Brief on Safety Oct 10

8/10/2019 Brief on Safety Oct 10

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INDEX

1. Role of Safety Officers 1

1.1 Redefined Role of Safety Officers 1

2.0 Safety Performance - 2009-10 ; 2010-11 (Apr To Sep 2010) 1

2.1 Safety Performance during 2009-10 vis--vis 2008-09. 1

2.2 Safety Performance during April to September, 2010 2

2.3 Collisions and SPAD cases: 3

3.0 Train Accidents on Account of Failure of Railway Staff. 3

4.0 Accident Management 4

4.1 Ordering Excessive Number of ARTs 4

4.2 Delay in Ordering and Departure of ARTs/ARMEs/CRANES 4

4.3 Delays in Restoration of Traffic after Track/OHE Fit Subsequent to Train Accident. 4

5.0 Threshold Value for Damage - Classifying Serious Accidents 5

6.0 Preparation of Accident Manual and DM Plan 5

7.0 Draft Accident Manual of DFCCIL 5

8.0 Operating Rules for Train Operations 6

8.1 Powers of Zonal Railways to amend Unified SRs/ SRs. 6

8.2 Working Instructions for Manned LC Gates Powers to Railways 6

8.3 Change in Working Instructions for Manned LC on Double line: 7

8.4 Change of Normal Position of Manned Non-interlocked (Engineering & Traffic) Gates fromClosed to Road Traffic to Open to Road Traffic 8

8.5 Development of Level Crossing Gate Control Equipment using wire/wireless datacommunication - Result of Field Trials. 8

8.6 Precautions for running of trains during fog 8

8.7 Working of Twin Single Line Delegation of Powers to Zonal Railways 8

8.8 Use of Walkie-Talkie Sets: 9

8.9 Shunting During Reception of Trains GR 5.16 9

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8.10 Provision of Intermediate Block Signal on gradients: 9

8.11 Stabling of load on Main line with live Engine: 9

8.12 Exchange of all right signals between train crew and station staff on multiple line section: 9

8.13 Training of Traffic Staff 10

9.0 Vigilance Control Devices (VCD) on Locomotives 10

10.0 Safety/ Securi ty Teams 10

11.0 Vacancy Status 11

12.0 Vision 2020 Safety Items Plans and Progress 11

13.0 Rail Accident Investigation Cell 12

14.0 LED Type Red Colour Light in Rear of Train 12

15.0 HS Lamp Specif ications Trial 12

16.0 Tail Lamp- Problems Reported by Zonal Railways 12

17.0 Breathalyzer Integration in CMS with Biometric Identification 13

18.0 Drivers Biometric Vigilance & Telemetric Control Device 13

19.0 Overloading of Wagons 13

20.0 CADAT Installation 14

21.0 Assessment Centres 14

22.0 Guard/ Drivers Boxes Committee Formed by Board 14

23.0 Speed Guns to Detect Over- Speeding by Drivers. 16

24.0 Preparation of Accident Manual and DM Plan 16

25.0 Implementation of 10 Hour Duty 16

26.0 Equipment Failures 16

27.0 Relief and Restoration Equipment- ARMV/ART 16

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27.1 Mock Trials/Drills 16

27.2 Review of Beats 16

27.3 Speed Potential of ARTs and 140 tonne BD Cranes 17

27.4 Composition of ARTs 17

27.5 Double Entry/Exit ARMV/ART Siding 17

27.6 Availability of diesel locomotives on electrified routes 17

28.0 SPAD Cases 17

29.0 Expenditure on Road Safety Works 18

29.1 Replacement of LC Gates with ROBs/RUBs 18

29.2 Replacement of LC Gates with Limited Height Subways 18

29.3 De-Manning of LC Gates having Low TVUs 18

29.4 Closure of LC Gates by diverting the traffic & Merging/Combining with adj. LC gates 19

29.5 Manning of Level Crossings 19

29.6 Provision of Lifting Barriers & Basic Infrastructure at LC Gates 19

29.7 Shifting of LC Gates outside Station Limits 20

30.0 Safety Issues of Signal & Telecommunications 20

30.1 Signal without light - failure of Power - Back-up Power Supply 20

30.2 Delay in Works of Track Circuiting, Panel / Route Relay / Electronic Interlocking 20

30.3 Installation of BPAC 20

30.4 Interlocking of Level Crossing Gates 21

30.5 Communication at Level Crossing Gates 21

30.6 Provision/Maintenance of Data Loggers 22

30.7 Provision of FOG-SAFE Device in locos 22

30.8 Exclusive Frequency for Walkie-Talkie/VHF sets for ASMs, Drivers and Guard etc. 22

30.9 Block Failures in SGE Block Instrument 23

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Index of Annexures

Annexure No. Letter No. & Date Page No.

Annexure 1 Letter No. 2010/Safety(A&R)/3/16 dated 18.08.2010 1-4

Annexure 2 D.O letter no.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/19 dated 29.09.2010 5-10Annexure 3 Letter no.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/19 dated 08.09.2010. 11-13

Annexure 4 CRBs D.O letter No.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/15 dated

09.08.2010.

14-15

Annexure 5 Boards letter No.2000/Safety (A&R)/19/20 dated 16.08.2010. 16-18

Annexure 6 Letter No.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/15 dated 28.09.2010 19-23

Annexure 7 Boards letter no. 2000/Safety (A&R)/19/20 dated 28.09.2010. 24-25

Annexure 8 letter No.2002/Safety (A&R)/19/29 dated 21.08.2009. 26-27

Annexure 9 Boards letter No.2009/Safety(A&R)/19/17, dated 29.09.2010. 28

Annexure 10 Letter No. 2010/Safety(A&R)/19/18, dated 18.08.2010. 29-30

Annexure 11 Letter No.2000/Safety (A&R)/19/39 Pt. dt 24.09.2010. 31-33

Annexure 12 Letter No.2000/Safety (A&R)/19/39 Pt. dated 15.12.2009. 34-35

Annexure 13 Letter No. 2000/Safety (A&R)/ 19/39/ Pt.dated 19.05.2010 36-38

Annexure 14 D.O No. 2008/Safety (A&R)/19/12 dated 31.05.2010 39-40

Annexure 15 Letter No.98/Safety (A&R)/19/16 dated 23.08.2010 41-49Annexure 16 Letter No.98/Safety (A&R)/19/16 dated 25.08.2010 50-51

Annexure 17 Letter no 95/Safety-I/23/7 dated 12.07.2010 52-53

Annexure 18 Letter No. 2009/Safety(A&R) /19/29 dated 10.03.2010. 54-55

Annexure 19 Letter No. 2008/Safety (A&R)/19/5 dated 14.05.2010 56-57


Annexure 21 Letter No.2009/Safety (A&R)/1/25 dated 10.09.2009 60

Annexure 22 Letter No.2009/Safety (A&R)/19/15 dated 06.08.2009 61

Annexure 23 Letter No. 2009/Safety-I/13/1 dated 19.5.2009 62-63

Annexure 24 Result of VCDs checking drive 64

Annexure 25 D.O. No.2009/Safety I/2/2 dated 29.07.2010 65

Annexure 26 Brief of Safety issues in Vision 2020 Documents. 66-67


Annexure 28 Board's letter No.2009/Safety-I/23/2 dated: 16.09.2010 70

Annexure 29 Installation of Four CADAT centres one each in East, West,

North & South for conduct of psychological tests for high

speed drivers.

71

Annexure 30 Boards letter No.ERB-I/2010/23/21 dated 09.06.2010 72

Annexure 31 Letter No. 2010/Safety (DM)/Insp. Dated 07.09.2010 73-75

Annexure 32 Letter No.2010/Safety-I/11/2dated: 25.02.2010 76-77

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Annexure No. Letter No. & Date Page No.

Annexure 33 Boards letter no.2005/Safety(DM)/Running staff duty dt.

6.9.2010

78-80

Annexure 34 Letter No. 2010/Safety(DM)/6/23 dt. 23.8.10 & No.96/M

(M&P)/175/3/A/T dt. 20.8.2010

81-82

Annexure 35 Boards leter No.99/M(M&P)/7/6 dt. 24.4.2003 83

Annexure 36 AM/ME's letter No. 99 M(M&P)/7/6 dated 24.09.99 84

Annexure 37 Boards letter No.2004/M(L)/466/710dt. 29.6.2010 85-86

Annexure 38 Boards letter No. 2010/Safety(A&R)/3/9 dt. 26.8.2010 87-88

Annexure 38-A Five Year Master Plan for Elimination of Un-manned LC 89

Annexure 39 Bd.s letter No. 2010/Safety (A&R)/3/9 dated 29.9.2010 90-91

Annexure 40 Boards letter No. 96/CE-I/LX/AC/6 dt. 31.5.1996 92

Annexure 41 Boards letter No. 2002/Sig/A/Misc. dated 25.09.2009, 28.7.10 93-94

Annexure 42 Letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R) /26/4 dated 11.8.10 95-97

Annexure 43 Position of block sections provided with BPAC. 98

Annexure 44 Position of level crossing gates interlocking. 98

Annexure 45 Board's letter No. 2000/Safety (A&R)/19/39Pt.II dated

27.09.2010.

99-101

Annexure 46 Boards letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R)/3/2 dated 24.9.2010. 102

Annexure 47 Position of data loggers installation. 103

Annexure 48 Board's letter No. 2010/Sig/SGF/12/Data Loggers dated 22ndJuly 2010.

104-104A

Annexure 49 Letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R)/26/1 dated 12.8.10 and 13.8.10. 105-109

Annexure 50 Board's letter No.98/Safety (A&R)/19/16 dated 23.08.2010. 110-118

Annexure 51 Rly. Bd.s letter No. 2004/tele/WL/2/misc. dated 22.05.2007. 119-122


Annexure 53 Letter No. 2009/Safety &Signal/26/2/Part file Dated

07.05.2010.

126

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1. Role of Safety Officers

1.1 Redefined Role of Safety Officers

Each department on the Railways is responsible for safety in its own sphere ofworking. The operating department has to issue rules for working of trains based on safety

parameters considered optimal, and it is no longer the domain of the Sr. DSOs/CSOs.

Tendency of the Operating Officers to pass on duties pertaining to Operating Safety

items to the Safety officers is to be curbed.

Safety officers have to monitor every department equally to ensure that the laid

down systems are being followed by all departments, including Operating Department.

Consequent upon the recommendations of the Railway Safety Review Committee,

1998, the Safety Organization has now been made multi-disciplinary. It is now required

to work more in an advisory role.

2.0 Safety Performance - 2009-10 ; 2010-11 (Apr to Sep 2010)

2.1 Safety Performance during 2009-10 vis--vis 2008-09

The number of consequential train accidents reduced in 2009-10 in comparison to

the previous year 2008-09 (162 during 2009-10 as against 177 in 2008-09) Category-wise

break-up of accidents is as under:-

Type of Accident 2008-09 2009-10

Collisions 13

(7.34%)

9

(5.56%)

Derailments 85

(48.02%)

80

(49.38%)

Manned Level Crossing

Accidents

7

( 3.95%)

5

(3.09%)

Unmanned Level Crossing

Accidents62

(35.03%)

62

(38.27%)

Fire incidents 3

(1.69%)

2

(1.23%)

Miscellaneous 7

(3.95%)

4

(2.47%)

Total 177 162

Cause-wise analysis of accidents in 2009-10 reveals that railway staff failure

though decreased from 76 to 68, this constitutes 41.98% of the total accidents,

while Equipment failure constitutes 0.62% (1 case) of the total accidents in the

year.

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Analysis of casualty in 2009-10 reveals that about 72% of the total fatalities were

at unmanned level crossing gates. (Out of total fatalities of 225, 161 fatalities

were at unmanned level crossing gates).

The details of Fatalities and Injuries in 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 are as

under:

Year Killed Injured

2007-08 191 412

2008-09 209 444

2009-10 225 385

2.2 Safety Performance during April to September, 2010

In the current financial year during April to September 2010, the number of

consequential train accidents has been 67 as against 69 during the corresponding period ofthe previous year. Category-wise break-up of accidents is as under:-

Type of Accident April to September, 2009 April to September, 2010

Collisions 5 3

Derailments 35 41

Manned LevelCrossing Accidents

3 2

Unmanned Level

Crossing Accidents

24 20

Fire in Train 2 1

Miscellaneous - -

Total 69 67

The following Railways have shown an overall increase in accidents during April

to September 2010 over the corresponding period of the last year:-

Railway April to September2009

April to September2010

Difference

SCR 2 5 +3

ECoR 4 6 +2

SWR 2 4 +2

On ER, NR, NCR, NER, SER and WCR, consequential accidents increased during

April to September, 2010 by 1 each in comparison to the corresponding period of the last

year.

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2.3 Collisions and SPAD cases

(i) 2009-10:

Out of 09 collisions in 2009-10, 7 collisions were solely due to negligence of

Loco Pilots (02 cases due to SPAD by Loco Pilots, 04 due to non-observance of

rules in Automatic Signalling Territory and in 01 case driver lost control overengine during shunting), 1 due to failure of S&T (manipulation of signalling

gears) and 01 due to sabotage.

Most of the collisions (6 out of 9) have taken place in the Automatic Signalling

Territory.

In addition, 10 other cases of SPAD all due to fault of Loco Pilots were also

reported to have occurred during 2009-10 though these did not lead to accidents.

(ii) 2010-11 (April to September, 2010):

3 Collisions (Collision of Gyaneshwari Exp. on SER, Rear-end collision of Uttar

Banga Exp.with Vananchal Exp. on ER & Collision of Goods train with Indore-Gwalior Intercity Express on WCR) took place during April to September, 2010

as against 5 during the corresponding period of the previous year.

SPAD cases The number of incidents of SPAD have shown a significantincrease. One of the major reasons noted is vulnerability on account of crews.

Out-of-beat crews booked.

If no earmarked/allotted crew is available, crew of the starting

station/yard (Division/Zonal Railways) is booked to perform duty. The

LR of such crews may not be there for the booked route; or they may

have performed only a very few trips on the section. Inadequate trips on account of infrequent working of one Division/Zonal

Railways crews.

The number of such instances have increased over almost all Railways

consequent to one or two trains of other than the territorial jurisdiction

crew decided to work a few trains for the purpose of Equalization of

kilometres earned by crews between adjacent Railways.

3.0 Train Accidents on Account of Failure of Railway Staff

A review of the cause-wise analysis for the Consequential Train Accidents duringthe last 8 years has revealed that, as a percentage, accidents on account of Failure of

Railway Staff constitute between 40 to 50% of the total number of accidents. Such a high

proportion on this account is a cause of concern despite the fact that in terms of numbers,

there is a reducing trend.

On the other hand, it is surprising that train accidents on account of Failure of

Equipment has come down to a negligible percentage of the total i.e 5% in the year 2002-

03 to less than 1% in the year 2009-10. During the year 2008-09, there was no accident on

account of equipment failure; and there was just one case of this account during the year

2009-10. The reasons for such low figures were gone into. It appears that the norms for

compilation of statistical data as recorded in the Manual of Statistical Instructions need a

review.

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It is often the case that failure of equipment or assets precedes the human slip up.

Thus, the underlying cause of human failure never comes out as the root cause of the train

accidents. Care should be taken while reporting the cause of accidents as also during

accident inquires. For example, in case of an accident (derailment) on account of a weld

failure, the cause is presently attributed to Failure of Railway Staff. The staff

accordingly is held responsible on account of improper maintenance of rail, and for nottaking timely action either to detect the unsafe weld, or to replace the weld. This is not a

correct system of recording the cause of accident. In such cases, the cause of the Accident

should be on account of Failure of Equipment Pway.

A letter No. 2010/Safety(A&R)/3/16 dated 18.08.2010 (Annexure-1) addressed to

CSOs has been issued. COMs may also like to give their views, if any.

4.0 Accident Management

4.1 Ordering Excessive Number of ARTs

On some of the Zonal Railways it has been observed that more than the requirednumber of ARMEs/ARTs/Cranes are ordered subsequent to an accident. There have been

instances when as many as 3-4 ARTs have been ordered by Zonal Railways and

accordingly had to be returned even without reaching the accident site. Excessive

ordering of ARTs/ARMEs/Cranes results in undue congestion of accident site where

mobility is prime concern after an accident. The Block Stations adjacent to the site of

accident have to be kept free of any train or stabled load, as far as possible, so as to

provide faster clearance of re-railed wagons/coaches and facilitate reaching of urgently

required material/labour at the site. Prudence need to be observed by the Zonal Railways

keeping in view the objective of expeditious restoration and mobility/fluidity of the Block

Stations on either side of the accident site as also at the site itself.

A D.O letter no.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/19 dated 29.09.2010 (Annexure 2) fromMT/CRB addressed to all COMs regarding maintenance of mobility at and near the

accident sites is enclosed.

4.2 Delay in Ordering and Departure of ARTs/ARMEs/CRANES

Instances of delay in ordering and despatch of ARMEs/ARTs/Cranes subsequent to

an accident on some Zonal Railways is a matter of concern. Sometimes the delays in

ordering / departure have been much in excess of the laid down norms in the respective

Accident Manuals of the Zonal Railways.

The delays in ordering and dispatch of ARMEs/ARTs/Cranes result in delay in

reaching the relief and rescue machinery at the accident site and hampers the restorationefforts. Sometimes, these delays invite adverse criticism by the public and the media.

A letter no.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/19 dated 08.09.2010 (Annexure 3)is enclosed inthis regard

4.3 Delays in Restoration of Traffic after Track/OHE Fit Subsequent to

Train Accident

Boards policy instructions regarding Reclassification of Accidents contained in

letter No. 2000/Safety (A&R)/19/20 dated 13.12.2000 has defined interruption to traffic in

Para 10(vii) as duration from the time of accident till starting of first train on line

clear from adjacent station for movement over the affected line in the section. It hasbeen decided vide CRBs D.O letter No.2010/Safety(A&R)/3/15 dated 09.08.2010

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(Annexure 4) that the first train should be taken to mean a regular commercial train(Goods or Passenger) to ensure the best utilization of the track consequent to dislocation

of traffic. Board has also laid down a time frame of 30 minutes within which the first

commercial train should start on line clear from adjacent station for movement over the

affected line. Cases of movement of Commercial Train after 30 minutes of fitness of

Track/OHE shall be categorized as delay in restoration of traffic vide Boards letterNo.2000/Safety(A&R)/19/20 dated 16.08.2010 (Annexure 5). In case, there is no

commercial train available to be run on that section after track fit/OHE fit, an exception

may be made at the level of COM who shall certify that there was no commercial train to

pass over the affected section within 30 minutes of track fit/OHE fit. Accordingly, para 4

(b) and para 10 (vii) of Boards letter dated 13.12.2000 mentioned above have been

amended to incorporate the above decision.

Vide Boards letter No.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/15 dated 28.09.2010 (Annexure 6)COMs have been advised to incorporate these instructions in their Accident Manuals.

5.0 Threshold Value for Damage - Classifying SeriousAccidents

Serious Accidents, inter alia, involving loss to Railway Property exceeding Rs.

25 lakh were hitherto required to be reported to CRS as per section 113 and 114 of

Railways Act for conducting an inquiry by him or otherwise. Boards letter no.

2000/Safety (A&R)/19/20 dated 13.12.2000 on the subject has been amended to enhance

this value to Rs. 2 crore.

COMs have been advised vide Boards letter no. 2000/Safety (A&R)/19/20 dated

28.09.2010 (Annexure 7) to incorporate this provision in the Accident Manuals.

6.0 Preparation of Accident Manual and DM PlanIt has been laid down that the Accident Manual shall be prepared by the

Operating Department (COM) whereas Disaster Management Plan shall be prepared by

CSOs, vide letter No.2002/Safety(A&R)/19/29 dated 31.12.2008. The Accident Manual

shall have a relevant para on Disaster Management which shall be provided by the CSO

to COM.

Accident Manuals are required to be revised/reprinted and updated periodically,

at least once in 15 years, vide letter No.2002/Safety(A&R)/19/29 dated 21.08.2009

(Annexure 8). SCR have their Accident Manual which is more than 15 years old,

whereas Accident manual of ECoR and NCR is yet to be printed after formation of new

zones.

7.0 Draft Accident Manual of DFCCIL

A Draft Accident Manual to be used over DFC system has been submitted by

DFCCIL to the Railway Board for comments / suggestions. In the Draft Manual, DFCCIL

has mentioned about sharing of Relief / Rescue Equipments of the IR with the DFCCIL in

case of accidents, etc.

The availability of ART/ARME/Cranes at all times on the nominated locations of

the Divisions of IR is very essential, primarily to be in a state of preparedness at all times

to handle Train Accidents involving casualties to passengers on the existing IR system and

to restore through communication after accidents. Sharing of ART/ARME/ Cranes withDFCCIL by IR may reduce their availability on IR.

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The Zonal Railways (COMs/CMEs) may conduct a review as to whether they can

share the resources of existing ART/ARME/Cranes. They may send their comments to the

Railway Board.

In this regard Boards letter No.2009/Safety(A&R)/19/17, dated 29.09.2010

(Annexure 9)has been issued.

8.0 Operating Rules for Train Operations

8.1 Powers of Zonal Railways to amend Unified SRs/ SRs.

A review of the GRs and USRs issued in the past has revealed that broadly on

major issues, Railway Board has issued an amendment to the GR; on minor issues, Board

had advised Zonal Railways to issue USRs. The main reason of the practice/convention to

issue Unified Subsidiary Rules from Railway Board on issues of lesser importance was

to circumvent delays attendant with the protracted process involved in issue of a Gazette

Notification subsequent to an Amendment to the GR. For the last 2 years, however,

Safety Directorate, Railway Board, has modified this policy and has not issued any USR.A new system of issue of Advance Amendment Slip to the GR as approved by Board

(MT) has been adopted. When the Gazette Notification is issued, the GR is finally

modified superseding the Advance Amendment Slip.

As a policy, it is now decided to have only GRs issued by Railway Board; and

SRs by Zonal Railways. As such the revised GR will not have any Unified SRs and the

Zonal Railways (Authorised Officers) shall continue to have powers to issue SRs.

A letter No. 2010/Safety(A&R)/19/18, dated 18.08.2010 has been issued

(Annexure 10).

8.2 Working Instructions for Manned LC Gates Powers to Railways

Detailed working instructions for Manned Level Crossing Gates were issued vide

letter No.2000/Safety(A&R)/19/39 dated 08.05.2002. The instructions were modified from

time to time. Some of the Zonal Railways faced difficulties in implementing these

instructions, especially those pertaining to Manned Non-interlocked Gates normally

Closed to Road Traffic.

A level crossing closed for long, once opened for road traffic, cannot be closed

again for passage of trains due to pressure of the large number of road vehicles held up.

This in effect reduces line capacity. A time has come when harassment to the Gateman

through pressure from irate road users held up for long periods at the LC gate needs to be

addressed. A system needs to be evolved for those manned non-interlocked level

crossings which are normally kept closed to road traffic, so that the road traffic can be

allowed to pass around every 20 minutes by opening the gate. Once the system is made

that the level crossing is opened around 20 minutes, the road traffic will not be able to

build up to an unmanageable level.

Some of the Railways have adopted a system which requires exchange of private

numbers between SM and the Gateman too many times especially at gates normally

Closed to Road Traffic. Due to this the SM is often not able to attend to the Gatemans

call seeking permission to open the gate. It is essential that the system is redesigned in

such a way that it becomes practicable for the SM to be able to respond to the call of the

Gateman on busy gates and also where the number of trains is large. To implement this,

the basis for framing revised Working Instructions for manned non-interlocked LC Gates

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normally closed to road traffic (where either number of trains is more and/or there is heavy

road traffic) should be as under: -

As the gate is normally closed, the SM can dispatch (or give line clear for) the

train without every time exchanging a Private Number with the gateman. It can be safely

assumed by the SM that the Gate is normally kept closed by the Gateman, as for its

opening he has to take permission of the SM. The number of instances when a Private

Number is to be exchanged will be those occasions when the Gateman wants to open the

Gate to pass road traffic, and thereafter, after passing the road traffic when he has to

advise the SM of having closed the Gate.

While framing the detailed instructions for manned non-interlocked LC Gates

normally Closed to Road Traffic, the following broad principles may be kept in mind:-

(i) The instructions should enable the Gateman to open the gate at least every

20 minutes or so.

(ii) The number of transactions of exchange of private numbers between the

ASM and Gateman should be as less as possible, as detailed above.

(iii) Working instructions should suit the local conditions prevailing over the

section.

(iv) SWR of the respective stations and Gate Working Instructions of

concerned Gates should incorporate the provision of opening of Gates

around every 20 minutes.

With the approval of the Board (ME and MT) it has now been decided that the

Authorized Officers (COMs) of Zonal Railways may frame revised working instructions

for manned level crossing gates (non-interlocked, closed to road traffic) on their system onthe broad principles mentioned above, in consultation with the PCEs, depending upon

local conditions and the pattern of traffic. The COMs, in consultation with the PCEs, are

also empowered to frame Working Instructions for all type of manned level crossing gates,

whether interlocked or non-interlocked and normally open or closed to road traffic,

depending upon local conditions prevailing over their systems.

A letter No.2000/Safety (A&R)/19/39 Pt. dt 24.09.2010 is placed at (Annexure 11)

8.3 Change in Working Instructions for Manned LC on Double line

The working instructions for Manned Level Crossing Gates were modified to

authorize the gateman for opening of the gates (which have normal position Closed toRoad) after complete passage of train after observing tail board / tail lamp, for single line

sections, vide letter No.2000/Safety(A&R)/19/39 Pt. dated 18.08.2008.

Vide letter dated 15.12.2009 (Annexure 12), this provision has been extended to

double line sections also, provided the SM has not advised the gateman to keep the gate

closed for any other train from either direction under exchange of Private Number.

Besides, the gateman must ensure that conditions laid down in letter dated 18.08.08 are

fulfilled.

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8.8 Use of Walkie-Talkie Sets

The revised instructions on use of Walkie-Talkie Sets have been issued vide letter

dated 10.03.2010 (Annexure 18). In case a train has come to an out of course halt in

Automatic Signalling Territory between two stations, and is not in a position to move

ahead and requires a train engine, Guard of that train can guide the crew of relief engineover walkie-talkie sets/VHF, except in suburban territories.

Use of WT sets has been permitted in exceptional cases for exchange of signals

between LP and Guard when it is not possible to exchange the signals physically due to

length of a train. This can be done to Dispatch/Start a train from station and for trains

stopped at curvatures/tunnels in mid section.

8.9 Shunting During Reception of Trains GR 5.16

Some Zonal Railways had pointed out that shunting may be permitted upto a Stop

Shunt Signal short of Points over which an incoming train is scheduled to pass at major

yards. Zonal Railways have been authorized to provide operational flexibility by insertingsuitable SRs to GR 5.16 with certain safety precautions. This Supervised Shunting shall

not exceed 15 kmph and can be carried out upto a Stop Shunt Signal (or upto a relevant

signal if no Shunt Signal is provided) even towards points over which an incoming train is

to pass. This shall not contravene GR 5.16 (as it is actually only up to the shunt signal) in

anyway. A letter No. 2008/Safety (A&R)/19/5 dated 14.05.2010 (Annexure 19)has beenissued.

8.10 Provision of Intermediate Block Signal on gradients

Provision of Intermediate Block Signal on gradients upto 1 in 80 has been

permitted. Para 7.169 of SEM (Par-I) is now applicable for IBS also in addition to

Automatic Signalling. This implies that IBS shall not be provided on sections with heavy

and continuous falling gradients steeper than 1 in 80, unless the brake power of trains on

the section is adequate to enable the trains being stopped at the IBS.

Similarly Note (f) to item No. 2, of Chapter II Station Yard of schedule-I has

also been amended accordingly. This implies that maximum permissible gradients in

station yards as mentioned in Item 2 of Chapter II of Schedule Dimensions i.e. 1 in 400

(existing works) and 1 in 1200 (new works) do not apply to IBS as no station section

exists therein. (Letter No. 2008/Safety (A&R)/19/10 dated 24.03.2009 (Annexure 20).

8.11 Stabling of load on Main line with live Engine

No restrictions on stabling of load on main line with live engine can be imposed at

stations with gradients between 1 in 400 and 1 in 1200. Special precautions are required

only at those stations which are on gradients steeper than 1 in 400. It has been clarified

that the matter is within the purview of zonal railways and they should approach

concerned CRS if any restriction is imposed by him. The matter has been clarified vide

letter No.2009/Safety (A&R)/1/25 dated 10.09.2009 (Annexure 21).

8.12 Exchange of all right signals between train crew and station staff on

multiple line section

It has been laid down that any competent duly authorized staff can be nominated

by SM to exchange all right signal with the train running through from the off-side. Such

competent staff can even be a class IV Railway employee duly trained to do the jobs such

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training can be imparted in the Divisional Traffic Training schools/Centres (DTTCs).

Even traffic gateman can be authorized to exchange all right signals on multiple line

section in case a manned traffic gate is available on the off-side in the vicinity of the point

zone. Detailed guidelines have been issued to formulate SRs under relevant GRs. The SR

will then facilitate that such a provision is made in the Station Working Rules of the

Station letter No.2009/Safety (A&R)/19/15 dated 06.08.2009 (Annexure 22).

8.13 Training of Traffic Staff

Zonal Railways have been advised to depute their training managers to visit

nominated ZRTIs frequently and sort out the problems faced by the faculty and trainees at

ZRTIs vide letter No. 2009/Safety-I/13/1 dated 19.5.2009(Annexure 23).Latest systems

deployed in the field like FOIS, ICMS, UTS, Data Loggers, BPAC, SSI/EI, etc. are not

available to the trainees for familiarization. A provision should be kept in the estimates of

these projects to cater for the requirement of Model Rooms in all ZRTIs.

9.0 Vigilance Control Devices (VCD) on LocomotivesIn the year 2009-10, 10 SPAD cases were reported and in the current year from

April to 25thAugust, 5 SPAD cases took place, all due to the fault of Loco Pilots. Board

has decided for provision of Vigilance Control Device (VCD) in all locomotives. A two

day long drive was conducted to find out the working of VCD on locomotives. The results

are placed at Annexure-24. Out of 4395numbers of VCDs provided 3958were found inworking conditions.

Presently, Vigilance Control Device exists on some Diesel locos and on all 3 phase

Electric locomotives. After successful trial of this device in 30 conventional Electric

locomotives, it has been decided to install this device in all conventional Electric

locomotives. This has also been installed on 1500 diesel locomotives and it has beendecided to install it in the remaining diesel locomotives in a phased manner.

However, the effectiveness of the working of the device in the locos where this has

been installed needs to be closely monitored. A number of Loco Pilots have isolated this

device during run; as also as its functioning was not satisfactory. Zonal Railways may

conduct a drive at Divisional level to check whether the device is in working condition or

not, where provided.

10.0 Safety/ Security Teams

Honble MR has once again expressed her concern over the recent accidents which

have resulted in large number of casualties. Vide D.O. No.2009/Safety I/2/2 dated29.07.2010 (Annexure 25), General Managers have been advised that all SAG officers at

the headquarters of the departments eligible to be posted as DRM/ GMs (Civil, Engg. S&T,

Electrical, Safety, Operating, Mechanical, Accounts, Stores, as also those working in the

Construction Organization) may be utilized to conduct inspections and look into allotted

areas so as to effect improvement in safety in train operations.

These officers may be directed to carry out inspections on all safety items

including the following:

(i) Two night inspections per month at road-side stations; LC gates or on Footplate.

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(ii) Regular day inspections of maintenance practices of all departments, which may

include working of crew; visit to running rooms; Crew lobbies, Surprise checks of

crew by mobile breathalyzer equipments.

(iii) Ambush checks at unmanned level crossings with Police.

(iv) Check on working of Vigilance Control Devices on Locos, where provided.

11.0 Vacancy Status

The recruitment process through RRBs has been streamlined. One of the RRBs has

been made the nodal agency to conduct exams of a particular category. It has been decided

to hold such exams on one particular day throughout India.

The vacancy status now requires immediate action before safety gets affected.

There were 89,024 vacancies in safety category on 01.0.2009 which have increased further

to 1,03,667 as on 01.04.2010. A lot of questions have also been raised in Parliament on

this issue.

12.0 Vision 2020 Safety Items Plans and ProgressThe road map for the progress of Indian Railways into the future has been

presented to the Lok Sabha in the form of Vision 2020 document. Honble MR has now

directed that each department should make out detailed plans for implementing the targets

laid down in Vision 2020. She has asked for a well coordinated, detailed, year-wise

implementation plan, encompassing all major activities for achieving the targets,

indicating the annual requirement of funds as well.

Every department defines its own parameters for function, legislates procedures

and checks to be followed in the implementation of working systems. Therefore selection

of technology, manpower improvements (training and HRD), equipment modernizationand deciding targets on above, etc. for the required infrastructural inputs, may be prepared

by the respective PHODs on each Zonal Railway and submit details to respective

directorate in Railway Board. A brief of Safety issues mentioned in Vision 2020

Documents are enclosed in Annexure-26. COMs may like to prepare an Action Plan on

items pertaining to them.

The Vision 2020 Document prepared by the Railway Board has very ambitious

targets/ goals. Every effort is required by all departments as also by Zonal Railways to

work towards it. However, if any Zonal Railway has any reservation on these goals/

targets the same may be put across by them to their GM, expressing difficulty and

indicating help required from the respective departments. If, however, even the GMs feel

that the goals in one or two cases are not achievable the Board may be advised accordingly

with full justification.

It was mentioned that Vision 2020 document aims at zero failure of equipments.

CSOs mentioned that while there will be failure of equipments; we may aim at zero

accidents on account of equipment failures.

Faster restoration to traffic after an accident is equally important and zonal

railways should improve their preparedness.

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13.0 Rail Accident Investigation Cell

In June 2010, Board (CRB) has approved for setting up of a Rail Accident

Investigation Cell (RAIC) in IRITM to compile and index accident inquiry reports, cause

wise accident, etc. in order to train officers to conduct Train Accident Inquires.

All CSOs have been informed vide letter No. 2010/Safety (A&R)/26/10 dated13.07.2010 (Annexure 27) to help prepare a knowledge bank through data base of train

accidents in the last 10 to 12 years. COMs may also take note of it.

14.0 LED Type Red Colour Light in Rear of Train

A suggestion has been received from Northern Railway that LED type Red colour

light may be provided (on the SLRs) in the rear of passenger trains. The guard will switch-

ON the LED Red light in the event of foggy weather or during any unscheduled halt or a

derailment to indicate a danger signal to any train that would follow.

Another suggestion is regarding lime powder mixed in water is sprayed on the ballast

across the track to indicate the presence of an approaching level crossing or signal, etc.

Nowadays coloured flashing type Reflectors and Blinkers are used on the highways to

indicate curves or give directions of the road onwards and of the dividers. On a similar

pattern, Blinkers and Reflectors of suitable colour may be planned on Railways to indicate

position of oncoming level crossings, signals, etc. Railway Board vide letter

No.2009/Safety-I/23/2 dated: 16.09.2010 (Annexure 28) has advisedCOMs to ponder on

the above suggestions.

15.0 HS Lamp Specifications Trial

RDSO vide letter dated 29.04.2010 has advised General Managers that Signal

Directorate of RDSO has cleared for procurement of 750 numbers LED based torch light

cum flashing Hand Signal Lamps by each of the Zonal Railways from any of the vendors

approved by Signal Directorate (RDSO) for field trials.

There is an urgency that we complete this exercise before the onset of the next

foggy season. Zonal Railways may expedite procurement of newly developed HS lamps

and advise its performance to RDSO for any further improvement /revision in the

specification.

16.0 Tail Lamp- Problems Reported By Zonal Railways

It is noted that zonal railways have reported the problems in the Tail Lampsprocured according to RDSO specifications. RDSO has stated that to overcome the

problems reported by zonal Railways in the supplies of Tail Lamps, vendor development

may be carried out which will ensure the quality of the product.

In a similar case, RDSO had earlier obtained the samples of HS lamps procured by

the Zonal Railways and tested them. It was found that those did not conform to the RDSO

specifications to the full. Further, based on the feedback received from the zonal Railways

and its analysis, RDSO improved the specification again.

RDSO has been advised that similar exercise may be carried out for the Tail

Lamps also. The problems reported by the zonal Railways may be analyzed by RDSO and

changes in specification, if any, may be accordingly made. RDSO may test the samples, ifconsidered so. Recently by a gazette notification, the requirement of flashing amber colour

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in tail lamp has been removed. RDSO may therefore examine the required changes in

specification. Vendor development may be looked into thereafter.

17.0 Breathalyzer Integration in CMS together with Biometric

Identification Device (Thumb Imprint + Photo)

Integration of breathalyzer equipment in computerized CMS is under consideration

for quite some time. CRIS has to prepare the standards of interface as Board (MT) has

approved the above to make the system foolproof, photographing of the signing-on crew

also needs to be integrated in CMS. CAO (FOIS) has been advised to get specification

prepared and carry out the works.

During the GMs conference on 12.01.2010, the subject was discussed and it was

emphasized that in order to reduce the Train Accidents on account of human failures,

integration of Breathalyzer Equipments in CMS should be expedited. CRIS had earlier

confirmed that efforts are on to integrate the Breathalyzer equipment alongwith bio-metric

identification of signing-on crew in CMS. Some trials were also being conducted at GZBcrew lobby. COMs may like to watch on the implementation of Crew Management

System software by CRIS at crew lobbies on their Railways.

18.0 Drivers Biometric Vigilance & Telemetric Control Device

On 29-04-2009, in a miscreant activity at Chennai Southern Railway, an

unauthorized person entered the cab of an EMU train (around 05:00 hours) and drove it for

few kilometers and collided head-on with 350 UP pilot goods train at Veyasarpadi Jeeva

station. To prevent such accidents, Electrical dte in Board has approved of a trial with a

Drivers Vigilance through Biometric Control Device. In this system, the driver wears a

device of the size of the wrist watch strapped to his wrist. The device measure short

interval variation in the electrodermal parameter of skin and communicate through

wireless to a monitoring device in the locomotive cab.

The data is interpreted to find if the driver is inside the locomotive and alert or not.

It is claimed that the system is capable of giving warning about a minute before the driver

is likely to dozeoff and applies brake if the driver does not acknowledges the alarm to

him. If the driver leaves the locomotive with the device strapped on his wrist, the

locomotive will not function till the driver with the device returns in cab. The will ensure

that the locomotive can be driven only in the physical and alert presence of the authorized

person.

The purchase order has been placed on a firm M/s Neurocom, Moscow Russia.Above system is to be tried on ten electric locos each on ECoR and SCR. It is learnt

through CSO/ SCR that the device has been put under trial. However, there have been

instances of false alarm by the devices which is under examination. Such devices have not

yet been installed on ECoR. Having too many alarm system (devices) on the loco may

become counter productive and cause distraction to the LP/ ALP. Zonal Railway may

check if any similar trial is planned for diesel locos or not.

19.0 Overloading Of Wagons

CAG in its audit of Corporate Safety Plan works has pointed out that there is

overloading of wagons to the tune of 20% of those weighed on wayside weighbridges.

Now that the permitted loading has been increased to CC+8t, it is learnt that except iron-

ore and manganese, no other item can be overloaded due to dimension constraints of

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wagons. SER had advised overloading of wagons to the tune of 25% in the year 2008-09.

This figure has drastically reduced to 3% in 2009-10. It is suspected that reporting of SER

on the wagons found overloaded may be incorrect.

Zonal Railways may review the extent of over-loading detected at wayside weigh-

bridges.

20.0 CADAT Installation

In pursuance of recommendation No. 308 of RSRC-1998, a new Computer-aided

Test Scheme (CADAT) for screening of High Speed Train Drivers has been developed

and introduced w.e.f. September 2006 at RDSO. As all the Zonal Railways sent their

drivers to RDSO for the Aptitude Test for the High speed Train running, precious man

days were lost in transit for conduct of psychological tests for the selection of high speed

train drivers. Decentralization of CADAT was therefore required for saving man-hours

lost even though the number of drivers that need to undergo the test is small

It was accordingly decided that:i) Four CADAT centres one each in East, West, North & South (Annexure 29)

will be established in addition to one at RDSO for conduct of psychological

tests for high speed drivers.

ii) RDSO shall be the agency to procure CADAT systems for setting up the

CADAT centres.

iii) CADAT centres will merge with psychological test Assessment centres when

these are established.

All the CADAT centres have been commissioned in March 2010. All other

procedures and norms of existing CADAT test remain unchanged. COMs may also take

note of it and review the system adopted.

21.0 Assessment Centres

Proposal for setting up of 8 such Assessment Centres at an estimated cost of

Rs.12.21 Cr at. Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Secunderabad, Guwahati, Gorakhpur

and RDSO (Lucknow) has been sanctioned in the Supplementary Budgetin Nov 2008.

Board vide letter no. 2004/Safety-I/8/1/4 dated 03.12.2008 has advised COMs of the

Railways where the Assessment Centres have to come up, to nominate a SAG Traffic

officer (other than CSO), who deals with operating safety rules, etc., to work as the Nodal

Officer to co-ordinate with RDSO. The respective COMs may also in the meanwhile

strengthen the class IV and class III staffin the Assessment Centres so as to be able toundertake the workload.

The detailed specification for the procurement of modules for computerized

Aptitude Test is being prepared by RDSO. Tenders are likely to be floated by December

2010 and concluded by March 2011. COMs may extend help to RDSO in preparing the

estimates for Civil and E&M works at the assessment centre locations on their Railways

and ensure timely readiness of the locations.

22.0 Guard/ Drivers Boxes Committee formed by Board

A Committee has been formed vide Boards letter No.ERB-I/2010/23/21 dated

09.06.2010 (Annexure 30) to study the issues regarding replacement of Drivers andGuards boxes with bags/briefcases.

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DG/ RDSO vide his letter dated 06.07.2010 has sent a report to Board on a study

conducted by Traffic Directorate of RDSO for rationalization of items for personal stores

of train crew and their carriage in light weight container. As a result of rationalization it is

possible to carry guards equipment in a trolley type suitcase and drivers equipment in a

canvas bag.

GR 4.9 prescribes certain equipments which driver and guard are required to

necessarily carry while on duty as his personal equipment. RDSO in its report has given

details about provisions as per GR, guards personal store, brake van equipment, drivers

personal store and items provided in locomotive cabs. RDSO has carried out the field

study on the items actually being carried by drivers and guards and made following

suggestions:

RDSO Suggestions for changes in guard box equipment.

(i) First aid box to be made an item of brake van equipment of Mail /Express/

Passenger guards.

(ii)

Alternatively this item can be provided by station masters of the originatingstation and stowed in the cupboard together with portable control telephone,

fire extinguishers, etc.

(iii) Small almirah may be provided in the brake van of passenger carrying trains

and freight trains to house rule books and stationery items.

(iv) Vacuum gauge may be removed from the personal equipment and issued to the

guard of vacuum trains at the lobby and deposited back at the lobby.

(v) As GR 4.16 - 1(a) permits an unlit red painted tail lamp. Therefore, an unlit red

painted tail lamp may be used during the day and same can be used by lighting

during the night. This will save carrying of tail board.

(vi)

Torch cum Hand signal lamp, as per revised specification will way around 600gms, excluding battery. Such a hand signal lamp may be provided by station

master of originating station alongwith other equipments. The guard only

carries the dry cells with him.

(vii) Flashing LED based HS lamp eliminates the requirement of fusee.

(viii)Only relevant extract rule books may be carried by the guards.

(ix) Complaint and suggestion books of smaller size with less number of pages will

reduce the weight.

(x) Use of telescopic type light weight aluminum sticks in the red and green flags

will reduce the weight.

RDSO Suggestion for drivers box

(i) A suitable small almirah in the loco may house tool box, rule books and

stationery. This will reduce driver box by about 4.5 kg.

(ii) Trolley type light weight suitcase for guards and canvas bag for drivers is

suggested in lieu of heavy weight steel box. The life of these is assessed as 3

years.

Director (Safety)-III during his inspection of KRCL has noted that Loco Pilots,

Assistant Loco Pilots and Guards have been provided with Brief cases and there are no

box porters on KRCL. Vide Letter No. 2010/Safety (DM)/Insp. Dated 07.09.2010

(Annexure 31).CSOs have been advised to examine emulation of such a practice on theirRailway. COMs may also like to ponder over it.

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Railways may advise and confirm that their sections have been adequately covered by the

beats of either their own ARMVs/ARTs or that of adjoining Railways.

27.3 Speed Potential of ARTs and 140 tonne BD Cranes

Mechanical directorate have instructions vide Boards leter No.99/M(M&P)/7/6 dt.

24.4.2003 (Annexure 35)for making fit all ARTs and 140 tonne BD cranes for the speedof 100 Kmph. Railway may confirm that their ARTs and BD cranes are fit to run at 100

kmph.

27.4 Composition of ARTs

A longer composition of ART creates operational problems in backing/shunting etc.

It may result in a longer lead for material to be moved to reach the site of Accident.

AM/ME had advised vide letter No. 99 M(M&P)/7/6 dated 24.09.99 ( Annexure 36)thatthe maximum composition of A Class ARTs should not exceed 8 in case of electrified

sections and 7 on other sections. However some of Railways are still having 8-18

vehicles in their ARTs.

Railways may confirm that their A Class ARTs are as per the stipulated

composition.

27.5 Double Entry/Exit ARMV/ART Siding

Conversion of single entry/exit sidings into double entry/exit sidings needs to be

undertaken on priority wherever possible. Railways may advise sidings identified for

conversion and the progress thereof.

27.6 Availability of diesel locomotives on electrified routes

Zonal railway must ensure that there should not be any inordinate delay in turning

out ARMVs/ARTs on account of non-availability of diesel locomotives. Individual

railways, therefore, need to check, plan and confirm the availability of diesel locomotives

near or at locations where their ARMVs/ARTs are based. In the recent accident cases, it

was observed that few ARTs/ARMEs were sent by Electric Locos which caused delay .

Adv TT (M) has issued instructions vide Boards letter No.2004/M(L)/466/710dt.

29.6.2010 (Annexure 37)which may be followed.

Zonal Railways may also check as to whether the 140 Tonne/crane is stabled

along with ART or kept on a separate line/depot.

28.0 SPAD Cases

The broad principle of allocation of beats of crews is the ownership of the major

portion of the crew run on a particular Railway. However, exceptions have been made for

Km equalization, when crew of one/two train per day have been earmarked to work on

adjoining Zonal Railway.

It has been observed that a large percentage of SPAD cases are due to:-

(a) Out of beat working of crews.

(b) Crew working on other territory on rare occasion.

(c) Maximum cases are during train working of 000-0800 hrs

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29.0 Expenditure on Road Safety Works

The expenditure on Road Safety Works in the last few years on Indian Railways

has been much less than the Budget allotment. This indicates less priority given by Zonal

Railways on Road Safety Works under plan head 29 and 30. The performance of almost

all the Zonal Railways has not been up to the mark. The total expenditure in ROB/RUBand Level Crossings works in the year 2009-10 was 54.6% and 49% of budget allotment

respectively.

The Railway receives funds for Safety Works related to Level Crossings and ROBs

from Central Road Fund (CRF) @ 12.5% of 50% of Diesel cess and of 100% of Petrol

cess (Rs.1.50 per litre). Railways inability to spend money allocated from CRF may lead

to less allotment in future, therefore, it was emphasised that the funds allotted to Railways

from CRF for Safety Works of LCs and ROBs should be utilized fully. For ROB/RUBs

under Plan Head 29 the outlay for year 2010-11 is Rs.1000 Crores, and for Level

Crossing Works under Plan Head 30 it is Rs. 700 Crores for all over Indian Railways and

expenditure upto Aug10 is only Rs.269 crores .It is advisable that adequate speed restriction and traffic blocks are granted as and

when demanded to expedite the utilisation of funds allocated for Road Safety Works.

29.1 Replacement of LC Gates with ROBs/RUBs

In 2009-10, a total of 120 ROBs/RUBs had been targeted out of which only 80

have been completed The progress of construction of ROBs/RUBs is not satisfactory.A

total of 787 ROBs/RUBs works have been sanctioned as on 01.04.2010 over Indian

Railways under cost sharing. . There are total 1421 ROB/RUB works sanctioned under all

heads i.e. Cost Sharing, Deposit, BOT, GC/New Line/Doubling, NHAI

(787+174+47+50+363) as on 01.04.2010. Railways needs to focus more as a largenumber i.e. 146 of ROBs/RUBs are targeted in 2010-11 under cost sharing and only 37 are

completed till Aug10.

The work involved is clearly gigantic. It is advisable that adequate speed

restriction and traffic blocks are granted as and when demanded to expedite these works.

29.2 Replacement of LC Gates with Limited Height Subways

At present, 1525 locations have been identified to be replaced by Limited Height

Subways over Indian Railways. Out of these, 740 Nos. have been sanctioned as on

01.09.2010 and 211 Nos. are targeted to be constructed in the year 2010-11. The progress

is only 49. Railways need to focus more as a large number of Limited Height Subways aretargeted in 2010-11.

The powers of the GM have recently been revised to sanction limited sub-ways in

lieu of level crossings and increased to Rs.2.5 crore. Some of the Railways have done

encouraging work on this; others have yet to improve. Boards letter No.

2010/Safety(A&R)/3/9 dt. 26.8.2010(Annexure 38)may be looked into in this regard.

29.3 De-Manning of LC Gates having Low TVUs

With the decision taken to man all unmanned level crossings, it is imperative now

to do away with LCs with very low level of TVUs. Efforts should be made to identify LC

gates having low TVUs and to impress upon the State Govt. Authorities to reduce thenumber of unmanned level crossings. Zonal Railways are not taking adequate initiative

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Indian Railways was 1310 Nos. for the year 2009-10 out of which 2572 Nos. were

completed. The target fixed for the year 2010-11 is 1041 Nos. This may be followed up.

29.7 Shifting of LC Gates outside Station Limits

A manned crossing gate located within the outermost points in the station area is

particularly a major bottleneck for train operations. In case of stabling of a rake, within

the point Zone, on a complete track circuited station, the LC gate once closed cannot be

opened. Also, manned LC Gates within station limits are not desirable. Efforts need to be

made to shift the existing manned level crossings which are within station limits to outside

station limits. Boards letter No. 96/CE-I/LX/AC/6 dt. 31.5.1996(Annexure 40)may befollowed in this regard.

30.0 Safety Issues of Signal & Telecommunications

30.1 Signal without light - failure of Power - Back-up Power Supply

The following are a matter of concern from safety point of view:

(i) The blanking off of signals due to non-availability of back-up power supply;

and

(ii) Non-reversal of signal to the original aspect or the modified aspect if

movement has taken place, after restoration of power supply.

Signal Directorate has issued instructions on the subject vide Boards letter No.

2002/Sig/A/Misc. dated 25.09.2009, 28.7.10 (Annexure 41) Safety Dte vide letter No.

2009/Safety (A&R) /26/4 dated 11.8.10 (Annexure 42)has forwarded extracts of chapterXVI of Signal Engineering Manual Pt.-II giving details of power supply arrangements and

asked Railways for carrying out a station wise check of Power Supply equipment andtake necessary action for removing the deficiencies.

30.2 Delay in Works of Track Circuiting, Replacement of over-aged

Signalling Assets by Panel / Route Relay / Electronic Interlocking

Provision of complete track circuiting of station section is one of the most

important & effective safety aid in preventing collisions. Delay in completion of track

circuiting works sanctioned is a matter of concern. At some of the locations, complete

track circuiting is not available even on A route (CR, NCR, WCR & ER), B route (ER,

NR, NCR, SCR ,ECR & ECoR), C route (ER) and D-Special route (NR, ECR, ECoR,

SER, SECR ,WR & NCR).Priority is also to be given for replacement of sanctioned works of over-aged Signalling

assets by Panel/Route Relay/Electronic Interlocking (PI/RRI/EI).

30.3 Installation of BPAC

Out of a total target of 421 block sections to be provided with BPAC in the year

2010-11, 190 have been commissioned till Aug. 2010 ( Annexure 43) CR, NFR, SR, WR

& ECR are lagging behind the Proportionate target (upto Aug. 2010). A large number of

stations do not have sanctioned works of BPAC on almost all Railways. Provision of

BPAC not only enhances safety but also helps in operational efficiency. Follow-up action

needs to be taken by Zonal Railways for sanction and expeditious completion of theseworks.

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30.4 Interlocking of Level Crossing Gates

30.4.1 Status of Interlocking of gates

Out of a total target of 333 level crossing gates to be interlocked in the year 2011-

12, 205 have been interlocked till Aug. 2010( Annexure 44). Eastern Railway, NorthernRailway, N.F. Railway, SE Railway, Western Railway, EC Railway , ECOR & SECR are

lagging behind the proportionate target (upto Aug). This may be followed up with CSTEs

for expeditious completion.

30.4.2 Policy on Interlocking of Level Crossing Gates

Comprehensive policy on Interlocking of Level Crossing Gates were issued by

Signal Directorate Railway Board vide Letter No. 77/W-3/SG/LX/2 dt. 16.8.79. As per

these guidelines, Traffic Level Crossings Gates which are of Special, A and B Class

were to be interlocked. However, C Class Manned Level Crossings were to be

interlocked, in other than suburban sections, only where such gates are operated by the

Cabin staff of Gates adjoining Level Crossings. Relevant provisions of this circular havebeen incorporated as such, in IRPWM in para 904, Annexure 9/1 sub item 9(b).

As these guidelines have become outdated mainly due to the cabins have been

done away with the Panel Interlocking introduced, Board is in the process of issuing

revised Guidelines.

A copy of proposed guidelines under consideration in the Railway Board has been

circulated vide this office letter No. 2000/Safety (A&R)/19/39Pt.II dated 27.09.2010

(Annexure 45).

30.5 Communication at Level Crossing Gates

Zonal Railways have been advised to step up the pace of manning so as to

complete manning of qualifying unmanned level crossings at the earliest. One of the

problems faced by Railways in manning of Level Crossing is feasibility of exchange of

private nos. by gateman with the ASM of the station to which the gate is connected

with telephone communication. It has been noticed that some of the stations already

have large nos. of Level Crossings gates connected with them. If more gates are

connected to such stations, it may not be feasible for the ASM to exchange private

numbers. On the other side, there are adjacent stations, which are connected with

lesser nos. of Level Crossings.

It is, therefore, advised that in above situations, for both existing and new

gates, whenever the gate communication is to be provided through quad cable, whichruns through the block section (between two stations), some rationalization, about the

number of gates to be connected to each station should be done. Efforts should be

made to reduce as far as possible the imbalance in no. of gates connected with each of

the adjacent stations i.e. the guiding principle for provision of LC gate telephones

should be the number of gates to be connected to each block station instead of the

existing geographical location based criteria.

Boards letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R)/3/2 dated 24.9.2010 (Annexure 46)inthis regard may be followed.

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30.6 Provision/Maintenance of Data Loggers

A target for provision of 320 data loggers during 2010-11 has been fixed, out of

which 221 data loggers have been provided till Aug. 2010(Annexure 47).

AM/Sig Railway Board vide letter No. 2010/Sig/SGF/12/Data Loggers dated 22ndJuly 2010 (Annexure 48) has instructed Railways regarding proper upkeep and

maintenance of data loggers to ensure timely extraction of reports. The failure of data

loggers is not recorded in the statistical compilation of equipment failures. Due to this,

very little monitoring of these failures is done at Zonal Railway level. The Operating

officers must check the Data loggers during their inspections and follow up with the S&T

Deptt for removal of deficiencies, if any.

COMs are advised to follow up with CSTEs for provision of Data loggers at

stations not provided with it so far.

30.7 Provision of FOG-SAFE Device in locosBoard has approved provisions of Fog-safe device in the locos to indicate the

location of an approach stop signal during foggy season after ascertaining the reliability on

such a device. The reliability of Fog-Safe device has to be certified by the CSOs. In this

regard this office letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R)/26/1 dated 12.8.10 and 13.8.10

(Annexure 49)may be looked into.

Board vide letter No.98/Safety (A&R)/19/16 dated 23.08.2010 (Annexure 50) has

issued instructions for precautions to be taken for train operations during fog.

30.8 Exclusive Frequency for Walkie-Talkie/VHF sets for ASMs, Drivers

and Guard etc.Standardization of the frequency for Walkie-Talkie sets to be used by different

departments and the staff has been done and circulated to all Zonal Railways vide Rly.

Bd.s letter No. 2004/tele/WL/2/misc. dated 22.05.2007 (Annexure 51). The

standardization has been done with a view to provide a common frequency to the staff of

different departments alongwith at least one exclusive frequency separately for each

department.

Board vide above referred letter had asked the Railways for the following action:

(i) Check whether guidelines of allocation of frequencies as circulated by

Telecom Directorates above mentioned letter are being followed on each

railway.

(ii)

Whether VHF sets have been programmed with the allotted frequency before

issue to the respective departments or directly to the staff. The switch over

arrangement from one frequency to another is only as assigned to their

departments.

(iii) Whether the ASMs and Drivers/Guards communication through the

nominated frequency is exclusively provided only to them and cannot be

accessed by any other department.

(iv) Whether there is a provision for automatic switch over of the VHF sets

provided to the ASMs with the Driver/Guard communication channel in case

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of the Calling Station Master failure to switch over the channel manually

within 5 seconds after the talk is over.

In this reference Board (CRB) has also written to General Managers, All Indian

Railways vide letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R)/19/29 dated 24.08.2010 (Annexure 52) toconfirm whether the laid down system is followed.

30.9 Block Failures in SGE Block Instrument

In double line SGE Type Block Instruments, the ASM of the receiving station is

required to move the operating handle to TOL position once the train crosses the advance

starter of the dispatching station (marked by sounding of buzzer) and before the train

crosses Home signal of the receiving station. In case the train enters the home signal before

the handle is turned to TOL position, the block instrument fails and the next train has to be

sent on PLCT and the block instrument then is normalized by passage of this train.

NCR, ER, SR and SEC Rly. Have implemented an Auto TOL circuit which results

in normalization of the block instrument even when the handle is turned to TOL position

after the train has entered the home signal. This prevents running of train with PLCT and

thus improves safety as well as improves operations by reducing failures of block

instrument.

Other Zonal Railways may like to follow up with the S&T Department of their

Railways. Safety Directorates letter No. 2009/Safety &Signal/26/2/Part file Dated

07.05.2010 (Annexure 53)may be referred in this regard.

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Brief on Safety Oct 10

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Transcript of Brief on Safety Oct 10