Bourdieu, Pierre & Angela Zanott-Karp. 1968. Structuralism & Theory of Sociological Knowledge

7/21/2019 Bourdieu, Pierre & Angela Zanott-Karp. 1968. Structuralism & Theory of Sociological Knowledge

1/27

STRUCTURALISM AND THEORY OF SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGEAuthor(s): PIERRE BOURDIEU and Angela Zanotti-KarpReviewed work(s):Source: Social Research, Vol. 35, No. 4, FocusConservative Approaches in the Human Sciences(WINTER 1968), pp. 681-706Published by: The New SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40969937.

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2/27

THE INTERNATIONAL

SCENE:

CURRENT

TRENDS

IN

THE

SOCIAL

SCIENCES

STRUCTURALISM

AND

THEORY

OF

SOCIOLOGICAL

KNOWLEDGE*

BY PIERRE BOURDIEU

JL

e

originality

f the

trend

n

anthropological

esearch alled

structuralism

ay

e

said

to

rest,

aradoxically,

n

the

fact hat t

has

greatly

ontributed

o

wiping

out the

fictitious

riginality

assigned

o

anthropological

nowledge

y

the

pontaneous

heory

of

uch

knowledge.

he

risk f

underestimating

r overestimat-

ing

two

lternatives

hich

re

not

mutually

xclusive)

he

rigin-

ality f his rend, hich easonablyeservesess hanmathematics

or

modern

hysics

he name of

structuralism,

s due to

the

fact

that

he

principles

t has

stirred

p again

or

expressly

onstituted

in

their

pecificallynthropological

orm

re

diametrically

p-

posed

to the

spontaneousheory

f

knowledge

f man and of

society.

Consequently,

hen

nthropology

ndertakes

o

found

itself

pon

principles

hat

ultimately

re those f

any theory

f

scientific

nowledge,

t

has to

overcome

pistemological

bstacles

that renotcomparable ith hose aced ythenatural ciences.

Properly

o

appraise

the

theoretical

ontribution

f

struc-

turalism,

e must

ntroduce,

n

opposition

o

the

usual

ways

f

thinking,

clear-cut istinctionetween

heory

f

sociological

knowledge

nd

theory

f

he

ocial

ystem.

he

theory

f

ociologi-

cal

knowledge,

s

the

ystem

f

principles

nd

rules

overning

he

production

f ll

sociological

ropositions

cientifically

rounded,

and

of them

lone,

is the

generating

rinciple

f all

partial

theories

f

the

social

and,therefore,

he

unifyingrinciple

f

a

properlyociological

iscourse

hichmust

otbe

confused ith

a

unitaryheory

f

the

ocial. In

other

words,

sociological

is-

*

Editor's Note

-

Translated

by Angela

Zanotti-Karp.

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3/27

682

SOCIAL RESEARCH

course,forexamplea theory fmarriage ransactionsr of cul-

tural

diffusion,

s

scientific

nly

to

the

extent

that

t

makes

use

of

the

epistemological

nd

logical

principles

f the

theory

f so-

cial

knowledge,

hat

s,

of

sociological

meta-science,

n

arranging

a

system

f

relations nd

of their

explicatory rinciples.

It

fol-

lows,

on

the one

hand,

that

the

plurality

f theories

f the social

system

must

not conceal the

unity

f

the

meta-science

pon

which

all

that n

the former

tands

out

as scientifics founded:

scholars

such sMarx,Durkheim ndWeber, otally ifferentn their iews

of

social

philosophy

nd

ultimate

values,

were able

to

agree

on

the

main

points

of

the fundamental

rinciples

of the

theory

f

knowledge

f the

social

world.

It

follows,

n the other

hand,

that

what is

usually

called

the

unity

of

science

is

nothing

but the

unity

of

meta-science,

he

identity

f

principlesupon

which

all

science,

ncluding

he

scienceof

man,

s founded.

The

originality

f

anthropological

tructuralism

ies

essentially

in the fact hat tattacks rom irst o lastthesubstantialist ayof

thinking

which

modern

mathematics

nd

physics

ave

constantly

striven

o

refute.

Only

in

relatively

ecent

times

has

it

been

possible

to

break

withthe substantialist

ay

of

thinking

hatcon-

ceives

of

geometrical

igures

n theirfactual

existence

nstead

of

considering

hem

n

their

reciprocal

relations;

t

has

finally

e-

come

possible

to

perceive

that

single

elements

only

hold their

properties y

virtue

of

the relations

inking

one

with

another

within system,hat s tosay,byvirtue f thefunctionhey

ulfill

within

the

system

f relations.

Finally,

t

has

been

possible

to

discover hat

ny geometry

s

nothing

but a

pure

system

f

rela-

tions

determined

y

the

principles

overning

hem

nd not

by

the

intrinsic

ature

of the

figures

ntering

hoserelations.

Thus,

for

example, points,

ines

and

planes

of

Euclidean

geometry

an

be

replaced by

an

infinity

f

entirely

different

bjects

without

affecting

he

validity

f the

corresponding

heorems,

n

such

a

way

that,

s

Bachelard

writes,

the

reality

f a line

is

strengthened

y

its

belonging

to

multiple

varied

surfaces;

ven

better,

. . the

essence

of

a mathematical

otion is

defined

by

the

possibilities



4/27

CURRENT

TRENDS 683

ofdeformationhat llowfor xtendinghe pplicationf such

notion. One can

immediately

ee

all the

epistemological

b-

stacles

nthropology

ust

overcome

n order

to deal with

ts

subject

cultural

systems

nd

systems

f social

relations

as

modern

eometry

eals

with

ts

ubject,

hat

s,

s

systems

efined

not

by

some

ubstantial

content

ut

only

by

the aws

of

com-

bination

f

their

onstitutive

lements.

n the

first

lace,

uch

things

s

anguage,

ulture,

r

a

complex

f ocial elations

annot

be dealtwith ssystemsavingnternal oherencendnecessity,

except

by

overruling,

s

Ernst

Cassirer

emarks,

he clear-cut

opposition

stablished

y

Leibniz and

all

classical

ationalism

betweenruthsfreason nd truthsf

fact,

etween ormal

ternal

truths

f

ogic

nd

mathematics

nd

contingentmpirical

ruths

of

history.

n

ceasing

o

place

n

opposition

o

each

other

hat

which

s

formalnd

thatwhich

s

real,

eason

nd

experience

on-

ceived

s

mere

Rhapsodie

on

Warnehmungen,

tructuralism

placestsfoundationnthepostulatehat xperiencesa system.2

The

postulate

f the

systematic

haracter f

empirical

acts,

however,

resupposes

he

overcoming

f further

pistemological

obstacle

hich

s

typical

fthe ciences f

man

because t s

linked

to

the

particular

elationship

etween he ocial

cientist

nd

his

object.

The

artificialism

nherent

n

the

pontaneous

hilosophy

of

the

social

world eads to the

atheism f the moral

world

criticized

y

Hegel

n the ntroductionohis

Philosophy

f

Right:

social ubjectsre nclined odeny he ocialworld he mmanent

necessityhey

ecognize

n

the

natural

ne,

ither ecause

hey

re

deluded

y

the

xperience

f

everyday

ife,

where he

meaning

f

others'

onduct nd

activitiess

immediately

eizable,

r

because

they

re anxious o retain

he

mprescriptible

ights

f

man,

n-

cluding

he

right

o be awareof

the

meaning

f

an

action

nd

i

G.

Bachelard,

e

Nouvel

Esprit

cientifique,

aris,

P.U.F.,

1934;

5th

ed.,

1949,

p.

24.

Bachelard

lso writes:

The

role

of

entities

akes

recedence

ver

heir

nature

. . . and the

essence

s

concomitant ith he

relation

p.

22).

It is

in relations

hat

differenteometriesre equivalent. As relations heyhave a reality nd not by

reference

o an

object,

n

experience,

r an

image

of

ntuition

p.

28).

2E.

Cassirer,

Structuralism

n

Modern

Linguistics,

Word,

,

1945,

pp.

99-120.



5/27

684

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

freely nd rationally o determine t and its consequences. By

recognizing

n

the

social

world vicarious

necessity nly,

f which

man

ever

remains

master

nd

owner,

one

may

avoid

such

arti-

ficialism;

ocial

reality

may

be dealt with

as

a

system

hat

has

im-

manent

necessity,

ndependent

f individuals'

consciousness

nd

will,

and

that,

herefore,

ustbe

explored

n the same

way

as

are

the

relationships

mong

facts

f the

physical

world.

The debate

recently eveloped, especially

n

France,

about structuralism

s

a philosophywithout ubject misseswhat is trulyoriginalin

this

trend of research

by

attributing

o structuralism

hat the

founders f

social

science,

Marx as well

as

Durkheim,

lways

tated

both

in

their theoretical

writings

nd scientific

ractice:

struc-

turalism

imply

eaffirms

he

postulate

f the

systematic

haracter,

or the

mmanent

ntelligibility

f the

social

world,

hus

divesting

individual consciousness

f

the

gnoseologicalprivilege

granted

to

t

by

the

pontaneous

heory

f the

ocial.

Considerabledifficultiesinder themethodological ecision to

regard

a

cultural

formation,

uch

as

language,

myth

or

ritual,

or

a

social

formation

s

a

system

ontaining

he

key

to its own

interpretation,

nd

to

draw

from he facts

hemselves

he code

for

unraveling

heir

meaning:

the

symbols

f culture

formations

myths

r

rituals

even

more

than

anguage

do not

have the

con-

clusive

clarity

f

the

symbols

f formal

ogic,

which

are

arbitrary

and

are

perceived

o be

so.

Even more

than

geometrical

igures,

they ppearas concretendividualitieshatmust

be dealt with

n

themselves

nd for

hemselves,

ather

han

n their

relations

with

all

phenomena

n the same

class.

Myths,

ituals r even

iterary

r

philosophical

works

belonging

o

different

raditions

re

shielded

against

interpretation,

ot

so

much because

minds

which

are

deprived

of the

key

of

interpretation,

nd

in addition of

the

consciousness

f such

a

deprivation,

xperience

n them

an

ap-

parent

bsurdity

nd

incoherence;

ut

rather,

ecause

theygive

an

appearance

f

sense

to

partial

nd

selective

eadings,

where

the

meaning

of each

symbolic

lement s

expected

to derive from

special

revelation

rather

than

from ts

methodically

stablished



6/27

CURRENT

TRENDS

685

relationwith ll the other lements fthe same class.8 The true

meaning

of

a

given

ritual

act,

of

a

symbol,

may

remain hidden

from

the

observer

because,

paradoxically,

his act

or

symbol

assumes

too

easily

the

appearance

of

truth

as

for

example,

the

sexual

significance

f

work). By

allowing

one to

assign

ne mean-

ing

to

each

symbol

eparately

aken,

he

books on

dreamsdiscour-

age

even

the ntention

f

referring

ach

symbolic

lementto the

total

ystem

f

manifestations

rom

which

t

derives

ts

true

sense.

In thesamewaythe earliermythologists,ayinggreater ttention

to

the

subject

matter

f the

myth

han

to the

way

it was

told,

to

its

vocabulary

ather han to its

syntax,

ere

contented

withword-

by-word

ranslations hich

were

made

possible

by

dictionaries

f

universal

ymbolism

hich

ncluded

mythical

r

ritual

elements

borrowed

rom

different

raditions

nd

considered

n

their

con-

tent

nly. By

taking

uch

short-cuts,

hich

directly

ed

from ach

signifiant

o

its

correspondentignifi,

cholars

were

diverted

rom

the ongdetourbythe total ystemf theconstitutiveignificants

of a

ritual

or

mythical

orpus.

Yet

that

detour

alone could

have

led

them

o the

complete

ystem

f

significants

nd,

consequently,

to

the

particular

significant

orresponding

o

each

particular

correspondent.

It

would

not be difficulto

find

quivalent

practices

t

once

lazy

and

over-hasty,mong sociologists.

The

very

ogic

of

investiga-

tion,

a

series

of

operationsproducing

collection

of

facts,

eads

into hair-splittingtomismthosewho,yieldingto an easytask,

take

the statistical

able

as the unit of

interpretation

nd

who

avoid

exposing

an

entire coherent

body

of

propositions

o

the

confutation

hat

might

ome

from

very

able,

because

they

kip

over

the

question

of

articulating

he

propositions

erived

from

3

Several

of

the

interpretations

f Greek

philosophers'

works,

especially

those

of

the

pre-Socratics,

eveal

more

about the

interpreters'

way

of

thinking

than

about

the

structure

f

the

discourse

nterpreted.

Among

other

reasons,

the

ease

of

word-

by-word,

at

times

letter-by-letter,

ranslation

has

shielded

these

works

from

a

systematicnterpretation t least as effectivelys has the apparent

absurdity

of

translating

ultural

works

belonging

to the

most

removed

and

least

acknowledged

tradition.



7/27

686 SOCIAL RESEARCH

each table or from eries ftables, achentailingtsownanalysis.

As

against

discontinuous eries of

ad hoc

hypotheses,

system

of

hypotheses

wes

its

epistemological

alue

to

coherence,

nd

to

its

vulnerability

o attack:

one

fact lone can

bring

nto

question

thewhole

system. Being

built at the

price

of

breaking way

from

phenomenal

ppearances,

he

ystem

annotreceive

he

mmediate

and

easy

corroboration

hat

facts

t

theirface value

or

documents

literally

aken

would

provide:

ts

verifications

only

made

possible

by thewhole coherence f the totalsystem f facts reatedby

and

not

for

the

theoretical

hypotheses.

Such

a

method

of

proof,

wherethe

coherence

f

the

system

f

intelligible

acts

s

in

itself ts

own

proof,

while,

t the

same

time,

he

power

of

proof

s

conferred n

the

partial

ests

ositivism

manipulates

n

a

scattered

way,

vidently resupposes

he

systematic

ecision

to

question

the

facts

bout

the

relationswhich

bind them

nto a

system.

When

Erwin

Panofsky

ffers s an

element

of

proof

the

inter

e

dis-

putandoof Villard de Honnecourt'sAlbum,he does not ignore

that that

phrase

does

not settle

a

question

of

fact,

he direct

n-

fluence

f the

scholastics

pon

the

architects,

or

example:

such

a

smallfact

erives

ts

proof

alue

from ts relationswithother

facts

which

are

insignificant

s

long

as

they

are considered

ndepen-

dently

of

the

relations

that

a

systematic

ypothesis

llows

us

to

discover,

but which take

hold

of their

real

value

only

as

organized

inks

of

one series.4

The

sociologist

ets

n motion

the

same circularprocess n his analysisof the factsyieldedby

an

investigation:

tarting

rom he

complex

f

responses

o a

question-

naire,

he

interprets

he

meaning

of each

question

by

means

of

whichhe

has elicited

nd built

the

responses,

onstantly

eformu-

lating

the

meaning

of

the whole

in

the

light

of what he learns

from

ach

ofthe

responses.

The

structural

pproach

an

be

established

n

research

rovided

only

that

ll

automatic

outines

n

scientific

ractice

re

broken.

*Cf.P. Bourdieu, Post-face, n E. Panofsky, rchitectureothiqueet pense

scholastique,

rcd

de

L'Abb

Suger

de

Saint-Denis,

aris:

Editionsde

Minuit,

1966,

p.

135-167.



8/27

CURRENT

TRENDS

687

In addition, owever,hegreater isciplinempliedby systematiza-

tion

always

runs the risk of

appearing

s

a

cleverly

isguised

re-

nunciation

f scientific xactitude

o

those forwhom

ust taking

the

given

as

such

represents

he

ideal

of

precision. Actually,

the

proof

btained

through

he coherence f

the

system

f

proofs

condemns

ny

systematic

rocedure

to

a methodic

cycle

which

inevitably ppears

as

a

vicious

circle,

nspiredby

the

spirit

f

the

system,

o a

positivist

pistemology

hat

reinterprets

his

ogic

of

proofwithreference o an analyticaldefinition f verification.

The same blindness eads

some

to

perceive

n

the structural

naly-

sis

of

a

myth

the

projection

of the

researcher's

ategories

of

thought,

r even

the

protocol

f

a

projective

est

or

a

bias

in

the

chosenmethod f

interpreting

ach statistical elation

stablished

by

a

multivariate

nalysis

n

the

basis of

the total

system

f

the

relations etween

he

relations rom

which

each

derives

ts

mean-

ing.5

The

strength

f

proof

of a

relation

empirically

iscovered

is not exclusively etermined y a strong tatistical orrelation.

The

validity

f

the

hypothesis

ested s

a

function

f the

complete

system

f

relations

lready

stablished,

hether

tatistical

elations

or

regularities

f a

different

ype.

In

Reichenbach's

words,

t

is

a

function

f

those

chains

of

proofs

hat

may

be

stronger

han

their

weakest

ink,

ven

stronger

han

their

trongest

ink,

6

since

their

alidity

s

measured

not

only

by

the

simplicity

nd

coherence

of

the

principles

mployed,

ut

by

the

range

and

diversity

f

the

s

Thus,

in the

same

way

that

mathematics

can

consider

the

absence

of

property

as

itself

a

property,

the

sociologist

can

view

the

absence of

a

statistical

relation

between

two

variables as

highly significant

when

he

places

it

within

the

complete

system

f

relations of

which

it is

a

part.

For

example,

no

significant

elation

(in

a

statistical

ense)

is

found

among

students

of different

ocial

origin

n

their

knowledge

of

classical

theater,

while

they

systematically

ifferentiate

hemselves

n

all

other

cultural

practices.

In

this

case,

an

interpretation

of

the

meaning

of

the

attitude

toward academic

culture,

which

reveals a

non-significant

elation,

should

contain

the

meaning

of

the

socially

conditioned

and

diversified elation of

the

students

with

the

free culture

(avant-garde

theater or modern

music)

and

vice

versa,

etc.

(P.

Bourdieu and

J.

C.

Passeron,

Les Etudiants et leur

tudes,

Cahiers

du

Centre

de

Sociologie Europenne, n.l, Paris-La Haye, Mouton, 1964).

A.

Kaplan,

The Conduct

of

Enquiry,

Methodology

of

Behavioral

Science,

San

Francisco,Chandler,

1964,

p.

215.



9/27

688

SOCIAL RESEARCH

facts consideredand by the multiplicity f unforeseen onse-

quences.

The

words

hat

Duhem used to describe he

progress

f

physics

an

thus

describethe

progress

f

any

structural

esearch:

A

symbolic ainting

o which ncessant

etouching

ivesgreater

extent

nd

unity

. .

,

while

each

detail,

cut

off rom

he

whole,

loses

any meaning

nd no

longer

represents

nything.

It

is not

by

chance, herefore,

hat

physicist

as

expounded

the

theory

f

scientific

heory

which s the most

appropriate

or

removing

he

apparentdifficultiesn the applicationof the structuralmethod

to the

social sciences.

In the introduction

o

his

book,

The

Principles

of

Mechanics,

Herz shows

that the

theoretical

rocess

consists

n

building symbolic epresentations

hose structure

s

such

that their

necessary

onsequences

n

the

sphere

of

thought

are

symbols

f the

consequences

n

the realm

of

things

of the

objects

represented.

Here

Herz

is

very

lose

to

a

positivist

hilos-

ophy

f

science

uch

as that

f

Mach,

forwhom

n

adequate

theory

is definedby itsconformityo the sensedata which t expresses

in

their here and

now.

Herz,

however,

radically

differentiates

himself rom

ositivism

n

that

he

stresses

hat,

n

order

that

the

theory

e

verified,

t is

not

necessary

o

verify

ach

single

proposi-

tion

but

only

the

complete

ystem

f

propositions.

That

is to

say

thatno element

n a

theory

f

nature,

uch

as

the

notion

of force

or

mass,

an

be isolated

n

order

o be

verified

y

an

objective

or-

relate,

nd that

ingle

oncepts,

ypothetically

onstructed,

an

no

longerbe expectedto reproduce oncretely

nd

empirically

acts

that an

be

demonstrated.

t is

in their

otality,

r,

more

exactly,

in their

mutual

relations

that

such

concepts

represent

their

objects,

so

that

their

necessary

onsequences

n

the

sphere

of

thought

re

always symbols

f

the

necessary

onsequences

n

the

realm

of

things

f

the

objects

represented.

The

theory

s

not

a literal

ranslation

ased

upon

a

term-by-term

orrespondence

with

the

real,

merely eproducing

he

apparent

elements

nd

properties

f

the

object

after

he fashion

f

the

mechanical

models

T

P.

Duhem,

La

thorie

hysique,

on

objet,

a

structure,

aris:

M.

Rivire,

914,

2nd

ed.

reviewed

nd

enlarged, .

311.



10/27

CURRENT TRENDS 689

of ancientphysics. The structure f symbols ymbolizes8 he

structure

f

relations

stablished

y

experience

n

such

a

way

that

the

relationbetween

heory

nd

facts,

etween eason

and

experi-

ence,

is

still

a

structural

omology.

This

is well

expressed

by

Juvet:

In

the

rushing

lux f

phenomena,

n

the ever

changeable

reality,

he

physicist

bserves

omething

ermanent.

In

order to

describe

it

his

mind

builds

geometry,

inematics,

mechanical

models

whose

axioms

fulfill he

purpose

of

specifying

hat

which,

forwantofa better erm,we shallcall usefulunderstandingfthe

different

oncepts

formed fter

experience

and

observation.

If

the

axioms

husbuilt are

representations

f

a

group

whose

nvari-

ants

allow

for

the

translation nto

reality

of all

permanent

le-

mentsdiscovered

mpirically,

hysical heory

s

free

from ontra-

dictions

nd

is

a reflection

f

reality.

In

other

words,

heory

s

a

system

f

signsorganized

o

represent, hrough

heirown

rela-

tions,

he relations

mong

the

objects

s

a translation

r, better,

a symbol inkedto what t symbolizes ya law ofanalogy.

More than cultural

formations,

ocial formations

esist he

ap-

plication

of

such

a

meta-theory.

n

the

first

lace,

like cultural

facts,

ocial

relations

nd

institutions,

ecause

of

their

belonging

to

a

system

f

relations

among

relations,

re

endowed with

a

necessary

haracterwhich makes them

appear

to

individuals

as

natural,

t

once

as matter f

course

and

as

partaking

f

a

human

nature.

Paradoxically,

social relations or

institutions,

which

otherwisewould be perceivedfor what theyobjectively re

arbitrary

onstructs stand

unquestioned

oncerning

heir

belong-

ing

to the

system

nd

are rather

pprehended

n

themselves,

n

absolute

terms,

recisely

ecause

of what

they

we

directly

o the

system

f

relations

f which

they

re

part:

that

s,

their

pparent

necessity.

In

the

second

place,

the

logical

expurgation

presup-

posed

by

the constitution

f

facts

s elements f

a

system

f

rela-

tions

clashes

here with

particular

difficulties:he

elements n

Moreaccurately,ne should ay ymbolizes ith, s they id in theseventeenth

century

o

indicate

relation f

analogy

etween

wo

things.

9

P.

Juvet,

a

structure es nouvelles hories

hysiques,

933,

p.

170,

uoted

by

G.

Bachelard,

p.

cit.,

.

35

my

talics).



11/27

690

SOCIAL RESEARCH

mutualrelationshipre individual gentsdirectly erceptible nd

immediately

ocated

n

a here

and

now;

they

nsistently

emand

to

be

conceived

f

n

their

eparate

xistence,

s

if

they

had a real

autonomy

s

against

he

system

f

relations

f which

they

re

part

and

by

which

they

re

produced,

n

the

sense

that the

electron,

according

o

Herman

Weyl,

is

not

an

element

of the

field but

a

product

f thefield

eine

Ausgeburt

es

Felds).

The methodo-

logical

decision

to

focus

upon

the

relationships

ather

than the

elementscomposingthemmust therefore eckonwith this ens

realissimum

f

the

pontaneous

heory

f the

ocial:

the

ndividual,

the

subject.

One

may

believe,

for

xample,

hathe

has

broken

with

all

substantialism

hen he

takes as

his

object

the relation

between

two substances

hat,

as

often

as

not,

indicate

inter-

subjective

elations.

The

subject,

hybrid ffspring

f Christian

spiritualism

nd

of the Cartesian

dogma

of

the

spirit

in the

machine,

in

Ryle's

words,

s

more

resistant

han

geometrical

figuresothe effortfgrasping hesystemfrelations romwhich

it derives ts

raison

d'tre

and even

the

appearance

of

an

autono-

mous

existence.

Thus,

for

xample,

he

objective

elations

mong

the

subjects'

social

positions

re

usually

reduced

to the

inter-

subjective

elations

which

actually

nvolve

the

individuals

occu-

pying

hose

positions:

uch

a

procedure,

owever,

gnores

he fact

that

the

property

f social

relations

s

precisely

hat of

existing

even

f

the

ubjects

hey

nvolve

employers

nd

workers,

ducated

and

uneducated

people,etc.)

do not

have

any

direct

relationship,

even

f

they

have

never

met

and

will

never

meet

within

he

same

here

and

now.

It also

ignores

he

fact

that

the actual

relations

among

ubjects and

a

number

f

kinds

fconduct

s

well,

cultural

practices

or

example,

which

are

apparently

ree

from

ny

refer-

ence

to such

relations)

lways

mply

n

objective

reference

o the

objective

relations

f

position

which

define

their

form

nd con-

tent.

Only

a radical

break

with

the

spontaneous

way

of

thought

and

perception,

herefore,

llows

us to

perceive

hat,

or

nstance,

the actual relations

among

agents

constituting

he intellectual

field

owe

their

pecific

orm o

the

position

each

agent

occupies



12/27

CURRENT TRENDS

691

within uch a field, o the extentthateach of theserelations s

dominated

and defined

by

the

objective

relation between the

positions

f

the

agents

that

enter

t

such

an

objective

relation

being

tself

efined

y

its

belonging

o the intellectual ield

on-

ceived

as

a

system

f

relations.10

n

the

same

way,

the

relation

between

ndividuals

from

differentocial classes

and

one

or

an-

other ultural

good,

the

meaning they

give

to different

ractices

perceived

s

vulgar

or

distinguished,

noble

or

common,

and the actual relations heymayhold amongthemselvesn such

an

occasion,

re

always

mediated:

their

relational

meaning

and

function, herefore,

re determined

by

the

objective

relations

between lass conditions

nd

class

positions

which n

these

kinds

of

conduct,

ttitudes r

opinions

find

possibility

f

being

actu-

alized.11

For

example,

one could

not

understand he

passionate

and

naive nterest f

sociologists

nd

intellectuals

n

the

problems

of

modern

mass

media,

eisure

or

popular

culture,

f t

werenot

that the relationshipbetweenthe intellectualand his culture

enclosesthe whole

question

of

how

the

intellectual s

related

to

the

ntellectual

ondition,

question

that

s never

o

dramatically

posed

as

in

the ssue of

the

relation

between

the

intellectual nd

the

owerclasses

s

classes

deprived

of

culture.

Being

established

mong

social

conditions

nd

positions

e.g.,

those

defining

class

situation),objective

relations

have more

reality

han

the

subjects

nvolved,

than

the

direct or

mediated

relations

ctually akingplace among

the

agents,

han

therepre-

sentations

he

agents

form of

these

relations. To

ignore

the

objective

relations

eads to

apprehending

ll the

characteristics

observable r even

disclosed

by

experimentation

s

if

they

were

substantial

roperties,

ttached

y

nature

to

individuals

r

classes

of

ndividuals.

The

most

laboratenotions

n

sociological

heory

which,

ike

that of

attitude,

re but the

abridged

formula

of a

relation

between

two

systems

f

relations,

may

be

used in

a

real-

10

Cf.

Projet

crateur

t

champ

ntellectuel,

es

Temps

Modernes, .246,

No-

vember966.

n

Cf.

Condition

e classe t

position

e

classe,

Archives

uropennes

e

Socio-

logie,

II,

1966,

p.

201-223.



13/27

692

SOCIAL RESEARCH

isticframewhen theydefine bsolute properties,usceptibleof

being

thought

f

independently

f the

system

f

objective

condi-

tions of

which

they

re

the

product

nd of the

system

f

acts

or

conduct

within

which

they

ecome

manifest

like,

e.g.,

the notion

of

force

n

earlyphysics).

Most

usages

of

concepts

t once

descrip-

tive

nd

explicatory

uch as

motivations,

tendencies, needs,

inclinations

r

aspirations,

est

upon

a

bracketing

f

the

sys-

tem

of

objective

relations.

An

entirely

imilar

procedure

is

operatedby spontaneoussociologywhen it separatesacts and

expressions

alled

vulgar, distinguished

r

pretentious

rom

the

system

f

regularities

nd

probabilities

hat

objectively

efine

the

social

conditions,

ence

the

motivations

f individuals

n

their

behavior.

Thus,

one

refrains

rom

eeing,

or

xample,

hat

upper

class

mobile

petty

ourgeois

end

to

adopt,

through

ntici-

pation,

nd as

much s

their

means

llow

that

s to

say,

more

often

in

wishful

hinking

han

in

actuality),

ttributes

which,

t

least

in their yes,belongto theobjectivepositiontheywill reach in

the

future

ccording

o

statistics;

o the extent

hat

t

favors

ntici-

patory

ocialization

y

fostering

favorable

isposition

o

acquire

the

indispensable

ttitudes

for social

mobility,

uch

a

pre-

en-

sion

contributes

o

the

realization

f

subjectivehopes,

hemselves

the

product

f

a

given

system

f

objectiveopportunities.

To remove

from

physics

ny

remnant

f

substantialism,

t has

been

necessary

o

replace

the

notion

of

force

with

that of form.

In

the

same

way

social sciences

ould

not

do

away

with

the

idea

of

human

nature

except

by

substituting

or

it the

structure

t

conceals,

hat s

by

considering

s

products

f

a

system

f

relations

the

properties

hat

the

spontaneous

heory

f the social

ascribes

to

a substance.

Marx's

criticism

f Stirner s

valid

in

regard

to

all

psychologists

nd

sociologists

ho

reduce

social

relations o re-

lations

mong

subjects,

r,

even

worse,

o the

subjects'

repre-

sentations

f

such

relations,

nd

who,

in

the

name

of some kind

of

practical

rtificialism,

elieve

t

possible

o transform

he

objec-

tiverelations

mong

the

subjects

by

transforming

he

subjects'

representations

f

them:

Sancho

does

not

want two

individuals



14/27

CURRENT

TRENDS 693

tobe 'in contradiction' itheachother, ikebourgeois nd prole-

tarian . .

,

he

would

like to

see

them

n

a

personal

relationship

of an individual to anotherone. He does

not

consider

that,

n

the framework

f the

division

of

labor,

personal

relations

neces-

sarily,

nevitably

become

class

relationsand

crystallize

s

such;

thus,

ll his

verbiage

reduces tself

o

a

pious

wish thathe

thinks

to

realize

by exhorting

he

ndividuals

n

these

lasses o

bar

from

their

mind

the dea of their

contradictions'nd

particular privi-

lege/ It would sufficeo changethe opinion' and the 'will' to

destroy

he contradiction'nd

the

particular.'

12

The

system

f

objective

relations

n

which

the

individuals

find

themselves

nd

which

re

more

dequately xpressed

n

the

economy

nd

morpho-

logy

of

groups

rather han in the

individuals'declared

opinions,

contains the

principle

of the satisfaction r

'

'dissatisfaction'

they

feel,

of the

conflicts

hey

experience

or of the

expectations

and

ambitions

hey

xpress.

It

constitutes,

herefore,

he

condi-

tion for completeunderstandingf the lived-throughelation-

ship

ndividuals

old with

heir

bjectivated

ruthwithin

system

of

objective

relations.

The

apparent

relations

cience

must

shatter

n

order

to build

up

the

system

f

objective

relations

hey

onceal,

are not

always

mere

fictions

iable

to

be annihilated

by

exposing

truth,

s

light

dispels

darkness.

Ideological

representations

re,

as

it

were,

well

founded

rrors

f which

the science of

objective

relations

eveals

at

once theoretical

allacy

nd

social

function.

It

is

useless

to

hope,

for

example,

that

the revelation f

the

objective

truthof

social

relations,

y

force

f

tsown

evidence

lone,

can break

down

the

deologies

of

'participation'*

nd

communication

onveyed

and

guaranteedby

certain kinds of

social

psychology,

nd

pre-

disposed

to

become the

ustification

f

the

enterprises

r

institu-

tions

which

this

science

analyzes

and to

whose

end

it

becomes

accessory.

This is

the

errorof

those

who

believe in the

virtues

of

the

dialogue

and of

the

face-to-face

ituation,

r

who

organize

12

K.

Marx,

Ideologie

allemande,

J.

Molitor, trans.,

n

Oeuvres

Philosophiques,

vol.

IX,

Paris,

A.

Costes,

1947,

p.

94.



15/27

694 SOCIAL

RESEARCH

magiccultsofthenewindustrialge,socio-drama r non-directed

interviews.

The social

science

whichfinds

n

the

adequate

knowl-

edge

of

objective

relations he

proof

that

transforming

he

repre-

sentations

f

the

objective

relations

s

not sufficiento transform

the

latter,

ould

not attribute o

such a

knowledge

he

power

to

transform

he

objective

elations

r

even

their

epresentations.

Well

founded

errors,

deological

representations,

ppose

to

science

an

organized

nd

systematic

esistance ecause

they

are

supported ythewholesocialordertheyn turnhelp to support:

the extreme

difficulty

ncountered

y

the

smallest

onquests

of

science

could

not

otherwise

be

understood,

o

evident are

the

truths

nce

they

re

reached

gainst

ll

evidence. All

techniques'*

by

whichthe social

system

ends

to conceal its own

truth

mount

ultimately

o

the

logic

of

camouflage:

relations

and

their

real

configurations

re

in

some

way

lost, confused,

lurred,

nullified,

disfigured

n

the

intertwining

f

their

appearances.

Whoever

hasdoneresearchwork n the ocial sciences nowshowcautiously

it

s

necessary

o

proceed

n

order

o avoid thefalse

rails ontained

in

the

object

tself,

o

resist

he

plentiful

bundance of

epistemo-

logical

obstacles'

as

Georges

Canguilhem says,13

nd the ever

present

llurement

f

the

ready-madenterpretations

hat

reality

insistently

roposes

o the

interpreter,

nd

not

only

through

he

informants'

esponses,

ften

eceiving

ven without

ny

ntention

of

doing

so.

Thus,

for

example,

a charismatic

deology,

from

which

most

of the

privileged

lasses'

representations

f

culture,

of

the relations

with

culture

and of

the

modes

of

acquiring

it

originate,

an

be

produced

by

simply

racketing

he evident

rela-

tion

between

ducation

nd culture.

Such

a

bracketing

s

objec-

tively

uthorized

nd sustained

by

a

social

system

which

nsures

to

the

privileged

lasses,

mong

other

things,

hat

mode

of ac-

quiring

culture

hrough

whichthis

bracketing

an be

more

easily

effected,

n a

more

unconscious

han

conscious

way.14

is

G.

Canguilhem,

Sur

une

epistemologie

oncordataire,

n

Hommage

Bachelard,

Etudes de

philosophie

t d'histoire es sciences, aris,P.U.F., 1957,

pp.

3-12.

14

For

a

more

ystematic

nalysis

r tne

relation

eiweenme

sysiem

r

aeoiogicai



16/27

CURRENT TRENDS

695

The adequate theory f the object implies the theory f the

social

conditions

n

which are

produced

the

pre-constructed

b-

jects

that

re

proposed

by ideology

nd that

constitute

he

major

obstacleto

the

formulation f

an

adequate

theory

f the

object.

Consequently,

ecause of

a blind

acceptance

of

what

Nietzsche

calls

the

dogma

of the immaculate

perception/' ositivist

ocio-

logy viewing

tself

s

free

from

reventions

nd

presuppositions

-

is

likely

o

fall

nto

all

the

traps

et

by

pre-constructed

bjects,

social factsperceived nd named by spontaneous ociology nd

social

problems

whose claim to exist

as

sociological

problems

is

stronger

he

higher

he

degree

of

social

reality

heydisplay

for

the

global society

nd

especially

for

the

community

f

scholars.

When,

misled

by

a

false

philosophy

f

objectivity

onceived as

mere

ubmission

o

the

given

as

such,

the

sociologist egates

him-

self

as

a

sociologist y refusing

onsciously

o build

his

own dis-

tance

from

eality

nd the

conditions

or n

adequate knowledge

of t,he condemns imselfoascertain re-constructedactswhich

are

imposed

on

him

despite

himself

ecause he is

not

provided

with

hemeansof

knowing

he rules

of

their

onstruction.

Thus,

for

xample,

sociologist

may

tudy uvenile

delinquency,

social

problem

par

excellence,

anctioned

y

a

long

tradition

s

a

socio-

logical problem: by

means of the most

rigorous

tatistical ech-

niques

he

establishes

elations

between

types

f

delinquency

nd

the

different

haracteristics

f

delinquents

such

as

sex,

social

origin,

evel of

education, mployment

r

unemployment,

em-

bership

n

more

or

less

ntegrated amily

milieu,

etc.;

in

so

doing

he

is

bound

to

adopt

as his own

production

n

explicatory ystem

whichhas

been

objectively

mposed

n

him

by

the

pre-constructed

object

which

he has

allowed to

be

imposed

upon

himself,

f

he

fails

o

investigate

he nstitutional

onditions

hat

produce

delin-

representations

n

the

sphere

f

culture nd the

system

f

mechanisms

hich uch

representations

onceal

and fromwhich

they

derive heir

xistence

nd

logic,

ee

P.

Bourdieu

nd

J.

C.

Passeron,

es

Hritiers,

aris,

Ed.

de

Minuit, 964;

P. Bour-

dieu et

al.,

Un art

moyen,aris,

d. de

Minuit, 965;

P.

Bourdieu

nd AlainDarbel,L'amourde

l'art,

Paris,

Ed. de

Minuit,1966;

P.

Bourdieu,

Elments

our

une

thorie

ociologique

e

la

perception

rtistique,

evue

internationale

es

sciences

sociales,

orthcoming.



17/27

696

SOCIAL RESEARCH

quents. Such conditionsnclude institutionsnd agents hat are

responsible

or

urbing

delinquency

nd

identifyingelinquents,

from

he

people

in

the

neighborhood

where

the first

omplaints

are

made,

up

to the

udges

n

thechildren's

ourts,

assing

hrough

police

officers

nd

social

workers;

hey

nclude also

the

values

and

the conscious

r unconscious

epresentations

f the

social

order

that

these

representatives

f

order

derive

from heir

belonging

to

given

social

classes

petty

bourgeoisie

nd

bourgeoisie

n

this

particular ase), and thatdirect theirperception nd evaluation

of

the

different

orms,

ocially

dentified,

f violation

of

social

norms.

It

is

against

uch

a substitution

f

object

that

Erving

Goffman

defends imself

n

his

study

f

what he calls total nstitutions:

e

refuses o

accept

the social

definition

f

insanity

ccording

to

which the

given

is

constructed

nd

describes nstead

the

logic

of

the

process

f

alienation

by

which

a

society

hooses

nd

pro-

duces ts insane population.15 n order o understandhe social

conditions

that

produce

the

pre-constructed

bject

(psychiatric

hospital

nd

mental

patient),

which

sociology

f

mental llness

could

only

assume

as

such,

t

was

necessary

o tear

apart

the web

of

apparent

relations

hat,

n the

common

consciousness,

ontain

madmen

and

insanity.

The series

madman,

nsanity,

eurosis,

psychiatrist,

ental

hospital,

ure,

had to be

replaced

by

the one

that it

disguises:

committed,

commitment,

orced

residence,

prison,barracks,

oncentration

amp,

institutional

lienation.

Briefly,

reaking

with

the

ideologicalrepresentations

f

insanity,

particularly

with

the

humanitarian

octrine

that

makes

up

the

faade

of

the institutions

fficially

n

charge

of

curing

t,

is one

with

building up

a

system

f

total

institutions,

paradoxical

grouping

of

organizations

eparated

for

so

long

that

only

their

declared

functions

re

taken

nto

account.

It

is

sufficient,

hen,

to

conceive

of

each

institution

or

class of

institutions)

onstitu-

ting

the

system

s so

many

somorphic

ases

of

a

single

group

of

transformationsn orderto be able to graspthe invariant har-

15

E.

Goffman,

Asylums,

New

York:

Doubleday

&

Co.,

Anchor

Books,

1961.



18/27

CURRENT TRENDS

697

acteristics hicheach of them s givenby the logic of the total

institution.

Taken in

itself,

he

mental

hospital

doubtless

dis-

guises

better

han

any

other nstitutionts relation

to

the

system

and

the

characteristicsf

ts

functioning

hat

derive

from

his

fact,

thanks

specially

o the scientific

uthority

f the

psychiatric

is-

course

which

expresses

ts

declared functions.

Once,

however,

the

series

of total

institutions

as

been

constructed,

he

mental

hospital displays

much

more

completely

han

other

institutions

the ogicofideologicalcamouflage.

In

order to

escape

an

idiographic,

nd

therefore

deological,

consideration f

those

ases

thathave

been able

to

resist

ny

nter-

pretation

or

o

long

that

they

re

perceived

s

they

demand

to

be,

that

is

in

their

specificity,

cience must construct

system

which

alone

can reveal the

hidden

truthof the

case

considered

because it

contains

he

principle

of

its

own

interpretation.

For

this

purpose

t

must

use

the

hypothesis

f

analogies among

facts

claimingto be considered n themselvesnd forthemselves,r

between

the fact

directly

tudied and

the

complex

of

logically

possible

facts

onstituting

he class

of

which

the

particular

fact

is

a

part

from

sociological

viewpoint.16

Max

Weber's

methodo-

16

uch a

probing

f

the

possible

ide

cases,

f the

compossibles,

maginary

r

realized,

hat

constitutene whole

tructured

ystem,

an

legitimately

eek

the aid

of

the

hypothesis

f

structural

nalogies

between

he

phenomena

nder

tudy

nd

some

phenomena

hat

have

already

aken

hape

n

different

pheres

f

social

cience

or of

other

ciences,

tarting

rom

he closest

nes,

inguistics,

thnology

r even

biology it is such a procedure hat has led to conceiving f the structure f

intellectual

ield

y

analogy

with

he

structuref

the

religious

ield uch

as can

be

derived

rom

Max

Weber's

nalysis;

f.

Projet

crateur

t

champ

intellectuel ).

Such

transpositions

f

concepts

nd schemes f

thought

must

always

be

strictly

controlled:

nalogies

with he

closest

pheres

re

not

necessarily

he

east

dangerous

(witness

he

errors

roduced

by concepts

oosely

ntroduced rom

inguistics

nto

ethnology

nd

sociology),

nd

analogies

with

the

farthestnes

may prove

to

have

great

heuristic

alue if

they

re

rigorously

ontrolled. Durkheim

bserved hat

analogy

s

a

legitimate

orm

f

comparison

nd

(that) comparison

s the

only

practical

means t our

disposal

o

make

things

ntelligible.

his

already uggests

the

principles

f a reflection

bout the

conditions

f

a

regulated

sage

of

analogy.

He

condemned he

attempts

imply

o infer

ociological

aws

from

he laws of

biology ecausethey gnore he factthat if the awsof life are found n society,

they

have new

forms nd

specific

haracters. He

suggested

hat the

search

for

partial

nalogies

etween

he conditions f

social

organization,

stablished

hrough



19/27

698

SOCIAL RESEARCH

logical analysis bout theconditions f thevalidity f the Ideal

type,

coherent

iction

o be

measured

gainst

he

real and

to

be

defined

y defining

ts

own deviationfrom he

real,

may

help

to

specify

he

principles

nd

rules under

which such

a

methodical

investigation

f

possible

side-cases

(compossibles)

hould

be

operated,

rovided

however hat

ome

ambiguities

e

removed.17

By identifying

he

ideal

type

with the

model,

the

extreme

ase,

without

differentiating

learly

the

case

actually

observed

from

the one obtained through n imaginary xtreme,Max Weber

tends to

use

it to

indicate

both

a

theoretically

rivileged

case

within

a

constructed

roup

of transformations

nd

the

paradig-

matical ase

which

may

be either

pure

fiction

btained

through

a

unilateral

accentuation

Steigerung)

f relevant

properties,

or an

actually

observable

object (such

as

a

piece

of

writing

by

Benjamin

Franklin)

displaying

n the

highest

degree

the

largest

numberof

properties

f the constructed

bject.

To avoid

these

ambiguities, speciallywhendealingwith really bservable act,

the deal

type

must

be considered

not

in

itself

nd

for

tself,

ike

a

revealing ample

which discloses

he

truth f the whole collec-

tion,

but

rather s

a

particular

ase

of

the

possible,

s

an

element

of a

group

of

transformations,

y

referring

t to all

possible

or

real casesof the

family

f whichthe

deal

type

s

a

privileged

ase,

a

properly ociological nalysis,

nd

the conditions f

animal

organization,

ould

legitimately

ead to

developing

he common features f

any

organization

E.

Durkheim,Reprsentationsndividuellest reprsentationsollectives, evue de

Mtaphysique

t

de

morale,

.

VI,

May

1898,

eprinted

n

Sociologie

t

Philosophie,

Paris,

.

Alean,

924,

rd

d.,

P.U.F.,

1963).

17

Doubtless,

hese

mbiguities

ssentially

erive

from he tact that

Max Weber

views

the ideal

type

as a

guide

for

constructing

ypotheses

nd

that,

placing

himselfwithin

the

logic

of

invention,

e is inclined

to

recognizeparticular

heuristic irtues

n

given

bservable

ases,

hence

givingway

to

a realistic

nterpreta-

tion

of the

notion

of ideal

type,

n

complete

pposition

o his own

theoretical

intentions. he same

ambiguities

re found

gain

n

his

applied

work.

Thus,

for

example,

his

analysis

f

religious

gents, riest, rophet,

orcerer,

an be

easily

reinterpreted

ithin

structural

ogic

and

he

himself

oints

ut the

property

hat

each

religious gent

wes to

the

relations

inding

im to the others nd

to

laymen.

The factremains, owever,hat acking conceptionf the religious ield s a

system,

e does not

escape

(and

his

commentators

ven

less)

typological

hought

and

Aristotelianefinition.



20/27

CURRENT

TRENDS

699

andthereforeakingt as revealinghestructurefisomorphic

cases.

On

this

ondition,

he

deal

type

n

the

ense

f

a

directly

observable

ase can

be

employed

s

rigorously

s

the

fictitious

construction

e.g.,

the

pure type

f

rational

onduct,

sing

the

most ffective eans

o

achieve

ationally

alculated

nds),

which

is

a

privileged

eans

or

grasping

he

range

f real conducts

he

ideal

type

llows

o

objectivate

y

objectivating

heir

ifferential

distance

rom

he

pure type.

Following

uch

a

logic,

Mauss

selectedhepotlatchsthe 'paroxysmalorm nthefamilyfthe

exchanges

f

total nd

agonistic

ature;

r one can view

the tu-

dent

of

etters,

f

bourgeois

arisian

rigin,

nd

his

inclination

toward

ilettantisms

a firm

round pon

which

o

build

the

model

f

possible

elations

etween

ociological

ruth

oncerning

the

tudent's

ondition

nd

its

deological ransfiguration.18

ne

can

well

understand ow

the

structural

pproach

an

find

n

logical

formalizationhe

predestinate

eans

fully

o realize

t-

self: ymbolsndsystemsf ogic nd mathematicsllowthought,

freed

rom

eferenceo

mplicit xamples,

o

push

o

ts

very

nd

the

nvestigation,

t

once mechanical

nd

methodic,

f

the

pos-

sible,

nd

to realize he

controlled

onstructionf

a

systematic

body

f

hypothesesncompassing

ll

possible

xperiences.

The

model,

ormalized

r

not,

s the

ubstitute

or

xperimenta-

tion,

which

s almost

lways

mpossible,

nd

provides

he

means

to

compare

with

eality

he

consequences

rawn

hrough

uch

construction,

n

a

way

hat

scompleteustbecause

t

s fictitious.

As

against

he

mimetic

models hat

eproduce

nly

he

phenom-

enal

properties

f

the

object,

nstead

f

restoring

ts

principles

f

functioning,

he

nalogical

r

structural

odels,

isregardingp-

pearanceshrough

bstraction

nd

methodic

omparison,

stablish

an

intelligible

elation

mong

onstructed

elations

nd

can

be

transposed

o

orders

f

reality

henomenallyery

ifferent,

ug-

gesting y nalogy

ew

nalogies

nd

giving

ise o newconstruc-

tions of

objects.

These

partial

theories

hat

formulate he

generatingndunifyingrinciplesf systemf tructuralomo-

is

Cf.

P. Bourdieu nd

J.

C.

Passeron,

es

Hritiers,

p.

cit.,

pp.

69-79.



21/27

700

SOCIAL RESEARCH

logiesare thesystematicealization f a system frelations o be

verified r

already

verified,

nd

demand

a

procedure

f

verifica-

tion that

annot

but

be

itself

ystematic.Consciously

onstructed

against

the immediate

given/1 hey

allow

the

testing

gainst

reality

f

the

properties

hat an be

exposed

completely,

y

deduc-

tion,

thanks

o the

rreality

f

such

theories. In

the

same

way

as

the mathematician

may

find n the definition

f

a

straight

ine

as

curve without

ny

curvature

he

principle

of

a

general

theory

f

curves, o theconstructionf a puremodel allows consideration

of

differentocial

formations

s

different

ealizations

f a

single

group

of

transformations

nd

brings

o

light,

onsequently,

idden

properties

hat

can be revealed

only

by

relating

ach

realization

to

all the

others,

hat

s

to

say

with

reference o

a

complete

ystem

of

the

relations

n

which

the

principle

of

their

tructural

ffinity

is

expressed.

Whether

pplied

to

differentocieties

nd

social

classes

or

to

differentub-systemsfthesamesociety, hecomparativemethod

makes

t

possible

o

explain

the

peculiarity

f

a

phenomenal

om-

plex

(of

ts 'structure'

in the senseof

a

system

f

relations

mong

the

constitutive

lements

f

a

totality)

y

relating

t to other om-

plexes

also

defined s

systems

f

relations),

y

a

procedure

nalo-

gous

to

thatwhich allows

the

mathematician

to

expose

relations

through

egulated

ransformations

f

formulas/'

s

Leibniz

says.19

The

positing

f

the structure

s

a

system

f covariations

hrough

whichone

structure

in

the

original ense)

of

a

system

f

relations

is

changed

nto

another,

makes

t

possible

to attribute

o the

sys-

tem

under

study

ts

own

position

within the

whole

complex

of

possible

ases.

Thus,

for

xample,

statistical

nalysis

may

estab-

lish

the

structure

f

the

museum

public

of different ountries

(separated

by

systematic

ifferences),

hat

s,

the

system

f direct

or

indirect elations

mong dependent

nd

independent

ariables

such

as

sex,

age,

level

of

education,

profession,

ndividual

prefer-

ences

n

art,

xpectations

bout

the

organization

f museums

nd

arrangement

fworks, tc. At thispoint,however, n pain either

is

G. W.

Leibniz,

hilosophische

chriften,

erhardt,

ol.

VII,

p.

206.



22/27

CURRENT TRENDS

701

ofcomparing he ncomparable r offailing o comparethecom-

parable,

he

analysis

annot

be

limited

o

bringing

ogether

ingle

relations,

gnoring

he

positional

values

which

each

of them

owes

to its

belonging

o

a

particular

ystem

f relations.

Further,

f

one

does

not

want to overlook

the

systematic

ction

exercised

upon

each

relation

by

the

characteristics

f each

country,

rom he

population

tructure

o

policies

n

matters

f culture r

education,

and if

one does

not

want

to be

precluded

from

ystematically

verifyingheeffectsfsuchan action, t is necessaryodetermine

the

aws

of

transformation

hich,

ystematicallypplied

to

one

or

another f

the

systems

f statistical

elations

r,

more

exactly,

o

the

principle

of

such

systems

represented

n

the

particular

ase

by

a

mat

Bourdieu, Pierre & Angela Zanott-Karp. 1968. Structuralism & Theory of Sociological Knowledge

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Transcript of Bourdieu, Pierre & Angela Zanott-Karp. 1968. Structuralism & Theory of Sociological Knowledge