British vs German Army

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Organizational learning capabil ity and battlefield performance: The British and German Armies inWorld War II

Author : MAX VISSER - Email :[email protected]

Universi ty: RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN

Track: 50. Knowledge and Learning General Track
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Abstract- In the past two decades the concept of organizational learning capability has been

developed to bridge the gap between the concepts of learning organization and organizational

learning. However, current conceptualizations of organizational learning capability stillpredominantly lean towards the learning organization side, emphasizing the necessity of

double-loop learning in profit firms in highly volatile markets. This leaves room for a

conceptualization of organizational learning capability that leans more towards the

organizational learning side, emphasizing the necessity of solid single-loop learning in

nonprofit and government organizations facing complex societal and political problems and

situations. Army organizations appear as particularly interesting cases in this respect. In this

paper such a conceptualization is proposed as a model with four dimensions: (1) degree of

empowerment; (2) degree of error openness; (3) degree of knowledge conversion; (4) degree

of adequate human resource management and development. Next, this model is applied to the

British and German army organizations during World War II, on the basis of a secondary

analysis of historical and military sources and data. It is argued that this learning capability is

differentially present in both armies, and that this difference can be reasonably related to

differences in battlefield performance between these armies.

Keywords organizational learning capability; battlefield performance; British army; German

army; empowerment; error openness; knowledge conversion; human resource management.

The importance of learning in and by organizations has since long been recognized by

organization scientists. In particular in the last three decades the interest in organizational

learning and learning organizations has been growing, as evidenced by increasing numbers of

journal articles, reviews and books (Argote, 2011; Bapuji and Crossan, 2004). This does not


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imply, however, that there has been an equivalent growth in common conceptual understanding

and theoretical convergence among learning scholars. According to many observers, this still is a

field characterized by conceptual diffusion and confusion, despite some recent attempts towards

conceptual order (Huysman, 2000; Tosey et al., 2012, Visser, 2007).

One of the most important and enduring differences can be found between the concepts of

learning organization and organizational learning. Most of the literature on the first concept has

adopted a prescriptive, practice-oriented approach, directed at developing learning

organizations. Mostly designed for profit firms looking for organizational survival in highly

volatile markets, this literature is both optimistic and normative about the necessity of double

loop, generative and other forms of deep learning for such survival (e.g., Pedler et al., 1997;

Senge, 1990). Most of the literature on the second concept has adopted a descriptive, scientific

approach, directed at analyzing organizational learning. This literature is less optimistic and

normative about the necessity and possibility of deep learning in organizations (Easterby-Smith

et al., 1998; rtenblad, 2002; Tsang, 1997).

To bridge the gap between these concepts, an increasing number of studies have attempted to

identify factors that influence the development of an organizations learning capability (Prieto

and Revilla, 2006; Van Grinsven and Visser, 2011). However, this literature still predominantly

leans towards the learning organization side, emphasizing the necessity of deep learning and

mainly diagnosing profit firms in industry and services sectors. Although some authors here

diagnose the learning capability of nonprofit and governmental organizations, they uniformly

apply the same instrument to all organizations, often finding that nonprofit and government

organizations are less capable of learning than the profit ones (e.g., Goh and Richards, 1997;

Moilanen, 2001).


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But diagnosing organizational learning capability may be equally useful for organizations not

facing existential dangers in highly volatile markets, and thus not experiencing a pressing need

for deep forms of learning. Governmental and larger non-profit organizations, for example, often

face complex societal and political problems and situations, which, when not adequately solved

and dealt with, make them the object of media and political scrutiny. At the same time their

continuing existence is mostly not at stake. Consequently, these organizations need to become

particularly good at single loop, adaptive and other less deep forms of learning, and a diagnosis

of their learning capability would profit more from organizational learning than learning

organization theory (Browne and Wildavsky, 1984; McHargue, 2003; Wilson, 1989).

Army organizations appear as particularly interesting cases in this respect. On the one hand

armies arguably face the most dynamic and competitive situation any organization may

encounter, i.e. actual war. On the other hand their existence, at least in an institutional sense, is

generally not at stake, although naturally victory and defeat may have a large impact on army

functioning. Furthermore, the common image of armies as hierarchical and bureaucratic

machines appears at odds with the degree of adaptability that organizations should possess

when dealing with such dynamic and competitive situations, according to current organization

theory (Bijlsma et al., 2010; Mutch, 2006; Stokes, 2007). In other words, army organizations

appear to pose a learning paradox here.

In this paper a four dimensional model of organization learning capability is proposed that leans

more towards the organizational learning side, and that is specifically directed at nonprofit and

government organizations. Next, this model is applied to the British and German Army

organizations in World War II, , on the basis of a secondary analysis of historical and military

sources. It is argued that this learning capability is differentially present in both armies, and that


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this difference can be reasonably related to differences in battlefield performance between these

armies.

Dimensions of Organizational Learning Capability

For the purpose of this paper I regard organizational learning as the detection and correction of

error, whereby an error is defined as a problematic situation, involving a discrepancy between

what organization members aspire to achieve and what they actually achieve (Argyris and Schn,

1978: 2; 1996; March and Olson, 1975). An organizations capability to detect and correct errors

is here supposed to have four dimensions, based on a synthesis of the dimensions distinguished in

the literature (Table 1) and in the sources mentioned below:

Table 1 about here

The first dimension, degree of empowerment, refers to the degree to which decision-making

responsibilities are (de)centralized in organizations. Drawing on theory and research on

empowerment and (de)centralized decision-making in organizations (e.g., Argyris, 1998; Mills

and Ungson, 2003; Randolph, 2000), it is supposed that the more decision-making

responsibilities are decentralized to lower echelon employees, the higher the probability is that

they will make errors.

The second dimension, degree of error openness, refers to the degree to which organizational

learning climates are open or closed towards errors. Drawing on theory and research on (Model I

and II) learning climates (e.g., Argyris and Schn, 1978, 1996; Schneider et al., 2002), and on

deutero-learning and double binds in organizations (e.g., Rowe and Boyce, 2009; Visser, 2007,


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2010b), it is supposed that the more open towards and tolerant of errors organizational learning

climates are, the higher the probability that errors may be surfaced and corrected.

The third dimension, degree of knowledge conversion, refers to the degree to which lessons

learned from past errors in organizations are being translated, stored and disseminated. Drawing

on theory and research on organizational knowledge conversion (e.g., Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka et

al., 2006), and on the use of after action reviews in organizations (e.g., Baird et al., 1997, 1999;

Darling et al., 2005; Ron et al., 2006), it is supposed that the more organizations translate, store

and spread lessons learned from previous error detection and correction in and through formal

and informal channels and repositories, the higher the probability that these organizations as a

whole may learn from these experiences.

The fourth dimension, degree of adequate human resource management and development,

refers to the degree to which organizations adequately deal with their personnel. Drawing on

theory and research on human resource management and development in organizations (e.g.,

Arthur and Aiman-Smith, 2001; Jaw and Liu, 2003; Lopez et al., 2006; Tannenbaum, 1997), it is

supposed that the better selected, educated, trained and motivated organization members are, the

more decision-making responsibilities they can handle, the more responsibilities can be delegated

to them, which brings us back full circle to the first dimension.

These four dimensions are supposed to form a configuration or Gestalt, to the extent that they

dynamically interact in the determination of organizational learning capability (Meyer et al.,

1993; Miller, 1996; Siggelkow, 2002). When the dimensions are positively configured, they may

constitute a productive learning cycle, and, when negatively configured, they may constitute a

defensive learning cycle. Changes in one dimension always lead to corresponding changes in the

other dimensions, so that improvement or deterioration in one dimension will soon or later affect

the other three dimensions.


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In the following sections this model of organizational learning capability will be applied to the

British and German army organizations in World War II, on the basis of a secondary analysis of

historical and military sources and data. The sources were repeatedly searched from February

2005 to March 2010 through search engines PiCarta, Web of Science, Google Scholar, and

Google, using the search terms army organization, British Army, German Army, army

performance alone and in various combinations. References in the sources found were further

checked for relevance and suitability for this paper.

The British Army

Regarding degree of empowerment, the British Army in World War II came from a tradition as an

Imperial Army, accustomed to fighting brief, small-scale colonial wars in disparate areas around

the vast British Empire. At the heart of this tradition stood the British Armys regiments, which

were responsible for maintaining one of their two or three battalions overseas. While the

regimental system in general fostered an excellent esprit de corps, strong unit cohesion and

identification, and provided room for local experimentation, during World War II this system

hampered the adoption of army wide doctrine and tactics and the formation, development and

training of coherent fighting units at the brigade and division levels. Further, continuity and

cohesion at these levels suffered from regimentally-induced wholesale replacements of battalions

inside divisions, from the rotation of battalions between the Home Office and field commands,

and from frequent leadership changes at senior levels. The latter problem, combined with the lack

of army wide doctrine, led to radically different operational styles, meaning that divisions and

higher had to learn a new way of waging war with each new commander (French, 2001; Hart,

2001; Heginbotham, 2000).


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To avoid the massive manpower attrition of World War I (the shadow of Passchendaele),

already in the 1930s the British Army had come to rely on combined arms operations to generate

overwhelming firepower (French, 1996a: 170). However, only in 1942 did Field Marshall

Bernard Montgomery apply it successfully in the North African desert. Building on recognized

British strengths in artillery, logistics and administration, his operational methods were

characterized by careful and methodical planning, achievement of a distinct material superiority,

and the concentrated and coordinated use of artillery fire power and tactical air power. The

purpose was to curtail German operational maneuverability and flexibility, and to engage the

Germans in attritional, massive set-piece battles, which Montgomery knew in the long run would

exhaust the scarce German human and material resources (Hart, 2001, 2007).

The decentralized nature of the British Army and the lack of army wide doctrine led to different

styles of command and empowerment across echelons. On the one hand, junior officers were

required to obey orders to the letter, and rather than taking independent action and seize

battlefield opportunities they were encouraged to wait for orders (Befehlstaktik). Under

Montgomerys command, also more senior officers were gripped in this way (Hart, 2007: 76).

On the other hand, senior commanders were allowed much leeway in interpreting doctrine and

applying general principles of war, stemming from a general distaste of abstract rules and ideas

and an inclination towards improvisation and pragmatism among these senior commanders

(French, 2001; Hart, 2001; Heginbotham, 2000).

Regarding degree of error openness, when in the course of 1940-1942 the British Army

suffered a long line of defeats at the Germans hands, this led to efforts towards face-saving,

protection of reputation, and putting the blame on others, rather than openly and honestly

evaluating strengths and weaknesses. Class differences between senior officers and the rank and

file hampered communication from the bottom up and advice seeking from the top down, as well


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as cooperation between older, socially exclusive units and newer units. These class differences

were exacerbated by the hierarchical culture, making criticism on commanders only possible in

euphemistic and diluted terms, and valuing loyalty over honesty. Furthermore, senior officers and

the War Office made a habit of censoring lessons-learned material, fearing that an open

discussion of errors by both commanders and troops might adversely affect troop morale and

public opinion. Only when the British Army gradually gained successes in N-Africa and Italy,

did the pace of learning increase, because the British made it a habit to learn from success only,

not from failure (Hart, 2001; 2007).

Further, error openness was not encouraged by the inclination of the two most influential British

senior commanders Brooke and Montgomery to ruthlessly weed out any officer who they

believed was not competent to do his job (French, 1996b: 1197). Not only did this lead to a

quick rotation of divisional commanders, it also made them reluctant to act boldly and to gamble,

because gamble could imply failure, and failure could imply the end of a successful career

(French, 1996b; Hart, 2001).

Regarding degree of knowledge conversion, in general the British Army lacked appropriate

mechanisms to draw and disseminate combat lessons-learned. Only halfway World War II did the

Army establish the Directorate of Tactical Investigation to adopt a more professional and

scientific approach to the analysis of lessons-learned. Among senior commanders, Montgomery

in particular recognized the importance of lessons-learned from immediate post-battle analysis,

and saw to it that these lessons were disseminated though education of his senior officers (and

through them further down the chain of command), and to his troops through memoranda,

pamphlets, and other written materials. He then based his doctrine and training on these lessons

learned, emphasizing retraining in the field. But his traits of arrogance, egoism and

condescension also hampered this whole lessons-learned process: troops had to learn the gospel


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according to Monty (Hart, 2001: 125; 2007). However, since his approach was only gradually

backed up and propagated by the War Office, until 1944 it remained particular to the armies

under his command. Also, most other senior commanders did not consider field training and

retraining under combat conditions very important, leaving it to the Home Office or the regiments

(Hart, 2001, 2007; Heginbotham, 2000).

Regarding degree of adequate human resource management and development, throughout

World War II the British Army experienced problems with the quality and quantity of officers

and men. With regard to officers, class considerations were influential in determining officer

suitability, and only in 1942 did the War Office establish selection boards for a more rigorous

and objective assessment. Further, only after 1942 did Officer Cadet Training Units receive their

training from battle-experienced instructors, which until then were reassigned to front-line units,

due to manpower shortage. In spite of allegations of Blimpism, most senior officers had

received a broad staff college education in tactics, military law and organization, geography and

foreign affairs, history, economy, and more. However, the staff colleges tried to produce both

good staff officers and commanders. According to many observers, turning out good

commanders should have been a priority, and these commanders should have been separately

trained from staff officers. But this was not done, partly because of the fear of training arrogant

staff officers in the German mould, partly because higher training continued to be carried out

through Army exercises (although these were held only twice between 1925-1935). Not

surprisingly, by 1944 two main weaknesses were identified among British corps and divisional

commanders: they had not been trained in peacetime for their wartime roles, and the course at

the staff college was insufficiently related to staff and command duties in battle (French, 1996b:

1190-1191). These deficiencies, however, were partly overcome by the attempts of Field


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Marshals Brooke and Montgomery to promote only competent and professional officers, at least

within the armies under their command (Hart, 2001; French, 1996b).

With regard to men, the quality of the most important branch, the regular infantry, was diluted

by the assignment of the best men to the industry, the technical branches, and other services.

Within the army, many good men were diverted to various Special Forces that grew beyond all

reasonable bounds to the equivalent of six divisions, where the British Army only employed 18

first-line infantry divisions. British morale, influenced by World War I traumas, remained

vulnerable, and throughout World War II commanders were cautious and conscious of the

continuing needs for maintenance of morale and casualty conservation. Casualty conservation

was driven by acute manpower shortages in the UK by 1943, and by political and imperial

considerations, in which the British were aware that after World War II they needed a strong and

large standing army to play an continuing role in world politics against the US and Russia

(French, 1996a; Hart, 2001).

For example, much of Montgomerys seemingly erratic operational conduct of the Normandy

and Market-Garden campaigns can only be comprehended in relation to these two overriding

concerns. Morale was boosted by Montys methodical and cautious approach, in which victory

was practically ensured through large advantages in material and numbers. Casualty conservation

was important in halting seemingly promising exploitation of operational successes in Normandy

and thereafter, and also explains in part the unimpressive combat performance of Anglo-

Canadian forces in Northwest Europe, why numerical superior forces failed to achieve

decisive penetrations (Hart, 2007: 66).

Military justice in general was lenient, with no soldier being executed for desertion during the

whole war. In practice the Army combined psychological treatment for exhaustion victims, and

suspended sentences for deserters in order to make the best use of the limited manpower


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available. On the whole, the military justice system reflected the essentially civilian attitudes

among the rank and file in the Army (French, 1998, 2000; Hart, 2007).

The German Army

Regarding degree of empowerment, the doctrine of war of the German Army traditionally was

directed at overwhelming the enemy through superior fighting power, rather than through

numerical and material superiority. The geographical position of Prussia (later Germany) as a

relatively small state, with few natural resources and surrounded by powerful (potential) enemies,

led to an operational conception of war, which since the early 19 th century had been

systematically translated into army wide doctrine, tactics and training. An emphasis was laid on

maneuver, surprise and improvisation to ensure a quick and decisive destruction of the enemys

command and control capability. In line with this, the army encouraged individual initiative,

independent thinking and responsibility at all levels of command. As a consequence, German

officers did not give detailed orders from the top down (Befehlstaktik), but instead provided

broad missions to their lower commanders (Auftragstaktik). They assigned them the tasks to be

accomplished and left them as much room as possible in determining how they should

accomplish these tasks. However, in the course of World War II Hitler, as supreme commander

of the armed forces, tended to resort to Befehlstaktik again (Frieser, 2005; Uhle-Wettler, 1993;

Von Lossow, 1977).

The General Staff of the German Army played an important role in developing and maintaining

army doctrine. In the spirit of Napoleon, this Staff and its equivalents at army, corps and division

levels functioned as small, well-trained, integrated support units of commanders, emphasizing

execution over detailed planning that, in the words of Von Moltke, would not survive the first


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contact with the enemy (Boothe, 2005: 76). Staff units were very reluctant to place

administrative burdens on the troops in the field, relying on global ten days reports instead of

detailed daily reports. Staffs at all echelons remained well-informed and closely connected to one

another, though, because officers rotated continuously between the General Staff and senior field

command positions (Dupuy, 1984; Hughes, 1986; Van Creveld, 1983).

Regarding degree of error openness, an important role of the General Staff was the rigorous and

objective analysis of victory and defeat on the basis of critical and detailed after action reports

(Erfahrungsberichte) from lower units. For example, directly after the seemingly successful

Polish campaign in October 1939, the Army commander-in-chief, Colonel-General Von

Brauchitsch, ordered his corps and division commanders to come up with as critical, honest and

realistic Erfahrungsberichte as possible. In the same spirit, these senior commanders in their

turn should collect after action reports from their subordinate officers down to regimental level.

Within one month these reports were written, collected and passed on to OKH. In general lower

commanders were not afraid to issue reports in this spirit, indicating a high level of trust and

honesty between echelons (Hart, 2001; Murray, 1981; Visser, 2008).

Regarding degree of knowledge conversion, the General Staff used the results of analysis for the

continuous improvement of doctrine and tactics and their translation in training programs, which

it developed in close collaboration with the Army. For example, the lessons learned from the

Polish campaign were translated into a vast, six-month (re)training program, not only for the

units that had been involved in that campaign, but also, and even more importantly, for the

numerous new units and existing reserve units that Hitler intended to commit against the West in

the Spring of 1940. In that program, the lessons of Poland were directly tied to the training of

existing and new troops, emphasizing the importance of combat leadership of officers and non-

commissioned officers (NCOs) and the importance of discipline and order as a basis for victory.


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The General Staffs training section developed a detailed set of objectives and standards for

training in the various schools of the German Army, where officers and NCOs with recent

combat experience were brought in as instructors (Hart, 2001; Murray, 1981; Visser 2008).

Regarding degree of adequate human resource management and development, throughout

World War II the German Army increasingly experienced problems with the quantity of officers

and men, but in general attempted to maintain quality standards. With regard to officers, in the

German Army the selection of officers, their admission to officer training and their commission

rested with the regimental commanders of the men involved. Only in 1942 a central screening

bureau was instituted for officer testing, but the other decisions remained at the regimental level.

Officers were primarily selected on the basis of character and will power, more than intelligence,

class or education. Psychological tests, examinations and personal evaluations played a main role

in the selection process. In formal training tactics and operations were emphasized, while

strategy, logistics and organization were relatively neglected. As the war proceeded, active front

service increasingly came to be regarded as the best training of aspiring officers, including those

NCOs who showed leadership and initiative in front of the enemy. Promotion to higher ranks

primarily occurred on the basis of personal evaluations of character, competence and the ability

to generate trust under front line conditions, increasingly more than seniority, class or General

Staff training (Dupuy, 1984; Van Creveld, 1983; Visser, 2010a).

Although in the course of the war a shortage of officers developed, the German Army in general

did not compromise on their quality, preferring competent junior or no officers over incompetent

ones. Thus, in 1944 hundreds of battalions were commanded by majors, captains or even 1st

lieutenants. In their behavior, officers were expected to show responsibility, independent action

and quick decision-making, while remaining within the framework of the mission of their senior

officers. They should lead from up front, issuing their own mission orders on the basis of first-


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hand knowledge of the situation. Unlike the British Army, officers were expected to live with

their men and allowed to fraternalize with them when off duty. At the same time they were

expected to enforce strict discipline, thus combining attitudes of sternness and benevolence. In

general both officers and senior NCOs, at least up to battalion level, were highly regarded by

their men (Frieser, 2005; Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Visser, 2010a).

With regard to men, they were selected, trained and organized in ways that bolstered unit

cohesion and morale. The selection of recruits occurred in local centers by a selection officer and

a physician, while their admission to specific army branches rested with their future regimental

commanders. Selection was based on personal judgments and tests, assessing character more than

intelligence. This system ensured that the best men were assigned to front-line fighting units,

rather than to special branches and staff units (Hart, 2001; Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).

In the German Army replacements were mainly used to set up new divisions, not to bring

existing divisions up to strength. This practice turned divisions into cohesive, tightly knit units

with considerable fighting power, until cohesion gains were offset by the depletion of men and

officers due to war attrition. Further, this practice made rotation of divisions in and out the line

possible to the very end of World War II. Rotation involved a few weeks of refreshment,

rearmament, recovery and rest, which were quite important for morale. Replacements reached

their divisions in 1,000 men strong, armed and self-sustained marching battalions

(Marschbattallione), led by officers of the receiving division. Recovered men and officers also

traveled back to their last field unit in the same Marschbattallione, which in this way were

instrumental in integrating old and new men and officers. Recovered soldiers, though small in

numbers, were particularly welcomed by their units, since these veterans were important for

group cohesion and front atmosphere (Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld,

1983).


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Since especially at the Eastern front war attrition often broke up cohesive units in a matter of

days, other sources of morale were important as well. Although the influence of Nazi propaganda

is often mentioned in this respect, it is estimated that Nazi enthusiasts made up only 10-15

percent of all enlisted men. However, they were more numerous among NCOs and young

officers, and much more numerous among Waffen SS and paratroopers. Further, personal faith in

Hitler as a leader was widespread among the troops. As the war progressed, other forces driving

German morale became the increasing realization that the German Homeland was now in danger,

the still faint but uneasy realization that the war excesses and crimes committed by German

forces at the Eastern front would now backfire on Germany at the hands of the revenging

Russians, and the Allied call for unconditional surrender. It led to the sardonic exhortation Enjoy

the war while you can, because the peace will be terrible (Kershaw, 1990: 57; Shils and

Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983).

Military justice in general was harsh and often draconian, with 11,753 men executed for

desertion and undermining morale, which probably led to relatively low desertion rates. The

harsh system was given a human face by the veterans and by relative lenience on private

transgressions, like drunkenness and women in the barracks (Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz,

1948; Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).

British and German Battlefield Performance

In order to assess relative battlefield performance, it is important to find engagements in World

War II that permit a more or less fair comparison between German and British Army units

without too many confounding influences of Allied air and naval superiority, Allied and Axis

political developments, and relative differences in combat experience.


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For several reasons, the Italian campaign between September 1943 and June 1944 appears

suited for that purpose. First, it affords a comparison of German and British Army performance at

a time and place in which Allied naval and air superiority did not yet decisively impact ground

operations. Although the initial landing at and securing of the Salerno beach head was decisively

aided by Allied naval and air bombing, in later engagements the rugged mountainous terrain and

adverse weather conditions made Allied naval and air support much more difficult (Graham and

Bidwell, 1986). Second, it affords such a comparison at a time that the German Army, although

badly battered at Stalingrad (December 1942), did not yet experience the profound impact of the

Normandy invasion and the attempted assassination of Hitler (June - July, 1944)(Wilmot, 1952).

Third, it affords an assessment of the development of battlefield performance of the British Army

over nine months of intense fighting, after its initial string of defeats during 1940-1942 and its

successful comeback in the North African desert (Dupuy, 1985; Graham and Bidwell, 1986; Hart,

2001).

The Italian campaign has been intensively researched by Dupuy, a retired US Army colonel and

military historian. Dupuy and his team developed the Quantified Judgment Model, which

involved the identification and quantification of 73 battlefield performance variables, pertaining

to weapons, terrain, weather, season, air superiority, posture, mobility, vulnerability, tactical air

effects and intangible factors such as leadership and morale (Dupuy, 1985, 1986). While not

without its critics (e.g., Brown, 1986, 1987; Geldenhuys and Botha, 1994), the QJM in general

has remained robust under criticism (Dupuy, 1986, 1987; Nutter, 2004).

Dupuy tested the QJM on the basis of 60 division-size engagements in the US Fifth Army zone

in Italy between September 1943 - June 1944. He selected this particular zone because both

ground and air operations took place in a confined operational area between the Tyrrhenian Sea

and the Apennines, which permitted a better comparison of forces than would be possible in less


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strictly confined areas (Dupuy, 1985). Since the Fifth Army zone involved the commitment of

US as well as British and Commonwealth divisions, out of Dupuys original 60 engagements I

have selected those 28 that only involved British divisions. Table 2 contains the various

campaigns, engagements, German and British units, and other necessary data (based on Dupuy,

1985: 234-235). In this Table it can be seen that seven British and seven German divisions were

involved in these engagements, in which the British divisions enjoyed an average numerical

superiority of about 40 percent over their German counterparts.

Table 2 about here

Dupuy developed two measures to analyze engagements in the Italian campaign. The first

measure, Combat Effectiveness Value (CEV), is concerned with the ratio of relative combat

outcomes and combat power. In a formula it is defined as: CEV = (Rg/Ra)(Pg/Pa), whereby CEVg

= 1/CEVaand vice versa (Dupuy, 1986).

In this formula the first part, R, represents Result, defined by three sub measures: mission

accomplishment (the extent to which opposing sides succeed in achieving their goals); spatial

effectiveness (the number of miles gained or withdrawn in an engagement), and casualty

effectiveness (the number of daily inflicted casualties, controlled for the size of the opposing

sides). Calculating R values for the German and Allied sides in the engagements results in Rg/Ra

ratios, reflecting the actual outcome of an engagement (Dupuy, 1985, 1986).

The second part of the CEV formula, P, represents Combat Power, which in its turn is defined

as: P = S x V. Here S represents Force Strength, a quantification of the lethality of all infantry,

artillery, armor, and air support weapons used into an Operational Lethality Index, modified for

the effects of environmental variables (like weather, terrain and season) on the effectiveness of


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each weapon. Further, V represents Variables affecting the employment of the force under the

circumstances existing as the time of the engagement. This includes tangible factors like posture,

terrain, weather, mobility and vulnerability, and intangible factors like leadership, training,

experience, morale and logistics. Calculating P values for the German and Allied sides in the

engagements results in Pg/Paratios, reflecting the theoretical outcome of an engagement (Dupuy,

1985, 1986).

Applying this CEV formula to the 28 engagements between British and German forces (Table

2), the average CEVg of 1.55 (or corresponding CEVb of 0.65) seems to indicate that on the

whole the Germans were about 50 percent more combat effective than the British forces facing

them. However, as Table 3 indicates, the British forces showed some signs of development and

adaptation during the nine months under consideration. In the Salerno and Volturna campaigns

(September - December 1943) the average CEVg of 1.59 (or corresponding CEVb of 0.63)

appears to show the distinct combat advantages of the Germans (Graham and Bidwell, 1986). In

the Anzio and Rome campaigns (January - June 1944), the average CEVgdecreases somewhat to

1.49 (with a corresponding CEVb of 0.67), indicating a slight improvement in combat

effectiveness of the British troops. This development coincides with a decrease in average

numerical superiority of British over German forces from 85 to 2 percent, providing further

indication of British troops learning to fight more effectively in the face of stiff resistance.

Table 3 about here

The second measure, Score Effectiveness Value (SEV), is not concerned with results and

weapons, but simply counts the number of men and the daily number of casualties (killed,

wounded, missing) on both sides of an engagement. From this a score is calculated, indicating the


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average number of casualties inflicted on the enemy by blocks of 100 men on each side. The

Score Effectiveness is calculated by dividing the score by a constant, the value of which depends

on a number of interacting factors, of which posture (attack, delaying resistance, hasty defense,

prepared defense, fortified defense) is the most important (Dupuy, 1985).

As an example, a typical average engagement in World War II has the following division of

forces (Dupuy, 1986: 206-207):

Army N Posture # Casualties/day % cas/day

German 10,000 Defense 250 2,5Allied 20,000 Attack 400 2,0AL Score ffect (SEa): GE cas/AL N 250/20,000 x 100 = 1.25GE Score Effect (SEg): AL cas/GE N 400/10,000 x 100 = 4.0 / 2.0 = 2.0

During most of World War II the Allied forces were the attacking party and the Germans

delaying or defending. Because of the advantages of a defensive posture, the German score is

divided by a constant of 2.0, yielding a German Score Effect (SEg) of 2.0. The Score

Effectiveness Value of German versus Allied troops (SEVg) then is 2.0 : 1.25, or 1.6 : 1 (the

corresponding SEVais the reverse, namely 1.25 : 2.0, or 0.63 : 1).

Applying this SEV formula to the 28 engagements between British and German forces in Italy

(Table 2), the average SEVgof 1.87 : 1 (or corresponding SEVbof 0.54 : 1) seems to indicate that

on a man for man basis the German troops inflicted casualties at an average 87 percent higher

rate than they incurred from the opposing British troops. However, as Table 3 indicates, on this

measure the British forces showed signs of development and adaptation as well during the nine

months under consideration. While in the Salerno and Volturna campaigns the average SEVg is

2.47 (with a corresponding SEVbof 0.41), in the Anzio and Rome campaigns the average SEVg

has dropped to 1.35 (with a corresponding SEVbof 0.74), providing another indication of clear

improvement in battlefield effectiveness of the British troops.


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Discussion and Conclusions

In this paper it has been argued that the German Army enjoyed a more effective battlefield

performance than the British Army, and that this advantage can be reasonably related to their

comparatively higher organizational learning capability vis--vis the British. Regarding the four

dimensions, the German Army appears to present a relatively more productive learning cycle, in

which officers and men were substantially empowered, in which errors were valued and honestly

appraised, in which lessons learned from errors were quickly and thoroughly disseminated, and in

which officers and men were thoroughly selected, trained and organized so that they could be

empowered more, and so on. The British Army appears to present a relatively more defensive

learning cycle, in which officers and men were little empowered, in which errors were

unwelcome and covered up, in which lessons learned from errors were partly disseminated, and

in which officers and men were reasonably well selected, trained and organized so that in

principle they could have been empowered more, and so on.

While organizational learning capability may have been influential, several other factors have

played a role as well in determining battlefield performance. For example, a factor favoring the

Germans was geographical proximity, with the British troops fighting on remote battlefields and

the German forces increasingly fighting close to home, in defense of their fatherland (Kershaw,

1990). Another factor favoring the Germans was the political factor, with the Allied forces

consisting of multiple nations with concomitant political complications and the German forces

being led by one man, at least in principle (Beaumont, 1986). This was particularly true for the

Italian campaign, which was subject to rather intense inter-Allied strive and disagreement, while

Hitler lend his senior commander in Italy, Air Marshal Kesselring, a relatively free hand (Graham


22/30

and Bidwell, 1986; Wilmot, 1952). However, from the Normandy invasion onward inter-Allied

cooperation greatly improved, while Hitlers increasing resort to Befehlstaktik and micro-

management became de factoliabilities for the German Army (Murray, 1992; Wilmot, 1952).

In the end, however, all these factors could not compensate for the basic strategic fact that

Germany lacked sufficient industrial, logistical and human resources to wage a prolonged two-

front war against the combined Allied forces and that its fate was de facto sealed after the

onslaught at Stalingrad (Frieser, 2005; Murray, 1992).

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Table 1 Dimensions of organizational learning capability

Source Dimensions of organizational learning capability

Chiva et al.(2007)

(1) Experimentation; (2) risk taking; (3) interaction with the external environment; (4) dialogue; (5)participative decision making.

Jerez-Gmez

et al. (2005)

(1) Managerial commitment to learning; (2) systems perspective; (3) openness and

experimentation; (4) knowledge transfer and integration.Marsick andWatkins(2003)

(1) Create continuous learning opportunities; (2) promote inquiry and dialogue; (3) encouragecollaboration and team learning; (4) create systems to capture and share learning; (5) empowerpeople toward a collective vision; (6) connect the organization to its environment; (7) providestrategic leadership for learning.

Moilanen(2001)

(1) Driving forces; (2) finding purpose; (3) questioning; (4) empowering; (5) evaluating.

Goh andRichards(1997)

(1) Clarity of purpose and mission; (2) leadership commitment and empowerment; (3)experimentation and rewards; (4) transfer of knowledge; (5) teamwork and group problem solving.

DiBella et al.(1996)

(1) Scanning imperative; (2) performance gap; (3) concern for measurement; (4) experimentalmindset; (5) climate of openness; (6) continuous education; (7) operational variety; (8) multipleadvocates; (9) involved leadership; (10) systems perspective.

Ulrich et al.(1993) (1) Build a commitment to learning capability; (2) work to generate ideas with impact; (3) work togeneralize ideas with impact.


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Table 2 Selected engagements British-German troops, Italy 1943-1944

Nr. Engagement Brit. div. Nb Germ. div. Ng CEVb SEb SEg

Salerno Campaign, September 9-18, 1943

D1 Port of Salerno, Sep. 9-11 46 I 12,917 16 Pz 4,250 0.79 1.02 3.85D2 Amphitheater, Sep. 9-11 56 I 12,917 16 Pz 4,250 0.46 0.99 2.75

D4 Vietri I, Sep. 12-14 46 I 12,917 HG Pz 15,000 1.04 1.78 2.30D5 Battipaglia I, Sep. 12-15 56 I 11,230 16 Pz 14,730 0.19 1.61 2.86D7 Vietri II, Sep. 17-18 46 I 18,912 HG Pz 13,300 0.78 1.59 1.74D8 Battipaglia II, Sep. 17-18 56 I 14,730 16 Pz 6,995 0.73 0.88 2.02Volturno Campaign, October 12-December 8, 1943

D10 Grazzanise, Oct. 12-14 7 A 14,557 15 PzGr 8,068 0.46 0.68 2.05D11 Capua, Oct. 13 56 I 16,857 HG Pz 8,000 0.13 1.08 3.94D15 Castel Volturno, Oct. 13-15 46 I 17,765 15 PzGr 8,158 0.41 0.51 2.94D17 Canal I, Oct. 15-20 46 I 17,500 15 PzGr 8,138 0.90 0.93 1.73D18 Monte Grande, Oct. 16-17 50 I 16,400 HG Pz 7,239 0.71 0.76 2.20D19 Canal II, Oct. 17-18 7 I 14,600 15 PzGr 8,138 0.91 0.75 1.60D20 Francolise, Oct. 20-22 7 I 14,000 15 PzGr 8,088 0.85 0.96 1.06D22 Monte Camino I, Nov. 5-7 56 I 19,513 15 PzGr 6,750 0.52 0.81 2.06

D25 Monte Camino II, Nov. 8-12 56 I 5,200 15 PzGr 7,942 0.26 0.42 2.24D27 Calabritto, Dec. 1-2 46 I 17,765 15 PzGr 7,588 0.79 0.84 2.95D28 Monte Camino III, Dec. 2-6 56 I 20,744 15 PzGr 3,288 0.79 1.25 3.27Anzio Campaign, January 22-February 29, 1944

D30 Aprilia I, Jan. 25-26 1 I 19,350 3 PzGr 6,750 0.49 0.81 4.60D31 The Factory, Jan. 27 1 I 17,976 3 PzGr 15,317 0.59 0.73 1.10D32 Campoleone, Jan. 29-31 1 I 17,766 3 PzGr 15,098 0.77 0.88 1.71D33 Campoleone counterattack, Feb. 3-5 1 I 9,734 Kg Greizer 26,029 0.85 3.14 3.11D34 Carroceto, Feb. 7-8 1 I 4,515 3 PzGr 26,490 0.98 1.56 1.47D36 Aprilia II, Feb. 9 1 I 17,730 Kg Greizer 27,518 0.21 1.35 2.08D39 Moletta river, Feb. 16-19 56 I 9,761 65 I / 4 Pa 21,478 0.67 1.88 4.56Rome Campaign, May 11-June 4, 1944

D49 Moletta offensive, May 23-24 5 I 17,345 4 Pa 12,569 0.59 2.43 1.92D50 Anzio-Albano road, May 23-24 1 I 17,313 65 I 11,343 0.89 2.48 1.58D57 Ardea, May 28-30 5 I 15,557 4 Pa 7,659 0.74 1.81 1.60D60 Tarto-Tiber, June 3-4 1 / 5 I 38,011 4 Pa 10,855 0.60 2.36 2.4428 Average 7 divs 15,842 7 divs 11,465 0.65

(1.55)

1.30 2.42

Ratio 1.38 : 1 1 :0.54:

1.871

Italics = attacking Pz = PanzerI = Infantry Gr = GrenadierA = Armored Kg = Kampfgruppe

b= Britsh Pa = Paratroopersg = German


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Table 3 Development British-German battlefield performance over campaigns, 1943-1944

Campaigns Nb/ Ng CEVb(g) SEb SEg

Salerno & Volturna(Sept.- Dec. 1943,17 engagements)

1.85 : 1 0.63(1.59)

0.991 :0.41 :

2.442.471

Anzio & Rome(Jan. June 1944,11 engagements)

1.02 : 1 0.67(1.49) 1.771 :0.74 :

2.381.351

Average 1.38 : 1 0.65

(1.55)

1.30 2.42

Ratio 1 :

0.54 :

1.87

1

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