Book Reviews from the "Georgia Guardsman" magazine

Professional DeveloPment Bookshelf: Reviews of books that teach us about ouR cRaft

By Maj. John H. Alderman IVPublic Affairs OfficeGeorgia Department of Defense

What can Guardsmen learn from a business executive’s handbook written half a century ago? Lots, actually.

First published in 1967, The Effective Executive is business guru Peter F. Drucker’s close look at how executives operate and how they can improve themselves in order to improve their organizations. Rather than a focus on managing people, it’s really about managing one’s self.

Executives, Drucker writes, mainly contribute by affecting their organization’s ability to perform and obtain results. By “executive” he generally means business executives. But his working definition – people who are expected to get the right things done – sounds a lot like the basic definition of a “leader.”

While it is more obvious that this book would be great for battalion commanders and chiefs of staff, I found its lessons very useful – decisive even – as a Troop Commander, and figure the lessons would apply to thoughtful leaders from squad level, up.

For example, Drucker has a healthy appreciation for decentralized decision-making. Leaders must make decisions, not just carry out orders. Executives must focus their efforts and time on what other people need and can use to make the organization successful. Meetings should be held only for a purpose.

Essentially, executives do two things: provide a

vision and make decisions. And the key is making the right decisions. If executives make decisions that others can make, or that they can make unnecessary by issuing policy, they are wrong, Drucker contends.

Perhaps the best-known example from this book is Drucker’s observation that a well-run factory is a quiet factory. If he visited a factory where everything was dramatic, and people were rushing about excitedly making things happen – it would be less well-run than a quiet factory where good planning, solid policies and thorough systems and procedures had made things…quite regular.

“A recurrent crisis,” he writes, “should always have been foreseen.” So the job of the leader, then, is to anticipate problems and provide training, equipment, systems or decisions to keep problems from developing.

A major takeaway is that, whatever his rank, a leader acts like “top management” when she focuses on what she can do to serve the needs of the entire organization – from whatever position she’s in. And that is a lesson we could all do well to keep in mind.

Throughout, the prose is lightened by illustrations and observations from business and the military. After all, military leaders make tough decisions all the time, and the high stakes of our field means we have to get things more right more often than most business leaders – or we face more awful consequences.

It’s not the simplest manual on leadership, but it is one of the very best. I first read this book when I was a young lieutenant, and the ideas in it completely changed the way I approach leadership. I wish I had read it sooner.


We can learn a lot from taking a little time to analyze battles and asking ourselves what decisions, or technology, or logistics, or

personalities were key to victory... or defeat. But military history books that describe these battles share the common challenge of reaching the right level of detail for a quick study.

Too little detail and you get what amounts to a dictionary entry of places and people; too much detail and it’s hard to cover a lot of ground while drawing broader conclusions.

100 Decisive Battles gets the mix just right. Each battle gets a few pages, and Davis describes the historical setting and results of each one in crisp, entertaining prose. For every battle he includes a short, precise description of why that battle is important, a description of the battle itself, and then an explanation of the results and effects. He then offers his references for further reading. Most battles include maps, and some have illustrations.

Throughout, his analysis is spot on. More than once,

I found myself thinking of even familiar battles in a new way because Davis had given them more, or different, context than I had seen before. The results sections extended my understanding of the battles and helped me fit them together – making the book’s chronological order even more useful.

There are some surprise inclusions and exclusions of battles; but narrowing it down to 100 battles over the course of 3,500 years of history had to be tough. More important is that the battles span both time and place, and each of the battles was decisive in its own way.

So, for example, Davis covers the battle of Crécy but not the more famous battle of Agincourt – because Crécy is more important strategically and Agincourt basically repeats the tactics used at Crécy.

Overall, 100 Decisive Battles serves as both a thorough grounding in the most important battles and tactics of history – and as a great general reference on the subject. It is broad enough to teach us how to think about maneuver, logistics, and decision-making, yet specific enough to give us useful examples.

I don’t think it’s too strong a statement to say that this book should be on the bookshelf of every professional military officer.

Professional DeveloPment Bookshelf: 100 Decisive Battles from ancient times to the Present


June 2010 | 18 July 2010 | 20


A science fiction book? On the Professional Development Bookshelf? You better believe it! Right up there on the shelf next to Starship

Troopers.Ender’s Game is the story of a young boy becoming

a leader under unique and trying circumstances. Set in the relatively near future, the novel spins a fairly straightforward tale. Earth has been attacked by aliens twice, and now the planet is desperately trying to prepare for the rematch they know is coming. So, they are selecting and developing leaders at very early ages and pouring everything into the hope that one of them will be, essentially, perfect.

Like all good fiction, this storyline is about developing character and solving problems. In this case, how does a society select and develop leaders? What makes a good combat leader, and how does a trainer pull that out of a candidate for leadership? What does that candidate go through as the transformation takes place?

That selection and development process forms the core of the novel. Card takes us inside two minds: one shaping a leader through direct counseling and by indirect situational challenges; the other, Ender, growing into that leader as he is poked and prodded along. Then,

as he becomes a leader and starts shaping teams, we see it all over again from a different angle.

Ender’s Game really becomes an exploration of the methods – a philosophy, really – of training junior leaders. Ender is thrown into a real maelstrom of experiences and people, and he encounters different attitudes toward command, leadership, followership, and decision making. He has to handle superiors less talented, and subordinates more talented, than he is.

Most useful to us as readers are the lessons Ender learns about how those without power can influence those in power through example, or counsel, or even direct challenge. The parallels to be drawn by a new lieutenant – in charge but inexperienced – are clear. The same could be said for junior NCOs.

A minor theme explores the power of rhetoric: Methods to shape thoughts and action with words and ideas. In fact, we come to see the ability to communicate effectively as the leader’s best tool.

Card is a fantastic storyteller. His characters have an edge to them, and project a peculiar kind of reality. So, although the book is practically a manual on leadership, it never feels like one. In fact, it is plenty enjoyable just to read as a space yarn. But that would be to miss the point.

So, if you need a change of pace, or prefer to learn by example and consideration, give this novel a shot. You will probably immediately see why it has been on the Marine Corps Reading List since its inception.



The perennial trick to understanding a given battle or campaign is matching the detail of written description to the visualization of a map

illustration. The West Point Atlas of War series spans centuries of warfare in a simple, effective manner that supports both close reading and general browsing. First published in the 50’s under the auspices of Gen. Esposito at the Military Academy, many of the maps are available online.

The books are harder to find, but if you’re lucky, you can still pick up reprints at larger bookstores. The most recent reprint included separate volumes on the American Civil War, World War I, and the European and Pacific theaters of World War II. The latter is the one that most opened my eyes.

Just as Paul Davis’s 100 Decisive Battles (featured in this column this past June) perfectly balances scope and detail, so too does The West Point Atlas. For each battle or campaign, a map of the area of operations (and sometimes area of interest) is set with a concise description of the action. Sometimes, the two are perfectly matched; sometimes, the maps may only illustrate the decisive part of the action.

Throughout, the prose is lively and appropriately detailed, a good read that balances analysis with reporting in some pretty neat ways. So, for example, sometimes the narrative is explicit in its condemnation or praise for a commander’s decision. At other times, facts are presented

in such a way that a student of history can draw his or her own conclusions about the action. Rather than feeling uneven in its treatment, it keeps the atlas interesting and makes it more a tool of instruction.

The maps are beautiful. Perfectly scaled and illustrated, there is enough detail to give the reader some terrain to analyze to help see how commanders’ decisions were shaped – similar to the utility provided by staff rides.

The maps are rarely unclear or cluttered, with a clear and concise black-and-white color scheme. Another nice detail is the inclusion of local place-names, which give a feel for what the commanders may have seen on the ground. Unremembered places like Catherine’s Furnace, Barber’s Point, and Todd’s Tavern show up next to the names we know well only because a battle took place a little farther down the road.

The atlas maps and descriptions are probably best at teaching an understanding of the higher-order decisions that shape wars. The volume on the Pacific Theater, for example, was the first book that really helped me fully visualize and understand the division-level maneuver that surrounded or supported some of the smaller-scale (or seemingly unconnected) battles with which I had previously been familiar.

Ultimately, a robust appetite for and understanding of the various factors which have affected major battles and campaigns in the past allows any commander to better contextualize any challenges faced by his or her own unit. The West Point Atlas of War series effectively puts salient facts and mitigating factors into a visually and intellectually compelling format that makes it easy for commanders to make use of the lessons hard-learned in battles past.


August 2010 | 20 September 2010 | 20

By Maj. John H. Alderman IV Public Affairs OfficeGeorgia Department of Defense

This slim little volume on logistics is so brilliant that it would be tempting to read the first short essay or two, declare yourself Enlightened, promise never

to load your Troops down with extra gear again, and move on.

Famed historian Col. S.L.A. Marshall’s basic premise is: “No logistical system is sound unless its first principle is enlightened conservation of the power of the individual fighter.”

In other words, don’t weigh down your folks with unnecessary stuff.

Marshall’s famous studies of the great mass of gear we ask our troops to carry into combat have affected generations of leaders. Staff gets much of the blame: To

mitigate their fears of every possible contingency, all sorts of extra equipment is added to the basic combat load.

Because Marshall also believes that “In war, all effort, all policy, should be directed toward speedier delivery of a greater volume of a more efficient fire at the decisive point,” this study of logistics is all about the intersection of logistics and leadership. For him, strategic leadership marshals resources effectively; tactical leadership motivates and inspires subordinates by doing the same.

Some of Marshall’s ideas are challenging and practically unthinkable. Send troops into combat with little food or ammunition? Are you kidding? Yet, as Marshall writes, “the Soldier with only five clips in his pocket but spring in his gait is tenfold stronger than the

man who is foundered under the weight of ammunition he will never use.”

And if you accept his basic premise, then you should give careful consideration to this new equation of risk assessment. What might we gain in mobility in exchange for accepting the risk of having fewer reloads?

At its core, The Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a Nation is about the creation and preservation of combat power so that it can be used at the decisive point. And that proves a pretty good model for leadership in general.

Soldiers manage their fuel and ammunition to maintain pressure on an enemy; pilots manage energy to maintain superior position in a dogfight; managers balance the need for information against the cost of distracting their people from their daily tasks by holding too many meetings.

Marshall illustrates his points with vignettes from various wars to keep things interesting. Along the way he makes some pithy observations on decision making, the psychology of combat, staff work, maneuver, and morale.

Another valuable inclusion in the book is straightforward leadership philosophy that ties everything together: “The ability to command the loyalties of your men, to learn to think rapidly and resolutely in their behalf while teaching them to do likewise, and to strive always to avoid wasting their force and energy so that it may be applied in strength at the vital time and place - that is leadership of the highest possible caliber.”

Whatever their position or duty, leaders are responsible for managing resources to accomplish missions. So, Marshall’s approach will prove useful in its relentless focus on necessary things, of unencumbering subordinates, and maximizing operational effects.


“economy of foRces opeRates in the spheRe of supply just as Relentlessly as it does in its application to the stRiking foRces.”

October 2010 | 20


Anyone who has ever fenced, or wielded a close-combat weapon, or studied martial arts understands how a weapon can serve as an extension of the

body. This understanding entails a comprehension of the relationship between action and reaction, vulnerability and the strike.

Knowledge of these things proves useful whether employing a tank platoon, or a light infantry battalion, or a fighter aircraft. But these are lessons which can be learned more immediately (and perhaps easily) with a close-combat weapon.

Probably, it is for this reason that Miyamoto Musashi’s The Book of Five Rings – collected here with Yagyu

Munenori’s Family Traditions on the Art of War – has survived through the ages as a key text of the martial arts.

The translator, Thomas Cleary, refers to these as “texts on conflict and strategy,” meant to be useful in all walks of life. Both authors, too, stress repeatedly that the “martial arts” are meant to be applied in all situations.

This approach truly makes these works of conflict philosophy more than strategic thought (or even business method) alone. The end result Miyamoto and Munenori would have us reach is more a state of mind – a way of approaching problems, martial or otherwise – with a proper balance of focus and openness, of passive and aggressive physical and mental states.

Of course, this also means the book is not always easily

approachable. Much of it reads like a book of aphorisms; some of it is repetitive and mystical, a little too Eastern for many readers.

For these reasons, this is a book best savored. You’ll want to have enough time to reflect on what you read – but not so much time that you lose the threads of the major themes running throughout the works. I recommend as interactive an experience as you can manage: Discuss it with others, or capture your thoughts and reflections in the margins of your book as you read. Agree or disagree, your reactions matter and, if captured, can help you better understand and develop your own philosophy of conflict.

Some of the lessons will be more challenging. “‘Mountain and sea’ means that it is bad to do the same thing over and over again,” writes Musashi. Yet, on reflection and in context, understanding the need to match

tactics to the situation at hand, and not repeat stale tactics – these are things with which we can identify.

Other lessons will be clearer immediately. “When you strike a blow, do not keep your mind on where you hit; after striking, bring your mind back to observe your adversary’s condition,” writes Munenori. Students of maneuver – and many pilots – will recognize this admonition against “tunnel vision” from early in their training.

The bottom line is that if one approaches this book with an open mind, and a willingness to apply somewhat abstract lessons to today’s situation, The Book of Five Rings may help you reach “the next level” in your strategic thinking.


“the peRfoRmance of an expeRt seems Relaxed but does not leave any gaps. the actions of tRained people do not seem Rushed.”

January 2011 | 20


Watching the A-Team as a kid, it never occurred to me how odd it was that although Hannibal and the boys traded hundreds of bullets with each

week’s bad guys, practically no one was ever hit. Sure, tires were hit. Drums of gasoline were hit, and fireballed into the air. Makeshift welded contraptions were hit. But not people.

As ridiculous as this now seems, perhaps the show was more realistic than we think. At least, that’s a conclusion one might reach after reading On Killing, a psychological tour de force by former Ranger and paratrooper Dave Grossman.

Grossman’s book thoroughly explores the psychology of humans killing other human beings: What it takes,

mentally, as well as the costs, psychologically. Reasons why it is hard to kill, and the things we do to make it easier. The reaction most people have to killing, and what can be done to ease the difficulties that often later result.

Even in the Army we don’t seem too eager to talk about it in such blunt terms – unless we are boasting, or talking about blood making the grass grow. Both can be useful; but neither is a particularly effective way to improve ourselves professionally. And we should be honest: While Peace may be our Profession, killing is our business. Army or Air, and especially on today’s battlefield, any of us entering a combat zone had best be prepared to kill.

Grossman builds off of previous studies (particularly

those of S.L.A. Marshall) which revealed that, historically, the vast majority of Soldiers (and pilots) in combat either never pull the trigger, or miss that target, even at pretty close ranges. The historical examples aren’t perfect (certainly there are exceptions!) but they’re there.

He demonstrates, in part, that humans and animals alike have powerful urges not to kill members of their own species. Grossman explores why, and the training that has been implemented in the last century to help correct that deficiency.

Grossman goes on to help us understand why and how combatants do kill, a model based on the demands of authority; group absolution; predisposition of the killer; distance from the victim; and the attractiveness of killing the victim. And he explores what happens later, the visceral reaction most people have to killing, even if they are willing to do it in the first place.

Finally, he turns his attention on society – on the TV

shows, movies, and video games that desensitize us to killing and to death not at all unlike military training meant to make us more comfortable with killing. Is that a good idea for our society?

On Killing reminds us that this subject is worth considering, and perhaps even discussing with our fellow Guardsmen. Certainly these considerations can affect how we prepare ourselves and our units for combat. It certainly did both for me.

As for those of us who have never been to combat, and perhaps never will – these days, many around us have. Reading this book is also a great way to help us understand them better.


“ouR chants in basic tRaining... weRe not just meant to make us disdainful of the dangeR of ouR own deaths, but moRe willing to kill in combat, as well.”


No one need tell Soldiers that stress can affect decisions. But what can we do about that?

Doctor Henry Thompson’s book, The Stress Effect, sets out to help leaders make better decisions despite (and perhaps even using) stress. “The trick,” he writes, “is to keep stress as an ally, not an enemy.”

A veteran Ranger and paratrooper, Lt. Col. Thompson has been into the sleep-deprived, ultra-high-stress combat that pushes Soldiers to their limits even as it demands superior-quality decisions with the highest of stakes. He has subsequently applied and refined his experience and

education as an esteemed organizational psychologist and leadership consultant in the corporate world. The result is a book uniquely useful to us Guardsmen, who must be successful in both arenas.

The Stress Effect examines the art and science of decision making, including different models people use, and the important differences between intuitive and rational decision making. It then looks at types of intelligence; the effects of emotions and stress on decision making; how to manage stress; and how to build resilience.

There’s a fair amount of science here – the chemistry of emotions, the anatomy of the brain – but this is well-balanced by practical application and illustrated by real-world examples, both civil and military. Not only does Thompson clarify complex concepts, he also condenses

vast areas of research (with references for further study).So this is a great resource for leaders trying to develop

themselves or their subordinates.The book is especially well-timed for Army Guardsmen,

explaining concepts of Resilience that underlie training implemented in the Army over the last year or so.

What I find most interesting about The Stress Effect is that while the concepts in each chapter can stand alone, they very effectively build upon one another. Explanations of stress, plus explorations of emotion and intelligence lead to the critical concept of Building Stress-Resilient Emotional Intelligence.

Emotion is key. It seems like we spend a fair amount of time urging young leaders to take the emotion out of decisions. This can be vital; but it’s also a little disingenuous.

Those emotions are markers and motivators. They can be enormously useful in motivating people, or understanding what motivates them – or in how they will respond to a decision. Understanding our own emotions can be vital in maintaining accurate situational awareness, especially in stressful situations.

The Stress Effect concludes with seven best practices to build stress resilience. Thompson’s ARSENAL system of Awareness, Rest, Support, Exercise, Nutrition, Attitude, and Learning provides a great roadmap to focusing our efforts and maximizing our effect.

For the growing and professional leader, The Stress Effect provides immediate effect on how we do business – as well as a system of systems from which we can further develop our own way of living.


“the tRick is to keep stRess as an ally, not an enemy.”

March 2011 | 20 April 2011 | 20


Fighting a Counterinsurgency (COIN) with the massive resources of the United States behind you is daunting enough. But what if you had so many

constraints that you also had to manufacture your own weapons, including bombs that used super-bounce balls as shrapnel?

J.R.T. Wood’s Counter-Strike from the Sky is a superbly detailed historical account of a relatively modern counterinsurgency fought in the 1970s in the country of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) under just these constraints. The resultant, curious mixture of old equipment, low technology, innovation, and daring airborne maneuver makes a thought-provoking solution to an age-old problem.

Wood’s book (some editions include a DVD as well) chronicles their weapons, strategy, armament, and tactics in a direct, matter-of-fact manner that seems characteristic of the British military. The last few chapters, a detailed historical account of the massive cross-border raid, Operation Dingo, is practically a book by itself, and clearly demonstrates the height of airmobile, deep-strike vertical envelopment tactics as exercised by the Rhodesians.

As a result of a widening guerilla war in which the insurgents were increasingly difficult to bring to battle, the SAS and Rhodesian Light Infantry, as well as associated police and intelligence forces, developed a concept that came to be known as “Fireforce.”

Its genesis probably was the Battle of Sinoia in 1966, when their troops were first transported by helicopter into combat. The battle was disappointing: Weapons were ineffective; air and ground radios were incompatible; common practices such as a standard left-hand orbit for

helicopters had not been worked out; coordination between police and military forces was awful.

Over time, lessons from Sinoia led to new training, equipping, and focus that transformed the force into a new weapon.

Scouts and intelligence teams maintained Observation Posts on likely or known areas of insurgent operations. Once enemy elements were spotted, small teams of light infantry (called “sticks”) were transported by helicopters (the French “Alouette” light utility aircraft) to the target area and dismounted onto blocking positions. Additional, larger sticks would be dropped by World War II-era Dakota aircraft in further blocking positions to box in the insurgents.

Practically simultaneously, gunship versions of the Alouette would circle overhead and begin destroying the enemy. Additionally, the (somewhat aging) Rhodesian Air Force would send in aircraft such as the Canberra, Hunter, or Vampire to provide close air support. In coordination with these fires, the sticks would sweep through and destroy the remaining enemy troops.

This fast-moving, hard-hitting combined arms force proved deadly. This Fireforce developed into an aerial ballet of fixed and rotary attack and transport aircraft, with intricate Command and Control necessary to maintain situational awareness and unity of command.

Modern warriors of both the Army and Air Guard have great lessons to learn here. The integration of air and ground elements of combat power are clear, as are the effects of unfettered innovation. The Fireforce is a great reminder that the best solution need not be as dependent on technology or the newest weapon system as on the intelligent use of weapons available.

A final note: get the edition with the DVD. It’s low-tech, but packed with personal accounts and video of the countryside to help you visualize the battles.


May 2011 | 20


Mobile Armor. Light, fast, maneuverable suits with jump jets, guns, rockets, bombs, hand flamers, radar, IR goggles, heads up display,

commo suites, and a prototype Blue Force Tracker. That’s the hook for this book.

But there’s so much more going on.New members of the military have a tough time. They

must find their own place in an organization infinitely bigger than they are, even while learning skills, customs, regulations, culture, and people, all at once. Most are newly adult, too, further complicating things.

Finding one’s place in the organization is essentially what this book is about. I think that’s why it remains popular and is so often recommended to junior leaders.

The great science fiction makes it a fun read. The “Mobile Infantry” – future versions of Marines, Rangers, skirmishers, or Cavalry, depending on your taste – jump onto alien planets, maraud, dispatch bad guys with bombs and mini-nukes, get extracted, and head off to the next system. Good. Times.

We follow the protagonist through alternating memories of combat, Mobile Infantry enlistment, leadership training, and even high school. Through these experiences, Heinlein introduces and plays with all sorts of ideas. Why do we fight? Who fights? What’s the division of labor in a small

unit? How do we train officers? What’s the model for NCO/officer working relationships? What demeanor should a junior officer project?

So Starship Troopers isn’t just a romp through space – or a memoir of basic training. It’s more a series of philosophical discussions between characters that provide thoughts like this one to new officers:

“I gave you a talk on how rough it’s going to be. I want you to worry about it, doing it in advance, planning what steps you might take against any combination of bad news that can come your way, keenly aware that your life belongs to your men and is not yours to throw away in a suicidal reach for glory…and that your life isn’t yours to save, either, if the situation requires that you expend it.”

Anyone ever express that sentiment to you quite so clearly?

Some of these philosophical points are what make some people refer to this book as “controversial.” For example: In a free society, who gets to vote? In the book’s future, only Veterans – and not even current service members – get to vote. Other folks are free, but they don’t determine the course of government. His point, however, is one that ties selflessness and service to governance and society.

In fact, this is a good example of why leaders can re-read the book over time, finding new ideas in it that reward further reflection (as with Gulliver’s Travels, for example). Starship Troopers is a great work, not just because it is fun – but because it is instructive and provocative.

Final note: If you have had the misfortune of seeing the Verhoeven movie from the 90s which shamelessly uses the name of this novel, I recommend you banish it from your mind. In many cases it actually inverts Heinlein’s philosophies and erases the leadership lessons offered. The less said about it, and the sooner it is forgotten, the better.


“theRe aRe no dangeRous weapons; only dangeRous men.”

June 2011 | 20


Early in this collection of excellent essays and articles, German Capt. Adolf Von Schell points out that, while in peace we learn about leading and maneuvering

forces, we are not instructed in the thoughts and fears that run through the mind of the front-line Soldier. “We are not told how we can help him in his mental battles.”

Von Schell wrote this between World Wars I and II, while a student at Fort Benning – and well before the Resiliency programs we now have in place. Yet his approach to Battle Leadership can inspire and inform our approach to training.

Topics covered include battlefield psychology, “leavening” green troops with tested veterans, the development of the German Army, and numerous descriptions of battles and maneuvers in World War I.

These battles are wonderfully detailed, following combatants at the company and platoon level in open warfare against the British and Russians. Some sections chronicle the leader’s thought process as well, giving further insight.

The focus is always on the mental state of troops involved – the feeling of constantly being under fire, the thoughts going through a young leader’s mind in a changing situation, the effect of darkness or retreat on march casualties, etc. These small incidents, writes Von Schell, make up Troops’

experiences and should be considered ahead of time. Another key characteristic of the battlefield is

uncertainty. Reports are exaggerated (and first reports always wrong); information is slow in coming, or comes in unrelated bits and pieces that somehow must be connected. On a modern battlefield, the problem can actually be exacerbated by the sheer amount of information coming in.

Yet, writes Von Schell, in our peacetime training, too often we present perfect information to leaders and even prompt them when to make a decision and even on what needs to be decided.

“Our field exercises, our map problems, and our war games should be conducted with as little information of the enemy as possible,” he writes. Then they will prepare our leaders for battle.

“Leaders must nearly always issue orders without exact information. Our mission and our will are often the only things untouched by obscurity. These will frequently form our only basis for an order. If a leader awaits complete information before issuing an order, he will never issue one.”

For all this talk of battlefields, Von Schell’s observations apply equally well to domestic emergency operations and, to a lesser extent, in day-to-day office environments. In the latter, there are stressors in Troops which leaders must take into account regularly; in the former, a potential for disasters that cause mass casualties and a corresponding deep effect on Troops that probably cannot be fully calculated in tranquil times.

Though it is especially useful for leaders in light infantry, Battle Leadership contains lessons for leaders at all levels and in most professions. It makes an excellent companion to On Killing (review), which is more limited in scope and to The Stress Effect (review), which explains the science behind Von Schell’s anecdotes.


“in peace we should do eveRything possible to pRepaRe the minds of ouR soldieRs foR the stRain of battle.”

AAugust 2011 | 20


I remember, several years ago, watching one of my lieutenants maneuver his squads in an attack on the MOUT complex at Camp Blanding. They were in close

contact with the OPFOR, moving through the point of penetration into the streets beyond.

Tom was just behind his lead squad. But he wasn’t looking at the enemy. Rather, he was sitting down on his haunches, leaning against a wall, head tilted back, looking up at the ceiling. He listened to reports come in, listened to the sounds of the fight, and calmly gave his men orders. Tom was visualizing the battlefield – a vital skill for leaders at all levels, and a skill that John Macdonald’s Great Battlefields of the World can help you develop.

Macdonald covers 30 battles from Cannae (between Romans and Hannibal, 216 B.C.) to Dien Bien Phu (between the French and the Viet Minh, 1953-4). The sense of breadth is a little misleading, however, as Macdonald skips 1200 years of military history between his first and second battles, and fully two-thirds of the battles covered involve the British.

That’s not necessarily a problem, however, as British military history between Hastings and The Hook really is the story of Western military history in the same period.

The book’s compact, engaging coverage of that history is its greatest strength.

Each of the 30 battles is given a brief historical context, detailed description of how the battle unfolded, depictions of tactics and weapons used, a rudimentary 3D model of the terrain, and an illustrative painting.

These many “entry points” to the battles’ stories make Great Battlefields easy to skim. In fact, one could go through the entire book just reading the sidebars on weapons and get a pretty good brief history of Western armies’ weapons development.

The real draw of the book, however, is the one or two paintings provided for each battle. Macdonald chooses a decisive point in the battle and provides a ballon’s-eye-view of the action. These lively paintings of the pageantry, sweeping movement, fallen horses, muzzle flashes, and gallantry of the battlefields really brings the action to life – and aids the student of history with visualizing the maneuver and decisions that shaped history.

True, the computer graphics are a bit dated; and, having visited a couple of these battlefields, I can confirm that details of the terrain elevations are sometimes wanting. But, the overall benefit of gaining a new perspective on the battles proves useful both in understanding the battles better, and in learning how better to visualize battlefields based on reports and descriptions.

Great Battlefields is a perfect companion to 100 Decisive Battles – not least because many of the books’ battles share common weapons, tactics, uniforms, and even commanders.

This book also is exceptionally user-friendly, an excellent introduction to Western warfare for junior leaders. If you’re looking to get started – or want a book in your library to make it easy to share lessons from – this is a great first choice.


“many of moRgan’s shaRpshooteRs weRe sited high up in the tRees, fRom which vantage points they used theiR poweRful pennsylvania Rifles to deadly effect.”

July 2011 | 20

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By Maj. John G. LoweJ7 Joint Training & DoctrineGeorgia Army National Guard

N o True Glory is an excellent account of the 20-month struggle for Fallujah, Iraq, in a series of battles in 2003 and 2004. The reader gets a vivid

front-line account of the vicious fighting that occurred in the streets, house-to-house, and hand-to-hand.

Bing West takes the reader through four phases: counterinsurgency, siege, reversal and attack. The reader rides along with American units as they apply counterinsurgency doctrine to fighting insurgents.

Early in the counterinsurgency phase, Soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Division spent time constructing a soccer field in downtown Fallujah. Once they had finished, a mob gathered, ripped down the nets, removed the dirt, and dumped garbage on the site. The enemy was determined to prevent ordinary Iraqis from ever seeing that the American invaders had improved their lives. This was an ominous sign of what was to come.

The author further showcases how little cooperation, and often how little civility, existed between the military and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) planners in Baghdad, partly due to having two separate chains of command.

Mr. West also takes a look at how the U.S. lost the information war to Al Jazeera and allowed them to shape

the story of Fallujah. “Every night, images of civilian casualties were

transmitted worldwide via satellite and across the internet. Western television networks pooled video from Fallujah, including film from the Arab cameramen with the insurgents. The pictures stressed destruction. Al Jazeera was unrelenting in depicting the death of civilians.”

As Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, Commander of the 1st MEF, put it, “Al Jazeera kicked our butts.”

The heart of the story, though, is about the brutal fighting in close combat – the courage and bravery displayed everyday by the men who fought the battle of Fallujah. West’s accounts are detailed and riveting.

“Chandler kneed Sanchez in the buttocks to signal ‘Go!’ and they flooded the room. Sanchez ran straight across the room. Chandler and Severtsgard broke right, aiming up at the catwalk. Farmer was the last one to the door, where he froze for a moment, trying to convince himself it wasn’t fear. A second later, a grenade landed in the middle of the room and exploded right where he would have been standing. Farmer was blown off his feet back into the foyer. Severtsgard and Chandler disappeared in a huge swirl of dust and debris, as the deafening roar of AK’s filled the main room. Chandler fell instantly with three bullets in his leg and both his shoulder and leg shredded by the grenade shrapnel. Severtsgard was also torn up, with shrapnel in his leg and foot. With one hand he dragged Chandler from the kill zone into the kitchen.”

This book has something for Soldiers of all ranks. From leadership and decision making at the strategic level and how it affects Soldiers on the ground in the thick of the fight, to close quarters combat at the squad level, this candid look at combat will help leaders understand what they may one day face in person.


“eveRy night, images of civilian casualties weRe tRansmitted woRldwide via satellite and acRoss the inteRnet.”


W e’ve begun passing through the 150th anniversaries of some of the most trying, dramatic, dangerous, heroic, and bloody times

in our Nation’s history: those of our Civil War.While many of us have studied particularly famous

military battles of the period (many of which can be read about in the books we reviewed in the June 2010 or August 2011 editions of the Georgia Guardsman), and most folks know something about the political history of the time, The New York Times Complete Civil War offers a unique reference for the time period, and a penetrating view into the intersection of military and political events of the war.

Holzer and Symonds have reprinted no fewer than 650 articles published in the New York Times between 1850 and 1877. Complementing these articles are timely and informative footnotes to explain vague allusions or dated comparisons. Included are spot-on choices from illustrations and engravings, and even a number of political cartoons that capture the flavor of the time.

With the hardcover edition, they include a DVD-ROM with (literally) every single article published by the paper during the war. While this represents an incredible body of

text – and a searchable database – the text is unedited and unformatted, making reading somewhat cumbersome.

But the real value of this book is to put the war into a very different context than most of us have experienced before. The articles are arranged chronologically as they were published – and therefore in the order people were made aware of events, rather than when they actually occurred. In an age where even telegraphs were still rare, it could take days – and from the Western theater, weeks – for a story to reach New York. So the story of battles or political events unfold and evolve much as they would have for readers 150 years ago.

That’s important because it reminds us (who have certain knowledge of the outcome of Gettysburg or Vicksburg) of how wars unfold in the public understanding. Many of the articles are not just late getting to New York – they are wrong. Or, because the journalist had to dispatch an article before the battle was over, they are incomplete.

So, understanding the military and historical events of the day really took an extra effort to piece together fragments of information – and sift through the rather pro-Lincoln bias that the Times had – to get closer to the truth.

The reader also better understands that the War was not a long string of battles, one after another. Rather, there were long periods of inaction and indecision. Complex problems and powerful sentiments meant pervasive uncertainty; And it is within this context that we should place not just our understanding of the Civil War, but of war and of warfare in general.

What we do on or above the battlefields – or on the scenes of a domestic response – of tomorrow will of course have a profound effect on the Citizens we serve… and on their support, which we require in order to succeed.


“a battle is not a pRize-fight. its object is not to test eitheR the pluck oR enduRance of the combatants, but to secuRe possession of ceRtain positions.”

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Afew thousand years ago, a large group of veteran Greek hoplites joined a Persian prince in a march to capture the throne from his brother, the Persian

king. They made it almost to Babylon, where in a decisive battle the Persians were defeated…but in the process the Persian prince was killed and the victory made moot. Those Ten Thousand then had to march a thousand miles through hostile territory to Greece, or face death, maiming, or slavery.

Anabasis is the famous story of that difficult journey home.

This is a military classic, full of details of battles and personalities of the time. But more than that, it is an adventurous yarn with touches of epic storytelling that enliven, rather than belabor it. The author was a mid-level officer at the start of the journey, and later elected to a key senior position and was instrumental in getting the force back to Greece. Xenophon’s style is surprisingly engaging and personal, simple and direct. For that reason, this is a good choice if you’d like to learn more about warfare in the ancient world.

Large and small battles punctuate the story. More than mere troop descriptions, however, the reader gets a true sense of the thought processes of the Greeks and their

leaders as the battles unfolded. But can we really learn anything about the modern

battlefield from an ancient battle? Absolutely. As a maneuver guy, I tend to think of forces as heavy or light; fast or slow; and using close combat or ranged weapons. In the old Maneuver paradigm, these are the old firepower-speed-protection constraints. Anabasis shows that these constraints were at work in the ancient world, as well: The slower, (more) heavily armored, close combat hoplites had to devise new tactics against faster, lighter missile troops.

What is especially useful to our professional development, however, is Xenophon’s central focus on leadership.

He characterizes leaders both good and bad; he explains in detail the thought process necessary when making several difficult decisions; and throughout Anabasis models the use of rhetoric and argument in making his points clear to Soldiers, to other generals, and to potential friends and enemies.

In modern times, we’re used to rejecting “mere rhetoric” as trickery or a waste of time. But the real purpose of rhetoric is to focus and sharpen the effect of argument – a skill all leaders need.

He also describes and codifies an ancient, constant thread in the philosophy of Western Warfare: Because we are free and fight for freedom, we are innately superior to armies of the east who are forced to fight. Whether this is absolutely true or not, it’s worth considering as a source of strength and pride…and a difference we need to allow for when working with ally and enemy alike.

Overall, Anabasis is a great opportunity to get a detailed look at how our business was conducted in the ancient world – and to hear a lively, real-world adventure along the way. A great read, too.


“the hoplites will Run fasteR and moRe cheeRfully if i also am on foot leading the way.”

November 2011 | 20


A sk five people to define leadership, and you’re likely to have 10 definitions when you finally cut off discussion. Yet, most would agree that

leadership requires interaction between people. Leadership therefore requires communication – and this slim little volume is one of the most important and accessible works on the subject.

Of course, it’s mostly about written communication. The book covers three main areas: Rules of usage, principles of composition, and style. Strunk & White clarify common usage errors, help us understand how to compose for greater effect, and help us suit that composition both to the rhetorical situation and to our own particular ways of doing things.

I won’t be the first to argue that good writing and good speaking are inescapably connected. And certainly, modern leaders are required constantly to communicate up, down, and sideways in the chain of command in both written and oral formats.

Few things are as unnatural as reading. Consider what our pets must think as we sit for hours (or minutes!) on end, staring at blocky objects covered in squiggly lines. Yet somehow, those scratches of letters on the paper convey ideas and emotions across time and space. Small wonder that writing, then, could be so tricky (especially with as

nutty and contradictory a language as ours).We may not like it, and we may not want our audience

to care, but grammar and punctuation matter. Minor, non-recurring errors matter less. Glaring or frequent errors are indicators (conscious or not) that the writer does not know what he is talking about.

Even grammatical errors affect credibility in sometimes unpredictable ways --- and, I think, the fear of this keeps some leaders from communicating as often or as confidently as they should.

The bulk of Elements of Style is about grammar and usage, but it all drives toward higher-order questions of composition. The goal is to get the basics down so we can focus on actually shaping communication for better effect.

How many of us have ever been confused by an unclear order? Or failed clearly to communicate our intentions? Or had cause to present a complex situation simply? Clearer, more vigorous communication is key to good leadership. Consider this passage from Elements of Style:

“Vigorous writing is concise. A sentence should contain no unnecessary words, a paragraph no unnecessary sentences, for the same reason that a drawing should have no unnecessary lines and a machine no unnecessary parts. This requires not that the writer make all his sentences short, or that he avoid all detail and treat his subjects only in outline, but that every word tell.”

Sounds like great advice for orders and plans. Communication is essential to leadership. If we are

going to get this right – if we are going to develop ourselves in this profession, not just serve time in a mere occupation – we must also develop ourselves as leaders. This book is a great start in an important area – and a good companion and reference throughout our careers.


“the act of composition disciplines the mind.”

December 2011 | 20

January 2012 | 20

By Lt. William CarrawayMedia Relations OfficerGeorgia Department of Defense

W hen I deployed to Afghanistan in 2009, a copy of Ian Mitroff and Gus Anagnos’ book went with me. I found that the observations of Mitroff and

Anagnos had equal utility in the crucible of combat and the business world.

The academic lessons I had learned in crisis management became immediately relevant to the task of mentoring Afghan police and local government officials. At the same time, the means of identifying and mitigating the effects of crises before they erupted was critical to platoon leadership in battle and in garrison. Effective principles of crisis management may be applied whether the crisis is related to economics, human endeavor, natural emergencies, or the actions of enemy combatants.

The centerpiece of Mitroff and Anagnos’ book is a best-practices model for crisis management as presented in chapter three. Chapters one and two lead up to this model by establishing the inevitability of crises and reviewing previous examples of crisis management that achieved various degrees of success.

Beginning with the Tylenol poisonings of 1982 (roundly considered to be the birth of modern crisis management) and moving forward, Mitroff and Anagnos offer case studies of crisis management which illustrate how organizations successfully mitigated crises or were consumed by them. Johnson & Johnson was noted for using prompt media engagement and swift action to address consumer fears

following the Tylenol poisonings. By contrast, Intel Corporation’s handling of complaints

following its 1994 Pentium Chip release demonstrate how an organization can completely misunderstand potential second-order effects of its actions.

Having paved the way with past examples, the authors introduce the best practices model, the components of which are stakeholders, types and risks of crises, mechanisms, scenarios, and systems. Particularly interesting is the section on systems, which describes the factors that impact corporate culture and how that corporate culture affects the organization’s institutional defense mechanisms.

Having established the model, the authors’ succeeding chapters delve into something of a running dialogue on matters impacting crisis management. Mitroff and Anagnos imagine how Machiavelli, Sigmund Freud, Mahatma Ghandi and William James would counsel a crisis manager. The manager is advised to avoid self-deception and counseled to seize the initiative by telling the truth and accepting responsibility.

In one of the wiser counsels, the authors suggest the crisis manager (or leader) “respond to the emotional needs of others as they perceive them not as (the leader) perceives them” and to “never never assume the outside world will see a situation exactly as you do.”

In Afghanistan, there was often a wide gulf in how problems were viewed by mentors and the Afghan forces. Being able to step back and analyze a crisis from different perspectives allowed me to understand problems facing the Afghan forces and apply outside-the-box solutions.

At just 154 pages, the book is not an exhaustive study, but it does provide nuggets for further reflection. Where the best-practices model is offered as a framework, the model by itself is not a crisis management panacea. As a tool, however, the model may be used as a starting point for organizations to conduct a self-audit of crisis preparedness.


“neveR, neveR assume the outside woRld will see a situation exactly as you do.”

By Lt. William CarrawayMedia Relations OfficerGeorgia Department of Defense

A book entitled The 60 Second Leader probably doesn’t suggest in-depth analysis of the subtle nuances of leadership; however, what the book

concedes in brevity it makes up for with bibliography. Composed of 30 short chapters, the book offers brief summaries of leadership lessons augmented by real-world anecdotes. Rather than “just another management cliff notes book,” this work whets the appetite for further study. Each chapter provides sources for further reading. Thus, the book offers the reader the opportunity to conduct further study.

Don’t like a particular lesson? Forget it. All you’ve lost is a minute. But find something you really appreciate and the author invites you to read further from a laundry list of tomes on leadership, economics, and behavioral science.

Of particular relevance was the lesson that recounted Gen. Colin Powell’s observation of the effects of

leadership on gunnery practice. The Army was interested in determining the optimal number of shells to fire to maintain proficiency.

In a study, one tank battalion was given the maximum amount of practice rounds while another received fewer rounds and more time in the simulator. The units were then tested on the firing range to determine which training

approach was more effective. The surprising result: Neither training strategy was

more effective. The units that fired the best were the ones with the best commanders. It was the commander who was able to maximize the unit’s performance regardless of the circumstances.

Powell concluded, “Leadership is the art of accomplishing more than the science of management says is possible.”

The book also shares the suggestion that all leadership is autobiographical and that great leaders must do three things: Tell a compelling story about themselves, tell a compelling story about the organization and its mission, and make people feel that they are part of that story.

At just 194 pages, the 60 Second Leader is a breeze to read in short manageable sections. The book is available free on the AKO Library.

The 60-second PhD in leadership:1. Make a list of all things done to you that you abhorred.2. DON’T DO THEM TO OTHERS. EVER.3. Make another list of things done to you that you loved.4. DO THEM TO OTHERS ALWAYS. – Dee Hock

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“take caRe of soldieRs and they will take caRe of you.” -- command sgt. maj. phillip stRingfield

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By Maj. John Hazel Alderman IVPublic Affairs OfficerGeorgia Department of Defense

As a tanker by trade I’ve always been fascinated by an old romantic notion of (to borrow a phrase) “fighting a desperate battle against incredible

odds.” In modern military history, few events match this description so well as Israel’s desperate defense against a combined Egyptian and Syrian attack in October 1973.

Nowhere is this story better told than in Abraham Rabinovich’s The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East. A former writer for the Jerusalem Post, Rabinovich’s work is both engaging and vivid, and a must for any student of warfare in the Middle East. He masterfully blends multiple aspects of modern warfare - air and land battles, political considerations, and civilian perspectives - into a comprehensive picture of war.

The Israelis faced truly incredible odds. On the Golan Heights, a scant 177 Israeli tanks with 11 artillery batteries were assaulted by 1,460 Syrian tanks with 115 artillery batteries. Incredibly, they held the line until the reserve could arrive and organize into a counterattack.

On the other side of the country, Egypt’s assault crossing of the Suez Canal proved to be a masterpiece of

planning and an engineering marvel. Following low-level air strikes against command posts, SAM batteries, and airfields, more than 10,000 artillery shells fell on Israeli positions in the first minute alone. This was followed by a perfectly executed crossing operation that put 32,000 Egyptians across the canal in just three and a half hours.

An hour later, the first bridge was complete; two hours later, the number of bridges had risen to 12.Meanwhile, Israeli tanks defending the canal got their first taste of a new weapon: Sagger anti-tank missiles, in their first major encounter with armored forces. The crews had no idea what the odd lights were “floating” toward them until tanks started to explode around them.

Only six years earlier, the Israeli Air Force had reigned supreme following a pre-emptive strike that virtually destroyed the Egyptian Air Force. Now, however, two Israeli Phantoms scrambled to meet the attack, only to find themselves up against 26 MiGs. Other IAF planes attacking the crossing sites ran into a sophisticated SAM umbrella that rivalled what the Americans had faced in Vietnam; early losses were appalling.

The story of how Israel recovered from these blows not just to hold the line, but to mount counterattacks that threatened both Cairo and Damascus, makes up the rest of this great book. Rabinovich explores the inner workings of both sides, as well as Israel’s initial, nearly fatal failure: They expected to be fighting the same Arabs they had faced in 1967. Yet, “Israel had not calculated the vital psychological boost the Arabs would derive from having seized the initiative.”

Maps and photographs throughout this book are excellent. Rabinovich tells a complex story masterfully, blending human detail with the epic sweep of battle to give us a true sense of the war, and what it takes to overcome such incredible odds.

Professional DeveloPment Bookshelf: reviews of Books that teach us aBout our craft

“the platoon commandeR had no idea what they might be. the answeR came oveR the Radio net. ‘missiles.’”

April 2012 | 20

By 1st Lt. William CarrawayPublic Affairs OfficerGeorgia Department of Defense

The 48th IBCT deployed for Operation Enduring Freedom in 2009. In May 2009, in the course of 2nd Battalion, 121st Infantry’s introductory

briefings in Kabul, we were introduced to Dr. Terry Tucker, Operations Training and Management Mentor for the Afghan National Army.

Dr. Tucker provided guidance on counter insurgency (COIN) and methods for working with the Afghan population, forces, and non-government organizations. Dr. Tucker has collected many of his observations of COIN techniques in his book Counterinsurgency Methods & the Global War on Terror.

It is no exaggeration to say that this book, and Dr. Tucker’s subsequent visits to Kunduz, helped shape the success of our (Delta Company, 2-121) mission in Afghanistan.

“We still have not made the most important shift of all – the mental shift from conventional operations to counter insurgency.”

Dr. Terry Tucker served 24 years in the Infantry, Armor, and Cavalry. Retiring as a Sergeant Major, he

served as an instructor and advisor to the U.S. Army, Royal Saudi Land Forces, and the Afghan National Army. By the time 2-121 arrived in Kabul, Dr. Tucker was in his fifth year of instructing at the Kabul-based Counter Insurgency Academy.

His experience in the Army and his time on the ground in Afghanistan informs the pages of his book with a language and perspective that will be instantly familiar to one who has participated in COIN.

For those unfamiliar with COIN doctrine, Dr. Tucker breaks down the subject with understandable metaphors and allusions to the business world.

One example is his treatment of the human terrain element, which he compares to market share. Dr. Tucker notes that there are multiple methods used by companies to achieve market share, many of which occur simultaneously. COIN and conventional operations must also be synchronized.

Dr. Tucker notes that the Army is in a state of change with regard to how best to execute COIN operations. The Army’s transformation to meet the asymmetrical post-9-11 threat has not been a smooth journey, nor is that journey complete.

For one thing, Dr. Tucker notes that Army Doctrine has been slow to process and implement the changes. To examine the state of COIN doctrine, Dr. Tucker explores the history of doctrine development from World War II to present day. He also examines the role of decisive operations in terms of mass vs. precision. Where “Shock and Awe” was a means to achieve a decisive end in the conventional battlefield, the challenge in the COIN environment is to balance conventional with psychological effects to achieve disproportionate effects.


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By Maj. William CoxPublic Affairs OfficeGeorgia Army National Guard

Being an Army Aviator who flew the UH-1 in flight school, and who has flown combat MEDEVAC missions, I was drawn to Robert

Mason’s Chickenhawk, a visceral account of his yearlong deployment to Vietnam.

Mason’s story takes you with him and the rest of the “Preachers” of B/229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, to their musty, mildewed tents and into his shot-up cockpit, while flying over Vietnam. He nonchalantly weaves basic rotary wing tactics, techniques, and procedures into the storyline, teaching readers while captivating them with this very human experience.

The first chapter made me laugh as he recounted his first few months at flight school. While it is uniquely his story, it is also ubiquitous with every helicopter pilot’s experience at flight school.

“A week before I was to graduate Anderson, my instructor pilot cut the power as I cruised towards the stage field. I bottomed the pitch immediately, turned into the wind [everything that flies lands into the wind - it reduces ground speed at touchdown] and glided down in autorotation… I was concentrating on doing the maneuver by the numbers. I noticed Anderson shaking his head forlornly, out of the corner of my eye. My feeling of pride and competence turned to stark terror. I saw the power line. I turned abruptly away from them but I was now very low, heading for a stand of trees. Anderson kept shaking

his head sadly [saying] ‘I’ve got it.’”Mason then sails to Vietnam where his instruction

really begins with his mentors who had flown combat missions in gliders during WWII, and had been fighters in Korea. He learns that flight school taught him just enough to be dangerous, and the Pilot-In-Command who sits next to him is his primary instructor until he becomes a PIC himself.

In addition to detailing his air-assault missions, the story is intensely personal concerning his thoughts and experiences in combat. Most Soldiers will find a sentence which puts into words their own experience: “We stared like tourists at the people we had come to save.” Soldiers cannot help but be drawn into the conversations and absurd situations Mason and his crew members experience both in the air and on the ground in between missions.

Whether the “Preachers” are verbally abusing the “Operation Twins” that never leave the compound on a combat mission, or are talking about ladies, the reader realizes that Mason’s crewmembers are archetypes that somehow end up on every Soldier’s deployment.

While the book keeps you at the edge of your seat, reliving his intensely personal and raw experiences, it does not prepare you for his downward spiral of troubled dreams and sleepless nights. While Mason does survive Vietnam, he is not able to leave Vietnam behind. Back in the States, he becomes an instructor pilot but is soon grounded. He gets out of the Army, and his life continues to take tragic turns until he finds himself in jail in 1983, just before this book is published. The reader is left wishing Mason had Mental Health services like the service has today, ready to help Soldiers deal with the stress of combat.

Professional DeveloPment Bookshelf:reviews of Books that teach us aBout our craft

June 2012 | 32


Of the thousands of books and articles written about leadership and management each year, those produced by Harvard Business Review

stand out for the quality and expertise associated with the brand. Each volume in this new series collects 10 such articles on a particular subject – Strategy, Change Management, Managing Yourself – and in that sense is the best of what HBR has to offer. This volume On Leadership is excellent for military leaders looking to consider new ideas and better understand old ones.

Selected from the last 20 years or so of HBR, writers include Peter F. Drucker, author of The Effective Executive and other enduring leaders in the field. The articles range from analytical to practical to scholarly to self-help in style; all benefit from HBR’s cogent editing and their insistence on lucid prose.

The book’s layout aids accessibility as well as retention. Articles include sidebar “Idea in Brief” and “Idea in Practice” sections as well as short case studies. The Idea in Brief summarizes main ideas and makes it easy to prioritize reading. The Idea in Practice adds depth and applies these basic ideas.

Each of the articles is just the right size. Coleman is famous for his development of “emotional intelligence” and while I find the idea attractive, I’m disinclined to read hundreds of pages about it. So his article in On Leadership explores the idea well enough for me and allows me both to apply it and to decide if I want to read

more later.Understanding this is actually pretty important to

personal development and the idea of an anthology in the first place.

There are so many books on leadership published because there are so many different situations, so many maps to success. How can we hope to localize those ideas and apply them in our lives? Immersion in a long book steeps us in a relatively small number of ideas and aids internalization. Conversely, an anthology like this one broadens development and aids in experimentation with new ideas.

For example, Rooke and Torbert posit seven “action logic” models of leadership. What happens when you try to put your co-workers into these models? Where do you place yourself? Are any opportunities or threats revealed?

Working the other direction, Kotter helped me codify past observations. I’ve been a fan of decentralization since my Cavalry days, and always thought that situation builds good leaders. But why? Kotter observes that good leaders tend to have had demanding jobs early in their careers – and decentralized organizations tend to create just this situation.

HBR’s 10 Must Reads: On Leadership contains dozens of examples of leaders in action applying these various leadership theories, yet there’s no overabundance of prophetic declarations about leadership or its requirements.

It proves an immediately approachable book full of good sense by trusted authors who see leadership as a mosaic of factors – making this anthology a mosaic of mosaics, in a way. A great and informative read.

PRofessional DeveloPment bookshelf:Reviews of books that teach us about ouR cRaft

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By SDF Warrant Officer 1 Seth G. StuckPublic Affairs OfficeGeorgia State Defense Force

As mentioned in last month’s article about family emergency preparedness, sometimes it’s helpful to consider how your family would or should

respond to a worst-case scenario. Well, I’m here to tell you, it doesn’t get any worse than the zombie apocalypse.

Max Brook’s The Zombie Survival Guide forces you to consider what you would do in the absence of a police force, a transit system, household utilities and other creature comforts while at the same time coping with the presence of potential disease infection, violence, and even hysteria. Brooks is particularly adept at making you consider your potential recourse over different lengths of time and space and varying degrees of danger.

What if you have to relocate? What if you have to relocate through a hostile area? What if you have to relocate through a hostile area while transporting wounded?

“Americans are notorious for their bad diet, lack of exercise, and relentless fetish for labor-saving technology. As recognizable as the term ‘couch potato’ is, a more accurate term would be ‘cattle’: fat, lazy, listless, and ready to be eaten.”

Works of fiction like The Zombie Survival Guide

serve as excellent thought experiments. The threat of flesh-eating zombies would be enough to give anyone pause, which is exactly why this book serves as such a great emergency preparedness resource. If you feel confident in your ability to respond to a zombie apocalypse, there isn’t much you couldn’t handle.

True, the odds of you having the beat back the walking dead with a crowbar are slim, but the thought and imagination Brooks puts into his emergency preparedness outline serves as an example to us all.

In fact, many of the tactics he references come from guidance offered in Army field manuals and even emergency plans issued during the Cold War – an era when worst-case scenario emergency preparedness was less of a thought experiment and more commonplace. For instance, if you have to hunker down for a long period of time in a facility that’s likely to have its utilities cut off, run to the bathtub and fill it up with fresh water.

From a thorough breakdown of weapons one might want to have handy for home defense, to what household items might suffice as substitutes in the absence of any traditional weapons, to considerations about potential refuges when all civic leadership and structure has broken down, to transportation pros and cons, to terrain considerations, Brooks takes you through every stage of apocalyptic mayhem response planning. And his basic point is the same as that of most any work on emergency preparedness: if you wait until an emergency happens to prepare, it’s too late.

As Brooks notes, “If you believe you can accomplish everything by ‘cramming’ at the eleventh hour, by all means, don’t lift a finger now. But you may think twice about beginning to build your ark once it has already started raining.”

PRofessional DeveloPment bookshelf:Reviews of books that teach us about ouR cRaft


Book Reviews from the "Georgia Guardsman" magazine

Education

Transcript of Book Reviews from the "Georgia Guardsman" magazine