Break Up Banks for Investors?

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    July 23, 2012

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    Investors Dont Need Government to Right-Size BanksIf investors want smaller banks, they will invest in themByTonyFratto,(202)822-1205,[email protected]

    Afterayearofoccupiersbemoaningbigbankprofits,nowthecallsaretobreakup

    bankstounlockvalueforinvestorsthe1%!Thatssometransformation!

    Thetheorygoesthatlargebanksaresomehowholdingbacksmaller,butmore

    valuablebusinessesandthatgovernmentcapsonbanksizewillhelptounleash

    profitsinthesefirms.Investorsshouldthereforejoinwithregulatorsincallingfor

    breakingupthebigbanks.

    TheotherwisebrilliantSebastianMallabyarguedthiscaseinhisrecentFinancial

    Timescolumn[BreakingUpBanksWillWinInvestorApproval],arguingthatthe

    combinationofbigbanksfundingadvantagesinthedebtmarketandfundingdisadvantagesintheequitymarketsuggestthatthecapitaladequacypoliceshould

    capitulateto(presumed)investorssentimentandjustbreakupthebanks.

    Now,letssetasidetherealitythatadvocatingapolicywiththeexpressrationaleof

    elevatingprofitsforbankinvestorswould,onitsown,dropjaws.Anythingsgameif

    wrappedinpopulistbankbust-upgoals.Letsinsteadanalyzethefundamental

    assertions.

    Investorsmarketparticipantsareneithermonolithicnorprescriptiveinpolicy.

    Decisionsaremadeintheaggregate,reflectedinequity(anddebt)pricing.If

    investorsareskepticaloflargebanks,andthecapitaladequacypolicemaintain

    theirholdforclearcapitalrequirements,thenthemarketwillreducethesizeand

    makeupofbanksifwarrantedwithouttheheavyhandofgovernment.

    Thispricingandscalingprocess,bytheway,playsoutinallindustries.Insome

    circumstances,investorswantlarger,diversifiedcompanies,whileinothers,themarketwantssmaller,morenarrowlyfocusedpure-plays.Inacompetitivemarket,

    theresroomforallkinds,withvaryingdegreesofpredictability,cyclicality,riskandpricepremia.Theshort-termburstofspinningoffthemostprofitablepartsofa

    business(asMallabyimplies)doesnotalwaysmakethebestlong-termstrategy.

    Themarkethasthemechanismstodecide.

    Bondmarketadvantage?

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    Advocatesforbreakingupthebanksoftencitethatbigbankscanmorecheaply

    financethemselvesinbondmarketsthansmallbanks.Specifically,Mallabyofferstworeasons:

    First,U.S.taxpolicysubsidizesdebtissuancerelativetoequity.

    Second,marketparticipantsbelievebankswillbebailedoutandthattherefore,

    bondholdersfeelsafe,requiringlessofareturnfortheirinvestment.

    Thefirstpointisentirelyvalid.Governmentpolicydoesinfactsubsidizedebtover

    equityforbanksaswellasforeveryothercompanyinthecountry.Itsatax

    distortionthatshouldbefixed,butitsnotauniquebenefittobanks.

    Thesecondpointmaybevalidaswell,buttheresabsolutelynobasisforsucha

    belief.Unliketheactionstakenduringthefinancialcrisiswhenbondholderswerebailedout(howevernecessaryatthetime),thenewResolutionAuthoritymakesitclearthatbondholdersandothercreditorswilltakelossesifafirmfails.Recent

    ratingsdowngradesonthebigbanksfromthemajorcreditratingsagencieshaveunderscoredthismarketreality.

    Intheabsenceofaclearbondmarketadvantage,letsmoveontoequity,whichhas

    becomemoreexpensiveforbigbanks.

    Equityvaluations

    Therearemanyvariablesaffectingtheprofitabilityofbanksandbankshareprices,andthesevariablesmakepricingbankstocksdifficultintheshort-term.

    Bigbanksfaceaslewofregulatorychallengesandchangesimpactingprofitability

    thehundredsofDodd-FrankreformsincludingtheVolckerRuleprohibitions,

    DurbinAmendmentinterchangefeepricefixing,newFDICinsurancepremiumsfor

    non-depositliabilities,andsignificantlyhighercapitalrequirementsforsystemically

    importantfinancialinstitutionsarebutafewexamples.Inrecentyearsasignificant

    amountofbankcapitalhasalsobeentiedupinprovisioningforhousingrelatedlosses.

    Bankvaluationsmayalsobedepressedduetothedilutionofshareholdersas

    banksraiseTier-1equityand,insomecases,havebeenblockedbygovernments

    frombuyingsharesbackorpayingdividends.Governmentpolicyseekingtominimizetradingandnewcounterpartyriskregulationsareprobablyimpacting

    profitabilityaswell.

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    Allofthesevariablesarerealandobservable,impactingtopandbottomlinesofthe

    bankbusiness,whilethebankbreak-upvaluetheoryrestsinsteadonephemeralmoralhazardpricing.

    Mallabyrightlyarguesthatequityinvestorsarewaryofbeingwipedoutinthe

    eventofabankfailure.Afterall,Dodd-FrankResolutionAuthoritygivestheFDIC

    thetoolstowinddownalargeinstitution,wipeoutitscreditors,sellassets,and,if

    thereisenoughmoneyleftoverafterTreasuryisrepaid,totrickledownto

    bondholders.InMallabyspresentation,theregulatorsselectiveconcernwith

    moralhazardisdrivingupthecostofequity.

    Buttheresnothingselectiveaboutit.WhatMallabydescribesisthebasiccapital

    structureofanypubliclytradedcompanyandnormalresolutionthrough

    bankruptcy.Inbankruptcy,bondholdersareseniortoequityshareholders.

    Shareholdersbenefitfromupsiderisk,butsitinafirst-losspositionifafirmfails.Thisisnodifferentthaninanybankruptcy:shareholdersareintheexactpositionof,sayStarbucksshareholdersintheeventofabankruptcy.

    Market-determinedbanksize

    Moretothepointwiththeseinvestorvaluetheories,themarkethasallthetoolsit

    needstoreducebanksizeifwarranted.Evenifitwereappropriate,themarket

    hardlyneedsgovernmenttohelpinvestors.Marketparticipantsarefreetotaketheirinvestmentstosmallerbanks.

    Meanwhile,regulatoryrequirementsunderBaselIIIrequirebigbankstoraiseequitytobufferagainstpotentialfuturelosses.Thisleavesbankswithtwochoices:

    facehighercostsforequity,orreduceassetsgetsmaller.

    Thisisthemarketworking.TheoutcomeMallabyseeksdoesntrequiretheheavy

    handofgovernment,justtheenforcementofcapitalrequirements.Currently,

    Americasfourbiggestbankshaveraisedtheircommonequitytoassets(notrisk-

    weighted,nogames)ratiosignificantlysincethecrisis(Exhibit1).

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    Exhibit!1 !ON AVERAGE, THE 4 LARGEST U.S. BANKS HAVE INCREASED

    THEIR EQUITY RATIO TO ALL-TIME HIGHS!

    Source: SNL, 4 banks are JP Morgan, Citi, Bank of America, Wells Fargo!

    Common Equity And Common Equity/Assets For Top 4 Largest BHCs !

    C

    ommonEquity/Assets(%)

    10!

    9!

    8!100!120!

    5!

    6!

    7!

    160!140!

    180!

    2007Q1

    2006Q1

    2005Q1

    2004Q1

    2003Q1

    60!80!

    40!

    2012Q1

    2011Q1

    2010Q1

    2009Q1

    CommonEquity($)

    2008Q1

    Comon Equity/Assets (%)!Common Equity ($)!

    Indeed,fromthestrategicpointofviewofmanagement,therearecompelling

    argumentstobeinglarge,globalanddiversifiedinsomecases,andcompelling

    argumentstobeingsmall,localandmorenarrowlyfocusedinothers.Inthelong-

    term,businessdiversificationspreadsrisk,lowersvolatilityandlowerstheeffects

    ofcyclicality.Therealsoexisteconomiesofscalethatsizeanddiversificationcangenerate.

    Tomaximizeshareholdervalue,somebanksmaydecidetogetsmaller,whileothers

    mayviewtheeconomiesofscaleanddiversificationofaglobaluniversalbankas

    vitaltotheirsuccessandresponsivetotheircustomers.Eitherway,investorsarefreetochoose.

    Buttheresnousefulprinciplewheregovernmentshouldfavorshort-termprofits

    forsomeequityinvestorswhileignoringtheneedsofindividualsandcompanies

    whorelyonbigbanksscale,reachandexpertisetooperateinrapidlygrowing

    globalmarkets.

    Bankscancompeteandservecustomersatthegloballevelwhilemaintaining

    adequatecapital,liquidityandtransparency.Andleavebanksizetothemarketand

    theneedsofcustomers.