Chapter 4

The Four Pillars of Brazil’s Governance Legacy

Executive Summary

On the eve of hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics, public outrage in Brazil over government corruption and mismanagement spilled into the streets. In a remarkable display of democratic legitimacy, the Brazilian government responded by enacting four important statutes: a 2011 law reforming public procurement; another 2011 law guaranteeing public access to government information; a 2013 law addressing corporate participation in public corruption; and a 2013 law that gave federal prosecutors powerful new enforcement tools. These statutes constitute the four pillars of Brazil’s Olympic governance legacy. Taken together, they have fundamentally reshaped Brazilian anti-corruption enforcement in ways that will endure long after the 2016 Olympics have ended. This chapter discusses the historical and cultural forces that drove enactment of these four pillars, and describes each of the pillars in detail.

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Chapter 1 discussed Brazil’s bold redefinition of the Olympic legacy.

Though legacy is traditionally thought of in economic terms, Brazil has created

for itself a governance legacy – a series of laws that have an impact well beyond

the Olympic Games, and that will endure after the Games are done. This

chapter describes that legacy.

Brazil’s Olympic governance legacy has four pillars: four distinct

statutes, two of which were enacted in 2011 and two in 2013. They were, to

varying degrees, enacted in response to public concerns about governance

generally and corruption specifically that arose on the eve of hosting the World

Cup and Olympic Games. The four pillars are: the 2011 procurement reforms,

called the Regime Diferenciado de Contratações and known as the RDC; the

2011 freedom of information law that addressed the government’s role in

corruption by obligating agencies to make information available to the public;

the 2013 Clean Companies Act that addressed the corporate sector’s role in

public corruption by creating corporate liability for bribery, incentivized

cooperation with government investigations, and incentivized corporate

compliance programs; and the 2013 organized crime bill which authorized the

enforcement tools that allowed federal prosecutors to blow open the Petrobras

scandal and many other corruption schemes. This combination of laws –

enacted in such a short span and to such dramatic effect – is beyond rare. It

may well be historically unprecedented.

These pillars did not arise out of thin air, but rather, were a democratic

government’s response to surging public discontent about public corruption.

The exposure of a 2005 vote-buying scheme that resulted in the convictions of

several high-profile public officials, called Mensalão, injected the issue of

public corruption into the public’s consciousness and discourse in dramatic

ways. Soon thereafter, optimism about the economic prospects of this BRIC

nation began to wane, as a result of global economic changes and controversial

domestic fiscal policies. At about this time, the populace came to recognize that

a cash-strapped government, now proven to be corrupt, would be one of only

three countries to host back-to-back the two most expensive sporting events in

the world: the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games. Against this

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backdrop, Brazil adopted what might be called the two minor pillars of its

governance legacy: the 2011 procurement reforms and freedom of information

law.

Public discontent would then surge when, in 2013, the government

announced rate hikes for public transportation. Outraged, the public took to

the streets in large-scale demonstrations over corruption specifically and

government mismanagement generally. In a breathtaking example of

legitimate democratic processes actually working, Brazil’s Congress responded

to these protests with the 2013 adoption of its two major pillars: the Clean

Companies Act and the organized crime law. As subsequent enforcement

initiatives has demonstrated, Brazilian governance will never be the same.

These four pillars make for a stark contrast between the two BRIC

nations simultaneously hosting the FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games back-

to-back. In Russia – host of the 2014 Winter Olympics and 2018 FIFA World

Cup – allegations of corruption were rampant. But we saw neither a credible

legislative response, nor effective enforcement actions. Russian corruption

continued in impunity. Brazil, in dramatic contrast, has addressed deeply-

rooted public corruption with adopting a four-part legislative framework and

then a series of enforcement actions. In so doing, Brazil is self-consciously

addressing a culture that once tolerated corruption and glorified jeitinho (see

chapter 2), seeking to move beyond a history of official corruption bred under

colonization and military dictatorships. Brazil thus redeems Coubertin’s idea

(see chapter 1) of the Olympic Games as a venue for promoting an ethic of

international fair play.

This chapter will discuss the four pillars in order of their enactment:

first, the procurement reforms; then the freedom of information law; the Clean

Companies Act will be third; and finally, the organized crime law.

I. Procurement

The harms of corruption in the specific realm of government

procurement are obvious to all. Government officials may be bribed to accept

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bloated contracts, or inferior products, or both, all at the public’s expense. But

in trying to prevent corruption, procurement presents a series of

counterintuitive, and underappreciated, policy trade-offs. This chapter is

designed to clarify what is at stake in procurement, how Brazil has addressed

those competing concerns in response to the imperatives of hosting the

sporting mega-events, and the corruption risks that may yet remain.

The first trade-off is between transparency and cost. Transparency is

generally thought to be an antidote to corruption: where processes are open to

the public, and readily reviewable, the risk of cost inflation would seem to go

down. And controlling corruption is generally among the ways to control costs.

But as this chapter will explain, and as the Brazilian experience has shown,

sometimes transparency can actually exacerbate cost inflation. In this regard,

transparency can cause the precise harm that anti-corruption measures are

designed, at least in part, to prevent. The relationship between transparency

and cost is thus not as simple as may first appear.

So too, in procurement as in government generally, do we suspect that

the concentration of power can give rise to corruption. We might assume

multiple companies working on project would be better than a single company

with monopolistic control over the project; the various companies might tend

to keep each other in check, increasing accountability and decreasing graft. But

again, experience has shown that multiple companies sharing responsibility in

procurement projects creates inefficiencies that tend to result in increased costs

and delays. Again, an effort to reduce corruption might increase costs to the

public.

Brazil was keenly aware of these trade-offs, and of the challenges

inherent in its procurement regime, before the World Cup and Olympics. But

the mega sporting events became an impetus to experiment with a new

procurement regime. This new regime, described in this chapter, is at least

designed to make public procurement more streamlined and efficient. The

extent to which these efficiency-minded reforms will create corruption risks

remains to be seen. This subsection describes basic procurement concepts,

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briefly describes the procurement regime that was in place prior to the World

Cup and Olympics, and then explains Brazil’s new corruption reforms.

Procurement Fundamentals

Procurement, of course, is the acquisition of goods and services. In

using the term, some draw a distinction between public and private

procurement, and others define the term to include only acquisition by a

government entity. For the purposes of this paper, procurement refers to any

acquisition by official Olympic organizing entities whether public, private, or a

combination of the two.1

For large scale events, or government projects, procurement is typically

accomplished through a regulated process that requires potential suppliers of

goods and services to bid against each other with the goal of maximizing the

quality of the good or service offered while minimizing its cost.

It is no secret that procurement is highly vulnerable to corrupt

practices.2 The 2004 OECD Global Forum on Governance identified lack of

transparency and lack of accountability as two of the major threats to

corruption in procurement.3 At all stages, issues like bribery or kickback

arrangements could present themselves. Further, as will be discussed below,

there are specific corruption risks unique to each stage of the procurement

process.4 While some are specifically addressed in the Clean Companies Act,

others are addressed by the various procurement laws outlined here.5

Procurement generally consists of three distinct stages: (i) Pre-Bidding,

(ii) Bidding, and (iii) Post-Bidding stages.6 In the Pre-Bidding stage, entities

formulate their needs, the process they will use to meet those needs, and the

timeline that they will provide for the bidders to place a bid.7 In the Bidding

stage, entities open an invitation to bid and after evaluating bids, offer an

award, at least in theory, to the best bidder.8 Finally, in the Post-Bidding stage,

the awarding entity manages the contract with the bidder and completes

payment. 9

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The Pre-Bidding stage is generally the least susceptible to corruption.

At the Bidding stage, however, bidders may engage in corruption by

independently, or in concert with some or all of the other bidders, attempting

to influence the outcome of the awarding of the bid. This can take the form of

bid suppression, complimentary bidding, bid rotation, or customer or market

division.10 All of these relate to an attempt to restrict competition and to cause

the requestor to pay more than it otherwise would.11

In the Post-Bidding stage, after the award has been granted, corruption

is often found in instances where costs run over or products or services are not

delivered. This is the stage where things such as mischarging costs, charging

for products or services that were not delivered, and substitution of products or

services -- particularly those of an inferior quality – occur.12

The first two stages in particular – pre-bidding and bidding – can play

out in a couple different ways in procurement law, as the next section describes.

Brazilian Procurement Before the World Cup and Olympics

The first piece in Brazil’s Olympic procurement regime is the

Concessions and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), which are both ways the

government can award contracts to private entities to provide a public service.

Concessions are governed by law 8987/95 (Concession Law) and PPPs are

governed by law nº 11.079/04, passed in 1995 and 2004 respectively.13 With both

concessions and PPPs, the government will delegate the provision of a public

service during a fixed period of time.14 Practically, there is little difference

between the operation of the concession or the PPP; the main difference is the

source of funding for the project. When the government awards concessions,

the investment for the project comes from the private entity. Conversely, when

a PPP is awarded, the cost of the investment is shared by the private entity and

the public. A common example would be the awarding of a company to

construct and manage a toll-road on behalf of the government. Both

Concessions and PPPs have been granted in relation to the World Cup and

Olympics.

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The second piece of the traditional Brazilian procurement regime is the

Brazilian Procurement Law 8666/93, which established the rules and

regulations for public procurement. The law applies to general government

procurement of services, goods, and construction, and requires a two-step

bidding process to complete a procurement project.15

In the first step, the government extends a request for proposal (RFP) for

the creation of a technical project. A technical project in this sense is a project

that addresses the needs assessment, planning, and budgeting phase of the Pre-

Bidding stage of the procurement project. This request is subjected to public

bidding and the best bid is given the award for the creation of the technical

project.

After the technical project is completed, the government then moves to

the second step of bidding which is again open to the public and uses the

technical project from the first step to determine the needs, budget and other

planning of the remainder of the procurement project. In the case of the

Procurement Law, bidding is open and transparent, allowing others to see what

bids have been in the past and see the bids of their competitors once the

bidding process has opened.16 Adding up the time limits for all of these

different procedures involved, before the project is even started, the time it may

take can be between 180 days and 285 days, if the time limits are not exceeded

due to legal disputes.17

Mega-Event Procurement Reforms

The traditional Procurement Law has two features that, at first glance,

may appear to promote efficiency and accountability, but that have created

new and serious problems. The first concerns the pre-bidding and bidding

stages. Under the Procurement Law, these bids are solicited separately, and

awarded to separate companies. The company that is helping the government

to design the project is thus different from the company that builds the project.

Though four eyes are often better than two, the difficulty arises when the

construction phase encounters a problem. If the project, as designed and thus

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far built, proves inadequate, and requires additional time and money to

complete, neither the firm that won the bid for the technical project nor the

firm that won the construction project wishes to accept the blame. Instead,

each will point the finger at the other: the construction firm will claim that the

problem lies with the design, while the design firm will attribute the problem to

poor execution of a blameless plan. Unable to settle, the two companies will

proceed to litigate, obviously causing delays and increased costs. Ultimately,

the problem is that the interests of the design firm, and the interests of the

construction firm, are not aligned; when trouble arises, each blames the other,

and attributing fault is slow, costly, and imprecise.

The second problem concerned the ironic tension between

transparency and inflation. The traditional Procurement Law followed the

practice of “open bidding,” in which the government publicly announces the

project’s budget before issuing its RFP (request for proposal). Open bidding

reflects the default assumption that transparency will tend to limit corruption

and costs. However, Brazilian experience proved the opposite to be sometimes

true. A bidder that is capable of bidding substantially under the government’s

budget might inflate the bid to more closely approximate the available

government funding. In this way, open bidding tended to drive up costs.

The Regime Diferenciado de Contratações, law No. 12462/11 and locally

known as the RDC, is Brazil’s experiment with addressing the inefficiencies

with traditional procurement. So too was the law passed to specifically address

the procurement needs of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics.18 The law is

designed to expedite the public procurement process because of massive

infrastructure projects that were undertaken and that are still underway in

Brazil. Put another way, Brazil’s hosting of the World Cup and Olympics

provided a catalyst to experiment with an alternative procurement regime.

The law modifies the usual procurement process under the

Procurement Law in two ways relevant to this study. First, is allows the

government to conduct a single, integrated bidding process for both the design

and construction, combining the pre-bidding and bidding phases. The

construction bidding no longer depends on the existence of an elaborate design

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already prepared by a separate design company (who had won the bid in a

prior bidding process). Instead, the government will provide a general

description of what it needs from the project, and companies will

simultaneously bid for the design and construction of the project.

Second, the RDC eliminates the requirement for open bidding. It does

not require the government to make its budget publicly available before issuing

the RFP. The government has the option of conducting closed bidding, and not

disclosing the budget, although the government has to justify doing so. Many

believe that this process will produce better financial results for the

government, for the reasons described above: the lowest bidder will not allow

its bid to creep up to be as close to the budget as possible.

However, skeptics of the RDC are quick to point out that this financial

benefit comes at the apparent cost of transparency. The instinct that

transparency limits corruption, and secrecy exacerbates it, is immediately

triggered. Moreover, some critics believe that the most powerful companies

can use inappropriate influence to find out the budget amount anyway; if this

were true, secrecy would indeed be compounding corruption. But our

interviews suggested that companies can no longer expect to obtain that non-

public information in closed-door private meetings. The mores of Brazilian

government are changing.

The RDC can and will be used for a limited subset of projects, including

Olympic and World Cup projects. The mega-events are regarded as a kind of

experiment in this new procurement regime. Though most Olympic projects

have not used the RDC, the Olympics nonetheless served as a catalyst for

adopting this new regime. Leading procurement professionals expect a post-

Olympic dialogue on whether the RDC did in fact constitute an improvement

over the traditional procurement system, and whether further reforms should

be adopted.

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Expenditure Oversight: the Responsibility Matrix

In addition to the RDC, the Brazilian government has adopted two

mechanisms that allow public oversight of government expenditures: the

Responsibility Matrix and the Transparency Portal.

The function of the Responsibility Matrix is to provide information both

to the public, and to the government, on the projects the government has

committed to completing and the roles of various government offices in doing

so.19 The idea of government accountability in mega-sporting events was first

established through a Responsibility Matrix for the World Cup in Brazil in

2014.20 For the Olympics, the APO has enumerated the timeline for each project

on a scale of 1-6 in the Matrix.21

The Responsibility Matrix is complemented by a Transparency Portal.

Enacted in 2011, the Transparency Portal makes information available on the

allocation of funds by the Federal Executive Branch. The search engine can

obtain data on direct expenses of the Federal Government, resource transfers to

states and municipalities, agreements with individuals, corporations or

government entities, forecasting and revenue collection. The Transparency

Portal also lists companies that have been sanctioned from the Federal Public

Administration or by Brazilian states.

In adopting the portal, Brazil is joining seven other countries and

various civil society organizations in the founding of the Open Government

Partnership (OGP). OGP aims to secure concrete commitments from

governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption and

harness new technologies to strengthen governance, and, as such, fits perfectly

with the goals of our work at the Office of the Comptroller General of Brazil.22

The Responsibility Matrix and Transparency Portal will be tested by the

Rio Games. The Olympic Games require a vast amount of equipment, supplies,

and services to be a success, and Rio 2016 is no exception. The Organizing

Committee has estimated that more than 30 million items will be needed in

order to meet the demands of the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games alone,

not including the goods and services that the city, state, and federal

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governments will need to enlist to accommodate the games.23 Rio will need

general public infrastructure projects as well as specific sports facilities.

In the area of general public infrastructure, there are four main

categories of projects: mobility projects, social development projects,

environmental projects, and urban renewal projects.24 The key mobility

projects are Light Rail Vehicle, completion of the BRT Transolímpica, the BRT

Transoeste, and the road to the Olympic Park. According to the Brazilian

Olympic Portal, the purpose of the Light Rail is to improve traffic.25 The

purpose of the BRT TransOlympica is to reduce time travelled between the

Barra and Deodorra by “54%”.26 The BRT Transoeste is already a functioning

highway, but needs improvements.27 The important social development project

is the installation of four future arena schools. During the development of the

idea of hosting the Olympics, the municipal council created the idea of using

movable architecture during the Games to be repurposed after the games. After

the Games, the Arena of the Future will be dismantled and transformed into

four municipal schools, each with a capacity for 500 students. Three will be in

the region of Barra and Jacarepaguá and in São Cristóvão.28 The key urban

renewal project is to add roads and tunnels to Porto Maravilha, add flood

control to Tijuca, redevelop of the neighborhoods surrounding the João

Havelange Olympic Stadium, and revitalize of the urban area of Deodoro.

The sporting events will take place in four unique venues in Rio de

Janiero in 2016: Copacobana, the Barra, Deodoro region, and the Maracana

region.29 Each region comes with its own unique attributes and set of problems.

Overall, there are 31 facilities being built by a mixture of the federal

government, state government, local government, and private contractors

comprehensively called a PPP (Public-Private Partnership).30 Of the four

regions, the Barra has the most infrastructure being developed.31

Necessary infrastructure in the Barra Region includes the Olympic Golf

Course, the Pontal, and the Rio Olympic Park, The Rio Olympic Arena, The

Maria Lenk Aquatic Park, the Olympic Tennis Center, the Olympic Aquatics

Stadium, the Velodrome, Arenas Cariocas 1, 2, and 3, and four pavilions.32 The

Rio Olympic Park will be the central focus of the games from an infrastructure

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perspective. The Olympic Park will host: basketball, track cycling, gymnastics,

trampoline gymnastics, rhythmic gymnastics, handball, judo, wrestling,

wrestling, swimming synchronized swimming, water polo, diving, taekwondo,

fencing and tennis.33 The Rio Olympic Park is financed by a PPP, with help

from the Federal Government of Brazil and will cost roughly 1.7 billion.34

Necessary infrastructure in Copacabana includes Copacabana Stadium, Fort

Copacobana, Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas, and the Marina da Gloria.35 The

Copacabana Region will host volleyball, endurance events such as the

triathlon, and sailing.36 Necessary infrastructure in the Deodoro region includes

the Youth Arena, the Rugby Arena, the National Equestrian Center, the

National Shooting Centre, the National field Hockey Centre, and Rio Radical

Park.37 Necessary infrastructure for the Maracana region includes the João

Havelange Olympic Stadium, Maracanã Stadium, Gym Maracanãzinho, the

Sambadrome, and the Waterpark Julio de Lamare.38

The Transparency Portal and Responsibility Matrix become powerful

symbols of a changing era in Brazilian government. Perhaps at least as

powerful a symbol, and one enacted at roughly the same time, also concerned

public access to information, as the next subsection describes.

II. Freedom of Information Law

Law No. 12.527/2011, widely known as the freedom of information (FOI)

law or information access law (its more common moniker in Brazil), was

perhaps the first major signal of the government’s intention to enact

meaningful anti-corruption law. While perhaps the least prominent of the four

pillars, it would prove a precursor to the extraordinarily impactful statutes of

2013.

Based on the principle, “publicity as the general precept, and secrecy as

the exception,”39 the FOI law moves to an era of active transparency, in which

the government is obligated to publish certain forms of information without a

request.40

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It brings an end to what Brazilians called the “eternal secrecy,” in which public

documents had an indefinite period of confidentiality41 because highly

classified documents could see their classification renewed indefinitely.

Indeed, when the FOI law was under consideration in Congress, some

lawmakers had pushed for keeping the “eternal” classification for certain

categories of documents – including nuclear and aerospace technology,

national defense, and diplomatic relations – but the provision was ultimately

defeated.42 So too did the bill create controversy about the potential disclosure

of military intelligence concerning human rights violations during the military

dictatorship.43

Specifically, the law has three core components. First, it obligates the

federal, state, and municipal governments, and all branches thereof, as well as

state-owned companies and even non-profits receiving government funds, to

publish various kinds of information, including documents on government

spending, without a request. These so- called “active transparency” obligations

extend to the official contact details of all employees, financial operations,

spending, procurement contracts, and answers to frequently asked questions.44

Second, the law empowers any citizen to request information from the

government and obliges the government to provide any such documents that

are not classified.45 Third, it reduces the terms of confidentiality of documents

designated as top secret, secret, and undisclosed for 25, 15, and 5 years

respectively, and ends the possibility of renewal of these periods.46

Preliminary data suggest that Brazilian government is starting to comply

with the law, although patterns and attitudes will take time to reform.

According to one study in 2014, of all valid requests for information under the

new law, 40% unanswered, 18% partially answered, and 31% received full

responses. Of the partial or full responses, 51% were deemed of good quality.

Of eight jurisdictions, Sao Paulo and the Federal Government had the best

response rates. Notably, the worst two were the city and state of Rio de Janeiro.

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III. Anti-Corruption Law: the Clean Companies Act

While the FOI law targets the public sector, the corporate sector is the

target of another statute. Passed in 2013, Brazil’s Anti-Corruption Law, also

referred to as the Clean Companies Act (“CCA”),47 adopts a number of

measures to increase corporate liability and accountability, and to incentivize

the growth of a compliance industry and culture.

Brazil obviously had a law on the books before the mega-events that

prohibited official corruption; all governments do. But it failed to create the

corporate compliance culture that has proven in other countries to be so critical

to anti-corruption enforcement. Enacted in 1992,48 the Administrative

Improbity Law prohibits illicit enrichment that arises from acts of

administrative misconduct. Both public officials and private individuals or

entities that are a party to the illegal act may be subject to penalties under the

law.49 The prohibited acts include a wide variety of behavior that captures “any

kind of patrimonial advantage by reason of holding public positions,” including

direct or indirect economic advantages to act or not act in the position’s official

capacity.50 Public officials can also violate the law by hindering or entering into

a public contract without due process.51 While the Administrative Improbity

law apparently covers any corrupt acts of public officials, and places liability on

both the government agent and any private entity that was a party to the act,

there remained a gaping fundamental weakness: the statute created no

corporate liability (though courts have since created certain, limited forms of

corporate liability). Because sporting events involve corporations, this piece

proves critical.

Accordingly, in response to the Mensalão scandal and public protests,

Brazil adopted the CCA. Indeed, the law marks an important milestone in

Brazil’s fight against corruption and was intended by Dilma’s administration to

send a strong message that the corruption tides have turned in Brazil.

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An Anti-Corruption Law with Teeth

The CCA’s essential prohibition is the promising, offering, or giving of

an “undue advantage” to a public official or third person related to the public

official. This provision mirror’s the bribery prohibition in the Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development’s Anti-Bribery Convention, to which

Brazil is a party.52The statute also prohibits a number of other forms of

corporate corruption concerning public tenders, shell companies, and

obstructing public investigations of companies suspected of corporate

wrongdoing.53

In comparison to the Improbity Act, and to comparable anti-corruption

laws in other countries, the CCA has a number of noteworthy provisions. First,

it moves beyond the Improbity Act by prohibiting not just the bribing, but the

solicitation or offer of a bribe. This brings the act into conformity with the

OECD Convention, and other nations, and obviously serves to prohibit a much

broader swath of conduct.

Second, the act imposes strict liability on the company for the acts of its

employees.54 That is, when an employee commits a violation, the company

automatically becomes liable; the prosecutor need not prove that the company

intended, authorized, or even had knowledge of the bribe independently of the

employee. This is similar to the U.S. model, but different from the U.K. In the

U.S. owing to a long-established principle of respondeat superior, the company is

liable for the acts of its employee as long as the employee was acting in the

course of employment (defined very broadly) and intended at least in part to

benefit the company.55 The U.S. statute, like Brazil’s CCA, does not need to

prove somehow that the company was also liable, independently of whatever

the employee did; if the employee did it while acting as an employee, the

company is also liable. Similarly, under the CCA a company will be liable “for

the wrongful acts . . . performed in their interest or for their benefit.”56 The U.K.,

by contrast, has recently provided companies a defense to liability for the acts

of its employees. If the company can prove that it had a good faith compliance

program in place – that is, that it took appropriate measures to prevent the

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violation – but the violation occurred nonetheless, the company will not be

liable. Brazil’s CCA eschews the British approach, containing an explicit

provision holding companies strictly liable. Though time will tell, this will

likely mean that a company is liable no matter what it, apart from the

employee, did or did not do.

Thirdly, the statute makes clear that companies owned by the

government – typically called state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) are deemed an

extension of the government, such that these companies’ employees are public

officials.57 In the U.S. context, for example, whether employees of SOEs are

foreign officials was a matter of much dispute, as the statute did not explicitly

address the question. Only in 2011 did the U.S. courts resolve the question,

holding just as the CCA now does that SOE employees are to be treated as

officials.58

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the statute imposes two forms of

liability on companies: civil, and administrative.59 Notably, the statute does not

impose criminal liability on companies, but this is not inappropriately lenient,

much less scandalous. Though the U.S., U.K., and many other jurisdictions

around the world hold companies criminally liable, many (such as Germany)

do not. And indeed, corporate criminal liability is a relatively new

phenomenon in the history of law. International conventions such as the

OECD Anti-Bribery Convention require signatory states to hold companies

liable in accordance with their underlying principles of law, recognizing that

some jurisdictions simply do not recognize the criminal liability of

corporations. The CCA should not be thought as somehow less effective in this

regard.

The CCA’s penalty provisions are especially strong; companies may

even say severe. The penalty is to be calculated as a percentage, up to 20%, of

the gross earnings in the company’s most recent fiscal year preceding the onset

of enforcement proceedings.60 Note what the statutory penalty is not. First, it is

not calculated based on the amount of the bribe, as some might assume; a bribe

of relatively modest proportions could give rise to a substantial penalty.

Second, it is not a function of the earnings that resulted from the bribe. In the

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U.S., for example, a company’s financial penalty for foreign bribery is

calculated based on the profits made possible by the bribe(s).61 The CCA, by

contrast, disregards both the size of the bribe and the size of the profits made

possible by the bribe. Finally, note that this statute does not calculate profits

based on annual profits, but rather, annual gross earnings. Accordingly, a

company that is losing money – that is, one that has no annual profits – can still

be fined. Where the bribes proved to be bad business, and became a losing

proposition, the company may nonetheless be fined. So too may the company

be debarred, or prohibited from conducting further business with the

government, and in some circumstances may even be dissolved.62

Changing Enforcement to Transform Corporate Culture

To understand the CCA’s enforcement-side provisions, a brief overview

of the U.S. system can be helpful. Though Brazil does not appear to be

emulating the U.S., it is trying to build a system that now exists in the U.S. and

has proven central to anti-corruption enforcement.

Federal anti-corruption laws in the U.S., particularly anti-bribery laws,

are enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice and, to a lesser extent, the U.S.

Securities and Exchange Commission. These agencies out of necessity have

limited budgets. The principal aim of public anti-corruption enforcement is to

maximize general deterrence – to prevent persons within their jurisdiction

from committing similar acts. While specific deterrence refers to preventing

recidivism – the defendant’s repeated violation – general deterrence refers to

preventing persons other than the defendant from committing similar

violations. Accordingly, the U.S. enforcement agencies seek to maximize

general deterrence while operating on a fixed budget. It might be said that they

are looking for the maximum general deterrence return on the dollar.

One way – the traditional way -- to achieve both specific and general

deterrence is to bring wrongdoers to trial. If convicted, the defendant company

would face a stiff penalty and considerable reputational damage through the

negative press. However, trials present two challenges for the enforcement

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agencies. First, they are extremely resource-intensive, as the gathering of

evidence (discovery) and resulting trials are notoriously drawn-out and

expensive, consuming vast amounts of the enforcement agencies’ time, money,

and personnel. Second, because they are so resource intensive, the agency can

try a relatively small number of companies. As a matter of simple math,

because each company requires so much time to investigate and try, and

assuming fixed resources, the agencies cannot try as many companies as they

could if the trial process were substantially shorter than various legal and

practical circumstances presently permit. Finally, a trial is unpredictable; the

government can rarely be sure that, after all the time and money spent on

trying a company, it will actually get a conviction. Accordingly, the U.S.

Department of Justice realized that trials are no way to maximize the general

deterrence “bang for the buck.” They would get relatively few companies, with

unpredictable results.

Meanwhile, criminal trials in particular are likewise a losing proposition

for the defendant company. The company also feels the drain on resources, as

key personnel are distracted from their regular duties and high-priced

corporate litigators rack up billable hours. So too is the unpredictability of

trials a major down side to the defendant company: they may get an acquittal,

but so too may they get a conviction with an unexpectedly severe penalty.

Finally, trials will generally produce negative press for a company, harming

their reputation and, for public companies, their stock value. Even if ultimately

acquitted, the reputational damage can be very hard to overcome.

Accordingly, as U.S. anti-corruption enforcement has increased over the

last decade, so too has the use of alternatives to trial. Increasingly, U.S.

enforcement authorities are proposing, and companies are accepting, an

alternative form of investigation and settlement. Indeed, in the U.S., with anti-

bribery law in particular, trials against corporate defendants are nearly

unheard of. Rather, the DOJ and the corporate defendants agree to resolve the

allegations by a different route.

That route has four core components. The first is occurs at the

investigation stage. When an allegation of wrongdoing arises, either within a

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company or publicly, the company will not wait for the government to catch

wind of the suspicions and begin to investigate the company. Rather, the

company conducts its own investigation into its own potential wrongdoing.

With an “internal” investigation, typically for lesser alleged offenses, the

company will conduct the investigation in-house. When the misconduct is

larger-scale, more systemic, or where the in-house lawyers are potentially

implicated, the company may conduct an “independent” investigation. Here,

the board of directors will retain an outside law firm, one that has not

previously represented or been affiliated with the company, to conduct a

factual investigation into the wrongdoing and formulate conclusions

concerning what wrongdoing may have occurred, the liability the company

may face, and which steps the company should take in terms of internal

governance and the retaining or firing of implicated personnel. That law firm

does not represent the company, and is not advocating on behalf of the

company. But neither does it represent the government. Rather, it is an

independent third party, with no loyalties to either side of the prospective

dispute, seeking an impartial account of the facts. Either way, when the

investigation is complete, a substantial factual record, and a report

summarizing the factual and legal conclusions, will be compiled. That report

is left in the company’s possession.

The second core feature of modern U.S. anti-bribery enforcement

concerns what happens next – that is, what happens with the report. The

company has now spent millions, or tens of millions, on an investigation into its

own wrongdoing, and possesses a comprehensive report with supporting

documentation. Needless to say, the U.S. Department of Justice would like to

get its hands on the report. Accordingly, it offers to the company “cooperation

credit.” By the terms of this deal, if the company hands over the investigation’s

findings, and makes its employees available to further interviewing, and

otherwise cooperates with the government, the government will offer a penalty

that, it claims, is substantially less than what the defendant would likely get if

convicted at trial. The company now must make a decision. It can risk the

unpredictability of a trial, with its exorbitant costs, substantial drain on

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company resources, and undoubtedly negative press. Or, it can accept the

government’s offer of cooperation credit and turn over to the government the

results of its investigation, buying itself a reduced penalty, predictability of

outcome, reduced lawyer’s fees, and reduced negative press.

Invariably, companies select the latter route: they choose to cooperate.

The turning over of its investigation conclusions is widely referred to as

“voluntary disclosure:” the company voluntarily discloses the results of its

findings. The return for voluntary disclosure is the cooperation credit.

Notably, the government cannot force companies to accept this deal, and yet

the companies invariably do. It is perceived to be in the interests of both

parties.

This deal culminates in the third core feature of the U.S. settlement

process: the deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) or nonprosecution

agreement (NPA). DPAs and NPAs are forms of settlement, in which the

government agrees to either defer prosecution or to forego prosecution

altogether in exchange for the company accepting certain terms of settlement.

The terms will include a penalty and might also include disgorged profits, the

termination of various personnel, the withdrawal of business from the

problematic markets, or acceptance of a government-imposed monitor. Under

a DPA, the government in effect gives the company a trial period in which to

demonstrate its compliance with the law and the settlement terms. DPAs are

agreements between the enforcement agency and the defendant; they do not

involve judicial oversight. With a NPA, by contrast, a judge will sign off on the

agreement, but with minimal oversight. The difference does not prove terribly

important. DPAs and NPAs are two minor variations of the basic negotiated

settlement.

The fourth unique component of this enforcement procedure concerns

the role of compliance programs. Compliance programs are designed to

prevent violations of given laws through training, monitoring, and the

maintenance of an appropriate company culture. With respect to a given area

of federal law – be it environmental, health care, or in our case, anti-corruption

– a company that knows itself to be at risk may invest in compliance to varying

21

degrees. Of course, it may not invest at all, liking its chances that it will not

violate the law or, at least, will not get caught. It may create a mediocre

compliance program, and may or may not work to support that program by

creating a culture within the company that values compliance. Or, the

company may take compliance seriously, investing in a first-rate program and

taking substantial effort to back up those programs with company culture.

The U.S. Department of Justice wishes to incentivize the growth of

compliance programs, and will therefore reward companies for quality

programs in several different stages of enforcement. First, the government may

decide not to investigate a company at all. Though these decisions are not

public, practitioners take for granted that, given the DOJ’s limited resources,

one factor it may consider in deciding whether to investigate a company at all is

whether it had a quality compliance program in place at all. Second, the DOJ

may investigate a company but then decide not to penalize it. That is, the DOJ

does not find sufficient reason to penalize the company. A formal decision not

to penalize a company is called a declination, and while these too are rarely

public, the government has recently publicly declined to penalize a small

number of companies based at least in part on the quality of the company’s

compliance program. Finally, when the DOJ does find sufficient evidence of

culpability to enter into a DPA or NPA with the company, a quality compliance

program can lead to a penalty reduction, as authorized by the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines.

Brazil’s CCA introduces this enforcement regime into Brazilian anti-

corruption enforcement. Though necessarily announcing that it is eschewing

or even discouraging traditional trials, multiple provisions of the CCA are

designed to foster the growth of an enforcement regime based on self-

investigation, voluntary disclosure, and cooperation credit through settlements.

First, the CCA contains a list of enumerated factors that the government

will consider when determining appropriate sanctions. The first six provisions

of Chapter III, Article 7 are predictable and rather unremarkable: the

seriousness of the offense, the advantage gained by the illicit conduct, whether

the illicit act was completed, the degree or risk of damage, and the offending

22

company’s economic circumstances.63 However, the next two provisions are

harbingers of a new enforcement era. Section 7.VII provides that penalties will

be determined in part based on the cooperation of the legal entity in the

investigation of the wrongdoing. This is cooperation credit. The next

provision, 7.VIII, provides that penalties will also be based on the existence of

internal procedures designed to promote integrity, including but not limited to

auditing, whistleblowing, and self-enforcement of the codes of ethics and

conduct. These are all features of what the west (or north, as it were) calls a

compliance program.

Additionally, the CCA authorizes the relevant enforcement agency to

enter into what the statute calls “leniency agreements.”64 These agreements are

analogous to the U.S.-style DPAs and NPAs, but perhaps more aptly named.

Unlike the U.S. terminology, the term “leniency agreement” makes its purpose

more explicit: to be lenient on the defendant in exchange for the defendant’s

cooperation. The CCA establishes several requirements that a defendant

company must meet if it is to be entitled to a leniency agreement; these

requirements are much more specific, and perhaps more exacting, than

anything seen in the U.S. system. They include: the collaboration must result

in identification of the guilty individuals; the rapid exchange of information;

the legal entity must have initiated the cooperation; the entity must completely

discontinue its involvement in the investigated wrongdoing; the entity must

fully admit its participation in the wrongdoing; and fully and completely

cooperate with the investigation until its conclusion.

The CCA is thus a bold effort to stimulate the growth of a new corporate

enforcement climate – where companies invest in compliance programs, where

they investigate their own potential misdeeds, and where they will cooperate

with the enforcement agencies to efficiently negotiate settlements.

IV. Organized Crime Law

Of the four pillars, Brazil’s new organized crime statute, passed in

August of 2013 – is perhaps most remarkable, both for its impact and for the

23

circumstances that led to its enactment. The statute provides a definition of

organized crime and authorizes a number of law enforcement methods to

investigate and prosecute organized crime. The federal prosecutors’ use of

these tools led to the Petrobras scandal.

The bill was supposedly proposed to go after organized crime (e.g. drug

trafficking, etc.) generally and specifically a group of violent protestors known

as the Black Bloc. Wearing black disguises, these protestors became highly

more organized and visible in the 2013 anti-corruption protests, engaging in

vandalism and theft.65 During the early stages of congressional consideration,

there was no mention that these enforcement tools could, or would, be used to

go after high-level officials and businesspersons engaged in graft. But word on

the street is that the advocates pushing for adoption of this bill may well have

understood its potential to convict the very politicians who would vote to

support the bill.

Of its various enforcement tools, two have proven of particular

significance to anti-corruption enforcement. First, it provides an obstruction of

justice charge: a person who obstructs investigations is subject to the same

punishment range as one who promotes, constitutes, or finances a criminal

organization.66

Second is the expanded plea bargain. Though plea bargaining

previously existed under Brazilian law, it was much more restricted and thus a

much less effective tool in the prosecutor’s arsenal. Under the previous

regime, judges could only reduce the penalty by one to two thirds, or grant a

pardon post-conviction if the judge determined that the defendant’s

cooperation was useful to the conviction.67 A defendant could thus not be sure,

at the time of confession, of the plea bargain’s effects on his/her conviction and

sentence. Laws that previously governed plea bargains include the Heinous

Crimes Law (8.072/1990), the Law on Economic and Tax Crimes, and Against

Consumer Relations (8.137/1990), the Law on Crimes Against the Financial

System (7.492/1986, as amended by Law 9.080/1995), Law 9.269/1996, which

altered Article 159 of the Penal Code (on extortion with kidnapping), the

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Money-Laundering Law (9.613/1998), the Cooperation and Witness Protection

Law (9.807/1999) and the Law on Combating Drug Misuse (11.343/2006).68

The new organized crime law goes significantly further. It does not

merely provide for a sentence reduction or eventual pardon. Rather, it allows

the prosecutor to not bring charges at all under certain circumstances.

Specifically, a prosecutor or judge may grant complete impunity, or reduce a

penalty by up to two thirds, for a defendant who has effectively and voluntarily

cooperated with the investigation, provided that the cooperation produces one

of five results: 1) the identification of other participants in the crime; 2)

information on the structure and control of the criminal organization; 3) the

prevention of additional criminal activity by the organization; 4) the complete

or partial recovery of the criminal proceeds; or 5) the location of the victim.69 So

too may the prosecutor dismiss the complaint against the defendant if (s)he is

not the leader of the criminal organization and is the first member of that

organization to enter into a plea agreement with the enforcement authorities.70

As the next chapter will show, the obstruction of justice charged and the

enhanced plea bargain have made possible what may be the largest anti-

corruption prosecution in history: Petrobras.

1 As explained earlier {[reference Olympic Governance section]}, the governing bodies of the 2016 Olympics consist of both public and private entities. 2 Some, such as those in the OECD, believe that public procurement is the activity undertaken by a government that is the most vulnerable to corruption. See generally OECD PRINCIPLES FOR INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, p. 9 (2009), available at www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/48994520.pdf. 3 Supra INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, note 8 at 3. 4 See Office of the Inspector General, Procurement Fraud Handbook, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION 14-16 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.gsaig.gov/?LinkServID=6486B647-A5DF-C154-010A408470CAE0B8. 5 For more details on the Clean Companies Act See [reference to Carter’s section on the CCA].

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6 Integrity in Public Procurement: Good Practice from A – Z, OECD 21-24 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/38588964.pdf. 7 Id. at 22. 8 Id. at 24. 9 Id. at 25. 10 For further discussion on these forms of bid rigging, see supra Procurement Fraud Handbook, note 14 at 14-16. 11 See Id. at 24. 12 Id., at 17-25. 13 Public Procurement in Brazil: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW (Oct. 1, 2014) http://us.practicallaw.com/0-521-5566?q=&qp=&qo=&qe=. 14 Id. 15 Procurement Law. Lei 8666/93 de 21 de Junho de 1993 (Braz.). CONSTITIUÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 22. 16 Bids that have been made are submitted to the public in the Official Gazette. Id. at art. 20. 17 Id. 18 Lei 12462, de 4 de Agosto de 2011 (Braz.). 19 Id. 20 Matrix of Responsibilities, World Cup Portal: Brazilian Federal Government website on the 2014 FIFA World Cup, http://www.copa2014.gov.br/en/brasilecopa/sobreacopa/matriz-responsabilidades 21 Responsibility Matrix, Brazil 2016: The Official Website of the Federal Government About the Olympic and Panolympic Games in 2016, http://www.brasil2016.gov.br/en/paraolimpiadas/governança/matriz-de-responsabilidades. 1 meaning that conceptual project in development based on the commitments of candidacy; 2 means that the draft or basic project/term of reference is under development; 3 means that notice with invitation to bid posted (for government projects) or a request for proposal published (private); containing scope, cost and schedule; 4 meaning signed contract; 5 meaning work completed, or service available; and 6 means that the project is delivered (status “Ready for Operation” granted). Id. 22 “Transparency, Monitoring, and Control,” http://www.cgu.gov.br/assuntos/informacoes-estrategicas (last visited Jul. 5, 2016). 23 João Saravia, Procurement for Rio 2016™ Olympic and Paralympic Games, RIO 2016 (Jun. 2012), available at http://www.brazilcouncil.org/sites/default/files/OlympicCommittee_Procurement%20Presentation2012.pdf; Rio 2016 Launches Procurement Portal in Order to Meet Games Demands, RIO2016.ORG (Aug. 8, 2013) available at http://www.rio2016.org/en/news/news/rio-2016-launches-procurement-portal-in-order-to-meet-games-demands. 24 Id. 25 Infrastructure, Brazil 2016: The Official Website of the Federal Government About the Olympic and Pan-Olympic Games in 2016,

26

http://brasil2016.gov.br/en/olimpiadas/legado/infraestrutura (last visited Jul. 5, 2016). 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 Four Regions, 31 Facilities and an Unprecedented Wave of Emotion in Brazil, Brazil 2016: The Official Website of the Federal Government About the Olympic and Panolympic Games in 2016, http://brasil2016.gov.br/en/olimpiadas/instalacoes/competicao (Last visited Jul. 5, 2016). 30 APO Announces Responsibility Matrix for the 2016 Games, Brazil 2016: The Official Website of the Federal Government About the Olympic and Panolympic Games in 2016, (Jan. 28th, 2014), http://brasil2016.gov.br/en/noticias/apo-announces-responsibility-matrix-2016-games (Last visited Jul. 5, 2016). 31 Barra Region, Brazil 2016: The Official Website of the Federal Government About the Olympic and Pan-Olympic Games in 2016, http://brasil2016.gov.br/en/olimpiadas/instalacoes/barra (Last visited Jul. 5, 2016). 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 Copacobana Region, Brazil 2016: The Official Website of the Federal Government About the Olympic and Pan-Olympic Games in 2016, http://brasil2016.gov.br/en/olimpiadas/instalacoes/copacabana (Last visited Jul. 5, 2016). 36 Id. 37 Deodoro region, Brazil 2016: The Official Website of the Federal Government About the Olympic and Pan-Olympic Games in 2016, http://brasil2016.gov.br/en/olimpiadas/instalacoes/deodoro (Last visited Jul. 5, 2016). 38 Maracana region, Brazil 2016: The Official Website of the Federal Government About the Olympic and Pan-Olympic Games in 2016, http://brasil2016.gov.br/en/olimpiadas/instalacoes/maracana (Last visited Jul. 5, 2016). 39 Greg Michener, Analyzing Brazil’s New Freedom of Information Law, OBSERVING BRAZIL (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.observingbrazil.com/2011/12/13/analyzing-brazils-new-freedom-of-information-law/. 40 See Marcelo Sarkis, Access to Public Information in Brazil: What Will Change with Law No. 12.527/2011?, FREEDOMINFO.ORG (May 14, 2012), http://www.freedominfo.org/2012/05/access-to-public-information-in-brazil-what-will-change-with-law-no-12-5272011/. 41 See Id. 42 Week in Review, 06/22/12, BRAZIL PORTAL, https://brazilportal.wordpress.com/tag/freedom-of-information-law/.

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43 See Fabrizio Rigout & Camila Cirillo, Evaluating Readiness for the Implementation of Open Government Systems: The Brazilian Case in Comparative Perspective, PLAN, http://www.planbrasil.com/repositorio/arquivo/artigo/Rigout&Cirillo_EvaluatingReadinessForImplementation.pdf. 44 Michener, supra note xxxix. 45 See Week in Review, supra note xlii. 46 See Rigout, supra note xliii. 47 Lei Nº 12846, de 1º De Agosto de 2013 (Braz.). 48 COLIN NICHOLLS ET AL., CORRUPTION AND MISUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE 652-53 (2d ed. 2011). 49 Lei Nº 8249, de 2º de Junho de 1992, art. 3. Private liability extends to direct and indirect benefit from the improper act. Id. 50 COLIN NICHOLS ET AL., supra note 48, at 653. 51 Lei 8249, supra note xlix, at Art. 10. 52 Lei 12846, supra note xlvii, at Ch. II, Art. 5.1. 53 See generally Id, at Ch. II, Art. 5. 54 Id., at Ch. I, Art. 2. 55 THE CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE ENF’T DIV. OF THE SEC, A RES. GUIDE TO THE FED. CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, NOV. 12, 2012, available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml. 56 Lei 12846, supra note xlvii, at Ch. I, Art. 2. 57 Id., at Ch. 2, Art. 5, § V, ¶ 2. 58 U.S. v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014). 59 See Lei 12846, supra note xlvii, at Chs. III & IV. 60 Id., at Ch, III, Art. 6.1. 61 Criminal Div., supra note lv, at p. 68-9. 62 Lei 12846, supra note xlvii, at Ch. VI. 63 Id., at Ch. III, Art 7.I – 7.VI. 64 Id., at Ch. V. 65 See Garcia-Navarro, Lulu, “Brazil’s Black Bloc Activists: Criminals or People Power?” (Oct. 22, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/10/22/239860341/brazils-black-block-activists-criminals-or-people-power. 66 Lei Nº 12850, de 2º de Agosto de 2013, Ch. 1, Art 2, § 1. (Braz). 67 http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/White-Collar-Crime/Brazil/Delmanto-Advocacia-Criminal/Introducing-plea-bargaining-a-uniquely-Brazilian-approach (I did not have access to get this citation information) 68 Id. 69 Lei 12850, supra note lxvi, at Ch. II, § 1, Art. 4. 70 Id., at ¶ 4.