Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand

Occasional Paper – March 2014

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About The Author

Brig (Retd.) Vinod Anand is a Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International

Foundation (VIF), New Delhi. He holds a post-graduate degree in Defence and

Strategic Studies and is an alumnus of Defence Services and Staff College and

College of Defence Management. Earlier he was a Senior Fellow at the Institute

for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Brig Anand has also been a Senior

Fellow at the United Service Institution, New Delhi. His recent publications

include monographs on ‘Pak-Af Equation and Future of Afghanistan’, ‘Multi-

Vector Politics of Central Asian Republics and India’ and ‘Strategic Enviornment

in Central Asia and India’. Earlier he had authored a monograph on ‘Joint Vision

for Indian Armed Forces’ and a book titled ‘Defence Planning in India: Problems

and Prospects’. He writes on military and strategic issues including regional and

international security. At the VIF, he is coordinating research activity and

focusing on China and Ballistic Missile Defence.

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Nehru Era’s Defence and Security

Policies and Their Legacy

Introduction

During the nationalist movement and struggle for independence, there was little attention paid to

articulation of India’s defence and security policies by the Indian National Congress (INC).

Allusions to concepts and precepts of defence of an independent India were entirely absent from

INC party resolutions and documents or for that matter in the speeches of the political leadership.

If at all there was some reference to defence issues, it was in the sphere of developing defence

industries as part of an overall plan of industrialization of India. The dominant impulse among

INC leadership later led by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was that India’s security would be bolstered

not only by its natural frontiers but also by its professions of peace and neutrality in the emerging

world order. Nehru was more inclined to pay attention to socio-economic development and

industrialization rather than strengthen the armed forces. Coordinated development in a sense

was an appropriate strategy for the newly independent nation but Nehru failed to pay adequate

attention to building up of the armed forces that would protect the sovereignty of the nation.

In defence matters, he chose to be guided by bureaucrats and political leaders who had little or

no understanding of strategic and military matters. Influenced by British traditions and mores, he

selected PMS Blackett, a renowned British scientist to advise him on development of defence

industry and science who later expanded his mandate to advise Nehru on defence and security

strategies in which Blackett had no expertise. Whatever recommendations were given by Backett

in his report were largely coloured by British conception of what India should be doing in

matters military. There was hardly any independent or original thinking done especially in the

context of threats and challenges emerging at that time due to changing strategic environment

after the end of Second World War, beginning of Cold War and realities of Communists coming

to power in China. Treating China as not an adversary also suited Nehru’s economic policies as

defence preparations against China would require a much bigger Army and Air Force involving

additional defence expenditure. Sage advice of his own military leadership was largely ignored.

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There was a lurking suspicion shared by Nehru and some of his political colleagues that a

powerful and unified military might pose a challenge to the civil authority. Therefore, during his

reign Nehru successively lowered the stature of military leadership in the official Warrant of

Precedence and dissolved several defence appointments, structures and mechanisms which could

promote conceptual unity, integration and jointness among the armed forces. Krishna Menon, the

Defence Minister during Nehru years at the helm of affairs, has been credited more with

interfering in promotions and postings of defence officers and appointing his yes men rather than

with formulation and pursuance of a prescient defence policy.

Nothing more underscores the lack of Nehru’s long term strategic vision than his policy choices

during Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir by so called ‘raiders’ in 1947-48. Firstly, he stopped the

advance of Indian troops after they had evicted the outer reaches of Kashmir Valley and were

ready to reclaim rest of the Kashmir and secondly, Nehru committed the monumental blunder of

taking the issue to the UN where it lies unresolved till date. But what shattered him immensely

was his failure in understanding China and his miscalculations about the intentions of China.

Nehru’s idealism and his perceptions that China would pose no threat to India floundered on the

rock of unrelenting realist and hard headed policies followed by Chinese leadership on the

question of Tibet and border issues. Since Nehru did not visualize a threat from China, he did not

take adequate measures to prepare for the same. All indications of building up of threat from

China were overlooked by him despite some perceptive advice by many political leaders

including his own Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Looking back, it can be

easily surmised that the first decade or so after India’s independence was a formative period for

Indo-Pak and Sino-Indian relationship that set the tone for many decades to follow. Even after a

passage of more than six decades it has been difficult to obliterate or rectify the negative impact

of past decisions and strategies adopted then.

Therefore, this paper seeks to critically examine the defence and security policies of Nehru’s

years and posit that the legacy bequeathed by such policies has left an indelible impression on

the policy making establishment and even today some of our defence policies bear the stamp of

Nehruvian era.

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Approach to Security

References to defence and security were few and far between in the deliberations of INC’s

political leadership, in the pre-independence era. Though there was general awareness that India

has to be built up as a nation but most of the intellectual discussions were on the social,

economic and industrial aspects of building a nation. If at all there was some discussion on

defence aspects it was development of defence industries as a part of India’s overall

industrialization effort.

Nehru in his speeches before independence did say that “We have an Indian Army which is

brave and efficient, and well-tried in many continents. It is good enough to fight for freedom of

the Allies in the battlefields of Europe and it will be good enough to fight if necessary for the

freedom of India. When freedom comes, we shall develop our army and strengthen it to make it

more efficient than it is today.” 1 However, he saw the pre-independence Indian Army as

advancing only British interests and had some misgivings about the nationalist credentials

especially of the Indian military officers. Nehru alluded to the Army being a mercenary army

though not in a disparaging sense but strictly in a legal and technical sense 2 . In his remarks to the

Press in 1945, he said that “I am convinced in my mind that it (Army) would have done infinitely

better if it was given a national colouring. Nationalist sentiment is bound to have influence.”

3 Nehru was desirous of removing barriers that isolated Indian soldiers from the people. But that

was impractical as long as the British power ruled over India. This disconnect between the Indian

Army and the newly emerging political leadership continued to