BRIDGING THE GAP: Transforming Knowledge into Action ... · portance of communication and...

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BRIDGING THE GAP: Transforming Knowledge into Action through Gaming and Simulation Proceedings of the 35th Conference of the International Simulation and Gaming Association, Munich, 2004 Edited by Thomas Eberle, Willy Christian Kriz, Matthias Puschert & Fabian Glötzner

Transcript of BRIDGING THE GAP: Transforming Knowledge into Action ... · portance of communication and...

BRIDGING THE GAP:

Transforming Knowledge into Action through

Gaming and Simulation

Proceedings of the 35th Conference of the

International Simulation and Gaming Association,

Munich, 2004

Edited by Thomas Eberle, Willy Christian Kriz, Matthias Puschert & Fabian Glötzner

BRIDGING THE GAP: Transforming Knowledge into Action through Gaming and Simulation

Proceedings of the 35th Conference of the International Simulation and Gaming Association, Munich, 2004

Edited by Thomas Eberle, Willy Christian Kriz, Matthias Puschert & Fabian Glötzner

Design and Layout: Adrian Döge

Copyright and Publisher: SAGSAGA – Swiss Austrian German Simulation And Gaming Association; (Gesellschaft für Planspiele in Deutschland Öster-reich und in der Schweiz e.V.); Munich, Germany; www.sagsaga.org

ISBN: 3-00-013989-3

No parts of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electron-ic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

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MS ANTWERPEN: A Simulation for Emergency Management Training

STEFAN STROHSCHNEIDER

1. IntroductionEmergency management is a highly demanding process that requires a num-ber of competencies on the side of those that are to become members of an emergency management team. Both the literature on emergency manage-ment training (Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, & Volpe, 1995; Prince & Salas, 2000) and the literature on the improvement of complex problem solving (Dörner & Schaub, 1992; Funke, 1995; Keys, Fulmer, & Stumpf, 1996) point to several important dimensions. Prominent among these is “team-work” which includes communication, group decision-making, leadership and team management, maintenance of interpersonal relations, and shared situational awareness. Another dimension would be the development of gen-eral “emergency skills” (Skriver & Flin, 1997) like goal and task analysis, assertiveness and “background control”, strategic and tactical adaptability and flexibility, and performance and feedback monitoring (Ramnarayan, Strohschneider, & Schaub, 1997). Other authors stress “adaptive coordina-tion” as a central requirement in critical situations (Dörner, 1996; Entin & Serfaty, 1999) and suggest strategies to increase adaptive coordination like preplanning, use of idle periods, favouring information transmission over action/task coordination, anticipation of information needs, and dynamic redistribution of workload among team members. Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Milanovich (1999) argue for the critical importance of the develop-ment of shared mental models in emergency decision-making.

During the last two or three decades, the design of training programs appears to increasingly acknowledge the importance of what has been called “soft skills” when it comes to emergency management “staff work” that focuses on plan-ning, coordinating, and monitoring operative procedures (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). One reason behind this development is the increasing im-portance of communication and coordination within and between emergency management teams (Schaafstal, Johnston, & Oser, 2001). “Staff work” in this area poses quite different requirements than those faced by the operational personnel directly facing the emergency. Another reason behind this develop-ment is the growing insight that crises and emergencies have the tendency not to behave as they were conceived during emergency planning. In the actual situation, concrete emergency plans often are of limited help and unspecific problem solving abilities become important. Evaluation studies (Entin & Ser-faty, 1999; Stout et al, 1999; Salas, Fowlkes, Stout, Milanovich, & Prince, 1999), although still rare, have generally supported the claims with respect to the ef-fectiveness of training programs that are based on this framework.

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2. Scope and goals of the trainingQuite naturally, work in this area has concentrated on high-risk environ-ments where all sorts of un-normal states of operation, crises and outright emergencies have to be calculated. In these fields there is a general awareness of the dangers involved and the staff usually are equipped with knowledge about emergency procedures. In contrast, the training approach that is de-veloped in this paper is aimed at people working in low risk environments like hospitals, or hotels. Here, the awareness of potential dangers is generally low. Emergency plans are rarely updated and even mandatory emergency procedures are treated quite ‘step-motherly’. Although there may be well-trained operational forces (like security personnel or in-house fire-brigades), the integration and coordination of operational measures (fire fighting, evacuations, and so on) with administrative tasks and information man-agement remains wanting (Klimpe, 2001). These requirements of successful emergency management are usually the task of a staff which, in low risk environments, is often ad-hoc, ill-defined and with very limited knowledge about appropriate emergency management procedures. Since “low risk envi-ronment” doesn’t mean “no-risk environment” such organisations are often overtaxed when the unthinkable happens.

Combining this perspective with practical considerations, the training pro-gramme was to meet a number of different requirements. Due to the diver-sity of potential trainees it should require no special skills or knowledge – neither with respect to technical background, nor with respect to organiza-tional procedures. The training should aim at improving general competen-cies and strategies as well as insights into the necessary flexibility required by the dynamics of typical emergencies. The training, therefore, should focus on both team competencies and on strategic approaches in dealing with uncertainty, time pressure and dynamic developments as well as prob-lems of handling and processing of information in stressful situations as described in the literature on complex problem solving. In order to achieve these goals, the training should combine elements of experiential learning (cf. Kolb, Boyatzis, & Mainemelis, 2001), reflexive learning, and knowledge inputs (see below) since this combination was hoped to yield the highest ef-ficiency in training results.

3. MS ANTWERPEN: The training environmentIn order to meet these goals, a “playground” was needed that would provide the opportunities for experiential learning. Structurally, this “playground” needed to be similar to the participant’s professional background in order to promote transfer from training to reality. On the other hand, the play-ground needed to include sufficient elements of novelty and unexpected-ness, of dangers and emotional involvement in order to make the training environment sufficiently realistic (Fowlkes, Dwyer, Oser, & Salas, 1998). It was decided that a passenger ship would be an ideal candidate to combine

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these two conflicting requirements. A passenger ship, like a hospital, is a complicated spatial structure combined with a complex technical system. There is a distinction between “caregivers” and “caretakers” and there are different functions that need to be fulfilled on the side of the caregivers. Finally, both types of organisation operate in relative isolation from their surrounding environment. Therefore, we developed a low fidelity interactive computer simulation (see Prince & Jentsch, 2001), of a passenger ship, which was subsequently baptized as MS ANTWERPEN.

MS ANTWERPEN is the simulation of a relatively old passenger cruising ves-sel with a length of 149.7 metres and two engines that allow for a cruising speed of 17.5 knots. It has seven decks and room for 300 passengers and 193 crew. It was built in 1947 and, after a series of ownership changes and re-constructions and renovations, it is now owned by a Panama-based line that runs it as a cruiser for passengers from the East- and South-east European countries. The ship is not completely modern but generally well equipped for its purpose. For the passengers, there are restaurants, lounges, bars, and many other facilities. In terms of technical equipment, the ship has, besides the two main engines, two auxiliary engines and an emergency diesel ag-gregate, all the necessary pumps and supply aggregates. The navigation- and safety equipment is complete, including eight life-boats, large numbers of life-rafts and life-vests and water-proof bulk-heads. Although MS ANTWER-PEN is a fictitious ship, in its structure, technical equipment, building his-tory, and so on it is a combination of several passenger cruisers that in fact existed and are described in the maritime literature.

Although we have introduced the simulation as “low fidelity” it is in fact quite complex. All the structural and the major technical aspects of this cruising ship were included, matching the real conditions as closely as pos-sible. The same is true for the ship’s environment (sea-, weather-, and wind conditions, traffic). Most importantly, however, all 300 passengers are simu-lated individually, using a coarse human-factor model (see fig. 1). Each pas-senger belongs to one of several role categories that determines the pattern of his or her activities on board. Beyond this role level, each passenger is de-scribed by his gender, age, current position on board and intended destina-tion, his physical status and his degree of worry/fear. The latter variables are dependent on the environmental conditions (passengers get sea-sick), the ship’s technical status and any crises and emergencies. The passengers there-fore are autonomous agents and their behaviour reflects the crews control over the ship. In case of danger, for instance, passengers tend to leave their cabins and cluster in the higher and more backward sections of the vessel, in a severe crisis they may even panic, mount life-boats or jump outboards. If any passengers’ physical status drops below a certain threshold he or she becomes unable to move, does not follow any commands and, in case of, e.g. a fire, has to be salvaged by crew members.

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Figure 1: Outline of the human factor model realized in MS ANTWERPEN.

It is the participants’ task to safely navigate their vessel through a stormy night in the North Atlantic Ocean, heading south from a position near the southern rim of the Grand Banks, some 320 nautical miles off Halifax, Nova Scotia. Due to the adverse conditions and since the ship is old and it is the end of a long season, the crew has to deal with different passenger-related problems and several technical failures which, in the end, may result in an outright state of emergency.

The simulation is designed for a group of five to seven participants who take command of the ship. Each participant “plays” a specified role within the typical functions of a passenger vessel’s leadership, namely the Captain, the First Officer, the First Engineer, the Chief Steward, the Ship’s Doctor, the Navigation Officer, and the First Machinist. Each participant is given an Introductory Note that describes the general features of the ship, the cur-rent situation and the group’s task. Additionally, each participant is given specific materials that contain the information needed for his or her role. There is, for instance, general nautical information, a detailed description of the ship’s technical features and functions, crew- and passenger roles, and safety regulations. The Captain has, of course, direct access to all informa-

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tion. Also, there are a number of maps as well as technical and structural blueprints available for the participants.

The participants are given sufficient time to read through their materials and clarify questions before the simulation is started. The simulation programme is handled by a facilitator and most of the communication between the crew and the ship is done by printouts that constantly provide the standard in-formation that would be available an a ship’s bridge (course, speed, wind and weather conditions, radar, smoke detectors, etc.). These data are printed every “real” minute. Additionally, a complete overview of the ship’s techni-cal status is printed every 7:30 minutes (the simulation compresses time; one minute “real time” equals two minutes “ship time”).

For the participants this means that they have to deal with a considerable amount of distributed information of initially unclear relevance. Of course, they can also inquire all information they might need directly from the facilitator. For additional stress induction we use an old line printer which is almost constantly producing disturbing noise. The printing facility is also used for incoming cables (from e.g., the shipping company, Radio Halifax, and other vessels in the vicinity) as well as messages from within the ship (technical information, passenger complaints, crew information, alarms). There are prefabricated messages of all sorts, which can be sent to the printer at any time during the simulation. To further increase the feeling of realism one can have the sounds of wind and seas coming from a CD-player.

In order to sail the ship and handle the upcoming events the participants have a wide variety of action possibilities. They can, of course, steer the ship and they have complete control over the technical facilities, including maintenance and repairs. They can also influence the members of the crew (working and not working) and they can give all kinds of orders relating to the passengers (including, for instance, sending drunken ones to their cab-ins, close sections of the ship for passengers or have them man the life rafts and life boats). However, participants are not provided with a list of possible actions but have to develop them among themselves and find out about nec-essary prerequisites, lead times and side effects.

The participants, therefore, find themselves in a dynamically developing situation of high uncertainty, informational overload and a vague anticipa-tion of dangers. They have to try to understand and steer the ship, deal with unforeseen events and organize the work among themselves – all at the same time. In terms of psychological demands, this situation is quite similar to the situation they would face in managing a real emergency.

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4. Structure of the emergency management team training

The two-day training program basically follows a five-step structure:

4.1. Emergency management on the MS ANTWERPEN, first tripSince participants often have only very coarse (and sometimes wrong) pre-conceptions about emergency management, the first trip on the MS ANT-WERPEN is designed to provide some preliminary experiences in emergency management, the basic requirements and the various difficulties teams are facing. It is important in this opening phase to make it clear to the par-ticipants that effective emergency management does not come naturally but has to be learned and trained.

The duration of the first trip is roughly three hours. The scenario starts with a rather “tame” and quiet first hour, intended to give participants the op-portunity to make themselves acquainted with the ship, information and data flow, and action possibilities. Then, participants are confronted with a sequence of events that gradually increase in frequency, importance, and gravity. Some of these events are failures of technical systems, others are related to passenger complaints or passenger misbehaviour, and still others have to do with nautical problems and traffic en route of the vessel. Finally a fire starts in the printing shop on one of the lower decks, which, due to simultaneous technical malfunctions is extremely difficult to extinguish and usually requires evacuation and abandonment of the ship with loss of (simulated) lives.

4.2. Guided reflection of the first sessionAfter this opening session several failures and shortcomings of their “un-armed” teamwork are usually obvious to the participants and some time is needed to evaluate and “digest” this experience. In the reflective process par-ticipants are asked to discuss their experiences with respect to the structure of the emergency management team, the procedures developed in the course of the process, communication, and “soft factors” (like strategic approach, general “mindset” of the team, reactions to stress and failures). The rationale underlying this second step is twofold. First, it is critical that the participants understand why they couldn’t save the ship and what they could have done better. And second, any knowledge and insight generated from within the group conveys an increased sense of competence. The questions guiding this reflective process are designed in a way that helps participants to find an appropriate level of analysis and not, for instance, to engage in scapegoat-hunting.

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4.3. Knowledge input: Basic elements of successful emergency management

During this seminar-like third step the results of step two are collected and summarized. Additionally, participants are instructed about the basic do’s and don’ts of emergency management. Special emphasis is given to transfer-ring the most relevant topics from high-risk-environment trainings (team structure, distribution of workload and communication, development of shared mental models, development of proactive strategies) to the partici-pants’ low-risk-background. During this step it is certainly not possible to transform participants into emergency management experts. It should, how-ever, achieve an increase in the participants’ sense of competence towards critical situations; it should increase their feeling that a real crisis would not render them completely helpless.

4.4. Bringing new insights to work: The second trip on the MS ANTWERPEN

This second trip is somewhat shorter than the first one; it is designed in a way that allows the participants to try out and practice the knowledge and procedures they have learned during the first phases. The ship and the gener-al setup is identical to step one, the scenario, however, differs. The sequence of events, participants have to deal with, starts earlier and the events are of different character. Besides the typical technical problems, passenger-related problems require more attention. For instance, one passenger suffers a severe heart attack that cannot be handled onboard the ship. Therefore, a decision has to be made whether to stay on course or turn west in order to meet a SAR-helicopter off Halifax. There are many more incoming cables and the general workload is higher. Again, there is a final fire which is, however, easier to handle than the one in the first trip. The idea is to give participants a fair chance to end this trip with a positive experience of success, which should make it easier for them to accept the contents of the training program.

4.5. Guided reflection of the second trip, transfer discussionThis reflexive phase concentrates on the changes between the first and sec-ond trip. Participants are asked to formulate their personal view of the key issues involved and discuss how these could be used or implemented in their organization in order to improve the organization’s reaction to a possible emergency.

5. Evaluation of the training programmeFirst results of attempts to evaluate this training programme are reported by Strohschneider & Gerdes (in press). This evaluation was based on a com-parison of the two trips with respect to participants’ control over the vessel, their handling of emergencies and communication and team behavior. The

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available data indicate improvements in all three aspects which are not at-tributable solely to improved gaming competence.

Additionally, the program was run with emergency management experts from the police and chemical industry. At least during the initial phases of the first trip, the emergency managers experienced similar difficulties in controlling the ship as the untrained novices. Not unexpectedly, however, both their handling of emergencies and their team behavior was far supe-rior. Some interesting results of this study relate to the communication pat-terns within the teams. The interaction processes were analysed using the KatKomP – category system for complex problem solving behaviour which was developed by Badke-Schaub & Stempfle, 2001. With this system, ver-bal behaviour is coded as either belonging to “content”, “process”, “relation-ship”, or “rest”; with each of these broad categories divided into a number of more precise sub-categories. According to Fisch (1994), who analyses the interaction of discussion groups, effective group behaviour should consist of about 25-30% of process-oriented interactions, 40-60% of content-ori-ented interactions and up to 20% relationship management. Badke-Schaub and Stempfle (2001) argue that in groups engaged in dynamic problem solv-ing the distribution should be roughly 2/3 content-oriented interaction and 1/3 process-oriented interaction with only a very small percentage of rela-tionship-management. In the training groups reported by Strohschneider & Gerdes (in press) there is a clear difference between the first and second trip: The frequency of content-oriented interaction decreases while the frequency of process oriented interaction increases. In the second trip, the groups come close to meeting the Badke-Schaub & Stempfle – criterion (2001). In contrast, the emergency management experts have about 78 percent content-oriented interaction already during the first trip, some 19 percent process oriented in-teraction and only 3 percent relationship management. During a second trip these figures remain roughly the same. This indicates that the experts dem-onstrate highly integrated teamwork that enables them to fully concentrate on the different strategic and tactical aspects of emergency management.

6. DiscussionThe training programme that is described in this paper is targeted at staff members from organizations that are considered “low-risk”, but that nev-ertheless run a chance to encounter grave emergencies (like fires, chemical contaminations, or bomb threats) with the possibility of sizeable numbers of casualties and material damage. Examples for this kind of organization in-clude hospitals and hotels. The training has the aim to provide staff members with some basic knowledge and skills necessary to function effectively, and within the context of an emergency management team. The training focuses on emergency management team structures, appropriate procedures within the team, team communication, and the development of a helpful “mindset”, including, strategic preferences. The training itself is based on a combination of instruction, “learning by doing”, and “learning by reflection”.

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As of now, the data base is still insufficient for definite conclusions about the effectiveness of this training programme although the available data in-dicate that it seems to be able to influence participant’s behaviour in the intended direction. Also, it wouldn’t be very prudent to try to disentangle the different components of this training approach and ask for their relative contribution towards behavioural changes. Yet, the results presented in this paper corroborate other findings about the usefulness of low-fidelity comput-er simulations for training purposes (see Bowers, Salas, Prince & Brannick, 1992; Jentsch & Bowers, 1998). Low-fidelity training tools like MS ANTWERPEN appear to be especially applicable for low-risk-environments, where there are no clear preconceptions about likely crises. As long as the tool contains suf-ficient structural similarities to the features of the real environment, it can be hoped that this quality even enhances the transferability to a wide range of real-world challenges.

NoteThe simulation programme was written by Jürgen Gerdes. I would also like to thank Peter Schindewolf for his assistance in collecting and evaluating the data. I am also indebted to Detlef Klimpe, Friedebert Kröger and Askan Hendrischke from the University Hospital Aachen for their ideas and their support in developing and testing the simulation.

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AuthorSTROHSCHNEIDER, Stefan Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg Institut für Theoretische Psychologie Markusplatz 3, 96045 Bamberg, Germany Email: [email protected]

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