BP-This is the Story of How and Why It Didn (1)

8/2/2019 BP-This is the Story of How and Why It Didn (1)

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A very simple explanation of the oil spill crisis in the Gulf of Mexico

by Marshall Brain | May 4, 2010

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The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico has all the makings of a major environmental catastrophe, but what actually happenedand why can’t they stop the oil? Here are two things that can quickly help you understand what is going on. The first isthis one-minute video:The second is this image:Beneath the oil slick If you would like to go a little deeper: The well is supposed to have a Blowout Preventer, or BOP, that is designed toprevent this kind of thing from ever happening. The BOP contains valves that BP should be able to close, cutting off theflow of oil. Why can’t they close the valves? First, this video gives you some sense of the size of a BOP. You will seea marlin stuck in a BOP:Think of the marlins you have seen hanging on the wall. This fish is probably 10 feet long, and the BOP is probably 40or 50 feet tall. The following article explains what has gone wrong:Offshore well blowout preventer was supposed to be fail-safe “We have a collapsed pile of steel on the well bore,” said Brian Petty of the International Association of DrillingContractors. “It’s hard to get to the BOP.” Blowout preventers rely on pistons, or rams, of steel and rubber driven by hydraulic fluid. A typical BOP stack usesseveral rams that shove rubber blocks or rings into or around the well’s bore hole. The most powerful ram – and a blowout preventer’s last line of defense – shears through the steel pipes of an oil well toseal it. BP last week released a photo of a robot-armed submarine trying to activate the shearing ram 5,000 feetbeneath the sea.That article contains a lot more information on Blowout Preventers, or see: Blowout Preventers Since the BOP isn’t working, and since relief wells will take months to drill, an alternative approach is to use steelstructures over the leaks to catch the oil before it reaches the surface:

BP pins Gulf of Mexico oil clear-up hopes on funnel The video in that article shows what the “funnels” look like. Welders in Louisiana are working against the clock to build a giant iron funnel for BP in a bid to halt the huge spill from aGulf of Mexico well.The 98-tonne, dome-topped box being built by steel workers is to be ready on Wednesday and may be shipped to thesite by the end of the week.So how did we get here? This video shows the rig’s explosion… And the Wall Street Journal explains it here:Drilling Process Attracts Scrutiny in Rig Explosion In the case of the Deepwater Horizon, workers had finished pumping cement to fill the space between the pipe and thesides of the hole and had begun temporarily plugging the well with cement; it isn’t known whether they had completedthe plugging process before the blast.Regulators have previously identified problems in the cementing process as a leading cause of well blowouts, in whichoil and natural gas surge out of a well with explosive force. When cement develops cracks or doesn’t set properly, oiland gas can escape, ultimately flowing out of control. The gas is highly combustible and prone to ignite, as it appears to

have done aboard the Deepwater Horizon, which was leased by BP PLC, the British oil giant.

Did BP know this was gonna happen ?

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Man's Greed and Stupidity.....

On Wednesday May 12, Representative of California Henry Waxman took it upon himself to tell the

world how he thought it might have happened, he said the oil company came to confide to the Energy

and Commerce subcommittee in private, and admitted that the oil rig failed a key pressure test that

could have caused the well to start a blaze on April 20.

Waxman said that the test indicated pressure was building up in the lines while they were doing it,

which should have set off an alarm in their minds to shut it down. Instead, there Executives were

bragging and partying on how great the safety record was for this particular off shore rig. Now the

question is why didn't they stop the work on the rig, and save those eleven lives and kept our oceans

clean of the black poison.

There were witnesses that came forth and testified at the subcommittee, which were the Executives

who were on the oil rig days before this happened. These are top dogs in the oil business, and the

winning companies are Halliburton, BP and Transocean. The three stooges said the cause of the

explosions is still under investigation, and only time will tell the cause they told the panel.

Jack Moore CEO of Cameron International, who's company built this device said it has been a very

reliable tool in situations like these. He has also stated it has worked in some of the harshest

conditions that the world could offer. Jack Moore is personally looking into the reason of the failure and

said, he doesn't know right now the reason why.

Michigans (Rep) Bart Stupak said, there were three main problems that could have happened too it, he

said it could have been the battery power,they could have made too many modified changes, and

possibly a hydraulic leak that shut it down. So there are a number of ways the blow out preventer could

have failed at that moment.

This machine is not designed to handle all of these problems said the 3 stooges. (Rep) Joe Barton of

Texas stood up and said that he see's no reason why it could not have handled this problem, thats




























what it was built for to begin with he said. BP is also being criticized by the subcommittee for

attempting to seal the well with gulf balls, bits of tires, (YOU THINK)!

Confidence is building says BP Consultant's

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New Idea's

They attempted to use a mile long pipe to capture the majority of the spill, but when they tried this, they

ran into some big problems they didn't think of at the time. For this to work they had to bring up some

frame work from the bottom of the ocean, so they could properly fit it to the long pipe which after thatcould be used to transfer the oil to the tanker above.

The frame work that they brought to the surface holds two key elements to get the job done, it holds a

pipe and a plug. Using a submarine robot they attempt to plug the main leak area and distribute the

crude up the pipe to the surface holding tanker. But the frame shifted so they couldn't make the proper

connections which they think would have made this work.






http://wolfpack5.hubpages.com/hub/Confidence-is-building-says-BP-Consultants#rate











Underestimating the job

Ed Overton, an LSU professor of environmental studies, said this was BP's best chance for success so

far since the explosion happened. He said doing this on the surface would be simple, but trying to use

a robot in over 5000 feet of water with gushing oil makes things a lot more difficult.

You can compare it to threading an eye of a needle in the dark. It would be difficult to do it above thewater, but doing it in 5000 feet of water with the blackness of the oil is unnerving to say the least,. they

also said that this massive piping system could contain over 70% of the slick.

BP also has the problem of a smaller leak to contend with if and when the bigger leak is fully

contained, if this works it will be their first positive step since the accident

They did it, but is it to late

BP succeeded early Sunday morning in connecting the mile long pipe over the top of the broken line.

Initially they had it suctioned for about for four hours, sending water, oil and gas up the pipe to the

tanker above. then it came off but it was reattached later that morning. While the amount of

contaminants being sucked up was gradual, it has not been measured yet.

They are not saying it is a complete solution, but its a very good start. Despite BP's success this past

Sunday, the damage has already been done say scientist. NASA has said they have pictures of the oil

spill already in the Gulf Loop current, which they say could bring the slick through the Florida Keys intoSouth Florida.

A Professor from the Rosenstiel School for Marine and Atmospheric Science of Miami Igor

Kamenkovich said he thinks this threat to South Florida is real and we should buckle down for it.

Predicting this is difficult, but if it gets in the Loop current it could take as little as five days to get to

Florida's mainland, and they say if it does it will be very bad news for us.

Where the main oil leak is they put a tube five foot long and four inch in diameter that was pressed in

the leaking riser that's 21 inches in diameter the source of the main spill area. This tube has three large

flexible rubber diaphragms to keep it in the riser and block the oil and water from mixing together.



This pipe is full of nitrogen, which is being pulled back to let the gas and oil flow in while keeping the

water from entering. A tipe of antifreeze Methanol, is being put in the riser to stop crystallization from

forming that could block the oil and gas flowing to the ship.

The ship will separate the gas and oil for proper storage untill they can be disposed of. BP officials

could not say how much the surface tanker could hold, but said some of the gas was burned off

through a flare system on the boat on Sunday, and said this a harmless way to get rid of some of the

gas build up.

BP's latest attempt at plugging that massive Oil leak

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BP may have the right idea

BP said in the late night on this past Wednesday that it had suspended pumping heavy mud into the

blown well that is 5000 feet below the oceans surface so they could bring in more materials for this

Vidal job.

This is known as Top Kill, and it was expected to start up again Thursday night, but they won't know

until the weekend if it had cut off the main leak or not.

They are insisting that Top Kill was going as planned, although they did say some of the mud was

escaping from the leaking pipe. But if this mud works like it should, they will attempt to pump cement in

it for a permanent seal.

This procedure is just one of many Ideas that the company has implemented over the last few weeks,

there are also two relief wells still being drilled that is the only true guarantee that they can stop the oil

leak the company said.



Top Kill has never been tried in 5000 feet of water says BP's Chief operating Officer Doug Suttles. The

company said it is considering pumping small plastic balls and gulf balls in the blowout preventer to

keep the mud from escaping.

Enough Lies !

Scientist have calculated that the well has been loosing anywhere from 500,000 to a million gallons a

day, Even using conservative estimates that would mean about 18 million gallons lost so far, and in theworst case it could be as bad as 40 million gallons spilled.

Now that we know the true scale of the monster we are fighting, its safe to say that BP has unleashed

an unstoppable force of reaping proportions. Steve Rinehart spokes person for BP said the old figures

of 210,000 gallons a day was there best guesstimating they could do at that time.

Bubble Bubble Toil in Trouble

Trouble follows BP like the plague, scientist said they spotted a huge plume that they believe is oil

deep below on the ocean floor stretching about 20 to 24 miles from the well head to north west toward

Alaska. It could be caused by all those chemicals they have been using on the oil slick.

A report that was released earlier this week said that between 2000 and 2008, staff members from the

company were accepting bribes like tickets for pro sports, gifts, lunches and other stuff from the Oil

companies.and they have used government computers for personal use as well.

Tourism is dead and fishing is in the same boat, she also added we are dying slow death and

something has to be done before we loose everything.

Patience is not a verchu

Florida's Pensacola and their sandy white beaches are smelling and seeing the effects of that

nightmarish oil spill. The ocean air wreaks of oil and the beachcombers mostly kids scoop up the balls

of tar with plastic shovels.

There are four gulf states that have been hit by this oil so far and they are Louisiana, Mississippi,

Alabama and Florida. In these gulf states their marsh lands have been turned into death areas for the

wildlife and some are saying this is a punishment from God.

http://gss.hubpages.com/hub/Pensacola-Florida-Things-To-Do



http://wolfpack5.hubpages.com/hub/BPs-latest-attempt-at-plugging-that-massive-Oil-leak




One Step Forward Two Steps Back

There was an Inverted cap that was put on the spew area this past week, and they had high hopes this

would capture most of the crude that was escaping, then the Federal Government point man just

couldn't resist to say it could be as late as fall before this spill is resolved, even though this seems to be

working well and catching most of the crude.

He went on "Face the Nation" and warned that this spill could very well stretch into fall The cap willonly catch so much of the oil, and until the relief well are completed the crude will keep coming. But

even after that, there will be oil out there for months to come says Coast Guards Thad Allen.

This will run well into the fall, this is a siege that runs across the entire Gulf of Mexico..

Very Bad Idea !

BP is planning to bring in an oil burner contraption and tanker from the North Sea as it tries to control

this massive spill.

The current containment system is catching right around 630,000 gallons of crude within a 24 hour

period, and at the system's capacity it could hold 756,000 gallons. Even so, there's still more crudethat's eluding them.

They are also bringing in a second vessel that will increase the capacity, as well as a North Sea tanker,

which will help in the move of all that crude, BP is also looking into burning off some of the top oil in the

Gulf. The company has said it has plans to change out the original containment cap to a slightly larger

one, hoping it will capture more oil.

The burn rig will be away from the main leak site so the flames and heat won't engulf the other ships

and vessels that are in that area.

Chemist from the Louisiana Environmental Action Network told BP this is a very bad idea, instead

bring in more processing equipment, they strongly feel that this will be a huge health risk and is not

worth the effort or time.

http://wolfpack5.hubpages.com/hub/Anger-Grows-and-the-Oil-Spill-Continues






It's been seven weeks since the accident, the most recent estimates put the total amount of oil lost

anywhere from 24 to 50 million gallons, making it the largest spill in US history. But they really aren't

sure, how could they ?

NEWS PAPER REPORT

This is the story of how and why it didn’t.

It is based on interviews with 21 Horizon crew members and on sworn testimony and written

statements from nearly all of the other 94 people who escaped the rig. Their accounts, along

with thousands of documents o btained by The New York Times describing the rig’s

maintenance and operations, make it possible to finally piece together the Horizon’s lasthours.

What emerges is a stark and singular fact: crew members died and suffered terrible injuries

because every one of the Horizon’s defenses failed on April 20. Some were deployed but did

not work. Some were activated too late, after they had almost certainly been damaged by fire

or explosions. Some were never deployed at all.

At critical moments that night, members of the crew hesitated and did not take the decisive

steps needed. Communications fell apart, warning signs were missed and crew members incritical areas failed to coordinate a response.

The result, the interviews and records show, was paralysis. For nine long minutes, as the

drilling crew battled the blowout and gas alarms eventually sounded on the bridge, no warning

was given to the rest of the crew. For many, the first hint of crisis came in the form of a blast

wave.

The paralysis had two main sources, the examination by The Times shows. The first was a

failure to train for the worst. The Horizon was like a Gulf Coast town that regularly rehearsed

for Category 1 hurricanes but never contemplated the hundred-year storm. The crew

members, though expert in responding to the usual range of well problems, were unprepared

for a major blowout followed by explosions, fires and a total loss of power.

One emergency system alone was controlled by 30 buttons.

The Horizon’s owner, Transocean, the world’s largest operator of offshore oil rigs, had

provided the crew with a detailed handbook on how to respond to signs of a blowout. Yet its

emergency protocols often urged rapid action while also warning against overreaction. and yet

after reading it cover to cover he struggled to answer a basic question:



“How do you know it’s bad enough to act fast?”

In the end, though, after the Horizon’s elaborate defenses had failed, many lives were saved by

simple acts of bravery, the interviews and records show.

Morning, April 20

The deck, nearly as big as a football field, was dominated by a 25-story derrick flanked by two

cranes. Below deck were two more floors, including quarters for up to 146 people. Each room

had its own bathroom and satellite television. There was a gym, a sauna and a movie theater.

Housekeepers cleaned the crew members’ rooms and did their laundry. “A floating Hilton,”

they called it.

But this place — a space-age behemoth packed with up to 5,000 pieces of sophisticated

drilling equipment — practically gleamed. “Everything on Horizon, it’s like, pretty,” he said.

They were a tight-knit bunch, working in close quarters 12 hours a day, day after day, over a

21-day hitch. They knew one another’s moods and quirks.

Drilling is a competitive business, and it was an article of faith that the Horizon’s crew

members were among the best. Just last year, the Horizon drilled the deepest oil well on earth,

at 35,055 feet.

On this day, the main task was finishing off the “well from hell.” The Macondo had been

behind schedule nearly from the get-go, and the Horizon had been sent to get it back on track.

At first the Horizon drilled rapidly, welcome news for a crew whose bonuses were tied to

meeting schedules.

But drilling quickly adds risk. For all of the Horizon’s engineering wizardry, it was tangling

with powerful and unpredictable geological forces. And pushing rapidly into a highly

pressurized, three-mile-deep reservoir of oil and gas can be particularly problematic in the

Gulf of Mexico’s unstable and porous formations.

Sure enough, the Horizon hit trouble. Heavy drilling fluid, called mud, kept disappearing into

formation cracks. Less mud meant less weight bearing down on the oil and gas that were

surging up. This set off violent “kicks” of gas and oil that sent the Horizon’s drilling teams

scrambling to control the well. March 8 had been especially bad. A nasty kick had left millions

of dollars worth of drilling tools jammed in the well. Operations were halted for nine

maddening days. There was still so much gas filtering up that cookouts were suspended on the

deck.

For the crew, the sooner they left the Macondo the better, so the team quickly got down to

business.



Along with finishing the Macondo, the rig had to complete several repairs before beginning

two other high-priority projects for BP. The executives were keen to keep the Horizon on

track. In e-mails, BP managers — whose bonuses were heavily based on saving money and

beating deadlines — kept asking when the well would be finished.

Mr. Holloway returned to work, and he and the other floorhands got busy cleaning the drilling

floor. They avoided the drill shack, though. Lately, there had been too much stress there.

BP has denied pressuring the Horizon’s crew to cut corners, but its plans for completing the

well kept changing, often in ways that saved time but increased risk.

By early evening, there was one crucial test remaining before the Horizon could plug the

Macondo and move on. To make sure the well was not leaking, the crew would withdraw

heavy mud from it and replace it with lighter seawater. Then they would shut in the well to see

if pressure built up inside. If it did, that could mean hydrocarbons — oil and gas — were

seeping into the well.

In effect, they were daring the well to blow out. Designing and interpreting this test — a

“negative pressure” test — requires a blend of art and engineering expertise. There are no

industry standards or government rules. Designing the test was BP’s job, yet the oil company’s

instructions, e-mailed to the rig that morning, were all of 24 words long.

It fell to the BP company men and the drilling crew to work out the details, but it did not go

well. There was strong disagreement over the test results. Pressure had built up, exactly what

they did not want, and Mr. Wheeler, the team’s toolpusher, was worried. A BP company man

said he thought the test went fine. Other rig managers, including Mr. Anderson, joined the

discussion, and they debated whether to repeat the test.

By 8 p.m., after redoing the test, they all agreed that the Macondo was stable. In a few hours,

the drilling crew’s 21-day hitch would be done. They were working unusually fast. In seven

years on the Horizon, Joseph Keith had never seen so much activity while sealing a well, and it

made him uncomfortable. His job included monitoring gauges that detect blowouts. But all

the jobs going on at once — transferring mud to a supply vessel, cleaning mud pits, repairing a

pump — could throw off his instruments. Mr. Keith did not tell anyone that he was worried

about his ability to monitor the well. “I guess I just didn’t think of it at the time,” he later

testified.

Mr. Holloway and Mr. Weise were filling out paperwork when Mr. Revette called on the radio

again. He needed a floorhand in the pump room below. “I’ll see you at 11:30, buddy,” Mr.

Weise said, heading down. Mr. Holloway walked to the drill shack to drop off the papers.

By then, oil and gas had probably begun seeping into the well.



Investigators believe that the influx began about 8:50 p.m. Preparing to plug the well, the

drilling crew was pumping mud from it, reducing the weight bearing down on the

hydrocarbons. Investigators agree that the Macondo had in fact failed its crucial final test.

They have pointed to BP’s cursory instructions and questioned whether the Horizon’s crew

had the skills to correctly interpret the results. They also believe that monitors should have

allowed Mr. Revette’s team to spot the signs of leaking within the first 20 minutes.

But Mr. Holloway detected no concern in the drill shack. Whether the team was distracted by

other tasks or rushing to get done or simply complacent may never be known.

“The question is why these experienced men out on that rig talked themselves into believing

that this was a good test,” said Sean Grimsley, a lawyer for a presidential commission

investigating the disaster.

“None of these men out on that rig want to die.”

Mr. Ezell, the senior toolpusher, was in his office below deck. He had been up nearly 18 hours,

but a little before 9:30 he decided to check in one last time with Mr. Anderson, who had

relieved Mr. Wheeler. Mr. Ezell and Mr. Anderson had been born in the same Texas hospital,

and though they were 20 years apart, Mr. Ezell considered Mr. Anderson to be “just like a

brother.” He knew Mr. Anderson would give it to him straight on whether there were lingering

doubts about the final tests.

Mr. Anderson assured him everything was good.

“Get your ass to bed,” he said.

Blowout

By now, investigators agree, hundreds of barrels of oil and gas were moving up the well,

gathering force and speed as the gases expanded.

At 9:38, well data indicates, the first hydrocarbons passed through the Horizon’s five-story

blowout preventer. Resting on the seabed, the blowout preventer was an elaborate fail-safe

device that gave the drilling crew several ways to seal the well. But once the oil and gas got

past the blowout preventer, there was nothing to stop them from racing up the Horizon’s riser

pipe, the 5,000-foot umbilical cord to the rig.

Mr. Holloway and Mr. Barron were working on the main deck when Mr. Holloway happened

to glance up at the drilling floor. He could not believe it. Drilling mud was gushing up from the

well, just like a water fountain.

It would be nine minutes before the first explosion, well data shows.



Nine precious minutes.

The drilling crew had trained for blowouts. Floorhands like Mr. Holloway were the crucial first

responders. A driller would call “Blowout!” and time their response. This usually involved

quickly installing a special valve on the drill pipe to end the imagined blowout.

But confronted with the real thing for the first time, Mr. Holloway realized there were no

floorhands on the drilling floor to respond.

Mr. Holloway cursed and sprinted for the stairs. Mr. Barron was right behind him. A waterfall

of mud was pouring off the drilling floor to the main deck. Then, in a split second, mud and

water exploded up inside the derrick.

When they reached the drilling floor, Mr. Holloway and Mr. Barron paused. They would have

to pass through a watertight door to get to the drilling floor. Yet they could not be sure what

they would find on the other side.

Mr. Holloway cracked open the door. All he could see was mud and water bouncing off the

derrick in every direction with incredible force. He and Mr. Barron went through anyway.

Twenty feet from the blowout’s full fury, it sounded like a jet engine, a shrill whining howl. Mr.

Holloway was instantly soaked, his protective glasses coated in mud. Objects were crashing

around him, some “loud enough to make you jump.”

He told Mr. Barron to take shelter in the heavy tool room just behind them.

Their training sessions contemplated a blowout coming up through only the drilling pipe. This

one, it seemed, was erupting from the whole well opening. “I had no idea it could do what it

did,” Mr. Holloway said.

He considered making a dash for the drill shack to find out what his bosses wanted to do, but

he would risk being torn apart by the blowout.

He reached for his radio and called Mr. Revette.

‘Something Ain’t Right’

Even more unnerving was the smoky haze of gas coming from a pipe opening positioned like a

large shower head high up on the derrick. The Horizon had two ways to defend against oil and

gas surging to the rig. The drilling crew could turn a valve and divert the blowout out to sea.

Or it could try to contain it on the rig by funneling it into a device called a mud gas separator.

The separator was much preferred for smaller kicks because it avoided any cleanup and

investigation required by a spill.



The gas Mr. Sandell saw floating down from the derrick indicated that Mr. Revette’s team had

chosen the mud gas separator, only to see it quickly overwhelmed.

The gas cloud spreading over the aft deck was a grave threat.

The Horizon’s six main diesel engines, spanning the rig’s back end, were fed by air intakes

above the deck. If the engines began taking in air suffused with gas, they might speed up to the

point of breaking apart.

There was a high-pitched hissing. On a closed-circuit television, they could see mud flying into

the sea.

Suddenly, gas alarms began lighting up Ms. Fleytas’s computer console. The lights showed gas

spreading over the rig, from the drilling floor to the main deck. There were so many alarms it

was hard to keep track of where gas was being detected. More frightening still, the lights were

all magenta, signaling extremely high levels of combustible gas.

The alarm system relied on dozens of sensors strategically placed all over the Horizon. When a

sensor detected fire or gas, a corresponding alarm lighted up on computer consoles — not just

on the bridge, but also in the two other crucial parts of the rig, the drill shack and the engine

control room. In theory, this meant anyone in the three critical locations could respond swiftly

to the first sign of trouble.

As originally designed, this system would also automatically trigger the general master alarm— the shrill warning that signaled evacuation of the rig — if it detected high levels of gas.

Transocean, though, had set the system so that the general master alarm had to be activated

manually.

she said, to immediately sound the general master alarm if two or more sensors detected gas.

She knew it had to be activated manually. She also knew how important it was to get crew

members out of spaces filled with gas.

Ms. Fleytas hesitated. She did not sound the general master alarm. Instead she began pressing

buttons that told the system that the bridge crew was aware of the alarms.

Ms. Fleytas and Mr. Keplinger had another powerful tool at their fingertips — the emergency

shutdown system. They could have used it to shut down the ventilation fans and inhibit the

flow of gas. They could have used it to turn off electrical equipment and limit ignition sources.

They could have even used it to shut down the engines.

They did none of these things.



Ms. Fleytas’s lawyer, Tim Johnson, said that with so much gas, explosions were all but

inevitable.

As with the general master alarm, the effectiveness of the Horizon’s emergency shutdown

system relied on human judgment. Transocean had been warned that the human element — the need for crew members to act quickly and correctly under stress — made the shutdown

system vulnerable. In 2002, a safety consultant specifically urged Transocean to consider

changing the system “so that human input is not critical for success.” Transocean says that

having an automatic system is less safe.

A Fine Mist of Gas

On the drilling floor, inside the heavy tool room, Mr. Holloway found Mr. Barron pacing. They

were both close to losing it. “I just remember the look on his face,” Mr. Holloway said. Mr.

Holloway picked up a phone and started to dial Mr. Revette again. Then he froze. He realized

he was enveloped in a fine mist of gas.

He looked at Mr. Barron, and for the first time he panicked. He knew they were one spark

from oblivion.

They had also turned off the pumps removing mud from the well, and they had sent word that

they were going to hold off on plugging it.

When the mud erupted, they reacted quickly, well data shows. They turned to their mightiest weapon, the 400-ton blowout preventer. It gave the men several different methods to shut in

the well, the most extreme being a powerful set of hydraulic shears that could cut through drill

pipe and seal the well.

A red button in the drill shack would activ ate the shears, yet Transocean’s well-control

handbook said they should be used “only in exceptional circumstances.” It does not appear the

button was pushed. The well data, though, indicates that the drilling team tried to use at least

two other methods, both in keeping with Transocean’s guidelines. Neither worked.

however, that the blowout preventer may have been crippled by poor maintenance.

Investigators have found a host of problems — dead batteries, bad solenoid valves, leaking

hydraulic lines — that were overlooked or ignored.

Then drilling fluids began cascading onto the ship. Dead seagulls fell, killed by the blowout’s

blast. The Bankston’s captain radioed the Horizon’s bridge and was told to move to a safe

distance.



later wrote in a statement to the Coast Guard, Captain Kuchta was screaming at Ms. Fleytas

for pushing the Horizon’s distress signal.

Only after the explosions did the bridge crew finally hit the general master alarm.

It had been at least two minutes since the first gas alarms sounded, records and interviews

show. And according to government officials and BP’s internal investigation, it had been nine

minutes since mud had gushed onto the drilling floor, although Transocean has suggested that

it might have only been six minutes.

Although Ms. Fleytas disputes Mr. Keplinger’s account, it was Mr. Keplinger who got on the

intercom.

“Fire, fire, fire,” he called out.

A Fighting Chance

There was still a way to keep the Horizon from sinking. Chris Pleasant saw it first.

Mr. Pleasant was one of the supervisors responsible for the blowout preventer. With the main

deck on fire, he ran for the bridge with one thought: they needed to disconnect the rig from

the blowout preventer — and therefore from the well itself. That would cut off the fire’s main

source of fuel and give the Horizon a fighting chance.

He just needed to activate the emergency disconnect system. Like a fighter pilot hitting eject,

it would signal the blowout preventer to release the Horizon. It would also signal it to seal the

well, perhaps stopping the flow of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.

“I’m hitting E.D.S.,” he told the captain.

According to Mr. Pleasant, the captain told him, “No, calm down, we’re not hitting E.D.S.”

Mr. Bertone assumed that the Horizon was now freed from the Macondo. The inferno

consuming the derrick would soon subside. If they could get the standby generators to work,

he reasoned, they could start one of the remaining engines and fight the fires. The generators,

however, were on the back end of the Horizon, just beyond the burning derrick. Someone

would have to brave the flames to get to them.

The three crept along the rig’s edge, holding one another by the shirttails. But when they

finally reached the generators, they could not get them to start.

Meanwhile, David Young, the chief mate, had discovered a new problem. Mr. Young was in

charge of the Horizon’s two firefighting teams, which practiced each Sunday. After the

explosions, he went to a fire locker and waited for his men to show up. Only one did.



But the death knell for the Horizon was the emergency disconnect system itself. Like so many

of the rig’s defenses, it failed to work for reasons that remain unclear.

There was nothing left for the crew to do but to get off the doomed rig before they all died.

‘We Got to Go’

Mr. Holloway and Mr. Barron ran along a catwalk toward the rig’s forward lifeboat deck.

They felt the second explosion, and for a sickening moment, it seemed as if the lifeboat was

going to plummet into the gulf. But it held fast.

He wanted to get people moving. Suddenly he became aware of a mass of dazed men coming

toward him. Some were shirtless or shoeless or wearing only underwear.

Together, they made their way to the lifeboats.

Of all the emergency procedures on the Horizon, evacuation was the most practiced. But the

routine rapidly disintegrated.

Inside the enclosed lifeboats, heat and smoke were building. Men began screaming at the

coxswains to launch. The burning derrick, they warned, might collapse on all of them.

He made a quick decision; he and a friend jumped into the gulf.

Mr. Holloway saw his friend Matt Hughes clinging to the handrail and urged him not to jump.

But Mr. Hughes lost his footing and fell, glancing off the rig and cartwheeling into the water.

Mr. Holloway climbed the rail, prepared to go after Mr. Hughes if he did not come up

swimming.

The gulf, he recalled, was as calm as a “mud puddle.” At last, Mr. Hughes popped up and

backstroked away.

He could hear the nitrogen tanks bursting on the main deck. The heat was suffocating.

10 Left Behind

Both lifeboats had left, but at least 10 people were still alive on the rig.

“That’s it,” Mr. Bertone said to his men. “Abandon ship.” The captain said it was time to go,

too.

The plan was for everyone to leave in an inflatable raft, a backup to the lifeboats. But this plan,

too, went awry. For all the evacuation drills, they had never rehearsed inflating and lowering



the raft. They had trouble freeing it from the deck, more trouble keeping it level and more

trouble still getting it loaded.

Small explosions kept going off around them, sending projectiles every which way. Intense

waves of heat were now coming up from under the rig.

The raft, far from full, began to descend, leaving several people on the deck. The raft pitched

and spun wildly and when it hit the gulf, she went tumbling into the water. The raft’s

remaining occupants were stuck under a burning, exploding, sinking oil rig, and they couldn’t

find the paddles.

Mr. Bertone jumped in the water and tried to drag the raft away. Others did, too. Then, out of

the smoke, he saw someone plunging at him.

Mr. Bertone could make out Mr. Williams up on the helicopter pad. He watched him sprint

and then leap, his legs churning as he arced into the sea.

Try as they might, they could not get the raft away from the rig. It turned out the raft was still

tied to it. Captain Kuchta thought fast. He swam to a rescue boat launched by the Bankston,

fetched a knife and returned to cut the raft free.

On the Bankston

When lifeboat No. 1 arrived, Mr. Holloway scrambled up a ladder to the deck. He was quickly

put to work directing the injured to a makeshift triage area..

Eventually he went to sign in with a man who had a list of the crew. The name of everyone who

had reported in was highlighted. Mr. Holloway scanned the list. Only two names from his

team were marked — his and Mr. Barron’s.

After the Coast Guard arrived and moved Mr. Wheeler and the other injured off the Bankston

by air

Ian Urbina contributed reporting.



causes of the spill

Coming Together

They say this could be the worst Eco disaster that the world has ever seen.

BP has asked anyone who was willing to listen to help contain this massive spill, they said if this hits

lands fall it could destroy the Eco systems on the hole eastern sea coast of the United States.

Right now they are very concerned about the extreme southern areas, but are keeping a very close

eye on the eastern part as well.

What Caused this Massive Spill ?

They know now it was a methane bubble that escaped from the well and shot up the drill column,

expanding very promptly as it blasted through several of the main seals, that's when the explosion

happened according to the Rig workers that were there.

Before all this happened, a group of BP Executives were on board celebrating the safety record of this

particular project, and at the time they were converting the rig from an exploration well to a production

well.

Way beneath the sea floor methane is in crystalline form, and at any given time they could hit that

nasty gas, that's just the chance they take with the Eco system.

As the methane bubble came up through the drill column from the high pressure environs of the deep

to the pressurized shallows, the bubble increased breaking through the safety barriers they said.

According to one interviewer a gas cloud surrounded the rig causing the drill head to run to fast, whichcaused it to explode and catch fire, with all that gas that was around the rig it was by Gods grace that

everyone wasn't killed at that time.




http://direxmd.hubpages.com/hub/Our-Future-is-Methane-Energy







What is being done to clean this up ?

The amount of Oil that is pouring into the Gulf in just one day is phenomenal, they say it's up to

210,000 gallons a day. For the Golf of Mexico clean and containment effort they are taking out all the

stops,

Experts have fixed one of the three leaks so far, and now are lowering down a containment vessel ontop of the main spill. which they say should contain about 85% of the spill if it works like they hope. But

on the other hand, the back up plan is to drill relief wells which could take up to three months.

Main industries like the fishing and tourism been hit very hard by this catastrophe. Tourism is very big

there as everyone knows, there are lots of family's canceling there holidays for good reason, but the

people who need them to make a living will be hit very hard in the pocket book by this.

The companies involved in the Gulf of Mexico oil spill made decisions to cut

costs and save time that contributed to the disaster, a US panel hasconcluded.

In a chapter of its final report, to be published next week, the presidentialcommission said the failures were "systemic" and likely to recur.

BP did not have adequate controls in place to ensure safety, it found.

BP said in a statement that the report, like its own investigation, had found theaccident was the result of multiple causes, involving multiple companies.

But, it said, the company was working with regulators "to ensure the lessonslearned from Macondo lead to improvements in operations and contractor servicesin deepwater drilling".

Continue reading the main story

Mardell: Failure of an industry

The new report criticises BP, which owned the Macondo well, Transocean andHalliburton, which managed the well-sealing operation, and blames inadequate

government oversight and regulation.

Specific risks the report identifies include:

Continue reading the main story

The report is likely to turn attention back to BP after several months in whichthe oil giant sought to turn the spotlight on its contractors”

Stephen Power and Ben CasselmanWall Street Journal

Commentators: implications of report

http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Chapter4.pdf



http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12124830#story_continues_2


http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/markmardell/2011/01/the_failure_of_an_industry.html




http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/seealso/2011/01/daily_view_blame_for_deepwater.html









A flawed design for the cement used to seal the bottom of the well

A test of that seal identified problems but was "incorrectly judged a success"

The workers' failure to recognise the first signs of the impending blow-out

"BP did not have adequate controls in place to ensure that key decisions in the

months leading up to the blow-out were safe or sound from an engineeringperspective."

He said that not all the faults lay with BP, although the company did have overallresponsibility.

David Shukman with the "top hats" used by BP to help seal oil leaks

"For example the lack of a proper test that was done and the cement that was usedto seal the bottom of the well, that was pretty clearly the direct responsibility ofHalliburton," he said.

"When the well started to blow there were decisions made by Transocean abouthow the material coming up the well was handled, and those were unfortunate,fateful, decisions which actually led to the explosion."

Most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a singleoverarching failure - a failure of management ”

National Oil Spill Commission report

Excerpts: BP oil spill report

Department of the Interior was understaffed, [and] didn't have the inspectors andtechnical analysts who were up to the task fully."

Though it lacked subpoena power, the panel reviewed thousands of pages ofdocuments, interviewed hundreds of witnesses, and in the autumn conducted aseries of public hearings.

"Rather, the root causes are systemic and, absent significant reform in bothindustry practices and government policies, might well recur."





























http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12125559





Hazardous effects of the spill:-

The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill "devastated" life on and near the

seafloor, a marine scientist has said.

Studies using a submersible found a layer, as much as 10cm thick in places, ofdead animals and oil, said Samantha Joye of the University of Georgia.

Knocking these animals out of the food chain will, in time, affect species relevant tofisheries.

Millions of barrels of oil spewed into the sea after a BP deepwater well ruptured inApril 2010.

Assessments of the clean-up effort have focused on the surface oil, but much oil remains at depth

Professor Joye told the American Association for the Advancement of Scienceconference in Washington that it may be a decade before the full effects on theGulf are apparent

Professor Joye and her colleagues used the Alvin submersible to explore thebottom-most layer of the water around the well head, known as the benthos.

"Filter-feeding organisms, invertebrate worms, corals, sea fans - all of those weresubstantially impacted - and by impacted, I mean essentially killed.

"Another critical point is that detrital feeders like sea cucumbers, brittle stars thatwander around the bottom, I didn't see a living (sea cucumber) around on any ofthe wellhead dives. They're typically everywhere, and we saw none."

Organisms on the seafloor stimulate the activity of micro-organisms and oxygenatethe sediments, two tasks at the bottom of the aquatic food chain that will inevitablyhave longer-term effects on species nearer the surface - including the ones we eat.

Scientists are still assessing the effects of the estimated 170 million gallons of oil that flooded intothe Gulf after the explosion of BP's Deepwater Horizon oil rig.



More than 8,000 birds, sea turtles, and marine mammals were found injured or dead in thesix months after the spill.

The long-term damage caused by the oil and the nearly 2 million gallons of chemical dispersantsused on the spill may not be known for years.

Immediate ImpactsIn the months following the Gulf oil disaster, wildlife managers, rescue crews, scientists andresearchers saw many immediate impacts of the oil impacting wildlife.

Oil coated birds' feathers , causing birds to lose their buoyancy and the ability to regulatebody temperature.

Mammals could have ingested oil , which causes ulcers and internal bleeding. Sea turtles were covered in oil Dead and dying deep sea corals were discovered seven miles from the Deepwater Horizon

well.

Long Term ImpactsThough oil is no longer readily visible on the surface, it isn’t gone. Scientists have found significant amounts on

the Gulf floor, and the oil that has already washed into wetlands and beaches will likely persist for years. We

likely will not see the full extent of impacts for many years, which makes creating and implementing successful

restoration plans a serious challenge.

Unbalanced Food Web - The Gulf oil disaster hit at the peak breeding season for many species of fish

and wildlife. The oil’s toxicity may have hit egg and larval organisms immediately, diminishing or even

wiping out those age classes. Without these generations,population dips and cascading food web

effects may become evident in the years ahead.

Decreased Fish and Wildlife Populations - Scientists will be watching fluctuations in wildlife

populations for years to come. It wasn't until four years after the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil disaster that the

herring population collapsed. Twenty years later, it is still has not recovered.

Decline in Recreation - The Gulf Coast states rely heavily on commercial fishing and outdoor recreationto sustain their local economies. According to NOAA, commercial fisheries brought in $659 million in

shellfish and finfish in 2008, and just over 3 million people took recreational fishing trips in the Gulf

that year. After the spill,recreational fishing from the Atchafalaya Delta to Mobile Bay was shut down from

May to August, and state park closures dealt a serious blow to the parks' summer revenue.

RESPONSE OF BP

BP's Attempt at Redemption

80


http://www.nwf.org/Oil-Spill/Effects-on-Wildlife/Birds.aspx



http://www.nwf.org/Oil-Spill/Effects-on-Wildlife/Mammals.aspx



http://www.nwf.org/Oil-Spill/Effects-on-Wildlife/Sea-Turtles.aspx


http://blog.nwf.org/wildlifepromise/2010/11/coral-damage-how-long-will-gulf-oil-disaster-impacts-linger/


http://blog.nwf.org/wildlifepromise/2010/11/questions-remain-how-will-the-oil-disaster-affect-the-gulf%E2%80%99s-food-web/




http://www.nwf.org/Oil-Spill/Effects-on-Wildlife/Compare-Exxon-Valdez-and-BP-Oil-Spills.aspx



http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sf/deepwater_horizon/Fish_economics_FACT_SHEET.pdf



http://www.nwf.org/News-and-Magazines/Media-Center/News-by-Topic/Wildlife/2010/12-14-10-Create-New-Recreation-Areas.aspx



http://wolfpack5.hubpages.com/hub/BPs-Attempt-at-Redemption#rate




















BP's first Attempt

The contractors that are over seeing this cleanup effort had set the containment box at the point wherethey felt was the main spill area. It didn't work anything like they hoped it would.

There was ice like crystals that formed on top of the container which clogged up when it was lowered

down in the main flow area. It's being attempted again, but this time it's being put 1600 feet away from

its initial site, which they hope will fix that problem.

BP's failure of their first attempt is not going to discourage them from trying again, this time they are

going to use a smaller containment box. With their crippled equipment on the ocean floor, they know

their time is running out.

BP said their new replacement box could be in as soon as five days. But the best chance of success is

still the original idea they said. As of May 9th, they began digging a relief well in hopes that it will

permanently stop the gushing oil, and it could take a month or more until it's up and running.










http://gorgeously.hubpages.com/hub/Garbage-In-The-Sea






They have estimated that 3.5 million gallons has been lost since the accident, it could surpass 11

million gallons that was lost at the Exxon Valdez disaster by months end if it isn't contained soon.

Philip Johnson, a petroleum engineering Professor from the University of Alabama, said cutting the

riser pipe and slipping a larger pipe over the cut end could possibly divert the flow of oil to the surface.

BP's Mark Proegler said that it was a good idea, and we could make it work, but its a dangerous play

mainly because if it slips off, it would be a bigger pipe and as such it would pump out oil even faster

than it is now.

On May 8th, there was some slug that worked its way to Dauphin Island, which is just three miles from

the Alabama shoreline, it was a huge wake up call for BP and everyone else involved.

Right now BP scientist are asking for any suggestions on how to contain this oil spill, the pressure and

frustration has to be spiraling out of control. I Pray to God that they find a way to fix this problem soon.

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill:

Highlighted Actions and Issues

Curry L. Hagerty

Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy

Jonathan L. Ramseur

Specialist in Environmental Policy

May 11, 2011

http://billyaustindillon.hubpages.com/hub/BP-Gulf-Oil-Spill-Disaster



http://wolfpack5.hubpages.com/hub/The-Annihilation-and-Devestation-of-the-Philippine-Mangroves-in-the-Panay-Islands







CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

R41407

http://www.crs.gov/

http://www.crs.gov/



Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Actions and Issues

Summary

This report highlights actions taken and issues raised as a result of the April 20, 2010, explosionon the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig, and the resulting oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

Readers can access more extensive discussions in various CRS reports, identified at the end of this report.

Members in the 112th Congress continue to express concerns regarding various oil spill-relatedpolicy matters. At least three committees in both the House and the Senate have held hearings onissues associated with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Members have introduced multipleproposals that would address various issues, including:

• the regulatory regime for outer continental shelf (OCS) oil exploration anddevelopment activities;

• the liability and compensation framework created by the 1990 Oil Pollution Act;

• technological challenges involved with deepwater activities;

• response activities (e.g., the use of chemical dispersants) and decision-making.

However, some argue that, in response to the Deepwater Horizon incident, the Administration hasadopted less than optimal policies toward offshore oil exploration and development. Expressingthis viewpoint, some Members have offered proposals that seek to spur offshore oil explorationand development. Three such proposals (H.R. 1229, H.R. 1230, and H.R. 1231) were reported bythe House Committee on Natural Resources on May 2, 2011. On May 5, 2011, the House passedH.R. 1230, which directs the Secretary of the Interior to conduct four oil and gas lease sales — three in the Gulf of Mexico and one off the coast of Virginia — within specific time frames.

Future congressional activity may be influenced by several factors, including conditions in theGulf region, independent inquiries, judicial actions, and the availability of data for further study.

Multiple executive branch agencies continue to respond to the incident within the framework of the National Contingency Plan. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard plays a key role in responseefforts, because the spill occurred in the coastal zone. In addition, the Bureau of Ocean EnergyManagement, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE), formerly known as the MineralsManagement Service (MMS), initiated internal procedures for safety inspections and otherregulatory functions for offshore operations.

As a responsible party for the spill, BP worked to control the well and the spill and continues toperform cleanup measures at the direction of the federal government. According to BP’s recentfinancial statements, the total costs of the 2010 Gulf spill are projected to dwarf those of theExxon Valdez. In its 2010 financial statement, BP estimated the combined oil spill costs —

cleanup, natural resource and economic damages, potential Clean Water Act (CWA) penalties,and other obligations — will be approximately $41 billion.





Contents

Overview of Spill Response Efforts............................................................................................. 1

Congressional Actions........................................................................................................... 1

Executive Branch Actions ..................................................................................................... 2Responsible Party Actions ..................................................................................................... 2

Issues Raised by the Gulf Spill .................................................................................................... 3

Statutory and Regulatory Framework .................................................................................... 3Prevention and Containment Technology for Deepwater Oil Spills ........................................ 4Relief Wells .................................................................................................................. ........ 4Dispersants .......................................................................................................................... . 4Liability and Compensation Framework ................................................................................ 4

Factors Influencing Future Congressional Action ........................................................................ 5

Conditions in the Gulf ........................................................................................................ ... 5Independent Inquiries ............................................................................................................ 5Judicial Activity . .................................................................................................................. . 6Further Research .............................................................................................................. ..... 6

CRS Reports for Further Reading ................................................................................................ 6

Contacts

Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 8





Overview of Spill Response Efforts

In the aftermath of the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig on April 20,2010, the federal government and responsible parties faced an unprecedented challenge in the

Gulf of Mexico. Never before had a subsea drilling system blowout of this magnitude, or an oilspill of this size — estimated at approximately 206 million gallons (4.9 million barrels) — occurredin U.S. waters. The spill continued for approximately 84 days, until, following several attempts,responders gained control of the oil discharge on July 15, 2010.

• Response activities continue but have diminished substantially compared to theheight of operations. During the 2010 summer, personnel levels rose to 47,000;vessel numbers approached 7,000. Approximately 2,000 federal responsepersonnel remain in the Gulf region (as of April 8, 2011). For updated responseactivity see the Unified Command website at http://www.restorethegulf.gov.

• The natural resources damage assessment (NRDA) process is progressing asfederal and state natural resource trustees have moved from a pre-assessment

phase to a restoration planning phase.

• On behalf of BP, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF) continues tocompensate parties for economic losses resulting from the oil spill. As of May 2,2011, the GCCF has awarded over $4 billion to individuals and businesses.

Much of this material is covered in greater detail in the CRS reports listed in the ―FurtherReading‖ section at the end of this report. Citations and footnotes are available in each of thesereports, but are not included in this abridged version.

Congressional Actions

Although attention to issues raised by the 2010 Gulf oil spill has arguably diminished in the 112

th

Congress (relative to activity in the 111th Congress — see text box below), some Memberscontinue to express concerns regarding various oil spill-related policy matters. At least threecommittees in both the House and the Senate have held hearings on issues associated with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Several of these hearing dealt with recommendations made by theNational Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, whichissued its final report in January 2011. Members have introduced at least 25 proposals that would

address various issues. Some of the bills are similar (if not identical) to proposals from the 111th

Congress. Other bills reflect recommendations by the commission.

Activity in the 111th Congress

During and shortly after the heightened spill response operations, Senate and House committees in the 111th

Congress held more than 60 hearings on a variety of issues. Members introduced more than 150 legislative

proposals related to oil spill matters. The 111th Congress enacted three of these proposals into law (P.L. 111-

191, P.L. 111-212, and P.L. 111-281). Provisions in these laws generally concerned short-term matters that will

not have a lasting impact on oil spill governance. However, H.R. 3619, the Coast Guard Authorization Act for

Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, which the President signed October 15, 2010 (P.L. 111-281), includes more

substantial changes. In addition to the enacted legislation, the House in the 111th Congress passed several

bills, including H.R. 3534 (the Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act, or CLEAR Act) that

included multiple oil spill provisions. The Senate had comparable bills on its legislative calendar, but did not

vote on their passage.

http://www.restorethegulf.gov/

http://www.restorethegulf.gov/



Congressional Research Service 1




Some argue that, in response to the Deepwater Horizon incident, the Administration has adoptedless than optimal policies toward offshore oil exploration and development. Thus, some Memberhave offered proposals that seek to spur offshore oil exploration and development. Three suchproposals (H.R. 1229, H.R. 1230, and H.R. 1231) were reported by the House Committee onNatural Resources on May 2, 2011. On May 5, 2011, the House passed H.R. 1230, which directs

the Secretary of the Interior to conduct four oil and gas lease sales — three in the Gulf of Mexicoand one off the coast of Virginia — within specific time frames.

Executive Branch Actions

Pursuant to the framework of the National Contingency Plan (discussed below), theAdministration’s response involves multiple agencies. As this spill occurred in the coastal zone,an on-scene coordinator (OSC) from the U.S. Coast Guard directs and coordinates the on-siteactivities of federal, state, local, and private entities (e.g., BP). This framework of multiple partiesworking together under the leadership of the federal government is referred to as the UnifiedCommand.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary, Janet Napolitano, coordinates federalefforts and chairs the National Response Team, an organization of 16 federal departments andagencies. Upon classifying the event as a spill of national significance (SONS), SecretaryNapolitano appointed retired Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen as National Incident Commander,a role that dissolved in October 2010.

Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar deployed Deputy Secretary David J. Hayes as theDepartment’s liaison to the Gulf for response efforts. As discussed below, in a related initiative,Secretary Salazar issued an administrative order to restructure the Bureau of Ocean EnergyManagement, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) — formerly known as the MineralsManagement Service (MMS) and hereinafter referred to as BOEMRE.

In addition to various regulatory actions within BOEMRE, the Department of Justice (DOJ)initiated a civil proceeding on December 15, 2010, against BP and other defendants. Among otherthings, the civil action seeks penalties pursuant to the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1321). Due touncertainty regarding several factors, including the spill’s estimated volume, any possiblepenalties remain a matter of conjecture.

Responsible Party Actions

As an identified responsible party (others may also be legally responsible), BP is liable forcleanup costs, natural resource damages, and various economic damages. As a member of theUnified Command, BP has played a key role in response actions. Although efforts by BP to stop

the uncontrolled oil flow from the well included a series of failed engineering and re-engineeringmethods, BP contained the well on July 15, 2010. In addition, BP has worked at the direction of the Coast Guard to mitigate the oil spill and its impacts.

The total costs of the 2010 Gulf spill are projected to dwarf those of the Exxon Valdez. In its 2010financial statement, BP estimated the combined oil spill costs — cleanup, natural resource andeconomic damages, potential Clean Water Act (CWA) penalties, and other obligations — will beapproximately $41 billion. This estimate includes payments made to date as well as projectedfuture payments, such as claims. However, BP acknowledges the difficulty in estimating some





costs and does not include these costs in its projection. Therefore, this estimate is subject toconsiderable uncertainty.

Issues Raised by the Gulf Spill

This section briefly highlights some of the issues raised in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil

spill, many of which were not resolved during the 111 th Congress. Issues raised by the spillinclude scrutiny of the regulatory regime for outer continental shelf (OCS) exploration anddevelopment activities; concerns about liability and compensation; the technological challenge of some deepwater activity; and other matters related to response activities.

Statutory and Regulatory Framework

During the height of the spill response, some observers raised concerns about who was in chargeand under what statutory authority decisions were made. The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) and the

Clean Water Act (CWA) are the primary federal statutes governing the federal response to oilspills. These laws provide the President with broad authority to direct or monitor all federal, state,local, and private activities in response to an oil spill.

The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) contains thefederal government’s regulatory and operative requirements for responding to an oil spill (orhazardous substance release) into or on navigable waters and other specified locations. Firstdeveloped through administrative processes in 1968, the NCP has been amended by subsequentlaws, including the CWA and the OPA in 1990. Oil spill response actions required under theregulations of the NCP are binding and enforceable, per these enforcement authorities.

Stakeholders raised various issues during response operations, including (1) the relationshipbetween the federal government and the responsible party and (2) confusion regarding the role of state and local governments during oil spill responses.

In the aftermath of the Gulf spill, the regulatory framework for outer continental shelf (OCS)activities continues to be subject to heightened scrutiny. OCS activities are primarily regulated byBOEMRE/MMS and the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard generally oversees the systems andworker safety at the platform (or surface) level of mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) suchas the Deepwater Horizon. The sub-platform (i.e., underwater or sea floor) drilling systems arewithin the jurisdiction of BOEMRE.

Prior to the 2010 Gulf spill, members of Congress had focused on addressing a range of potentialconcerns at BOEMRE/MMS, including mismanagement, ethical shortcomings, mission conflicts,and, in some instances, agency capture by its regulated industry. These concerns have increased

since the Gulf incident. To address them, on May 19, 2010, Interior Secretary Salazar issued anadministrative order dividing MMS into three new offices, to separate three of the agency’sfunctions: enforcement, energy development, and revenue collection. The Secretary issued theMMS name change one month after the reorganization order.





Prevention and Containment Technology for Deepwater Oil Spills

After observing recent operations in the Gulf, many have questioned the ability of industry and thefederal government to prevent or respond to a significant blowout at substantial water depths.Although a blowout preventer (BOP) is designed as the last line of defense, and is built to include

multiple backup mechanisms to stop an uncontrolled release, the Gulf incident demonstrated thatBOPs are not failsafe. The Gulf response highlighted the technological challenges involved withcontaining an oil release 5,000 feet below the ocean surface. At these depths, equipment must becontrolled by operators thousands of feet above and be able to withstand high pressures and lowtemperatures, which pose multiple engineering challenges. For example, when BP first attemptedto intercept the oil and gas and divert it to the surface, solid methane hydrates formed and cloggedthe equipment intended to divert oil to the surface.

Relief Wells

The Administration and some members of Congress expressed interest in establishing a policy forrelief wells. A relief well is drilled to intersect a well that has suffered a blowout and itsconstruction is similar to an exploratory well. As the Gulf incident has demonstrated, deep relief wells can take months to reach their target. Drilling a relief well concurrently with drilling anexploration or development well would likely shorten the time between a blowout and when aleak is plugged. However, requiring a concurrent relief well is not a risk-free proposal: apossibility would exist for a blowout from the relief well itself; and a concurrent well wouldsignificantly increase costs and affect project schedules.

Dispersants

Dispersants are chemical agents that enhance the breakup of oil into small oil droplets that mixwith the water column. Federal responders have allowed for the use of approximately 1.8 million

gallons of dispersants in the Gulf. While dispersants have proven effective in breaking up the oilon the surface, questions remain about the fate of the dispersed oil and the chemical dispersantsand their short- and long-term environmental impacts.

Liability and Compensation Framework

The Gulf spill placed a spotlight on the liability and compensation framework established by OPAin 1990. With some exceptions (whose applicability in the Deepwater Horizon incident has notbeen determined), the liability of a party responsible for an oil spill is limited. For example, thelease or permit holder of an offshore facility (e.g., BP) is liable for all removal (i.e., cleanup)costs, but liability for other damages/costs is capped at $75 million. If a party’s liability limit is

met (and the party denies claims above its limit), claims for compensation may be awarded up toa per-incident cap of $1 billion through the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which is managed bythe Coast Guard.

BP has awarded claims exceeding its (conditional) liability limit. The Obama Administration andBP jointly announced on June 16, 2010, the creation of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF),an independent claims facility administered by Kenneth Feinberg, to process claims forindividuals and businesses. BP continues to finance the GCCF with incremental payments, whichwill eventually total $20 billion. Although the GCCF has awarded over $4 billion (as of May 2,





2011), it has received considerable attention, with some raising questions about its effectivenessin compensating injured parties.

Factors Influencing Future Congressional Action

Several factors may influence future congressional action regarding the 2010 Gulf incident. Theseare discussed below.

Conditions in the Gulf

The perceived state of conditions in the Gulf will likely be as influential as the actual conditions,which may be difficult to conclusively assess and which will change over time. Extensive datawas collected during the spill. Peer review reports (which are generally published many monthsafter data collection) and other assessments of these data may spur legislative activity, dependingon the conclusions drawn in and from these reports.

On November 23, 2010, the federal government released a peer-reviewed publication thatprovided an oil budget estimate (i.e., an estimate of what happened to the oil). At the time of thesecalculations, a substantial portion of the oil had been effectively removed from the Gulf environment through human interaction. However, a greater portion remained, in some form, inthe Gulf. It is unknown what then happened to the oil that remained in the Gulf.

It is debatable whether the fate of the remaining oil will ever be established conclusively.Multiple challenges hinder this objective, and as time progresses, determining the fate of the oilwill likely become more difficult. Researchers are continuing to study various components of theGulf. Some of these efforts may provide clues to the oil’s fate.

A related issue is how one defines the scope of the oil spill cleanup and restoration. For example,should the objective be to return the Gulf to pre-spill conditions or to attempt a morecomprehensive restoration of the region? These different perspectives may influencepolicymakers.

Independent Inquiries

Several investigations and commissions — both federal and private — have been initiated toexamine issues surrounding the Deepwater Horizon incident. For example, the NationalCommission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling was established by thePresident on May 22, 2010, to investigate root causes of the accident and to providerecommendations. The commission submitted its final report to the President on January 12,

2011. Findings and recommendations from this body and others may influence futurecongressional action.

In addition, BOEMRE and the U.S. Coast Guard convened a Joint Investigation with the purposeto develop conclusions and recommendations as they relate to the Deepwater Horizon incident.The final report is scheduled for July 27, 2011.




Deepwater Horizon Oil

Spill: Highlighted

Actions and Issues

Judicial Activity

Measures taken by the government and the private sector after

a major accident sometimes involve the judicial system. Theoutcome of judicial proceedings can influence the actions of the executive branch or of Congress. There are several active judicial proceedings in federal and state courts related to oiland gas activity in the Gulf region; some of these deal with theDeepwater Horizon incident and its direct and indirect impacts.It is unclear how this judicial activity may affect federal OCSpermitting, oil spill damage assessments and other mattersrelated to oversight of oil and natural gas leasing in the Gulf of Mexico.

One example of a judicial proceeding that may influence

policymakers is a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) civilproceeding initiated on December 15, 2010, against BP andother defendants related to the Deepwater Horizon incident.In this matter DOJ charges BP and others with violationsrelated to federal safety and operation requirements at theDeepwater Horizon drilling site. DOJ seeks to recoverremoval costs, economic costs, environmental damages andcivil penalties pursuant to both Oil Pollution Act and theClean Water Act.

Further Research1

An accident or natural disaster of national interest posesimmediate demands for research, data, and statistics. In thecase of the Deepwater Horizon incident, data on deepwateractivities and vicinities are generally not viewed as robust,and some question the adequacy and objectivity of dataimmediately available for congressional hearings and otherdeliberations. Most observers anticipate that further researchon these matters will be a useful tool for policymakers. Theavailability of data about federally regulated offshoreactivities, particularly in deepwater areas, seems to be afactor that would influence future congressional action.

Deep Sea Oil Spill Cleanup Techniques:

Applicability, Trade-offs and Advantages by Pam Graham

As the explosion of BP’s Deepwater Horizon oilrig in the Gulf of Mexico has shown, recovering

large amounts of crude oil from aspill is a daunting task. The range of clean-up efforts varies widely and



depends on a number of fac-tors, including oiltype and density, water tem-perature, thevolume of the spill, proximity to shorelines,waves, currents, weather and speed of response,among others. From low-tech ap-proaches, suchas physical containment and skimming andburning, to high-tech methods that usesophisticated dispersants – giant separa-tors that

basically vacuum oil from the surface – andseeding with oil-eating microorganisms, thetechnique(s) applied to any given spill must becarefully chosen.

Workers shovel oiled sand hit by theBP Deepwater Horizon oil Saul Loeb, Getty Images, 06-13-2010,Taken from ProQuest’s eLibrary

The principal U.S. federal agency in charge of funding and coordinating oil spill response re-

search for the past 25 years, the Minerals Management Service, has focused on technologies todetect, contain and clean up oil spills that may occur on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf. ThisDiscovery Guide takes a brief look at detection technologies and more thoroughly explores theadvantages and trade-offs inherent in today's most viable oil spill remediation technologies.

Countless marine and terrestrial wildlife species rely on sea and coastal habitats for food, coverand breeding space, creating a variety of ways for spilled oil to threaten fish, birds, mammals andreptiles. This Discovery Guide ends with a discussion of cleaning and rehabilitation of oil-im-pacted wildlife.

Since the universally recognized key to avoiding catastrophic damage is fast response, the effec-

tiveness of any cleanup effort begins with timely detection and accurate appraisal of an oil spill’ssource, location, size, thickness, depth and more.

Detection and Assessment of an Oil Spill’s Extent

For the foreseeable future, as today, spill response will depend on the ability to trap and removeoil. That reality places heavy importance on the speed and accuracy of detection, because thesephysical methods, according to Larry Nies, a professor of civil engineering at Purdue University,are generally most effective if you get there in time and are the first line of defense." [1]

In practice, the majority of oil spill detection continues to be performed by the least costlymethod: visual observation from the air, along with still and video photography. But the many

©2010 ProQuest Released August 2010 1



Graham: Oil Spill Cleanup

critical deficiencies of this approach include limitations on seeing ability imposed by atmos-pheric and sea conditions, as well as complete inoperability in rain, fog or darkness. The Miner-als Management Service (MMS) warns that all estimates of oil thickness and coverage by visualobservations should be viewed with considerable caution.

Oil spreading north-east from the leaking Deepwater Horizon well in the Gulf of Mexico.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:BP_Oilspill_June25.2010.jpg

Increasingly, aircraft-based remote sensors (which work by detecting color, reflectance, tem-perature, roughness and other sea surface properties) are proving useful in a variety of oil spilldetection modes, such as large area surveillance, site specific monitoring, and tactical assistancein emergencies. [2] Yet, while airborne sensors offer greater accuracy and the advantage of oper-ating beyond the optical spectral region, they are expensive and require highly trained personnelto control the systems and interpret results.

At the top end of spill detection technology, the ideal system: 1. would be completely automaticto reduce operational staff,2. would be capable of delivering real-time data (including wave andcurrent information) with no need for post-processing, and 3. would be able to see oil spills inthe dark, enabling 24-hour vigilance.

In 2005, a Norway-based company developed a system that satisfies some of these requirementsby capturing and processing digitized radar images from standard X-band navigation radars. Thesystem features a user-friendly graphical interface that shows the oil spill, its area, velocity andother information valuable for a discovery and recovery operation. This technology is based onthe fact that areas covered by oil will reflect less microwave power due to dampening of sea sur-face capillary waves. [3] These very short waves, or tiny ripples, are the predominant scatterersof microwave radiation from the ocean’s surface. A coating of oil changes the water’s surface

tension in a way that reduces the presence of capillary waves, resulting in less microwave radia-tion. So, sections covered in oil show up as dark areas in radar sea surface images. [4]

Other research seeks to get a jump on detection by accurately predicting slick trajectories usingdata such as salinity, temperature, bottom pressure, and number and area of the slicks, obtainedfrom an array of orbital satellites. A recently proposed computational methodology uses the

ProQuest Discovery Guides http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/discoveryguides-main.php Released August 2010

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Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) methodology to forecast the probability of finding oil in certainopen sea areas after an oil spill. [5] CBR depends on the case base, a database where a collectionof problems is stored, keeping a relationship with the solutions to every problem stored, whichgives the system the ability to generalize in order to solve new problems and predict outcomes.[6]

Currently, there are two critical shortfalls in the technical ability to measure and assess the ex-tent of marine environment oil spills. Thickness sensors, which would be valuable as triage toolsfor targeting the thickest portions first, do not yet exist. Additionally, there is no practical ap-proach to remotely detecting or mapping oil trapped in, under, on or among ice. [7]

Another fairly recent addition to the spill cleanup team's arsenal is a series of data-gatheringbuoys and other ocean-based instruments that allow response teams to get a real-time sense of the conditions at sea.

Regardless of the sophistication of the detection system, once government and oil company offi-cials have been notified of a spill, they are dependent on the system’s data and analysis to

quickly make targeted decisions and immediately deploy the appropriate containment andcleanup measures.

Containment: Oil Booms

When oil is accidentally released into a body of water, the most urgent priority is limiting thespill’s spread to minimize the natural resources at risk and to facilitate cleanup and removal.Swift and skillful deployment of a containment boom is essential for achieving both of thesegoals.

Boom Basics

SOUDA BAY, Crete, Greece (July 23, 2008) An oil spillresponse team at U.S. Naval Support Activity deploysa "Harbour Buster" high-speed oil containmentsystem U.S. Navy photo by Mr. Paul Farley/Releasedhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:080723-N-0780F-002.jpg

Because oil is less dense than water, it rises tothe surface, where floating fences called boomscan corral it. In its simplest form, a boom con-sists of a length of rugged fabric with buoyantfiller stitched into the side intended to floatabove the water, and a heavy chain or otherballast inserted into the bottom to weigh downthe sub-surface skirt and make it sink. Boommaterial is brightly colored for ease of recoveryand to help crews spot a break in the line. Thefreeboard (above surface) component is com-

monly designed to reduce splash-over, whilethe skirt is engineered to keep oil from escapingbeneath the boom.

Under ideal conditions, a spill is quickly con-tained by booms strung end to end until they


3




completely encircle the floating oil. Realistically, however, a number of factors, such as watercurrent, wave height, wind velocity and oil viscosity steadily work to churn up the surface andhamper a boom’s capacity to contain oil. [8] The result is that in heavy seas or during roughweather, some of the oil sloshes over and under the boom, making a single line inadequate.These cases require multiple concentric circles of oil boom extending over increasing diameters

until the spatial extent of the leak is contained.

When a slick becomes too dispersed for circular containment or when it begins to approach land,a mobile retention boom, with or without a built-in recovery system or skimmer, can be deployedto assist the oil roundup.

Modified Boom

A variety of booms designed to repel water (hydrophobic) and soak up oil (oleophilic) serve as abackup or replacement for physical containment booms. Unlike barrier-only booms, absorbentbooms are lightweight, easy to deploy, and have the ability to simultaneously contain a spill andbegin the recovery process. They also require timely retrieval or an anchor point to prevent

sinking as the booms become heavy with oil.

Commercial absorbent booms are commonly made of an outer mesh with polypropylene fillerand are engineered for easy deployment and maximum absorbency, as well as a long flotationperiod.

While booms made of natural sorbents [9] like hair, hay and even a 3,000-year-old Egyptian hi-biscus plant called kenaf [10] reflect the largely low-tech measures still used to clean up oilspills, they are also environmentally safe and stimulate community involvement. [11]

Often functioning as the first and last line of defense in an oil spill, booms are meant to bothcontain and concentrate the oil close to the source, so it can be skimmed or vacuumed from the

surface by other equipment, and then prevent the oil that manages to get through from washingup on beaches or marshes.

Mechanical Recovery: Skimmers and Separators

Once booms have concentrated oil in sufficiently thick layers on top of the water, mechanicalmethods such as skimming, separating and vacuuming can be mobilized where conditions arefavorable. But because these techniques take place at the surface, they are subject to the samedisruptions that applied to booms, particularly those posed by wind, waves and currents.

Skimmers

Skimmers are slow yet very effective machines used for surface removal in calm or shelteredwaters and along shorelines. They work by taking advantage of the adhesive nature of the oil,which will cling to any surface that it comes into contact with. Using rotation, suction, gravity orother forces to drive motion, these machines: 1. provide a never-ending surface for the spilledpetroleum to cling to, 2. clean the surface, and 3. repeat that process continuously. [12]


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solved and emulsified oil from the heavy use of dispersants), another invention could soup-upseparators by blasting these stubborn hangers-on with microwaves. Idaho National Laboratorychemist David Meikrantz, on whose patented technology Kevin Costner’s Ocean Therapy Solu-tions based its separators, says microwaves add a little turbo boost that can give centrifuge separatorshigher throughput and better efficiency. [18]

The video referenced to the right demonstratesthe separation principle for one of these com-mercially available vortex-driven separators.

When the primary fluid enters the separator, animpeller creates a cyclonic flow that forces theheavier water outside the stream, while thelighter oil is drawn inward to form a centralcore. At the exit of the separation chamber, theseparated streams are collected and the primary(clean) fluid is released for discharge.

Mechanical collection by skimmers and sepa-rators cannot recover all the petroleum dumpedin a major spill, a deepwater leak or a spill in

rough waters where oil is rapidly churned and emulsified. These situations require chemical, mi-crobial and other more experimental types of intervention such as airplane-deployed robots thatcordon off the oil and use centrifuge separators to collect oil for refining, [19] non-toxic superab-sorbent polymer powder that forms a sponge-like material when sprinkled on an oil slick and iseasily removed from the surface, [20] new high-speed skimming vessels that not only work fast,but can handle the rough seas that hamper current mechanical methods, and products likeAerogel, a reusable sponge-like material (composed of 2 percent clay, 2 percent plastic and 96

percent air) that’s capable of absorbing oil and leaving water behind. [21]

Cleanup: Chemicals and Microbes

Dispersants

Dispersants are chemical formulations composed of solvents, surfactants and other additives thatdisrupt the solid surface of an oil slick by reducing the surface tension between oil and water.Composed of molecules with a water-compatible (hydrophilic) end and an oil-compatible (lipo-philic) end, dispersants link an oil droplet to nearby water molecules and allow the natural agita-tion caused by waves and wind to pull the droplets apart into increasingly smaller droplets.Unlike the large, free oil droplets that float in a two-dimensional slick at the surface of the water,

these smaller droplets eventually become heavier than water and sink (spread in three dimen-sions) into the water column, or the vertical expanse of water extending from the sea surface tobottom sediments.


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Oil Spill Cleanup. EVTN: able to launch a voraxialseparator unit for oil spill response. [18]




The action of dispersants does notchange the total amount of oil leakedinto the environment. It simply changesthe oil’s transport, fate and potential ef-fects. Surface oil not only poses the

greatest danger to exposed seabirds, tur-tles and fur-bearing marine mammals, itis also the main threat to biologicallysensitive shorelines and economicallyimportant beaches. But since both thedispersants and the dispersed oil aretoxic (in varying degrees, according tothe type of oil spilled and the chemicalagent used) to animals living underwa-ter, coral reefs and other marine life,

[22] decisions to use dispersants involve trade-offs between decreasing the risk to water surface

and shoreline habitats while increasing the potential harm to organisms in the water column andon the seafloor. [23] For these reasons, decisions concerning the use of dispersants are usuallybased on a broad assessment of the overall environmental impact of a specific spill. [24]

Once the decision to use dispersants has been made, there are additional considerations such aschoosing the most effective commercial product and determining the optimal application system.

Dispersant acceptance and product effectiveness criteria vary from country to country. Oil spillsin the United States have been limited primarily to offshore marine waters where water salinitiesare high, so there has been an emphasis on dispersants formulated to work in relatively high sa-linity water and some are known to lose their effectiveness when applied in fresh or brackishwater. In Canada, a number of federal and provincial agencies are responsible for specific as-

pects of spill response and planning, but as in the U.S., Canada lacks a decision guide and spe-cific criteria for dispersant use in fresh water. France is the only country with published informa-tion on dispersant use policies and criteria for their use specific to freshwater. [25] Australia’s Guidelines for Acceptance is a clear and informative publication within that country’s National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and Other Noxious and Hazardous Substances. [26]

Whatever dispersant formulation(s) the agencies in charge of a spill select, they must design anapplication system (aboard aircraft or marine vessels) capable of meeting several basic criteria,including the ability: 1. to spray dispersant uniformly on the oil, 2. to disperse a droplet size thatencourages mixing with the oil and ease of movement to the oil-water interface, 3. to attain theproper concentration at the oil-water interface, and 4. to deliver sufficient energy to disperse the

slick into droplets. [27]

There is evidence that dispersed oil degrades more quickly than oil that has not been dispersed.So, ultimately, a successful dispersant operation would end in dispersed oil droplets being proc-essed in the marine ecosystem and degrading into naturally occurring substances. This processstarts with the droplets of oil and dispersant being colonized by bacteria that then begin to de-


7

An airplane applies dispersant to a streamer of oil.National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrationhttp://response.restoration.noaa.gov/




grade them. Next, protozoans and nematodes (small worms) join the colonies. Eventually, the oilmay be further broken down and incorporated into the food web. [28] However, some researchraises concerns that certain microbes may chew up the dispersant molecules instead of dining onthe oil. [29]

Microbes

Bioremediation (the use of natural microorganisms, plants or fungi to correct a contaminated oraltered environment) may have a role to play in restoring oil-contaminated environments andhabitats. But when it comes to using microorganisms and their enzymes to return areas to theiroriginal conditions, there are two opposing schools of thought. Many scientists agree that natu-rally occurring bacteria capable of degrading oil are already present in marine environments, butthe limited availability of nutrients like nitrogen and phosphorus prevent the oil-eaters from per-forming to their full potential. [30]

Others, like Ben Lyons, a research scientist and engineer at the small biotech firm Evolugate,think greater potential lies in seeding oil spills with more bacteria. Lyons says, Our methodol -

ogy is, you’ve got to get oil from the actual site where you’re going to be putting the microbes.As the experiments go forward, Thomas Lyons (no relation to Ben Lyons), Evolugate’s principalresearch scientist, says that his staff will collect more samples from the waters and marshes alongthe Gulf Coast and attempt to evolve designer communities for each sample. [31] But, ac-cording to Ronald Atlas of the University of Louisville, who has been studying oil-spill biore-mediation since 1968, field studies show that adding new microbes is no more valuable than pro-viding nutrients to the ones already there.

Because ecosystems are complex systems of finely tuned, interconnected parts that thrive onvery symbiotic relationships, they can be damaged by anything that disrupts the balance of inter-actions that take place within them. A major known consequence of subsea oil plumes is that

they lead to a bloom in oil-chomping microbes that eat the oil, but use oxygen in the process — meaning that oxygen levels in the water can drop rapidly and threaten marine life. [32] Atlasadmits that seeding an oil spill with microbes has no environmental drawback, although provid-ing too much fertilizer can cause die-offs by triggering damaging algal blooms.

For a variety of reasons, bioremediation will likely remain a secondary weapon, most effectiveafter mechanical and physical efforts at containment and cleanup have been exhausted, in thefight to minimize the environmental damage of oil-contaminated water and coastal areas. Onedownside to using bioremediation in the initial cleanup is that it’s a slow process that doesn’tsatisfy the urgency of first response efforts to minimize environmental threats. Also, bioreme-diation isn’t a practical approach far offshore, where high energy and waves can quickly dilutenutrients the microbes need to thrive. [33] The final battle line, rescue and rehabilitation, comesafter the oil has escaped containment, evaded cleanup and penetrated the living spaces of count-less marine and terrestrial wildlife species.


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Remediation: Wildlife Rescue and Rehabilitation

Oil spills kill wildlife and cause ecosystem damage that can last for generations by forcingchanges in reproduction and compromising complex food webs.

The impact scientists worry about most in a major spill is more subtle than the presence of oil on

feathers or fur. It is the long-term exposure to dispersants and oil that have the potential to triggerdramatic die-offs and population declines. Scientists are not yet able to address these large-scaleeffects, and will require new methods to monitor and assess the impact of deep, massive leaks faroffshore, like the one that resulted from the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.

Scientists, volunteers and other responders are,however, prepared to deal with oiled wildlife andshoreline effects, because those are the usualproblems. [34] While experts agree on the mostviable methods for cleaning oiled wildlife, theydisagree about whether rescuing individual animals

impacted by a spill is worthwhile. This DiscoveryGuide bypasses the argument for euthanasia andconcentrates on techniques for cleaning and reha-bilitating oil-impacted wildlife.

The chemicals in oil are toxic and only trained per-sonnel with appropriate protective gear and equipment should handle and treat oiled animals. For the health and safety of rescuers and the animals they

A brown pelican, covered with oil from the BP are trying to save, the Marine Mammal Health andDeepwater Horizon Stranding Response Program and the Sea Turtle Saul Loeb, Getty Images, 06-15-2010, Taken from Stranding and Salvage Network urges anyone who ProQuest’s eLibrary

finds oiled wildlife to avoid direct contact with the

animal and immediately call their Wildlife Hotline or other rescue organization so they can de-ploy trained wildlife personnel to collect the animal. [35]

When trained professionals respond to such a report, they generally go through a seven-part res-cue and treatment process:

1. Both live and dead wildlife are collected.

2. Rescues receive a full physical examination.

3. Rescues are warmed, fed, hydrated and then rested for 48 hours.

4. Rescues are washed in a series of tubs filled with a mixture of diluted cleaning agent andhot, softened water.

5. Cleaned animals are then placed in outdoor pools or other appropriate housing for any-where from three days to several months, depending on the animal’s condition.


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6. Rescued animals receive another medical examination and are banded or tagged before re-leased back into a clean habitat.

7. Released animals receive a post-release assessment, which often entails tagging the ani-mals with radio devices and monitoring them. [36]

Birds

Birds are some of the most frequent animals at rescue sites. It was once believed that washing abird with soap would remove the natural oils from its feathers, causing the bird to lose its insula-tion and waterproofing, which would lead to its death. But what actually keeps birds waterproof is the position of the feathers, which overlap each other like shingles on a roof to create a cover-ing. Millions of tiny barbs on individual feathers gently interlock to form a flexible seal. Preen-ing is all about aligning feathers to ensure a waterproof and airtight seal that insulates the bodyfor insulation and buoyancy. If the feathers aren’t perfectly aligned, the bird will die from expo -sure. Oil kills birds by matting feathers and separating the intricate barbs, which exposes the birdto temperature extremes.

Oiled birds are initially too traumatized to be washed immediately, but once stabilized, they gothrough a series of tub washes alternating between baths with a one percent solution of Dawndishwashing liquid and clean water. The wash time varies depending on the amount of oil andthe size of the bird, but on average it takes two people 45 minutes and 300 gallons of water to doa thorough washing. [37]

Machines that wash oiled animals have been available for at least a decade. Manufacturers claimthey cut clean-up time by half, reducing a 35- to 45-minute manual washing to just 20 minutes.The speed, however, may come at a cost. Jay Holcomb, executive director of the InternationalBird Rescue Research Center (IBRRC), told Discovery News that his network of specialists willnot use such a machine "as it does not truly clean the birds all the way and is sometimes hurtfulto them." While working after the ERIKA oil spill in France, his specialists initially used a ma-chine, with disastrous results. Due to the machine’s inability to adapt to individual birds’ shapesand sizes, each time the machine was used, wings were injured and many birds died. [38]

Before a bird can be released, it should be able to pass a waterproofing test. That is, it must dem-onstrate the ability to float and the ability to keep water away from its body. Once a bird passesthe test, it is slowly exposed to temperatures comparable to outside weather. Its weight and mus-cle structure should be average for its species, and it should show no signs of disease. Afterbanding, rehabilitated birds are released early in the day to an appropriate habitat. [39]

Unfortunately, the success rates of bird rehabilitation have been low in past spills. In 1999, when

the Maltese tanker ERIKA spilled 31,000 tons of oil in the Bay of Biscay, a major cleaning op-eration was mounted for the 15,000 oiled sea bird survivors and 2,000 were ultimately released.[40]


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Sea Turtles

Sea turtles are vulnerable to oil exposure by many different routes. Several aspects of sea turtle biologymake them highly sensitive to chemical insults such as oil, and their natural behavior, includingindiscriminate feeding in convergence zones, a lack of avoidance behavior and large pre-dive inhalations,

places them at particular risk in oily waters.

In addition, many response activitiescan result in unintended adverse im-pacts to turtles. Dispersants can inter-fere with lung function through theirdetergent effect. In-situ burns requirecareful surveying for sea turtles beforeignition, and even then smoke inhala-tion can harm the lungs. Additionally,the increased boat traffic during an oil

spill cleanup adds increased dangerdue to collisions with swimming seaturtles. [41]

Oiled sea turtles present a different setof challenges than birds, requiring an-tibiotic treatment for lung and gastro-intestinal damage caused by swimming

for long periods of time through oil-saturated waters. When it comes to external recovery, veteri-narians often use mayonnaise to help break down the oil in the eyes and other sensitive areas.[42]

Experts agree that hatchlings from sea turtle nesting in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil rigexplosion are in jeopardy of being completely wiped out by the oil. In response, officials drew upa plan to dig up the approximately 700 nests on Alabama and the Florida panhandle beaches.Translocation of nests on this scale has never been attempted before. Sea turtle biologists havemixed opinions about this plan to relocate thousands of sea turtle eggs over 40 days old. Thisprocedure is very risky to each and every sea turtle embryo, but many experts feel the hatchlingsemerging from nests along Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida panhandle beaches will be doomedto oily deaths if they are not moved. Others believe that relocating a species endemic to the area,like Kemp's ridleys to Gulf beaches, away from their natural nesting area, is ecologically un-sound. [43]

At the writing of this Discovery Guide, there was no data on the success of this unprecedentedrelocation effort.


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Studies in Gulfport, Mississippi document a dead Kemp's Ridleyturtle that washed up on the beach

Carolyn Cole, KRT Photos, 06-11-2010, Taken from ProQuest’seLibrary




Conclusion

From accurate, real-time detection to quick deployment of the right containment and cleanupmethods at the right location, oil spill response is a largely low-tech endeavor that hasn’tchanged much over the years. According to U.S. Coast Guard incident operations coordinator

Doug Helton, there are improvements and efficiencies on the edges, but oil spill cleanup still re-lies on heroic efforts and a lot of dirty, messy labor. [44]

Oil spilled from the single-hulled oil tanker Prestige washes up on the beach as the sun rises inCaion, Northern Spain. Marco Di Lauro, Getty Images, 11-22-2002, Taken from ProQuest’s eLibrary

Robert Bea, a University of California engineering professor and an expert on offshore drilling,worked for Shell Oil on the Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969; the Bay Marchand, LA, spill in 1970;

and for the Mexican oil company Pemex on the huge Ixtoc spill in 1979. Bea said today’s boomsare better, and new materials absorb more oil than the straw that once was used, but in the yearssince those spills, the technology of cleanup hasn't changed substantially. For the most part, theonly ways to get rid of the majority of the oil are old ones — corralling it, burning it, mopping itup and letting nature break it down. [45]

Oil cleanup remains an inexact science fraught with guesswork for a number of reasons, includ-ing greater industry investment and emphasis on better drilling technologies, the difficulty of simulating massive deep-sea oil spills for controlled research, the uniqueness of each disaster,and a federal funding preference for research programs that promote oil and gas production overthose that focus on safety and accident prevention. [46]


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6. Corchado, J.M., Aitor Mata, Francisco de Paz and David del Pozo. A Case-Based ReasoningSystem to Forecast the Presence of Oil Slicks. IADIS European Conference Data Mining,2008 http://www.iadis.net/dl/final_uploads/200812L001.pdf

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9. Min Choi, Hyung and Rinn M. Cloud. Natural Sorbents In Oil Spill Cleanup. EnvironmentalScience Technology, 1992http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es00028a016

10. Keating, Michael. Product with Long History Is Fighting Gulf Spill. GovPro, Penton Media,2010 http://govpro.com/public_works/content/oil-absorbent-booms-20100624/

11. Hair for Oilspills Program. Answers to Frequently Asked Questions. Matter Of Trust http://www.matteroftrust.org/programs/hairfaq.html

12. Mundt, Bret. Oil Skimmers - Simple and Effective. Ezine Articles, June, 2010http://ezinearticles.com/?Oil-Skimmers---Simple-and-Effective&id=4444815

13. The Basics of Oil Skimming ? How It Gets Done with the BP "Big Spill/Leak" in the Gulf.Skimoil, Inc., June, 2010http://www.wisegeek.com/what-are-oil-skimmers.htm

14. Kietzman, Shannon. What are Oil Skimmers? WiseGeek, June 2010 http://site-press.com/gulf-oil-spill-news/oil-spill-news/the-basics-of-oil-skimming-how-it-gets-done-with-the-bp-big-spillleak-in-the-gulf-2/

15. Megator Oil Skimmers. Megator Corporation, 2004http://www.megator.com/oil_skimmers.htm

16. What is Emulsified Oil and where does it come from? TurnKey Solutions,Inc. http://www.turnkey-solutions-inc.com/wieo.html

17. Thompson, Derek. How Does Kevin Costner's Oil Cleaning Machine Work, Exactly? TheAtlantic, June, 2010 http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/how-does-kevin-costners-oil-cleaning-machine-work-exactly/57983/


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18. Oil Spill Cleanup. EVTN: able to launch a voraxial separator unit for oil spill response.YouTube, December, 2008http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-W8_GpMz9nI

19. Calderin, Alessandra. A Slick Fix: Oil-Eating Robots Could Mop Up Ocean Disasters. PopularScience, July, 2010http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-07/slick-fix

20. Spangler, Steve. Oil Spill Absorbing Polymer. Steve SpanglerScience http://www.stevespanglerscience.com/experiment/00000108

21. Hasler, Joe. The State of Oil Spill Cleaning Technology. Popular Mechanics, May, 2010http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/state-of-oil-cleaning-tech

22. Dispersants: A Guided Tour - Part Five. National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA), April, 2005 (revised October, 2008)http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/topic_subtopic_entry.php?RECORD_KEY %28entry_subtopic_topic%29=entry_id,subtopic_id,topic_id&entry_id%28entry_subtopic_topic%29=159&subtopic_id%28entry_subtopic_topic%29=8&topic_id%28entry_subtopic_topic%29=1

23. Committee on Understanding Oil Spill Dispersants: Efficacy and Effects. Oil Spill Dispersants:Efficacy and Effects. National Research Council, 2005

http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11283&page=224. Oil Spill Dispersants: Top 20 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). Australian Maritime

Safety Authority

http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/National_plan/ General_Information/Dispersants_Information/FAQ_Oil_Spills_Dispersants.asp

25. Ross, S.L. Literature Review of Chemical Oil Spill Dispersants Herders in Fresh andBrackish Waters. U.S. Department of the Interior. Minerals Management Service, January,2010 http://www.mms.gov/tarprojects/635/AB.pdf

26. Oil Spill Dispersants: The National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil andOther Noxious and Hazardous Substances. Australian Maritime Safety Authorityhttp://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/National_plan/ General_Information/Dispersants_Information/Oil_Spill_Dispersants.asp

27. Marine Board, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems. Using Oil SpillDispersants on the Sea. National Academy Press, 1989

28. Dispersants: A Guided Tour - Part Four. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA), April, 2005 (revised October, 2008)http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/topic_subtopic_entry.php?RECORD_KEY %28entry_subtopic_topic%29=entry_id,subtopic_id,topic_id&entry_id%28entry_subtopic_topic%29=158&subtopic_id%28entry_subtopic_topic%29=8&topic_id%28entry_subtopic_topic%29=1

29. American Chemical Society; Questioning the effectiveness of oil dispersants in Gulf oil spill.Energy & Ecology. July, 2010

30. Oil-Spill Answers: Are We Going to Use Microbes to Destroy the Oil? If So, How WouldThat Work? Newsweek, 2010 http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/the-human-condition/2010/05/04/oil-spill-answers-are -we-going-to-use-microbes-to-destroy-the-oil-if-so-

how-would-that-work.html31. Upson, Sandra. Oil-Eating Microbes for Gulf Spill. Discovery News, June 11, 2010

http://news.discovery.com/tech/oil-eating-microbes-gulf-oil-spill.html

32. The Great Unknowns in Gulf Oil Spill. Newsweek, 2010http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/24/the-great-unkowns-in-gulf-oil-spill.html


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33. Radermacher, Matt. Bioremediation of Marine Oil Spills. Iowa State Universityhttp://home.eng.iastate.edu/~tge/ce421-521/matt-r.pdf

34. Winter, Allison. Gulf Oil Spill Creates 'Giant Experiment' in Marine Toxicology. New York

Times, May, 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/05/21/21greenwire-gulf-oil-spill-creates -giant-experiment-in-mari-1284.html

35. Response and Rescue Plans for Marine Mammals and Sea Turtles Impacted by the DeepwaterHorizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA)http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/health/oil_spill_response_plans.pdf3

36. Viegas, Jennifer. Animal Clean-Up After Oil Spill: A Lengthy Process. Discovery News, Apr 30,2010http://news.discovery.com/animals/oil-spill-wildlife-clean-up-process.html

37. Just little bit of oil on a bird can be deadly. International Bird Rescue Research Center (IBRRC),2010

http://www.ibrrc.org/oil_affects.html38. Viegas, Jennifer. For Oiled Wildlife, Dawn Cleans Best. Discovery News, May 11, 2010

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39. Marine Mammal Rescue and Cleaning. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/learning/rescue.htm#Marine

40. Case Histories - E. The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF), 2010http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/case-histories/elist.html

41. Milton, Sarah and Peter Lutz. Oil and Sea Turtles: Biology, Planning, and Response. NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), August 2003.http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/35_turtle_complete.pdf

42. Bell, Debbye Turner. Gulf Wildlife Rescue Efforts Only Just Beginning. CBS News, June 7,2010.

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43. Pincetich, Chris. Daily Updates: Oil Spill Jeopardizes All Sea Turtles in the Gulf of Mexico. SeaTurtle Restoration Project, August, 2010. http://www.seaturtles.org/article.php?id=1621

44. Terdiman, Daniel. Gulf Coast Oil Spill Responders Employ Latest Tech. CNET News, April,2010. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13772_3-20003894-52.html

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Websites accessed in June and July of 2010




Future action

A simple proposal to prevent future oil spills: Require oil companies to drill the relief

wells first

by Marshall Brain | May 26, 2010

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We are all aware of the gigantic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Millions of gallons of oil will end up destroying beautiful beaches, abundant commercialfishing grounds (oyster, shrimp and fish are all products of the Gulf), nature preserves and wetlands used by birds and fish. The leaking oil may movetoward fragile reefs around Key West and could potentially come up the East Coast. If there is a hurricane that blows the oil inland, no one really knowswhat will happen. And if the Exxon Valdez disaster is any indication, we already know that the effects of the oil spill could last for decades, and that oilcompany lawyers are experts at delaying damage awards. The whole thing is an unmitigated disaster.(More info: A very simple explanation of the oil spill crisis in the Gulf of Mexico) BP has tried and failed at a number of solutions to stop its underwater geyser of oil. The “fail-safe” Blowout Preventer that should have prevented thecrisis has been useless. Domes to catch the oil before it rises have proven useless. There has been talk of “junk shots” and “top kills” and “mudinjections” and stacked Blowout Preventers, but nothing seems to work. BP’s final solution is something called a relief well. The idea is simple: BP is drilling a new well that will meet up with the existing well shaft a couple ofmiles below the ocean floor. Once the oil is diverted into the relief well(s), that will take much of the pressure out of the main well shaft and allow it tobe capped. Problem solved, or so we are told.You can find a nice diagram of a relief well (along with diagrams of many of the other solutions BP has tried) in this slide show from the Wall StreetJournal:Gusher in the Gulf (click on the Relief Well tab)The problem with relief wells is time. It will take BP two to three months to get the first relief well in place.This is not the first time an oil well had sprayed millions of gallons of oil into the ocean, and it will not be the last unless we develop regulations toprevent it. And prevent it we must – as mentioned above, this entire episode is a disaster on so many different levels. The obvious question goingforward is: How do we prevent this situation from ever happening again?Here is a proposal for a simple solution: We require drilling companies to drill their relief wells first, before they strike oil. Then, if there is a problem withthe main well, the relief wells are already in place and can be activated in a few hours rather than a few months.BP drilled for weeks, through several miles of rock, to get to the oil reservoir it has tapped. In this proposal, BP would drill its main well halfway down.Then BP would drill one or more relief wells that tap into the halfway-finished main well. BP would place its well heads on the relief wells and cap them.Then BP would continue drilling the main shaft until it struck oil. If something goes wrong with the main shaft, BP already has the relief wells in placeand can instantly activate them.If there is some technological or production reason that means you don’t want relief wells penetrating into the main well bore if no emergency arises,then there is an easy solution. Drill 99% of the relief well, and leave the last bit undrilled. Then, if there is an emergency, 99% of the work to create arelief well is already complete. It takes days to finish the relief well rather than months.Someone will bring up a cost objection. The best response to that is “So what?” The cost of gasoline will go up a few cents at the most, and untoldbillions of dollars in long-term commercial and environmental damage will be prevented. The cost of pre-drilling relief wells is insignificant compared tothe real cost of a catastrophe like we are seeing today.There are other safeguards and regulations that can be brought to bear to prevent future disasters. However, this one is a necessity. If a relief well isthe final solution to solve a runaway oil well in the ocean, then relief wells should be drilled before the catastrophe, not two months after the fact.






http://blogs.howstuffworks.com/2010/05/04/a-very-simple-explanation-of-the-oil-spill-crisis-in-the-gulf-of-mexico/



http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704026204575266714089093670.html?mod=wsj_india_main#project%3DOIL_FLIP_BOOK10%26articleTabs%3Dinteractive









Good question – How do you burn oil floating in the ocean?

by Marshall Brain | April 28, 2010

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The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is huge and getting bigger. 42,000 gallons of oil get added to the spill every day.This image shows the spill from a satellite:Oil Slick Spreads off Gulf Coast One proposed solution is to burn off the oil… Gulf businesses wait as oil creeps toward coast As crews struggled to contain the oil slick, Coast Guard officials said Tuesday they were considering setting fire to thecontaminated water to burn off the crude. Pools of oil far offshore would be trapped in special containment boomsand set aflame as soon as Wednesday.

But how can the oil burn if it is in water? The key is to scoop it together into large floating pools and light is withburning gel from a helicopter. The process is shown in this video (if you are impatient, jump to 4:30):As described in the video, floating booms dragged behind 2 ships act like a net to pool the oil. The booms arewrapped in wet fabric to keep them from burning once they light the oil. See Elastec.com for more info.The main problem right now is the physical size of the spill (over 80 miles wide) and the weather:Ed Overton, a professor emeritus of environmental sciences at Louisiana State University who’s studying the oil spill,questioned whether burning would work.“It can be effective in calm water, not much wind, in a protected area,” he said. “When you’re out in the middle of theocean, with wave actions, and currents, pushing you around, it’s not easy.” If the oil can’t be burned and makes landfall, here’s what happens next: Here is what caused this spill:






http://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/imagegallery/image_feature_1649.html


http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Gulf-businesses-wait-as-oil-apf-1200710473.html


http://www.elastec.com/oilspill/fireboom/gallery/









BP-This is the Story of How and Why It Didn (1)

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