Brunnermeir 2014a sanfranciscofed_mopo_new_normal

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Brunnermeier & Sannikov 2014 Monetary Policy: A New Normal? & The I Theory of Money Markus K. Brunnermeier Princeton University San Francisco Federal Reserve San Francisco, Nov. 10 th , 2014 http://scholar.princeton.edu/markus http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files /markus/files/2014a_sanfranciscofed_ mopo _new_normal .pdf

Transcript of Brunnermeir 2014a sanfranciscofed_mopo_new_normal

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Monetary Policy: A New Normal?& The I Theory of Money

Markus K. BrunnermeierPrinceton University

San Francisco Federal ReserveSan Francisco, Nov. 10th, 2014

http://scholar.princeton.edu/markus

http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files

/markus/files/2014a_sanfranciscofed_mopo

_new_normal.pdf

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Follow @MarkusEconomiston Twitter

https://twitter.com/MarkusEconomist

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Stability concepts & interconnections

OUTPUT (GAP)

E[W( 𝑦�− 𝑦∗,

PRICE STABILITY

𝜋�− 𝜋∗, )]

Instruments

short-term interest rateunconventional MoPo

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Stability concepts & interconnections

OUTPUT (GAP)

E[W( 𝑦�− 𝑦∗,

PRICE STABILITY FINANCIAL STABILITY FISCAL DEBT

𝜋�− 𝜋∗, risk concentration, sustain.)]

Instruments

short-term interest rateunconventional MoPo

micro-prudential

LOLR

fiscal rules

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Stability concepts & interconnections

OUTPUT (GAP)

E[W( 𝑦�− 𝑦∗,

PRICE STABILITY FINANCIAL STABILITY FISCAL DEBT

𝜋�− 𝜋∗, risk concentration, sustain.)]

Instruments

short-term interest rateunconventional MoPo

micro-prudential

LOLR

fiscal rules

The Fiscal Theoryof the Price Level

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Stability concepts & interconnections

OUTPUT (GAP)

E[W( 𝑦�− 𝑦∗,

PRICE STABILITY FINANCIAL STABILITY FISCAL DEBT

𝜋�− 𝜋∗, risk concentration, sustain.)]

Instruments

short-term interest rate

unconventional MoPo

macro-prudential

LOLR

fiscal rules

The Fiscal Theoryof the Price Level

Diabolic Loop Bank-Sovereign Nexus

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Stability concepts & interconnections

OUTPUT (GAP)

E[W( 𝑦�− 𝑦∗,

PRICE STABILITY FINANCIAL STABILITY FISCAL DEBT

𝜋�− 𝜋∗, risk concentration, sustain.)]

Instruments

short-term interest rateunconventional MoPo

macro-prudential

LOLRFor complete description:Brunnermeier Sannikov (2013) “Redistributive MoPo” (Jackson Hole paper)

fiscal rules

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The Fiscal Theoryof the Price Level

The I Theoryof Money

Diabolic Loop Bank-Sovereign nexus

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Financial Stability in the I Theory

• Term spread:• Credit spread:

expectations hypothesis fails default risk +risk premium predicts future economic activity

Gilchrist & Zakrajsek

Δprice = 𝑓(Δ� future cash flows , Δriskpremia)

Endogenous risk (dynamics)• Amplification• Runs

Risk premia (time varying)

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Financial Stability in the I Theory

• Term spread:• Credit spread:

expectations hypothesis fails default risk +risk premium predicts future economic activity

Gilchrist & Zakrajsek

Δprice = 𝑓(Δ� future cash flows , Δriskpremia)

Endogenous risk (dynamics)• Amplification• Runs

Risk premia (time varying)

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Financial Stability in the I Theory

• Term spread:• Credit spread:

expectations hypothesis fails default risk +risk premium predicts future economic activity

Gilchrist & Zakrajsek

Volatility Paradox• Measured volatility is low when risk builds up (in background)

Δprice = 𝑓(Δ� future cash flows , Δriskpremia)

Endogenous risk (dynamics)• Amplification• Runs

Risk premia (time varying)

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Financial Stability in the I Theory

• Term spread:• Credit spread:

expectations hypothesis fails default risk +risk premium predicts future economic activity

Gilchrist & Zakrajsek

Volatility Paradox• Measured volatility is low when risk builds up (in background)

Measure of Topography (distribution) ofrisk concentration pockets• Distribution of Liquidity Mismatch

Δprice = 𝑓(Δ� future cash flows , Δriskpremia)

Endogenous risk (dynamics)• Amplification• Runs

Risk premia (time varying)

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Liquidity Mismatch

Margin-funding is recalled

Maturity mismatch

Distribution of Liquidity Mismatch (with Gorton & Krishnamurthy)

• Across sector

• Substitutability of sector

• Wealth shifts/undercapitalization likely, also shift risk premia

Technological liquidity Reversibility of investment

Market liquidity Specificity of capital

Price impact of capital sale

A L

Funding liquidity Maturity structure of debt

Can’t roll over short term debt

Sensitivity of margins

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Risk Build-up Phase – “Volatility Paradox”

Liquidity mismatch increases during tranquil times

Long-term irreversible projects

Austrian element (Hayekian triangle)

Specialization (specificity)

Low market liquidity⇒ larger fire-sale discount

Intermediation chain often hide overall liquidity mismatch

Distribution matters: “Topography of Liquidity Mismatch”

Debt maturityDuration of projects

A

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Sectorial analysis

Riskier direct lending/credit

Insidemoney

Equity SaversCredit

Reserves

Government

Outsidemoney

Banks

Households

Risky Credit

Real Estate

Equity

Corporation

Risky CreditFactory

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Equity

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“Bare bone” NK Model I Theory

Friction Price/Wage stickiness Financial friction

Manage Price dispersion Potential wealth shifts- Amplification/runs- Risk premia

Balance sheet constraintsi

Linear around Steady State Non-linearities

Transmissionmechanism

Euler equation (STABLE)

Substitution effect

Time-varying & depends on-{LM}sectors

- Financial/mortgage contracts- Borrowers’ bank dependency

Income/wealth effects- ex-post: redistributive- ex-ante: insurance⇒ affects risk premia

(Hanson-Stein on 10 year Tips)

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𝑖�= 𝜋�+��+

“Bare bone” NK Model I Theory

Friction Price/Wage stickiness Financial friction

Money/Interest Interest rate prime focus (moneyless economy)

Endogenous inside money creation (by financial sector)

Instruments Interest rate & QE Interaction with MacroPru- Complements- Substitutes

Rule ∗

𝜆 𝑦� − 𝑦∗ + 𝛼(𝜋� − 𝜋∗)

coefficients of Taylor rule are constant/stable

𝑖� 𝑦� − 𝑦

�𝑎�𝑖�𝑎𝑙 𝜋� − 𝜋∗� =� 𝑉𝑎𝑅 [𝑦 ]

𝑙𝑖��𝑖�𝑖�𝑦� � �+𝜏

… �� �𝑒𝑐�𝑜�

Possibly unstable coefficients and nonlinearities to capture substitutability/complementarity

Long-term interest rate

Expectations hypothesis Term risk premia (time varying)

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Trade-off: Price vs. Financial Stability

Induce “financial risk taking” during crisis in order toreduce endogenous risk, contraction & disinflation• Precautionary delevering leads to

Fire-sale prices Disinflation

Liquidity spiral Disinflation spiral

Inefficient due to pecuniary externalities

• Take on “financial risk” to boost economy, reduce endogenous risk (& risk premia)

1. “Stealth” recapitalization ofimpaired sector (bottleneck)

Banking vs. insurance, SMEs, Corporate sector, household,…

2. Make risk-taking attractive

Banks’ capitalization 16

Tota

lris

k/vo

lati

lity

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sica

l cap

ital

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Interest rate cuts vs. QE/Forward Guidance

Mainstream: QE = interest rate cut below 0

Interest rate cut

𝜏Economically

relevant duration

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Interest rate cuts vs. QE/Forward Guidance

Mainstream: QE = interest rate cut below 0

Interest rate cutQE

𝜏Economically

relevant duration

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Interest rate cuts vs. QE/Forward Guidance

Mainstream: QE = interest rate cut below 0

I Theory view: different distributional implicationsacross and within financial sector

- banks borrow short and lend long

- insurance/pension funds companies

- households – depends on mortgage market

Bottleneck MoPo: Whose balance sheets are impaired?

Interest rate cutQE

𝜏Economically

relevant duration

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Inflation Index: Core vs. Headline

Empirical view: “core” is better predictor of future 𝜋�+𝜏

- exclude energy since it is mean reverting

NK view: Core excludes less sticky prices- exclude energy since prices are flexibel

I Theory view: price changes cause wealth effectdesirable or not?

- exclude energy (in Europe) since it causeswealth transfer to middle east/Russia

(Is oil price drop and lowflation bad for Eurozone?)

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Conclusions – the “Forgotten Normal”

Price stability and financial stability are linked• Money is created by financial sector

Monetary policy and Macro-prudential policy interact

Taylor rule has to be expanded• Instruments (LHS of Taylor rule) are multi-dimensional

I Theory: Wealth/income effects vs. substitution effects

Financial stability – price stability trade-off:More financial risk taking (in crisis), less disinflation

QE/Forward guidance ≠ interest rate cut (below zero)

Reinterpretation of Optimal Inflation Index• Optimal inflation index depends on which sector is impaired

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