Bridges Brian

8/13/2019 Bridges Brian

1/25


2/25

Overview of Sixty Years

Long historical and cultural linkages betweenChina and Korea, but the establishment of theRepublic of Korea in 1948 and the PeoplesRepublic of China in 1949 created a newrelationship which was initially hostile and distant

but which has been transformed in recent years.

This paper has two objectives: ( i ) to brieflysketch and analyse the ups and downs of thisrelationship over 60 years and ( ii ) discuss the keyelements, internal and external, which areimpacting on this relationship today.


3/25

Four Phases

1. 1949-1988

mutual suspicion and restraint

2. 1988-1994

normalization and honeymoon

3. 1994-2004

convergence and cooperation4. 2004-present

pragmatism and caution


4/25

1948-88

Heavily dominated by Cold war politics.

The legacy of the Korean War, PRC volunteers

intervention, and the role of alliances.Very limited contacts until 1980s, when economic

interest began to grow and sporting

events (1986 Asian Games

and then 1988 Olympics)provided catalyst for semi-official

contacts.


5/25

1988-1994

South Korean push for normalization of relations

with PRC, achieved in 1992.

President Roh Tae Woos nordpolitik road toPyongyang led through Beijing and Moscow.

Economic reasons predominated for China (though

Taiwan factor also important), but political and

strategic objectives paramount for South Korea.


6/25

1994-2004

Increasingly positive relationship.

Frequent high-level exchanges, strong commercial

links (an emergency exit from Asian financialcrisis), and Korean public opinion seemed to bebecoming more pro-China and anti-American.

South Korean expectation of constructive Chinese

role in ensuring stability on peninsula and overNorth Korean nuclear crises. President Roh Moo-hyuns balancer concept exemplified thisrethinking.


7/25

2004-present

Economic links remained strongeach became amajor trading and investment partner of the other(by 2004 China was S.Koreas largest trading

partner and top investment destination),

but Chinas Koguryo project, apparent anti-Koreanism in Chinese society, growing concernabout Chinese treatment of North Koreanrefugees and, above all, the spectacular rise ofChinese economic and military power began toworry some South Korean elites.


8/25

Koguryo controversy

dispute about historical

extent of ethnic Korean

territories in N.E.China,

added to which camedisputes over Mt Paekdu


9/25

South Korea as a middle power

South Korea is an important andtechnologically-advanced economy, situated

at a strategic point in North-east Asia,but conscious of the large and growing

population, economic and military power ofits neighbour China.

How do middle powers deal with such bigpowers?


10/25

5 Variables in PRC-South

Korean relations1. South Korean domestic situation

2. Chinese domestic policies

3. Alliance with United States

4. North Korean factor

5. Role of Japan


11/25

South Korean internal situation

(I)A political system which is still strongly

presidential, so that views of presidents

impact strongly on external policies.

But democratization has opened up the system

to greater diversity of views and inputs

not just political parties, but also media,business circles and the public


12/25


(II)South Koreas strategic priorities during the Cold

War were clear (obtaining support against North

Korean threat), but they have subsequentlybecome disputed.

Perceptions of China within South Korea now quite

diversified. But the China threat argument is a

minority view, and both elite and public opinion isbroadly favourable (although Koguryo

controversy reduced that amity in opinion polls).


13/25


(III)While in 1990s and early 2000s most Koreans

seemed to agree on some form of engagementwith China, they differed on how to balance tieswith it and with United States:

conservatives prefer to stress the primacy of the USalliance,

while progressives lookfor more balanced relations

with the two big brothers.


14/25

Chinese priorities (I)

3 decades of successful open door policies havemade PRC a major economic force, stronglycommitted to rapid economic development, butmore dependent on outside world economically(for resources, markets and technology).

- in 1980s and 1990s Chinese wished to learnfrom Korea

- aware of appeal of large market for Koreanbusiness community

- but intensified Sino-Korean competition in

third markets for exports and resources


15/25

Chinese priorities (II)

China has a continuing political and strategic needfor peaceful environment to allow continuedeconomic developmentbut doctrinal shift fromDengist lay low to Jiangs peaceful rise andnow to a more proactive role, under Hu.

China sympathetic to the

sunshine policy of Kim DJand Roh MH, but unwilling to

put as much pressure on North

Koreaover nuclear issues

in particularas South Korea expects.


16/25

South Korea-US relations

A latent anti-Americanism in Korean society,

which surfaces

intermittently. Generally,a slow decline in public

support for US alliance in

2000s, but governments

continue to recognise

importance of US deterrence (even Roh MH, ratherambivalent about US, sent troops to Iraq).


17/25

MB Doctrine

President Lee came to power advocating twofundamental pillars to his foreign and security

policy thinking:

(1) reciprocity in relations with North (economicbenefits for de-nuclearization)

(2) revitalising the alliance

with US.China did not feature

prominently in initial formulations.


18/25

US in the MB Doctrine

President Lee puts greater positive emphasison alliance with USan approach which

the recent nuclear/missile tests haveencouraged further

but the Obama administration

has broader perspectives thanthe Bush administration on

North-east Asian affairs.


19/25

2 Concerns for Lee

Administration( i ) Just as Kim DJ and Bush did not see eye-to-eye,

will Lee and Obama also have differingperspectives, especially if

Bill Clinton visit to Pyongyang

leads to direct US-North Korean

negotiations ?

(ii) Could Korea passing occuras US and China cooperate on solutions

to settle nuclear and other Korea-related issues?


20/25

North Korea

North Korea is a difficult neighbour for both

China and South Korea.

Chinas centrality in six-party talks and itsstrong links with the North

make it necessary for the South

to court China.At the same time,

China is the Norths strongest ally.


21/25

Korean reconciliation?

Both the Koreas would like to sort out reunificationbetween themselves, but they know that Chinalike other major powerscannot be ignored.

China has acted as a conduit or catalyst for inter-Korean talks from time to time,

but South Koreans (and maybe

North Koreans too) worry thatChina prefers two Koreas to

one Korea (or stability to reunification).


22/25

Role of Japan

Both Koreans and Chinese have bitter memories ofpast Japanese wartime actionsand their

nationalisms are frequentlyreactive against Japanese

current actions or statements.

But convergence of Chinese and South Korean views

on Japan may be more apparent than real, as Chinadoes see pragmatic reasons for working withJapan which do not always sit well with moreemotional Korean perspectives.


23/25

South Korean Options in China

Policy1. Bandwagoning

aligning with a threatening state to avoid

potential costs of being attacked

2. Hedging

keeping open more than one strategic

option against possibility of a future

security threat


24/25

3. Engagement

rewarding a dissatisfied power to socialise it into

accepting rules and institutions of existinginternational order

4. Balancing

against a perceived potential adversary, either

internally (shifting resources to military) orexternally (cooperation with another state whichfaces same potential adversary)


25/25

South Korea, currently, seems be favouring a

low-intensity version (Denny Roys term)

of external balancing, which implieskeeping some constructive relations with

China while also cooperating with its ally

the United States.

Bridges Brian

Documents

Transcript of Bridges Brian