brief - BICC Bonn International Center for Conversion · über das Militär wurde gestärkt und die...

brief 26Becoming anBecoming anBecoming anBecoming anBecoming anEx-military ManEx-military ManEx-military ManEx-military ManEx-military ManDemobilization and ReintegrationDemobilization and ReintegrationDemobilization and ReintegrationDemobilization and ReintegrationDemobilization and Reintegrationof Military Professionalsof Military Professionalsof Military Professionalsof Military Professionalsof Military Professionalsin Eastern Europein Eastern Europein Eastern Europein Eastern Europein Eastern Europe

2 B·I·C·C

brief 26brief 26brief 26brief 26brief 26

The authorThe authorThe authorThe authorThe author

Editing:Moira Davidson-Seger

Cover photo:Josef Koudelka/Magnum PhotosBulgaria, Sofia, 1995

Andreas Heinemann-GrüderSenior Researcher, Bonn InternationalCenter for Conversion, Germany

ContentsContentsContentsContentsContents

ZusammenfassungZusammenfassungZusammenfassungZusammenfassungZusammenfassungGerman summaryGerman summaryGerman summaryGerman summaryGerman summary 44444

AcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgments 55555

IntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroduction 66666

Identity Patterns of Former MilitaryIdentity Patterns of Former MilitaryIdentity Patterns of Former MilitaryIdentity Patterns of Former MilitaryIdentity Patterns of Former MilitaryProfessionalsProfessionalsProfessionalsProfessionalsProfessionals 1010101010

Research questions 10

Behavioral patterns: general findings 10

Identity patterns among former Ukrainian officers 11

Identity patterns among former Polish officers 13

Identity patterns among former Hungarian officers 14

Identity patterns among former officers in Latvia 16

Administrating Demobilization: ExperiencesAdministrating Demobilization: ExperiencesAdministrating Demobilization: ExperiencesAdministrating Demobilization: ExperiencesAdministrating Demobilization: Experiencesin Ukraine, Russia, Poland and Hungaryin Ukraine, Russia, Poland and Hungaryin Ukraine, Russia, Poland and Hungaryin Ukraine, Russia, Poland and Hungaryin Ukraine, Russia, Poland and Hungary 1818181818

Ukraine 18

Russia 29

Poland 33

Hungary 39

Summary and RecommendationsSummary and RecommendationsSummary and RecommendationsSummary and RecommendationsSummary and Recommendations 4545454545

List of Interview PartnersList of Interview PartnersList of Interview PartnersList of Interview PartnersList of Interview Partners 4848484848

Appendix: Questionnaire for Interviews withAppendix: Questionnaire for Interviews withAppendix: Questionnaire for Interviews withAppendix: Questionnaire for Interviews withAppendix: Questionnaire for Interviews with 5050505050Demobilized SoldiersDemobilized SoldiersDemobilized SoldiersDemobilized SoldiersDemobilized Soldiers

List of Selected Acronyms and AbbreviationsList of Selected Acronyms and AbbreviationsList of Selected Acronyms and AbbreviationsList of Selected Acronyms and AbbreviationsList of Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 5151515151

ReferencesReferencesReferencesReferencesReferences 5252525252

3B·I·C·C

brief 26Becoming anBecoming anBecoming anBecoming anBecoming anEx-military ManEx-military ManEx-military ManEx-military ManEx-military ManDemobilization and ReintegrationDemobilization and ReintegrationDemobilization and ReintegrationDemobilization and ReintegrationDemobilization and Reintegrationof Military Professionalsof Military Professionalsof Military Professionalsof Military Professionalsof Military Professionalsin Eastern Europein Eastern Europein Eastern Europein Eastern Europein Eastern Europe

Andreas Heinemann-GrüderAndreas Heinemann-GrüderAndreas Heinemann-GrüderAndreas Heinemann-GrüderAndreas Heinemann-Grüder

4 B·I·C·C


ZusammenfassungZusammenfassungZusammenfassungZusammenfassungZusammenfassung

Ende 2001 gab es in Osteuropa,einschließlich der Nachfolgestaaten

der Sowjetunion, etwa 2,6 Millionenweniger Soldaten als Anfang der 1990erJahre. Mit diesem für Friedenszeitenbeispiellosen Truppenabbau wird diemilitärische Erblast des Sozialismuswenigstens teilweise bewältigt. Amstärksten von Demobilisierung und derNotwendigkeit zur Reintegration in dasZivilleben sind Berufsoffiziere betrof-fen. Wie die Erfahrung der WeimarerRepublik belegt, birgt ein Misslingen derDemobilisierung erhebliche Gefahrenfür die Stabilität junger Demokratien.Der vorliegende BICC brief 26 unter-sucht die Einstellungen und Verhaltens-muster von demobilisierten Offizierensowie die staatlichen bzw. halbstaatli-chen Maßnahmen zur Unterstützungder Reintegration. Betrachtet werden dieReintegrationsprozesse in der Ukraine,Russland, Polen und Ungarn.Welche Lehren lassen sich aus demosteuropäischen Truppenabbau ziehen?Demobilisierung und Reintegrationsind Teil einer umfassendenRestrukturierung, die die Lebensfähig-keit ganzer Regionen betrifft, etwa wennGarnisonsstädte und andere militärischeLiegenschaften freigezogen werden.Zudem verfügten die sozialistischenArmeen über einen umfangreichenDienstleistungsapparat, dieser wird nunentweder privatisiert oder gänzlichaufgelöst. Das zivile Personal derStreitkräfte ist ebenfalls von Demobili-sierung betroffen.

So hart Entscheidungen häufig sind, diekünftige Struktur und die Aufgaben derStreitkräfte sollten so früh und klar wiemöglich definiert werden. Berufsmilitärsbedürfen einer gesetzlichen Regelungihres Karriereverlaufs und der post-militärischen Leistungsansprüche.Diesbezügliche Unklarheit wirkt sichnegativ auf die Loyalität von Berufs-militärs aus.

Die Reintegration erfordert gemeinsameAnstrengungen der Verteidigungs-,Finanz-, Arbeits-, Sozial- und Bildungs-ministerien, für die eigeneKoordinierungsgremien auf zentralerund regionaler Ebene geschaffen werdensollten. Die Umschulung von Berufsof-fizieren erfolgt am besten auf regionalerund lokaler Ebene, orientiert am Bedarfdes örtlichen Arbeitsmarktes. Dieberufliche Umschulung sollte bemühtsein, übertragbare persönliche Qualifika-tionen und Fertigkeiten gezielt zunutzen, darunter auch einige dermilitärischen Sekundärtugenden. Dabeigilt: Umschulung ist nur effektiv, wennsie mit gezielter Arbeitsbeschaffungverbunden wird. Die Reintegrationsollte so eng wie möglich mit regionalenStrukturprogrammen verknüpftwerden, die die Konversion vonmilitärischen Liegenschaften für dieSchaffung von Arbeitsplätzen einbe-zieht. Kommunen können einenBeitrag zur Reintegration leisten, indemsie Unternehmensgründungen von Ex-Militärs, etwa durch Steuervergünsti-gungen oder Mietnachlässe, erleichternbeziehungsweise fördern. Um einenmissbräuchlichen oder wenig effektivenEinsatz von Reintegrationsmitteln zuvermeiden, bedarf es einer unabhängi-gen Evaluierung. Reintegrationsmittelsollten den Ex-Militärs dabei möglichstdirekt zugute kommen, um denAufbau kostenintensiver Bürokratien inGrenzen zu halten.Die Verantwortung für Reintegrationliegt allerdings nicht allein bei staatlichenStellen. Berufsmilitärs müssen Abschiedvon der Vorstellung einer risikolosenMilitärkarriere nehmen: Je früher sichBerufsmilitärs mental und durchZusatzqualifikation auf eine zivileBerufstätigkeit einstellen, desto größersind ihre Chancen auf dem späterenArbeitsmarkt. Umschulung sollte nachMöglichkeit bereits im Militär selbsterfolgen. Um Offizieren eine stärkereKontrolle über ihren postmilitärischenLebensabschnitt zu geben, könntenOffiziersverbände eine aktive Rolle bei

German SummaryGerman SummaryGerman SummaryGerman SummaryGerman Summary

der Planung und Durchführung vonReintegrationsmaßnahmen spielen. Teilder Reintegration sollte auch demokrati-scher Sozialkundeunterricht sein. Unterden interviewten Ex-Offizieren warendie Befürworter einer autoritärenHerrschaft zwar in der Minderheit,trotzdem ist die Enttäuschung über diepostsozialistischen Demokratien starkausgeprägt. Vergleichsweise hohePensionsbezüge können die Passivitätbeziehungsweise Versorgungsmentalitätvon Berufsmilitärs verstärken, da sienicht genügend Anreiz für beruflicheEigeninitiative schaffen. Die post-militärischen Bezüge sollten deshalbflexibel nach Dienstalter und Fähigkei-ten angepasst werden und auf das Ziel“Arbeitsbeschaffung” orientiert sein.

Ausländische Programme wareninsbesondere für die Reintegration inder Ukraine und Russland entscheidend.Allerdings hat es bisher wenig Koordi-nation und Erfahrungsaustauschgegeben – dies ist jedoch für möglicheProgramme in den Balkanländernwünschenswert.Truppenabbau und Reintegration habenzwölf Jahre nach dem Ende desSozialismus an Dramatik verloren. Andie Stelle der sozialistischen, für einenKrieg mit der NATO trainiertenMassenarmeen mit hoher “Kopflastig-keit” treten sukzessive kleinere, mobileund für internationale Einsätze präpa-rierte Streitkräfte. Die zivile Kontrolleüber das Militär wurde gestärkt und dieRüstungsausgaben wurden bis Endeder 1990er Jahre erheblich reduziert. Dieosteuropäischen Streitkräfte sind mitwenigen Ausnahmen nicht mehr aneinem Feindbild ausgerichtet. Gleichzei-tig besteht jedoch noch ein Defizit anziviler Expertise in Sicherheitsfragen, anTransparenz und bei der Aufgaben-teilung zwischen den verschiedenenSicherheitsapparaten.

5B·I·C·C

AcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgments

The empirical findings of this studyare based on the project

“Demobilization of the Armed Forcesin Eastern Europe”, conducted by theauthor at the Bonn International Centerfor Conversion from late 1999 toSeptember 2002 and supported by theGerman Federal Ministry of HigherEducation and Research. The projectresearched the post-socialist build-up ofarmed forces and demobilization effortsin the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary,and Ukraine, supplemented by a casestudy on the demobilization of theKosovo Liberation Army (KLA) afterJune 1999.

This study could not have beencompleted without the support andcooperation of partners in the respectivecountries. Among the many peoplewho contributed, I would particularlylike to thank professor Dr LechGiermakowski and Dr Tadeusz Kesonof the Government Center for StrategicStudies/Department for DefenseAffairs in Warsaw; Dr Lech Koscielecki,former Director of the Department ofSocial Affairs at the Ministry of NationalDefense in Warsaw; Dr Ferencz Molnarof the Miklos Zrinyi National DefenceUniversity in Budapest and Dr LajosKeresztes of the Eötvös LorándUniversity in Budapest; Dr Janos Szabo,former Hungarian Vice-Minister ofDefense; Colonel Aleksander S.Shikalov, Chairman of the NationalCoordinating Center for the SocialAdaptation of Former MilitaryServicemen at the Cabinet of Ministersof Ukraine (NCC); Dr AnatoliyGrytsenko and Dr Leonid Polyakov ofthe Ukrainian Centre for Economic andPolitical Studies in Kiev; Dr FrankJacobi, EU TACIS long-term projectmanager in Ukraine; Jack Hemsley ofthe Russian Resettlement Project,Directorate for Central and EasternEurope at the Ministry of Defence,

United Kingdom; Dr Ksenia Goncharof the IMEMO Institute of theRussian Academy of Sciences inMoscow; Lt Colonel StanislavsVoicehovics, Chief of the MilitaryPersonnel Division at the Ministry ofDefense, Republic of Latvia; and PhDcandidate Janis Keruss of the Universityof Riga, Department of History.Otfried Nassauer and Dr ArendWellmann of the Berliner Informations-zentrum für Transatlantische Sicherheit(BITS) were helpful at an early stage ofthis project by providing empirical dataon force structures and reductions in the1990s. I furthermore benefited fromunpublished reports by the Danishjournalist Jorgen Dragsdahl ondemobilization in Poland during theperiod 1989–1999, by DimitarDimitrov’s writings on the restructuringof Bulgaria’s armed forces, and byGustav Urbani’s accounts of theHungarian military reforms. Maciej

acknowledgmentsacknowledgmentsacknowledgmentsacknowledgmentsacknowledgments

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)was established in October 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government. TheCentre encourages and supports states and non-state governed institutions in theirefforts to strengthen democratic and civilian control of armed and security forces,and promotes international cooperation in this field, initially targeting the Euro-Atlantic regions. To implement these objectives, the Centre:

collects information, undertakes research and engages in networking activities inorder to identify problems, to establish lessons learned and to propose the bestpractices in the field of democratic control of armed forces and civil-militaryrelations;

provides its expertise and support to all interested parties, in particulargovernments, parliaments, military authorities, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, academic circles.

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)Rue de Chantepoulet 11P.O.Box 1360CH-1211 Geneva 1, SwitzerlandTel: +41 (0)22 741 77 00Fax: +41 (0)22 741 77 05E-mail: [email protected]: http://www.dcaf.ch

Kuffel helped me to translate Polishtexts, located relevant literature andsystematically fed BICC’s electronicarchive. Tatiana Vorsmann diligentlyassisted in computing interview dataand in conducting searches in diverseelectronic archives. I am very grateful toMichael Brzoska and Kees Kingma forhaving read the whole manuscript. Theircritical remarks are appreciated. Mythanks also go to Moira Davidson-Seger, for the quick job she did editingthe text, and to Katharina Moraht andSvenja Bends for their reliable and fastlayout work, despite pressures of time.Finally BICC and the author would liketo thank DCAF (Democratic Control ofArmed Forces, Geneva) for generouslysupporting this publication. Allremaining insufficiencies and errors are,of course, mine.

Andreas Heinemann-GrüderAugust 2002

6 B·I·C·C


The military legacy of socialism put aheavy burden on the transition

economies and their societies at large.When socialism came to an end, thearmed forces became a part of thetransition process—both objects andsubjects at the same time. Duringtransition, the military was affected byshifts in political, economic and financialpriorities. Not only did its role in thepolitical system alter from being acornerstone of socialism to beingmerely one of the many competingbureaucratic and social interest groups,but most military functions that hademanated from this Cold War role weredevalued. Thus, while the CentralEastern European countries have beenforced to reduce their armed forcesdramatically over the last decade, changesin the composition of armed forcesmust be seen as part of an overarchingrestructuring process.

GoalsGoalsGoalsGoalsGoals

The following report concerns only oneaspect of this transition however:Eastern Europe’s management ofreintegration of military servicemen intocivilian life. It looks particularly at theexperiences gathered in Ukraine, Russia,Poland and Hungary after the demise ofsocialism. The prime goal is togeneralize experiences, identifyshortcomings and to ascertain whichaspects of integration policy are essentialand should be recommended. Thereport is thus an attempt to evaluate thedesign and implementation ofreintegration policies, analyzing thecauses for failure or success in exitingmilitary roles.

Demobilization and reintegrationinvolve finding new social roles andnetworks, a new professionalorientation and overcomingpsychological stress. Thousands ofofficers have had to exit their formerroles—a staged process, successful forsome, for others not so. The shift froma military profession to a post-military

career often implies the loss of securityand social prestige which affects self-esteem, one’s sense of purpose and, lastbut not least, the position of the malehead of the family. Demobilized officersare forced to adjust their secluded groupnorms and values to the prevailingpatterns of civil society discourse.

The study did not aim to provide anempirically encompassing overview—either in terms of covering the whole ofEastern Europe or of presentingcountry studies which give full coverageover a set period of time. Due to highlyheterogeneous data provided by thenational Ministries of Defense as well asthe national project partners, not allquestions could be systematically dealtwith and compared in a cross-countryfashion. The country data nonethelessallow a list of indicators to be compiledwhich the initiators of futurereintegration programs may wish tobear in mind. The study is exemplary innature, focusing on the institutionalprerequisites of demobilization and onthe behavioral patterns of those makingthe transfer from military to civilian life.

The military andThe military andThe military andThe military andThe military andtratratratratrannnnnsitionsitionsitionsitionsition

The downsizing and reintegration ofmilitary personnel is an under-researched aspect of post-socialisttransition. Previously transition researchhas homed in on the replacement ofold by new institutions but rarely on theadjustment of old institutions to a newenvironment. From the perspective oftransition research, the story of thedownsizing and reintegration of armedforces is interesting in two respects:‘How does the military as an institutioncope with the task of downsizing?’ and‘How do its actors adjust?’ Thetransformation of the socialist massarmies is indicative of an underratedaspect of transition at large—the impactof institutional inertia. The military asan institution had first and foremost avivid interest in self-preservation, oftenat the expense of the social costsincurred.

Under socialism, the military hadrepresented an interest group withsignificant power over the allocation ofresources, an institution isolated fromincursions by the social environment,protected by its pivotal role inpreserving the political system as awhole and bolstered by exceptionalbenefit packages. Not only did themilitary protect socialism, it embodiedits key features: the command system; acult of masses and leadership;uniformity and collectivism instead ofindividualism; secrecy and the absenceof transparency; a disregard for humanrights; a lack of respect for theenvironment; fixation on the Sovietcenter; and, ideological integrationthrough images of the enemy. In short,the military was the nucleus of thesocialist system.

At the same time the military as aninstitution symbolized statehood andstate power. It therefore survived thecollapse of socialism in contrast to theformer state planning apparatus or theCommunist Party. In other words, forthe government elite, national armiesturned into a symbol of statehood,national independence and powerprojection capacity.

There were a variety of factors which ledto the restructuring of armed forces inEastern Europe, important amongthem: cuts already initiated by theWarsaw Pact during the second half ofthe 1980s; the treaty on ConventionalForces in Europe; the dissolution ofthe Warsaw Pact; changed threatperceptions; the ensuing shift frommass armies to smaller, more mobileforces; the closure of military basesoriginally designed for attacks from theWest; and, last but not least, financialrestrictions. The capacities and thepolitical will to sustain a permanent wareconomy were exhausted. Particularlythe downsizing in the 1990s—oneaspect of restructuring—was a logicalconclusion following on from theclosure of bases which had lost their

IntrIntrIntrIntrIntroooooductionductionductionductionduction

7B·I·C·C

introductionintroductionintroductionintroductionintroduction

purpose, voluntary discharge from theforces, a shortening of the period ofmilitary service, and the emergence ofmore attractive positions for qualifiedyoung man on the civilian market.

Nevertheless, only after a decade of‘muddling-through’ did thedownsizing of armed forces begin to besteered by conscious design. Theabsence of sufficient conceptual andlegal frameworks for the defensesystems in general and the armed forcesin particular had a negative impact onthe process. The nationalization ofarmed forces after the dissolution of theWarsaw Pact and the Soviet Union didnot automatically lead to a newconceptualization of the role of thearmed forces: the post-socialist mindsetremained heavily influenced by priorsocialization, while the militaryestablishment—lacking proper politicalguidance in crucial years—displayed aninterest in self-preservation.

It is hardly possible to provide exactfigures on the structure of thedownsizing of professional servicemenfor each Eastern European country,partly because the figures provided forthe 1990s by the Ministries of Defensevary to the extreme. Whereasmodernization led to the reduction ofmany professional posts, new positionsopened up in the wake of therestructuring programs, though thenumber of new positions was lowerthan that of those abolished. As theattractiveness of a life in uniform hadlargely dwindled and with the socialprestige of the armed forces in decline,many professional officers—mainly theyounger, more qualified and moreambitious—left the armies on theirown volition. This even held true forcountries with strong patrioticundercurrents such as Poland and theBaltic States. As a rule, the Ministries ofDefense did not keep track of post-military employment of their former

servicemen making it impossible toascertain exact figures on the success offormer servicemen on the civilian jobmarket. Hence figures in this briefindicating whether reintegration wassuccessful or not mainly refer to directjob placements or to the direct creationof jobs by the agencies involved inreintegration measures.

Despite the fact that associations ofprofessional soldiers exist in all EasternEuropean countries, servicemen areusually poorly organized. Professionalsoldiers have thus rarely contributedsubstantially to reintegration in agrassroot fashion. Obviously the longduration of service time reinforcedhierarchical thinking patterns,paternalism, the idea that thegovernment owed the officerssomething, an unrealistic sense ofinfinite security and expectations ofprivileged entitlements. Both the closedcorporate nature of the militarycommunity and the frequent lack of civilqualifications often discouragedconscious role-exit strategies.

The effects of downsizing on the labormarket or on the target group itself arenot unequivocal. Reintegration successdepends on qualification levels, age,goal-oriented retraining and, most ofall, on the absorption capacity of theregional economy. Thus the urgency ofreintegration measures and supportdepends above all on the varyingabsorption capacities of the labormarkets, with Hungary at the upper andUkraine and Russia at the lower end.Yet, the urgency of support programsin Ukraine and Russia was de facto onlyrecognized by the national Ministries ofDefense once EU TACIS funding orfunding by NATO countries loomedon the horizon. Often the Ministries ofDefense produced ‘moral noise’ aroundthe demobilization issue without takingaction.

After a decade of downsizing, theurgency for reintegration is now indecline, though this is not the case allover Eastern Europe. There are noconsensual criteria defining what the

successful conclusion of reintegrationamounts to. The absence of openrevolt, organized social unrest orpolitical instability due todemobilization could be taken as aminimal definition. Applying thisminimal measure, reintegration inEastern Europe would appear to havebeen successful. A medium yardstickmight be a situation where formerservicemen willing and capable ofreintegration can enjoy civilianoccupations without beingdiscriminated against on the grounds oftheir former military profession, wherepost-military occupations correspond toqualifications, and where the ex-militaryemployment-unemployment ratioreflects the average for society at large.Among the countries covered in thisstudy, Hungary seems to come closestto such a definition. A maximalistposition would entitle militaryprofessionals to lasting preferentialtreatment in terms of pension rights,housing support, retraining and othersocial advantages. This latter positiondoes not appear to hold true, however:part of the transition agenda seems tobe that the military must say goodbye toa self-image of above-averageentitlements. Seen in this perspective,reintegration requires areconceptualization of the military asone profession among many, implyingsimilar demands, risks, insecurities andthe need for life-long learning as inother professions. Such a departurefrom maximalist criteria requires publicdialogue and must call political partiesand the media into action.

8 B·I·C·C

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1010

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911

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1111

98

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Pol

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314

305

270

270

270

263

221

242

228

187

191

178

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126

201

172

167

200

199

200

200

180

140

130

103

-23

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2,60

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300

1,90

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685

1,43

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200

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497

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enia

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1512

88

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98

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33

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78

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1012

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Tur

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2520

1818

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780

600

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517

453

400

387

346

311

303

303

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4540

4565

8074

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Yug

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via

180

169

137

137

140

127

114

114

114

109

9870

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Tot

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duct

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1990

–200

12,

647.

5

10 B·I·C·C


Research questionsResearch questionsResearch questionsResearch questionsResearch questions

In order to establish how formerofficers and NCOs adjust to post-

military life, we conducted standardizedface-to-face interviews, promising theinterviewees anonymity. In July 2000,15 interviews were conducted withdischarged officers in Latvia; inDecember 2000, 29 with former officersin Hungary, in February 2001, 34 withformer officers in Poland, and in June/July 2001, 43 with former officers inUkraine. We were mainly interested inofficers who were younger than 55 yearsof age at the time of dismissal,preferably in the age group 35–50. Thereason was simple—this was the agegroup which would be forced to find apost-military career and which was likelyto have significant problems inreintegrating. The former officers camemostly, but not exclusively, from thecapitals (Riga, Budapest, Warsaw, andKiev) or the surrounding regions—abias that may actually mean they wereprivileged in comparison to laid-offofficers in economically depressedregions.

Each questionnaire contained 25questions translated into the nativelanguage of the former officer (seeAppendix). Naturally the answers canonly give a rough picture of thebehavioral factors affecting ‘success’ or‘failure’ of reintegration, and it wouldbe inappropriate to generalize thesefindings for the rest of Eastern Europe.However, it is nonetheless possible todiscern certain patterns and to formulatelinkages between socio-biographicalmodels and the success or failure ofpost-military adjustment.

To be specific, we were interested aboveall in the following: reasons fordemobilization; patterns of adjustmentto civilian life; forms of assistancereceived from governmental agencies;and general political views. We linkedthese answers to personal data on age,duration of military service and militaryrank as well as to levels of professionalskills. It was expected that certain linkscould be established between levels ofsuccess, protracted difficulties or failureto adjust to civilian life on the one handand skills, behavioral patterns andpolitical identities on the other hand.

Behavioral patterns:Behavioral patterns:Behavioral patterns:Behavioral patterns:Behavioral patterns:general findingsgeneral findingsgeneral findingsgeneral findingsgeneral findings

The findings of the interviews allow forsome cross-regional observations aswell as tentative conclusions relating toimplications for reintegration policy.Officers were often taken unawares bythe sudden need to find a post-militaryjob. As they often did not start lookingfor alternatives in time, they lost controlover their own lives. A negativeassessment of the transition periodappeared to be linked to a sense ofvictimization that was at least partiallyself-inflicted. For most interviewees, themilitary represented an institutionassociated with job security, an attractivebenefit package and a decent income,while ideational attachments or politicalmotivations were comparatively weak.It was therefore more the long seclusionfrom the norms, habits and normalrisks of civilian life rather than themilitary vocation itself that complicatedpost-military adjustment. Interestingly,those laid-off officers who voiced astrong attachment to the military as aprovider of norms and values were theones most frustrated with their post-military life.

Whereas some were able to make use ofskills acquired in the military, especiallythose who took on jobs in securitycompanies, very few individuals actuallyacquired additional qualifications afterleaving the armed forces. Notsurprisingly, age and the duration of themilitary service were the key factors indetermining post-military jobopportunities. But, next to age, whetherthe soldier had left the forces voluntarily,the related level of activity and theacquisition of dual-use qualificationsduring service time proved to exert themost significant impact on reintegrationsuccess. Not all those who left thearmed forces voluntarily were successfuland some even regretted their decision,but, all in all, control over one’s own lifeappeared to be essential if a sense ofsatisfaction was to be reached. Based onthe interviews, a significant link betweenrank and reintegration success could notbe established.

There are certain qualifications whoseacquisition during service increases thechances of successful post-militaryadjustment, namely learning of foreignlanguages, especially English; computerskills; administrative and managementskills. On the positive side, it should benoted that most former officers wereable to integrate their past militaryexperiences into their new life (for apsychological statement on biographicalsynthesis, see Erikson, 1973, esp. p. 106ff.). It is assumed that a collective senseof radical estrangement would have ledto more hostile expressions ofdisappointment and to thedevelopment of hatred and aggression.Instead of collective and organized foraof demobilized officers with common

Identity PIdentity PIdentity PIdentity PIdentity Patterns ofatterns ofatterns ofatterns ofatterns ofFFFFFormer Militaryormer Militaryormer Militaryormer Militaryormer MilitaryPPPPProfessionalsrofessionalsrofessionalsrofessionalsrofessionals

11B·I·C·C

identity patternsidentity patternsidentity patternsidentity patternsidentity patterns

interests, we were met withindividualization, often even social‘atomization’, adding to a widely spreadsense of disempowerment vis-à-visgovernmental agencies.

The interviews did not lend anysupport to the fear that disappointmenthad translated into some form ofextreme nationalism or activepromotion of authoritarianism. Thelikelihood of repeating the WeimarRepublic scenario appeared almostnonexistent. The dangers ofauthoritarianism originating from themilitary seemed to be small, thoughsome interviewees may have hiddenmore explicit authoritarian views. Theywere not, however, comparable to thethreats against weak democracies thathad emanated from an enfeebled ormarginalized military in WeimarGermany (1920s), that had arisen inLatin American countries (mostlyduring the 1960s and 1970s) or whichmight have been expected from amilitary which plays a decisive role indeciding domestic conflicts.Authoritarian attitudes were not spreadequally among the counties covered:pre-democratic or authoritarian patternswere the most prevalent in Ukraine andthe least discernable in Latvia.Furthermore, there did not seem to be adanger of praetorianism by officersfacing demobilization due to the shakycorporate identity and inefficiency of themilitary itself.

Identity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsamong formeramong formeramong formeramong formeramong formerUkrainian officersUkrainian officersUkrainian officersUkrainian officersUkrainian officers

Of the 43 former officers interviewed inUkraine, 4 were younger than 30, 14between 30 and 40, 14 between 40 and50, and 11 older than 50 years of age. Interms of rank, 3 were warrant officers,11 lieutenant-colonels, 7 colonels, 7majors, 10 captains, 4 senior lieutenantsand finally one was a female soldier withthe rank of ‘servicewoman’. In terms ofthe duration of military service, 9 hadserved up to 10 years, 5 up to 15 years, 8

up to 20 years, 9 up to 25 years, and 12more than 25 years. During theirmilitary career, 29 had received training:25 as engineers, 4 in another technicalorientation and the rest as economists,psychologists, administrators, managersor sociologists.

We asked all laid-off officers about whathad prompted them to join the armedforces. Obviously, motives were mixed,and it was possible that answers mightbe biased because the interviewees givereasons only with hindsight. However,keeping this in mind, it is nonethelessrevealing that personal gain dominatedthe decision to become a professionalsoldier. Only 4 of the intervieweesclaimed patriotic reasons like ‘defense ofthe fatherland’, while almost half cited‘high reputation’, ‘stability of payment’or ‘the living conditions’ as beingdecisive. Roughly one-quarter of thoseinterviewed (12) mentioned a familytradition of joining the armed forces.4 held that “military romanticism” wasone of the reasons but very fewadditionally mentioned militarydiscipline as a motivation. It wasnotable that expectations associatedwith the military as a profession orinstitution outweighed idealisticreasons. 15 out of 43 were explicitlydisappointed with their experiences inthe military compared to their originalexpectations.

The average duration of military serviceof those officers who experiencedfrustration was 16.7 years. There weresome younger officers among thedisappointed, but those with 15 yearsof service or more clearly dominated thegroup of the frustrated. Most of thesedisappointed individuals hadmentioned ‘high reputation’ or ‘servicefor the fatherland’ as the main reasonfor originally choosing a military career.Some added that their disappointmentoccurred only after the dissolution ofthe Soviet Union. Slightly less than half(20) nevertheless maintained that theiroriginal expectations had been met by

actual experience. Of the 43interviewees, 20 had left the armedforces voluntarily, while the rest had leftdue to health reasons (5), according toschedule (8) or as a result of earlydismissal.

Asked what they had expected fromcivilian life, only 18 were able to givereasons at all—clearly a sign ofpassiveness on the part of those notanswering. Those who did give ananswer said they reckoned with animprovement in their living conditionsor financial situation, but only onementioned ‘self-fulfillment’. Amongthe post-military occupations found, avariety of jobs were mentioned: mostfrequently administrative or managerialjobs, work for security services or as atrainer or teacher in areas related toformer military skills, for exampleemergency relief. Those who hadworked as propagandists or economistsin the military or who had not acquiredany additional qualifications, eitherduring or after service, clearly faredworse on the job market than others.

Among the skills acquired during servicetime which proved useful for civilianlife, skills in engineering, technicalsubjects, leadership and planning werecited most along with discipline,thoroughness and a sense ofresponsibility. Compared to theadvantages of these transferable skillsand habits, very few thought thatcoming from a military background wasdisadvantageous. Several mentioned‘honesty’ or the fact they had ‘too muchrespect for the law’ as beingdisadvantageous in civilian life. Very fewdiscerned within themselves an ‘inabilityto make decisions on their own’ or‘difficulties in choosing an activitywithout assistance’.

It is striking that, in their self-assessment, the overwhelming majoritythought that they had acquiredadvantages and transferable skills duringservice time. Despite this, one-third (14)of the interviewees were unemployed,with this unemployment spread quite

12 B·I·C·C


evenly across ranks. Unemploymentappeared to affect all ranks and profes-sional backgrounds, not only warrantofficers without any particular dual-usequalification. On the basis of ourlimited sample, the only factorsignificantly correlating positively withunemployment was the duration ofmilitary service: the longer a personstayed in the military, the greater thelikelihood of post-militaryunemployment.

Among other things, we were interestedin establishing to what extent thedecision to leave the armed forces hadbeen influenced by discussions withcolleagues in the military or whether ithad been taken individually. Only one-third (14 out of 43) answered positively,saying their decision had resulted fromcollective discussions. If this resultreflects the larger picture, then officerswho left the Ukrainian armed forces didso in isolation: of those who leftvoluntarily, only a few claim to havediscussed their decision with theircolleagues—possibly because of theunfavorable climate in the armed forcesfor deliberation and discussion. Slightlyless than one-third of the interviewees(13) were members of an officerassociation—mostly associations forthose with housing problems—whileonly 3 reported tangible advantagesfrom this membership.

Officer organizations evidently playedno significant role in focusing theinterests of laid-off officers. Possiblereasons for the lack of collective actionmay lie in extremely poor resources, thediversity of post-military career goals,and passivity among the officers. Askedhow they solved these problems, veryfew could answer at all; those that didmentioned retraining, hard work andhelp from friends. A significant findingwas the lack of problem-solving abilitieson the part of individual officers, not tomention the lack of collective capacities.

Taking all these facets together one canconclude that the ‘corporate identity’ offormer officers is weak.

Asked what problems proved mostpressing after dismissal, the intervieweesgave various answers. ‘Lack ofaccommodation’, ‘financial problems’,‘looking for a job’, ‘lack of money tostart one’s own business’, ‘lack ofknowledge of legal and economicmatters’, and ‘loss of friends andcolleagues’ were the problems mostoften mentioned. Almost allinterviewees claimed that ‘thegovernment’ should have assisted themmore. Asked what concrete kind ofsupport they had applied for, one-thirdexplicitly stated that they had notapproached any agency at all. Slightly lessthan one-third had encountered‘indifference’ and ‘empty promises’whereas those who received assistancementioned ‘provision of a job’,‘retraining’, and ‘help withaccommodation’. Asked about theassistance they would like to havereceived in the transitional period, only 3out of 43 gave an answer at all. Theyreferred to ‘mental rehabilitation’—whatever that may mean, ‘solvingaccommodation problems’ and ‘moreinformation’. The inability to verbalizeexpectations in the face of a generallyhigh degree of disappointment isevident—it mirrors a passive, pro-paternalistic attitude. The problemsingled out by almost all intervieweeswas ‘lack of money’. Half of theinterviewees did not acquire anyadditional qualification at all afterdismissal. Those who did underwentmanagement, administrative, foreignlanguage, computer, or handicrafttraining.

Does leaving the armed forces lead to aretrospective reassessment of themilitary as an institution?Approximately one-quarter (11)regretted leaving the armed forces, morethan half did not regret their choicewhile the rest were indifferent orundecided. Asked whether they wouldrecommend that their sons embark on amilitary career, 19 answered ‘no’, 10 ‘not

at the present time’, only 9 answered‘yes’ and the rest were undecided. Itseems, therefore, that the military as aninstitution to identify with has clearlylost its attraction for the overwhelmingmajority of the former officers.Moreover, as far as the interviewees wereconcerned, the almost unanimousfeeling was that the military had lost itsformer reputation and influence inpolitics and society.

We inquired finally about the generaloutlook adopted by former officers.Slightly less than half (18) maintainedtheir living standards had dropped sincedemobilization, whereas somewhatmore than one-quarter (12) thoughtthat their situation had explicitlyimproved. The rest were undecided.Slightly less than half of theinterviewees thought that the impact ofsystem change had been negative. But,asked about their expectations (‘fiveyears from now’), 26 hoped for orexpected improvement, 7 were explicitlypessimistic and the rest found it difficultto assess the prospects.

Was the military seen as a savior or as aninstitution better suited to govern thecountry? Only 5 out of 43 explicitlywould have preferred an autocratic leaderinstead of a democratic one, thoughanother 5 qualified their general supportof a democratic leader by noting that‘elements of autocratic style’ or a ‘tough’politician would be needed. Althoughthree-quarters may be counted as beinggenerally supportive of democracy,among the former officers there was arampant disappointment with thepolitical system in Ukraine—corruption,lawlessness, chaos, absence of controland of responsible government,disorder, demagogy, and populism werethe features most often mentioned.One additionally criticized that ‘freedomof speech’ allowed a negative image ofthe country to be created. However thehighly critical image of the presentsystem in Ukraine was not tantamountto a negative image of the West—criticism of the transition results was

13B·I·C·C


not identical to criticism of the West ingeneral. We took the image of NATOas an indicator of the general imagery ofthe West—31 had a positive image ofNATO, 7 negative, and the rest wereindifferent.

Certain conclusions about the exit frommilitary roles can be drawn from theUkrainian interviews. The mostpressing reintegration problem for laid-off officers in Ukraine was to findhousing outside military garrisons. InUkraine, officers were not sufficientlyprepared for a post-military careerduring their service time while thelength of the military service evidentlyhad a negative impact on reintegrationprospects. Furthermore, there was adiscernable mismatch between howmost of the former officers assessedtheir acquired skills and the demand forqualifications on the job market.Regardless of the concrete requirementsof the Ukrainian labor market, officersto be laid-off need to be empowered insuch a way that they are capable offinding a job. The overwhelmingimpression of the officers is negligenceon the part of the governmentalagencies. This is all the more strikingbecause the interviews were conductedby a counterpart from the NationalCoordination Center for the SocialAdaptation of Former MilitaryServicemen in Ukraine, the agency taskedby the Cabinet of Ministers withreintegration policy.

Identity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsamong former Pamong former Pamong former Pamong former Pamong former Polisholisholisholisholishofficersofficersofficersofficersofficers

The group of 34 former Polish officersinterviewed consisted of 14 lieutenant-colonels, 5 colonels, 5 majors, 4 navycaptains, 3 lieutenants, 2 squad leaders,and 1 contract soldier. The averageservice time of the interviewees was25.6 years, with 3 having served 12–16years and only 1 having served 3 years.In other words, most of theinterviewees had served 20 years ormore. Their average age was 46.2 years,with no one older than 55 years and theyoungest 29 years of age. Similar to thepicture in Ukraine, the Polish officers

gave a variety of reasons for originallyhaving joined the armed forces. Amongthose who were able to identify specificreasons at all, 10 claimed romantic oremotional reasons, 8 mentioned thesocial prestige or high levels ofpayment, 4 mentioned personal reasonssuch as ‘self-development’, and only 3mentioned ‘patriotic reasons’. Morethan half of the interviewees (23) weresatisfied with their experience in themilitary. In retrospect, their expectationsappeared to coincide with their actualexperiences and they had left the armedforces with a certain sense of fulfillment.Only 4 out of 34 were explicitlydisappointed while the rest wereundecided or gave no answer at all (7).The group of those who weredisappointed or who refrained fromgiving a positive answer was dominatedby officers who had been dismissed—their negative assessment of the servicetime was obviously related to the factthat they had not left the forcesvoluntarily. In terms of formalqualifications, almost half of the cohorthad acquired dual-use skills such asdegrees as engineers, in economics, ortechnical capabilities. After dismissalfrom the armed forces, most had beenunemployed for a certain period of timewhich had lasted from a few months toup to two years.

The reasons for leaving the armed forceswere equally divided between voluntarydischarge or early retirement (15) on theone hand and dismissal (15) on theother, while 4 had left for reasons ofhealth. If we take ‘voluntary discharge’as an indicator of an active pursuit of apost-military career, are there anybiographical patterns discernable whichare conducive to such behavior? Interms of age, voluntary discharge wasquite evenly spread over the wholecohort. A positive correlation, thoughonly a weak one, is discernable withregard to rank—the higher the rank, themore likely voluntary discharge was.Though our sample was too small togive a representative survey, the prospectof post-military employment was not

significantly increased by voluntarydischarge alone—dual-use qualificationswere evidently also a key factor. Similarto the findings in Ukraine, former‘polit-officers’ usually fared worst on thejob market.

Among skills acquired in the armedforces which proved advantageous forcivil life, a variety were cited—self-discipline and persistence, humanresource management, punctuality, asense of duty, leadership skills,proficiency and additional training suchas degrees in economics, engineering,foreign languages, legal knowledge andcomputer skills. Few mentioned skillsthat proved disadvantageous such as theability to handle weapons or thoseresulting from the different way of lifein the military. Generally speaking, asense of undue disadvantage on thelabor market was not observed. 14 outof 34 reported having had discussionswith colleagues before leaving the armedforces, but only 3 thought that thesedeliberations with colleagues had had animpact on their decision or on the waythey adjusted to post-military life. Onceagain, the absence of a process ofcollective discussion and deliberation issurprising. Asked what kind ofproblems they faced after leaving thearmed forces, only 12 out of 34mentioned any at all and these 12 wereevenly spread among those who hadchosen to leave and those who had beendismissed. The difficulties reportedwere: ‘hypocrisy’, ‘lack of accountability’,‘intolerance of different worldviews’,‘lack of acknowledgement’, ‘lack ofEnglish language skills’, ‘lack of acivilian profession’, ‘the bad image offormer soldiers’, and ‘lack of assistancein finding a job’. Similar to the findingsin Ukraine, we could—with fewexceptions—discern no strategies toovercome the reported difficulties.Nobody, for example, mentionedfurther training or requalification as ajob-search strategy.

As for expectations that the governmentmight assist them with reintegration,only 10 out of 34 expressed any hope atall. When they did, it was directedtowards the military, the center for

14 B·I·C·C


conversion at the Ministry of Defenseand, in one single case, ‘localadministration’. Such expectations weremostly related to education or trainingin the armed forces, financial support orassistance from the local government inlooking for a job. If we take theseanswers as being representative, not alllaid-off officers needed assistance butthose who did articulate such needsoverwhelmingly pinpointed bettertraining and education in the armedforces as being what was required.Generally the impression of howgovernmental agencies reacted to thosewho were seeking help was positivewhich is very different to the negligencereported in the case of Ukraine. 9 out of34 former officers acquired additionalqualifications after having left theservice, including English languagecourses, studies in economics, andtraining for private security services.

All in all, having left the armed forces,ex-soldiers did not appear to have anegative perception of the military.Asked whether they ever regrettedhaving left the armed forces, 16 (out of34) answered ‘no’, 4 answered ‘yes’,while the rest were undecided or did notanswer at all. Asked whether they wouldencourage male relatives to embark on amilitary career, 13 answered ‘yes’, 17 ‘no’and the rest remained undecided ordeclared they would not influence anydecision. However affinity to themilitary as an institution has clearlyweakened. With few exceptions, formerofficers felt that the prestige andinfluence of the armed forces haddiminished during transition.Questioned whether their politicalworldviews or party preferences hadchanged during transition, only 2answered in the affirmative: bothreported that they now tended to leantowards the socialist party (PZPR); 6took a decidedly apolitical stance and therest stressed that their world view hadnot changed. It was not that we wereinterested in the kind of worldviewsprevalent among former officers as such;we were merely interested in learning

whether a decline in the status of themilitary translated into shifts in attitudein favor of authoritarian or nationalistideologies. However no such shifts wereindicated by the interviews. In Poland,even less servicemen than in Ukraineseemed to be members of an officerassociation: only one of thoseinterviewed reported membership,though most said they kept in contactwith former colleagues on an individualbasis.

Compared to former living standards inthe military, only 5 maintained that theirsituation had worsened, 8 reportedimprovement, whereas most were eitherundecided or thought their livingstandard had basically remained thesame. If this reflects reality, then only aminor segment of the group chosen inthe overall assessment was dissatisfied.Asked whether five years from now animprovement or deterioration was to beexpected, only 6 reckoned with adeterioration, compared to 14 expectingan improvement; the rest wereundecided. Among the positiveexperiences of system change,democracy, freedom of speech and thefree market were mentioned most often,whereas negative experiences wereassociated with ‘hopelessness’,‘corruption’ ‘too many political parties’,‘slow privatization’, ‘loss of servicesand pensions’, ‘lack of stability’,‘criminality’, and ‘loss of discipline andmorale’. Given the mix of answers it isimpossible to say whether positive ornegative images prevail. When askedmore specifically whether anauthoritarian leader, for example ageneral, would be better suited to solvethe country’s problems, 6 out of 34explicitly supported such a solution,compared to 19 who openly rejectedsuch authoritarianism; 9 remainedundecided. If one takes the silent cohortinto account—those who are obviouslyunsure in the question of democracyversus authoritarianism—the result canhardly be interpreted as overwhelmingsupport for democracy. Asked what theydisliked most about democracy, the ex-servicemen most often cited thefollowing: ‘anarchy’, ‘nepotism of theparties’, ‘arbitrariness’, ‘stupidity of thegovernment’, ‘lack of professionalism’,‘bureaucracy’, and ‘slow decision-

making’. Disappointment with theconcrete experience of Polish post-socialist governments is widespreadamong former officers.

In respect to Poland’s cooperation withNATO—at the time of questioningPoland had already been a member fortwo years—most interviewees hadnoticed and were pleased about theimprovement in defenseadministration, standards, militarytechnology and order as well as theincrease in regional stability. Yet, cautionand skepticism were voiced as well. Theexpectation that NATO would actuallydefend Poland was wrong, oneinterviewee said. Another evenexpressed the hope that Poland wouldnot repeat the fate of the year 1939(Hitler-Stalin Pact). While, as a NATOmember, Poland would again becomedependent, NATO membership initself would prove very expensive. Itwas additionally suggested that Polandshould not accept everything NATO didwithout criticism. Regardless of thesereservations, 23 out of 34 expressed apositive attitude towards NATO, only 1an explicitly negative view, and 10 couldthink at the same time of both positiveand negative aspects of cooperationwith NATO or were simply undecided.

Identity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsamong formeramong formeramong formeramong formeramong formerHungarian officersHungarian officersHungarian officersHungarian officersHungarian officers

The 29 Hungarian interviewees had anaverage age of 41.3 years, with noneyounger than 30 and only 1 older than52 (namely 57); in other words, 28 ofthe former officers interviewed werelikely to embark on a post-militarycareer. On average, the officers had beenin service for 16.5 years. Almost all hadattended the military academy. Amongthe original motives for joining thearmed forces, half of the group citedexpected benefits such as furthereducation and stable living conditions.One-third mentioned romantic reasonssuch as ‘a wish to fly’ or ‘love of

15B·I·C·C


weaponry’ and 3 referred to theinfluence of their families, but nobodymentioned patriotic or political reasons.

Compared to the Ukrainian or Polishcases, only 2 were unemployed at thetime of being interviewed, althoughanother 6 had been unemployed from afew to 12 months. It thus transpiresthat the social urgency of reintegrationwas far less obvious in Hungary than inUkraine or Poland. Three of theinterviewees had retired, onlyoccasionally taking up new jobs. Amongthose with a distinct post-militaryoccupation, some patterns were evident:8 worked either for the police or thesecurity services, 9 worked as managersin retail sales, wholesales or in theservice sector, 4 were teachers orjournalists, and 2 had opened up theirown small businesses (bakery andtransport). Our limited sample seemedto suggest that the absorption capacityof the Hungarian labor market washigher than in Poland or Ukraine.

Asked whether their originalmotivations for joining the armedforces were matched by actual experience,12 answered ‘no’, 7 ‘yes’ and 10 thoughttheir expectations had at least in partbeen met. While these answerssuggested that roughly 41 percent hadbeen frustrated by their militaryexperiences, the assessment of affinitiesto the armed forces became even morecritical when we looked at the reasonsfor leaving the armed forces. 19 had leftvoluntarily, 5 had chosen earlyretirement; the rest had left due tohealth reasons or was simply dismissed.The reasons for leaving the armed forceswere often mixed. Some officers left thearmed forces after their units had beendissolved and they were offered lowerpositions which they were not willing toaccept. Most were very outspoken aboutthe reasons for quitting—‘lack ofperspective’, ‘lack of money’, ‘perma-nent reorganization’ and ‘lack ofstability’ were frequently mentioned;one added his ‘inability to fulfill ordersof stupid people’. If one comparesreasons to quit with those for originalenrollment, it becomes clear that thoseentering the forces for reasons of self-interest gradually lost their illusions

during the 1990s: idealistic or intrinsicattachments to the military proved nocompensation for concrete individualdisadvantages.

Among the so-called transferablequalifications, the former officersmentioned ‘team-leadership’ and‘planning skills’, ‘knowledge of humannature’, ‘analytical skills’, ‘technical skills’,‘organizational skills’, ‘accuracy’,‘reliability’, ‘punctuality’, ‘consistency’,‘self-discipline’, and the acquisition ofdegrees with a civil application such asengineering degrees.

Former Hungarian officers voiced theiropinions on the disadvantages of amilitary career in a comparatively strongform. ‘Schematic thinking’, ‘stereotypesand prejudices’, ‘having been in thearmed forces at all’, ‘lack of professionalskills for civil occupations’, ‘starchiness’,‘lack of connection to civilian life’, ‘thelow reputation of former officers’ and‘inadequate personal (social) skills’ wereidentified as unhelpful. The sharedexperience of disadvantages on the civilmarket was not however identical withregretting having left military service.Only 5 out of 29 actually regretted theirdecision to quit. Asked whether theywould recommend that their sons ormale relatives should embark on amilitary career, only 7 give a positiveanswer.

On being asked whether they haddiscussed their decision to quit thearmed forces with colleagues, 11answered negatively and 18 positively,though only 7 of the latter recalled anypositive influence of these deliberations.Compared to the Ukrainian or Polishinterviews, it seems that the Hungarianofficers were less isolated in theirdecision to quit the armed forces. Itwould nonetheless be an exaggerationto suggest there was a pattern oforganized decision-making. 6 out of 29interviewees declared that they hadexperienced no problems in adjusting tocivilian life. 23 reported a variety of

difficulties, most prominent amongthem financial problems, lack ofprofessional skills, lack of knowledge offoreign languages, general difficulties inadapting to civilian life, lack of workexperience, prejudices towards soldiers, alack of personal networks. Some vividlyarticulated psychological hardships—nervousness, decreased self-esteem anda sense of hopelessness but only oneexpressed ‘lack of support’ as aproblem. Given the fact that they wereaware of the difficulties on the civilianjob market, it is surprising that only 13out of 29 former officers acquiredadditional professional skills afterdemobilization—predominantly inmanagement, private security services,foreign languages, consulting ormarketing.

When specifically asked about whatassistance they expected, one mentioned‘powerful military friends’, while all theothers had either no particular ideaabout whom they could rely on ormentioned friends and their family (12out of 29). In the Hungarian case it isworth mentioning that almost nopaternalistic mindsets existed—friends,family and self-help were seen as themeans to overcome the reporteddifficulties while the government or themilitary itself was rarely expected toassist. Most simply answered: ‘I did notask for help’. Those who did receivematerial benefits upon quitting thearmed forces, mostly reported an offerto buy their service apartment alongwith financial compensations. Only oneof our interviewees was offered a job inthe regional administration.

With the exception of one formerofficer, it was the view of allinterviewees that the prestige andstanding of the army had declinedduring transition. Above all the feelingthat the reputation of the army withinsociety had decreased was stronglyvoiced, together with the opinion thatthe army no longer played an importantrole in the support of politicians. Oneinterviewee expressed the hope that thestatus of the army would increase withNATO membership. Asked whether

16 B·I·C·C


their political worldviews or partypreferences had changed duringtransition, 14 answered ‘no change’, 6said they were apolitical; 4 indicated achange (2 in a more liberal direction, 1 tothe right) and 1 maintained he hadbecome more interested in politics ingeneral than he had been in the past.

Most discharged officers kept in contactwith former colleagues, though only 4had joined an officers’ association. Thereis clearly no pattern of collective interestaggregation or representation. In theHungarian case, the motivation forjoining might be missing because 18out of 29 were of the opinion that theirlife had improved since leaving thearmed forces, while only 6 maintainedtheir life had deteriorated and the restwere hesitant to give an assessment.Only 4 expected a worsening of theirsituation in the coming five years; allothers were optimistic. As for theoverall assessment of system change,attitudes were mixed, with those seeingthe more positive aspects (17) prevailingover those with predominantly negativeimpressions (12).

Lastly, we were interested in thedemocratic or authoritarian mindset offormer officers. Only 2 out of 29explicitly opted for authoritarianism.Asked what they disliked most aboutdemocracy, these two individualsmentioned ‘corruption’, ‘venality’, ‘lies’,‘the greed of politicians’,‘permissiveness of authorities’,‘disinterest in people’, ‘nonsensical talk’,‘a culture of shifting blame amongpoliticians’, and ‘wild capitalism’. Notonly did the answers revealdisappointment with the post-socialistexperience, but in certain cases also anunderlying misunderstanding ofdemocracy. The more or less clearabsence of support for openauthoritarianism is therefore notidentical with an unwavering pro-democratic stand.

With respect to NATO membership,the interviewees were overwhelmingly infavor (21 out of 29), giving a variety ofreasons: it would ease the way into the

EU, provide more stability for theregion, allow for the modernization ofthe army, and guarantee security. Not asingle interviewee was openly critical ofNATO, though 3 expressedreservations—2 preferred neutrality,especially under the impression of theKosovo war, and 1 questioned whetherNATO would defend Hungary if thelatter could not defend itself.

Identity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsIdentity patternsamong formeramong formeramong formeramong formeramong formerofficers in Latviaofficers in Latviaofficers in Latviaofficers in Latviaofficers in Latvia

The 15 interviews in Latvia wereconducted with 14 Latvians and 1Russian officer who had served in thepost-independence armed forces ofLatvia. All interviewees had left theLatvian armed forces some time after1997, that is, not as a result of thedownsizing or dissolution of Soviettroops. The average age of theinterviewees was 48; half of the groupconsisted of former Soviet officers, theother half of officers who had joinedthe armed forces or the National Guardof Latvia after independence, namelyfrom 1992 onwards.

Compared to former Soviet officers, allthose who joined the Latvian armedforces after independence claimed that‘patriotism’ was the main reason. Giventhe advanced age of this group, we maysafely assume that these allegedly purely‘patriotic’ officers had originally servedin the Soviet army as well and hadsimply cut this part out of theirbiographical account. Furthermore, hadthe duration of service only consistedof the years after independence, officerswho claimed they had enrolled afterindependence could not have reachedthe ranks they gave (colonel, lieutenant-colonel, captain, and so on). One of thefirst observations thus pertains to thesplit identity of Latvian officers with arecord in the Soviet armed forces—onthe one hand a ‘patriotic’, ‘Latvian’identity was stressed in order to distanceoneself from the Soviet past, on theother hand the Soviet ranking wasretained. Though the limited numberof the sample group must be borne inmind, it is nevertheless conspicuous

that a significant number of those whohad joined the National Guard(Zemessardze) or the regular armed forcesin 1991/92 left the Latvian armed forcesvoluntarily in 1999/2000. Among thosewho left voluntarily, ‘stagnation’,‘intrigues’, ‘lack of promotion’ or‘promotion not based on merits andperformance’ and ‘low competence’ ofmilitary leadership are the reasonsreported for disappointment. Furtherreasons for voluntarily dischargeincluded financial problems (includingthe need to support a family), healthreasons, reaching the military pensionage and early retirement As for theRussian officer who had beendischarged, it seemed as if his ethnicorigin was a disadvantage even after 8years of service in the Latvian armedforces. Latvian officers with a lengthyperiod of service in the Soviet armedforces expressed a similar sense ofdiscrimination.

Among the abilities deemed useful inpost-military adjustment, organizationalskills, leadership, a sense of order,punctuality, fast decision-making,decisiveness, and—for those in securityservices—the command of weaponswere mentioned. Half of theinterviewees declared that they discussedtheir decision to leave the armed forceswith colleagues. Whether the decision toleave the forces is discussed or not isindicative of two issues: the degree ofindividual versus collective decision-making and the openness of the climatein the military for discussion at all. Inthe case of Latvia, it seems that thecollective had a comparatively strongereffect on decisions—even if mostmaintained that their ultimate decisionwas taken alone—and that the inner-military climate was more open fordiscussions.

One of the prime difficulties in post-military adjustment in Latvia is thesystem of military pensions which doesnot allow ex-soldiers to take up a newjob if they want to continue receivingtheir military pension. Hence, as nobody

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wants to lose his pension, there is noincentive to look for a job, even if ageand ability make this possible. As in theother case studies, a significant portionof the former officers who took up jobsdid so in areas closely related to themilitary—either in private securitycompanies, as guards or as civiliansworking for the Ministry of Defense. Itis once again noteworthy that only 1 outof 15 acquired any additionalqualifications after leaving the military.If one compares the case of Latvia withPoland, Hungary, and Ukraine, theprovision of pensions is the onlymeasure reintegration policy covers—atleast from the perspective of the formerofficers. Until 2000, there existed neithera system for preparing officers duringservice time for a post-military career,nor administrative structures to supportthe reintegration process. As a matter offact, looking for a job was actuallydiscouraged once an officer had becomeentitled to a pension. Only 2 of the 15officers interviewed expected to receivegovernment help after leaving the forces,while the rest thought of their friendsand families as their support groups.

Among the Latvian interviewees wefound a high degree of identificationwith the military as an institution—only3 dismissed the idea of recommendinga military career to their sons or malerelatives and all kept in contact, at least atirregular intervals, with formercolleagues. Only 2 out of 15 wereorganized in an officer association (theUnion of Latvian Officers or theAssociation of Reservists). In contrastto this emotional—rather thanorganizational—affinity with themilitary, most former officers werecritical of the Latvian armed forces,maintaining that the current army didnot differ much from the old Sovietprototype and society had a negativeattitude towards the armed forces. Itwas nonetheless mentioned that, incomparison to Soviet times, not onlynutrition but also motivation anddiscipline had improved.

As for their overall assessment of post-military life, the group was split equallybetween those who had experienced amaterial improvement, those whoseliving conditions had deteriorated andthose who either thought conditionshad stayed the same or merely haddifficulty in answering. A slight majoritynonetheless thought that the transitionperiod had brought positive rather thannegative results. Not a single intervieweestated that his worldviews had changedunder the impact of transition orleaving the armed forces. With theexception of one former officer whomaintained that for a short period oftime an authoritarian leader could solveLatvia’s problems, all other intervieweesruled out a military or authoritarianleader as a solution. Criticism of thepost-independence democracy was verysimilar to that in the other case studies.‘Corruption’, ‘anarchy’, ‘disregard forordinary people’, ‘bureaucracy’ and‘hypocrisy’ were the deficits most oftenmentioned. Asked about theirrelationship to NATO, all expressed apositive attitude with only twosuggesting that the ‘Partnership forPeace’ would be sufficient instead of fullNATO membership.

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UkraineUkraineUkraineUkraineUkraine

After the dissolution of the SovietUnion in December 1991, Ukraine

inherited one of the largest armies inEurope. In 1991 there were some780,000 soldiers on the territory ofUkraine, plus an estimated number of130,000 troops under the UkrainianMinistry of the Interior, Border Troops,Special Forces, and KGB men (Shikalov,2001). On 24 August 1991—immediately after the failed Augustputsch in Moscow, but still fourmonths before the dissolution of theSoviet Union—the Supreme Soviet ofUkraine took the Soviet troops on itsterritory formally under its ownjurisdiction. The post-independencetroops consisted of almost all thosenationalities of which the Soviet Unionhad been comprised. About 12,000officers or NCOs of non-Ukrainianorigin returned to their home republicsin the years 1991–1994, while 33,000soldiers came back to Ukraine fromother Soviet successor states (Shikalov,2001).

Ukraine then began the formation of itsown armed forces, based on ex-Sovietunits located on its territory. Accordingto Ukraine’s military doctrine adoptedby Parliament on 14 October 1993, thearmed forces, which had numberedapproximately 780,000 in January 1992(Shikalov, 2001), were to be reduced by450,000 men by the end of 1995. TheNational Coordinating Center for the

Social Adaptation of Servicemen underthe Cabinet of Ministers (NCC) hassince stated that the overall number ofmilitary servicemen was in realityreduced between 1991 and 1996 by410,000, that is, 40,000 less thanoriginally planned. Between 1997 and1999 the size of the Ukrainian armedforces was cut back even further: 127,000persons were discharged, among them60,000 military servicemen and 67,000civilian personnel (Shikalov, 2001). Thiswould imply an overall reduction in the1990s of 470,000 military servicemen(officers, contract soldiers and recruits),civil employees of the Ministry ofDefense not included. More than 80percent of the servicemen laid-off werereportedly less than 45 years of age.

Unfortunately these figures on troopreductions contrast with those providedin the “Law on the Number of Troopsin Ukraine” (7 December 2000) whichestimated troop strength for the year2000 at 400,000, including 310,000military servicemen (Zakon Ukrainy Ochislennosti Vooruzhennykh Sil Ukrainy na2000-2005 gody, N 2128-111, 7 December2000). As for future downsizing until2015, forecasts foresee a furtherreduction by 2005 (the end of the firststage of restructuring) to 295,000servicemen, plus 80,000 civilianemployees. In the second stage, 2006–2010, the number of militaryservicemen is expected to decrease to275,000, plus 70,000 civil employees,and in the third stage, 2011–2015, yetanother reduction to 240,000 militaryservicemen, plus 60,000 civil employeesis foreseen (Polyakov, 2001).

Before 2002 it was impossible toofficially obtain exact figures onUkrainian troop strengths which wouldclarify the de facto strength of personnelin the various military branches andtheir ranks as well as those of troopsunder the supervision of ministriesother than the Ministry of Defense.Budgeted troops often do not coincidewith actual troop strengths. In 2001 aUkrainian expert estimated that thedifference between the reported and theactual troop strengths amounted to40,000 soldiers, without taking troopsunder the Ministry of Interior, BorderTroops and Special Forces into account(Interview, L. Polyakov, February 2001).Requests submitted to the UkrainianMinistry of Defense asking for therespective information were declined ongrounds of “state security”. It istherefore hard to confirm or qualify suchfigures on the actual dimensions andnature of downsizing of the Ukrainianarmed forces. The figures ondownsizing only match the reportedtroop strength if one assumes thatsubstantial new recruitment has takenplace to fill the gap. Apart from theSoviet legacy of disinformation and thepossibility that the Ministry of Defenseitself does not know actual troopstrengths, the purpose ofmisrepresenting or over-representingfigures could be to receive morebudgetary means or to impresspotential adversaries.

AdministratingAdministratingAdministratingAdministratingAdministratingDemobilization:Demobilization:Demobilization:Demobilization:Demobilization:Experiences in Ukraine,Experiences in Ukraine,Experiences in Ukraine,Experiences in Ukraine,Experiences in Ukraine,Russia, PRussia, PRussia, PRussia, PRussia, Poland andoland andoland andoland andoland andHungaryHungaryHungaryHungaryHungary

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In Ukraine, the downsizing of thearmed forces mainly resulted from theneed to reduce the burden inheritedfrom the Soviet Union and theintention to restructure the armedforces. As in other Eastern Europeancountries, the Ukrainian army was amass army, top-heavy and short oncontract soldiers as well as non-commissioned officers. If one comparesthe absolute figures at the beginning ofthe 1990s with those at the end of thedecade, the most significant shortagespertain to the air force or the air defenseforces.

In Ukraine, discharged professionalservicemen face four main hurdles inadapting to civilian life:

Retraining

Finding employment

Social problems

Medical or psychological difficulties.

During the period of transition tocivilian life, the death rate among

recently released servicemen hasreportedly risen significantly(www.irf.lviv.ua/military.html). Socialproblems—the main one being the lackof housing—increase levels of stressand uncertainty. The large numbers ofdischarged servicemen are being releasedinto an environment characterized byhigh unemployment and economiccrisis, caused to a major extent bytransition to a market economy. Inaddition, most servicemen havefamilies, which adds to the alreadyoverwhelming numbers of peoplerequiring assistance.

Figure 2: Ukrainian troops other than regular armed forces,Figure 2: Ukrainian troops other than regular armed forces,Figure 2: Ukrainian troops other than regular armed forces,Figure 2: Ukrainian troops other than regular armed forces,Figure 2: Ukrainian troops other than regular armed forces,1998–20001998–20001998–20001998–20001998–2000

Source: Polyakov, 2001

a Planned number of personnel according to lawb Number of personnel according to the presentation of the Head of General Staff before the Ukrainian Parliamenton 22 December 1998c Approximate estimate of the total number of troops other than regular Armed Forces (Ministry of Defense)( ) Reported strength of the National Guard before its dissolution

Troop name Category of military personnel 1998 1999 2000

Border Troops Military servicemen (total) 43,500b 42,000 42,000Of whom draftees 15,000 14,000 14,000Of whom civil servants n.a. 3,000 3,000

Total n.a. 45,000b 45,000b

Troops of the Ministry Military servicemen (total) 39,700b n.a. n.a.of Internal Affairs Of whom draftees 15,000 15,000 15,000

Of whom civil servants 1,000 1,000 1,000

Total 49,414a 49,414a 49,414a

Civil Defense Troops Military servicemen (total) 9,550a 9,550a 9,550a

Of whom draftees 5,500 5,500 5,500Of whom civil servants 668a 668a 668a

Total 10,218 10,218 10,218

National Guard Military servicemen (total) 25,500b 25,500b Dissolution in(19,000) 2000

Of whom draftees 7,000 7,000Of whom civil servants 2,000 2,000

Total 128,632c 127,732c 104,632c

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Retraining and reintegrationRetraining and reintegrationRetraining and reintegrationRetraining and reintegrationRetraining and reintegrationprogramsprogramsprogramsprogramsprograms

The reintegration of military servicemenin Ukraine has been conducted withinthe framework of four major programs:

The German-financed reintegrationprogram for officers originallystationed in East Germany

The EU-TACIS program

NATO’s language training courses.

The program of the RenaissanceFoundation, a subsidiary of theGeorge Soros’ Open SocietyFoundation

Additionally, the InternationalAssociation for the Rehabilitation ofMilitary Servicemen, based in Israel andheaded by the former Russian citizen,Evgeniy Shpits, has offered retrainingcourses in Israel with stipends of US$600 per month. The associationoriginally announced its willingness toretrain some 2,500 to 3,000 formerofficers but no information could beobtained on how many officers actuallyparticipated in courses in Israel.

The administrative setup and the scopeof the reintegration measures in Ukrainehave resulted almost exclusively fromimpulses given by foreign aid. Theincentive to design and build upadministrative structures forreintegration thus came from outside—the offer of money from Westerncountries or organizations. During the1990s, the fear that laid-off militaryprofessionals could turn intomercenaries, threaten thedemocratization process, or cause socialunrest reinforced this benevolentbehavior of Western donors.

The German-financedThe German-financedThe German-financedThe German-financedThe German-financedreintegration projectreintegration projectreintegration projectreintegration projectreintegration project

The first program for reintegration inUkraine was financed by the Germangovernment as a means to facilitate thereturn of soldiers originally stationed inthe former GDR (German DemocraticRepublic). The German approach was

motivated by the desire to speed up thewithdrawal of former Soviet troopsfrom East Germany. The programforesaw the retraining of reservists aswell as of their wives and children. Itwas financed by the Germangovernment and was administeredfinancially by the Kreditanstalt fürWiederaufbau (KfW). Between 1993 and1995, three interregional ‘model’retraining centers were set up: one in thecity of Kiev, one in Krivoy Rog and onein Khorol. The program’s partner onthe Ukrainian side was the Ministry ofEducation, while the Germanconsulting company GOPAConsultants, together with BC BerlinConsult and ABU Consult, functionedas the general contractors of theretraining program. The total amountoffered to CIS countries (Belarus,Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine) by theGerman government was approximatelyDM 200 million with an Ukrainian shareof DM 22.98 million.

The money provided by the Germangovernment was mainly used for theacquisition and furbishing of teachingfacilities (c. DM 20 million) as well as thesetting-up of administrative structuresfor the interregional training centers.Two training centers were particularlybuilt for teaching companymanagement. Altogether courses wereavailable for sixteen differentprofessions. Additionally, ABU Consultoffered enterprise managers, thosestarting up businesses and youngentrepreneurs training in privatization,restructuring, business management,planning, controlling, marketing,distribution, accounting, investment,financing, and the reform of publicadministration.

Topics for the original 10-monthcourses were, for example, ‘The SmallBusiness Specialist’, ‘The Car Mechanic’,‘The Specialist for the Repair ofPersonal Computers’ and ‘The Specialistfor the Repair of VCRs and TV Sets’.Course participants were delegated bytheir respective district militarycommander. When the German-

financed program came to an end in1997, the three Interregional TrainingCenters (ITC) came under thejurisdiction of the Ukrainian Ministryof Education. The courses offered atthe ITCs since then are mainly 5-monthcourses with a symbolic fee of 150Hryvnas (29 euros) to be paid by theformer officers. The ITCs do not engagein job placement, and no records arekept on the success of their students onthe job market. It is nonethelessassumed that those who passed theoriginal 10-month courses were usuallysuccessful on the job market.

In some subjects, Ukrainian trainers firsthad to be trained. For instance, Germanteachers offered trainer courses in marketeconomy for 8 Ukrainian teachers while28 teachers were sent to Germany fortraining courses in car servicing, radio,TV and PC repair and the managementof construction companies or smallenterprises. The first training courses inApril 1993 concentrated on teachingsmall business management and the useof personal computers. By the end ofJune 1994, altogether 116 formerofficers or their family members hadsuccessfully completed professionalcourses. The number grew by the fall of1994 to 350 course participants in Kiev,164 in Krivoy Rog, and 65 in Khorol.

However, due to nontransparentaccounting procedures, the overallnumber trained under the Germanprogram is not known, nor is it firmlyestablished what happened to parts ofthe costly office equipment once theprogram came to its conclusion in 1997.Against the backdrop of the numbersof dismissed officers, the Germancontribution to actual retraining was ofmore of a symbolic nature, though theapparent high job-placement ratebespeaks success. The very creation ofITCs helped to sustain retrainingcapacities even after the German projectcame to an end. The shortcomings ofthe German-financed project were aresult of the institutional setup: asgovernmental bodies, the ITCs wereexclusively subordinated to theUkrainian Ministry of Education,excluding the Ministry of Defense. By

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and large, they acted independently ofeach other and without any tangiblecontribution from the NationalCoordinating Center at the Cabinet ofMinisters in Kiev (NCC) (more below),leading to a lack of exchange ofinformation, coordination andmonitoring.

The EU TThe EU TThe EU TThe EU TThe EU TAAAAACIS PCIS PCIS PCIS PCIS Projectrojectrojectrojectroject

The German project for reintegration offormer Soviet officers originallystationed in East Germany wasfollowed by the European Union’sTACIS project (EDUK 9301) whichlasted from 2 March 1995 to 31December 1998. It was carried out byGOPA Consultants, the company whichhad won the international tender. Themain long-term expert was Dr FrankJacobi. Parallel to the EU project, theUkrainian government developed a‘Complex Program for the SocialReadaptation and Reemployment ofMilitary Officers Laid Off or Transferredto the Reserve, and their Families’(called hereafter ‘Complex Program’)which became the basis forimplementing the TACIS project.TACIS supported this ‘ComplexProgram’ for 46 months through aproject entitled ‘Support to theRetraining and Reemployment of Ex-Military Officers in the Ukraine’.

The immediate objectives wereidentified as

Support in the establishment ofinstitutional capacities at the nationaland regional levels to implement andmonitor the national ‘ComplexProgram’

The establishment of institutionalcapacities for job counseling andcareer advice

The provision of different kinds ofretraining and requalificationprograms for laid-off officers.

The essential goal of the TACIS projectwas to reintegrate discharged officers ofthe Ukrainian armed forces by means offorming central and regional centers forretraining and job placement. Successfuljob placement was the ultimate aim andretraining was intended to contribute tothis. The TACIS project encompassedfive elements: support for the ‘ComplexProgram’; labor market analysis;upgrading of teachers’ qualifications;development of general and specializedtraining programs for officers; and,support for civilian reemployment.Reemployment soon emerged as thecore concern of the project.

Setting the retraining of some 8,000military service men as its goal, theTACIS project offered standardizedcourses: a 640-hour course onmanagement; a 200-hour basic courseon ‘Forming an Enterprise and Manage-ment of Small and Medium-sizedEnterprises (SMEs)’; as well asspecialized 640-hour courses on‘Management of Public Administra-tion’, ‘Financial Management’,‘Production Management’, ‘Manage-ment of Accounting and Auditing’,‘Personnel Management’, ‘Managementof SMEs’, ‘Information Management’,‘Banking Management’, ‘TourismManagement’, ‘Marketing’, and ‘FoodProcessing’. Before the retraining couldstart, teachers themselves had to betrained. In 1997, 250 teachers for theretraining of officers were selected on acompetitive basis; all underwentpreparatory courses in computer literacy,138 took English lessons, and 60attended the 1-month ‘General Manage-ment Training’ course in an EU-country.

Administrating reintegration:Administrating reintegration:Administrating reintegration:Administrating reintegration:Administrating reintegration:The National CoordinatingThe National CoordinatingThe National CoordinatingThe National CoordinatingThe National CoordinatingCenter (NCC) and RegionalCenter (NCC) and RegionalCenter (NCC) and RegionalCenter (NCC) and RegionalCenter (NCC) and RegionalCenters for EmploymentCenters for EmploymentCenters for EmploymentCenters for EmploymentCenters for Employment

At the beginning, the Ukrainiangovernment, and in particular theMinistry of Defense, did not feel a senseof urgency. Presented with an offer bythe EU, the Ukrainian governmentseems to have taken its time beforeaccepting it. The protracted build-up ofa sustainable structure reflectsinstitutional infighting among the

ministries in charge. A certain ‘mania’for secrecy inherited from Soviet daysalso contributed to delays. It was notuntil 5 August 1996 that, based on anorder of the Ukrainian Cabinet ofMinisters, a National Supervisory Boardwas created to coordinate activitiesrelated to the reintegration of militaryservicemen. The Supervisory Board wasformed by the heads of departments inseveral ministries, among them theMinistries of Defense, of Labor andSocial Policy, and of Education. TheSupervisory Board was to provide theNational Coordinating Center (NCC,see more below) with the necessaryinformation. The Ministry of Labor, forexample, was supposed to provide theNCC with information on regionallabor markets and to assist formerofficers in finding jobs. At the level ofregional governments, additionalSupervisory Boards were formed inorder to assist in the implementation ofthe governmental ‘Complex Program’,mainly in the field of local housingpolicy and job placement for formerofficers. The launch of the ‘ComplexProgram’ actually began in May/June1997.

It is safe to assume that nogovernmental reintegration programwould have taken place in Ukraine if theEU program had not been initiated.Out of US $13.16 million foreseen forreintegration measures for the period1996–1998, 10.6 million came from theEU. The Ukrainian share in financingmainly consisted of renting administra-tive buildings free-of-charge, taking onrunning costs, providing communityservices, taking over personnel on thegovernmental pay-roll, and assistingformer officers in building up theirbusinesses.

Before the TACIS project couldcommence, it was necessary to create acounterpart organization in the Ukraine.It took 21 months after the officiallaunching of the TACIS project for theUkrainian government to form a basicworking unit—the NationalCoordinating Center for the SocialAdaptation of Military Servicemenunder the Cabinet of Ministers (NCC),

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headed by Colonel AleksanderStepanovich Shikalov. The NCCcurrently has 46 staff members,including 19 regional representatives forlocal coordination. In Kiev, the NCC isdivided into four departments: Trai-ning, Reemployment, Utilization ofMilitary Assets, and Housing forDischarged Officers. In September 2001,reflecting its new role in the conversionof military bases, the NCC was renamedthe ‘National Coordinating Center forAdaptation of Servicemen, transferredto Reserve or Retirement, and for theConversion of Military Assets’.

The NCC, though formally a specialbody of the executive branch, remainedclosely linked to the Ministry ofDefense, though it lacked soundfinancial backing from this ministry.Cooperation between the NCC andboth the Main Administration of theCadres Politics and the Main Admini-stration for Military Education of theMinistry of Defense is practicallynonexistent (Narodnaya Armiya, 14 April2001, p. 5). Another illustration of thelack of coordination between the NCCand the Ministry of Defense is the‘Program for Social and ProfessionalAdaptation of Laid-off Officers up tothe year 2004’, signed by the President inMay 2000: the Ministry of Defense didnot incorporate the expenses for thisprogram into its planning for annualbudgets, obviously hoping that theNCC would attract finances fromabroad. It would seem that, for theMinistry of Defense, the NCCrepresented an ‘agency’ to which it couldtransfer its own responsibilities.Understandably, the NCC then strovefor several years to achieve the upgradingof its status and for more independencefrom the Ministry of Defense—up tothe present, however, with no avail.

Regional Centers forRegional Centers forRegional Centers forRegional Centers forRegional Centers forEmployment (RCE)Employment (RCE)Employment (RCE)Employment (RCE)Employment (RCE)

With TACIS help, 12 regional centersfor job placement (Regional’nye TsentryPerepodgotovki i Trudoustroistva—RegionalCenter for Retraining and Employment)were created. The RCEs represent theregional agencies responsible forimplementing the TACIS project. They

signed and implemented temporary,though renewable, contracts with theNCC in Kiev. Apart from assisting injob placements, one additional task ofthe RCEs consisted in elaborating andassessing projects for small businesseswith the support of the NCC, oftenbased on former military infrastructureor using ex-garrisons. In short, theRCEs were active in three fields:assistance in job placement for thosewho had undergone retraining;counseling former officers on professio-nal retraining; and helping to build-upnew businesses. Altogether some 5,000people found new jobs in smallbusinesses formed with the help of theRCEs and the NCC. The mostsuccessful small businesses were usuallyin the field of food processing for thelocal market, such as bakeries or noodleproduction. During the first TACISproject (until end of 1998), the resultsof the actual creation of new jobs weremodest: NCC and GOPA Consultantsreported that 306 jobs had been newlyestablished.

The NCC controls the finances of theRCEs used for retraining andreemployment. The RCEs have toaccount for their work to the NCC andthe TACIS administration. The regionalrepresentatives of NCC, who areresponsible for establishing contact withregional and local administrations, areoften located on the premises of theRCEs. Their actual function—apartfrom oversight—nevertheless remainsvague.

With time, most of the RCEschanneled their activities in newdirections. As the retraining of formerofficers lost importance, they turnedeither to the professional training of thegeneral public, to professional job-placement activities, or transformedthemselves into developers of formermilitary sites. Cooperation among theindividual RCEs is one of the weakestelements in the whole system. Somehave signed bilateral agreements amongthemselves or with state enterprisesfounded by the NCC. In contrast to theITCs, which remained state institutions,the RCEs are private.

Box 1: TBox 1: TBox 1: TBox 1: TBox 1: Training andraining andraining andraining andraining andjob procurementjob procurementjob procurementjob procurementjob procurementthrough the RCEsthrough the RCEsthrough the RCEsthrough the RCEsthrough the RCEs

RCEs provide services in three mainareas: retraining, job procurement, andpromotion of small businesses. TheRCEs regularly function as the liaisonbetween those undergoing training andthe subsidiary centers (Regional’nyeUchebnye Tsentry) which carry out someof the courses. Each RCE consists of adirector, a training manager, a managerfor the promotion of SMEs, a managerfor job placement and, in some cases, amanager for distant learning as well. TheRCEs mostly assist in job searches andjob placement, even if they cannotperform the task of an unemploymentoffice.

The training courses at the RCEs aredivided into short-term courses (1–3days at US $30), medium-term courses(6 months at US $600) and long-termcourses (1–2 1/2 years). Most courseswhich take place are short- or medium-term courses. Retraining encompassescourses in 30 different disciplines,including distance learning for smallbusiness management, career planning,and business planning. Whereas at thebeginning the courses had concentratedon basic administrative or computerskills, over time they have became morespecialized.

Former officers were able to choosebetween training in 32 differentprofessions. The average duration ofthe courses was four months—oneusually spent on basic market economyand computer skills and three on thechosen specialization. One task of theRCEs was to assist former officers toacquire basic knowledge and skills forjobs in the newly emerging marketeconomy or to facilitate the build-up oftheir own enterprises. In order topromote the formation of smallbusinesses by former officers—particularly in order to assess theviability of business plans—the NCCsigned an agreement with the UkrainianFoundation for the Promotion ofEntrepreneurs. In the city of Kharkov, aspecial Social Center for the Promotion

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of Private Initiatives was formed(Khar’kovskii Obshestvennyi TsentrSodeistvia Chastnym Initsiativam) whosepurpose was to legally advise andtechnically support discharged officers inbuilding-up their businesses.

A major part of the work of the NCCand the RCEs consisted in regular labormarket analysis. By the end of 1998, theRCEs had reportedly assisted in thecareer planning of 3,701 laid-off officerswhile 412 new work places had beencreated in 103 new small businesses.Furthermore, 2,882 individual careerplans and 773 business plans had beendeveloped. How much of thisconsulting resulted in actual jobplacement was not recorded.

Job procurement includes the creationof new work places, job placementwithout or after retraining, pre-selectionof candidates for enterprises, consultingon job procurement, and preparation ofcandidates for job interviews. Constantlabor-market monitoring by the RCEsand their cooperation with the StateEmployment Service was supportedthrough RCE staff training andcoaching. Finally, the promotion ofsmall businesses encompassesconsulting, equipping withtelecommunication equipment,business planning, the build-up ofnetworks, accounting services, theselection of candidates, advertisementand help in registering small businesses.

Practical work of the NCCPractical work of the NCCPractical work of the NCCPractical work of the NCCPractical work of the NCC

In February 1998, the NCC formed a‘Methodological Center’ in Kiev whosemain task became the preparation ofmaterials for a Distance LearningSystem. Financed through TACIS, theMethodological Center helped theregional centers to acquire and exchangeteaching experience, mostly by holdingseminars and creating and distributinghandbooks as well as functioning as aconsulting organization. Based on theagreements between the NCC, 12 RCEsand the 3 ITCs, 9,356 peopleunderwent some form of retraining inthe years up to 2001. This figureprobably relates to short-termcounseling as well as the retraining offamily members.

The NCC claims that by 2001 120businesses had been set up with itshelp, providing new jobs for 4,400people, among them 3,321 dischargedservicemen. In areas where theunemployment figures for formerofficers were high, the NCC establishedsome state enterprises of its own,altogether eight. It is not possible toassess the effectiveness of theseenterprises, though the NCC claims thatmoney generated by these stateenterprises has been used for thecreation of new jobs.

With the assistance of TACIS, the NCCbuilt up eight ‘project groups’ in orderto formulate long-term governmentprograms for the reintegration of ex-servicemen. These included, amongothers, groups on telecommunications,construction work, tourism, agricultureand the conversion of military sites.One of the instruments used topromote job procurement by formerofficers was job fairs. In December 1998,in the city of Donetsk, a job fair wasconducted with 502 representativesfrom seven garrisons, among them 343reserve officers. Representatives of 68enterprises and firms (59 Ukrainian and9 Western) offered 369 open positionswhich resulted in 68 job contracts. From1998 onwards, the NCC additionallyorganized a series of internationalconferences on the Crimean Peninsulaon demobilization and reintegration

policies, mostly with participants fromEastern Europe and the CIS but alsowith representatives from Austria,Germany, the United Kingdom, andIsrael.

The NCC has furthermore developed ahousing policy in conjunction with theAll-Ukrainian Union of Reserve Officersand the Union of Homeless Officers(Soyus bezdomnykh ofitserov). The Unionof Homeless Officers has a reportedmembership of 30,000. On the otherhand, however, the second half of the1990s saw constant reductions in specialfinancing from the national budget forthe housing of discharged officers—from 6 million hryvnas in 1996 to 2million in 1997. In 1998 and 1999, allbudgetary allocations for theconstruction of houses for laid-offofficers were cancelled. After publicpressure from the homeless officers, theUkrainian government resumed itsbudgeted support in 2000 by equalizingthe housing entitlement of formerofficers to that of other needy groups.In the years 2000–2001, the NCCreportedly provided former officers withsome 1,000 apartments, financed by aspecial tax on enterprise profits. Giventhat reports in 2001 indicated that13,300 former officers did not haveproper apartments, it seems thatdrawing the Ukrainian President andparliament’s attention to the urgency ofthe housing situation and a slightimprovement in the situation was allthe NCC had achieved.

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Box 2: The focusBox 2: The focusBox 2: The focusBox 2: The focusBox 2: The focusshifts fromshifts fromshifts fromshifts fromshifts fromreintegration to sitereintegration to sitereintegration to sitereintegration to sitereintegration to siteconversionconversionconversionconversionconversion

If the NCC had initially concentrated onthe reintegration of servicemen into thejob market, from May 1998 onwards itincreasingly became responsible foradministrating closed garrison townsand converting them into trainingcenters, business incubators or techno-parks. The procedure was as follows:The Ministry of Defense usuallyinformed the NCC about its intentionto close a certain military base. The NCCthen took the initiative to form atrusteeship-takeover in order to set upstate enterprises on the premises. Thebusiness incubators were supposed tohelp small businesses by providinginformation technology, consultingfacilities and professional training. Insome of these garrison towns, the NCCopened up consulting bureaus(konsul’tatsionnye punkty) where formerofficers could participate in distantlearning programs (covering some 2,866officers or their family members up tothe end of 2001).

Lack of affordable accommodation wasthe reason many laid-off officers couldnot move to a civilian city in search of ajob. As a rule, ex-officers in garrisontowns only had limited capital withwhich to start a business and lackedprofessional skills. About 500 garrisontowns in Ukraine are slated forconversion in conjunction with therestructuring of the Ukrainian armedforces. From 2000 onwards, the NCCbegan to take charge of entire militarytowns such as in Uzin, Belaya Tserkov,Svidnitsa, Alchevsk, Lugansk, L’viv, onthe Crimean peninsula and in theZhitomir region. Whenever garrisontowns were handed over tomunicipalities, they were usuallystripped of all their assets by the localpopulace and thus became useless forfuture investment. The NCC is keen topreserve such facilities and to attract

extra-budgetary funds as well asinvestment for these military cities,though the NCC itself does not havespecific expertise in promotingeconomic policy on a regional scale.

The two most ambitious siteconversion projects are thetransformation of the military airportUzin (70km south of Kiev) into a cargoairport and the conversion of theformer rocket base in NovyeBelokorovichi, 200km east of Kiev, intoa company for refining oil and gas. Atthe time of writing, it was still unclearto what extent the NCC would besuccessful in attracting the vastinvestments required. In the case ofNovye Belokorovichi, which was stillinhabited by 2,5000 persons of whom1,000 were laid-off servicemen, it wasexpected that the necessary impulses fordomestic and foreign investment incivilian production could be created byfreeing enterprises from import customduties, from paying value-added-tax onimported machinery, profit tax and landtax for three years, and by reducing theregular tax load by 50 percent for thefollowing three years. Similar tax breaksare offered by regional administrationsat a number of other military sites aswell.

The authorities assigned a variety oftasks to the NCC which proved difficultto coordinate in practice: retraining andcareer-planning belong to a verydifferent area from transforminggarrison towns or finding a civilian usefor military infrastructure. Given boththe type of expertise of its staff and itsstructure, it is difficult to imagine thatthe NCC is the appropriate institutionto deal with site conversion. There is adistinct difference between creatingbusiness plans for self-employed formerofficers and the development of hugemilitary areas such as the Uzin airfield orentire garrison-towns. Quite apart fromthe fact that they are isolated from majorcities and regional markets, military sitesslated for conversion regularly representecological disasters or require expensivecleaning from explosives beforeinvestors would take an interest.

Despite this, the Ukrainian governmentplaces high hopes on getting thesupport of the Economic Departmentof NATO for site conversion.According to plans, the Uzin militaryairport is to become a pilot project inUkrainian cooperation with NATO.Interests differ however: whereasNATO may have an interest in thefuture use of the airfield, the primaryconcern of the NCC is the fate of theroughly 16,000 people living in thegarrison town, among them 2,500military persons with military pensionswho are mostly unemployed.

In April 2001 and April 2002, in orderto attract additional investmentsparticularly in garrison towns or atmilitary sites to be converted, the NCCconducted conferences on the CrimeanPeninsula, “The Crimean Spring ofConversion”. Neither the list ofparticipants nor individual reports byparticipants given to the author after theconference indicate that significantinvestment can be expected.

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Outcomes of the first EUOutcomes of the first EUOutcomes of the first EUOutcomes of the first EUOutcomes of the first EUTTTTTAAAAACIS projectCIS projectCIS projectCIS projectCIS project

It is reported that, by December 1998,8,013 people of the so-called ‘targetgroup’ had been trained in one way oranother through the joint TACIS/NCCprogram. If one adds those trained bythe Interregional Training Centers, atotal of 9,356 people (compared to the8,000 planned) reportedly underwentsome form of retraining. Out of these,2,866 officers or their family membershad participated in distance learningcourses, mostly officers in garrisontowns who would not otherwise havehad the chance to commute to thetraining centers. 61.5 percent of thecourse participants were officers laid-offshortly before retraining, the rest werereserve officers. A high proportion ofthe personnel retrained were familymembers—39.5 percent of the totalamount. The figures on the actualresults of the first TACIS projectnonetheless vary: according to a reportby the NCC, 6,895 ‘people’ had finishedretraining by 1 December 1998, 1,768were still undergoing training at thattime, and 1,043 were planning to do soin the future. The accounting for thefirst EU TACIS program thus seems tobe ambiguous.

Within the framework of the firstTACIS program, it is reported that 103(according to the report from RAGBildung GmbH: 122) new businesseswere set up, resulting in 412 (or 466,according to the RAG report) new jobs.Career services helped to place 3,701 (or4401, according to RAG) of the ‘targetgroup’ in new jobs (Shikalov, 2001;Körver-Buschhaus, 2000). Althoughthe differences in the reports may in partbe due to the use of slightly differenttimeframes, ‘elastic’ accounting criteriaalso played its part. According to thefigures given by the NCC, 4,400 peoplesuccessfully found jobs after retraining,of whom 3,321 were former militaryservicemen.

The second EU TThe second EU TThe second EU TThe second EU TThe second EU TAAAAACIS projectCIS projectCIS projectCIS projectCIS projectand future directionsand future directionsand future directionsand future directionsand future directions

In July 2000, a second EU project(SCRE1/No. 42) on assisting jobcreation for ex-members of the militarywas launched with a duration of 24months and a budget of 2 millioneuros. The group targeted by thisproject was 5,000 discharged militaryservicemen and the staff of both theNCC and the RCEs. Partners of thenew EU project were the Ministry ofDefense, the Ministry of Labor andSocial Policy, the Ministry of Educationand Science, the Ministry of Economics,the Ministry of the Interior, the SecurityService of Ukraine, and the BorderGuards.

One of the goals of the new TACISproject was the formation of so-called‘project groups’ with the aim of creatingjobs in the area of new technologies, forexample IT-technologies, energy-savingtechnologies or ecologically-cleanenergies. The hope is that profitsincurred from these technologicallyadvanced endeavors could, at leastpartially, be used to solve some of thehousing problems experienced byformer officers. However, in the yearsleading up to 2005, it is becomingapparent that retraining is graduallylosing importance within the overallframework of reintegration. This echoesthe decline in importance within Ukraineof demobilization itself, as confirmedby the planned structure of the budgetfor reintegration measures.

Assessment of the ‘ComplexAssessment of the ‘ComplexAssessment of the ‘ComplexAssessment of the ‘ComplexAssessment of the ‘ComplexPPPPProgram’ and the Trogram’ and the Trogram’ and the Trogram’ and the Trogram’ and the TAAAAACISCISCISCISCISprojectsprojectsprojectsprojectsprojects

Over the years, some 12,000 people,both officers and their family members,have been retrained by the NCC, ofwhom an estimated 8,000 later foundemployment. It is impossible to give anexact figure because not all who undergoretraining by the NCC or itssubcontractors report back to theorganization once they have foundemployment. Reemployment—not justretraining—tended to be mostsuccessful when skills acquired duringthe military service could be transferred.

It is estimated, for example, that morethan 50 percent of former officers endedup in private security firms. Formerpolit-officers were as a rule hard to re-employ. With few exceptions, officerswho turned to trading or commercialbusiness ran the risk of unemployment,mainly due to the shaky nature ofcommercial business itself. Moreover,such officers needed a krysha—a ‘roof ’or protection from the Mafia. One ofthe most critical groups was that of laid-off officers and their families whocontinued to live in former garrisontowns.

On the basis of the author’s interviewswith TACIS staff, the NCC and trainersat the RCEs, certain qualifications andskills proved advantageous in theattempt to find a new job: discipline,accuracy, persistence, a structured mannerof decision-making, trustworthiness,communication skills, the ability todelegate tasks and—for thosesubsequently employed in securityservices—the ability to handle weapons.Many former officers simply movedfrom the regular armed forces to the‘Security Service’ (the successor of theKGB, with approximately 40,000members) or the Border Guards(approximately 40,000 servicemen); infact, neither agency has reduced itsnumbers over the last decade. Traitswhich proved to be a disadvantage forreemployment were: relying onentitlements instead of self-reliance, a‘wait-and-see’ approach, anunwillingness to leave the militarycommunity, and—frequentlymentioned—drinking problems. As theentitlements which ex-officers are dueare still above the social average, they areusually far better off than the otherunemployed. Seen in a Europeancontext, the entitlement of an officer toan apartment is quite an unusualprivilege; obviously the Soviet mentalityis still strong.

The NCC and the RCEs built up areintegration capacity that was at thesame time both regionalized andcentrally coordinated. The regional

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approach by the RCEs proved to beparticularly constructive. Nonetheless,retraining and job placement was largelydependent upon physical access to theregional centers although officers whodid not reside in the vicinity of RCEscould benefit either from more flexibledistant learning courses or from theoffer of training modules on militarypremises before actual discharge.Competition among the RCEs duringthe tendering process, the auditing ofincome and expenses by the NCC andannual reports on outcomes were salientinstruments to maintain a stimulus forgood performance. Some of the RCEsclearly fared better than others in termsof employment results or jobprocurement resulting from the creationof new businesses. Leaders were thecenters in Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk,Kiev and Nikolaev. Their success is onlypartially attributable to more favorablestructural conditions. A betterperformance in administration,management, strategy development andinnovation evidently made a difference.However not only are all of the RCEsoriginally formed still in existence, but,over the last two years, two more RCEs(in Zaporozhe and Lutsk) have evenbeen created.

The main Ukrainian agencies thatreceived money from foreign donors forreintegration viewed each other ascompetitors in the tight market ofsponsors. The NCC and the Renais-sance Foundation project (details below)did not exchange information onretraining methods, for instance.Cooperation between the InterregionalTraining Centers, originally equippedwith money from Germany, and theNCC remained similarly weak. Despitethe impressive setting up ofreintegration agencies, their work willnot become an integral part of the stateprogram for the development of thearmed forces until 2005: in short,restructuring, downsizing andreintegration have not been integratedinto one single effort. Neither did post-military career planning become anintegral part of military career planning

itself, nor did the armed forcesdevelopment plan guarantee therequisite financial backing for the socialand professional reintegration of ex-officers: there is simply no provision forthis in the Ukrainian budget. Thissituation is exacerbated by a furthercritical weakness of the reintegrationpolicy: the lack of an adequate legal basisfor planning military, and post-military,careers.

Yet another shortcoming of the‘Complex Program’ relates to theexchange of information. Officers arerarely informed about their dismissal indue time while regional commanders donot usually pay any attention to thepost-military careers of theirsubordinates. More than 90 percent ofthe officers discharged claimed that nopreparation for a civil career had takenplace during their time in service(Narodnaya Armiya, 25 May 1999,pp. 4–5). Nor do regional militarycommands for the reserve fare better inthis respect. For the years 1996–1999 itwas reported in several cases thatregional military commands were notable to provide laid-off officers withinformation on the ITCs or the RCEs,simply because they did not knowanything at all about such retrainingopportunities. Officers slated fordischarge were not systematicallyinformed about their rights andopportunities, though the informationpolicy improved slightly with the build-up of a NCC website.

One of the flaws of the Ukrainianprogram consisted in weak linkagesbetween retraining programs and actualjob placement. While the cooperationof the RCEs and the InterregionalTraining Centers with the Ministry ofLabor left much room forimprovement, the Ministry of Defensemerely transferred its ownresponsibilities to the NCC. In short,the Ministry of Defense or itssubstructures did not cooperateconstructively with the various differentorganizations engaged in thereintegration measures. As the capacitiesof the NCC were not evenly strong inall areas, the management of militaryassets, especially the attraction of foreign

investment and the raising of extra-budgetary funds for new businesses,proved difficult. The NCC particularlylacks expertise in assessing the assets ofhuge military sites.

Difficulties in implementation of theUkrainian ‘Complex Program’ resultfurthermore from institutionalmismanagement. Continuing delays inreleasing budgeted funds by theUkrainian government inhibited theNCC’s work during the first TACISproject. Having said that, thedistribution of budgeted means to theNCC was nonetheless far better than onaverage in Ukraine: the NCC received atleast 93 percent of the budgeted meansin 1997 in contrast to othergovernmental agencies which receivedonly 63 percent.

Certain services under the TACISprogram were at times criticized forbeing just a job procurement measurefor Western consultants who would beotherwise unemployed. As is often thecase with international aidorganizations, the Ukrainiancounterparts questioned the cost-benefitratio of short-term consultants or ofstandardized Western ‘business plans’which did not take the local market intoaccount.

General conclusionsGeneral conclusionsGeneral conclusionsGeneral conclusionsGeneral conclusions

The Ukrainian experiences allow forsome general conclusions. It would bebetter if retraining started during apreparatory stage in the military, theearlier the better. Family members,especially wives, need to be regularlyincluded in reintegration measures. Yetretraining should not be seen as havinga value in itself but must be linked toemployment. Especially at thebeginning of the Ukrainianreintegration programs, training was ofa too general nature and was notsufficiently market-oriented. In order tolink retraining to job placement,information on the regional labormarkets has to be regularly updated. On

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the other hand, valuable experience hasbeen gained through the TACIS/NCCproject as far as the combination ofreintegration measures with theconversion of military sites is concerned.The creation of special agencies tomanage the conversion of militaryassets is preferable to subordination tothe Ministry of Defense or to a transferof the assets to municipalities whichusually see military sites only as anadditional burden. Finally, it must besaid that in gaining experience withreintegration policies in Europe—especially in Eastern Europe—theUkrainian NCC has played a leadingrole. Since 1998, for example, the NCChas organized a series of conferenceswith the aim of exchanginginformation. Nonetheless, even if everyeffort should be welcomed in itself, theextent to which information is actuallytransferred is unfortunately stillunsatisfactory.

The Renaissance FoundationThe Renaissance FoundationThe Renaissance FoundationThe Renaissance FoundationThe Renaissance Foundationprojectprojectprojectprojectproject

In October 1993, the ‘Social Adaptationof Military Servicemen’ (Sotsial’nayaadaptatsiya voennosluzhashikh) programof the Renaissance Foundation wasformally launched in Ukraine andcontinued until 1998 based on anagreement between the President ofUkraine and George Soros. In reality, theRenaissance Foundation projectproperly began in 1994. The Retrainingof the Military program retraineddischarged or reserve officers inaltogether 50 disciplines, among themsales management, bookkeeping,economics, PC skills and small businessmanagement. Training centers werelocated at Kiev, Kharkov, Lugansk,L’viv, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk,Odessa and on the Crimean Peninsula.The courses were licensed by the

Ministry of Education. Although48,858 former servicemen are reportedto have been retrained through thisRenaissance Foundation project, thesenumbers seem unrealistic, given theschooling facilities and the financesavailable.

On 13 December 1998, an InternationalFund for Social Adaptation (IFSA) wasformed on the basis of the earlierRenaissance Foundation project. Theadjective ‘international’ indicated theintention to cooperate with NGOsoperating within the Commonwealthof Independent States (CIS), particularlyRussia, Belarus, and Moldova, as well aswith donor organizations in the West.Against the framework of the IFSA, 24centers for social adaptation, 17 centersfor the promotion of businesses andbusiness-incubators, 3 centers for social-psychological and medical rehabilitation,and 3 credit unions have been set upsince work began in 1999.

With the formation of the IFSA, thepersonnel covered by reintegrationmeasures expanded. The promotion ofsocial adaptation was widened toencompass not only former serviceman,but troops of the Border Guard, theSecurity Service (former KGB), theMinistry of the Interior and theMinistry of Emergency Situations aswell as family members of these troops.The scope of activities run by the IFSAalso expanded. Anyone interested increating his or her own small businesscould apply to the IFSA for help. Thisexpansion of services is indicative of abroadening in the understanding ofreintegration. Over time, however, itturned out that the retraining centershad built up more capacities than couldactually be used by former servicemen.Coupled with the fact that the retrainingcenters also required alternative sourcesof income, the IFSA began to developpurely business activities of its own—not only general training seminars buteven marketing their retrainingprograms in other countries.

Box 3: SecondaryBox 3: SecondaryBox 3: SecondaryBox 3: SecondaryBox 3: Secondaryreintegrationreintegrationreintegrationreintegrationreintegrationmeasuresmeasuresmeasuresmeasuresmeasures

Grassroot activitiesGrassroot activitiesGrassroot activitiesGrassroot activitiesGrassroot activities

Some associations of officers—there arealtogether 43 such associations inUkraine—offered professional trainingcourses as well. The UkrainianAssociation of Professional ReserveOfficers (Ukrainskaya assotsiatsiyauvolennykh v zapas kadrovykhvoennosluzhashikh/UAUZV), forexample, organized short-term courses(from two weeks up to five months) inKiev, but there was no cooperation withthe efforts of the NCC.

NANANANANATO language courses inTO language courses inTO language courses inTO language courses inTO language courses inUkraineUkraineUkraineUkraineUkraine

Since November 1998 the NCC hasbeen collaborating with the EconomicDepartment of NATO in order tofacilitate the reintegration of officers

who have left the military. The aim ofthis cooperation consists in trainingbetween 80 to 130 Ukrainian officersannually, mainly in foreign languages,and 130 former marine officers forreemployment on trade ships.Participants have to pass competitiveexams before course enrollment. Thecourses were provided by the BritishCouncil (English), the Institut Français(French) and the Goethe Institute(German). According to figures given bythe NCC, the overall costs of theselanguage courses amounted to US$100,000 by the year 2001. From theperspective of NATO’s EconomicDepartment, the promotion of theselanguage courses represented aninexpensive means of polishing upNATO’s image in Ukraine. In 2001,language training financed by NATOreached some 90 students, receivingwide press coverage. As a NATO officialadmitted in private conversation, theirpurpose consisted primarily of PRactivity for NATO.

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Though the author could not verifywhether reported figures of retrainedofficers corresponded to actual figures,allegations were repeatedly made bypersons spoken to in Ukraine thatfunds belonging to the RenaissanceFoundation were being misused forpurposes other than those specifiedunder the grant. The underlying idea ofthe Renaissance Foundation project wasto organize reintegration primarilythrough non-governmental structures,idealistically assuming that these wouldbe less compromised and corrupt thangovernmental ones. Former officersusually set up centers in the expectation

of receiving funds. The weak spots ofthe Renaissance Foundation projectevidently consisted in the absence ofadequate monitoring and auditing fromoutside and the lack of propercoordination with governmentalinstitutions such as the Ministry ofDefense, the National CoordinatingCenter at the Cabinet of Ministers andthe regional administrations, includingthe labor offices.

Figure 3: Number of ex-servicemen retrained by the RenaissanceFigure 3: Number of ex-servicemen retrained by the RenaissanceFigure 3: Number of ex-servicemen retrained by the RenaissanceFigure 3: Number of ex-servicemen retrained by the RenaissanceFigure 3: Number of ex-servicemen retrained by the RenaissanceFoundation, 1992–1998Foundation, 1992–1998Foundation, 1992–1998Foundation, 1992–1998Foundation, 1992–1998

Source: Information supplied to the author by the International Foundation for Social Adaptation, Kiev, [email protected]

Measures 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total

Re-training 253 2,000 7,258 12,582 10,412 9,836 6,517 48,858

Job placement - 510 2,808 4,784 6,410 6,147 3,158 23,817

Formation of - 72 11 52 152 112 211 610small businessesby former officers

Figure 4: Implementation of the PFigure 4: Implementation of the PFigure 4: Implementation of the PFigure 4: Implementation of the PFigure 4: Implementation of the Program of the International Frogram of the International Frogram of the International Frogram of the International Frogram of the International Fundundundundundfor Social Adaptation/Retraining of the Military Program (RMP),for Social Adaptation/Retraining of the Military Program (RMP),for Social Adaptation/Retraining of the Military Program (RMP),for Social Adaptation/Retraining of the Military Program (RMP),for Social Adaptation/Retraining of the Military Program (RMP),31 December 199931 December 199931 December 199931 December 199931 December 1999

Source: Information supplied to the author by the International Foundation for Social Adaptation, Kiev, [email protected]

1994–1999 Kiev Dnepro- Donetsk Kharkov Luhansk Lviv Odessa Crimea TotalPetrovsk

Retrained 27,035 3,307 2,706 3,819 200 4,037 3,933 5,979 51,016

Employed 10,803 2,428 2,327 2,145 58 1,766 2,255 3,599 25,381

Total number 38,185 6,271 4,162 5,835 218 4,896 6,085 6,507 72,159of personsassisted by theRMP

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RussiaRussiaRussiaRussiaRussia


Until the turn of the century,reintegration efforts in Russia were notallotted high priority by the Russiangovernment. Reintegration policy inRussia had a protracted start, and it isnot clear to what extent demobilizationefforts announced in the 1990s wereactually implemented (for an earlyassessment, see OECD, 1993). Duringthe 1997/98 demobilization campaign,when the strength of the authorizedforces was ostensibly reduced from 1.8million to 1.2 million, only 120,00people were actually demobilized(BICC, 2001, p. 74). As in the case ofUkraine and Belarus, reintegrationmeasures initially benefited from theGerman contribution to reintegrateservicemen formerly stationed in EastGermany. The German governmentprovided money to set up 10 retrainingcenters for servicemen, similar to theones in Ukraine. Over time, otherWestern countries invested money aswell. However, with the new Putinadministration, the approach todemobilization and reintegrationchanged.

Reintegration was inhibited by theindecisiveness of the Russiangovernment and the alleged shortage ofmoney. For long, the scope and natureof future downsizing remainedundecided, and even at the time of thiswriting, disputes over the future troopstrength had not yet been resolved.Vladimir Potapov, Deputy Secretary ofthe Security Council, announced in June2002 that the numerical strength wouldbe brought down from the authorizedfigure of 1,200,000 for the year 2000 tobetween 1,000,000 and 850,000 by 2010.Nonetheless the General Staff cites adifferent figure, speaking of an even1,000,000, the troop strength initiallyspecified for the armed forces by 2005(Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 June 2002). Themilitary is particularly concerned aboutthe unprecedented high number ofresignations from the officer corps on

top of planned troop strength cuts inthe army and navy. It is mostly theyoung officers who decide to leave thearmed forces, a situation which is mainlyattributed to social insecurity and lowsalaries.

During the first decade after thedissolution of the Soviet Union, theRussian Ministry of Defense did notcreate institutional capacities to deal withreintegration. At a meeting of agovernment committee on social issuesaffecting servicemen, the chief inspectorat General Headquarters, Gen. MikhailMoiseyev, released figures showing that,since 1992, more than 900,000 officers,warrant officers and midshipmen hadbeen dismissed. Of this number, only60,000, or 7 percent, had undergoneretraining for civilian professions atDefense Ministry training centers(Mukhin, 2001). Up to 1999, there wereonly 5 or 6 officers in the whole ofRussia providing information onretraining programs while Germany, bycontrast, had approximately 1,000 suchpeople. It was not surprising that themorale of servicemen to be dischargedwas low as they knew that the Ministryof Defense was not taking care forthem. A survey of servicemen showedthat two-thirds were worried at theprospect of having to find new workafter leaving the military. Many of thoseaffected by the cutbacks will also faceproblems finding new places for theirwives to live and work.

The government programThe government programThe government programThe government programThe government program

The system of retraining was finallyaltered in 2000 by being centralized andbrought under the Ministry of Defense,with regional authorities contributing tojob placement for former officers. In2000, the ‘All-Russian Center of SocialAdaptation of Military Servicemen’ wasestablished, uniting all retraining centers.International assistance, supplemented

by some national off-budget funding, isthe main source of funding (BICC,2001, p. 75). Out of a total of 3.5billion rubles allocated for militaryreform in 2002, 50 million rubles wereearmarked for the retraining of militaryprofessionals. However it was only in2001 that the government set asidemoney for retraining militaryprofessionals when it allocated 24million rubles for the first time, and it isnot yet clear whether the governmentwill indeed hand out all the moneyallocated for retraining (see Mukhin2001, also on the following).

Nevertheless, at least on paper thegovernment is doing something for theservicemen who have lost their jobs inthe military. Such servicemen are coveredby a 1998 Federal Employment Programfor 1998–2001. Another plan, passed bydecree in 2000, is aimed at compensatingdismissed servicemen for the cost oftraining for a new profession.Furthermore, a government committeeon social issues affecting servicemen isin existence, headed by Deputy PrimeMinister Valentina Matviyenko. Thecommittee is working on a draft federalprogram that aims at facilitating theintegration into civilian society ofservicemen to be discharged between2002 and 2005. The committee isdrawing up welfare programs forservicemen and their families. In early2001, former Defense Minister IgorSergeyev signed a resolution to set up acoordinating council on the welfare ofdismissed servicemen and their families,which should unite the efforts of thevarious Defense Ministry departments.Yet, the proliferation of servicemen’swelfare committees does not in itselfsolve anything. The military sociologistSergei Solovyev estimates that a little lessthan half the officers who fall under thecutbacks will end up having to findwork of some kind or another forthemselves. “It’s particularly hard forservicemen over 50 living in smalltowns or in garrisons where there are

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many retired servicemen,” Solovyev said(Mukhin 2001). Generally speaking, jobplacement depends on the state of thelabor market in the regional economy;training itself is no assurance of findinga place to apply the learned skills.

Regional effortsRegional effortsRegional effortsRegional effortsRegional efforts

Most of the regions (68 out of 89) haveset up centers of their own for the socialadaptation of military servicemen,though some of these centers dealexclusively with the development ofself-governing bodies in garrison-towns(full list in TACIS 1999, pp. 21–32). Thecenter in Kaliningrad, for example,supports the establishment ofresidential self-governing committees infour formerly closed military towns (see:www.civilsoc.org/nisorgs/russwest/milgrnt.htm#Social%20Adaptation). Theemphasis of the Kaliningrad center([email protected]) is on citizeninvolvement in communitydevelopment. The Nizhny NovgorodCenter for the Social Adaptation ofMilitary Servicemen supports thedevelopment of civilian institutions inthree formerly closed military townsthrough the establishment ofresidential self-governing committees(contact: [email protected]). A furthercenter exists in Odintsovo, Moscowoblast, supporting job creation andbusiness activity amongdecommissioned military officersthrough specialized training,consultation services, and assistance inobtaining micro-loans from a local creditcooperative serving this target group(contact: [email protected]). Apart fromthe regional centers, usually linked to theregional government, 34 regionalinstitutions specialized in the retrainingof former officers existed in 2000 (for afull list, see TACIS 1999, pp. 60–62).However, not only are these centersusually in need of the appropriateequipment for teaching, but teachingitself ought to be more closely linked to

the educational and trainingrequirements of local business andindustry. There is, furthermore, anidentified need to strengthen distancelearning capacities for those who do notlive in the vicinity of retraining centers.A particular role in reintegration ofservicemen is played by various regionalAssociations of Soldiers’ Mothers,though their prime focus is on soldierswho have participated in the Chechnyanwars (see International Foundation forCivil Liberties, Kolokol.org, at: www209.235.228.197/english/161.htm).

Centers of higher educationCenters of higher educationCenters of higher educationCenters of higher educationCenters of higher education

Some regional centers of highereducation have begun to specialize inretraining courses for militaryservicemen. But the existing system ofprofessional retraining programs isoften hindered because financial supportfor travelling to the retraining centers islimited, while the cost of rentingaccommodation for the duration ofcourses is high. Furthermore, servicesoffered by retraining centers on acommercial basis are rarely affordable forlaid-off officers.

Box 4: CooperationBox 4: CooperationBox 4: CooperationBox 4: CooperationBox 4: Cooperationbetween Russia andbetween Russia andbetween Russia andbetween Russia andbetween Russia andNANANANANATOTOTOTOTO

Since 1998 there have been discussionsbetween the Russian Ministry ofDefense and NATO on possiblereintegration measures (www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p980528e.htm). On 28May 1998, the NATO-Russia Perma-nent Joint Council discussedcooperation on the retraining of retiredmilitary servicemen at the ministeriallevel in Luxembourg. In December2000, NATO defense and foreignministers met their Russiancounterparts, Marshal Igor Sergeyev andMinister Igor Ivanov, once more atministerial sessions of the PermanentJoint Council at NATO headquarters inorder to discuss, among other things,the retraining of discharged militarypersonnel.

Michel Duray, who was with theEconomic Department of NATO until2001, said that retraining programsfunded by NATO for officers leavingmilitary service were of particularimportance. This comment becameespecially valuable once Russiaannounced that it would make large cutsin armed forces personnel over thefollowing few years. Duray calledattention to the fact that even long-termenlistment usually meant only 15–20years in the army, so that it was necessaryto offer retraining in civilian skills whena person entered the military and notafter they had left. He stressed thatmany servicemen were faced with losingnot only their jobs but also theirhousing, in some cases at only months’notice (Lagunina, 1999). According to ajoint plan of NATO and the RussianMinistry of Defense, training in the useof the internet would be provided toservice personnel. In June 2002, NATOand Russia’s Ministry of Defense set upa center, which, among other things,provides stipends for officers to learnhow to use the internet.

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External supportExternal supportExternal supportExternal supportExternal support

In 1994, a EU TACIS officers retrainingprogram was launched, the initial phaseof which totaled Ecu 24 million. Itinvolved the establishment of retrainingcenters and the retraining of 17,000officers, some 60 percent of whom havealready found permanent jobs. Inaddition, the EU has provided teachingequipment and computers to build anetwork linking the retraining centers.This network covers 10 retrainingcenters of the Russian Ministry ofDefense.

At the end of 1998, a project worth Ecu4 million in support of officer retrainingwas approved. Under this, demobilizedRussian officers were to receive help tofind work either in military industrieswhich were being converted to civilianproduction or in small and medium-sized enterprises. Training in jobskills—including management, banking,ecology, insurance, investment, logisticsand production—would be provided bya total of 600 teachers throughout anetwork of 23 retraining centers run inconjunction with the Russian Ministryof Education and the Ministry ofDefense. The EU project was to payspecial attention to both the municipaldevelopment of former military townsand the reintegration of military peopleinto these local economies. The shift infocus, from mere retraining toreintegration, is a reflection of thecurrent needs in Russia (see TACISAnnual Report 1998 at:www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/nis/tar98/russia.htm).Thus the EU TACIS project particularlytargeted servicemen in remote militarytowns and tried to help them both withprofessional retraining, development oflocal self-government and with businessdevelopment.

The UK Ministry of Defense programis the most prominent retrainingprogram in Russia. From 1996onwards, the United Kingdom hasbeen spending over US $2 millionannually in the support of 6 retrainingcenters for retiring officers in theMoscow region, St. Petersburg,Kronstadt, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov-on-Don and Vladivostok. During thattime, more then 10,000 officers andtheir dependents have passed throughthe program and over 70 percent ofthem found employment upongraduation. “The secret of the Britishsuccess is its commitment to retainingfull financial and operational controlover the program with a full-timeBritish officer running the program onthe ground in Russia. All funding hasbeen delivered directly to retrainingcenters, thereby minimizingopportunities for corruption. Anotherimportant feature of the UK program isits flexibility, which includes constantlyreshaping their training curriculum inaccordance with local employmentmarket research. Finally, the UKprogram has managed to establishconstructive relations with thecommanders of the North CaucasusMilitary District and the Pacific Fleet,who then issued orders authorizingofficers to attend the UK courses beforeretirement, thus assuring their smoothtransition to civilian life” (Antonenko2000). About 14,000 Russianservicemen have received civilian trainingthrough funds assigned by the BritishMinistry of Defense. The Britishcoordinator, Jack Hemsley, notedhowever that, under an agreementbetween the United Kingdom andRussia, the program “would not lastforever” and may in fact cease to existvery soon.

The British experience was subsequentlyused by the Japanese government indeveloping their own reintegrationprogram for the Russian Far East. TheJapanese program, running inVladivostok, Khabarovsk, Sakhalin andother regions, offers retraining for

officers to service Japanese cars andother products. “The rate ofemployment among its graduates is veryhigh, given the local demand andprestige that it has developed. Manygraduates are employed in Russo-Japanese joint ventures and assistJapanese investors to develop localinfrastructure for distributing andservicing their goods” (Antonenko2000, see also on the following).

In 1999, the Norwegian governmentstarted a program for naval officers inMurmansk with support from thecommander of the Northern Fleet. It isconducted in cooperation with aNorwegian university.

Until recently the US government hasnot participated in reintegrationprograms in Russia due tocongressional limitations that wereimposed on providing assistance formilitary retraining and housing,following corruption allegations aboutGerman government assistance.However, the British assistance hasdemonstrated that corruption can beeffectively minimized. The PONARSstudy concluded in 2000 that “there isno reason why such programs andexperience cannot be extended to socialadaptation and small businessdevelopment among ex-militarypersonnel” (Antonenko, 2000).

Along with these, other programssupported by foreign countries andinternational organizations also exist(on the following see Hemsley, 2001).Two German NGOs are active in theresettlement field although the numbersbeing retrained are small. The UK’sKnow How Fund ran a “Training theTrainers” program to establishretraining facilities on a number ofStrategic Rocket Force bases but there isno recent information on whether thisproject has continued under Russian

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guidance. Sweden initiated a smallprogram in Northwest Russia, Norway,as mentioned above, has a program inMurmansk, which started in 2000. 109officers of the Northern Fleet have beenretrained so far, 81 of whom started inMarch 2001 and the annual target is 160.The reported success rate of thosemoving on to employment is 60percent. The program is very similar tothe British program. As also mentionedabove, Japan has run several 2-weekseminars in Vladivostok andKhabarovsk and may expand toSakhalin. Denmark recently expressed aninterest in joining the UK program in StPetersburg.

One of the programs specificallytargeting small business developmentamong ex-servicemen is beingundertaken by the Russian ‘Partner’Foundation, which in turn receivesfinancial support from the SorosFoundation. By February 1999 thisprogram had reportedly retrained 5,700servicemen and employed around 4,000.In 2000, Antonenko reported on theachievements of this project: “Two“business incubators” have been set upand 9 more regions have offered tocreate them. Fourteen credit unionsamong ex-servicemen have beenestablished to help fund business start-ups. The program has also helped tocreate 23 small enterprises. The programconnected 28 resettlement centers to theInternet and set up 15 libraries inmilitary towns and garrisons, as well aspreparing 36 resettlement specialists forother regions”. Part of the success ofthe projects rests in the closecooperation of the Foundation withregional governors, who provide spacein closed military towns free-of-chargefor setting up the business incubators.

Lessons learnedLessons learnedLessons learnedLessons learnedLessons learned

Because the Russian reintegration effortsare still ongoing, the following remarksmust be seen as preliminary. In theRussian case, the most criticalshortcoming pertains to indecisivenessover the future strength of the armedforces along with salaries, pensions andthe benefit package for officers—all ofwhich affect the subsequent size, andconsequences of, downsizing. Work isstill needed to clarify the roles,responsibilities and resources at federal,regional and local levels of government.External support can help to formulatelegislation on pensions, housing andretraining and to support the build-upof related capacities, but a definitefinancial and administrativecommitment by the Russiangovernment is a prerequisite forimplementation. The experience of theUK project is particularly worth takinginto account: it was regionalized, thuscircumventing bureaucratic stalemate inthe central government; it establishedclear cost-benefit ratios and paid dueattention to accounting, thus reducingthe potential for corruption and misuseof funds.

As in the case of Ukraine, it becameevident that retraining programs aloneare no longer sufficient. Reintegrationmust become part of a comprehensiveprogram targeting economicallydeprived areas and creatingemployment. Programs supportedfrom abroad should also assist localgovernments in acquiring professionalemployees and should help integrate ex-servicemen into civil society bysupporting non-governmentalassociations to set up local socialadaptation programs. They shouldparticularly help to develop self-governing structures in converted

military towns. A final remark on thefrequently mentioned shortage offunding—funding from the businessworld would enable the retrainingproject to proceed more rapidly.Instruction should be adapted to reflectthe needs of businesses in whichofficers will be working.

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PPPPPolandolandolandolandoland


Since 1989 the Polish armed forces haveexperienced numerous plans forreorganization, changes of doctrinesand alteration in the relevant legislation.The general intention was to replace theformer offensive and support functionsof the Warsaw Pact; to ensureintegration into and interoperabilitywith NATO by mirroring its structure,training and equipment; to cut back airand air defense forces; and to redeployPolish forces from the Western to theEastern border (the following sectiondraws largely on Dragsdahl, 1999;Giermakowski and Keson, 2002).

Between 1 January 1989 and 1 Novem-ber 1998 altogether 71,296 individualsleft the professional military staff. Ofthis total number, 35,611 had alreadyleft during the period 1989–1991. From1989 to 1999, the overall number ofposts was reduced from 398,660 to226,460, namely by 43 percent. Thenumber of posts for commissionedofficers was reduced by 27.3 percent,warrant officers posts by 9.8 percent andNCO posts by 36.4 percent. These

figures include reductions in the actualtotal of compulsory-service recruits by56.2 percent (from 279,110 to 122,260)and of professional servicemen by 30.5percent (from 112,656 to 80,634). Thegiven numbers refer to official figures,but do not necessarily reflect actualholdings: official figures differed in the1990s from source to source and actualholdings were often below the numbersreported .

Reductions in the 1990sReductions in the 1990sReductions in the 1990sReductions in the 1990sReductions in the 1990s

The years 1996–1999 saw a sharpincrease in the number of contract-soldiers. A total of 8,181 professionalsoldiers were conscripted at the time,including 320 commissioned officers,699 warrant officers, and 7,162 non-commissioned officers. The number ofprofessionals leaving the armed forcesduring the entire period is nonethelesshigher than the number of positionscut. Between 1990 and 1999, more than62,500 professional servicemen retiredfrom the army—approximately 67percent of the manpower in service atthe end of 1990. This includes

approximately 31,500 commissionedofficers (c. 67 percent of the 1990figure), some 18,100 warrant officers(c. 70 percent), and some 12,750 NCOs(c. 62 percent) (Dragsdahl, 1999;Giermakowsi and Keson, 2002). Thedeterioration of living conditions in thearmed forces—even poverty, badhousing and expected gains on thecivilian market led the younger, moreambitious and better qualifiedprofessionals to leave the armed forcesvoluntarily whereas older colonels, ofwhom there were too many, remained(“A Servicemen’s Poverty”, FBIS DailyReport, FBIS-EEU-97-023, 20 January1997). Apart from individualpreferences, the number of personsleaving voluntarily depended on theregional unemployment rate and thecost of renting flats. In larger towns inparticular, officers frequently took upsecond jobs in order to increase theirincome while formally retaining theirstatus in the armed forces. As a result ofrestructuring and voluntary exit thearmed forces actually lacked qualifiedpersonnel. Many positions were held bycaptains and lieutenants whereas NATOcountries would have filled them withNCOs.

Figure 5: Changes in proportions between professionalFigure 5: Changes in proportions between professionalFigure 5: Changes in proportions between professionalFigure 5: Changes in proportions between professionalFigure 5: Changes in proportions between professionalservicemen ranks, 1990–1999servicemen ranks, 1990–1999servicemen ranks, 1990–1999servicemen ranks, 1990–1999servicemen ranks, 1990–1999

Source: Giermakowski and Keson, 2002, p. 14

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FigureFigureFigureFigureFigure 66666: Changes in proportions between ranks in the P: Changes in proportions between ranks in the P: Changes in proportions between ranks in the P: Changes in proportions between ranks in the P: Changes in proportions between ranks in the Polish armedolish armedolish armedolish armedolish armedforces, 1990–1999forces, 1990–1999forces, 1990–1999forces, 1990–1999forces, 1990–1999

Sources: Giermakowski and Keson, 2002, p. 13

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Figure 7: TFigure 7: TFigure 7: TFigure 7: TFigure 7: Total number of dismissals from professional militaryotal number of dismissals from professional militaryotal number of dismissals from professional militaryotal number of dismissals from professional militaryotal number of dismissals from professional militaryservice, 1990–1999service, 1990–1999service, 1990–1999service, 1990–1999service, 1990–1999

Source: Giermakowski and Keson, 2002, p. 15

Benefits on dischargeBenefits on dischargeBenefits on dischargeBenefits on dischargeBenefits on discharge

Contradictory opinions are held inPoland on the potential savings gainedfrom downsizing personnel: the benefitpackage given to military professionals isgenerous when compared to averagepensions. This is admittedly a reasonwhy reductions have not been moredrastic: the costs associated withretirement are too high (Jane’s DefenceWeekly, 17 April 1996). Nonetheless, infuture, maintenance of manpower willoccupy a decreasing share of militaryexpenditures in comparison to the share

of outlays for weapons procurement,command systems, communicationsystems and interoperability withNATO.

According to Polish regulations,professional soldiers have a right toimpressive pension benefits—40percent of their basic salary after 15 yearsof service (see Giermakowski andKeson, 2002 on the following). For eachadditional year, a rate of 2.6 percentapplies, up to a maximum level of 75percent of the basic salary. Whendischarged, a soldier who has acquiredfull pension rights amounting to 75percent of his basic salary can then takeup new employment without the

amount of his new salary having animpact on the level of pension received.However, when a soldier has acquiredpartial pension rights, regulations aresuch that taking up a new job does notnecessarily mean an increase in income.Especially among NCOs, warrantofficers, and junior officers with shortseniority, the economic situation of thesoldier’s family may deteriorate upon hisrelease from duty. For formerservicemen, taking on an additional jobis therefore practically unavoidable.Career officers with seniority shorterthan 15 years are in the worst situation,

Reason for dismissal 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Incapable of professional 2,362 1,840 723 499 541 685 786 712 596 320military service accordingto Military MedicalCommission (WKL)

Legal retirement age 1,115 285 277 162 155 194 270 151 104 101reached

Term as professional 5,122 4,199 759 1,044 2,637 3,347 4,823 5,174 7,036 1,632soldier expired

Term of military - - 58 269 179 208 406 205 140 174body expired

Age limit for rank 3,095 1,671 334 111 86 145 88 25 18 18reached

Full pension - - - 10 33 92 32 - - -entitlement acquired

Court ruling 23 50 46 42 35 44 21 45 33 37(imprisonment)

On request of soldier 1,063 537 365 38 46 20 35 24 35 2

Death 226 151 140 125 111 142 102 113 86 74

Other 1,007 908 1,058 216 100 98 64 51 115 78

Total 14,013 9,641 3,760 2,516 3,923 4,975 6,627 6,500 8,163 2,436

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as they do not have any pension rightsat all. During the restructuring process,the attempt is made to protect suchpeople from redundancy, even if thiscannot be guaranteed in every case.

To facilitate their integration into thecivilian community, the followingbenefits are available to dischargedmilitary personnel:

The amount of remuneration of thelast position is paid out every monthfor a period of one year afterdischarge. A discharged soldier maytake up an additional job within thistime and still receive remunerationfrom the military. As this additionalincome from the military does notcount for tax purposes, tax benefitsare incurred for one year.

A monetary equivalent will be paidfor holidays which are outstanding,including the holiday not taken inthe year of discharge.

A one-off severance payment,equivalent to three months’ salary ofthe last position held, is provided.The level of this severance pay risesby 20 percent of the monthly salaryfor every full year of seniority above10 years of continual military service,up to the amount of 6 monthlysalaries.

Additionally, until 31 December2003, the period of notice fortermination of military employmentmay—even on request of thesoldier—be reduced from 9 to 1month. Soldiers discharged frommilitary service are entitled to receivea one-off payment equal to theiraccumulated monthly salary for thereduced period of notice. Thus thereduced period of notice is treated asbeing equivalent to military serviceand is recorded as a period of activemilitary duty.

Costs for moving the soldier and hisfamily to a civilian place of residenceof their choice will be reimbursed.

Reintegration supportReintegration supportReintegration supportReintegration supportReintegration support

Reintegration measures began in 1993 asa reaction to the first wave ofdismissals, but it was not until 1996that these were given a legal frameworkthrough their inclusion in the law onthe military service of professionalsoldiers. Sociological studies undertakenby the Ministry of Defense in 1997show that 68.8 percent of the soldiersreleased during the years 1993–1996took up paid work, 5.7 percent were inthe process of finalizing formalitiesrelated to employment, 18.7 percent didnot currently work but intended to doso, and that only 6.4 percent of thoseinterviewed had no intention oflooking for work after discharge. 5.1percent had taken up work straight afterleaving the forces, 51.2 percent in the 6months following discharge and afurther 20 percent took up workbetween 6 and 12 months afterdischarge.

Various agencies in charge of humanresources have been active in assistinglaid-off officers to prepare for civilianemployment. This help has included so-called ‘conversion seminars’, professio-nal advice, professional training,support in finding employment,housing assistance, financing ofindividual qualification efforts andorganized group retraining. Thoughunderstaffed, there is a specialdepartment at the Polish Ministry ofDefense that deals with the ‘conversion’of personnel. This department of theMinistry of Defense cooperates with theMinistry of Social Affairs and theregional labor exchanges (Interview, M.Fedasz, 21 July 2000). Laid-off officerswere entitled to a one-off amount offinancial support for retraining by theMinistry of Defense, ranging from1,750 to 2,500 Polish zlotys (430–612euros). Formally, the Social Departmenthas the right to place retired officers instate enterprises and civiladministrations. Until 1998, retrainingwas organized by the Ministry ofDefense but since then some 180institutes of higher education havebegun to offer retraining courses on aregional basis. Finances for retraining areprovided upon request of the Ministry

of Defense. The army itself does notoffer any particular retraining for officersslated for discharge. In the years 1998–2000, 2,768 former officers wereretrained, mostly with a view to workinglater in security services (60 percent); 10percent acquired computer skills, 7percent driving licenses, 5 percentforeign languages skills and 4 percentknowledge of accounting.

As of September 1997, a special decreehas been in force specifying which postsin central and local administrationsdealing with national defense are to bestaffed by former professionalservicemen. An agreement aimed ateasing the adverse effects ofunemployment was signed by theMinistry of National Defense and theNational Office of Labor in March 1999.In practice, however, these provisionsare ineffective, as the said positions arealready occupied by civilian personnel: toemploy former soldiers wouldnecessitate dismissing the current staff.

The following example may serve toillustrate this practice: The officer incharge of reintegrating personnel in theKrakow region identified 627 openpositions in 526 agencies subordinatedto the regional administration(Vojevodstvo, Krakow). Thoughformer servicemen were eligible topreferential job placement, only 30percent of these positions were filledwith discharged officers. The office incharge gave the following reasons:former administrations lackedknowledge of mandated tasks; capacitieswhich would allow the implementationof legislation were very limited; agencieswere unwilling to hire former officers;there was a widespread perception thatofficers with military pensions did notneed jobs; and—on the part of theformer officers themselves—manyofficers were unwilling to take up jobsin case this might have a negative effecton their military pensions (Koscielecki,2001).

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In total, 25,762 professional servicemenleft the armed forces in the period 1996–2000, 13,642 of whom came under thePersonnel Conversion Program. Ofthese 13,642, 3,491 soldiers wereretrained, 7,925 were given jobcounseling and 5,620 were assisted inlooking for a job, while jobs were foundfor 2,077 others. Even though thenumber of soldiers who actually foundnew positions may seem low, oneshould bear in mind that this onlyincludes those soldiers who foundemployment opportunities through thedirect involvement of the conversionauthorities. The above figure is in factquite promising, as it does not includeformer soldiers who established theirown businesses or found jobs either ontheir own or through otheremployment services.

The financial benefits available to ex-soldiers in addition to pensions(remuneration for one extra year,severance pay, compensation for ashortened period of notice) andsupport in finding jobs (seminars,collective and individual career advice,recruitment assistance, collectiveretraining, and so on) are far from beingsufficient. The ‘conversion seminars’offered to groups of 40–50 personsusually last for only three days andprovide little more than basic careerplanning advice. The names of laid-offservicemen are entered into a databankof persons looking for jobs, but apartfrom identifying preferences, littleassistance is offered.

Shortage of fundingShortage of fundingShortage of fundingShortage of fundingShortage of funding

Efforts to reintegrate personnel intocivilian life are constrained by a shortageof funding. In 2000, the Ministry ofDefense planned to earmark 1.6 millionPLN (392,000 euros) for demobilizationand reintegration measures up to 2005.Yet, only 1.14 million PLN (279,00euros)—one-third less—were de facto setaside for the 5-year restructuringprogram and the ensuing downsizingwhich commenced in 2001.Reintegration measures are furtherinhibited by the limited number ofadministrative staff. Until February

2000, there were only four personsdealing with reintegration at the corpsand military district commandheadquarters. In fact, throughout theentire armed forces, only 33 people dealfull-time with the reintegration ofpersonnel—23 civil servants and 10from the military. Members of theProvincial Military Staffs and of theMilitary Reserve Commands areexpected to support the programalthough not officially involved in it.Of these 33 people, 8 are in charge ofreintegration work at the Social Depart-ment of the Ministry of Defense, 16provide information on the job marketat the Provincial Military Staffs or theMilitary Reserve Commands, and theremaining 9 are spread between severalMilitary Centers for ProfessionalActivities.

The existing structures are not able toeffectively provide all assistancemeasures foreseen for military staffunder the law. Along with extremelylimited capacities at headquarters and analmost complete absence ofrepresentation in the field, there is apermanent lack of funding. It hastherefore been recommended that themeans for reintegration be distributednot simply to the command posts ofthe military districts but also to militaryadministration authorities at a lowerlevel and to garrisons slated fordownsizing. Unless administrativeresources are increased, reintegrationefforts—organized for the most partcentrally—will not be able to providethe necessary measures foreseen by law.

Grassroot initiatives andGrassroot initiatives andGrassroot initiatives andGrassroot initiatives andGrassroot initiatives andbusiness start-upsbusiness start-upsbusiness start-upsbusiness start-upsbusiness start-ups

Even though there are no formalstructures supporting reintegrationwithin the associations of formerofficers, many ideas are born at theirmeetings. For example, the DeanConvention (which consists ofrepresentatives of various differentranks such as NCOs, warrant officersand officers) proposed that a special

governmental authority be appointed todeal with matters relating to theemployment of former officers in thedefense industry and the public sector.A suggestion has been made that careerofficers might be offered shares in theproperty of garrisons to be disbandedand bases to be closed as well as in theirinfrastructure and land. Dischargedsoldiers could participate actively in theprocess of creating jobs and conditionsconducive to business. The real estateand assets of former military property,transferred by the Ministry of Defenseto the Agency for Military Assets withthe express purpose of finding aneconomic use for them, might providepremises and infrastructure.

There are two additional non-governmental associations dealing withreintegration. The first is theFoundation for Professional Activation(FAR), founded in 1994, which aims tostimulate the economic activity offormer servicemen and to support theMinistry of Defense in retraining. FARorganizes training courses andestablishes contacts with job providers.Another grassroot association is Mars &Mercury Europe, founded in 1996,offering courses in marketing andmicroeconomics as well as languages forformer officer. Mars & Mercury, financedby a small French grant, covered only aminor group of totaling 40 servicemen.Compared to Ukraine, it appears thatthe collective self-help of formerservicemen is even less significant inPoland.

A notable new direction has been theestablishment of a system to helpsoldiers start up businesses using someof the assets currently at the disposal ofthe Agency for Military Assets.According to Article 9.1 of the law ofJune 2001 on the restructuring of thearmed forces, “the Minister of Defensemay, until 31 December 2006, transfer asubordinated or supervised unit to theAgency for Military Assets for a limitedor unlimited period to secure thecontinuation of its business activity”.Moreover, Article 10 stipulates thatproperty from disbanded militaryorganizations subordinated to, or

38 B·I·C·C


supervised by, the Minister of Defensemay be made available until 31December 2006 under the terms of alimited tender for enterprises whosesole proprietors are discharged careerofficers. This solution may proveeffective for whole groups of dischargedsoldiers. Another useful decision wouldbe one enabling the Agency for MilitaryAssets to take over individual facilities atgarrisons slated for closure while theywere still operational (such asworkshops, fuel depots, canteens,laundries, nurseries, warehouses, orhotels) and transfer them to newcompanies established by ex-militarypersonnel whom it employs, pendingtender. The businesses set up by suchex-military staff could offer perimeterguard duty along with additionalservices such as construction, geodesicor military catering services; they couldrun recreational and sports facilities, orclear the military complexes of explo-sives. A next step would be the legislati-ve backing to establish appropriateprocedures and a preferential systemwithin the agency (payment deferrals,preference prices and tenancy fees) insupport of the legal handover ofproperty to former military personnel.

Box 5: NewBox 5: NewBox 5: NewBox 5: NewBox 5: Newdirectionsdirectionsdirectionsdirectionsdirections

In view of the substantial reductionsplanned for overstaffed garrisons andmilitary districts between 2001 and 2003,special authorities responsible forconversion issues will be nominated.The Department of Social Affairswithin the Ministry of Defense has alsoproposed some further-reachingsolutions. Four career support centerscould be established in Bydgoszcz,Wroclaw, Kraków, and Olsztyn toexpand the structure of the entirereintegration apparatus to 105 persons(currently 33). The employment ofdischarged soldiers calls for inter-ministerial dialogue and cooperationamong the communities.

Based on recent experience, it seems nolonger advisable to switch to a career inmanagement and marketing as theboom in such positions is receding.With this market segment saturated,technical specialists—especially in thearea of information technology—seemto be the ones most sought after.According to the Ministry of Justice, itwould be possible to employ dischargedsoldiers either in prison management oras probation officers. This idea coincideswith another project of the Ministry ofJustice focusing on the transformationof former garrisons into penitentiaryfacilities. Action taken by the Ministry ofRegional Development andConstruction is even more promising inthat it has designed a “Pilot Project ofRe-conversion of the Nysa Garrisoninto the Center of Innovation,Technology and Education (CITE)”.

In collaboration with the localgovernment, the Ministry has prepared aprogram to test new solutions andinstruments for regional growth. Theprogram will be financed throughgovernmental resources (in 2001, 8.5million PLN = 2,081,000 euros will beallocated from the general budgetreserve).

What are the lessons of the CITE-Nysapilot project? First, governmentalassistance is required, particularly alegislative foundation for the local andcentral administrations. Second,launching the project at an early stage inthe downsizing of the garrison pavesthe way for counteractingunemployment in the town and in theregion alike. Third, the reintegration ofpersonnel cannot be left in the hands ofthe military alone. Collaborative effortsby local government and the Ministriesof Regional Development and ofDefense are crucial.

Fully aware of the deficient state ofreintegration measures, the SocialDepartment of the Ministry of Defensesuggests the following: the transfer ofcareer planning and advisory services tothe provincial military commands;special programs for abandonedgarrisons; the facilitation of acquisitionof military assets by former officers; theattraction of non-budgetary funds;regular sociological studies on officers’needs; and, finally, preferential jobprocurement within the civiladministration of national defense forex-officers (Koscielecki, 2001).

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HungaryHungaryHungaryHungaryHungary


The legacy of the Warsaw Pact affectedthe post-socialist armed forces ofHungary in many ways: the commandsystem was oversized; the army wasoverstaffed; the number of officers andwarrant officers was out of proportionto the number of recruits and contractsoldiers; troops were primarily located inthe western side of the country; therewere a great number of support andservice bases; military technology was ofan offensive rather than a defensivenature; and, finally, massive emphasiswas laid on land forces instead of airdefense. The overall goal of post-socialist restructuring consisted in thecreation of a small, but modern, army.

Although the restructuring ofHungary’s armed forces has beenunderway for more than 15 years, aplanned effort has only becomeapparent since the year 2000. In public,the military burden was largely perceivedas the main obstacle for economicreform and as one of the last bastions

of socialism. Until the late 1990s,adjustments had concentrated primarilyon the downsizing of personnel (onthe following see Urbani, 1998a; Urbani1998b; Urbani, 1999; Urbani, 2002;Molnar and Keresztes, 2000; InterviewSzabo, 2001). Only with the war inKosovo and Hungary’s joining ofNATO did military reform begin tofollow a conscious design (Interview,Szabo, 4 December 2000).

The downsizing of the Hungarianarmed forces has caused considerablesocial tension. Complaints from theAssociation of Hungarian Servicemen,HOSZ, maintain that officers who havebeen laid off did not receive any materialassistance apart from the money paid asan indemnity, and that even suchcompensations were at times onlytransferred after court rulings. InHungary, the most crucial problemimpeding military reform has been adeficiency in financial allocations. Duringthe period 1989–2000, the share ofmilitary expenditures in GDP (grossdomestic product) decreasedsubstantially—from roughly 2.71percent in 1989 to 1.51 percent in 2000.

Transfer to civilian life and a newprofession is often abrupt and happenswithout appropriate warning. It hasproved quite difficult for former officersto find new jobs that correspond totheir level of qualifications. Given thatthe overwhelming majority of militaryprofessionals with 25 or more years ofservice tend to leave the armed forcesvoluntarily and that younger officers andNCOs often switch to the private sectorimmediately after having received acollege diploma, the pool of militarypersonnel is being depleted. Asociological study conducted in 1993revealed that the prime motives forleaving the armed forces in the early1990s were: misconduct of leadingcommanders; insecurity about futurecareer; the bad atmosphere; exaggeratedbureaucracy; the hope of a higherincome; more freedom. Over time, theexpectation of higher income becamethe most dominant factor (Molnar,2000).

Figure 8: Changes in the distribution of military ranksFigure 8: Changes in the distribution of military ranksFigure 8: Changes in the distribution of military ranksFigure 8: Changes in the distribution of military ranksFigure 8: Changes in the distribution of military ranks

Source: Figures provided by the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, November 2000

Rank Nominal positions Actual positions December 2001 Planned byavailable occupied the end of 2003

Generals 85 62 45 45

Officers 11,100 9,500 8,555 8,000

NCOs 11,000 10,000 10,320 11,000

Contract 5,300 3,700 6,700 7,200soldiers

Recruits 21,000 19,000 12,160 13,000

Civilian 11,600 10,500 4,010 5,800employees

Total 60,085 52,762 42,900 45,045

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Reductions, 2000–2003Reductions, 2000–2003Reductions, 2000–2003Reductions, 2000–2003Reductions, 2000–2003

According to the parliamentary decisionsof June 2000, the future peacetimestrength of the armed forces under thecommand of the Ministry of Defense isto be limited to 45,000 persons with aconcentration on contract soldiers andNCOs and with a reduced number ofrecruits. The major bulk of troopreductions was to be accomplished bythe end of 2001. Restructuring between2000 and 2003 will involve a nominalreduction of approximately 15,000persons, but this does not mean that allthese people will enter the civilian jobmarket. In 2000, fewer positions wereactually occupied than were available onpaper: 23 fewer generals, 1,600 fewerofficers, 2,000 fewer recruits and 1,100fewer civilian employees. Based on thereal amounts of military personnel in2000 and the planned strength for 2003,there was an excess of 12,217 people tobe dismissed and a deficit of 4,500persons to be hired. All in all, manymore contract soldiers, officers of lowerrank and corps officers left the armedforces than had been planned by theMinistry of Defense which was mainlydue to low salaries. On the other hand,pressure from the military to increasesalaries was regularly met with criticismfrom civilians in the government.

Box 6: Changes inBox 6: Changes inBox 6: Changes inBox 6: Changes inBox 6: Changes inpersonnel structurepersonnel structurepersonnel structurepersonnel structurepersonnel structure

Plans for changes in the personnelstructure of the armed forces predict anoverall reduction of 29 percent in thenumber of planned posts: the numberof officers is to drop by 32 percent,NCOs by 6 percent, recruits by 40percent and civilian employees by 56percent. As a consequence, the overallproportion of officers will be reducedfrom 16 to 15 percent, of recruits from39 to 33 percent and of civilianemployees from 17 to 11 percent; theproportion of NCOs on the other handshould increase from 18 to 24 percentand contract soldiers from 10 to 17percent. The division of labor betweenofficers and NCOs will be largelydetermined by NATO requirements.While officers will be mainly responsiblefor strategic tasks, NCOs will deal withtraining and everyday command duties;peacekeeping and crisis preventionduties will be performed by contractsoldiers.

The restructuring implies atransformation of certain services runby the military—for example cultural,social and sanitary services—into publiccompanies which will continue toemploy the same personnel. Of their4,700 employees, between 2,000 and2,500, officers, NCOs and civilianemployees alike, will be transferred tothese so-called ‘carved-out’ servicecompanies. As the majority of officersdischarged have a service time of at least25 years and are thus entitled to militarypensions, they will not necessarilyappear on the labor market as potentialjob seekers.

Paradoxically, the Ministry of Defense isnot only burdening the labor market bydismissing officers and warrant officers,but is also a major job provider incertain regions (especially in Tata, Gyor,Hódmezovásárhely, Debrecen). Thoughthe Ministry of Defense aims at animprovement in the qualifications of

the pool of future contract soldiers andNCOs, it admits that mainly the poor,or persons otherwise disadvantaged onthe labor market, are likely to embark ona military career (Interview, Angyal, 1December 2000).

It has been estimated by the Ministry ofDefense that the number of militarypersonnel to be laid-off before 2003who do not have any social securities is2,700—mostly civilian employees. Some1,000 career officers will be relocatedfrom closed garrisons to other units andsome 700 are to be employed by otherarmed organizations such as perimeterguards. Nonetheless, altogether some4,000–6,000 persons, civilians andmilitary alike, will face problems on thejob market, even if they receive someform of indemnification. The mostproblematic cases are people with highlyspecialized military skills—pilots,artillery officers or gunners—and thosewhose civilian qualifications are alreadyover-represented on the labor market orwho reside in areas with highunemployment. Of those dismissedpersons likely to face reintegrationdifficulties on the labor marketapproximately 2,700 are civilianemployees, 1,000 officers laid-off beforetheir planned retirement and anestimated 1,000–2,000 warrant officerswho voluntarily left the armed forcesdue to the new pension regulations.

Reintegration programsReintegration programsReintegration programsReintegration programsReintegration programs

According to the Hungarian Ministry ofDefense, data on the absorption capacityof the labor market for former officersand NCOs is not reliable, however theoverall impression is that dischargedofficers manage to reintegratethemselves fairly quickly. As in otherEastern European countries, manydischarged officers end up as guards insecurity services or public servicecompanies held by the Ministry ofDefense or in other governmentalagencies. Before 2000, the Ministry of

41B·I·C·C


Defense had only established a modestreintegration program. In 1995, an officefor the coordination of reintegrationmeasures was formed under the GeneralStaff with just five employees. The taskof this unit was to find alternative jobsfor discharged officers and to establishcontacts with other state agencies,mainly the police and the border guards,or state enterprises that might becomefuture employers.

In October 2000, an additional inter-ministerial committee was established,including representatives of theMinistries of Defense, Labor, SocialAffairs, Education and Agriculture. Itstask was to coordinate the use of fundsfor the Program for Promotion ofReemployment (PPR). The main goalof this interministerial committee wasto assist closed garrison-towns in siteconversion, the promotion of smalland medium-sized enterprises and to

offer career advice, retraining and jobprocurement services (Interview, Angyal,1 December 2000). The overall sumallocated to this project, planned for theperiod until the end of November2002, is 440 million Hungarian forint(roughly 1,798,975 euros), to beredirected from budgets of all theministries involved.

Altogether the PPR assistance affectedsome 3,500 former servicemen, 2,180 ofwhom turned to the labor offices of theregions (Comitats) for assistance and1,320 of whom approached the 12existing Committees for the Promotionof Job Seekers (MEB) which areaffiliated with major garrisons andsupported by the county labor offices.Each MEB consists of representativesfrom the labor office, the regionalmilitary command, trade unions, localadministrations and the chamber ofcommerce. From 2001 to 2002, theMEBs were financially supported by thelabor offices of the Comitats to the sum

of 7.7 million forint (31,482,1 euros).By the end of 2001, 516 formerservicemen found employment with thehelp the MEBs.

The ‘tool kit’ for reintegration of theMEBs includes: information on thelabor market and on employmentpossibilities; advice on jobs and carrieropportunities; rehabilitation programsfor the handicapped; subsidies forunemployed persons; the teaching ofjob-search techniques; psychologicalcounseling; financial subsidies foremployers (support of training, salariesor the creation of new workplaces; taxbenefits) and support in becoming anentrepreneur.

Figure 9: Number of servicemen affected by downsizing andFigure 9: Number of servicemen affected by downsizing andFigure 9: Number of servicemen affected by downsizing andFigure 9: Number of servicemen affected by downsizing andFigure 9: Number of servicemen affected by downsizing andreintegration measures resulting from the Strategic Examinationreintegration measures resulting from the Strategic Examinationreintegration measures resulting from the Strategic Examinationreintegration measures resulting from the Strategic Examinationreintegration measures resulting from the Strategic Examinationbetween 1 January and 30 September 2001between 1 January and 30 September 2001between 1 January and 30 September 2001between 1 January and 30 September 2001between 1 January and 30 September 2001

Source: Keresztes, 2001

Rank Servicemen laid-off Recipients of Support through Newly employed Participants ofdue to the PPR assistance the MEB after MEB retraining courses‘Strategic Program Support

Examination’

Officers 1,709 866 660 218 217

Warrant 1,898 917 373 95 107officers

Contract 749 536 153 64 109soldiers

Civilian 2,122 1,181 465 139 105employees

Total 6,478 3,500 1,498 516 538

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Social remediesSocial remediesSocial remediesSocial remediesSocial remedies

Officers with at least 25 years of service,usually between 42 and 45 years old,receive a modest pension which is inmost cases not sufficient to support afamily (maximum: 68,000 forint permonth, or approximately 278 euros).Those with less than 25 years of servicereceive the equivalent of a one to eightmonths’ salary as a one-offcompensation, depending on age,service time and rank. Almost allmembers of this group are thus forcedto seek post-military employment.Retraining courses which are the mostpopular are those for computerprogrammers, security guards,accountants and security managers.

At the beginning of the 1990s, theMinistry of Defense sold off themajority of apartments previouslyallotted to officers. Since then the

mobility of officers and warrant officershas diminished critically. In contrast toUkraine or Poland, there is no specialhousing policy for dischargedservicemen in Hungary. Only thosewilling to move to another garrison areentitled to accommodation support,either in the form of rent payment orbeneficial credits for the purchase of anapartment (up to 4 million forint orroughly 16,354 euros).

The long-term plan for militaryrestructuring (2000–2010) attempts toaddress some of the social problemsstemming from past military reform.Officers to be discharged are now toreceive compensation, pensions andother forms of material assistance.Innovation Bureaus for Employmentin the Honved Army are to be allottedmore personnel, while sub-offices are to

be opened at many garrisons. It isplanned that joint commissionscomprising representatives of thesebureaus and regional commanders beset up and that regular contact with locallabor exchanges, major enterprises, localadministrations and education facilitiestake place.

Fixing criteria for salaries, the 10-yearPlan stresses the interdependence ofrank, position in the military hierarchyand duration of service on the onehand, and the assessment of individualperformance and qualificationdevelopment on the other. Servicecareers should follow the principle‘upwards or outwards’ in the sense thatthose who do not move up on thecarrier ladder should exit the military.The reform should meet a variety ofrequirements: the specific need for moreofficers in the lower ranks; theovercoming of congestion in upward

Figure 10: Forms of assistance under the Hungarian PPR ProgramFigure 10: Forms of assistance under the Hungarian PPR ProgramFigure 10: Forms of assistance under the Hungarian PPR ProgramFigure 10: Forms of assistance under the Hungarian PPR ProgramFigure 10: Forms of assistance under the Hungarian PPR Program(until the end of 2001)(until the end of 2001)(until the end of 2001)(until the end of 2001)(until the end of 2001)

Source: Keresztes, 2001

Note: Double entries of forms of assistance possible

Employment Officers Warrant Contract Civilian Totalassistance officers soldiers employees

Professional 212 127 154 459 952advice

Career advice 314 343 278 485 1,420

Support in 458 401 306 549 1,714job search

Advice for 1 11 11 121 144local employment

Job procurement 396 249 169 294 1,108

Other forms 86 74 31 58 249of advice

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mobility; provision of transparent andpredictable career models;implementation of competitiveprinciples for promotion andreimbursement; and, lastly, the need tobring the composition of ranks closerto the envisaged ‘optimal model’.

At the end of 2000 the Hungarianparliament approved a program for thefundamental improvement of soldiers’living conditions. Accordingly, soldierswill be allowed to choose betweenprivate and service accommodation,preferential credits for building orbuying houses will be provided, extraallowances for accommodation will beincreased, and special payments will beoffered for moving from one militarylocation to another. It remains to beseen to what extent theseannouncements are actuallyimplemented.

In Hungary there are four associationsof soldiers that aggregate and representthe interests of (former) servicemen: theAssociation of Hungarian Servicemen(HOSZ), the Trade Union for CivilianEmployees (HODOSZ), the Union ofTroop Soldiers (CSESZ) and theNational Association of ComradeSoldiers (BEOSZ). As an associationwith the rights of a trade union, HOSZrepresents the most important of theseassociations. While regionalcommanders were almost exclusivelyoccupied with the effects of downsizingin the early 1990s, the soldiersassociations pressed for financialcompensation, retraining and jobprocurement (Urbani, 1998a; Urbani,1998b). In order to alleviate the effectsof downsizing, these associations tookpart in regular meetings at a forumattended by the military command ofthe central and regional levels.Furthermore, the HOSZ is regularly

involved in the setting-up andoperation of regional Committees forthe Promotion of Job Seekers (MEB).The personnel department of theMinistry of Defense also contacts theofficer associations on a regular basis.

However, despite their tangible impact,the representatives of HOSZ complainthat their criticism and proposals are nottaken into consideration seriously by theMinistry of Defense and regionalmilitary commanders.

Box 7: Goals ofBox 7: Goals ofBox 7: Goals ofBox 7: Goals ofBox 7: Goals offuture restructuringfuture restructuringfuture restructuringfuture restructuringfuture restructuring

The 10-year plan aims at a concentrationof forces to compensate for reductionsin personnel; the outsourcing offunctions carried out by superfluous oruneconomic institutions; a reduction ofpersonnel in the support services andwithin command structures; a change inthe type of training given to officersand non-commissioned officers; and animprovement in working and livingconditions (Magyar Honved, “Reform2000–2010,” No. 49, 8 December 2000,p. 5; Magyar Honved, No. 49, 8 December2000).

The first stage of the 10-year Plan(2000–2003) concentrates on changes inthe location of troops, as well as in theway troops are composed, and animprovement in service conditions.With an end to the radical downsizingof the previous period, it is hoped thatinsecurity of status will be reduced andthat military service will become moreattractive for the young.

The aim of the second stage (2004–2006) is to increase the combat capacitiesof the armed forces along with theirability to operate in conjunction withNATO.

The main goal of the third stage (2007–2010) consists in the technologicalmodernization of the armed forces,hand-in-hand with furtherimprovements in the qualification ofpersonnel.

The general aim of the 10-year Plan isto actually fill the positions planned, to

achieve healthier proportions betweenthe various command structures andsubordinate ranks, and to reducepersonnel in the support services. Thusthe future structure of the armed forceswill affect the composition and size ofthe various branches, the actual meetingof planned troop strengths, thestructure of command and trooplocations, and the proportions allottedto certain ranks.

The transformation of the Hungarianarmy from one with compulsorymilitary service to a voluntary orprofessional army is still under dispute.Through its new policy, the governmenthopes to create the factual preconditionsfor a professional army over the planned10-year period. The reduction of theservice time for recruits from 9 to 6months is in line with this. The decisionto join NATO clearly reversed thedecade-long decline in militaryexpenditures, and further increases areenvisaged. According to the 10-yearPlan, financial means will be extendedby increasing the military budget and bysaving money through troopreductions, the concentration ofinfrastructure and personnel,outsourcing of non-military tasks, andthe privatization of real estate andservices. While there is general supportfor the military reform plan among theparties in parliament, against thebackdrop of increasing poverty in thepopulace and the substantial costs ofpreparing for EU membership, critics arenonetheless beginning to voice concernsover the extent of military expenditurescompared to the means set aside forother pressing transition tasks.

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ConclusionsConclusionsConclusionsConclusionsConclusions

When compared to the other countriescovered in this report, it becomesapparent the Hungarian labor market isin a position to absorb a high share oflaid-off officers. The number ofsoldiers voluntarily leaving the forces iscorrespondingly high. Moreover,comparing the numbers of dismissedofficers or NCOs in Hungary with thosein Russia, Ukraine or Poland, the needfor reintegration measures appears lesspressing. Furthermore, a cultural factormay have shaped the Hungarian low-keyapproach—among the countries understudy here, the importance of themilitary for the collective nationalidentity of Hungary seems to beinsignificant. Given the low ranking ofdemobilization on the transitionagenda, interministerial cooperation wasnot launched till the fall of 2000,though the main responsibility restedwith the regional Committees for thePromotion of Job Seekers. Theirservices concentrated on career advice,but did not include a package ofvocational retraining courses specified tothe needs of laid-off officers andregional or local business. TheHungarian government evidently neverapplied for foreign funding; neither didit attract business funding for retraining.

45B·I·C·C

summarysummarysummarysummarysummary

1. The future structure and tasks ofthe armed forces must beexplicitly defined. Support forreintegration and clear decisionson the part of civilian authoritiesare necessary.As long as the future tasks andstructure of the armed forces remainblurred, manpower is usuallyretained in the military withoutactually having a clear function. Dueto the minor relevance of militarypolitics for party competition andelectoral campaigns, awareness ofreintegration issues remains thedomain of the militaryestablishment which commonlylacks proper guidance from thecivilian sections of the government,including parliament. One of thekey problems in demobilization andreintegration is the postponementof hard decisions, causing a lastingsense of unpredictability as well aspsychological and moral hazards forofficers subject to demobilization.

2. The Ministries of Defense mustplay a critical role.In institutional terms it is obviousthat the Ministries of Defense mustplay a key role in preparing,implementing and adjustingreintegration measures. Specialadministrative units withappropriate funding for theduration of the reintegrationprogram together with qualifiedmanpower must be set up toimplement reintegration policies,particularly the retraining of, and jobcreation for, redundant officers. It isimperative that the Ministries ofDefense cooperate closely with otherministries involved in thereintegration measures (Finance,Labor, Social Affairs, Education)and with regional and local laboroffices.

3. It is important to establishcoordinating bodies.Central agencies at the ministeriallevel are necessary for projectinitiation, coordination, theexchange of information andmonitoring. To facilitate adjustment,special interministerial coordinatingbodies for reintegration should poolexperiences gathered at regional andlocal levels, together with expertisein the assessment of qualifications,vocational training, and job-marketrequirements. It should be their tasknot merely to establish informationnetworks and to encourage aconstant flow of information, butalso to prevent hierarchies in theaccess to information fromdeveloping. These coordinatingbodies would be responsible forguaranteeing regular evaluation ofprogram implementation and thegeneralization of insights intosuccesses and failures. A combinedmilitary-civilian authority is aprerequisite. It is not advisable toleave reintegration measures tomilitary institutions alone—neitherto the Ministry of Defense nor toregional commands. Such militaryinstitutions usually lack properinformation on labor marketrequirements, instruments ofeconomic promotion and retrainingskills.

4. Reintegration programs must beregularly evaluated by indepen-dent institutes.Independent institutes mustregularly evaluate the viability ofreintegration programs, weighingthem up against their aspirationsand objectives. Furthermore,constant and independentevaluation is required in order toprevent misuse of funds. The wayreintegration authorities areorganized should be derived fromtheir tasks and objectives as well as

from a balance of assets and needs,rather than being decided from thetop down.

5. Retraining is best organized andconducted at the regional andlocal levels.As a rule, flexible and decentralizedapproaches which not only respondpromptly to changes in regionalmarket requirements but arecombined with regional structuralpolicies are preferable to control bycentral agencies which do not haveregional implementation capacities.Retraining is best conducted at aregional and local level where thespecific characteristics of thedownsizing pattern, the local jobmarket, and the opportunities forjob creation can be taken intoaccount. Close cooperation withregional employment offices, jobplacement agencies and vocationaltraining centers is therefore key.Regional coordinating units thatbring together regional militarycommanders, regionaladministrations and the agenciesinvolved in retraining or jobcreation—including small businessincubators—should be set up.Regional administrations canencourage job creation by providingassistance in the establishment ofsmall and medium-sizedenterprises, for example throughencouraging the setting up ofbusiness parks or by providing taxbenefits, public services or premisesat reduced prices. Job placementnecessitates close links with potentialemployers. Job fairs, vocationaltraining on-the-job, and support inthe establishment of small andmedium-sized enterprises areinstruments that should already betaken into consideration at theplanning stage.

Summary andSummary andSummary andSummary andSummary andRecommendationsRecommendationsRecommendationsRecommendationsRecommendations

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6. Individual responsibility isessential.Ex-servicemen should beencouraged to take on responsibilityfor themselves. They cannot beexempted from the marketpressures faced by other socialgroups. Generally speaking it seemsnecessary to change both the imageof, and approach to, military service:no longer can it be treated as alifetime profession and officers orNCOs should be made aware ofthis fact from the outset. It isadvisable that serviceman areprepared as early as possible for theeventuality of a post-military career.

7. Soldiers should be prepared forthe eventuality of a post-militarycareer and given appropriatetraining while in the military.One of the findings of this studyhighlights the key importance ofproper information on, and thetiming of, retraining measures. Itwould be best if preparation forpost-military professional life beganduring military service, commencingas early as possible and concentratingon transferable and marketablequalifications. The Czech Republicseems to be the only EasternEuropean country where retrainingis undertaken before actual dischargefrom the armed forces. Servicemenwho have been prepared forreintegration psychologically andvocationally as early as possible farebetter on the job market while aprotracted break with the militaryinhibits later reintegration. In certaincases, reintegration must beaccompanied by special psychologicalassistance, supportive measures forfamilies and, very often, a specifichousing policy.

8. Servicemen must besystematically trained in skillswhich are in demand on themarket.Not all discharged officers needassistance but, for those who do,help should be customized, that is,it must be made to fit the particularrequirements an officer, or group of

officers, might have. Part of thetoolkit facilitating the reintegrationprocess should be a systematic andregular assessment of themarketable personal strengths andqualifications of the target group aswell as a sober look at weaknesses(for example, low problem-solvingcapacities or hierarchical thinking)coupled with possible strategies toovercome these. It is striking that, intheir self-assessment, theoverwhelming majority of laid-offofficers think that they acquiredadvantageous or transferable skillsduring their service time. It wouldtherefore seem advisable to assesstransferable skills moresystematically during the last stageof military service, not least in orderto give officers a stronger sense ofcontrol over their own lives and toovercome tendencies towardspassivity. Post-military jobprocurement should makeconscious use of transferable andmarketable secondary skills such asself-discipline and persistence, skillsin human resource management,punctuality, a sense of duty,leadership skills, proficiency andadditional degrees, for example inforeign languages, technical skills,legal knowledge and computer skills.

9. Reintegration needs a stronglegal base.Successful reintegration requirespredictability of military career pathsand of the post-military benefitpackage. A professional career in themilitary ought to be perceived,organized and legally guaranteed as atemporary occupation presupposinglater civilian employment.Parliaments are called upon toprovide legislative security for andcontrol of the implementation oflegal acts. Mechanisms such aslimiting service age and financialincentives can be but two of manycomponents essential to thereintegration process. In certain casesthe pension system actually

discourages post-military jobsearches, either because jobacquisition is ‘punished’ by totalloss of pension entitlements orbecause pensions are too high.Instead, the military pension systemshould begin to reward post-military job acquisition and must beflexibly adjusted, taking age andworking ability into account. Attimes, pension entitlements couldbe substituted by financial supportfor retraining, job searches andrelocation during the critical interimperiod.

10. Solid financing is a prerequisite.As most reintegration measureshave suffered from insufficient ordiscontined finances, it must nowbe recognized that reintegrationsupport necessitates financialbacking for the complete plannedduration of the downsizing effort.Non-governmental funding mostlycame from foreign actors, with fewattempts made to systematicallyinvolve potential national employersor to attract private financing ofreintegration measures.

11. Financial means should godirectly to beneficiaries.Financial means should be geared atdirect beneficiaries to prevent NGOsor other agencies from consumingmost of the money allocated toreintegration. Retraining agenciesshould be chosen on a competitivebasis, evaluated regularly, andrewarded for job-placementsuccesses and for their flexibility inmeeting real needs. A fixed, transpa-rent, and accountable ratio betweenmanagement costs and the cost ofretraining beneficiaries is aprerequisite.

12. The importance of anorchestrated job-creation effort.Demobilization itself, along withthe accompanying training seminars,provides no real assistance todischarged personnel unless backedup by an orchestrated job-creationeffort. The scope of the conversion

47B·I·C·C

summarysummarysummarysummarysummary

measures adopted should stemfrom local needs and opportunities,from the situation on the labormarket, and from its capability toabsorb the qualified workforce.Coaching into a new career shouldtake into consideration the existingniches in the labor market and be inline with medium- and long-termregional development strategies.Not only should newcomers to thelabor market be recognized asqualified former soldiers, but theiremployers should also assess thevalue of their qualifications beforethey are discharged from service.

13. Democratic education should bea facet of military service and ofreintegration programs.Among former officers, there hasbeen a widespread sense offrustration over post-socialistdemocratic experiences, along withthe strong feeling that theirgovernments were indifferent tothese problems. Even if criticism ofdemocracy reveals only latent anti-democratic leanings, its veryexistence nevertheless highlights thenecessity of enhancing efforts toimprove democratic educationduring military service. There is avalid reason for this: officers whogrew up under socialism and servedfor decades in the armed forces lackthe democratic experience of civilianlife. It would therefore be advisableto include political reeducation ofofficers in the so-called ‘retrainingkit’ in order to help dischargedservicemen differentiate betweenunconsolidated democracies anddemocracy per se.

14. Officer associations should beencouraged to play an active rolein all aspects of reintegration.The absence of a corporate identityand of organized protest amongformer officers may be seen asfavorable as long as it preventsundue military intervention intopolitics; on the other hand, it is also

a sign of collective passivity. Theprice for the absence ofpraetorianism, authoritarianism ormarked nationalism is nonethelesspaternalism and isolation of theindividual. In order to overcomesuch paternalistic patterns and thelack of individual problem-solvingabilities caused by a long servicetime, reintegration policies shouldempower officer associations to playan active role in all facets ofreintegration, not least in order tocreate a feedback mechanism for thegovernment.

15. External assistance is of crucialimportance.External assistance has been ofcrucial importance. Quite oftenreintegration was only initiated afterfinancial contributions were madeavailable from abroad. TheEuropean Union’s TACIS program,NATO, individual NATO countriesand NGOs such as the SorosFoundation have been active insupporting reintegration in oneform or another. However, up tothe present time, the exchange ofinformation and coordinationbetween the various programs hasbeen limited. In order to makenational and international programsmore available to the public, thesuggestion has been made to buildup a special website and an electronicnewsletter encouraging the exchangeof information.

16. Reintegration must be linked tolocal needs and the promotion ofregional economies, in particularafter the closure of militarybases.Very often, closing down militarybases and dismissing militarypersonnel affect not only individualpeople but entire towns andregions. It is therefore vital thatprojects are designed to take accountof local needs and to help establishan infrastructure which will supportthe economic existence of the regiononce the military facilities haveclosed. Very often reintegration of

personnel is linked to the fate ofclosed garrison-towns. Reintegrationpolicies should thus be organized insuch a way that they incorporateefforts to convert military bases, forinstance, by using infrastructures forjob creation programs, including thepromotion of small and medium-sized enterprises.

48 B·I·C·C


Adamsons, Janis, Member ofParliament (Saeima), Commission

of National Security, Latvia.

Aksionov, Gennadiy, Colonel,Executive Head of the Ukrainianretraining program for ex-officers(“Renaissance Foundation”), financedby the Open Society Foundation.

Angyal, Istvan, Ministry of Defense,Head of the Department on HumanResources, Budapest, Hungary.

Babos, Tibor, Dr, Ministry of Defense,NATO Department, Budapest,Hungary.

Brugetajs, Janis, University of Riga,Department of History, Latvia.

Bystrytsky, Yevhen, InternationalRenaissance Foundation, Kiev bureau,Ukraine.

Czylyk, Julian, First Secretary, OSCEMission in Riga, Latvia.

Damiani, Enzo, TACIS long-termexpert in Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine.

Degeratu, Constantin, General, formerMinister of Defense, Bucharest,Romania.

Dimitrov, Dimitar, Professor Dr,University of National and WorldEconomy, Department of National andRegional Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria.

Dragsdahl, Jorgen, freelance journalist,Copenhagen, Denmark.

Duray, Michel, Dr, NATO EconomicDepartment (Brussels), currently NATOrepresentative for Ukraine, Kiev.

Fedasz, Mariam, Ministry of Defense,Department of Social Affairs, Warsaw,Poland.

Garrido, Francisko, Dr, Director of theVinnitski Technopark, Vinnica, Ukraine.

Giermakowski, Lech, Professor Dr,Wyzsa Szkola Spoleczno-Ekonomiczna,Warsaw.

Grytsenko, Anatoliy, Dr, Director ofthe Ukrainian Center for Economic andPolitical Studies, Kiev.

Heidenhain, Stephan, First Secretary ofthe OSCE Mission, Tallinn, Estonia.

Hemsley, Jack, Russian ResettlementProject, Directorate for Central andEastern Europe, Ministry of Defence,London.

Hobster, R., EU TACIS ProgramOfficer, Brussels, Belgium.

Ivanov, Viktor, Department Head at theNational Coordinating Center for theSocial Adaptation of MilitaryServicemen, Cabinet of Ministers, Kiev,Ukraine.

Jacobi, Frank, Dr, EU TACIS long-term expert in Kiev, Ukraine.

Jundzis, Talavs, Dr habil, formerMinister of Defense, Latvia, currentlyDirector of the Baltic Center for StrategicStudies, Latvian Academy of Sciences.

Kaminski, Anton, Professor Dr, PolishChapter of Transparency International,Warsaw, Poland.

Keresztes, Lajos, Dr, Eötvös LorándUniversity in Budapest, Hungary.

Keruss, Janis, Ph.D. candidate,University of Riga, Department ofHistory, Latvia.

Keson, Tadeusz, Dr, GovernmentCenter for Strategic Studies, Departmentfor Defense Affairs in Warsaw.

Kirch, Aksel, Dr, Director of theInstitute for European Studies,Estonian Academy of Sciences, Tallinn,Estonia.

Korsun, Oleksandr M., Head of theRegional Center for Employment inDnepropetrovsk, Ukraine.

Korynski, Piotr, Open Society Institute,New York, Director of Economic andBusiness Development Program.

Koscielecki, Lech, Colonel, Dr,Ministry of Defense, Head of theDepartment of Social Affairs, Warsaw,Poland.

Kovtun, Sergeiy, Retired Colonel,Director of Ukrtourservice, Kiev,Ukraine.

Krivenko, Aleksander, Retired Colonel,former member of the General Staff,member of the Mezhdunarodnyi TsentrOfitserov v Zapase, Kiev, Ukraine.

Kurek, Jan, Major, Ministry of Defense,Department of Transatlantic Relations,Warsaw, Poland.

Lejins, Atis, Head of Latvian Instituteof International Affairs, Riga, Latvia.

List of Interview PList of Interview PList of Interview PList of Interview PList of Interview Partnersartnersartnersartnersartnersand Pand Pand Pand Pand Persons whoersons whoersons whoersons whoersons whoprovided Information forprovided Information forprovided Information forprovided Information forprovided Information forPPPPPreparing this Reportreparing this Reportreparing this Reportreparing this Reportreparing this Report

49B·I·C·C

Lukk, Toomas, Head of Department,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn,Estonia.

Milder, Kirk, Dr, Head of the Office ofthe Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Kiev,Ukraine.

Mirchev, Angel, Professor Dr, CMPConsulting, Varna, Bulgaria.

Molnar, Ferenc, Dr, Miklos ZrinyiNational Defense University, Budapest,Hungary.

Myrttinen, Henri, Project management,military site conversion, Bonn Interna-tional Center for Conversion, Germany.

Nassauer, Otfried, Director of theBerliner Informationszentrum für Transat-lantische Sicherheit, Berlin (BITS),Germany.

Noorkoiv, Tiit, Ministry of Defence,Director of the Department of Defence,Policy and Planning, Tallinn, Estonia.

Orzali, Achille, EU TACIS Officer,Brussels, Belgium.

Pocheptsov, Georgiy, Professor Dr,Institute for International Relations,University of Kiev, Ukraine.

Podnebesny, Jurii Vladimirovich, SocialServices for Military Pensioners at theRussian Embassy in Latvia

Pogrebniak, Viktor, Retired Colonel,Executive Director of the RegionalCenter for Employment in Kiev,Ukraine.

Polyakov, Leonid, Dr, Director forMilitary Programmes at the UkrainianCenter for Economic and PoliticalStudies, Kiev, Ukraine.

Poti, Laszlo, Dr, Miklos Zrinyi NationalDefence University, Budapest, Hungary.

Rudolph, Wolfgang, Professor Dr,GOPA Consultants, Bad Homburg,Germany.

Schibria, Olga, Local ExpertEmployment, EU TACIS program,Kiev, Ukraine.

Schröder, Hans-Henning, ProfessorDr, Bremen University, ForschungsstelleOsteuropa, Germany.

Shikalov, Aleksander, Colonel,Chairman of the National CoordinatingCenter at the Cabinet of Ministers inUkraine.

Slobodyanyuk, Sergeiy Mikhailovich,Vice Director of the KhmelnitskiiRegional Center of Employment,Ukraine.

Smolanski, Oles, Dr, Professor ofPolitical Science, Lehigh University,Pennsylvania, United States.

Sourkov, Aleksander, Retired Colonel,Manager of the Uzin Airfield, Ukraine.

Stanczyk, Jerzy, Dr, Instytut StudiowPoliticznych, Polish Academy ofSciences, Warsaw, Poland.

Szabo, Janos, Dr, former Vice-ministerof Defense, Budapest, Hungary.

Tolson, Rebecca, Open Society Institute,New York, Economic and BusinessDevelopment Program, United States.

Tsilevich, Boriss, Deputy of theLatvian Parliament (Saeima), HumanRights and Public Affairs Committee.

Vaares, Peter, Professor at EuropeanUniversity, Tallinn, Estonia.

Viksne, Ilmars, Head of the LatvianMilitary Academy, Riga, Latvia.

Voicehovics, Stanislavs, Lt. Colonel,Chief of Military Personnel Division,Ministry of Defense, Riga, Latvia.

Wellmann, Arend, Dr, Berliner Informati-onszentrum für Transatlantische Sicherheit,Berlin, Germany.

Yasniuk, Tatiana, NationalCoordinating Center (NCC) at theCabinet of Ministers, Kiev, Ukraine.

Zalkalns, Gundars, Colonel, formerExecutive Head of the National SecurityCouncil, Riga, Latvia.

Zukrowska, Katarzyna, Professor Dr,Warsaw School of Economics, Poland.

intervierw partnersintervierw partnersintervierw partnersintervierw partnersintervierw partners

50 B·I·C·C


1) Personal background: Age, yearsin service, rank, qualifications,original reason for becoming aprofessional soldier, years afterleaving the army, times ofunemployment/occupation afterleaving the army, currentoccupation.

2) Was your original expectation forbecoming a professional soldiermatched by your actualexperience in the army?

3) Reasons for leaving the army:health reasons, dismissal, earlyretirement, voluntary discharge

4) In the case of voluntary discharge,what were the prime motives fordoing so? What were yourexpectations?

5) Which qualifications and skillsacquired in the military provedto be useful for civil occupation?

6) Which qualifications and skillsacquired in the military provedto be disadvantageous for civiloccupation?

7) Did you discuss your decision toleave the army with yourcomrades? How did discussionsinfluence your decision-making?

8) Name at least three majorreintegration difficulties afterleaving service.

9) How did you overcome thesedifficulties or do they persist?

10) Whom did you expect to helpand assist you in overcomingreintegration problems?

11) What kind of assistance inreintegration (finding a job, newapartment, retraining) did thearmy, the government, the localcommunity or regionaladministration provide?

12) What were the reactions by thoseagencies you addressed withyour problems? How could theyhave helped you better inshifting from a military to a civilcareer (what are you the leastcontent with in terms ofgovernmental, militaryassistance)?

13) What additional qualificationsdid you acquire after leavingservice?

14) Did you ever regret the decisionto leave the army?

15) Would you recommend that yourson or male relatives embark ona military career?

16) How do you see the prestige andstanding of the contemporaryarmy of your country comparedto the socialist past (ten yearsago)? Do you think its role inpolitics and society hasdiminished or increased?

17) Did your political worldviewsand party preferences changeafter leaving service? If so, whatwere significant changes thatcome to your mind?

18) How frequently do you still keepin contact with formercomrades?

19) Did you join any association offormer officers? If so, what kindof benefits does this associationprovide for you?

20) If you look back at the time afterleaving the army, do you thinkyour life improved or worsened?Give reasons.

21) If you look forward, five yearsahead, do you think you will livebetter or worse than currently?

22) If you had to assess the positiveand negative experiences of thesystem change since the early1990s, what prevails (positive,negative)?

23) Do you think that an armygeneral would fit better forruling the country and solvingits problems than an electeddemocratic government?

24) What do you dislike most aboutthe democratic form ofgovernment in your country?

25) Do you think that closecooperation with NATO is agood or a bad thing? Givereasons.

Appendix: QuestionnaireAppendix: QuestionnaireAppendix: QuestionnaireAppendix: QuestionnaireAppendix: Questionnairefor Interviews withfor Interviews withfor Interviews withfor Interviews withfor Interviews withDemobilized OfficersDemobilized OfficersDemobilized OfficersDemobilized OfficersDemobilized Officers

51B·I·C·C

ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US State Department

BEOSZ National Association of Comrade Soldiers (Hungarian Army)

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CITE Pilot Project of Re-conversion of the Nysa Garrison into the Center of Innovation,Technology ad Education (Poland)

CSESZ Union of Troop Soldiers (Hungarian Army)

CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington)

EU European Union

FAR Foundation for Professional Activation (Poland)

GDP Gross domestic product

GDR German Democratic Republic

HODOSZ Trade Union for Civilian Employees (Hungarian Army)

HOSZ Association of Hungarian Servicemen

IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

IFSA International Fund for Social Adaptation

ITC Interregional Training Center (Ukraine)

KGB Former Soviet Secret Service

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

MEB Committees for the Promotion of Job Seekers (Hungary)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NCC National Coordinating Center for the Social Adaptation of Servicemenunder the Cabinet of Ministers (Ukraine)

NCO Non-commissioned officer

NGO Non-governmental organization

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PONARS Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (CSIS, United States)

PPR Program for Promotion of Reemployment (Hungary)

PZPR Polish socialist party

RCE Regional Center for Employment (Ukraine)

RMP Retraining of the Military program (Renaissance Foundation, Ukraine)

SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises

TACIS Technical assistance to CIS countries

UAUZV Ukrainian Association of Professional Reserve Officers

List of SelectedList of SelectedList of SelectedList of SelectedList of SelectedAcronymsAcronymsAcronymsAcronymsAcronymsand Abbreviationsand Abbreviationsand Abbreviationsand Abbreviationsand Abbreviations

acronyms &acronyms &acronyms &acronyms &acronyms &abbreviationsabbreviationsabbreviationsabbreviationsabbreviations

52 B·I·C·C


Agocs, Sandor. 1997. “A DispiritedArmy.” In Anton A. Bebler, ed. Civil-Military Relations in Post-CommunistStates. Central and Eastern Europe inTransition. Westport, London:Praeger, pp. 86–92.

Amato, Giuliano and Judy Batt. 1999.The Long-Term Implications of EUEnlargement: The Nature of the NewBorder. Florence, Italy: RobertSchuman Centre for AdvancedStudies, European UniversityInstitute.

Antonenko, Oksana. 2000. The SocialCost of Russian Military Reform:Redefining Priorities for US Assistance.Program on New Approaches to RussianSecurity (PONARS). Policy MemoSeries. Memo No. 152. InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies,London, November.

Asmus, Ronald D. and Robert C.Nurick. 1996. “NATO Enlargementand the Baltic States.” Survival, No. 2(Summer), pp. 121–142.

Bebler, Anton A. 1997. “TheRegionwide Perspective on Post-Communist Civil-Military Relations.”In Bebler, ed. 1997, pp. 65–76.

________, ed. 1997, Civil-MilitaryRelations in Post-Communist States.Central and Eastern Europe in Transi-tion. Westport, London: Praeger.

Berzins, Indulis. 1999. “Latvia’sMembership: Good for Latvia,Good for NATO.” NATO’s Nationsand Partners for Peace, Special Issue,NATO pp. 56–57.

Bleiere, Daina. 1995. “Ukraine’s Integra-tion with Central and EasternEurope: The Potential for RegionalCooperation.” In Lena Johnson, ed.Ukraine and Integration in the East.Economic, Military, and Military-Industrial Relations. Swedish Institutefor International Affairs, pp. 81–89.

Boguszakova, Magda, Ivan Gabal,Endre Hann, Piotr Starzynski andEva Taracova. 1996. “PublicAttitudes in Four Central EuropeanCountries.” In Richard Smoke, ed.Perceptions of Security. Public Opinionand Expert Assessment in Europe’s NewDemocracies. Manchester and NewYork: Manchester University Press,pp. 33–54.

Bonn International Center forConversion. 2001. Conversion Survey2001. Global Disarmament,Demilitarization and Demobilization.Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Danopoulos, Constantine and AdemCopani. 1997. “The Role of theMilitary in Post-Totalitarian Albania.”In Bebler, 1997, pp. 110–116.

Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner,eds. 1996. Civil-Military Relations andDemocracy. Baltimore and London:Johns Hopkins University Press, xvi.

Dragsdahl, Jorgen. 1999. “Demobilisa-tion in Poland 1989–99.” DefenceReview Committee Assessments of Plansof Poland. Warsaw and Berlin:Berliner Informationszentrum fürTransatlantische Sicherheit (BITS).

________. 1999. “Demobilisation inPoland 1989–99”. Unpublishedreport for the Berliner Informations-zentrum für TransatlantischeSicherheit, Berlin.

Ebaugh, Helen. 1988. Becoming an Ex:The Process of Role Exit. Chicago:University of Chicago Press.

Erikson, Erik H. 1973. Identität undLebenszyklus. Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp.

Giermakowski, Lech. 1999. “Informa-tion about the System of PolishMilitary Forces PersonnelReconversion.” Unpublished Memo.Government Centre for StrategicStudies, Department for DefenseStudies. Warsaw, February.

Giermakowski, Lech and TadeuszKeson. 2002. “The Post-socialistDemobilization of Poland’s ArmedForces.” In Heinemann-Grüder,2002, pp. 10–22.

Giessmann, Hans-Joachim, ed. 1997.Handbuch Sicherheit 1997. Militär undSicherheit in Mitteleuropa im Spiegel derNATO-Erweiterung. Daten-Fakten-Analysen. Baden-Baden: NomosVerlagsgesellschaft.

Giessmann, Hans-Joachim and GustavE. Gustenau, eds. 2001. SecurityHandbook 2001: Security and Militaryin Central and Eastern Europe. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Glantz, David M. 1998. “MilitaryTraining and Education Challengesin Poland, the Czech Republic, andHungary.” Journal of Slavic MilitaryStudies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September),pp. 1–55.

Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas. 2002. TheMilitary in Transition: Restructuringand Downsizing the Armed Forces ofEastern Europe. Brief 25. Bonn:BICC, August.

Hemsley, Jack. 2001a. Ministry of Defenceof the United Kingdom. RussianMilitary Resettlement Project (as of 31May 2001). Paper prepared for theBICC Seminar Demobilization andthe Build-up of Armed Forces inEastern Europe. Bonn, Germany, 31May/1 June.

________. 2001b. UK Experience inImplementing a Retraining Programme inRussia. NATO/EAPC Seminar onResettlement. Yalta, Ukraine, 25/26April.

Herd, Graeme P. 1997. “Baltic SecurityPolitics.” Security Dialogue, No. 2(March), pp. 251–253.

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53B·I·C·C

Herspring, Dale, 1994, “Revolution inEastern Europe: The Polish, Czech,Slovak and Hungarian Militaries.”European Security, Vol. 3, No. 4(Winter), pp. 664–690.

Hoppe, Hans-Joachim. 1999. “Geheim-dienste und Sicherheitsstrukturen inPolen, Tschechien und Ungarn.”Osteuropa, No. 9 (September), pp.893–907.

Huntington, Samuel P. “ReformingCivil-Military Relations.” InDiamond and Plattner, eds. Civil-Military Relations and Democracy.Baltimore and London: JohnsHopkins University Press.

Keresztes, Lajos. 2001. “ReintegrationMeasures in Hungary.” Unpublishedreport commissioned by BICC.Budapest.

Knudsen, Olav F. 1998. CooperativeSecurity in the Baltic Sea Region.Chaillot Paper 33. Institute forSecurity Studies, Western EuropeanUnion, November.

Körver-Buschhaus, Harald. 2000.TACIS Tender : Further Support to theRe-employment of Discharged Officers ofthe Armed Forces of Ukraine. RAGBildung GmbH, January.

Koscielecki, Lech. 2001.“Commissioned Report onPersonnel Conversion in Poland.”Ministry of Defense, Department ofSocial Affairs. Unpublished reportcommissioned by BICC. Warsaw,Poland.

Lagunina, Irina. 1999. Russia: NATOExperts Hope For Resumption ofContact With Russia. Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty News Line, 30April.

Luttwak, Edward N. 1999. “FromVietnam to Desert Fox: Civil-MilitaryRelations in Modern Democracies.”Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Spring), pp.99–112.

Magyar Honved, ed. 1999. NationalDefense 1999. Hungarian Ministry ofDefense, Budapest.

Molnar, Ferenc. 2000. “Former MilitaryProfessionals in Hungary.”Unpublished Manuscript. Budapest.

Molnar, Ferenc and Lajos Keresztes.2000. “Reintegration into CivilianLife in Hungary.” Unpublishedreport commissioned by BICC.Budapest, December.

Mukhin, Vladimir. 2001. “SoldiersWorry About Road to Civilian Life.Pending Reform Means Many WillSoon Have to Look for Work.” TheRussia Journal, 11-17 May, 2001.

NATO-Ukrainian Open-ended WorkingGroup on the Retraining of RetiredMilitary Personnel. 1999. Report ofthe Meeting. Kiev, Ukraine, 25/26February.

Nelson, Daniel N. 1998. “Civil Armies,Civil Societies, and NATO’sEnlargement.” Armed Forces andSociety. Vol. 25, No. 1 (Fall), pp. 137–160.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1993.Russian Officer Conversion Programme.OECD/GD (93)9. Paris.

Polyakov, Leonid. 2001.“Commissioned Report on MilitaryRestructuring in Ukraine.” Reportcommissioned by BICC. UkrainianCenter for Economic and PoliticalStudies (UCEPS).

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Ringe, Jörg. 1998. “Kooperationsmög-lichkeit in der Ostsee mit denbaltischen Staaten.” EuropäischeSicherheit. No. 8, pp. 47–50.

Sarvas, Steven. 1999. “ProfessionalSoldiers and Politics: A Case ofCentral and Eastern Europe.” ArmedForces and Society. Vol. 26, No. 1 (Fall),pp. 99–118.

Shikalov. A. S., 2001. Programmypodderzhki demobilizovannykhprofessional’nykh voennosluzhashikh vUkraine. Report by the NationalCoordinating Center (NCC) at theCabinet of Ministers of Ukraine,commissioned by BICC. Kiev,Ukraine.

Simon, Jeffrey. 1995. “Forging a Chainof Civilian Command for Poland’sMilitary.” Transitions, Vol. 1, No. 23,15 December, pp. 37–40.

________. 1997. “Central EuropeanCivil-Military Relations and NATOExpansion.” In Bebler, ed., 1997, pp.123f.

Szabo, Janos. 1999. “Report to theGovernment on the ComprehensiveStrategic Review of the NationalDefence of the Republic ofHungary.” October. Available atwww.//193.6.238.52/mod/rev/report.htm.

________. 2000. “Hungary’s Decision-making in Military Affairs.”Unpublished Report by the Vice-Minister of Defense, commissionedby BICC, Budapest, June.

Szemerkenyi, Reka. Central EuropeanCivil-Military Reforms At Risk: Progressin Establishing Democratic Controls overthe Military Has Not Been Sustained.Adelphi Paper No. 306, pp. 74ff.

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yearbooksyearbooksyearbooksyearbooksyearbooks

Conversion Survey 1996:Global Disarmament, Demilitarization andDemobilization, Oxford University Press,UK, 1996

Conversion Survey 1997:Global Disarmament and Disposal of SurplusWeapons, Oxford University Press, UK,1997

Conversion Survey 1998:Global Disarmament, Defense IndustryConsolidation and Conversion, OxfordUniversity Press, UK, 1998

Conversion Survey 1999:Global Disarmament, Demilitarization andDemobilization. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,Baden-Baden, 1999




BICC disarmament andBICC disarmament andBICC disarmament andBICC disarmament andBICC disarmament andconversion studiesconversion studiesconversion studiesconversion studiesconversion studies

No. 1:Jörn Brömmelhörster (ed.). 2000.Demystifying the Peace Dividend, NomosVerlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden

No. 2:Natalie Pauwels (ed.). 2000. War Force toWork Force: Global Perspectives onDemobilization and Reintegration, NomosVerlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden

No. 3:Jürgen Altmann (Hrsg.). 2000. Dual-use inder Hochtechnologie: Erfahrungen, Strategien undPerspektiven in Telekommunikation undLuftfahrt, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden

No 4:Hartmut Küchle. 2001. Rüstungsindustrie imUmbruch: Strategien deutscherUnternehmen und Ansätze einer europäischenNeuordnung (Arms Industry Restructuring—Ger-man Companies in a New European Setting),Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden

No. 5:Sami Faltas/Joseph Di Chiaro III (eds.).2001. Managing the Remnants of War: Microdis-armament as an Element of Peace-building, No-mos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden

No. 6:Michael Brzoska. 2001. Smart Sanctions: TheNext Steps. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Ba-den-Baden

briefsbriefsbriefsbriefsbriefs

brief 15:Herbert Wulf (ed.), Security Sector Reform,June 2000

brief 16:Herbert Wulf (ed.), Practical Disarmament,August 2000

brief 17:Ksenia Gonchar, Russia’s Defense Industry atthe Turn of the Century, November 2000

brief 18:Peter Batchelor, Jacklyn Cook and PennyMcKenzie, Conversion in South Africa in the1990’s: Defense Downsizing and HumanDevelopment Changes, December 2000

brief 19:Ksenia Gonchar and Thilo Roettger,Assisting Conversion and Company Restructuringin Moldova, September 2001

brief 20:Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and Wolf-Christian Paes, Wag the Dog: The Mobilizationand Demobilization of the Kosovo LiberationArmy, October 2001

Selected PublicationsSelected PublicationsSelected PublicationsSelected PublicationsSelected PublicationsFor a complete list of our publications, please refer towww.bicc.de/publications/.All briefs and papers can be downloaded from this site.

TACIS Project 97-0466. 1999.Recommendations to Officers Who AreLeaving the Army: Preparation toCivilian Life. Guide prepared by theEuropean Commission and theRussian Ministries of Education,Labor and Social Policy and Defense.January (available at:www.konversia.org/pamiatka.htm)

Urbani, Gustav. 1998a. “PersonelleKonversion der Streitkräfte Ungarns1990 bis 1998.” UnpublishedManuscript. Berliner Informations-zentrum für TransatlantischeSicherheit.

________. 1998b. “Streitkräftereformund neue bürgerliche Regierung inUngarn.” DDD-Arbeitspapiere, Vol.44. Dresden.

________. 1999. “Demobilization inHungary 1989–99.” UnpublishedManuscript. Berliner Informations-zentrum für TransatlantischeSicherheit (BITS), Berlin.

________. 2002. “Hungary’s Reformof the Armed Forces.” In Heine-mann-Grüder, 2002, pp. 23–29.

Vlachova, Marie and Stefan Sarvas. 1997.“From the Totalitarian to the Post-Totalitarian Military.” In Bebler, ed.,1997, p. 94.

Wellmann, Arend. 1999.“Demobilization of Armed Forcesin Eastern Europe.” Unpublishedmanuscript. Berliner Informations-zentrum für TransatlantischeSicherheit (BITS), Berlin.

Wiatr, Jerzy J. 1997. “Military Politicsand Society in Poland during theDemocratic Transition.” In Anton A.Bebler, ed. Civil-Military Relations inPost-Communist States. Central andEastern Europe in Transition. West-port, London: Praeger, pp. 77–85.

Wierzynski, Jan. 2001. Lt. Colonel,Reconversion of Personnel in the PolishArmed Forces. Ministry of NationalDefence. Social Affairs Department,Warsaw, April.

55B·I·C·C

brief 21:Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Small States—Big Worries. Choice and Purpose in the SecurityPolicies of the Baltic States, February 2002

brief 22:Corinna Hauswedell and Kris Brown,Burying the Hatchet—The Decommissioning ofParamilitar y Arms in Northern Ireland,March 2002

brief 23:Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold and IsabelleMasson (eds.), Small Arms in the Horn ofAfrica: Challenges, Issues and Perspectives,April 2002

brief 24:Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold and Vanessa A.Farr (eds.), Gender Perspectives on Small Armsand Light Weapons: Regional and InternationalConcerns, July 2002

brief 25:Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (ed.),The Military in Transition: Restructuring andDownsizing the Armed Forces of Eastern Europe,August 2002

brief 26:Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Becoming anEx-military Man: Demobilization andReintegration of Military Professionalsin Eastern Europe, October 2002

reportsreportsreportsreportsreports

report 4:Keith Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer,Restructuring the US Military Bases in Germa-ny: Scope, Impacts and Opportunities, June 1995

report 5:Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma andHerbert Wulf (eds.), Military Conversion forSocial Development, July 1995

report 8:Ulrike Lindemann und JØrgen Klußmann,Konversion militärischer Liegenschaften—Eine welt-weite Herausforderung, Konferenzreportage, Ok-tober 1996

publicationspublicationspublicationspublicationspublications

report 10:Ksenia Gonchar, Research and Development(R&D) Conversion in Russia, May 1997

report 11:Keith Cunningham, Base Closure andRedevelopment in Central and Eastern Europe,July 1997

report 12:Kiflemariam Gebrewold (ed.), ConvertingDefense Resources to Human Development,Conference Proceedings, October 1998

report 13:David DeClerq, Destroying Small Arms andLight Weapons: Survey of Methods and PracticalGuide, April 1999

report 14:Herbert Wulf (ed.), Disarmament and ConflictPrevention in Development Cooperation,Conference Proceedings, February 2000

paperspaperspaperspaperspapers

paper 20:Vanessa Farr, Gendering Demilitarization as aPeacebuilding Tool, June 2002

paper 21:Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska with KeesKingma and Herbert Wulf, Voice and accoun-tability in the security sector, July 2002

paper 22:Dimitar Dimitrov, The Restructuring andConversion of the Bulgarian DefenseIndustry during the Transition Period, July 2002

paper 23:Amanuel Mehreteab, Veteran combatants do notfade away: a comparative study on two demobiliza-tion and reintegration exercises in Eritrea, Sep-tember 2002

paper 24:Isabelle Ioannides, The European RapidReaction Force: Implications for democraticaccountability, September 2002

booksbooksbooksbooksbooks

Michael Brzoska und Werner Voss (eds.).1996. Auswirkungen und Alternativen desEurofighter 2000, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,Baden-Baden

Ulrike Lindemann und Ulrich Schirowski.1996. Truppenabbau und Konversion in NRW,Handbuch für Kommunen

Jörn Brömmelhörster and John Frankenstein(eds.). 1997. Mixed Motives, Uncertain Outco-mes—Defense Conversion in China, Lynne Ri-enner, Boulder, CO

John Hart and Cynthia D. Miller. 1998.Chemical Weapon Destruction in Russia: Politi-cal, Legal and Technical Aspects, Oxford: Ox-ford University Press

Michael Brzoska and Ann Markusen (eds.).2000. Military Industrial Conversion, Specialissue of the International Regional ScienceReview (IRSR), vol. 23, no 1, Sage Publica-tions

Monterey Institute for International Studies(MIIS) and Bonn International Center forConversion (BICC). 2000. Tackling Small Armsand Light Weapons: A Practical Guide for Collec-tion and Destruction

Kees Kingma (ed.). 2000. Demobilization inSub-Saharan Africa; the development and securityimpacts. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press

The Bonn InternationalCenter for Conversion (BICC)

an independent non-profit organizationdedicated to promoting the transfer

of former military resources and assetsto alternative civilian purposes

Published by© BICC, Bonn 2002Bonn International Center for ConversionDirector: Peter J. CrollPublishing Management, Layout: Katharina Moraht &Svenja BendsAn der Elisabethkirche 25D-53113 BonnGermanyPhone +49-228-911960Fax +49-228-241215E-mail: [email protected]: www.bicc.de

ISSN 0947-7322

Printed in GermanyAll rights reserved

he transfer of resources from the militaryto the civilian sector represents both a

social and an economic challenge, as well asoffering an opportunity for the statesconcerned. The sustained process ofdisarmament during the decade following theend of the Cold War has made defense conver-sion an important issue in many countriestoday. This process has now slowed downconsiderably, but the problems faced by thoseaffected are far from solved. BICC’s mainobjective is to make use of the chances offeredby disarmament, whilst at the same timehelping to avoid—or lessen—the negativeeffects.

This issue concerns a number of areas: Whatcan scientists and engineers who were formerlyemployed in weapons labs do today? What isthe fate of the roughly eight million employeeswho lost their jobs in the defense factories?Why are so many defense companies faringbetter today than they did ten years ago? Willall demobilized soldiers or former combatantsfind a future in civilian society? What actionmust communities take when suddenly facedwith the closure of a huge military base? Howdoes one solve the problem of the readyavailability of small arms and light weapons?

It is BICC’s task to tackle these questions, toanalyze them on the basis of scientificresearch, to convey the necessary information,and to give advice to those involved—in short,to manage disarmament.

nternational think tank. BICC conductsresearch and makes policy

recommendations. In-house and externalexperts contribute comparative analyses andbackground studies.

roject management and consultingservices. BICC provides practical

support to public and private organizations.For instance, BICC staff advise localgovernments confronted with the difficult taskof redeveloping former military installations.BICC also combines development assistancewith practical conversion work by helping inthe fields of demobilization, reintegration andpeace-building.

learinghouse. In its capacity as anindependent organization, BICC supports

and assists international organizations,government agencies, nongovernmentalorganizations, companies and the media, aswell as private individuals. It hereby mediatesand facilitates the conversion process at alllevels—local, national and global. BICCcollects and disseminates data and informationon conversion to practitioners in a wide rangeof fields and institutions. BICC strives to reachresearchers and practitioners as well asparliamentarians, the media, and the generalpublic by means of a variety of tools includingits library, its extensive on-line documentationservices and its internet service (www.bicc.de).Furthermore, the Center documents the courseof disarmament and conversion in its annualconversion surveys and produces a variety ofpublications.

The Bonn International Center for Conversionwas established in 1994 with generous supportfrom the State of North Rhine-Westphalia(NRW). The Center’s Trustees include the twoGerman states of North Rhine-Westphalia andBrandenburg as well as the Landesbank Nord-rhein-Westfalen and the Landesentwicklungsge-sellschaft NRW (LEG).

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