Brandner v. Pease, Alaska (2015)
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Transcript of Brandner v. Pease, Alaska (2015)
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Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFICREPORTER .
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
THESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFALASKA
MICHAELD.BRANDNER,
Appellant,
v.
ROBERTJ.PEASE,M.D.,
PROVIDENCEALASKA
ANESTHESIAGROUP,and
PROVIDENCEALASKAMEDICAL
CENTER,
Appellees.
)
) SupremeCourtNo.S-15633
SuperiorCourtNo.3AN-11-10914CI
OPINION
No.7066November25,2015
)
)
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)
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)
AppealfromtheSuperiorCourtoftheStateofAlaska,Third
JudicialDistrict,Anchorage,PatrickJ.McKay,Judge.
Appearances: Charles W. Coe, Law Office of Charles W.
Coe, Anchorage,forAppellant. Roger F. Holmes,Biss &
Holmes,Anchorage,forAppelleesRobertJ.Pease,M.D.and
ProvidenceAlaskaAnesthesiaGroup. RobertJ.Dicksonand
Christopher J. Slottee, Atkinson, Conway & Gagnon,
Anchorage,forAppelleeProvidenceAlaskaMedicalCenter.
Before: Fabe,Winfree,andBolger,Justices. [Stowers,Chief
Justice,andMaassen,Justice,notparticipating.]
BOLGER,Justice.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected] -
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I. INTRODUCTION
A cardiac patient who underwent open heart surgery sued the
anesthesiologist and medical providers involved in the surgery. The superior court
dismissed the patients claims onsummary judgment, concludingthat the patient had
offered no admissible evidence that the defendants breached the standard of care or
caused the patient any injury. On appeal the patient relies on his expert witnesss
testimony thatcertainsurgicalprocedures were suboptimaland thatpatients generally
tendtohavebetteroutcomeswhenotherproceduresarefollowed. Butweagreewiththe
courtsconclusionthatthistestimonywasinsufficienttoraiseanyissueofmaterialfact
regardingwhetherthedefendantshadviolatedthestandardofcareinawaythatcaused
injury to thepatient. Wealsoaffirmthe courts orders involvingattorneys feesand
costs.
II. FACTSANDPROCEEDINGS
A. HeartSurgery
Dr.MichaelBrandnersufferedaheartattackinSeptember2009andwas
admitted to Providence Alaska Medical Center (the Medical Center) for emergency
bypass surgery. Dr. Kenton Stephens was the cardiac surgeon who performed the
operation;Dr.RobertJ.Peaseadministeredanesthesia. Dr.Brandner isalsoamedical
doctor,licensedtopracticeplasticandreconstructivesurgery.
The surgery lasted six hours. At the outset Dr. Pease intubated
Dr. Brandneronhis second attempt and used the drugpropofol to induce anesthesia.
Shortly thereafter Dr. Brandners blood pressureprecipitously dropped, but according
to Dr. Stephens, Dr. Brandner did not suffer complete cardiac arrest. Dr. StephensperformedCPRwhileadditionaldrugswereadministeredtocounteractthedropinblood
pres sure. Dr. Brandners blood pressure ultimately stabilized, and the operation
continued.
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Dr. Pease then placed a transesophageal echo (TEE) probe in
Dr. Brandners esophagus to take ultrasonographic pictures of his heart and obtain
diagnos tic informationaboutitscondition. TheTEEprobesoonfailed,andDr.Pease
then notified Dr. Stephens of this failure. According to Dr. Stephenss deposition
testimony,herespondedbysaying,Okay,well,Impressingonwiththeoperation, do
whatyoucan. TheTEEprobewasnotreplaced.
Dr.Stephens performed asix-vesselbypass. Dr.Brandnersurvivedthe
operationandwasdischarged12days later. Inhisnotesfromafollow-upappointment
about a week after discharge, Dr. Stephens indicated that [Dr. Brandner] has been
progressingquite well. Dr.Stephensalso indicatedthatDr.Brandnercouldreturnto
full activity within six weeks of surgery and authorized him to return to his plastic
surgerypractice. InMarch2011Dr. Stephenswrotea letteronDr. Brandners behalf
indicating that [h]is recovery has been quite exemplary and that he had steadily
returnedtopractice.
B. Proceedings
In September 2011 Dr. Brandner filed a complaint against Dr. Pease,
Providence Anchorage Anesthesia Group (the Anesthesia Group), and the Medical
Center.1 Dr. Brandner alleged that [t]he administrationofanesthesia performed by
Dr.RobertJ.Peasewasbelowthestandardofcare,...wasnegligentlyandrecklessly
performed[,] and cause[ed] [Dr. Brandner] to sustainpermanentinjuries. Healso
allegedthattheAnesthesiaGroupand theMedicalCenter were vicariously liable for
Dr. Peases actions. Dr. Brandner alleged that he suffered severe and permanent
1 Dr. Peaseand theAnesthesiaGroupare jointly representedbythesame
firm;theMedicalCenterhasseparaterepresentationandhasfiledindependentbriefing.
Butbecausethesethreepartiesinterests,arguments,andevidencearegenerallyaligned,
weusuallyrefertothemtogetherastheprovidersthroughout.
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injuries,lossofpastandfuturewages,.. .[and]lossofenjoymentoflife[,]andthathe
incurred past and future medical expenses[.] In response to interrogatories,
Dr. Brandner specifically alleged [i]njury to and loss of myocardiumwithseverely
compromised cardiac functionand reserve;[i]njury tobrainwithnoticeable loss of
shorttermmemoryfunctionasdemonstratedontesting;and[s]everede-conditioning,
loss of calcium, with associated muscoloskeletal problems, displaced sternal
incision/wound with prolonged healing and continued pain, as well as hemorrhoids
requiringsurgeryandwithongoingproblems.
In February 2012 the providers jointly moved for summary judgment,
arguingthat the lawsuitmust be dismissed withprejudice unless [Dr. Brandner] can
produce an affidavit from a qualified expert claiming Dr. Pease failed to meet the
standardofcare,[and]thisfailurecausedorcontributedtohisinjuries. Themotionwas
supported by the affidavit of a board-certified anesthesiologist specializing in
cardiovascularanesthesiawhoattestedthat[t]hemedicalcareprovidedbyDr.Peaseto
[Dr.Brandner]wasappropriateinallrespectsandmetthe[s]tandardof[c]are.
InJuly 2012 Dr. Brandner submitted the affidavit of Dr. StevenYun,a
board-certified anesthesiologist, in connection with his opposition to the providers
motionforsummaryjudgment. Dr.Yunattestedthatthetreatment,care[,]andservices
providedby...Dr.RobertPease[]weresuboptimalandcontributedto[Dr.Brandners]
prolonged and delayed recovery. Specifically, Dr. Yun stated that in all medical
probability, (1)[p]ropofolwasnottheoptimalchoiceofinductionagentandits use
led directly to . . . [Dr. ] Brandners cardiac arrest,2 (2) the difficulty insecuring
[Dr.] Brandners airway . . . directly contributed to [his] cardiac arrest, and (3) the
Asnotedabove,Dr.Stephensdenied thatDr.Brandnersufferedcomplete
cardiacarrest.
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amountofdamageto[Dr.Brandners]heart,[the]timetohookuptheby-passmachine,
[and] theextentofsurgeryperformedwouldhave beenreduced by the use ofaTEE
[probe] throughout his surgery. Following the submission of this affidavit, the
providerswithdrewtheirsummaryjudgmentmotions.
InSeptember 2013 Dr. Brandnerwas indicted infederal court onseven
countsofwirefraud.3 The grand jurychargedhimwithattemptingtoconcealmillions
ofdollarsinassetsfromhiswifeduringdivorceproceedings.
In January 2014 the parties deposed Dr. Yun. During the deposition
Dr.Yunadmittedthatalthoughhewasapracticinganesthesiologist,hehadnotpracticed
cardiovascular anesthesiaorusedaTEEprobesinceabout2001. Healsostatedthathe
wasnotqualifiedunderthecurrentstandardofcaretopracticecardiovascularanesthesia
becausehelackedcertificationintheuseofTEEprobes.
WithregardtoDr.Brandnerssurgery,Dr.Yunreiteratedhisopinionthat
theuse of propofol and the failure tointubate Dr. Brandneronthe firstattemptwere
suboptimal,butherefusedtosaythateitherfellbelowthestandardofcare. Dr.Yun
didstatethatthefailuretoreplacetheTEEprobefellbelowthestandardofcareandthat
cardiacpatientsgenerallytendtohavebetteroutcomeswhenaTEEprobeisusedduring
surgery. Butherepeatedlydeclinedtodrawanyconclusionsaboutwhetherthelackof
aTEEprobecausedharmtoDr.Brandner specifically,explaining,Ithinkthatgoesa
little beyondmyarea ofexpertise. Dr. Yunalsoconfirmed thathis affidavit , which
statedthatDr.BrandnersoutcomewouldhavebeenimprovedbytheuseofaTEEprobe
throughoutsurgery,wasbasedonhisgeneralizedunderstandingof the utilityofTEE
probesnothisspecificunderstandingofDr.Brandnerssituation.
3 See 18U.S.C.1343(2012).
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In February 2014 the providers jointly moved to exclude Dr. Yuns
testimony,arguingthatDr.Yunwasnotaqualifiedexpertinthefieldofcardiovascular
anesthesia. Whilethismotionwasstillpending,andless thanamonthbefore trial was
set to begin, Dr. Brandner requested a continuance. Citing the ongoing criminal
proceedingsagainsthim,Dr.Brandnerarguedthathe[wouldnotbeableto] testify[]or
explainhis circumstancesand thatexercisinghis right toremainsilent is prejudicial
eveninacivilcasebecause[i]fheis acquittedand/or thechargesaredismissed,his
currentcriminalchargesbecomeirrelevantand...[in]admissibleunderEvid[ence]Rule
404(b). HealsoacknowledgedtheprovidersmotiontoexcludeDr.Yunandstatedthat
[i]f[Dr.Yun]isstruckfrombeingawitness,thetrialcannotproceed.
The providers opposed Dr. Brandners request for a continuance. The
MedicalCenterarguedthatpostponingthetrialwasunnecessarybecauseDr.Brandners
substantial rights would notbe violated:4 The [criminalproceedings] . . . do not
prevent [Dr. Brandner] fromputtingon his evidence concerninghis . . . surgery, the
resultsfromthesurgery,hisexpertsopinions(totheextentthat[the] trialcourt allows
thattestimony),and his test imonyondamages theessentialelementsofhis case.
TheMedicalCenter also arguedthatDr. Brandners requestwasdilatory becausehis
indictmenthadbeenissuedfivemonthsbeforeandhecouldhavemovedtocontinuetrial
atanytimeduringtheinterveningmonths. TheAnesthesiaGroupnotedthatithadhired
an additional physician at great expense . . . to cover the two weeks Dr. Pease is
expectedtobeintrialandthattwoout-of-stateexpertwitnesseshadalreadyrearranged
theirschedulesandpurchasedticketstoattendtrialinAnchorage.
4 See Wagner v. Wagner,299P.3d170,175 (Alaska2013)(Arefusalto
grantacontinuance constitutesanabuseofdiscretionwhenapartyhasbeendeprived
ofa substantial rightor seriouslyprejudiced. (quotingSiggelkow v. Siggelkow,643
P.2d985,987(Alaska1982))).
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Although the superior court called Dr. Brandners motion to continue
dilatory, inexplicable, and inconvenien[t] [to] opposing litigants, opposing
attorneys, and the [c]ourt, the court reluctantly granted his request. But the court
ordered Dr. Brandner to pay the actual out-of-pocket costs the Anesthesia Group
incurredasaresultofpostponingtrial. Thecourtlaterreconsideredthiscostsawardon
Dr.Brandnersmotionandconfirmeditsdecisiontoawardcosts.Butthecourtreduced
the award after learning that the Anesthesia Groups billings included costs that were
avoidable since Dr. Pease was sti ll available to work, including travel, hotels, car
rentals, per diem, overtime, and other costs associated with the substitute
anesthesiologist. In addition the court granted the providers motion to exclude
Dr. Yuns testimony after finding that Dr. Yun was not a practicing, board-certified
cardiovascular anesthesiologist. Dr. Brandner then asked the court to reconsider its
exclusion of Dr. Yuns testimony, contending that there is no such thing as board
certification in cardiovascular anesthesia and use of the TEE probe is allowed by
anesthesiologistswithoutanycertification.
In March the providers again moved for summary judgment, supporting
their motions with four affidavits. Two of these affidavits were fromboard-certified
anesthesiologistswhoassertedthatDr.Peasesactionsmetthestandardofcare. Intheir
motions theprovidersarguedthat,becausethecourthadexcludedDr.Yunstestimony,
Dr. Brandnerhadno expert to testify about the appropriate standard ofcare. In the
alternative they argued that Dr. Yuns deposition testimony, even if admitted in its
entirety, did not raise any genuine issues of material fact, because there was no
admissibleevidencethatanyof[Dr.Peases]actions[includingthefailuretoreplacethefaultyTEEprobe]causedinjurytoDr.Brandner.
The superior court granted the providers summary judgment motions.
Althoughacknowledging that its previous order excludingDr. Yun was based onthe
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erroneous premise that Alaska recognizes board certification for the subfield of
cardiovascularanesthesia,the court nonetheless excluded Dr. Yuns testimony. The
court also ruled that even if Dr. Yunwere qualifiedas anexpertwitness, summary
judgmentwould still be warranted because Dr. Yun did not causal ly connect any of
Dr.PeasesallegedlynegligentactstoanyofDr.Brandnersclaimedinjuries.
TheprovidersmovedforAlaskaCivil Rule 82attorneysfeesandcosts.
The superior court granted their requests but reduced the awards slightly from the
requestedamount.
Dr.Brandnerappeals.
III. STANDARDOFREVIEW
We reviewrulingsonmotions forsummary judgment de novo, reading
therecordinthelightmostfavorabletothenon-movingpartyandmakingallreasonable
inferencesinitsfavor. 5 Wewillaffirmagrantofsummaryjudgmentwhenthereare
no genuine issues ofmaterial fact and the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a
matteroflaw.6 Wemayaffirmthesuperiorcourt on anybasis supportedby the
record,evenifthat basiswas not considered by thecourtbeloworadvancedbyany
party.7 We review a trial courts fact-based determinations regarding whether
5 ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc.,322P.3d
114, 122 (Alaska 2014) (quotingWitt v. State, Dept of Corr., 75 P.3d 1030,1033
(Alaska2003)).
6 Maness v. Daily,307P.3d894,900(Alaska2013)(quotingRussell ex rel.
J.N. v. Virg-In,258P.3d795,801-02(Alaska2011)).
7 Smith v. Stafford,189P.3d1065,1070(Alaska2008)(quotingGilbert M.
v. State,139P.3d581,586(Alaska2006)).
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attorneys fees are reasonable for an abuse of discretion.8 However, [w]e review
de novo whether the superior court correctly applied the law in awarding attorneys
fees.9
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Err By Granting The Providers
SummaryJudgmentMotions.
In a suit alleging negligence or willful misconduct by a health care
provider, AS 09.55.540(a) requires a plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(1)thedegreeofknowledge or skillpossessedorthe
degreeofcareordinarilyexercised underthecircumstances,atthetimeoftheactcomplainedof,byhealthcareproviders
inthefieldorspecialtyinwhichthedefendantis prac ticing;
(2) that the defendant either lacked this degree of
knowledgeorskill or failed toexercise thisdegree ofcare;
and
(3)thatasaproximateresultofthislackofknowledge
or skill or the failure to exercise this degree of care the
plaintiffsuffered injuriesthatwouldnototherwisehavebeen
incurred.
Inmedicalmalpracticeactions...thejuryordinarilymayfindabreachofprofessional
dutyonlyonthebasisofexperttestimony. 10
8 Froines v. Valdez Fisheries Dev. Assn, 175 P.3d 1234, 1236 (Alaska
2008)(citingMarron v. Stromstad,123P.3d992,998(Alaska2005)).
9
Dearlove v. Campbell,301P.3d1230,1233(Alaska2013)(citingGlamannv. Kirk,29P.3d255,259(Alaska2001)).
10 Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Grp., PC,3P.3d916,919(Alaska2000)
(omissioninoriginal)(quotingKendall v. State, Div. of Corr.,692P.2d953,955(Alaska
(continued...)
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The superior court granted summary judgment infavorof the providers
undertwo independentrationales. First, the court concludedthatDr. Brandners only
expert,Dr. Yun,wasnotqualifiedto testifyas anexpert incardiovascular anesthesia.
Second,thecourtconcludedthat,evenifDr.Yunwerequalifiedtotestifyasanexpert
in cardiovascular anesthesia, his testimony did not make a clear causal connection
betweentheallegedmalpracticeand Dr. Brandners injuries under[any] of thestated
theoriesofliability.
Dr.Brandnercontestsbothoftheseconclusions. Withrespecttothecourts
second conclusion, Dr. Brandnerargues that if Dr. Yunhadbeenfound qualified to
testify as anexpert incardiovascular anesthesia, then there would have beengenuine
issuesofmaterial fact regardingall three allegedinstancesofmalpractice: theuseof
propofol, the two intubation attempts, and the failure to use a working TEE probe
throughoutthesurgery.
1. Dr.Brandnerproducednoexperttestimonydemonstratingthat
the standard of care had been breached with regard to his
propofolandintubationmalpracticeclaims.
Dr.Brandnercontendsthat[t]hereisagenuinedisputeoffactastowhether
theuseofthe drugpropofolandthe secondintubationattemptweresuboptimal;taken
togetherthese[support]Dr.Yunsconclusionthat[Dr.]Peasesactionsfellbelow the
standard of care. (Emphasis added.) But Dr. Brandnermischaracterizes Dr. Yuns
testimony. InhisaffidavitDr.YunstatedonlythatDr.Peases failuretouse aworking
TEE probe duringsurgery fell below the standard of care;he did not make the same
claimaboutDr.BrandnerspropofolandintubationtheoriesoraboutDr.Peasesactions
generally. AndinhisdepositiontestimonyDr.Yunexplicitlystatedthathe[couldnot]
(...continued)
1984)).
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makethe argumentthat[theuseofpropofol]wasbelowthestandardofcareandthat
takingmorethanoneattempttointubateapatientwassuboptimaland...notideal,but
notnecessarilybelowthestandardofcare. UnderAS09.55.540(a)theproviderscould
nothavebeenheldliable for eitheroftheseallegedactsofmalpracticeonthebasisof
Dr.Yunstestimony.
2. Dr. Brandner produced no evidence to supporthis claim that
thefailuretouseaworkingTEEprobethroughoutthesurgery
causedhisspecificinjuries.
Dr.YundidtestifythatDr.Peasesfailuretouse aworkingTEEprobe
andtheMedicalCentersallegedfailuretohaveaworkingbackupprobeonhandfell
belowthestandardofcare. But thesuperior court concluded thatDr.Yunfailed to
causally connecttheTEEshutdownandthe physiciansdecisiontoproceedwithouta
sparewithanyinjurysufferedby[Dr.]Brandner. Weagree.
Dr.BrandnerarguesthatDr.Yun,inhisdeposition,describe[d]theeffects
[that]the[defendants]negligencecausedto[Dr.]Brandner. Dr.Brandnercitesseveral
instancesinDr.YunsdepositiontestimonywhereDr.YunsuggestedthatDr.Brandner
probably wouldhavehadabetter outcome ifaTEEprobe hadbeenused. But when
thesestatementsarereadinthecontextofDr.Yunsfulltestimony,itbecomesclearthat
Dr.Yunwasopiningonlythatpatients in general tendtohavebetteroutcomeswhena
TEEprobe is used not thatthe failure touse aworkingTEEprobethroughoutthe
surgeryharmedDr.Brandnerspecifically. Dr.Yuntestifiedelsewhereinthedeposition:
Icantmakeanyspecificconclusions. Icanonlysay,ingeneral,thatpatientswhohave
aTEEprobeusedintheircardiacsurgerytendtodobetterthanthosewhodonot. And
whenaskedwhetherit was outsidethescopeof[his] trainingandexpertisetobeable
to testify about the impact the surgery hadon [Dr.] Brandner inhis particularcase,
Dr.Yunsimplyreplied,Yes.
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Asamatterofstatisticalprobability, evidencethatpatientsgenerallydo
betterwithagiventreatmentdoesnotnecessarilyprovidecausalsupport thataspecific
patientwilldobetter. TheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheFirstCircuitrecently
examinedthe logical pitfallinherent in attemptingtoprovecausationwithregard toa
specific patient basedonstudies demonstratingcorrelation amongpatients in general.
Anexpertwitness testifiedthat the chances ofa patients recovery increasedbyover
50%whengivenadrug,andconcludedthattherefore,theplaintiffmorelikelythannot
wouldhaverecoveredhadhereceivedthedrug.Butasthatcourtexplained,
thisreasoningisstructurallyunsound. . . . Whenapersons
chancesofa betteroutcomeare 50%greaterwithtreatment
(relative tothechancesofthose whowere nottreated),thatisnotthesameasapersonhavingagreaterthan50%chance
ofexperiencingthebetteroutcomewithtreatment. The latter
meets the required standard for causation; the former does
not.[11]
In thepresentcase,Dr.Yunstated thatpatientswhohaveaTEEprobe
usedintheircardiacsurgerytendtodobetterthanthosewhodonotinotherwords,
the chances of a better outcome increase when a TEEprobe is used. But Dr. Yun
providednospecificfiguresaboutwhatpercentageofpatientsdobetter,inwhichways,
andbyhowmuch. Withoutthisinformation,Dr.Yunsstatementsaboutgeneralpatient
outcomesprovidesnosupportforDr.Brandnersspecificclaimthathisrecoverywould
havebeenbetterhadaworkingTEEprobebeenusedthroughouthissurgery.
HeretheAnesthesiaGrouppresentedan expertwhostatedthatthefailure
touseaworkingTEEprobehadnoeffectonthesurgery, andDr.Yundeclinedtooffer
testimonyto thecontrary. Theuncontestedevidencethatthe lack of a workingTEE
Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp.,670F.3d21,33 (1stCir. 2012)(emphasis
added).
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probe had no impact on Dr. Brandners specific surgery overrides any marginal
relevanceofDr.Yunstestimonyaboutpatientoutcomesingeneral.
ForthesereasonsthesuperiorcourtwascorrecttoconcludethatDr.Yuns
testimony provided no evidence that the failure touse a workingTEE probe was the
likely cause of Dr. Brandners alleged injuries. Dr. Brandner pointed to no other
evidenceofcausationinhisoppositiontosummaryjudgment, nordoes heciteanysuch
evidence on appeal. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment in the
providersfavor.12
B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying
Dr. Brandners Request For Additional Time To Depose The
ProvidersExperts.
Priortothesuperiorcourtssummaryjudgmentruling,Dr.Brandnermoved
to depose Dr. T. AndrewBowdle,ThomasVasquez,andDr. Pease,whoseaffidavits
supported the providers summary judgment motions. The providers opposed the
motion,pointingout thatDr. Brandnerhad ample time to depose all three witnesses
beforethediscoverydeadline. ThesuperiorcourtdeniedDr.Brandnersmotionasmoot
because[his]onlyexpertcannottestifythat . . . thelackofaTEE[probe] causedany
injury to [Dr.] Brandner. Dr. Brandner contends that this order was an abuse of
discretion.
Thesuperiorcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretion. Dr.Brandnerhadproduced
noevidenceofcausation,while,incontrast,the providers submitted fouraffidavits to
supporttheirsummaryjudgmentmotion. Dr.Brandneraskedtodepose threeofthefour
witnesses,but hedidnotattempttodeposeorstrike the testimonyofDr.Beerle,who
statedthat[t]hemedicalcareprovidedbyDr.Peaseto[Dr.Brandner]wasappropriate
Becauseweaffirmthesuperiorcourtonthisbasis,wedonotreachtheissue
ofDr.Yunsqualificationsasanexpertwitness.
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inallrespectsandmetthe[s]tandardof[c]are,andthataworkingTEEwouldnothave
changed the surgeons plans to bypass the vessels chosen. Accordingly,even if the
superiorcourthadstrucktheaffidavitsofDr.Bowdle,Vasquez,andDr.Peaseintheir
entirety, the providers would have remained entitled to judgment as a matter of law
becauseDr.BrandnerproducednoevidenceofcausationtocounterDr.Beerlesexpert
testimony.
C. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Ordering
Dr.BrandnerToReimburseCostsTheAnesthesiaGroupIncurredAs
AResultOfHisMotionToContinue.
Dr.Brandnermovedforacontinuancelessthanonemonthbeforetrialwas
settobegin,largely based oncriminalcharges thatwere filedfivemonthsprior. The
superior court reluctantly granted the continuance, but specifically found that
[Dr. ] Brandner. . . violatedthepre-trialorderdeadlinesbyfailingto timely file this
motiontocontinueandsuchviolation...directlycaused...costs[totheproviders].
ThecourtorderedDr.Brandner to paythecoststhattheAnesthesiaGroupincurredas
aresultofthecontinuancewithin30days. TheAnesthesiaGroupsubmittedanaffidavit
stating that its total costs from the continuance were $27,559.38 $22,559.38 for a
temporary anesthesiologistwhowashired tocoverforDr. Pease duringtheoriginally
scheduled trial period and whose contract could not be cancelled,and $5,000 for the
cancellationfeeforoneofitsexpertwitnesses. ThecourtinitiallyorderedDr.Brandner
topaytheAnesthesiaGrouptheentiresum,thoughthecourtsubsequentlyreducedthe
costawardto$24,878becausetheAnesthesiaGroupsbillingsrevealedthattheoriginal
sumincludedtravel,hotels,carrentals,perdiem,overtime[,]andotheravoidablecosts
forthetemporaryanesthesiologistthat[t]he[c]ourtdidnotintendtoaward. Despite
this reduction,Dr. Brandner contends that the superior court abused its discretion by
awardingthesecosts.
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Dr. Brandner argues that it was unfair for him to pay for a temporary
anesthesiologist who was [n]ever needed. He points out that the temporary
anesthesiologistwashiredtoallowDr.Peasetoattendtrial,andheclaimsrevenueor
wagelossduetoapartyattendingatrialisnotrecoverableunderanyrule,andtherewas
nothing to showthat a [temporary anesthesiologist] wasneeded toreplaceDr. Pease,
whowasavailable[towork]whenthetrialwascontinued. Dr.Brandnerfurtherargues
thatthecostawardopensthedoorsforpartiestoclaimlossof incometoattendtrialas
acomponentofdamagesorasacomponentoflitigationcosts. Hearguesthatthecourt
penalizedhimforexercisinghis FifthAmendmentrights. Andhecontends that the
requirement that he pay the Anesthesia Group for their costs within 30 days was
inconsistent with the civil rules and amount[ed] to a[n] [unreasonable] sanction.
Theseargumentsareunpersuasive.
AlaskaCivilRule40(e)(2)grantsthesuperiorcourtsignificantdiscretion
inrequiringapartymovingforacontinuancetopaythecostsresultingfromthedelay
oftrial.13 Rule40(e)(2)provides:
Unless otherwisepermit tedby thecourt,applicationfor the
continuanceofthetrial...shallbemadetothecourtatleastfivedaysbeforethedatesetfortrial... . Ifsuchcaseisnot
trieduponthedayset,the court in its discretion may impose
such terms as it sees fit, and in addition may require the
payment of jury fees and other costs by the party at whose
request the continuance has been made. (Emphasisadded.)
Recently,inCooper v. Thompson,weaffirmedacostsawardfortravel,lodging,and. ..
attorneys hours oftrialpreparationthatwouldhavetobeduplicatedasa resultofa
13 Cooper v. Thompson,353P.3d782,796(Alaska2015).
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partysrequesttocontinuetrial.14 Thepurposeofawardingsuchcostsisnottopunish
thepartyrequestingacontinuance buttorequire[that]partytopayforthesefinancial
costswhenitwasresponsiblefortheneedtocontinuethetrialsoclosetothedateitwas
scheduledtobegin.15
ItisuncontestedthattheAnesthesiaGroupcommittedtopayingthesecosts
under the assumption that the trial would commence on the scheduled date. The
postponement of tha t trial, which Dr. Brandner requested and the Anesthesia Group
opposed, made the costs unnecessary but did not absolve the Anesthesia Groups
contractualdutytopaythem. AndtheAnesthesiaGroupcouldhaveavoidedcommitting
tothesecostsinthefirstplaceifDr.Brandnerhadmovedforacontinuanceearlier.
For thisreasonDr. Brandneris incorrectthat theaward opens thedoors
forparties to claim loss of incometo attendtrial asacomponentofdamagesorasa
componentoflitigationcosts. Affirmingthecosts awardhere merely recognizes that
when a partys delay in filing a motion to continue causes another party to incur
nonrefundablecoststhatcouldhavebeenavoidedhadthemotionbeenfiledearlier,the
superior court hasdiscretiontoassignthose costs to themovingparty. Itinno way
affects the general rule that such costs are normally each partys respective
responsibility.16
14 353P.3dat796. AswiththeAnesthesiaGroupscostsinthepresentcase,
thetravelandlodgingcostsinCooper werenotcostsanopposingpartywouldnormally
berequiredtobearunderRule79. See AlaskaR.Civ.P.79(f)(listingcoststhatmaybe
awardedtoaprevailingparty).
15 Id.
16 Cf. AlaskaR.Civ.P.79(f)(listofcoststhatmaybeawardedtoprevailing
partydoes notincludecosts associatedwithgrantofcontinuance,suchas fees incurred
forcancellationofexpertwitnesses).
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Dr. Brandner is also incorrect that the imposition of these costs was
intendedtopenalize[] himforexercisinghis Fifth Amendmentrights. The superior
courts order explicitly stated: The delay in filing the motion not the fact that
[Dr.]Brandnerhaddecidedtoexercisehis[Fifth]Amendmentrights...isthedirect
causeofthe.. .cost[s]unnecessarily[in]curred.. .. And whenthe superiorcourt
reduced the costs award on reconsideration, the court reiterated that [i]t was the
[c]ourtsintentiontoawardonlycoststhatcouldnotbeavoidedbecauseofthedilatory
filing ofthemotiontocontinue. (Emphasisadded.) Thereissimplynoevidenceinthe
record that the superior court intended to punish Dr. Brandner for exercising a
constitutionalright.
Dr. Brandner also argues the requirement that he pay the Anesthesia
Groupscostswithin30dayswasintendedtosanctionhimandwasinconsistentwith
the civil rules. ButRule 40(e)(2) grants the superior court significant discretion to
imposesuchtermsasitseesfitandtorequirethepaymentof...costsbytheparty
atwhoserequestthecontinuancehasbeenmade. Settinga30-daydeadlinewaswithin
thecourtsdiscretioninthismatter.
Dr.Brandnerfinallyarguesthat[i]fthiscostistobeimposed,[he]should
atleastbeallowedtodeposethebillingdepartmentof[theproviders]expertand[the]
Anesthesia Grouptofindoutwhat,ifanything,waspaidandwhat incomewas earned
asaresultofusinga[temporaryanesthesiologist]andDr.Pease[simultaneously]once
trialwascontinued. Dr.Brandnermadethisargumentbefore thesuperiorcourt,which
rejecteditwhilenotingthat[Dr.Brandner] is entitled toacopyof[the]documentary
proof of payment, which defendants shall timely provide. The courts order wasreasonable. Thereislittlereasontothinkthedemandforanesthesianecessarilyincreases
withthe supplyofanesthesiologists. And the AnesthesiaGroupdidprovide proofof
payment,whichalready resulted inthereductionof thecosts award. Thecourt could
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reasonably conclude that Dr. Brandners request for depositions on this matter was
excessiveandunreasonable.
Forthesereasons,weaffirmtheimpositionofcosts toDr.Brandnerunder
Rule40(e)(2).
D. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Awarding
AttorneysFees.
The superiorcourt awardedattorneys fees to the providers pursuant to
Rule 82,which provides inpart that [i]n cases [resolvedwithout trial] inwhich the
prevailing party recovers no money judgment, the court shall award the prevailing
party . . . 20 percentof its actual attorneys fees whichwerenecessarily incurred.17
Dr.Brandnerarguesthattheawardswereexcessiveandthatthecourtfailedtoprovide
explanationforthereasoningbehinditsawards. Theseargumentsarewithoutmerit.
Asaninitialmatter,Dr.Brandnerarguesthattheprovidersattorneysfees
werefaciallyexcessivegiventhatthecaseinvolved[only]sixdepositionsandalimited
motionforsummaryjudgment. But thisargumentignoresthefactthatthecasenearly
wentto trial,andthatDr.Brandnerclaimeddamagesofapproximately$1,681,065 plus
$466,905yearly infuturelostearningcapacity. Thusthesuperiorcourtcouldreasonablyconclude that the providers attorneys total billings, $240,456, were not facially
unreasonable.
Dr.Brandneralsoraises fourspecificcriticismsregardingDr.Peaseandthe
AnesthesiaGroupsbillings. Werejecttheseargumentsaswell.
First, Dr. Brandner criticizes Dr. Pease and the Anesthesia Groups
attorneys for reviewing the same chart notes and medical records . . . on multiple
occasions. Butthesedocumentswerethecriticalevidenceinthiscase,uponwhichboth
AlaskaR.Civ.P.82(b)(2).
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sides expert testimony relied. Dr. Brandner has not demonstrated that it was
unreasonable for the providersattorneys to review in depthcritical documents upon
whichbothsidesexpertsrelied.
Second, Dr. Brandnercriticizes the attorneysbillings forjointmeetings
withcounselfor[theMedicalCenter],andworkwithexpertsnotusedinthiscase. But
because the providers interests and legal defenses were largely aligned, it seems
reasonablethattheywouldwanttheirattorneystomeettocoordinatelegalstrategy. As
fortheexperts,Dr.PeaseandtheAnesthesiaGroupexplainedtothecourtthat[h]adthe
case progressed to trial,each [expert] would have testified. Dr. Brandner does not
explainwhyobtainingtheopinionsofexpertsnotultimatelycalledtotestifyattrialwas
inanywayunreasonable ina case thatwas resolvedbeforetrial and turnedonexpert
testimony.
Third,Dr.Brandnercriticizestheattorneysfortimespentinvestigatinghis
criminalcase,whichheclaimshadnothingtodowiththiscase. ButDr.Peaseandthe
AnesthesiaGrouptoldthesuperiorcourt that[t]hedefendantsweretryingtountangle
Dr. Brandners complicated financial picture as a part of defending [against] his
multimillion dollar loss of earnings claim, and that [Dr.] Brandner . . . used his
criminalissuesasabasisforalastminutecontinuance[,]whichalsorequiredthecourt
andthedefendantstodelveintothose issues . GiventherelevanceofDr.Brandners
criminal indictment to the case, Dr. Brandner has not demonstrated that it was
unreasonablefortheattorneystobilltimespentinvestigatingtheissue.
Finally, Dr. Brandner criticizes the attorneys for billing time spent
preparing the 2012 motion for summary judgment, which was later withdrawn. ButDr.PeaseandtheAnesthesiaGrouppointedoutthatsummaryjudgmentwaseventually
granted for the same reasons advancedintheoriginalsummary judgment motion, and
they maintained that [a]ll the work whichwent into the original motion was utilized
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whenfilingthe second, successfulsummary judgmentmotion. Dr. Brandnerhasnot
demonstratedthatthesuperiorcourterredinawardingfeesfortimespentpreparingthe
originalsummaryjudgmentmotion.
InadditiontodisputingDr.PeaseandtheAnesthesiaGroupslegalbillings,
Dr. Brandner argues that the attorneys fees awards should be remanded because the
superiorcourtprovidednoexplanationofthereasoningbehind[theMedicalCenters]
award and granted Dr. Pease and the Anesthesia Groups attorneys fees request
withoutrulingon[his]objections.
Thecourtwasnotobligedtoprovidereasonsforrejectingoraccepting18
Dr.Brandnersspecificbillingobjections.19 Itistruethat[i]f the [superior] court
deviates from [the Rule 82(b) percent award] formula, it must provide a written
explanation for doing so.20 But there is no indication here that the superior court
deviated fromthatformula. Instead, itappears that the superiorcourtdeterminedthe
actual attorneys fees which were necessarily incurred,21 accepting some of
Dr. Brandners objections intheprocess,andapplied the proper formula tothat sum.
18 It appears that the superior court did accept some of Dr. Brandners
objections. TheMedicalCenterreportedthatithadincurred$110,355.50inattorneys
fees and was entitled to an award of $22,071.10; the court awarded $20,616.10.
Dr. Pease and the Anesthesia Group reported that they had incurred $130,100 in
attorneysfeesandwereentitledtoanawardof$26,020;thecourtawarded$25,380.
19 Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a) (Findings of fact and conclusions of law are
unnecessaryondecisionsofmotionsunderRules 12or56 oranyothermotionexcept
asprovidedinRule41(b).).
20 Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d300,305 (Alaska2000)
(citingAlaskaR.Civ.P.82(b)(3)).
21 AlaskaR.Civ.P.82(b)(2).
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[T]he[superior]courtisundernoobligationtogivereasonsforanawardthatcomplies
withthepercentagesexpressedinRule82(b)(2).22
V. CONCLUSION
The superior court did not err in granting summary judgment to the
defendants because Dr. Brandner did not produce any evidence that the defendants
actionscausedhis injuries . Nordidthesuperiorcourtabuseitsdiscretioninordering
Dr.Brandnertopayattorneysfeesandcostsassociatedwithhismotiontocontinue. We
thereforeAFFIRMthesuperiorcourtsjudgment.
Nichols,6P.3dat305.
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