oil spill

Presented By

Dhanish Ahsen

What went wrong?

Deepwater HorizonRig operator

Cementing ContractorPrincipal DeveloperMacondo Prospect

Largest accidental marine oil spill

Accused for weaknesses in

cement design and testing, quality

assurance and risk assessment.

Nitrogen based cement used was

blamed

Accused for failure of BOP and incorrect evaluation of negative pressure test results

Accused for Cost Savings, poor safety

operations , well design and

decisions regarding testing procedures

28°44′17.30″N88°21′57.40″W

Mississippi Canyon Block 252

210mnGallons ofCrude Oil

11Killed

17Injured

20 April – 15 July 2010

87Days 5600mDeep Well

1600mDeep Water

The Deepwater Horizon

Semi-submersible, mobile, floating, dynamically positioned drilling rig

9yearOld

3000mDeep Water Operation

ManufacturerOwnerLessee

March ‘08-September ‘13

Upto

57 ft.Tall

400 tonsWeight

Manufacturer Lessee Owner

Blow out preventer

• BOP failed to activate• Didn't test the blowout

preventer's individual safety systems.

• BOP was powered by a battery (Found to be dead one)

8:45 pm CDT- Unexpected burst of pressure from the reservoir (kick)

9:45 pm CDT- High-pressure methane gas from the well expanded into the drilling riser and rose into the drilling rig

9:56 pm CDT- where it ignited and exploded, engulfing the platform

What went wrong?

What went wrong?

• Blind shear rams failed to fully close and seal due to a portion of drill pipe buckling between the shearing blocks.

• Defective cement job

• failure to run a cement bond log test

• BOP had a hydraulic leak and a failed battery, and therefore failed

• Installed just one third centralizers

• Faulty wiring in two places, a dead battery and a bent pipe in the hulking device

Failed safety systems and irresponsible behavior of contractors had led to the explosion, including claims that Halliburton failed to properly use modeling software to analyze safe drilling conditions

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BP blames contractors

• BP opted for a single long run of pipe rather than an alternative approach that would have increased the barriers to gas flow.

• BP failed to conduct a "cement bond log" test to evaluate the integrity of the cement at the bottom of the well, which was what blocked gas and oil from emerging up the production pipe.

• BP installed fewer than one-third of the recommended number of centralizer devices, which Transocean said had the effect of "dramatically increasing the risk of cement channeling and gas flow."

“

”

Contractors blames BP

Word War

BP spokesman Geoff Morrell said all of the evidence "demonstrates that Transocean owned the rig's blowout preventer and was responsible for its maintenance".

Transocean spokesman Brian Kennedy said the CSB report confirms the blowout preventer had been tested properly and had activated during the accident, “but was unable to seal the well because immense pressure buckled the drill pipe and prevented the blind shear ram from functioning as designed.”

“ ”

Conclusion

A complex and interlinked series of mechanical failures, human judgments, engineering design, operational implementation and team interfaces

BP is ultimately responsible for the spill, and that Halliburton and Transocean share some of the blame.

"a rush to completion"Time & Money