (1976) ThePloughandtheSwastika: TheNSDAP andAgriculture in Germany1928-45. Sage,London.Gervais, M., Jollivet, M., and Tavernier, Y. (1976)Histoire de a Francerurale, . La Fin de a Francepaysannede 1914 anosjours.Seuil, Paris.Gessner, D. (1981) The dilemma of German agriculture

during the Weimar republic. In Bessel, R. andFeuchtwanger, E. J. (eds), Social Change andPolitical Development. Croom Helm, London,pp. 134-54.

Goguel, F. (1977) Les elections legislatives et senatorialespartielles. In Remond, R. and Bourdin, J. (eds),EdouardDaladier Chef degouvernement.Presses de laFNSP, Paris, pp. 45-54.

Griffin, R. (1995) Fascism. Oxford University Press,Oxford.Gourevitch, P. A. (1986) Politics in Hard Times:Compara-tive Responses o InternationalEconomicCrisis. Cornell

University Press, Ithaca, NY.Hazo, B. (1975) Formationsociale-politiquede la France de

l'Ouest, iii. L'ideologiepolitique sous la IIIe Republiquedans le nord-ouestde la Loire-Inferieure. Centre derecherche politique, Nantes.Hojer, C.-H. (1946) Le RegimeParlementaireBelgede 19181940. Almqvist & Wiksells, Uppsala.Hunt, R. N. (1964) GermanSocial Democracy1918-1933.Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.Irvine, W. D. (1991) Fascism in France and the strangecase of the Croix de Feu. Journalof ModernHistory,63, 271-95.Jackson, J. (1988) ThePopularFront:DefendingDemocracy,1934-38. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

176


20/21

INTERWARASCISTOPULARITYN EUROPENDTHE EFAULTFTHE EFT

James, H. (1986) The GermanSlump:Politics andEconomics1924-1936. Clarendon Press, Oxford.Karvonen, L. (1988) From White To Blue-And-Black:Finnish Fascism in the Inter-War Era. Finnish Society

of Sciences and Letters, Helsinki.Kaschuba, W. (1986) Peasants and others: the historicalcontours of village class society. In Evans, R. J. andLee, W. R. (eds), The GermanPeasantry.St. Martin'sPress, New York, pp. 235-264.

Lane, B. M. and Rupp, L. J. (1978) Nazi Ideologybefore1933: A Documentation.University of Texas Press,Austin, Tex.

Lefebvre, G. (1954) Questionsagrairesautempsdela terreur.Henri Poitier, La Roche-sur-Yon.Linz, J. J. (1976) Some notes toward a comparative studyof fascism in sociological historical perspective. In

Laqueur, W. (ed.), Fascism: A Reader's Guide.University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif.,pp. 3-121.

Lipset, S. M. (1960, 1981 edn.) Political Man. JohnsHopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md.

Luebbert, G. M. (1991) Liberalism, Fascism, or SocialDemocracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins ofRegimesin InterwarEurope. Oxford University Press,New York.

Lyttelton, A. (1973) TheSeizureof Power: Fascism in Italy,1919-1929. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London.Macherer (1974) LiquesetfascismesenFrance(1919-1939).Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.Magno, M. (1984) Galanuominieproletariin uglia. Bastogi,Foggia.Maier, C. (1975) Recasting BourgeoisEurope. Princeton

University Press, Princeton, NJ.Milza, P. (1987) FascismeFrancais:Passe etpresent. Flam-marion, Paris.

Milza, P. (1993) L'ultra-droite des annees trente. InWinock, M. (ed.), Histoire de 'extremedroiteenFrance.Editions du Seuil, Paris, pp. 157-90.

Moore, B. Jr (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship andDemocracy.Beacon Press, New York.

Noakes, J. (1971) TheNazi Party in LowerSaxony, 1921-1933. Oxford University Press, London.Passmore, K. (1995) The Croix de Feu: Bonapartism,National Populism or Fascism? FrenchHistory, 9/1,67-92.Payne, S. G. (1995) A History of Fascism 1914-1945.

University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wis.Pfenning, A. (1933) Das deutschnationaleAgrarprogrammund eineRealisierung.Emil Friese, Itzhoe.Piva, F. (1977) Lotte contadineoriginidelfascismo.Marsilio,Venice.Price, R. (1972) The French Second Republic. CornellUniversity Press, Ithaca, NY.

Pridham, G. (1973) Hitler's Rise to Power: TheNaZi Move-ment in Bavaria, 1923-1933. Harper & Row, NewYork.Remond, R. (1968) La droiteenFrance.Aubier, Paris.Salvemini, G. (1973) TheOriginsofFascism inItaly. HarperTorchbooks, New York.Schepens, L. (1980) Fascists and nationalists in Belgium1919-1940. In S. U. Larsen, B. Hagtvet, and J. P.

Mykelbust (eds), WhoWeretheFascists, Universitets-forlaget, Bergen, pp. 501-16.

Schumacher, M. (1978) LandundPolitik: Eine Untersuchungiiberpolitische Parteienundagrarische nteressen.DrosteVerlag, Dusseldorf.

Sering, M. (1934) DeutscheAgrarpolitik: Auf Geschichtli-cher und LandeskundlicherGrundlage. Hans Buske,Leipzig.

Smet, R. E. de, Evalenko, R., and Fraeys, W. (1958)Atlasdes Elections Belges 1919-1954. Universite Libre deBruxelles, Brussels.

Snowden, F. M. (1972) The origins of agrarian fascism inItaly. A rchivesEuropeenes eSociologie,13, 268-95.

Snowden, F. M. (1986) Violence and Great Estates in theSouth of Italy. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge.

Soucy, R. (1995) French Fascism: The Second Wave1933-1939. Yale University Press, New Haven,Conn.Statistica dellaele.ionigenerale oliticheper al XXVI legisla-tura. (1921). Poligrafico per l'Amministrazione della

Guerra, Stabil, Rome.Statistik des DeutschenReichs. (1920-1934) vols. 402-82.Verlag von Reimar Hobbing, Berlin.

Statistique de la Belgique (1949) Recensementdea Popula-tionde1947. Ministry of the Interior (Central Office ofStatistics), Brussels.

Sternhell, Z. (1983) Nidroite nigauche:L'ideologiefasciste nFrance. Seuil, Paris.Stokes, L. (1984) (ed.) Kleinstadt undNationalsogialismus:A usgewahlteDokumentegur Geschichte on Eutin 1918-1945. Karl Wachholtz, Neumiinster.Szymanski, A. (1973) Fascism, industrialism, and social-ism: the case of Italy. ComparativeStudies nSocietyandHistory, 15, 395-404.Tasca, M. (1966) The Rise of Italian Fascism 1918-1922.Howard Fertig, New York.Tracy, M. (1964) Agriculture in WesternEurope. Praeger,New York.Treptow, K. W. (1996) Populism and twentieth centuryRomanian politics. In Held, J. (ed.), Populism nEast-ernEurope:Racism,Nationalism, andSociety.Columbia

University Press, Columbia, pp. 197-218.Vaini, M. (1961) Le originedelfascismo a Mantova(1914-1922). Riuniti, Rome.

177


21/21


Wallef, D. (1980) The composition of Christus Rex. InLarsen, Hagtvet, and Mykelbust (eds), Who WeretheFascists. Universitetsforlaget, Bergen, pp. 517-23.

Weber, E. (1964) Varieties of Fascism. Van Nostrand,Princeton, NJ.

Zangheri, R. (1960) Lotte agrarie n Italia. La FederagionenaZionale eilavoratoridellaterra 1901-1926. Feltinelli,Milan.

Authors'ddressUniversity of Minnesota, Department of Sociology, 909Social Sciences, Minneapolis, MN 55455.

Manuscript received: February 1999.

178

Brustein.berntson.interwarFascistPopularity.(ESR)

Documents

Transcript of Brustein.berntson.interwarFascistPopularity.(ESR)