Brussels Forum Views

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BRUSSELS FORUM VIEWS

MARCH 15 - 17, 2013 BRUSSELS, BELGIUM


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Brussels Forum 2013 a

Table of Contents

Fragility of the Global System 1

Views 3

Geopolitics: The Atlantic System Must Adapt for the 21st Century

by Luis Amado 3

Trade & Investment: The Time Is Ripe for a New Transatlantic

Economic Agreement

by Karel De Gucht 4

European Integration: Europes Phone Connection Needs

Both Hardware and Software

by Carl Bildt 5

Security: A Frank Debate Is Needed on NATOs Future

by Jamie Shea 6

Immigration: Citizenship-for-Labor Policies Are Far from Perfect

by Christopher Caldwell 8

Labor: The Transatlantic Jobs Crisis Will Leave Long-Term Scarsby Peter Sparding 9

Energy: Shale Gas Exports Could Be a Pillar of the

Transatlantic Alliance

by Michal Baranowski 11

Technology: A Digital World Requires Digital Values

by William Powers 12

Public Opinion: Pessimism about Transatlantic Economic

Conditions Is Rampant

by Bruce Stokes 14Burden-Sharing: Europe Should Lead from the Front

by Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer 15

Global Governance: A G-Zero World Lacks Resilience

by Gunther Hellmann 16

Europe: The Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic Offer Three New Frontiers

by Bruno Lt 17

The United States: Global Influence Will Be Tested by Partisanship

and Austerity

by Xenia Dormandy 19

China: Beijings Statism Is a Source of Fragility

by Minxin Pei 20


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Brussels Forum 2013b

The Arctic: Cooperation Is Necessary in Tapping the Oceans Full Potential

by Gitte Lillelund Bech 21

Belarus: Democracy Needs a Strategy

by Andrei Sannikov 22

Russia: Full Integration Is to Everyones Benefit

by Celeste A Wallander 24

Middle East & North Africa: Successful Transitions RequireTransatlantic Support

by Hassan Mneimneh 25

Emerging Democracies: Engaging with Developing Democratic

Powers Should Be a Priority

by Dhruva Jaishankar 26

Young Writers Award 28

An Innovative Approach to Combat Transatlantic Human Trafficking 28


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Brussels Forum 2013 1

Fragility of the Global System

For the first time, Brussels Forum will feature a theme connecting the different

discussions that will take place during the conference. The Fragility of the

Global System is meant to address the interconnectedness of todays world

and the vulnerability of various aspects of the international order: the global

economy, stability and security, governance, values, and the environment.

Fragility does not necessarily have to be pessimistic or negative. Rather, the term

is meant more as a commentary on how precarious things are, how past patternsof behavior and past solutions are either not up to the task for todays fast-paced,

dynamic, interconnected environment or require a completely different means of

thinking, approach, and resolution. Moreover, if something is considered fragile,

it can either break under the application of pressure or it can be reinforced and

readjusted to prevent such an outcome.

The following essays published together as Brussels Forum Views are meant

to capture various aspects of global fragility. The authors are leading policymakers,

German Marshall Fund experts, and others from across the transatlantic

community. The objective of publishing these views is to reinforce and reflectdiscussions at Brussels Forum on why certain situations are fragile, the degree to

which localized failures can lead to systemic global challenges, and what can be

done if anything to ensure that fragile situations do not result in outright

breakage.

There may not be agreement on solutions to these complex problems, but there may

come to be a common recognition about the challenges facing the international

community and a shared appreciation of the consequences of any failure to address

them. Stimulating a robust discussion on the ways in which the international system

is most threatened, and what can be done to reinforce or replace certain outmoded

practices and ways of thinking about the world, would make Brussels Forum a

tremendous success and set the foundation for future dialogues.


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Views

Geopolitics: The Atlantic System Must Adapt

or the 21st Century

byLuis Amado

The economic and political crisis currently affecting the West is but one

outcome of an ongoing metamorphosis of the international system, which

has been determined by rapid structural changes to the global economy overthe last three decades. In this brief period of time, half of humanity has embraced

capitalism and become linked to the global market. Deng Xiaopings introduction

of market reforms to the Chinese economy was the beginning of a revolution that

has had immense consequences. The implosion of the Soviet Union and the rapid

expansion of market forces, with unlimited flows of capital circulating at Internet

speed, has created new development opportunities for hundreds of millions of

people. By the time the global financial crisis exploded in 2008, the Wests over-

indebted economies were in a mess and China and other states in the Asia-Pacific

had risen. A new balance of power has now emerged with the erosion of Westerninfluence.

The irony is that despite the relative weakening of the West, its values have

expanded globally. Indeed, we are not experiencing a crisis of the Western system

but grappling with the consequences of its success. It is, rather, a crisis of an

exuberant form of capitalism, generated by the vertiginous expansion of financial

markets, fueled by innovation and excessive deregulation that resulted in huge

unbalances. In the United States and Europe, the crisis has had serious social

and political implications. But in its aftermath, the West will still remain the key

determinant in the establishment of a new order.

The West is perceived as the North Atlantic geopolitical space, structured by the

Atlantic alliance and by strong transatlantic relations. But the vision of an Atlantic

system for the 21st century cannot ignore the impact of the crisis, the new dynamics

of globalization, and its effects in the wider Atlantic region encompassing Central

and South America and Africa. The rapid development of South-South relations

between Africa and Latin America, the performances of its economies, the new

emerging powers, and the new role of China and other rising actors in this process

cannot be ignored. It is time to develop a new, comprehensive Atlantic conceptintegrating these new strategic dynamics.

Luis Amado is the former foreign and defense minister of Portugal.


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Brussels Forum 20134

Trade & Investment: The Time Is Ripe or a

New Transatlantic Economic Agreement

byKarel De Gucht

The relationship between the European Union and the United States is as old as

European integration itself. John F. Kennedy wanted this vast new enterprise

to provide the basis for a concrete Atlantic partnershipbetween the new

union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union. He cautioned,

however, that his goal would take time to achieve: A great new edifice is not built

overnight.

Since July 1962, when Kennedy said those words, we have built a continent-

wide economy in Europe, on the back of continent-wide rules to open markets.

Transatlantic economic flows have also raced ahead: today, 2 billion a day in goodsand services trade and over 2 trillion in mutual direct investment support 15

million jobs.

However, these flows have not been supported by similar legal structures to

guarantee and further open our markets. We may have survived without these so

far, but todays context is different. Both the U.S. and European economies need a

boost following the longest and deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression.

The development of long and complex transatlantic value chains has placed an extra

cost on regulatory and other barriers to trade and investment. And the core marketopening elements of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations remain

stalled. Moreover, the crisis has tempted some around the world and within our

jurisdictions to argue in favor of protectionist policies. A move towards freer

transatlantic trade would show very clearly where Europe and the United States

stand in that debate.

That is why the time is right for a comprehensive, ambitious, and realistic free trade

agreement between the European Union and the United States. Though we are both

open economies, there remain considerable barriers between us, at our borders but

particularly behind them in areas like services, regulation, and procurement. Anagreement that properly addressed these barriers would provide catalysts for growth

on both sides of the Atlantic.

Such an agreement would also break new ground for trade policy in tackling these

issues which are difficult but increasingly important acting as a laboratory

of sorts for eventual multilateral breakthroughs in these areas. It would set a gold

standard for trade openness around the world, creating common templates for

other partners who export to our large mature markets. And it would be a huge step

toward Kennedys idea of a concrete Atlantic partnership that looks outward to

cooperate with all nations in meeting their common concern.

Karel De Gucht is the European commissioner for trade.


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European Integration: Europes Phone

Connection Needs Both Hardware and Sotware

by Carl Bildt

The Kissinger question Whom do I call if I want to call Europe? has

been answered by now. Not that there is necessarily only one connection from

the switchboard in Brussels, but the telephone number for Europe is now in

place. Nonetheless, the critical question remains: what is our message? Or, to put

in another way, if we now have the hardware of institutions in place, where is the

software of policies that makes the entire thing operate in a clear and credible

way?

When we meet in the Foreign Affairs Council every month, it is usually the issues

of the day that dominate the agenda. Foreign policy is, as Harold Macmillan onceput it, events, dear boy, events. But what Europe needs today is a clear strategic

framework to guide its policies in a globalized world. The European Security

Strategy from 2003 was a good document, but to some extent it was an anti-Bush

document reflecting the sentiment of the post-9/11 era and the Iraq War. The

United States wanted robust unilateralism, while Europe argued for effective

multilateralism. This is still valid. But we need a strategy beyond security to guide

the institutions set up since then. In a world moving towards hyper connectivity

in the entire realm between outer space and cyberspace and with age-old sectarian

tensions resurfacing, developing a new strategy cannot just be about recalibratingold documents.

This is why Poland, Italy, Spain, and Sweden asked prominent think-tanks to come

up with elements for a European Global Strategy by early summer 2013. They

have been encouraged to think outside the box, and take a fresh perspective when

examining shortcomings, tasks, and challenges. This year, we are also reviewing

the European External Action Service, hoping to produce an agreed blueprint for

the European External Action Service 2.0 in time for the new crew entering the

institutions after the 2014 European Parliament election. This work on the hardware

should then go hand-in-hand with efforts to update the software of the EuropeanGlobal Strategy, so that when we emerge hopefully from the doldrums of the

aftershocks of the 2008 financial crisis, we will have a Europe far more ready for the

global century.

Carl Bildt is the minister for foreign affairs of Sweden.


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Security: A Frank Debate Is Needed

on NATOs Future

by Jamie Shea

With the conclusion next year of the International Security Assistance

Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, NATO will have conducted over

25 operations on land, at sea, and in the air. In recent times, nearly

200,000 allied servicemen and -women have been deployed, mostly at a strategic

distance outside Europe. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) presence continues, as does

the Ocean Shield counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. The impact of all

these operations on national finances, let alone human lives and injuries, has been

substantial. Yet with NATO not engaged in Mali or Syria and focused instead on

Patriot missiles in Turkey and missile defense in Central and Eastern Europe, thereis no escaping the fact that the alliance will no longer be able to define itself by its

ownership of large, ongoing operations. It needs to begin now to adapt to this new

reality, most urgently in three areas.

The first is preserving NATOs and Europes capacity to fight as a coherent,

collective entity. The conclusion of the Afghan war, coupled with an enduring

financial crisis and two decades of declining defense spending, makes the

permanent hollowing-out of European capabilities a distinct possibility. Full

spectrum forces are no longer achievable by individual European countries. At

the same time, only 2 percent of Europes defense budget goes to multinationalprograms, 95 percent of Europes military units are nationally constituted and

commanded, and three-quarters of military contracts go exclusively to the home

nation. The Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing initiatives and NATOs

Connected Forces project are important steps toward integration, but to address

U.S. concerns about burden-sharing and Europes future value as a military partner,

these initiatives must be sustained and expanded. Defining what NATO and the EU

should procure as multinational capabilities will be a crucial challenge.

The second post-2014 challenge will be to clarify NATOs political ambitions. The

NATO of 2020 could resemble in some respects at least its Cold War selfin being a largely static structure, resettled in Europe and waiting to be attacked.

Given NATOs enduring responsibility for collective defense and high-end military

operations, no-one could dispute that these should be placed near the top of its

agenda at all times. But is a more passive posture enough to keep NATO relevant or

the best use of NATOs unique transatlantic consultation machinery, global network

of partnerships, and policymaking expertise across the full range of security

challenges? There is at least a debate to be had perhaps at the next NATO

Summit about whether the alliance should turn its back on its 2010 Strategic

Concept with its global outlook and focus on crisis management and cooperativesecurity.


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Finally, Europeans and North Americans need a strategic dialogue about their

relationship and objectives. This debate has to go beyond burden-sharing. Should,

for instance, France have to assume most of the burden in Mali when extremists

there have declared their hostility to the entire Western world? What can Europe do

to help the United States make a success of the Asian pivot, given that Europes owneconomic health will depend increasingly on the Asia-Pacific? How can we work

better together to help Arab democrats, curb Irans nuclear ambitions, engage rising

powers, and engender greater Russian trust and cooperation? While this debate may

go beyond a traditional NATO discussion, the alliances machinery could be used

even if informally to contribute to it.

2014 may mark the end of one phase of NATOs long evolution, but it will not mean

the end of security threats and challenges that the alliance can usefully address.

While one path forward can lead to decline and withdrawal, another can lead

to rebirth, new skills, and new quests. NATO has always prided itself on beingmilitarily capable so capabilities currently occupy its attention. But its future may

lie even more in its political roles and tasks, and as a transatlantic hub for global

defense cooperation, training, and assistance. An alliance tackling the immediate

challenges of today will ultimately find it easier to require the capabilities it needs

for tomorrow.

Jamie Shea is deputy assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges at

NATO Headquarters in Brussels.


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Immigration: Citizenship-or-Labor Policies

Are Far rom Perect

by Christopher Caldwell

We all agree that these men and women should have to earn their way

to citizenship, U.S. President Barack Obama said in January. But for

comprehensive immigration reform to work, it must be clear from the

outset that there is a pathway to citizenship.

If the president believes there are any questions involving citizenship and

immigration about which we all agree, he is mistaken. Many in his own party

argue that immigrants have already earned their citizenship. Eighty percent of

undocumented migrants have been in the United States for more than five years,

and 60 percent for more than ten. A Republican plan, by contrast, would makecertain immigrants leave the country and then wait a decade or more to apply for

readmission no path to citizenship there! There is also a compromise position,

held by the immigration scholar Peter Skerry, which favors legalization for as many

undocumented immigrants as possible, but citizenship for none of them.

Citizenship-for-labor was the bargain struck after the last sustained mass migration

to the United States a century ago, but it is not a law of nature. And the institution

of citizenship has changed in the meantime. In 1913, naturalizing meant

exposing oneself to military service while repudiating old loyalties. Today it meansgaining access to a munificent set of government benefits while possibly keeping

your old citizenship. In the U.S. Supreme Courts Plyler v. Doe ruling of 1982 and

the European Court of Justices Sevince in 1990, judges have given even illegal

immigrants many of the rights of citizens. The legal theorist Ayelet Shachar of the

University of Toronto considers developed-world citizenship a form of heritable

property that governments use to compete for higher-skilled migrants. She believes

the United States used to deploy this resource generously and wisely, but is now

being outstripped by Canada and Australia.

For the native of a poor country, a perch in a developed economy is a thing ofalmost inestimable value. This is one reason why the number of immigrants in

OECD countries has not fallen dramatically since the start of the global economic

crisis in 2008, and why labor remittances from the developed to the developing

world passed $400 billion in 2012, a 7 percent increase. For policymakers, is

national citizenship for an immigrant and his or her descendants a fair price to pay

for one generations worth of below-market-price labor? Is it a bargain price? Or

does it conceal an off-balance-sheet liability? Answers await.

Christopher Caldwell is a senior editor at the Weekly Standard and a columnist for the

Financial Times.


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Labor: The Transatlantic Jobs Crisis

Will Leave Long-Term Scars

by Peter Sparding

One of the gravest legacies of the global economic meltdown of 2008 is the

persistent jobs crisis on both sides of the Atlantic. Five years after the

onset of the Great Recession, more than 12 million Americans remain

unemployed, and the eurozone reported a record jobless rate of 11.7 percent in

December 2012. These conditions, as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke

remarked, represent an enormous waste of human and economic potential. And,

one might add, they represent a challenge to the long-term economic prospects,

political stability, and geopolitical ambitions of the United States and Europe.

Two aspects make the transatlantic unemployment crisis particularly dramatic: thehigh and persistent number of long-term unemployed and the jobs crisis among

the younger generation. In the United States, an astonishing 38 percent of those

unemployed 4.7 million people have been without work for more than half

a year. Throughout Europe, the situation is equally grim, but the numbers vary

significantly. While Germany witnessed a decrease in long-term unemployment,

rates have spiked in many southern and eastern European countries. Although these

dramatic increases are largely a legacy of the economic crisis, persistent long-term

unemployment is threatening to turn such cyclical problems into structural ones, as

economies skill bases erode and it becomes increasingly difficult for workers to re-enter the job market. As a result, the long-term economic potential of some of these

countries could be permanently damaged.

For young people, entering the labor market during periods of economic slowdown

could also have dire consequences. While youth unemployment always tends to be

higher than average, the ongoing crisis has exacerbated this situation. According to

numbers from the OECD, the rate of young workers not in employment, education,

or training rose by more than 2 percent in both the EU and the United States

between 2007 and 2011. And some countries, like Ireland at more than 7 percent,

saw significantly higher increases.

The effects of youth unemployment are severe both at the individual and societal

levels. Studies show significant scarring effects, manifesting themselves in an

increased risk of recurring unemployment, diminished long-time earning

prospects, and negative health impacts for those affected. The economic and social

costs are equally troubling, as youth unemployment can contribute significantly to

rising income inequality and harm social cohesion. Direct costs in social payments

today and decreased tax revenue as a result of lower earning potentials in the future

are having an impact on already tight public budgets. And a younger generationconfronted with dismal economic perspectives could become more reluctant in

their support for greater European integration.


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Given these negative long-term consequences, greater effort needs to be exerted to

prevent or mitigate high levels of long-term and youth unemployment. Work share

programs, for example, could lower the number of people who initially become

unemployed during a downturn, thereby reducing the risk of skill erosion and long-

term unemployment. Meanwhile, educational efforts must be improved to betterline up with job market requirements, so as to increase the chances of young job-

seekers finding employment. In the short term, however, it is difficult to see how

the current employment situation in the United States and Europe can be enhanced

without a return to significantly higher growth levels.

Peter Sparding is a transatlantic fellow in economic policy with the German Marshall

Fund of the United States.


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Energy: Shale Gas Exports Could Be

a Pillar o the Transatlantic Alliance

by Michal Baranowski

Thanks to its ability to extract shale gas, the United States is now enjoying an

energy bonanza. It is set to become the worlds largest natural gas producer

by 2015 and, according to the International Energy Agency, will attain energy

independence by 2020. This newfound abundance of cheap energy is changing

the U.S. domestic economy, but it can also potentially influence the United States

foreign policy through the export of liquified natural gas (LNG) and the spread of

fracking technology used by U.S. energy companies to extract shale gas.

Nowhere is the issue of energy security more important than among the United

States allies in Central and Eastern Europe. Last year, Poland paid the highest pricein the European Union for its gas imports from Russia: almost 28 percent more than

Germany and 40 percent more than the U.K. Other countries in Central Europe

suffering from a lack of diversity in their energy supplies experienced similar

premiums. Despite the high price tag, 99 percent of Bulgarias gas imports came

from Russia, as did 98 percent of Slovakias and 72 percent of the Czech Republics.

Access to U.S. LNG would provide Central and Eastern European states with

greater energy diversity, reduce energy prices across the continent, and allow these

countries to renegotiate their long-term, expensive contracts with Russias state-owned energy giant Gazprom. From the United States standpoint, LNG exports

would not only be smart foreign policy, but also good business. A recent study by

the U.S. Department of Energy shows that the export of natural gas would benefit

the overall U.S. economy. The recent reintroduction of legislation in the U.S.

Congress that would facilitate exports of LNG to NATO allies is being watched with

great interest throughout Central Europe. Even the prospect of increasing volumes

of available gas in Central Europe could reduce monopolistic pressure from the east.

Europes import of fracking technology will have a similar impact. The introduction

of this technology in Europe has been gradual, but there are signs that things areabout to change. Last November, the United Kingdom lifted its moratorium on

fracking. In only the past few months, Romania and Lithuania have signed large

contracts with Chevron for exploring their shale reserves and Ukraine, with the

third-largest shale reserves in Europe, has announced an agreement with Shell.

The spread of U.S. shale gas technology to Europe along with LNG exports

provides the United States an important opportunity to make its energy policy an

important pillar of the transatlantic alliance.

Michal Baranowski is a senior program officer on foreign policy and civil society withthe German Marshall Fund of the United States.


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Technology: A Digital World Requires

Digital Values

by William Powers

Where is the digital age taking us? This is the question hanging over every

facet of modern existence, from business and government to science

and the arts, from remote villages to teeming metropolises, from social

networks to the brains that must process them. What will this new society look

like and how can we thrive in it? That it is still a puzzle after more two decades of

change should not be surprising or discouraging. After all, this is one of historys

great mash-ups, a revolution mediated by machines but not led by them or by

anyone in particular. The new devices and networks have disaggregated institutional

structures, flattened old hierarchies, and helped spark democratic uprisings. Thisflux is too drastic to be predictable.

In one sense, it is an exhilarating time of promise. Creativity and innovation are

blossoming as people meet and collaborate across great distances. A brilliant

business idea is funded through crowd-sourcing and takes off. An inspiring speech

goes viral, changing hearts and minds. A child is a global citizen from birth, in

touch with the rest of humanity at an unprecedented scale.

But digital devices are not inherently constructive or ameliorative. Like all

mechanisms, they are only as good as the people using them. In the wronghands, they can be instruments of repression and criminal wrongdoing, as well as

unintentional disaster and tragedy. An oligarchic government turns off its citizens

internet access. A young digital activist charged with hacking an academic database

commits suicide. A video made in one culture offends another, fomenting violence.

High-speed, interlinked financial markets raise the specter of a domino-like crash.

If we cannot predict the future, we can certainly help shape it. What is missing is

a set of values that we can use to navigate this new landscape wisely and fruitfully.

The early digital years have been focused on breaking down barriers that divided

people from each other and from information. The goals were increased access,openness, and freedom, all inarguably positive. But in every revolution, the real

challenge comes after the smoke has cleared. For progress to endure, it needs a

practical framework that honors and protects the upheavals highest aims for the

long haul, while allowing differences and conflicts to be hashed out fairly. What

happens, for instance, when one persons openness tramples on anothers privacy?

There are countless unresolved questions of this sort, and finding answers requires a

more robust set of digital values than we now possess.

We wont arrive at them overnight. They should be the product of an extended,

freewheeling global conversation, conducted on the same tools that created the needfor it. The recent U.S. presidential debates, remarkable for both their seriousness

and the large TV and social-media audiences they drew, could be a model, but with


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many more voices. The aim of this digital-values debate should not be to produce

a legal framework, but an ethical and moral one that could be used by any public

or private organization, any individual or family, to shape their own standards,

structures, and practices.

There is a curiously passive quality to this moment, as if were always waiting for the

silicon chieftains to tell us what comes next. The question shouldnt be where the

digital age is taking us, but where we are taking it. In the mid-19th century, when

instantaneous global communication first arrived in the form of the telegraph, the

U.S. philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson put it nicely: This time, like all times, is a

very good one, if we but know what to do with it.

William Powers is the author ofHamlets Blackberry: A Practical Philosophy for

Building a Good Life in the Digital Age.


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Public Opinion: Pessimism about Transatlantic

Economic Conditions Is Rampant

by Bruce Stokes

European and U.S. views of the economy have soured since the Great

Recession. Overwhelming pessimism across the transatlantic community,

coupled with doubts about prospects for the next generation and rising

frustrations with the free market system, are signs of an abiding fragility. In last

years Pew Global Attitudes Survey, just 6 percent of Spanish and Italian respondents

and 15 percent of British said the economy was doing well. Among Europeans,

only Germans (73 percent) thought their national economic situation was good.

More importantly, such assessments were down 29 percentage points in Spain and

23 points in Poland since 2008. Pessimism is just as rampant on the other side ofthe Atlantic. Despite modest economic growth in the United States, just 15 percent

said the economy was excellent or good in December. And a more recent Pew poll

showed that just 37 percent of Americans think the economy is going to get better

in the next year.

This is, in part, because the economic downturn has cast such a long shadow.

Seventy-nine percent of Americans and 65 percent of Europeans say that they or

their family has been personally affected by the economic crisis, according to the

2012 German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Trends survey. In addition, the Great

Recession has cast a pall over generational expectations, long part of the social andpolitical glue in both Europe and the United States. Just 9 percent of Europeans and

14 percent of Americans think it will be easy for a young person in their societies to

get a better job or to become wealthier than their parents.

The prolonged economic crisis has also eroded public support for the free market

system. Faith in capitalism is down 23 points in Italy since the before the recession,

20 points in Spain, 15 points in Poland, and 11 points in Britain. Only in Germany,

France, and the United States is support relatively unchanged. And such sentiment

is correlated with personal views of the economy. Those who are downbeat about

their economic conditions are more likely to also be negative about the free marketsystem. Moreover, 76 percent of Europeans say most of the benefits of the economic

system go to a minority, according to Transatlantic Trends and 64 percent of

Americans agree. All this feeds frustration with how Europe and the United States

organize their economies.

Bruce Stokes is director of global economic attitudes at the Pew Research Center and a

non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
http://www.people-press.org/2012/12/13/section-3-views-of-economic-conditions-2/http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/http://www.people-press.org/2012/12/13/section-3-views-of-economic-conditions-2/


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Burden-Sharing: Europe Should

Lead rom the Front

by Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer

The ongoing French-led military intervention in Mali and the 2011 French

and British operations in Libya have highlighted two major trends that will

continue to define transatlantic relations in the years to come: Europes

strategic retrenchment and U.S. disengagement from the Middle East and North

Africa. These two trends have revived long-standing tensions between the

transatlantic allies over security issues. While Europeans are concerned about

the strategic vacuum created by the United States as it reduces its global military

footprint and looks increasingly eastward, Americans see this evolution as an

opportunity for Europe to reinforce its military capabilities, coordinate its defensepolicies, and lead from the front in its neighborhood.

The difficulties France has encountered in enlisting both European and U.S. support

for the Mali mission also reflects a certain apathy towards African affairs. But Mali

has also revealed the need to strike a balance between diverging U.S. and European

strategic visions and security priorities. The United States so-called pivot to Asia

aims at countering the growing clout of rising powers and encourages Europeans

to define their own strategy for the region. But the French intervention in Mali also

reminds Washington of the continuing importance of terrorism in weak and failing

states in the Middle East and North Africa and the necessity of strong leadership inthe region. The challenge for the transatlantic partners is to find a way to anticipate

the potentially destabilizing effects of growing power in some cases and weakness in

others, in order to deploy the best foreign policy tools whether military, political,

or economic to address these challenges.

The absence of a common European foreign and defense policy and of a coherent

U.S. strategy for the region could result in one of two outcomes. Either the West

will become increasingly reliant on regional powers to advance its strategic interest,

such as the United States Asian allies in balancing China or the Gulf Arab states

in balancing Iran. Or it will find its emboldened allies naturally seeking to fill thevacuum left by U.S. leadership consider Japans possible rearmament against

China a development that could potentially result in destabilizing outcomes.

Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer is director of the Paris office of the German Marshall

Fund of the United States.


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Global Governance: A G-Zero World

Lacks Resilience

by Gunther Hellmann

The world today can be characterized by an increasing disconnect between the

accumulation of global governance problems and the provision of governance

solutions. A more dramatic description would be one of institutional crisis

and disorientation, particularly in the field of international security. There is an

increasing consensus that we are now in what Ian Bremmer has called a G-Zero and

what Charles Kupchan has called No Ones World in the title of his recent book.

Multilateralism the United Nations, European Union, NATO are out. Ad hoc

G- groupings and so-called minilateralism involving loosely coordinated

networks of presumably like-minded and capable states are in. In other words,this is a heyday for hard-nosed realists focused on sovereign states pursuing their

national interests. Gone are the days when a new world order was synonymous

with the prospect of a triumph of liberalism and democracy within and beyond the

nation-state.

In the eyes of their proponents, a G-Zero and minilateral world looks like the

best possible outcome. After all, minilateralism brings to the table the smallest

possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving

a particular problem, as Moises Naim, the possible progenitor of the concept hasargued. The difficulty is that the smallest possible number required may quickly

become quite large on issues such as a military escalation in the Persian Gulf.

Considering how a G-Zero world might deal with the consequences of such an

escalation reveals just how fragile the current international system is.

To the extent that one buys into this description of a realist world of sovereign

national interest maximizers, we must confront an international system that lacks

what risk analysts call resilience. That means, in this context, the ability of the

system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, and recover from the effects

of stress or shock in a timely and efficient manner. Some might argue that thisworld does not differ considerably from the realist world of the Cold War-era.

But consider, by way of example, the crisis management of the United States and

Soviet Union at the UN after Saddam Husseins invasion in Kuwait in 1990, and the

difference is discernible. It is hard to see how the minilateral system of today might

respond in order to absorb and recover from such a shock.

Gunther Hellmann is a senior transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of

the United States.


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Europe: The Pacic, Atlantic, and Arctic

Oer Three New Frontiers

by Bruno Lt

Even as it muddles through a major economic crisis, Europe retains all the

elements to remain a global leader well into the 21st century. Combined, the

27 members of the European Union constitute the worlds most productive

economy, the EU dominates global trade markets, and its defense spending is more

than China and Russia combined, making Europe the second most potent military

power after the United States. But while Europe possesses the tools to be a global

player, inefficient resource allocation and political sclerosis continue to cripple the

Union from within.

Europes international influence suffers as a consequence. While the EU is notnecessarily inward-looking and disengaged from the global community, it does lack

a common vision and sense of purpose and consequently weight in international

affairs, especially because its economic interests are rarely in concert with a credible

foreign and security policy. European efforts have principally been directed at

weak and collapsing governments in its immediate neighborhood, but in this fast-

changing world there are other regions beyond Europes traditional comfort zone

that are of increasing importance to its future prosperity and security. Europe

should focus more on these new frontiers and use its economic influence to solidify

its foreign and security strategy.

The first of these new frontiers is the Asia-Pacific region, which has become the

hub of global economic growth. Europes trade interests in the region are vast,

but they are not backed by a security approach. The challenges in this part of the

world are multi-faceted and range from conventional military competition and

energy security to climate change and the defense of human rights. It presents many

options for Europeans to decide when and where to become involved. Moreover,

as the United States ability to guarantee free navigation and trade flows is being

undermined by regional disputes, the need for Europe to also pivot to Asia is

growing fast.

A second new frontier has opened as a consequence of the rise of Brazil, South

Africa, and other countries on both sides of the Atlantic, which present their own

opportunities and challenges. From the discovery of new energy sources and drug

trafficking problems to new trends in commercial shipping, recent developments

have the potential to profoundly shape the geo-economics of the four continents

surrounding the Atlantic basin. New actors, above all China, are also playing a more

prominent role in Africa and Central and South America. These trends should

encourage Europe to widen its Atlantic strategy, and strengthen North-Southconnections in the fields of trade, investment, development, and security.


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Finally, as the ice melts over the Arctic Ocean, Europe should jockey for political

and economic influence in this outpost. Several European nations border the Arctic

region where abundant supplies of oil, gas, and minerals are becoming accessible.

The Northern Sea Route could boost economic development by reducing the time

required to ship European goods between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It mayalso offer a safe alternative to the maritime routes in the South China and Arabian

Seas, which are threatened by regional power struggles and piracy.

By evolving clearer approaches to these new frontiers, Europe would send a

reassuring signal to the rest of the world that it remains a global player. Additionally,

all three regions offer important opportunities to revitalize the transatlantic

partnership, either through direct cooperation with the United States, or through

multilateral institutions such as NATO.

Bruno Lt is the program officer for foreign and security policy with the GermanMarshall Fund of the United States in Brussels.


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The United States: Global Infuence Will Be

Tested by Partisanship and Austerity

by Xenia Dormandy

In his second term, U.S. President Barack Obama faces a country and a world

in the throes of profound change. Taken together, they promise a very different

picture of U.S. engagement with the rest of the world over the coming four years.

Domestically, Washington is even more polarized now than it was when Obama

assumed the presidency in 2008. Studies of voting patterns in Congress show that in

contrast to previous years, the 2007-08 Congress showed almost no overlap between

liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats. The partisanship is even worse

today. Through their control of the House, Republicans will continue to stymie the

Obama administrations policies as they have done for the past two years. Perhapsin response to this, Obama seems less inclined to cater to the Republican Party. The

rhetoric of bridging the divide is being replaced by less compromising positions,

whether regarding new cabinet appointments or economic policy.

Austerity in the United States as in other places is limiting the presidents

options. As he said repeatedly during his reelection campaign, his priority is

nation-building at home. Domestic priorities are going to outweigh international

initiatives, except where vital national interestsare concerned, a sentiment that

many presidents have espoused but, until now, rarely followed through on.At the same time, the challenges that the United States and others face are ever more

complex. Some are due to the actions of specific states, such as Iranian and North

Korean nuclear intentions, while others manifest themselves far more widely in

cyberspace, food or water insecurity, pandemics, and environmental degradation.

While the United States is a necessary actor, it cannot sufficiently address these

problems on its own. Neither can Europe. Together, however, they might be able to

make progress and, as appropriate, bring other actors to the table with the interests,

will, and capacity to engage, as seen in Afghanistan and Libya.

In response to the globalization of security challenges, and to domestic constraints,

the Obama administration will likely expand its collaborative, multilateral foreign

policy initiatives, despite occasional Republican opposition. Tools that are less

resource heavy in both human and economic terms development, diplomacy,

intelligence, soft-power, and targeted kinetic force such as Special Forces and drones

will be preferred over full military action. And a narrowing of focus, to issues of

vital national interest, will continue.

Xenia Dormandy is a senior fellow with Chatham House in London.


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China: Beijings Statism Is a Source o Fragility

by Minxin Pei

Recent political, economic, and social developments in China have refocused

the international communitys attention on the countrys underlyingfragilities. Politically, Chinas newly installed leadership is grappling with

multiple challenges pervasive corruption, lack of credibility, a diffusion of power,

a demand for greater political rights and civil liberties, and revival of economic

reform. On the economic front, growth momentum is flagging, massive non-

performing loans burden the financial sector, and overcapacity plagues many key

industries. Socially, high income inequality, lower social mobility, poor food safety,

and environmental degradation are fueling frustrations among the middle-class, a

social segment critical to the survival of the Communist Partys rule.

For most governments, such challenges are difficult enough, but for Chinas new

leadership, the most complex and intractable aspect is that they are interconnected.

In many ways, effective solutions lie in transforming the existing autocratic political

system. Fighting corruption and reining in the countrys newly emerged kleptocracy

will not likely succeed without the help of a free press or vigilant civil society

groups. Restoring public credibility in the Chinese government requires greater

transparency. Meeting the demands for more political rights and civil liberties

means liberalizing the political system. Re-energizing economic reform entails

overcoming the opposition of entrenched interest groups the bureaucracy, state-

owned enterprises, local governments, and families and friends of party members

who have leveraged their political connections into unimaginable wealth.

Tackling economic and social reforms must also start with their political causes.

The centerpiece of any new economic reform program must be a drastic downsizing

of the role of the state in the economy. In practical terms, this means curbing

the monopoly of state-owned firms, replacing government-directed credit with

market-based financing, and ending discrimination against private entrepreneurs.

The political obstacle to these reforms lies in the nature of the political system;

the ruling Communist Party has to control a significant portion of the economyto maintain its patronage system and the political loyalty of its followers. China is

unlikely to solve its myriad social problems, such as inequality, poor food safety, and

environmental degradation, without getting rid of the privileges of the ruling elites

and politically empowering the masses.

So the fundamental source of Chinas fragility is its ossified Leninist system. It may

have thrived for two decades after the Tiananmen Square protests and the fall of the

Soviet Union, but its future looks bleak.

Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.


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The Arctic: Cooperation Is Necessary in Tapping

the Oceans Full Potential

by Gitte Lillelund Bech

Today, huge and sweeping changes are taking place in the Arctic. Due to climate

change and technological developments, the regions considerable economic

potential is coming within reach. It is now possible to use the Northwest and

Northeast Passages as transport corridors, providing lower costs and higher profits

for the shipping industry. But with new opportunities come new challenges. The

Arctic has to be jointly managed on the basis of international principles of law to

ensure its peaceful, secure, and collaborative use.

A political declaration on the Arctics future the Ilulissat Declaration is one

of the primary documents to help ensure the international management of theArctic region. The declaration was adopted in Ilulissat, Greenland, in May 2008

by ministers from the five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean: Denmark, Canada,

Norway, Russia, and the United States. The Ilulissat Declaration sends a strong

political signal that the five coastal states will act responsibly concerning future

developments in the Arctic Ocean. In addition to acting responsibly, the five

countries also confirmed that they will strengthen their cooperation in bodies like

the Arctic Council and the UNs International Maritime Organization. They will

also increase their practical day-to-day cooperation on issues such as search and

rescue, environmental protection, and navigational safety. The states have politicallycommitted themselves to resolving disputes and overlapping claims through

negotiation, rather than by military means. Cooperation and negotiation should

be the only weapons used to handle disputes, challenges, and opportunities in the

Arctic. Hopefully, this will once and for all dispel the myth of a race to the

North Pole.

If all parties stay committed to content of the Ilulissat Declaration, it will greatly

lower the risk of security challenges emerging in the Arctic region. Instead, the

overall approach to security policy in the Arctic will be based on the goals of

preventing conflict, avoiding the militarization of the region, and actively helpingto preserve the Arctic as a region characterized by trust, cooperation, and mutually

beneficial partnerships.

Gitte Lillelund Bech is the former defense minister of Denmark.


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Belarus: Democracy Needs a Strategy

by Andrei Sannikov

For almost 19 years, Belarus has been ruled by one of the most ruthless

dictatorships in the world. The regime of Alexander Lukashenko has survivedusing what in Belarus is called the East-West Swing: whenever there is

pressure from Russia, Lukashenko seeks Western support claiming a threat to

independence; whenever the West applies pressure on human rights, the dictator

swears allegiance to Russia. Such tactics helped him usurp power through a rigged

referendum on the constitution in 1996, using a moment when the ailing Boris

Yeltsin needed his help to be reelected. In time, Belarus found that international

legitimacy and recognition through elections were not even necessary to preserve

its East-West Swing.

The Wests softness on Lukashenko invariably results in the regime becoming

more aggressive, both domestically and internationally. In 2009, there was an

unprecedented effort by the West to legitimise Lukashenkos rule. EU High

Representative Javier Solana, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Pope

Benedict XVI, and Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite all met with him.

Belarus was invited to join the Eastern Partnership, and several other high-level

meetings took place before Lukashenkos bloody crackdown of December 19, 2010.

Today, the dictatorship in Belarus is better equipped than ever, and is contributing

to international problems. It has established ties with other rogue states around theworld. The authoritarian practices of Lukashenkos rule in Belarus are also being

replicated in neighboring Russia and Ukraine. For the leaderships of those two

countries, Belarus is a successful example of how to maintain power and counter the

liberties and basic human rights that threaten an authoritarian regime.

The search for a solution to the situation in Belarus is hampered by several myths.

Some say that the people of Belarus are not ready for democratic change, as if

Belarusians enjoy living under a dictatorship. Others argue that Lukashenko

guarantees the independence of Belarus, but the same was said about Romanias

Nicolae Ceausecu and Libyas Muammar Gaddafi, and is still said by supporters of

North Koreas Kim Jong-Un. Another myth is that the opposition to the regime is

fragmented and weak. But such an opposition exists despite persecution, beatings,

exile, torture, jail, and killings, and despite little funding or Western support.

Nevertheless, it managed to produce the heaviest blow yet to the legitimacy of the

regime during protests following the sham presidential election of 2010. The shock

waves from those events still reverberate, as demonstrated by the miserable turnout

at last years polls.

Unfortunately, the window of opportunity created by the failed elections waswasted. Moreover, Europe risks falling prey to the East-West Swing again: there

is no real taboo on having political or commercial dealings with Lukashenko and


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there are enough people to serve his needs in the West. But history is against them.

The Arab Spring has proven that supporting dictatorial regimes for the sake of

stability eventually leads to the opposite. The only solution is to invest and support

democratic movements.

That is what Belarus needs today. Sporadic measures taken in reaction to

crackdowns will not address the problem in the long term. There has to be a

strategy, backed by a political will to implement it, in order to bring freedom to

Belarus.

Andrei Sannikov is a former deputy foreign minister of Belarus and a leader of the

civil campaign European Belarus.


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Russia: Full Integration Is to Everyones Benet

by Celeste A Wallander

The United States reset with Russia was not the strategic objective itself.

The objective was Russias integration as a responsible stakeholder in globalpolitics, supporting Russian progress in development, growth, transparency,

pluralism, and constructive global governance. Instead, the reset was a symbol and

an opportunity to transform the atmosphere of acrimony between Washington and

Moscow in order to achieve cooperation in areas of common interest and build a

foundation of trust for Russias constructive integration as an important European

and Asian power.

The glass is half full. Russia today is more integrated and has been an important

partner in vital cooperative security. It has joined the World Trade Organization(WTO), adjusting its economic and trade policies in ways that should lower barriers

to investors and draw Russian firms into healthy global competition. The Russian

leadership seems to understand the advantages of integration, because it is seeking

membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD), which entails even higher standards of good governance and global

integration.

This half-full glass has nourished not only Russias economic potential, but also

global security. The United States and Russia concluded a treaty on nuclear arms

reductions that lowers the number of warheads, creates transparency, and sendsa clear leadership signal for the global community to reduce reliance on nuclear

weapons. The United States and Russia have also worked together to stop Iran

from attaining a nuclear weapons capability. And despite hostile headline-grabbing

rhetoric about NATO, Russia has made incomparable contributions to ISAF security

operations in Afghanistan by supporting transit, training, and counterterrorism

cooperation that could lay the groundwork for success in combating global violent

extremism.

However, the glass is also undeniably half empty. Russias military doctrine remains

wrapped around scenarios that are more the stuff of nightmare science fiction or

clever Hollywood spy thrillers than the reality of our post-Cold War global system.

Even worse, Russias policies toward its neighbors and its own citizens are premised

on an attempt to turn back the tide of integration that has been the source of

prosperity and the awakening of hope and growth for Russias citizens.

The task facing the transatlantic community is to find ways to fill the rest of the

glass for Russias integration, prosperity, and security. The United States and Europe

must now pose the question to Russias leaders: are they up to the challenge?

Celeste Wallander is an associate professor with the School of International Service at

American University and a non-resident fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the

United States.


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Middle East & North Arica: Successul

Transitions Require Transatlantic Support

by Hassan Mneimneh

The transformations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) over the

past two years have generated both the euphoria and the inevitable letdown

associated with successful political change. This period has seen the toppling

of four longstanding autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, continuing

strife in Bahrain, the prolonged and brutal repression of a resilient uprising in Syria,

serious threats to the governments of Iraq and Jordan, and vocal challenges against

the established political order in virtually all other Arab states.

Politically, Islamist factions have generally succeeded in leveraging these events

to attain power, although never categorically. Much of the region is consequentlycharacterized by two trends. One, the outcomes of the uprisings are neither reliable

nor uniform enough to provide an impetus for further action. And, two, with

Islamists exposed to active politics, and their narratives under greater scrutiny, the

shape of the Arab political and cultural landscape in the near future is far from

determined. Just as the enthusiastic references to an Arab Spring may have been

the result of exuberant optimism, those to an Islamist Winter may simply be

reflections of fearful pessimism. Neither is a product of sober realism.

With internal dynamics characteristic of each Arab society affecting the tone andtempo of current events, the transformations in the region have proven more

complex. It may seem that the only ascertainable aspect of these transitions is that

they constitute a turning point in the history of the region and a paradigm shift in

its political development. However, of the vast multitude of variables complicating

outcomes, two can be ascribed particular importance: the success of the Syrian

Revolution and the strengthening of civil society across the region.

The fall of Bashar al-Assads despotic regime in Damascus may be inevitable.

The nature of that fall, in particular the role of the global community in limiting

bloodshed and ensuring a less than disastrous transition, will have a considerableimpact on both material developments in Syria and its vicinity, and on the ensuing

narrative in a fast-evolving regional political environment. A positive narrative

were it to emerge can only be reified if civil society is afforded a chance at

countering the statist and ideological conditions that had shackled the region to

autocracy for decades. Neither the Syrian uprising nor Arab civil society faces

a bright future, unless the transatlantic alliance and its regional partners can

demonstrate greater determination and support.

Hassan Mneimneh is the senior transatlantic fellow for MENA and the Islamic world

with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.


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Emerging Democracies: Engaging with

Developing Democratic Powers Should

Be a Priority

by Dhruva Jaishankar

The pessimism that has marked public discourse in the United States and

Europe over the past five years obscures two overwhelmingly positive trends

that now characterize the international system.

The first is that liberal democracy can no longer be considered an exclusively

Western value. Seventy percent of those living in electoral democracies today reside

in the developing world (almost 60 percent in nine large countries: India, Indonesia,

Brazil, Bangladesh, Mexico, the Philippines, Turkey, Thailand, and South Africa).Fifty-two states represented at last years Non-Aligned Movement Summit in

Tehran an event dismissed by many commentators in the West as a congregation

of dictators had held free and fair elections. Most of these countries adopted

democracy of their own accord, not because of its imposition by the West. In fact,

democracy has flourished in many of these states despite tacit or active support for

authoritarian regimes by the United States and its allies.

The second welcome trend is that developing democracies are delivering. Emerging

democratic powers are growing rapidly, creating new markets, improving

productivity, and pulling tens of millions of their citizens out of poverty each year.Together, the economies of the nine largest developing democracies have grown an

astonishing 330 percent in dollar terms over the past decade, comparing favorably

to 174 percent for the eurozone and 147 percent for the United States.

At a time of austerity, it is perhaps natural that the transatlantic allies should want

to focus on nation-building at home and pressing global challenges, such as the

ongoing turmoil in the Middle East and the rise of China. To do this, however,

would be short-sighted. The constructive engagement of key emerging democracies

not only has the potential to revitalize the U.S. and European economies byexpanding market access and helping to preserve an open trading system, it may

also be the only way to address the structural threats to Western interests, values,

and institutions posed by political outliers.

U.S. and European engagement with developing democratic powers will, however,

face at least four unique challenges.

1. Developing democracies, by their very nature, will seek to protect their markets

against perceived foreign exploitation, particularly in those sectors that are the

most labor intensive and consequently the most politically sensitive;2. They will on occasion enjoy relations with unsavory regimes, especially of states

that export resources necessary for their continued economic growth.;


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3. Their relatively meager military, economic, and diplomatic resources,

coupled with weak institutions, will make developing democracies reluctant

interventionists; and

4. They will often find common cause with non-democratic emerging powers in

multilateral settings in order to preserve their development agendas and ensure

better representation.

While such limitations may inhibit the assimilation of emerging democracies

into existing Western blocs or alliance structures, they ought to be instinctively

recognizable to anyone familiar with the complexities of functioning democracies.

It may be tempting to vilify these states as job-stealing, obstructionist arrivistes,

or to lump them together with the likes of China and Russia as powers that seek

to challenge a Western-led international order. But in fact, the rise of developing

democracies is the best possible validation of the merits of Western-origin liberal

values electoral democracy, private enterprise, the free market, and the rule of

law as well as a vital opportunity for the West to ensure their durability.

Dhruva Jaishankar is a transatlantic fellow with the Asia program of the German

Marshall Fund of the United States.


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Young Writers Award

An Innovative Approach to Combat

Transatlantic Human Tracking

Slavery is an obscenity. It is not just stealing someones labor; it is the theft

of an entire life. It is more closely related to the concentration camp than to

questions of bad working conditions.

Kevil Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy,University of California Press, 1999

by Teresa Cantero and Rachel Molomut

The world has more slaves today than ever before in history, a large number of

them trafficked across borders against their will to be exploited in developed

countries. Over the last few decades there has been increasing interest in

the private sectors connection to human rights and development. Governments,

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, and institutions have been

working to develop strategies to engage the private sector in development and

human rights agendas. It is time for the private sector to take a leading role in the

fight against human trafficking as well.

Human Traicking in the 21st Century: Modern-day Slavery

It is estimated that there are currently 27 million slaves in the world.1 As a poorly

understood and little known problem, human trafficking is the third most profitable

illegal activity in the world, after drugs and weapons trafficking.2 As defined by the

Palermo Protocol, human trafficking is:

...the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of

persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of

abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power, or of a position of

vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve

1 Kevin Bales and Ron Soodalter, The Slave Next Door: Human Trafcking and Slavery in America Today,University of California Press, 2009.

2 Kathryn Farr, Sex Trafcking: The Global Market in Women and Children, Contemporary Social Issues,

2005.


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the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose

of exploitation.3

Modern-day slavery, therefore, is more about control than legal ownership.4 In

the United States alone, 50,000 to 70,000 women are trafficked every year, making

it the second fastest growing crime in the country. In New York City, 4,000 to

5,000 children are estimated to be forced into prostitution every year. Annually,

trafficking brings $32 billion in revenue into the United States, from an estimated

2.4 million trafficked persons. Human trafficking refers not only to sex trafficking,

but to bonded labor, organ trade, and domestic servitude.5

Human trafficking happens in every country on earth. The main destinations are

the United States, Canada, Japan, Western Europe, and Persian Gulf States, and 80

percent of the persons trafficked are women or girls.6

The uniqueness of human trafficking, compared to other illegal activities, is that

the product is reusable. A woman or a girl can be sold tens of times, and can be

abused over and over. Unlike a bullet or a gram of cocaine, in human trafficking,

two criminal groups can benefit from the same commodity and two brothels

can trade the same women. Organized crime does not emerge unless there is

a profit to be made, and like any other business, trafficking happens because

there is demand.7 Crime groups normally specialize in one part of the process

smuggling into a country, fake documentation, transportation inside the country

of destination and with the arrival of globalization and the advantages of

information technologies, the business has grown exponentially. Human traffickingis a globalized problem that demands globalized solutions.

Human trafficking and people smuggling differs in the nature of the activity that

one is consenting to. A person can pay to be smuggled into a country, but that same

person might be trafficked later on. North America, Europe, and Oceania are a

net-in migration in the global export-import market of human trafficking. Asia,

Latin America, and Africa account for the net-out migration, the supply side of the

trafficking supply chain. The international community has tried to respond to this

issue, and in 2003 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All

Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families entered into force.8 To date, it

only has 35 signatories, with no representation from the European Union or the

3 The United Nations, Protocol To Prevent, Suppress And Punish Trafcking In Persons, Especially Women

And Children, Supplementing The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000.

4 Kevin Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy, University of California Press,

1999.

5 Louise Shelley, Human Trafcking: A Global Perspective, Cambridge, 2010.

6 The United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime, Human Trafcking: The Facts, 2012.

7 Jay S. Albanese, Organized Crime in Our Times, Anderson Publishing, 2011.

8 United Nations General Assembly, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All

Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Ofce of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Human Rights, Dec. 18, 1990. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htm.
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htmhttp://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htm


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United States. The United States and EU need to join this progressive community as

soon as possible.

Measures Taken by the United States and the European Union:

Why the Current Response is not Enough

Despite being the leading sources of international regulations and standards for

fighting trafficking, the United States and Europe are two of the main trafficking

destinations.

The U.S. Department of State annually publishes the Trafficking in Persons

Report, which divides countries into different tiers and examines whether states

comply with international laws and enforce anti-trafficking regulations.9 2012

is the first year that the United States itself is addressed in this report. The key

legal document about trafficking in the United States is the Trafficking VictimsProtection Act.10 This document lays out a plan for how the United States will

tackle trafficking nationally and internationally.

In June 2012, the European Union adopted the EU Strategy Towards the

Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings, a series of measures to be

implemented by 2016 that includes better protection, prosecution and the creation

of collaborative teams to investigate crimes.11 This new set of measures was created

to help with Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and the Council

of April 5, 2011, on preventing and combating human trafficking and protecting

victims. The deadline to implement the Directive is April 6, 2013.

The United Nations Palermo Protocol contains the most important legal

documents for fighting human trafficking internationally. These were released by

the UN in 2000.12

Presently, the U.S. and EU response to human trafficking is not enough. It does not

address specific practices (such as border control and supply chain practices) and

this enables human trafficking to not only continue but to increase in prevalence.

It is time for the United States and EU to implement an innovative transatlantic

partnership to combat this issue.

9 U.S. Department of State, Trafcking in Persons Report, 2012. http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.

10 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Laws on Trafcking in Persons, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/.

11 European Commission, New European Strategy 2012-2016, New European Strategy 2012-2016,

June 19, 2012. http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafcking/entity.action?id=714114c7-cd42-46cf- 85eb-

c09d042c7181.

12 The United Nations, Protocol To Prevent, Suppress And Punish Trafcking In Persons, Especially

Women And Children, Supplementing The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized

Crime, 2000.
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/http://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/entity.action?id=714114c7-cd42-46cf-85eb-c09d042c7181http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/entity.action?id=714114c7-cd42-46cf-85eb-c09d042c7181http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/entity.action?id=714114c7-cd42-46cf-85eb-c09d042c7181http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/entity.action?id=714114c7-cd42-46cf-85eb-c09d042c7181http://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/


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Private Sector Transatlantic Partnerships: The Importance o Private

Companies in the United States-EU Relationship

Over the last few decades, there has been increasing interest in the private sectors

connection to human rights and development. Governments and civil society have

been working to develop strategies to engage the private sector in developmentand human rights agendas. The private sector can make an enormous difference in

moving forward in this area.

Human trafficking exists because there is demand for it. In its 2010 report,

Human Trafficking and Business: Good Practices to Prevent and Combat Human

Trafficking, the United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.

GIFT) outlined several reasons why the private sector should be concerned with

these issues.13

First, companies can be directly involved (whether they are aware or not) in therecruitment, transport, harbouring, or receipt of a person for the purpose of

exploitation.14 In addition, companies can also be implicated in human trafficking

if their services, products, or premises are used by traffickers. Furthermore,

companies can also become involved through the actions of their business partners

or suppliers. Under the Palermo Protocol, human trafficking is considered a crime

and is currently punishable in 163 countries.15 Despite the obligations of the

Protocol, there are no legal consequences for punishing those countries that do not

abide by the Protocol.

Human trafficking for forced labor has been shown to negatively affect certain

economic sectors including, but not limited to agriculture and horticulture,

construction, garments and textiles, domestic service, food processing

and packaging, hospitality and catering, mining, logging and forestry, and

transportation.16 There are two main risks to businesses that participate knowingly

or unknowingly in human trafficking. The first is legal risk, including the violation

of national civil and/or criminal legal requirements.17 An example of a U.S.

company facing legal risk was when a suit was brought against Kellogg Brown &

Root, accusing them of trafficking 13 Nepalese men into Iraq in 2008. This suit was

brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the federal trafficking law.18

13 United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafcking, Human Trafcking and Business: Good

Practices to Prevent and Combat Human Trafcking, 2010.

14 Ibid.

15 The United Nations, Protocol To Prevent, Suppress And Punish Trafcking In Persons, Especially

Women And Children, Supplementing The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized

Crime, 2000.

16 United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafcking, Human Trafcking and Business: Good

Practices to Prevent and Combat Human Trafcking, 2010. Print.

17 The United Nations Global Compact, Human Trafcking, Human Rights and Business DilemmasForum. http://human-rights.unglobalcompact.org/dilemmas/human-trafcking/ .

18 The United Nations Global Compact, Human Trafcking, Human Rights and Business Dilemmas

Forum. http://human-rights.unglobalcompact.org/dilemmas/human-trafcking/ .
http://human-rights.unglobalcompact.org/dilemmas/human-trafficking/http://human-rights.unglobalcompact.org/dilemmas/human-trafficking/http://human-rights.unglobalcompact.org/dilemmas/human-trafficking/http://human-rights.unglobalcompact.org/dilemmas/human-trafficking/


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The second type of risk involves reputational risks, which can bring serious

consequences if a company is implicated in human trafficking, regardless

of whether the allegations are proven true. Consequences include brand

contamination, reduction in demand for a companys products or services, decrease

in stock price, workforce disaffection, etc.19

For example, in April 2010, the NationalLabor Committee published a report entitled Dirty Clothes that accused retailers

such as Dillards, J.C. Penney, Nygard, and Walmart of sourcing their clothes from

a factory in Jordan that was trafficking workers from Bangladesh, India, and Sri

Lanka.20 Following the release of this report, an emergency team was sent to Jordan

and conditions in the factory were quickly improved.21

Given the current state of the economy in the United States and the EU, companies

and governments have a huge incentive to work together to strengthen the economy

rather than continuing to ignore human rights and development violations that

are adding to the current economic burden we are facing. The incentive here is tostop human trafficking from becoming a more rampant problem in the EU and the

United States. At the End Human Trafficking Now luncheon held in March 2012

at the United Nations, the president of the General Assembly, Nassir Abdulaziz

Al-Nasser, stated, What is unavoidable is that economic pressure caused by the

financial crisis will continue to fuel the problem of trafficking even further...

Businesses that operate under strict ethical rules are safer and more sustainable

compared to those afflicted by trafficking and related abuses.22

In order to understand what we mean by a private sector transatlantic partnership,

it is important to understand what a public-private partnership (PPP) is. According

to the World Bank:

PPP refers to arrangements between the public and private sectors whereby

part of the services or works that fall under the responsibilities of the public

sector are provided by the private sector, with clear agreement on shared

objectives for delivery of public infrastructure and/or public services.23

Furthermore, PPPs have been expanding over the last decade and are tackling

a variety of issues. These partnerships have become increasingly important for

economic development and humanitarian projects worldwide.24 For example,

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights, The National Labor Committee, Signicant

Improvements at the IBG Factory in Jordan - Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights, Oct. 18, 2010.

http://www.globallabourrights.org/alerts?id=0255.

22 Rasha Hammad, Top Corporations Highlight Ending Human Trafcking as Smart Business, End

Human Trafcking Now, Mar. 23, 2012. http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/3/prweb9321588.htm.

23 The World Bank, PPP in Infrastructure Resource Center, Public Private Partnerships in Infrastructure.

http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/.

24 McKinsey & Company, Public-Private Partnerships, Harnessing the Private Sectors Unique Ability to

Enhance Social Impact, 2009. http://mckinseyonsociety.com/public-private-partnerships-harnessing-the-

private-sectors-unique-ability-to-enhance-social-impact/.
http://www.globallabourrights.org/alerts?id=0255http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/3/prweb9321588.htmhttp://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/http://mckinseyonsociety.com/public-private-partnerships-harnessing-the-private-sectors-unique-ability-to-enhance-social-impact/http://mckinseyonsociety.com/public-private-partnerships-harnessing-the-private-sectors-unique-ability-to-enhance-social-impact/http://mckinseyonsociety.com/public-private-partnerships-harnessing-the-private-sectors-unique-ability-to-enhance-social-impact/http://mckinseyonsociety.com/public-private-partnerships-harnessing-the-private-sectors-unique-ability-to-enhance-social-impact/http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/3/prweb9321588.htmhttp://www.globallabourrights.org/alerts?id=0255


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in the United States, 25 states have enacted legislation allowing PPPs to work on

infrastructure projects. These coalitions are allowing infrastructure investments to

remain relatively stable and combine the best of public-sector governance with the

most valuable of private-sector efficiencies. 25

Bringing in the Private Sector to take over Roles the Government has

been Unable to Fulill and to Help with Coordination

Many steps have been taken to strengthen U.S. and EU regulations for combatting

human trafficking, but to date it has not been enough. The more inclusive nature of

PPPs, which usually involve partners from government, the private sector, NGOs,

and foundations, would help to bring together the necessary actors for combatting

this issue.

In addition to including the UN.GIFT in planning moving forward, The Codeof Conduct for the Protection of Children for Sexual Exploitation in Travel and

Tourism (The Code) is a key mechanism that has already been put into practice

by 1,030 companies in 42 countries. The Code is defined as an industry-driven

responsible tourism initiative co-funded by the Swiss Government (SECO) and

by the tourism private sector.26 The Code commits companies to train personnel

to recognize trafficking as an issue, provide information to consumers, and report

annually on their anti-trafficking activities.27 The Code membership currently

consists of both industry and non-industry members. Industry members include

hotels, airlines, and tourism companies. Non-industry members include NGOs and

various associations.

Given that this association has already brought together members of the private and

public sectors, the United States and EU should start by reaching out to this group

and gauging interest in collaborating in a transatlantic partnership to combat these

issues.

Such a coalition would bring together expertise from these varying areas and

build upon the commitments that The Code has already created. This would help

to ensure that this issue is being dealt with at every level, from border control to

flight attendants to workers in supply chains in various sectors to hotel staff and

government officials. It would also ensure that this issue is more widely publicized

by adding trafficking to school curriculums, teaching the next generation what

modern slavery is and engaging them in combating it.

Entering into a PPP could also help involve countries of origin in stopping

human trafficking. Airline partners, for example, would be able to train their

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