Born - Anthropology, Kleinian Psychoanalysis, And the Subject in Culture

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Anthropology, Kleinian Psychoanalysis, and the Subject in Culture

Author(s): Georgina BornReviewed work(s):Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 100, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 373-386Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/683117 .

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IN RECENTYEARS everal writers have pursued the

methodological similarities between the practices of

ethnographyand of psychoanalysis.Theystress the use

of concepts of transference and countertransference

for understanding he experience of fieldwork and foranalyzingethnographicmaterial.lThese are not simply

methodological issues: in psychoanalysis transference

and countertransferenceare thepoints atwhich clinicalpractice meets the theorizationof psychic dynamics.

A second development involves anthropological

studies that attempt to update and broaden this rela-

tionship by drawing on various post-Freudianschools

of psychoanalysis.2The approachoutlined here formspart of this development.The areas of psychoanalyticworkto which it is closest are studies of cultureandso-

ciety influenced by the work of MelanieKlein and thetradition of studies of group relations and group psy-

chological dynamics.3Central o this perspective is theidea that processes such as projection andintrojection,

splittingand fragmentation,occur routinely, f variablywithininstitutionsat the level of the dynamics of group

culture, rather han simply due to the aggregate dynam-ics of individualmembers.Thus while individuals' nter-

nal states will have an impact on the institutionalcul-

ture, the lattercannot be reducedto the former.Group

psychic dynamics will profoundly affect the internal

states of individuals hrougha process of introjectionof

the Usocialdefense system"by members.4In this way

the psychic defense mechanismsof the institutionalcul-

ture are formativein constructingthe subjectivities of

its members.This perspective, however, has limitations. A1-

though it gives insight into the dynamics of individual

social institutions, the aim is a therapeutic" one: to

ameliorate the institution's "pathological"unctioning

from an analysis of destructive defenses. But this ig-

nores how present dynamicsmay be influencedby cul-

tural historical forces and may have tenacious roots.

There is also a tendency to read individual and group

psychic processes as closely bound,with little sense ofhow and under what conditions individualsmay with-

stand prevailing nstitutionaldefenses. Thus the group-

relationsapproach takes scant account of widersocial,

cultural, and historical forces. It lacks an adequate

theorization both of agency and of cultural-historical

process to complement its focus on the internal, syn-

chronic propertiesof groups. The group-relationsheo-

rists, Elnally,appear to grant psychic dynamics a pri-

mary or determinantstatus rather than conceiving of

them as but one significantdimension of a constellation

of unacknowledged conditions and forces political,

economic, and cultural bearingon culturalhistorical

process.Thepathologizing tenorof the group-relationsper-

spective echoes much extant anthropologicaluse of

psychoanalysis, in which questions of pathologyhaunt

the work. It is time to drop the problematicof pathol-

ogy. In examining social and cultural processes, we

should acknowledge that psychoanalysis bequeaths a

set of tools for analyzingthe complete spectrum of hu-

man states. This is why, despite a recognitionof its his-

toricity, psychoanalysismay be generalizedand used as

part of a hermeneuticprocess of gainingcritical insight

into socioculturalphenomena without imputingeither

judgments of clinical pathology or questions of practi-cal intervention.6

Despite limitations, the founding insight of the

group-relationsapproach remains, supported by syn-

chronicempirical studies: thatpsychic defense mecha-

nisms mayinhereas properties of collectively held cul-

tural systems. This principle is my starting point in

conceiving the relation between "collective repre-sentation and personalfantasy" hat WaudKrackeand

GEORGINAORNs a lecturern the faculty f SocialandPolitical

Sciences,Universityf Cambridge, ambridge B21ST,UnitedKingdom.

AmericanAnthropologist00(2):373-386. CopyrightO1998, AmericanAnthropological ssociation.

GEORGINABORN / UNIVERSITYF CAMBRIDGE

finthropology,lleinian Psyehoana

a n d t h e Subject i n Culture



374 AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST VOL. 1 00, NO. 2 JUNE 1 998

experiencedas derivingfromthe object. Ironically, his

is how the persecutionof the bad objectis justiEled: s a

defense against persecution. Ultimately the origin of

persecution may become irrelevant as the subject is

caught up in a phantasizedfrenzy of terrorand, there-

fore,preventativeand retributivedestruction.

Klein s clear,however, that externalreality,expe-rience in the world, greatly influences the degree of

splitting. Pain, suffering,and excessive uncertaintyor

anxietyexacerbatean individual's endencyto fragmen-

tation and splitting.This is compoundedby projection

of destructiveparts of the self into the object,whichare

then felt to be emanatingfromit. The Kleinian ermfor

such a process, which is common inthe paranoid-schiz-

oid position,a state of persecutoryanxiety, isprojective

identification. This entailsan aggressive,intrusivepro-

jection into the object 'in order to takeoverits contents

orto controlit"(Hinshelwood1989:179). t is markedby

a loss of boundarybetween self and other, subject andobject,a quality n whichthe subjectmaybelieve her-or

himself able to affect the inside of the object and make

it feel somethingunderher or his control.l?

Envy,as a primitivedefense anda destructive nter-

nal force, is also emphasized.This is linked to splitting

and involves the unconscious wish to spoil or steal the

good things and the autonomypossessed by the good

object. Envyinvolves aninability to tolerate separation

and difference and the drive to destroy the creativity

and goodness of the (m)other. Ultimately,Kleintraces

the destructiveelements of the primarydefenses to the

existence of a death instinct counterpartof the life in-

stinct or libidoand usuallyin some fusionwithit, whichis manifested n destructivenessaimedatthe self or pro-

jected into andattributed o the object.llThere are several important ways in which the

Kleinian perspective differs from Freudian and La-

canianapproaches,makingit a more responsive aid to

sociocultural interpretation.As a higher-levelconcep-

tual integrationof the basic defenses, andin contrastto

the normative developmental narratives of Freudian

and Lacanianperspectives, Kleinoffers the concept of

"positions." 2 While this involves a minimal develop-

mentaltheory n the ideaof a movefrom the initialpara-

noid-schizoidposition to the depressiveposition during

the firstyearof life, Klein(1986a) stresses thatboth po-

sitions and the defense mechanisms associated with

them actually recur throughout life and, in their less-

extreme forms, inhere in normalpsychic functioning.JulietMitchellnotes thatwhile "Freud's heoryrevolves

aroundthe question of a past" (1986:26)and, speciEl-

cally, of repression,for Klein "thepast and the present

are one . . . a position is a mentalspace in which one is

sometimes lodged"(1986:28).Hence defenses may be

observed not only in infancybut equally in adulthood.WhereFreud'sdevelopmentalscheme resonates witha

GilbertHerdt(1987:4) rightlypose as the key challenge

facing a nonreductive psychoanalytic anthropology.

The point about this approachis that the Kleinianac-

count of psychic functioning focuses on mechanisms

that are basic or infrastructural. n Klein'sterms, they

are primitive (or primary)defense mechanisms.7They

are necessarily encapsulated by abstract concepts-"splitting,"Udenial,"fragmentation"which can in turn

be used to decipheranotherlevel of reality: he defense

mechanisms characteristicof the discourse or cultural

system understudy. Theyare,then, open to reinterpre-

taton in relation to socioculturalprocess.

Klein's ConceptualSpace

A central Kleinianconcept, much extended from

Freud, s splitting." Kleinconsidersthis to be one of the

most primitivedefenses againstanxiety,present fromthe earliest stages of life and continuingin varyingin-

tensity throughout ife. Splitting nvolvesa distortion,a

fragmentationof thoughtand experience, wherebythe

object of perception is experiencedas split into a good

and a bad object which are absolutelyseparateyet an-

tagonistically bound. The good object is idealizedj

granted supreme and unquestionablelegitimacy, and

felt to be a refuge from persecution.The bad object is

feared as a terrifying,destructive persecutor or deni-

grated as worthless and illegitimate.Extreme splitting

is linkedwith two other mechanisms:"denial" nd aom-

nipotence."Denialinvolvesthe omnipotentobliteration

of a perception,such as the existence of the badobject,without reference to actual reality" (Hinshelwood

1987:266).Thus splitting, denial,and omnipotence are

mutually implicatedprocesses.8 But splitting can take

bothmore andless violent forms,fromthe less-extreme

devaluationof the bad object, to the more omnipotent

and persecuted "solution' of denial or annihilationin

"phantasy"r, concretized,inpractice.9

Splitting,then, involves a reductiveform of think-

ing:objects are eitherallgoodor all bad.The integrityof

the object is fragmented,as is the perception of it and

the ambivalencethat it evokes. Inthis state simple dif-

ference becomes imbued with extreme evaluation.

Complex and subtle perceptions of the object are

evacuated. In extreme splitting,the fear of persecution

by the bad object is labile. It exists, in a vicious circle,

side by side with persecutoryphantasiessuch as the de-

sire to annihllate the bad object before it can destroy

the self. The sense of persecution by the bad object is

immanentlybound to the impulse to persecute in re-

turn. In fact, for Kleinians,the directionof causality is

unclear or even reversed. The fear of persecution de-

rives from the projection of destructive, murderous

parts of the self into the bad object, yet these parts are



ANTHROPOLOGYNDKLEINIAN SYCHOANALYSIS GEORGINAORN 375

19th-century volutionism,Mitchellsees Kleinas offer-

inga sociologicalphenomenology.Therelativeabsence

of a developmentalnarrative(or foundingmyth) is im-

portantbecause it means the Kleinianapproach s less

teleological, less encumberedwith finding evidence of

specific psychic-developmentaldramas,and thus less

saturatedwith culturalassumptionsthan FreudianandLacanianperspectives. It is not true, then, that there is

no developmentalschema in the Kleinianperspective.

Rather, t is less elaborate,less specific, and less encul-

tured than those of its rivals. Kleiniannotions of pri-

marydefenses and positions are thus more responsive

to differentculturaland historicalmaterials.A relatedway that the Kleinianperspective differs

fromthe Freudianone is in its aimto find not onlythe in-

fantilein the adultbut also the adult n the infant.HereI

refer to Klein'sstress on the capacity of even small in-

fants to experience guilt andto attemptreparation, he

signs of an earlysuperego. In this way the Kleinianap--proachcomplexifies and invertsthe foundingFreudian

maximthatthe infantilepsychic depths" contradict he

adultsocial surface.The Kleinian rameworkmaintains

a healthyskepticism toward the potential for primitive

functioning on the part of the civilized or developed,

while remainingsensitive to the potential for integra-

tion, humanism,creativity,and communicationon the

partof the infantile.One of the key divisions between Kleinian and

Freudianpsychoanalysts, symptomaticof their differ-

ent conceptualizationsof psychic history,concerns the

role and weight accorded to the primarydefenses. An-

other concerns the genderedbiases of Freudian ormu-lations.Onbothcounts, Klein s heldbyher followersto

have lessened the Iigidityand culture-boundcharacter

of Freudianconcepts by emphasizingmore basic and

structuralpsychic components. These components al-

low one to explore pre-and proto-oedipaldefenses and

the asymmetriesof femaleand male development one

cause of Klein's nfluence in recent feministtheory.l3

Another argument for a productive affinity be-

tween Kleinianpsychoanalysis and anthropologycen-

ters on methodologyand textuality. Of all psychoana-

lytic schools, Kleinianismhas practitioners who are

most committedto theory being embedded in clinicalexperience andderived fromobservation,andaremost

averse to excesses of pure theoretical exegesis. Kle-

inian essays aim to give rich descriptions of the inter-

subjective clinical encounter,therebyrevealingthe ba-sis of theoreticalinterpretations. n herworkwith small

children,Klein founded the psychoanalytic"play ech-

nique" hatposits children'splay as equivalent o verbal

free association in adultpsychoanalysis (Klein 1986b).

Hence there is a methodologicalwidening beyond lan-

guageto behavior,nonverbalcommunication,and sym-bolic play, which lays stress on the analyst's observa-

tions as a complement to linguistic intexpretationand

exchange. Ironically,strippedof its Geertzianantipsy-

chologism,"thickdescription"evokes well the Kleinian

commitment to detailed observation and to writing

throughclinical material.All of this, of course, makes

Kleinian writings as susceptible as realist ethnogra-

phies to the recent critiquesof textualstrategies.Kleinian and Lacanianapproaches also differ in

terms of their ontologies and epistemologies (Frosh

1987:ch. 5; Rustin 1991:ch. 7, 1995). These are ex-

pressed in different views of the potential outcome of

the clinical process, whicharelinked n turnto different

attitudesto the potentialfor transformation ndchange.

For Lacaniansthe subject is conceived as immured n

an ontological condition of psychic alienation,and the

psychoanalyticprocess aims above all to rid the anal-

ysand of humanist and essentialist illusions, including

those of selfhood and of ;;cure" Bowie 1991:ch. 2;

Rustin1991:187).Thispessimismis echoed bythe tenorof Lacaniancultural theory,with its stress on the ideo-

logical character of cultural forms and their inescap-

able effects on subjectivity.For Kleinians,by contrast,

the vicissitudes of intersubjective and social experi-

ence, in conJunctionwith innatepsychic factors, condi-

tion a baby's internal world from the outset, and,

throughout life, the quality of human relations pro-

foundly affects internal object relations, for better or

worse. Thereis therefore a concept (and a practice) of

effecting change, of transformingpsychic structures

(Hinshelwood 1989:400-402).Given my earlier point

aboutthe strippingaway of pseudohistories and over-

elaborate developmental schemes, a Kleinianperspec-tive allows conceptually for the potential for changein

a prevailingpsychic structure,forinvestigating he con-

ditions of possibility of such change,and for analyzing

nonteleologicalhistoricalprocess.Transposedonto the analysis of culturalsystems,

this capacityto conceive variablechange yields two im-

portantpossibilities. First, it enablesa movebeyondthe

functionalistand ahistoricalpsychoanalyticapproaches

that portrayunconscious mechanismsin culturalphe-

nomena as primarily adaptive or as fulfilling needs

(Boyer 1986).It also providesa basis for analyzinghow

psychic dynamics may be implicatedin differentrates

of historicalor temporalchange,from states of relative

culturaltimelessness or discursivestasis, involvingthe

suppression or avoidance of change, to those of rapid

cultural ransformation Stein 1981:243).

Splittingof the Object:GenderClassificationandIdeology

Gender classification is so ubiquitous a culturalphenomenon hat analyzingt withreferenceto Kleinian



376 AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST VOL. 1 00, NO. 2 * JUNE 1 998

ideas indicates how psychoanalytictheory may eluci-

date commonplace classificatoryprocesses. I will ap-

proachwhatI haveto saythroughareadingof Henrietta

Moore's(1988)discussion of the debatesaroundSherry

Ortner's(1974) well-knownarticle, ;'IsFemale to Male

as NatureIs to Culture?".Thesedebates appearto have

settled into a postmodernorthodoxy,centered on a cri-tiqueof the ethnocentricassumption hatone couldem-

ploy Westerncategories of maleand female,cultureand

nature,analyticallyas thoughthey were fixed and uni-

versal. Rather, the postmodern position argues, it is

necessary in each case to interrogate the particular

classificationsystem at issue.Two key issues arise from Moore'sdiscussion.One

is the need to deconstruct Western assumptions by

showing the variabilityof the categories female, male,

nature,culture,andof theiralignment: hat is, the need

to trace the specific contents of differentgenderclassi-

fications. The second is the question of where genderideologies arise from and theirarticulationwith social

relationsand practices.Regardingthe first, it is striking that despite the

wide cross-culturalcategoricalvariationshown by her

ethnographicexamples, in each case she offers classifi-

catorymaterial hatsuggests thatwomenaresystemati-

cally, if differently, disparagedand devalued by com-

parisonwithmen:by, forexample,women's association

with pollution concepts, the association of maleness

with creativityand the transcendenceof social life, the

association of women with the inferiorityof children,

andthe metaphoricalequationof femaleness with self-

interest, rubbish,poverty,danger,and death. Thus,de-spite the convincingrefutationof Ortner's thnocentric

classificatory alignment,Mooredoes not overturnthe

postulate of the near universalityof dominantcultural

systems thatdevaluethe categorywoman.

Minimally,gender classification amounts to sys-

tems of beliefs and/orpractices,some of which devalue

or oppress the category woman," which is implicitly

defined in some way by opposition to the category

'8man." he binary division is at the same time highly

evaluative.Thismost basic of classificationsystems, in

its great variety of enunciations, characteristically

evinces splitting.Moorecalls thesephenomena"gender

stereotypes."Butthey aremore: heyarederogatory,re-

ductive, emotive, reified, naturalized,and legitimized

by referenceto physiologyor to powerfulmetaphors.In

short,they haveall thepropertiesof ideology. 4 Classifi-cation plus splittingequalsideology.That s, classifica-

tion plus the tendency to idealize one pole while deni-

grating,fearing, and persecuting the other is the way

ideology works in relationto gender,class, race, or eth-

nicity. Moreover, n Kleinian erms, the common foun-

dation of genderideologies in negativebeliefs about fe-

male bodily processes linkedto procreationsuggests a

ptimaryenvy at work, one that seeks to undermine e-

male creativityby reference to its fundamentalsigns,

and to denigratewomen's identity by recourse to ines-

capablephysiologicalreferents.

Mooreis clear that there is no simple Eltbetween

gender stereotypes and social or economic relations

andthus appearsto stress the autonomousforceof gen-

der ideologies. This is consistent with an emphasison

the contradictions that may7 n some cases, arise be-

tween culturalbeliefs andpractices, ideologyandexpe-

rience. These contradictions,however, do not obviate

the importanceof gender deologies and theirrolein the

culturalsubordinationof women, even if in otherexpe-

rientialdomainswomen have a certainpower.

How then should we understandthis autonomy? n

relation to her own work on the Marakwet,Moore

seems to offer an interactionist perspective: "Gender

stereotypes are developed and used in the strategies

whichindividualsof bothsexes employto advance heirinterests in various social contexts" (1988:37).Their

"powerand pervasiveness have to be accounted for in

terms of [their]strategic use in the day-to-daycontext

of interactionbetween women andmen"(1988:37).But

there is a disproportionhere between the emphasison

everydaystrategies, the constant microscopic produc-

tion and reproductionof gender ideologies, and their

"wideapplicability" s well as "substantialand continu-

ing rhetoricalandmaterialpower" (1988:38).These as-

pects of genderideologies demanda theorythatrecog-

nizes theirhistoricallongevityandresilience as well as

their systematicityand subsumptionof everydayprac-tices. Some explanatorydimension must also be found

to accountfor theirpsychologicaland emotionalpower

at a collective andan individual evel.Thisis where Kleinian deas are insightful.It is the

tendency for binaryoppositions and the classificatory

systems that encompass them to be experienced an-

tagonisticallyand evaluatively,the systematic idealiza-

tion or advocacy of one pole and denigrationof the

other, that is captured powerfully by the concept of

splitting. Thus splitting can provide a crucial link for

theorizing he relationbetween classificationand ideol-

ogy in general,as well as givinginsightintotheir subjec-

tive internalization,reproduction,andpower.l5A final

observation in support of this argumentconcerns the

arbitrarinessof the evaluation attributedto the object

of splitting: he interchangability,n principle,of ideali-

zationand denigrationor fear, andthe unstableoscilla-

tion betweenthe two. Thisis characteristicof manygen-

der ideologies with their prominent Madonna/whore

duality.It is also characteristicof racismin which the

body of the other (again physiology as the sign of

identity) is alternately perceived as a phobic or an

ideal/eroticobject.l6



ANTHROPOLOGYNDKLEINIANSYCHOANALYSISGEORGINAORN 377

A second observation links the ambiguityof sor-

cery with envy and projective identification. The

authors describe how sorcery acts as a levelingmecha-nism that works against inequality.This is drivenby thenotion, commonly expressed in a cannibalistic meta-phor, that "whatsomeone possesses must be appropri-

ated at the expense of someone else . . . someone has'eaten' the life, the health, the crops, the wealth of hisneighbour" Rowlands andWarnier1988:123).Envy of

the successful, stirred up by inequalities, is convertedinto fear of harm by the successful. Destructiveenvy is

projected intothe object and experienced asoriginating

there. On the other hand, sorcery accusations by the

poor act as threatsagainst the wealthy, threats that thelatter try to preempt by showing signs of having a be-nign, socialized evu, rather hana malevolent one. They

attempt this both by admitting o sorcery andby variousredistributiveand generous acts. Paradoxically,these

acts may increase the status of the successful, therebycreating the potential for an augmented cycle of envy,fear of sorceryaccusation,and redistribution.

At base this system is composedof complementarypersecutory anxieties. Peasants fear their good thingsbeing "eaten up"by the wealthy/sorcerer,a fear rootedin the projection of an envious wish to spoil and steal.This is linked to a knowledgeof the hold exercised overthe wealthy by the potential for sorcery accusations.Wealthypersons fear beingaccused of havinga malevo-lent evu, essentially of being a bad, persecuting object.Thus the redistributiveprocess is drivenbythe threat ofenvy and perception as a bad object and the need to

ward t off. Thisis a striking nstance of a mutuallynter-nalized and persecutory projectiveidentification,witheach party operating undera sense of intense threat.

Rowlands and Warnierdevelop historical argu-

ments, notingthat under conditions of economicreces-sion the persecutory dynamics intensified. Sorceryaccusations multiplied, the leveling mechanisms inten-sified to counteractthe monopolizingof resources,andstate repression increased.The authors depict the pres-ent in terms of a strangleholdof extreme mutualperse-

cutory anxieties.Villagersperceive the state elite as the"most powerful sorcererst and as aobjective[allies] of

deadly powersX Rowlandsand Warnier1988:130).Theurban elite, on the other hand,fear the villagesetting asthe source of "genuine esoteric knowledge"and are

"scaredof being eaten by thevillagers" 1988:130).They

therefore feel compelled to redistribute.Herethe analy-sis of changing historical conditions vindicates theKleinianproposition that withincreased hardship,per-secutory dynamicswill also intensify.

Rowlands and Warnier's ssay may be contrastedwith one by Mary Douglas (1991). With implicit refer-ence to contemporaryresponses to AIDS,Douglas aimsto complexify both our comparativehistorical grasp of

Racismand ethnic nationalismsalso exemplify re-

ified and evaluative classifications imbued with split-

ting, idealization,and denigration,embodiedin culturalsystems of historical resilience (Rustin 1991). In a case

such as the former Yugoslavia we see splitting in itsmost extreme form (Bowman 1992, 1994).The various

nationalist discourses polarizethe world between theidealized ethnic nation/selfand the otherethnic group,

the bad object,whose onlyaim is the defilement,perse-cution, and annihilation of that ideal object. The na-

tion's others, conceived as persecuting antagonists,must thereforebe obliteratedbefore they obliteratethe

natiordself.Witheach ethnic nationalism following thesame persecutory logic, a vicious circle of real mutual

persecution fueling the orgy of murderousphantasies,there seems no limit to destructiveescalation.The split-

ting and merging hat bindthe nation and itsenemy dic-tate that, the more the enemy is hated, blamed,and an-

nihilated,the more this negativityfunctions to evoke itsphantasizedcounterpart, the nation ideal. This is pre-

cisely the logic of persecutory projective identification,embodied in large-scale cultural processes involvingentire populations.l7

Persecutionand ProjectiveIdentification:Witchcraft,Sorcery,andHistory

Two recent articles (Douglas 1991; RowlandsandWarnier1988)on witcheraft and sorcery arehighly sug-

gestive of a Kleiniancultural nterpretationcentered on

processes of persecutory projective identification.l8They are also important ortheir analysesof the vanringsocial andhistorical contexts within whichsorcery andwitcheraft accusations multiply. They exemplify how

anthropological analysis can augment psychoanalyticcultural theory by elucidatingthe external conditionswithin which certain psychic dynamics become cultur-ally prevalent.

In Cameroon, he ubiquitoussorcery principle,evu,is synonymous with power and is highly ambiguous

(Rowlands and Warnier 1988). It may be Usocialized"and is then associated with success and wealth. But if

not socialized, it remainsharmful.The two modalitiesof evu are linkedwith chains of metaphoricalassocia-

tions. They may be summarizedas shown. My first ob-servation is that these binaryoppositions are stronglyimbued withsplitting.

socialized evu

diurnal

beneficent

legitimate social power

redistribution

eating mixed-vegetable and

soft, ground food

evu

nocturnal

malevolent

social disorder, evil

selfishness

meat eating, drawing blood,

cannibalism



378 AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST VOL. 100, NO. 2 * JUNE 1998

the conditions within which accusations of Uinsidious

harm"become rampantand the social and rhetorical

formsthat they take. She does this by consideringboth

Africanand Europeanwitcheraftand sorcery and the

historical case of leprosy as exemplaryof contagious

disease. Shedemonstrateshowthe imputationof insidi-

ous harm, based on fear of a hidden source of inJury,

that is, fear of secretive persecutionby the other, itself

becomes the rationale for persecution of that other.

Thus "the attribution of a hidden power to hurt is a

weaponof attack" 1991:726)and providesthe basis for

social rejection.She identifies three historical patterns taken by

strategies of blame and rejection. In the first, accusa-

tions are targeted upward against leaders who abuse

their office. In the second, they become diffuse andare

aimeddownat the powerless masses. Inthe third,accu-

sations operateuagainst he outsiderswho threatenthe

tight,beleagueredcommunity"1991:734).Douglasem-phasizes that insidious harm is an accusation that

reaches differenttargets in different political regimes"

and that "itwill be credible essentially if the political

system which it backs is accepted"(1991:726).She of-

fers two basic explanations for the changingpatterns.

One is negative: accusations decline when there is a

centralizationand standardizationof the nation-state's

legal apparatus.The second links the rise of witcheraft

accusations to periods of social crisis, enablinga ruth-

less restructuringof social relations.Avariant of this is

implicit in her own materialon the Lele. She describes

witcheraftas epidemicin the villagesand addsthatthisis a situationwhere the ruralpopulation s "livingwith-

out cash in a newly monetized economy"(1991:729).

The portraitshe gives is of completesocial and psychic

fragmentation.Yet she does not discussit inthese terms

andat anotherpoint dismisses the notionthat "relative

deprivation"might be causal.Douglas'sproject is an ambitiousone with many

virtues.ButI haveproblemswithit. First, a monocausal

explanationof these phenomenaseems inadequate.The

Lele case in combinationwith Rowlandsand Warnier's

suggests that economic breakdown and polarization

may well be contributing actors nthe escalationof sor-

cery and witcheraft and their persecutory dynamics.

Furthermore, the Cameroonianmaterial shows that

centralizationof the state andjudiciarydoes not neces-

sarily cause a terminaldecline in sorcery accusations

and may cause a repression. Far from sorcery being

functional for the dominant political apparatus, in

Cameroon t has a powerfullyautonomousand mediat-

ingrole. What s needed is attentionto how the political

is articulatedwith persecutoryand/orenvious dynam-

ics (e.g., Rose 1988)and underwhat historical condi-

tions such mechanismscome to be pervasive.

The main weakness of Douglas's essay raises the

broader limitations of an anti- or apsychologicalneo-

Durkheimianism. t is shown by her discussion of the

severalstages of libel" that signalthe onset andescala-

tion of persecution.At one level her analysisis compel-

ling,yet it remainsdescriptiveandtypologicaland has,

as it were, a blackhole at its center. Shehas no accountof how the linguistic behavior she describes is moti-

vated or experiencedby victimor perpetrator,or of the

underlying ormsof affect and emotion.For this, as for

much of her disturbingmaterial,insight into how cul-

tural phenomena play upon and resonate with collec-

tive psychic states wouldbe invaluable.

History,Discourse,andPsychicDynamics

I have suggested that we requiresome account of

the historicallongevityand systematicityof gender de-ologies andpractices. In the studies of witcheraftand

sorcery,historywas alreadya factor;at stake were the

conditions affectingthe rise andretreat of persecutory

cultural dynamics.Thepicture is complexifiedby Glen

Bowman's(1992, 1994) account of interethniccontlict

in Bosnia.Here,historyis not only a real temporalpro-

cess to be elucidated but a key component in the con-

struction and legitimation of ethnic identity in dis-

course. Bowman'sanalysis remindsus that discursive

constructionsof history themselves become partof the

reflexive productionof history.l9Startingwith this ac-

count I will trace the way psychic mechanismsmay be

operative in this process. In particular,I will examinethe way splittingand denial may contributeto advanc-

ing one discourse over coexistent or rival discourses,

instigatinga momentumthat tends to reproduceits he-

gemonyand contributeto its reification,by "absenting,"

annihilating,or subordinating ts others.Bowman gives two extreme examples of such a

process and of the manipulationof historicalmemory.

One is very postmodern:he describes the nationalist

erasure of tradition to clear the groundforthe erection

of uanother modern'community,this time posited on

archaic dentitiesof 'blood.'"However,"the dentitybe-

ing 'resuscitated' s not a 'thingof thepast.'. . . What s in

play is ... a logic of persecution by which the fairly

nebulous markersof 'the nation' are filled out ... in

terms of . . . a history-real or imagined of persecu-

tion at the hands of their erstwhile neighbours"(1992:6).He also discerns history as discourse in the

Serbianattempt to purge from the Bosnian landscape

any marksof the violence by which that landscapehad

been annexed,signaled bythe tearingdownof mosques

and turfingof the groundto makeparks. Suchaprocess

involvesviolence to real historyby manipulatingts per-

ception both in memoryand physical form.The attack



ANTHROPOLOGYNDKLEINIAN SYCHOANALYSIS GEORGINA ORN 379

on historical thinking s epitomized by an anecdotetoldto Bowman.A UnitedNations workerberated a Serbianmilitiaman or taking part in the destruction of a abeau-tiful and ancient Old City."The man replied, "But wewill build a new and more beautiful ancient Old Cityinits place" (1994:159).

Both the historyand practice of interethniccontlictand the discursive historical constructs produced bycertainparties aremarkedby the persecutorydynamicsof ethnic nationalism.In the obliterationof Bosniancul-turalforms and attacks on the Bosnian people, in theat-tempt to construct Serbianhegemony and promote itshistorical longevity by "absenting"(destroying) thesigns of its other, Serbian discourse exhibits an ex-treme,omnipotent,and murderousdeniaL

Two other cases exhibit anonviolent yet similardy-namic. The first comes from my studyof a Parisiancom-putermusic institute, Institut de Recherche et de Coor-

dination Acoustique/Musique(IRCAM).The researchcombines ethnography with a genealogy of the aes-thetic and philosophical discourse on which IRCAMwas founded,modernism n music(Born 1995).Histori-cal analysis shows that dominant characteristics ofmodernismas a long-termculturalsystem can be under-stood in terms of psychic dynamics. As many havear-gued, modernism has defined itself through a continu-ous, if variable,antagonism towardpopular culture.Inmusical modernism,such a disavowal is evidenced inthe construction of an aesthetic that is antithetical o, orthe negation of, popular music. Popularmusic is its ab-solute other. This is highlightedby contrast withmusi-

cal postmodernism, n which popular andnon-Westernmusics are present aesthetically as sources or intlu-ences. The discourse of musicalmodernism s thereforestructuredby omnipotent denial of its other.

The concept of denial has also elucidated ethno-graphicmaterial. Most relevant here is the absence inindividuals'IRCAM ractices of popular cultural ormsthat were prominent in other areas of their lives. Indifferent ways these subjects showed a dislocationbe-tween the legitimatemodernist allegiance of theirpro-fessional IRCAM elves and various illegitimate rela-tions with popular musics, whichwere kept external to

IRCAM. t work here is a splitting nwhich subjects andthe dominant culture of IRCAMdentify with an ideal-izedmodernism,while popular cultureis devalued orli-able to complete denial. Rather than exemplifyingtheuniEledand sovereign subject of classical humanism,these i'author-subjects"are best conceived as frag-mented, their aesthetic dispositions molded by discur-sive forces. Hence the replication of the same psychicconfiguration in the historical denigration and dis-avowal of popularculture by modernist discourse andin the same kind of denigrationanddisavowal in the in-stitution of IRCAMBorn 1995).

I have proposedthe term antidiscourse to sumup

this phenomenon of a discourse that is produced in theprocess of simultaneously denying another,coexistent,and rival discourse. This term may be contrasted withMichaelHalliday's 1978) concept of antilanguage.Itre-fers not simply to purely linguistic forms but to dis-

course more broadly conceived, in the Foucauldiansense, to include characteristicpractices, social rela-tions, institutions, technologies, and forms of knowl-edge. Moreover, Halliday portrays antilanguage as amarginal code that negates aspects of the dominantcode to express resistance. By antidiscourse I imply adiscourse that is engaged in the denial or "absenting"fthe existence of a rivaldiscourse.Antidiscursivedenialmaythus be as characteristicof hegemonic culturalsys-tems as subordinateones. It may also be central to thereproductionof dominantculturalsystems over time.Inthe historical analysis of modernism t is the most rigid

and enduring aspects of the discourse, its continuousconstructions of absolute difference from popularcul-ture,that show evidence of splittingand denial.

A third example of the operation of an antidis-course can be drawnfrom Eric Hirsch's(1994)materialon the Fuyuge of Papua New Guinea.He describes thecoexistence of two Fuyuge mythic discourses, one en-thusiastically ;'present,"elated to himkeenly andwitha collective sense of engagement, the other muted,downplayed, told eventually only with hesitation. The"present"myths all concerned themission andincludeda narrative of the arrival of the missionaries andtheir"taming"of the Fuyuge. Hirsch comments that these

mythsportray thingsbeing gained as opposed to beinglost. "Europeanculture is being conceptualized as thereturn of lost Fuyuge capacities and artefacts"(1994:696). Bycontrast, the absent mythwas a narrativeof ori-gin, one that "ends on the theme of loss and potentialperipherality" 1994:702).He stresses his sense of theinterconnectedness of the two discourses: "As imepro-gressed . . . the recitation of these [mission] narrativesseemed to be revealing more aboutwhat they werenotsaying" (1994:697,emphasis in original). That is, intheirinsistent presence, the mission myths wereabsent-ing the origin myth with its portrayal of Fuyuge

peripherality. Hirsch implies that the reproduction ofthe mission myths was simultaneouslya denial of theorigin myth.

Themissionnarratives,although hey touch onlossand subordination, offer an idealization of Europeancontact. The originmyth is, however,undeniably a nar-rative of Fuyuge loss of centeredness, of cosmologicalprecariousness and uncertainty.The myths that stoodthe telling were therefore those redolent with denial:denial of loss, of negative aspects of mission contact,and of the other myth with its more ambivalent por-trayal of Fuyuge origins and precariousness vis-a-vis



380 AMERICANANTFIROPOLOGIST VOL. 1 00, NO. 2 J UNE 1 9 9 8

white culture.It is the onlnipotentdiscourse grateful o

the mission for delivering things back to the Fuyuge,which is explicit, while the uncertain discourse about

the experience of being decentered is sonzehow lost.

Similar ssues areraised by Hirsch'saccount of the ma-

jor Fuyugeritualgab, in which he stresses the promi-

nence of Fuz,-ugemythic and ritual imaginings" nd4're-creations"of centeredness. The contemporaryritual

focuses on betelnutand evinces a certainomnipotence

in its iconic accomplishment" of their ardent wishes:

control of betelnut and the coming of a road from Port

Moresby. The roadsymbolizes their full incorporationinto the monetized nlarket economy anincorporation

that still eludes them.) Given the anxiety and uncer-

tainty of the conten poraryFuyuge condition, it is the

omnipotent mythic and ritual discourse, the antidis-course, that has become locally hegemonic and thatspeaks paradoxically of a certainpowerlessness, while

an earlierand more realistic narrativeof relative mar-ginalityhas been denied.20It should be clear that aspects of my approach de-

rive from a reading of Foucault on discursive forma-tions, on the tracingof dominantculturalsystems of thelong term? heir characteristicsocial, cultural,and tech-nological mediations, and the classifications they em-body. Ihave addedto this a concernwithanalyzing heirsynchronic sociocultural enunciation, for which eth-

nography s eminently suited,and with tracing a levelofpsychicstructuringamenableto psychoanalytic nsight.The point is that in the analysisof the reproductionand

transformationof dominantcultural systems, there is

also a need to explore their psychic dynamics,whichthemselves have a temporalityand maybe reproduced

or transformed. nmy work on musicalmodernism, ar-gue that the discourse has tended to reproduce itself,

and throughmechanisms of displacement,splitting,anddenial, has contained potential sources of change,achieved reification, and avoided significant transfor-

mation.I do not implythat all culturalsystems tend toward

simple reproduction.As MarshallSahlins (1981, 1985)

has argued, n deciphering the reproduction and trans-forrnationof culturalsystems it is necessary to explorethe interplay of structureand practice, to take account

of both internal logics of change and external condi-

tions. The outcome of such a series of forces is then an

empirical question. I suggest, however, that certain

dominantcultural systems tend toward continuityandthe absorption orsuppression of differencebecause ofthe cumulativemomentumof historical authorityandpower, their capacity as antidiscoursesfor the omnipo-tent denial of rival discourses, and their capacity forformingsubjectivitiesin the imageof theirown psychicdynamics.My ntention has been to counteract the ten-dency for psychoanalyticcultural theoryto ignore his-

toricaland wider contemporaneousociocultural orces.

But my remarks are not meant to comprise a meta-

theory of historicalprocess. I have suggested the needto interrogatethe structuralprocesses, including col-lective psychic dynamics, of cultural history. I stress

that these are not preeminent or determinant, nor do

they obviatethe theorizationof agency and of substan-tive historicalconditionsand processes.2l

SubjectificationandSociality

From the cases discussed it is obvious that the un-

conscious character of certain defense mechanismsdoes not preclude their conscious manipulation n dis-

course. It simply meansthat some agents are intuitivelyattuned to primitive psychic dynamics and show art-

istry in their discursive orchestration.22Two existing

theoreticalapproacheselucidate the production of sub-jectivity in discourse: Foucault'sconcept of subjectifi-

cation and the Lacaniannotion of the subject positioninscribed in discourse. In a sense, the two are comple-mentary.A major benefit of the Foucauldianapproach

is its eschewal of a viewof subjectification focused ex-

clusively on internal and psychologicalprocesses. ForFoucault, subjectificationis also external; it occurs as

much throughdiscursive templates molding the body,

formsof behavior, and practice.Lacanians,on the otherhand, have focused on unconscious mechanisms imma-nent in materialaspects of discourse, such as ideologi-

cal systems of representationin film and other media

and their construction of a subject position. Both por-traysociality as constructedin and saturatedwith dis-

course. ForLacarliansdiscourse is itself saturatedwithunconscious dynamics. Thus MarkCousins (1989) pro-poses that anthropology,like psychoanalysis, should

concern itself with Uapoint where unconscious catego-ries and ... collective thinking are synonymous"(1989:85).It is the common level of the unconsciouswhich is the condition for any intersubjective under-

standing of an other and so of anthropologicalknowl-

edge. Similarly, the Lacanian social theorist SlavojZiEekargues that psychoanalyticconcepts can be ap-plied to "structuresof discourse,' thereby elucidating

the unconscious structuringof the uwhole intersubjec-

tive space" (1991:30).Both approachesappear to encompass theoretical

conceptions of the lacunae and failures of subject for-mation.ForFoucault subjectification s a discursive im-perativemanifestin disciplinaryapparatusesthat, how-ever, fails to produce the compliant subjectivitiesintended. Yethe gives littleindicationof how orwhy thefailureoccurs and, in his rejection of humanistand es-

sentialist concepts of the subject, avoids any specula-tion on aspects of subjectivity or sociality that might



ANTHROPOLOGYND KLEINIAN SYCHOANALYSIS GEORGINAORN 381

exist beyond, or resist, the dominantdiscourse.23Both

Foucauldianand Lacanianapproacheshave been criti-

cized for lack of attentionto agency and the potential

for resistance. James Donald (1992) has developed an

ambitiousresponse, proposingthatpsychoanalysiscan

explain how discursive subjectification meets actual

subjectivities. Inhis model, subjectificationby a donli-nant culturalsystem will alwayscause splittingand re-

pression. Thus it incites a blossoming of fantasy and

transgressionin the individual.Thisis Donald'sversion

of a theoryof agency.But serious questions remain.As with all the ap-

proaches cited, the model lacks sociological acuity.

There is little sense of how subjectificationvaries with

social differentiation n a population.Moreover,by put-

ting psychoanalysis to work generallyat the interface

between discourse and subjectivity,Donald simplifies

the encounter. He renders it according to a pre-Fou-

cauldianmodel of repressionand a modernistlLacaniannotion of transgressionand excess. He has no way to

theorize the specific psychic contents of differentcul-

tural systems or those of particular ndividuals.A non-

reductive account of the constructionof subjectivity,I

suggest, would focus on the interfacebetween the de-

fense mechanisms immanent in discourse or cultural

system and the particularpsychic configurationof an

individualsubject.The individualconfiguration tself is

the resultof both anindividuatedandanencultured,so-

cially marked, and socially motivatedhistory. It is in

this complex psychoculturalsynergy,with its produc-

tive effects as well as its inevitablepoints of dislocation

and fracture,that spaces of agencyandresistance maybe conceived (Born 1997).Donaldoffers sparse empiri-

cal evidence insupport ofhis theoreticalscheme. In this

his work is symptomatic;both Foucauldian and La-

canian debates on subjectificationhave lacked empiri-

cal studies of the processes at stake.Anthropologymay be able to shed empiricallight

on these processes, and I offer aspects of my research

as a beginning.In my IRCAM thnography,I trace the

replicationof the same psychicconfiguration n histori-

cal discourse,presentinstitution,and individualsubjec-

tivities (Born 1995). However,while the introjectionof

discursive defense mechanismsmay be complete in in-stitutions which exist to reproduceand, by uinnovat-

ing,"to extend the life of a discourse the process for

individuals is less certain.24While the majorityof IR-

CAMsubjects naturallyadopt the appropriatepsychic

configurationof the discourse, even in their readingof

theirownpast lives, for othersit involvesan ambivalent

period of adaption.Still others refuse or continuepub-

licly to go throughthe motionswhile privatelydissent-

ing.The process of introjection s labilefor subjects;in-

trojection may be more or less complete. My findingsthus demurfroman overnormativeor consensual view

of the relationbetween discourse, institution,and sub-

jectivity. Neitherdo they suggest that the characterof

individual ubjectivitiesis unstructuredor atomized.

WhenI write of subjects introjectingthe psychic

configurationof modernistdiscourse, I am referring o

individualswho evidence a splittingbetween the ideal-

izingof a modernistaesthetic, assenting to its supremelegitimacy, while simultaneously denigrating,delegit-

imizing,or absentingpopularmusic and culture.Many

IRCAMubjectsappearsolidly grounded n such a posi-

tion, as shownintheirtheoreticaldiscussion, conversa-

tion, work,and everydaypractices. Composerswould,

for example,be completely and seriouslyengagedwith

high-modernistconcerns while at work or at IRCAM,

andthen returnhome andplay "lighter"music to relax

by, music that was not the object of their properintel-

lectualattention.Otherswouldrelatea splitting n auto-

biographicalterms, as a narrative between past and

present.Thuspopularmusic hadbeen a serious, even aprofessional, activity in their earlier lives, but now it

was renouncedas less valuableor worthwhileby com-

parison with serious modernist compositional con-

cerns. Yet others showed a splitting between different

spheres of theirprofessional work,producingmodern-

ist musicfor IRCAM nd commercialpopularmusicfor

their hidden, "illicit"moneymakingactivities such as

filmand television soundtracks.Otherpsychic mechanisms exemplifiedby IRCAM

subjects include a simplerfragmentationshown in dis-

junctures between exegesis and practice. Thus, re-

cently, some youngercomposers continueto espouse a

modernist,even a polemicallyantipostmodernist, heo-retical stance. Theiractual music, however, shows sig-

nificant hints of aesthetic reference to popularmusic,

as thoughthe exegesis was meant to disguiseor moder-

ate shifts in practice that contradict discursive laws.

Thereare also examples of a disjuncturebetween indi-

viduals'public rhetoric and private opinions or work.

For example, a music director known as a leading

spokesmanof IRCAMmodernismat internationalcon-

ferences let me know privatelythat he harboredmajor

doubtsaboutaspects of the institute'saestheticand phi-

losophy.Atworkin these instances are variousmanifes-

tations of asplitting of the subject, divisions between

different aspects of self-identity that, within this par-

ticular discursive frame, are irreconcilable or in pro-

foundcontradiction.Thatthe process of introjection of the discursive

defenses is a historicalprocess involvingsocial motiva-

tion, psychic work, and provoking ambivalence, is

shown by youngintellectuals in the process of trying o

convince IRCAMo let them workthere, who conveyed

confidentially hatinorderto do so they had firstto con-

vince themselves. Theyhad, in other words,to introject

the discursiveimperatives,by reevaluating(devaluing)



382 AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST VOL. 100, NO. 2 * JUNE 1998

andgiving up aspects of theirprevious(popularor com-

mercial)musical activities.This process maycreate am-

bivalence and even frank denial. As one example, I

found a youngcomposer, apparently otally converted

to IRCAM'smission, secretly at work late one Sunday

nightproducinga heavy funk soundtrackfor a film. Ig-

noringcontradiction,he continuedto producea sincererhetoric of obeisanceto IRCAM'sesthetic andspokeof

the necessity of givingup his "former"ommercial mu-. .

S1Cma (lng.These phenomena indicate aspects of the social

motivationat work in any individual'sdiscursive sub-

jectification in microtemporalprocess. Otherdata indi-

cate how social differentiationmeets the construction

of subjectivityin discourse. This is shown in the vari-able adoption of the modernist defenses by the insti-

tute's population according to certain axes of social

positioning,themselves microcosmicof wider sociocul-

tural forces. The only members of the IRCAM opula-tion who spoke openly,if strictly in private,of their dis-

like and questioning of the institute's aesthetic were

senior bureaucrats, cientists, and technologists.These

groups,whilesubordinate n status to the artistic cadre,

had a certain modest but autonomous and externally

validatedauthorityand power which allowed them to

experience dissent, to reject the tidysplitting of IRCAMaesthetic discourse,and to revelin more chaotic,unruly

"personal astes." Fora very few departmentdirectors,

the dissent expanded nto full-blownpolemicalcritique.

Thus those most resistant to the discourse were theleast invested and the less subordinate.MeanwhileIR-

CAM's ow-statussubordinates,secretaries, and build-ing staff showed a routine or enchantedsubmissionto

the sheer historical authority of the discourse and itsrepresentatives, while denigratingtheir own lack of

education andtaste. For themthe process of discursive

introjectionwas phrased as a conscious, quasi-ethical

task of self-improvementthat one willingly pursued.

Theyspoke of Ubeing ducated into understanding"he

musicand its scientific foundations.Theiractualbehav-

ior toward the concerts and conferences oscillated,

however, between interest anddiffidence.Some of the mechanisms I have described, and

their implicit methodological basis, are paralleled in

others' ethnographic work, for example, in Victor

Turner's (1962:125)inJunctionto distinguish between

the exegetical and the operational n the analysis of rit-

ualsymbolism.I considermyown work and Turner'sn-junction as mandatesfor the ethnographicelucidationof various kinds of potential contradictionand differ-ence: between words and actions, explicit and implicit,public and private,past andpresent,social orritual rni-

crocosm and wider social order, one historical or

mythic discourse and another.26None of these are lim-ited to the kind of Westernhigh-culturalobject that I

have researched. All should be possible in any ethno-

graphicsetting andin relationto differentorders of his-

torical analysis.This would be an ethnography hat seeks out dis-

juncture and difference, both intersubjective and in-

trasubjective difference, as they articulatewith domi-

nant cultural systems and resonate with collectivepsychic states. Farfrom indulging n a poststructuralist

fetishism of difference, the intentionmust be to gener-

ate empiricalfuel for a morecomplex andadequateac-

count of culturalhistoricalprocess.

Notes

1. For definitions and discussions of the psychoanalytic

concepts used in this essay, see Laplancheand Pontalis 1973

and Rycroft 1972. On their specific use in Kleinianpsycho-

analysis, see Hinshelwood 1989and Segal 1979,1982.Forthe

use of psychoanalytic concepts in understanding ieldworkexperience,see Ewing1992:261-262,Hunt 1989:ch.4, Kracke

1987,and Obeyesekere 1990:231-236.2. By post-Freudian I refer simplyto psychoanalyticper-

spectives derived from analysts working after Freud. The

approaches most often cited by anthropologists in recent

years are those of the Americanself-psychologistHeinzKo-

hut (e.g., Cohler 1992;Kracke and Herdt 1987), the British

object-relationspsychoanalystDonaldWinnicott e.g., Boyer1986;Cohler1992;Herdt 1987),and theFrenchpsychoanalyst

Lacan (e.g., Bowman 1992, 1994;Healdand Deluz 1994:part

3;Moore 1994;Weiner 1995).

3. See Spillius 1988b:221-225or an overviewof bothareas

of work.The grouprelationstraditionoriginates in the work

of Kleinian psychoanalysts Bion (1955, 1966) and Jaques(1955). The history of the British center for group relations

theory is surveyed in Trist and Murray1990.The traditionis

exemplified in the work of Menzies-Lyth 1988a, 1988b) and

Hinshelwood(1987, 1989, 1994),both of whom use Kleinian

concepts to analyze the existence within institutions of un-

consciously employed defense mechanisms analogous to

those operatingwithin individuals.Other areas of sociocultural study recently influenced by

Kleinian ideas include feminist theory (Nixon 1995; Rose

1988, 1993; Sayers 1991; W07nen:A CulturalReview 1990);

social history (Pick 1993; Theweleit 1987); and sociology

(Rustin 1991, 1995). Miller (1987:90-95,1995:15) ouches on

Klein'suses for ananthropologyof consumption,while Hook

(1994) outlines some key Kleinian deas for anthropologists.

Introductorytexts on Kleiniantheory include Hinshelwood

1989, 1994; Mitchell 1986; Sayers 1991:part 5; Segal 1979,

1982;and Spillius 1988a, 1988b.4. On introjectionas a characteristicdefense mechanism

of groups, see Hinshelwood1987:71-72.On the Kleiniancon-

cept of a social defense system,"see Hinshelwood 1987:ch.

13, Jaques 1955, and Menzies-Lyth1988a:63-81.While there

are parallels with Spiro's concept of aculturallyconstituteddefense mechanisms" 1965:100-113),Spiro's s embedded in

a Freudian rameworkandhas a more functionalisttone thanthe applied and therapeuticorientationof these Kleinians.



ANTHROPOLOGYND KLEINIAN SYCHOANALYSIS GEORGINA ORN 383

5. My basic position is close to Giddens's:

A conception of the unconscious is essential to social the-

ory.... We have to guard against a reductive theory ...which, in seeking to connect the forms of social life to un-

conscious processes, fails to allow sufficient play to

autonomoussocial forces.... But we must also avoid a re-

ductive theory of consciousness . . . one which, in empha-sising the role of the unconscious, [grasps] the reflexivefeatures of action only as a pale cast of unconscious pro-

cesses whichreally determine them. [1979:58]

See Rose 1988 for an exemplary, nonreductivepsychoana-

lytic account of the politics of Thatcherism n 1980s Britain.6. Kracke and Herdt (1987:4) and Obeyesekere (1990:

xvii-xviii) also call for an end to the pathological model of

culture found in earlier psychoanalytic anthropology and,

after Ricoeur (1979, 1981), for a hermeneutic orientationto

the relationship.7. On Klein's ideas of primitivedefense mechanisms, par-

ticularly those related to the paranoid-schizoidposition, see

Klein 1977:ch.6, 1986a.See also Hinshelwood 1989:ch. 9 andSegal 1979:ch. 9, 1982:ch. 3.

8. On their interrelation, see also the quote by Kleinianpsychoanalyst Rosenfeld in Hinshelwood1989:127.

9. This articlefollows a convention that phantasy implies

unconscious fantasy andfantasy implies conscious fantasy.10. On projective identification, splitting, persecutory

anxiety, and their interrelations, see Hinshelwood1989:partA, ch. 13 andEein 1986a. Projective identificationmay also

take benign and Unormal"olms, for example, in the experi-ence of empathy.Projective identification s inflected differ-

ently by differentpsychoanalytic perspectives; see Hinshel-wood 1989.

11. On envy, see Hinshelwood 1989:167-178 and Klein

1977:ch. 10, 1986c. On Klein's concept of the death instinct,see Hinshelwood 1989:266-270.This Uapriori"dea of thedeath instinct remainsone of themost controversialelements

of Kleinian heory. Rose discusses the violence andnegativ-ity" (1993: part 3, 139) of Klein'stheory, citing it as a major

cause of criticism and rejectionhitherto n the United States.12. The Freudiandevelopmental narrative s encapsulated

in the concept of the Oedipus complex, the Lacanianone in

the stage theory of mirrorphase, imaginaryorder, and sym-

bolic order.13. The recent discovery" of Kleinby a numberof feminist

cultural heoristsreflects in part their dissatisfactionwith thepatriarchal lavorof the Lacanianparadigm.Yetfeminism and

Kleinianismhavean ambivalentrelationship.Somefeministsdistrust Klein'sstress on the power of innate destructiveness

and envy, while others criticize what they take to be herexcessive biologism. (On Kleinianismand feminism,see Say-

ers 1991: ntroductionand Women:A CulturalReview 1990.)Kleinian scholars have responded by emphasizing her com-mitment to the interplaybetween innatefactors andintersub-

jective social experience as beingformativeof psychologicaloutcomes an interplay that grants social and cultural fac-tors substantialinfluence (e.g., Frosh 1987;Rustin1991).

14. On recent developments intheorizing deology, includ-ing the place of reification andnaturalization, ee Thompson1990:esp. ch. 1, 52-73.

15. On the relation between classification and ideology,

see Hall 1982:70-74.16. This oscillationbetween the phobic and erotic mayto

some extent explainn some of the grosser perversities of

interethnic war, that is, rape of the other acts out simultane-

ously both the murderous/phobicand the erotic components

of extreme splitting. By merging and bundifferentiating"hetwo in rape, the more idealizing and feeling components of

erotic sexuality are erased in an orgy of hate. Indeed, the

death instinct may itself become eroticized (Hinshelwood

1989:268).On the movement between idealization/eroticizationand

phobic devaluationcharacteristic of racist Ucolonial anta-

sies" (Bhabha), focused on the (black) Uother"male) body,

see Mercer 1992.17. Bowman's(1992,1994) analyses, on which my account

is based, draw on Lacanian heory. I have represented them

in Kleinian erms.Borneman in press) gives a Kleinian-influ-

enced analysis of similar material, ethnic nationalism, and

ethnic cleansing in the recent war in Bosnia.18. Throughoutthis section I follow the authors being

discussed as to which term, wttcheraft or sorcery, is appro-

priateto the material.19.For an elaborationof this approach o historical process

see Giddens 1979:ch. 2.20. It should be noted that my interpretation of Hirsch's

material contrastsmarkedlywith his own.21. There are interesting similarities between my aim in

this article, to theorize cultural history by drawing psycho-

analytic theory together with a Foucauldiananalysis of dis-

cursive formations, and Judith Butler's (1997) recent work.

Butler addresses how Foucauldianand Althusserian heories

of subject formationmay be enhanced by psychoanalysis,so

as to elucidate bthepsychic form that power takes" (1997:2).Focusing on the complexities of individualsubjection, how-

ever, she does not elaborate on how psychic forms may be

immanentin, and may vary with, specific cultural systems,

nor does she address questions of thehistorical reproduction

or transformationof such systems.22. The idea of a radical break between conscious and

unconscious processes is alien to Kleinian hought. Mitchell

(1986) contrasts Klein's concept of unconscious" with

Freud's: The Kleinianunconscious is a container full of

contents.... Thereare unconscious [defense] mechanisms

. . . but not [an] unconscious as a system" (1986:24).

23. The closest Foucault comes to identifyingresistanceto

discursive regimesis with his concept of subjugated knowl-

edges" (see Foucault 1980:81-85 on the hierarchizationof

knowledges). Yet he fails to give a fuller theoretical or histori-

cal account of what these might be. See I)ews 1987:ch. 6 on

this and related criticisms of Foucault.24. Barry's (1998) concept of defensive innovation"is

useful here in understanding the paradox whereby institu-

tions may foster a kind of pseudo-innovationthat in reality

functions not to produce change, but to reproduce a discur-

sive stasis.25. Ironically,Ewing (1992:259)points out that several of

Turner's key theoretical principles, including the exegeti-

cal/operationalcontrast, were inspiredby a reading of Freud,



384 AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST VOL. 1 00, NO. 2 * JUNE 1 998

but that at the time of writing The Forest of Symbols (1967),

Turnersuppressed the influence.

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