Brian Ghilliotti: US Army: Albania and surrounding regions (training purposes only)

9
UNCLASSIFIED (U) BLUF: United States government personnel in Albania face a variety of threats, ranging from national liberation movements, organized crime, regional tensions, and clan feuds. (U) Findings: Albanian communities residing in other regions to the east and northeast of Albania were not immune to the effects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990’s. Two and a half years after the Dayton Peace ended the Bosnian war, Albanian militants initiated their own separatist campaign in the former Yugoslavian Province of Kosovo (U) The Kosovo Albanian insurgent movement, known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), stated that they were fighting against Serbian ethnic repression, while the Serbs, under i the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, were claiming to protect Kosovo’s Serbian minority from Albanian nationalism. ii (U) The UN, using NATO forces, intervened in March 1999 with a 78-day air campaign against Serb forces in Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro (still part of Yugoslavia at the time). iii The Serbs continued their counterinsurgency operations and escalated matters by imitating the mass expulsion of Albanians in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanian refuges streamed over the Albanian and Macedonian borders, generating a potentially destabilizing refugee crisis. iv (U) By June 12, 1999, Milosevic gave into NATO’s air campaign and agreed to an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Consisting of UN and NATO forces, they v immediately sought to restore order, disarm the KLA, and resettle refugees. Many Albanians, enraged by their experiences with the Serb security forces in Kosovo, targeted the remaining Serbs in the province. Peacekeeping forces had to keep Belgrade from returning to Kosovo and control ethnic retaliation. These operations continue to this day. vi (U) The violence did not stop in Kosovo. Taking advantage of a de-militarized zone between Kosovo and Serbia , Albanian militants initiated attacks against security forces in the vii Presevo Valley region of southern Serbia. UNCLASSIFIED

description

Brian Ghilliotti's research work on Albania and surrounding regions, done as required for training. I was given Albanian as my assignment project. Please note that this document was transferred from one version of Microsoft Word to another, which caused some scrambling, especially with the bibliography and footnotes sections. I have no sympathy for any faction involved in these disputes.

Transcript of Brian Ghilliotti: US Army: Albania and surrounding regions (training purposes only)

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) BLUF: United States government personnel in Albania face a variety of threats, ranging

from national liberation movements, organized crime, regional tensions, and clan feuds.

(U) Findings: Albanian communities residing in other regions to the east and northeast of

Albania were not immune to the effects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990’s. Two

and a half years after the Dayton Peace ended the Bosnian war, Albanian militants initiated their

own separatist campaign in the former Yugoslavian Province of Kosovo

(U) The Kosovo Albanian insurgent movement, known as the Kosovo Liberation Army

(KLA), stated that they were fighting against Serbian ethnic repression, while the Serbs, under i

the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, were claiming to protect Kosovo’s Serbian minority from

Albanian nationalism. ii

(U) The UN, using NATO forces, intervened in March 1999 with a 78-day air campaign

against Serb forces in Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro (still part of Yugoslavia at the time). iii

The Serbs continued their counterinsurgency operations and escalated matters by imitating the

mass expulsion of Albanians in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanian refuges streamed over the Albanian

and Macedonian borders, generating a potentially destabilizing refugee crisis. iv

(U) By June 12, 1999, Milosevic gave into NATO’s air campaign and agreed to an

international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Consisting of UN and NATO forces, they v

immediately sought to restore order, disarm the KLA, and resettle refugees. Many Albanians,

enraged by their experiences with the Serb security forces in Kosovo, targeted the remaining

Serbs in the province. Peacekeeping forces had to keep Belgrade from returning to Kosovo and

control ethnic retaliation. These operations continue to this day. vi

(U) The violence did not stop in Kosovo. Taking advantage of a de-militarized zone

between Kosovo and Serbia , Albanian militants initiated attacks against security forces in the vii

Presevo Valley region of southern Serbia.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

The violence began as soon as peacekeeping forces moved into Kosovo on June 1999 and

continued for approximately two years. The Albanian militant group responsible for the violence

was the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medveda, and Bujanovac (UÇPMB).

(U) Peacekeeping forces tried to interdict their activities by securing the Kosovo-Serbian

border. Albanian militants reacted by moving through the Albanian populated regions of northern

Macedonia.

(U) The violence ended when peacekeeping forces allowed Serb security forces to re-

occupy the de-militarized zone. A settlement, known as the “Covic Plan” (named after a former

Serbian Deputy Prime Minister) called for increased regional investment, greater integration of

Albanians in local police forces, and more representation in local public institutions. The

UCPMB was disbanded. viii

(U) Ethnic Albanian agitation simultaneously erupted in Macedonia. Albanians in

Macedonia, with a significant demographic presence in the western and northern regions of the

country, pressed for greater language and political rights after witnessing events in Kosovo. ix

The Macedonians believed these demands would create an ethnically based “parallel” state. They

replied that Albanians were already fairly represented in Macedonia. x

(U) In January 2001, an Albanian militant organization, calling themselves the National

Liberation Army (NLA), attacked a police station in Tetovo , in northwest Macedonia. Violence xi

soon spread to the Serbia-Kosovo-Macedonia tri-border region.

(U) Though a ceasefire was reached in August 2001, a final peace agreement was not

drafted until January 2002. The NLA gave up separatist demands, recognized Macedonian

institutions, and disarmed. In exchange, the Macedonian government agreed that any language

spoken by more than 20% of a local population would become the official public language at a

municipal level. This applied to the Albanian regions of Macedonia. xii

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Though Macedonia is now relatively stable, ethnic clashes still happen. The most

serious incident occurred as recently as May 2015, when Albanian militants clashed with

Macedonian security forces in the city of Kumanovo. This came at a time when the Macedonian

government faced unrelated large-scale popular protests involving a political wire-tapping

scandal. Macedonian security forces regained control over the city. xiii

(U/Analyst Comment) These movements are relevant since they are still evolving and

have sympathizers throughout Albania. It is important that United States government personal

avoid discussions concerning Albanian history and current events unless it is in an official

business capacity. Any opinion from a US government employee about these events can be

mistaken as the official view of the United States government. If the local population is offended

by a government employee’s political statement, it can invite hostile actions ranging from

personal assaults to demonstrations.

(U) Albanian national liberation movements receive logistics, money and weapons from

Albanian organized crime syndicates. Experts argue that the conflicts in Kosovo, Presevo, and

Macedonia were really about Albanian organized crime groups fighting for control of smuggling

routes while using ethnic nationalism as a cover. Albanian militants have facilitated smuggling xiv

operations through the previously mentioned conflict areas on behalf of Albanian organized

crime groups. The proceeds from these operations are used to pay fighters and procure

weapons. xv

(U/Analyst Comment) Supporting the Albanian government’s operations against

smuggling operations can result in attacks against US government employees, property, or xvi

facilities by drug trafficking groups. When working with Albanian government officials,

precautions should be taken against the impact of corruption on operational security.

(U) Albanian security forces, both police and military, nearly collapsed during the looting

of weapons stockpiles during the financial pyramid crisis of January 1997. When the financial xvii

scheme collapsed, many lost their savings.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED (U) Nationwide protests erupted against the current government, under the leadership of

Sali Berisha. Albanian security forces deserted, and some even joined the demonstrations . xviii xix xx

Demonstrators looted weapons from national armories, especially in the southern and central

regions of the country. xxi

(U) The crisis exposed a long-standing regional rift in Albanian society. The clan, a

traditional unit of social organization, is still prevalent in Albanian society. These clans can be

broken down into a northern group of clans, who are collectively referred to as Ghegs, and a

southern group of clans, who are referred to as Tosks.

(U) The Tosks, who by geography were subject to outside influences, consider

themselves more ‘sophisticated’ and ‘worldly’. They regard Ghegs as backward. The Ghegs, on

the other hand, consider Tosks as unrepresentative of true Albanian culture. Due to the

mountainous geography of northern Albania, they stubbornly resisted outside control. Support

for the national liberation movements in Kosovo, Presevo, and Macedonia is strongest amongst

the Gheg clans. xxii

(U) Sali Berisha, a Gheg, got most of his support for the Democratic Party from the

Ghegs. He allowed the Gheg clans to open remaining armories so they could arm themselves as

armed demonstrations moved north from the Tosk dominated regions. xxiii

(U) A full-scale civil war was averted when Berisha agreed to elections in June 1997. His

Democratic Party lost power to the Tosk backed Socialist party. Much of the Albanian political

process reflects the split between the northern and southern clans. Many of the looted weapons

were never returned, ending up in the hands of organized crime groups. They later distributed to

Albanian insurgents. xxiv

(U/Analyst Comment) During periods of political unrest in Albania, political leaders

could unite the political environment by exploiting an ethnic crisis in a neighboring country.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) American government employees also face risks if they work with Albanians

involved in family bloods feuds. The Kanun, a codification of traditional Albanian values, calls

for family retribution when someone has been dishonorably murdered. It is not clear, however,

when the retribution must end, creating feuds lasting for generations, as revenge is sought for a

previous act of vengeance. Many families involved in these feuds are afraid to leave their homes.

(U) Children born into these situations cannot go to school or other public places for risk

of assault. Anyone perceived as assisting a targeted family can also be targeted. During the Cold

War, the Albanian Communist regime repressed this practice, but it was revived after the

Communist Party lost power. The Albanian government has set up reconciliation teams to end

these disputes. xxv

(U/Analyst Comment) This is relevant for government agents or HUMINT teams that

work with sources coming from a family involved in a blood feud.

Conclusions: The threats US Government employees face in Albania are multi-layered, trans-

regional, and deeply interconnected. It is misguided to look at Albanian security threats without

considering the political affairs of the Albanians in surrounding nations. Regional political

volatility, widespread influence of crime, and corruption require careful interaction with local

populations and a strong emphasis on operational security training.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED Notes

Anderson, Sean & Sloan, Stephen. The Historical Dictionary of Terrorism. Lanhan, Maryland: Scarecrow i

Press, 2009, pg. 362.

Hitchcock, William I. The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945 to the ii

. New York: Anchor Books, 2013, pg. 386.

Unknown author. “15 Years on: Looking Back at NATO’s ‘humanitarian’ bombing of Yugoslavia”, Russia iii

Today, March 24th, 2014, accessed July 12, 2015. http://rt.com/news/yugoslavia-kosovo-nato-bombing-705/

Beaumont, Peter & Wintour, Peter. “Milosevic and Operation Horseshoe”, The Guardian, iv

July 17th, 1999, accessed July 12, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jul/18/balkans8

Hosmer, Stephen T. “Why Milosevic Decided to Settle the Conflict over when He Did,“ v

RAND Research Brief, October 15, 2001.

Unknown author. “Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom?”, ICG Balkans Report No. 78, vi

November 2nd, 1999, pgs. 1-3. http://www.crisisgroup.org//~/media/Files/europe/Kosovo%2014.pdf

Sotiropoulos, Dimitri & Veremis, Thanos. Is Southeastern Europe Doomed to Instability? vii

New York, NY: Routledge, 2002, pg. 158

Unknown author. “Southern Serbia (Presevo Valley): The Second Kosovo?” Presheva Jone, no publication dates viii

given, accessed July 12, 2015. http://www.preshevajone.com/southern-serbia-presevo-valley-the-second- kosovo

Ciment, James. Encyclopedia of Ethnic Conflicts Since World War II New York, NY: Routledge, March 20, ix

2015, pg. 857.

Unknown author. “Macedonian Government Rejects Ethnic Albanian Demand”, Agence France-Presse, July 18th, x

2001, accessed July 14, 2015. http://www.alb-net.com/amcc/cgi-bin/viewnews.cgi? newsid995398995,64409,

Roundometof, Victor. Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the xi

Macedonian Question, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, January 2002, pg. 214

Rubin, Alissa J. “Macedonians Make Tentative Language Deal”, Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2001, xi

accessed July 16, 2015. http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/02/news/mn-29775 xi

xii Rubin, Alissa J. “Macedonians Make Tentative Language Deal”, Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2001, accessed July 16, 2015. http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/02/ news/mn-29775

Rubin, Alissa J. “Macedonians Make Tentative Language Deal”, Los Angeles Times, xii

August 2, 2001, accessed July 16, 2015. http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/02/ news/mn-29775 Rubin, Alissa J. “Macedonians Make Tentative Language Deal”, Los Angeles Times, xii

August 2, 2001, accessed July 16, 2015. http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/02/news/mn-29775

xiii Petrov, Angel (editorial). “Macedonia: Imagining the Unimaginable about Kumanovo”, novinite.com, May 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015. http://www.novinite.com/articles/168438/Macedonia%3A+Imagining+the+Unimaginable+about+Kumanovo

Battersby, Paul, Ripiloski, Sasho, and Siracusa, Joseph M. Crime wars: The Global Intersection of Crime, xiv

Political Violence, and International Law. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2011, pgs. 62-62.

UNCLASSIFIED Cooley, John K. “Albanian Insurgents Increasingly Linked to Drug Trade”, ABC News xv

March 9, 2001, accessed July 17, 2015. http://abcnews.go.com/International/ story?id=81410

Semini, LLazar. “Albanian Police Clash with Suspected Pot Growers in Lawless Village”, Associated Press, June xvi

16, 2014. Date accessed: July 20 2015. http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/06/16/albanian_police_clash_with_su spected_pot_growers_in_lawless_village.html

Carter, Grey. ”The Shape of Albanian Organized Crime: Albanian Mafia Clan Keljmendi List”, There Must Be xvii

Justice!, March 10th, 2013, pg, 2. https://theremustbejustice.wordpress.com/2013/03/10/shape-of-the-albanian-organized-crime-albanian- mafia-clan-keljmendi-list/

Unknown author. “Albanian Civil War”, GlobalSecurity.org. Page last modified: June 26th, 2013. Date accessed: xviii

July 17, 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/albania.htm

Unknown author. “Albanian Civil War”, GlobalSecurity.org xix

Unknown author. “1997 Unrest in Albania”, World Heritage Encyclopedia, Project Gutenburg Self Publishing xx

Press, no publication date. Date accessed: July 18, 2015, pg 5. http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/ 1997_unrest_in_albania

Shkullaku, Ghent. “Albanian Protests and Potential Regional Consequences”, Stratfor.com, January, xxi

2011, date accessed: July 14, 2015.

Shkullaku, Ghent. “Albanian Protests and Potential Regional Consequences” xxii

Stasiuk, Andzej. On the Road to Babadag: Travels in the Other Europe. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin xxii

Harcourt, June 2011, pg. 107.

Shkullaku, Ghent. “Albanian Protests and Potential Regional Consequences”, stratfor.com

Unknown Author. “Stuck at home in an Albanian Blood Feud”, Youtube Video. Published xxii

October 1, 2013. Accessed July 18, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=7FoQs8e6WWY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Sources

Anderson, Sean & Sloan, Stephen. The Historical Dictionary of Terrorism. Lanhan, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2009. Battersby, Paul, Ripiloski, Sasho, and Siracusa, Joseph M. Crime wars: The Global Intersection of Crime, Political Violence, and International Law. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2011, pgs. 62-62. Beaumont, Peter & Wintour, Peter. “Milosevic and Operation Horseshoe”, The Guardian, July 17th, 1999, accessed July 12, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jul/18/balkans8 Carter, Grey. ”The Shape of Albanian Organized Crime: Albanian Mafia Clan Keljmendi List”, There Must Be Justice!, March 10th, 2013, pg, 2. https://theremustbejustice.wordpress.com/2013/03/10/shape-of-the-albanian-organized-crime-albanian- mafia-clan-keljmendi-list/ Ciment, James. Encyclopedia of Ethnic Conflicts Since World War II New York, NY: Routledge, March 20, 2015, pg. 857. Cooley, John K. “Albanian Insurgents Increasingly Linked to Drug Trade”, ABC News March 9, 2001, accessed July 17, 2015. http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=81410 Hitchcock, William I. The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945 to the Present. New York: Anchor Books, 2013, pg. 386. Hosmer, Stephen T. “Why Milosevic Decided to Settle the Conflict over when He Did,“ RAND Research Brief, October 15, 2001. Semini, LLazar. “Albanian Police Clash with Suspected Pot Growers in Lawless Village”, Associated Press, June 16, 2014. Date accessed: July 20 2015. Petrov, Angel (editorial). “Macedonia: Imagining the Unimaginable about Kumanovo”, novinite.com, May 10, 2015,

accessed July 17, 2015. http://www.novinite.com/articles/168438/Macedonia%3A+Imagining+the+Unimaginable+about+Kumanovo

Roundometof, Victor. Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, and the Macedonian Question, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, January 2002, pg. 214. Unknown author. “Macedonian Government Rejects Ethnic Albanian Demand”, Agence France-Presse, July 18th, 2001, accessed July 14, 2015. http://www.alb- net.com/amcc/cgi-bin/viewnews.cgi?newsid995398995,64409, Unknown author. “Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom?”, ICG Balkans Report No. 78, November 2nd, 1999, pgs. 1-3. http://www.crisisgroup.org/ /~/media/Files/europe/Kosovo%2014.pdf Unknown author. “Southern Serbia (Presevo Valley): The Second Kosovo?” Presheva Jone, no publication dates given, accessed July 12, 2015. Unknown author. “1997 Unrest in Albania”, World Heritage Encyclopedia, Project Gutenburg Self Publishing Press, no publication date. Date accessed: July 18, 2015, pg 5. Unknown Author. “Stuck at home in an Albanian Blood Feud”, Youtube Video. Published October 1, 2013. Accessed July 18, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7FoQs8e6WWY

UNCLASSIFIED