bonacich[1] etnste ve sınıf

8/8/2019 bonacich[1] etnste ve snf

1/14

http://www.jstor.org

A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market

Author(s): Edna Bonacich

Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 37, No. 5, (Oct., 1972), pp. 547-559

Published by: American Sociological Association

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2093450

Accessed: 04/07/2008 04:39

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asa.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the

scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that

promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2093450?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asahttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asahttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2093450?origin=JSTOR-pdf


2/14

THEORY OF ETHNIC ANTAGONISM 547LeBon, Gustave1960 The Crowd. New York: Viking Press.Lieberson, Stanley and Arnold R. Silverman1965 "The precipitants and underlying condi-tions of race riots." American SociologicalReview 30 (December):887-898.McPhail, Clark1971 "Civil disorder participation: a criticalexamination of recent research." Ameri-can Sociological Review 36 (December):1058-1073.Neter, John and E. Scott Maynes1970 "On the appropriateness of the correlationcoefficient with a 0, 1 dependent variable."Journal of the American Statistical Asso-ciation 65 (June):501-509.Paige, Jeffrey1971 "Political orientation and riot participa-

tion." American Sociological Review 36(October) :810-819.Pugh, Richard C.1968 "The partitioning of criterion score vari-ance accounted for in multiple correla-tion." American Educational ResearchJournal 5 (November):639-646.Quarantelli, E. L. and Russell Dynes1968 "Looting in civil disorders: an index ofsocial change," in Don R. Bowen andLouis H. Masotti (eds.), Riots and Re-bellion. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,Inc.Raine, Walter J.1967 "Los Angeles riot study: the ghetto mer-chant survey." Institute of Governmentand Public Affairs. Los Angeles: Univer-sity of California at Los Angeles.

Reiss, Albert J., Jr. and Howard Aldrich1971 "Absentee ownership and management inthe black ghetto: social and economicconsequences." Social Problems 18 (Win-ter) :319-339.Rossi, Peter H.1968 "Between white and black: the faces ofAmerican institutions in the ghetto," inSupplemental Studies for the NationalAdvisory Commission on Civil Disorders.Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-ing Office.Rossi, Peter H. and Richard A. Berk1970 "Local political leadership and populardiscontent in the ghetto." Annals of theAmerican Academy of Political and So-cial Science 391 (September):111-127.Rossi, Peter H., Richard A. Berk and Bettye EidsonForth- The Roots of Urban Discontent. Newcoming York: John Wiley and Sons.Rude, George1964 The Crowd in History. New York: JohnWiley and Sons, Inc.Sears, David 0.1966 "Riot activity and evaluation: an over-view of the Negro survey." Unpublishedpaper written for the United States Officeof Economic Opportunity, and cited inFogelson and Hill (1968).Smelser, Neil1962 Theory of Collective Behavior. New

York: Free Press.Spilerman, Seymour1971 "The causes of racial disturbances: testsof an explanation." American SociologicalReview 36 (June):427-432.

A THEORY OF ETHNIC ANTAGONISM:THE SPLIT LABOR MARKETEDNA BONACICH

University of California,RiversideAmerican Sociological Review 1972, Vol. 37 (October):547-559

An importantsourceof antagonismbetweenethnicgroups s hypothesized o be a split labormarket, .e. one irnwhich there is a largedifferentialn price of labor for the same occupa-tion. The price of labor is not a response o the race or ethnicity of those enteringthe labormarket.A price differential esultsfrom differencesn resourcesand motives which are oftencorrelatesof ethnicity. A split labor marketproducesa three-way conflict betweenbusinessand the two labor groups, with businessseeking to displacehigher paid by cheaper abor.Ethnic antagonism an take two forms: exclusionmovementsand "caste"systems.Both areseenas victoriesfor higher paid laborsince they preventundercutting.

OCIETIES vary considerably in their de-gree of ethnic and racial antagonism.Such territories as Brazil, Mexico, andHawaii are generally acknowledged to berelatively low on this dimension; whileSouth Africa, Australia, and the United

States are considered especially high. Liter-ally hundreds of variables have been ad-duced to account for these differences,ranging from religions of dominant groups,to whether the groups who migrate aredominant or subordinate, to degrees of dif-


3/14

548 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEWference in skin color, to an irreducible"tradition" of ethnocentrism. While somewritershave attempted to synthesize or sys-tematize some subset of these (e.g. Lieber-son, 1961; Mason, 1970; Noel, 1968;Schermerhorn, 1970; van den Berghe,1966), one is generally struck by theabsence of a developed theory accountingfor variations in ethnic antagonism.One approach to this problem is to con-sider an apparent anomaly, namely thatethnic antagonism has taken two major,seemingly antithetical forms: exclusionmovements, and so-called caste systems.'An example of the former is the "whiteAustralia" policy; while South Africa'scolor bar illustrates the latter. The UnitedStates has shown both forms, with a racialcaste system in the South and exclusion ofAsian and "new" immigrants from thePacific and eastern seaboards respectively.Apart from manifestingantagonismbetweenethnic elements, exclusion and caste seemto have little in common. In the one, aneffort is made to prevent an ethnically dif-ferent group from being part of the society.In the other, an ethnically different groupis essential to the society: it is an exploitedclass supporting the entire edifice. The deepsouth felt it could not survive without itsblack people; the Pacific coast could notsurvive with its Japanese. This puzzle maybe used as a touchstone for solving the gen-eral problem of ethnic antagonism, for tobe adequate a theory must be able to ex-plain it.

The theory presented here is, in part, asynthesis of some of the ideas used byOliver Cox to explain the Japanese-whiteconflict on the U.S. Pacific coast (Cox,1948:408-22), and by Marvin Harris toanalyze the difference between Brazil andthe deep south in rigidity of the "color line"(Harris, 1964:79-94). It stresses the roleof a certain kind of economic competition

in the development of ethnic antagonism.Economic factors have, of course, not goneunnoticed, though until recently sociologicalliterature has tended to point them outbriefly, then move on to more "irrational"factors (even such works as The Economicsof Discrimination,Becker, 1957). A resurg-ence of Marxian analysis (e.g. Blauner,1969; Reich, 1971) has thrust economicconsiderations to the fore, but I shall arguethat even this approach cannot adequatelydeal with the problem posed by exclusionmovements and caste systems. In addition,both Marxist and non-Marxist writers as-sume that racial and cultural differencesin themselves prompt the development ofethnic antagonism. This theory challengesthat assumption, suggesting that economicprocesses are more fundamental.No effort is made to prove the accuracyof the following model. Such proof dependson a lengthier exposition. Historical illus-trations are presented to support it.Ethnic Antagonism

"Ethnic" rather than "racial"antagonismwas selected as the dependent variable be-cause the former is seen to subsume thelatter. Both terms refer to groups definedsocially as 'sharing a common ancestry inwhich membership is therefore inheritedor ascribed, whether or not members arecurrently physically or culturally distinc-tive.3 The differencebetween race and eth-nicity lies in the size of the locale fromwhich a group stems, races generally com-ing from continents, and ethnicities fromnational sub-sections of continents. In thepast the term "race" has been used to referto both levels, but general usage today hasreversed this practice (e.g. Schermerhorn,1970; Shibutani and Kwan, 1965). Ethni-city has become the generic term.Another reason for choosing this term isthat exclusion attempts and caste-like ar-

1 I do not wish to enter the debate over the ap-plicability of the term "caste" to race relations(cf. Cox, 1948; Davis, et al., 1941). It is used hereonly for convenience and implies no particulartheoretical bent.2 The term "exclusion" has not usually been ap-plied to immigrant quotas imposed on eastern andsouthern European immigrants; but such restric-tions were, in effect, indistinguishable from therestrictions placed on Japanese immigration.

3This usage contrasts with that of van denBerghe (1967a: 9-10) who reserves the term"ethnic" for groups socially defined by culturaldifferences. In his definition, ethnicity is not nec-essarily inherited. I would contend that, whilepersons of mixed ancestry may be problematicand are often assigned arbitrarily by the societiesin which they reside, inheritance is implied in thecommon application of the word.


4/14

THEORY OF ETHNIC ANTAGONISM 549rangements are found among nationalgroupings within a racial category. Forexample, in 1924 whites (Europeans) at-tempted to exclude whites of different na-tional backgrounds from the United Statesby setting up stringent immigration quotas.The term "antagonism" is intended toencompass all levels of intergroup conflict,including ideologies and beliefs (such asracism and prejudice), behaviors (such asdiscrimination, lynchings, riots), and insti-tutions (such as laws perpetuating segrega-tion). Exclusion movements and caste sys-tems may be seen as the culmination ofmany pronouncements, actions, and enact-ments, and are continuously supported bymore of the same. "Antagonism"was chosenover terms like prejudice and discriminationbecause it carries fewer moralistic andtheoretical assumptions (see Schermerhorn,1970:6-9). For example, both of theseterms see conflict as emanating primarilyfrom one side: the dominant group. Antag-onism allows for the possibility that conflictis mutual; i.e. a product of interaction.The Split Labor Market

The central hypothesis is that ethnic an-tagonism first germinates in a labor marketsplit along ethnic lines. To be split, a labormarket must contain at least two groupsof workers whose price of labor differs forthe same work, or would differ if they didthe same work. The concept "price oflabor" refers to labor's total cost to theemployer, including not only wages, but thecost of recruitment, transportation, roomand board, education, health care (if theemployer must bear these), and the costsof labor unrest. The degreeof worker "free-dom" does not interfere with this calculus;the cost of a slave can be estimated in thesame monetary units as that of a wageearner, from his purchase price, living ex-penses, policing requirements,and so on.The price of a group of workers can beroughly calculated in advance and compari-sons made even though two groups are notengaged in the same activity at the sametime. Thus in 1841 in the colony of NewSouth Wales, the Legislative Council'sCommittee on Immigration estimated therelative costs of recruiting three groups of

Table 1. Estimated Cost of Three Tvpesof Labor to Be Shepherds in New SouthWales, 1841*Free ManjPrisonerl Coolie(White) (White) (Indian)

- s.d. f s. d. AS.d.Rations 16 18 0 13 14 4 9 6 4Clothing i - - - 3 3 0 1 1 8Wages 25 0 0 ' - - - 600Passage fropjIndia - - 2 0I.Total per

Annum 41 18 0 j16 17 4 ;18 8 0*From Yarwood (1968:13).laborers to become shepherds. Table 1shows their findings. The estimate of freewhite labor, for example,was based on whatit would take to attract these men fromcompeting activities.Factors Affecting the Initial Price of Labor

Labor markets that are split by the en-trance of a new group develop a dynamicwhich may in turn affect the price of labor.One must therefore distinguish initial fromlater price determinants. The initial factorscan be divided into two broad categories:resourcesand motives.1. ResourcesThree types of resources are important

price determinants. These are:a. Level of Living, or Economic Resources-The ethnic groups forming the labormarket in a contact situation derive fromdifferent economic systems, either abroador within a -conquered territory. For mem-bers of an ethnic group to be drawn intomoving, they must at least raise their wagelevel. In general, the poorer the economyof the recruits, the less the inducementneeded for them to enter the new labormarket. Crushing poverty may drive themto sell their labor relatively cheaply. Forexample, Lind (1968:199) describes theeffect of the living level on the wage scalereceived by immigrant workers to Hawaii:

In every case [of labor importations]thesuperioropportunities or gaining a liveli-


5/14

550 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEWhood have been broadcastn regionsof sur-plusmanpower, ransportationacilitieshavebeenprovided,andfinallya monetaryreturnlarger than that alreadyreceived has beenoffered o the prospective aborer.The mone-tary inducementhas varied considerably,chiefly according o the plane of living ofthe population being recruited, and thecheapest available labor markets have, ofcourse,been most extensively drawn upon.Workers need not accept the originalwage agreement for long after they haveimmigrated, since other opportunities mayexist; for instance, there may be ample,cheap land available for individual farming.One capitalist device for keeping wages low

at least for a time is to bind immigrantsto contracts before they leave the old econ-omy. The Indian indenture system, forexample, rested on such an arrangement(Gillion, 1962:19-38).b. Information-Immigrants may bepushed into signing contracts out of igno-rance. They may agree to a specific wage intheir homeland not knowing the prevailingwage in the new country, or having beenbeguiled by a false account of life and op-portunity there. Williams (1944:11), forexample, describes some of the false prom-ises made to draw British and Germansasworkers to West Indian sugar plantationsbefore the advent of African slavery.Chinese labor to Australia was similarly"obtained under 'false and specious pre-tences"' (Willard, 1967:9).The possibilities for defraudinga popula-tion lacking access to the truth are obvious.In general, the more people know aboutconditions obtaining in the labor market towhich they are moving, the better can theyprotect themselves against disadvantageouswage agreements.c. Political Resources-By political re-sources I mean the benefits to a group oforganizing. Organization can exist at thelevel of labor, or it can occur at higherlevels, for example, in a government thatprotects them. These levels are generallyrelated in that a strong government canhelp organize its emigrants. There are ex-ceptions, however: strong emigrant govern-ments tend not to extend protection to theirdeported convicts or political exiles; andsome highly organizedgroups, like the Jews

in the United States, have not received pro-tection from the old country.Governmentsvary in the degree to whichthey protect their emigrants. Japan keptclose watch over the fate of her nationalswho migrated to Hawaii and the Pacificcoast; and the British colonial governmentin India tried to guard against abuses ofthe indenture system (for example, by re-fusing to permit Natal to import Indianworkers for their sugar plantations untilsatisfactory terms had been agreed to; cf.Ferguson-Davie, 1952:4-10). In contrastMexican migrant workers to the UnitedStates have received little protection fromtheir government, and African states wereunable to intervene on behalf of slavesbrought to America. Often the indigenouspopulations of colonized territories havebeen politically weak following conquest.Thus African nations in South Africa havebeen unable to protect their migrantworkers in the cities.In general, the weaker a grouppolitically,the more vulnerableit is to the use of force,hence to an unfavorable wage bargain (orto no wage bargain at all, as with slavery).The price of a labor group varies inverselywith the amount of force that can be usedagainst it, which in turn depends on itspolitical resources.2. Motives

Two motives affect the price of labor,both related to the worker'sintention of notremaining permanently in the labor force.Temporary workers tend to cost less thanpermanent workers for two reasons. First,they are more willing to put up with un-desirable work conditions since these neednot be enduredforever.If they are migrants,this tolerance may extend to the generalstandard of living. Often migrant temporaryworkers are males who have left the com-forts of home behind and whose employersneed not bear the cost of housing and edu-cating their families. Even when familiesaccompany them, such workers tend to bewilling to accept a lower standard of livingsince it is only short term.Second, temporary workers avoid in-volvement in lengthy labor disputes. Sincethey will be in the labor market a short


6/14

THEORY OF ETHNIC ANTAGONISM 551while, their main concern is immediate em-ployment. They may be willing to undercutwage standardsif need be to get a job, andare therefore ripe candidates for strike-breaking. Permanent workers also stand tolose from lengthy conflict, but they hopefor benefits to their progeny. If temporaryworkers are from elsewhere, they have nosuch interest in future business-laborrela-tions. Altogether, temporary workers havelittle reason to join the organizations andunions of a permanent work force, and tendnot to do so.a. Fixed or Supplementary Income Goal-Some temporaryworkers enter the marketeither to supplement family income, or towork toward a specific purchase. Theworker'sstandardof living does not, there-fore, depend on his earnings on the job inquestion, since his central source of employ-ment or income lies elsewhere.Examples ofthis phenomenonare to be found through-out Africa:

. . .the characteristiceature of the labormarket in most of Africa has always beenthe massivecirculationof Africansbetweentheir villages and paid employmentoutside.In some places villagers engage in wage-earning seasonally.More commonly todaythey work for continuous houghshort-termperiodsof roughlyone to three years, afterwhich they returnto the villages. . . . theAfricanvillager,the potentialmigrant intopaid employment, has a relatively low,clearly-definedand rigid income goal; hewants money to pay head and hut taxes,to makemarriagepaymentsrequiredof pro-spective bridegrooms, r to purchasesomespecificconsumerdurable(a bicycle,a rifle,a sewingmachine,a givenquantityof cloth-ing or textiles, etc.) (Berg, 1966:116-8).Such a motive produces the "backward-sloping labor supply function" character-istic of many native peoples in colonizedterritories. In addition to the general de-pressing effects on wages of being tempo-rary, this motive leads to a fairly rapidturnover in personnel, making organization

more difficult and hindering the develop-ment of valuable skills which could be usedfor bargaining. If wages were to rise,workers would reach their desired incomeand withdraw more quickly from the mar-ket, thereby lessening their chances of de-veloping the political resources necessaryto raise their wages further.

b. Fortune Seeking-Many groups, com-monly called sojourners (see Siu, 1952),migrate long distances to seek their fortune,with the ultimate intention of improvingtheir position in their homeland. Such wasthe case with Japanese immigrants on thewest coast and Italian immigrants in theeast. Such workersstay longer in the labormarket, and can develop political resources.However, since they are temporary theyhave little incentive to join the organiza-tions of the settled population. Instead theytend to create competingorganizations com-posed of people who will play a part intheir future in the homeland, i.e. membersof the same ethnic group.Sojourner laborers have at least threefeatureswhichaffectthe priceof labor: lowerwages, longer hours, and convenience tothe employer.The Japanese show all three.Millis (1915:45) cites the U.S. Immigra-tion Commissionon the question of relativewages:

The Japanesehave usually worked for alowerwage than the membersof any otherrace save the Chineseand the Mexican.Inthe salmoncanneries he Chinesehave beenpaid higher wages than the Japanese en-gagedin the same occupations. n the lum-ber industry,all races, includingthe EastIndian,have beenpaidhigherwagesthantheJapanesedoing the same kind of work, Assectionhandsand laborers n railwayshopsthey have been paid as much or more thanthe Mexicans,but as a rule less than thewhite men of many races.

And so on. The lower wage level of Japa-nese workersreflects both a lower standardof living, and a desire to get a foothold inthe labor market. As Iwata (1962:27) putsit: "Their willingness to accept even lowerwages than laborers of other races enabledthe Japanese to secureemploymentreadily."Millis (1915:155) describes a basketfactory in Florin, California, where Japa-nese workers had displaced white femaleworkersbecause the latter were unwilling towork more than ten hoursa day or on week-ends. The Japanese, anxious to return toJapan as quickly as possible, were willingto work twelve to fourteen hours per dayand on weekends, thereby saving their em-ployers the costs of a special overtimeworkforce.The Japanese immigrants developed po-


7/14

552 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEWlitical resources through a high degree ofcommunity organization.This could be usedfor the convenience of the employer, bysolving his recruitment problems, seeingthat work got done, and providing workerswith board and lodging. In the case ofseasonal labor, the Japanese communitycould provide for members during the off-season by various boarding arrangementsand clubs, and by transporting labor toareas of demand (Ichihashi, 1932:172-6;Millis, 1915:44-5). These conveniencessaved the employer money.4As the reader may have noted, I haveomitted a factor usually considered vitalin determining the price of labor, i.e. dif-ferences in skills. I would contend, however,that this does not in itself lead to thatdifference in price for the same work whichdistinguishes a split labor market. While askilled worker may be able to get a higherpaying job, an unskilled laborer of anotherethnicity may be trained to fill that job forthe same wage. Skills are only indirectlyimportant in that they can be used to de-velop political resources, which in turn maylead to a difference in wage level for thesame work.Price of Labor and Ethnicity

Ethnic differencesneed not always pro-duce a price differential. Thus, if severalethnic groups who are approximately equalin resources and/or goals enter the sameeconomic system, a split labor market willnot develop. Alternatively, in a two-groupcontact situation, if one ethnic group occu-pies the position of a business elite and hasno members in the labor force (or in aclass that could easily be pushed into thelabor force, e.g. low-capital farmers) thenregardless of the other group's price, thelabor market will not be split. This state-ment is a generalization of the point madeby Harris (1964) that the critical differ-ence in race relations between the deepSoutifh Snnd RPra.7il urn.. fbnf fth fnrmar hkn

a white yeomanry in direct competitionwith ex-slaves, while the Portuguese onlyoccupied the role of a business elite (plan-tation owners).Conversely, a split labor force does notonly stem from ethnic differences. Forexample,prison and female labor have oftenbeen cheaper than free male labor inwestern societies. Prison labor has beencheap because prisoners lack political re-sources, while women often labor for sup-plementary incomes cf. Hutchinson, 1968:59-61; Heneman and Yoder, 1965:543-4).That initial price discrepancies in laborshould ever fall along ethnic lines is a func-tion of two forces. First, the original wageagreement arrived at between business andnew labor often takes place in the laborgroup's point of origin. This is more ob-viously a feature of immigrant labor, butalso occurs within a territory when con-queredpeoples enter their conquerors'econ-omy. In other words, the wage agreementis often concludedwithin a national context,these nationalities coming to comprise theethnic elements of the new labor market.One would thus expect the initial wages ofco-nationals to be similar.Second,nations or peoples that have livedrelatively separately from one another arelikely to have developed different employ-ment motives and levels of resources(wealth, organization,communicationchan-nels.) In other words, the factors that affectthe price of labor are likely to differgrosslybetween nations, even though there maybe considerable variation within each na-tion, and overlap between nations. Colordifferences in the initial price of labor onlyseem to be a factor because resourceshavehistorically been roughly correlated withcolor around the world.5 When color andresources are not correlated in the "ex-

4Sojourners often use their political resourcesand low price of labor to enter business for them-selves (a process which will be fully analyzed inanother paper). This does not remove the split inthe labor market, though it makes the conflictmore comnile-.

5 It is, of course, no accident that color andresources have been historically related. Povertyamong non-white nations has in part resulted fromEuropean imperialism. Nevertheless, I would arguethat the critical factor in the development ofethnic segmentation in a country is the meetingthat occurs in the labor market of that country.The larger economic forces help determine the re-sources of entering parties, but it is not such forcesto which workers respond. Rather they react tothe immediate conflicts and threats in their dailylives.


8/14

THEORY OF ETHNIC ANTAGONISM 553pected"way, then I would predict that pricefollows resources and motives rather thancolor.In sum, the prejudices of business do notdeterminethe price of labor, darker skinnedor culturally different persons being paidless because of them. Rather, business triesto pay as little as possible for labor, regard-less of ethnicity, and is held in check bythe resources and motives of labor groups.Since these often vary by ethnicity, it iscommon to find ethnically split labormarkets.The Dynamics of Split Labor Markets

In split labor markets, conflict developsbetween three key classes: business, higherpaid labor, and cheaper labor. The chiefinterests of these classes are as follows:1. Business or Employers-This class aimsat having as cheap and docile a labor forceas possible to compete effectively with otherbusinesses.If labor costs are too high (ow-ing to such price determinants as unions),employersmay turn to cheaper sources, im-porting overseas groups or using indigenousconquered populations. In the colony ofQueensland in Australia, for example, itwas believed that cotton farming would bethe most suitable economic enterprise:

However,such plantations being too large)could not be worked,much less cleared,bytheirowners;neithercould the workbe doneby Europeanaborersbecausesufficientnum-bersof thesewerenot available-while evenhad therebeen an adequate upply,the highrates of wageswouldhave been prohibitive.This was a consideration hich assumedvastimportancewhen it was realized hat cottonwould have to be cultivatedin Queenslandat a considerablyower cost than in theUnitedStates in order o compensateor theheavier freightsfrom Queensland-themoredistant country from England. It seemedthenthat therewas no possibilityof success-ful competitionwith Americaunlessthe im-portationof some form of cheaplabor waspermitted(Moles, 1968:41).Cheaper labor may be used to create anew industry having substantially lowerlabor costs than the rest of the labor mar-ket, as in Queensland.Or they may be usedas strikebreakersor replacementsto under-cut a labor force trying to improve its bar-gaining position with business. If cheap

labor is unavailable, business may turn tomechanization, or try to relocate firms inareas of the world where the price of laboris lower.2. Higher Paid Labor-This class is verythreatened by the introduction of cheaperlabor into the market, fearing that it willeither force them to leave the territory orreduce them to its level. If the labor marketis split ethnically, the class antagonismtakes the form of ethnic antagonism. It ismy contention (following Cox, 1948:41 in)that, while much rhetoric of ethnic antagon-ism concentrates on ethnicity and race, itreally in large measure (though probablynot entirely) expresses this class conflict.

The group comprising higher paid labormay have two components. First, it may in-cludecurrentemployeesdemandinga greatershare of the profits or trying to maintaintheir position in the face of possible cuts.A second element is the small, independent,entrepreneur, ike the subsistence farmer orindividual miner. The introduction ofcheaper labor into these peoples' line canundermine their position, since the em-ployer of cheaper labor can produce atlower cost. The independent operator isthen driven into the labor market. The fol-lowing sequence occurs in many colonies:settlement by farmers who work their ownland, the introduction of intensive farmingusing cheaper labor, a rise in land valueand a consequent displacement of indepen-dent farmers. The displaced class may moveon (as occurredin many of the West Indieswhen African slave labor was introducedto raise sugar), but if it remains, it comesto play the role of higher paid labor.The presence of cheaper labor in areasof the economy where higher paid labor isnot currently employed is also threateningto the latter, since the former attract olderindustries. The importance of potentialcompetition cannot be overstressed. Often-times writers assert the irrationality ofethnic antagonism when direct economiccompetition is not yet in evidence owingto few competitorshaving entered the labormarket, or to competitors having concen-trated in a few industries. Thus Daniels(1966:29) belittles the role of trade unionsin the Asiatic Exclusion League by describ-


9/14

554 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEWing one of the major contributors as "anorganization whose members, like mosttrade unionists in California, were neverfaced with job competition from Japanese."It does not take direct competition formembersof a higher priced labor group tosee the possible threat to their well-being,and to try to prevent its materializing. Ifthey have reason to believe many more low-pricedworkers are likely to follow an initial"insignificant trickle" (as Daniels, 1966:1,describes the Japanese immigration, failingto mention that it was insignificantpreciselybecause a larger anticipated flow had beenthwarted, and diverted to Brazil), or ifthey see a large concentration of cheaperlabor in a few industries which could easilybe used to undercutthem in their own, theywill attempt to forestall undercutting.Lest you think this fear misguided, takenote that, when business could override theinterests of more expensive labor, the latterhave indeed been displaced or undercut. InBritish Guiana the local labor force, com-posed mainly of African ex-slaves, called aseries of strikes in 1842 and 1847 againstplanters' attempts to reduce their wages.Plantation owners responded by usingpublic funds to import over 50,000 cheaperEast Indian indentured workers (Despres,1969). A similar situation obtained inMississippi, where Chinese were brought into undercut freed blacks. Loewen (1971:23) describes the thinking of white land-owners: "the 'Chinaman' would not onlyhimself supply a cheaper and less trouble-somework force but in addition his presenceas a threatening alternative would intimi-date the Negro into resuming his formerdocile behavior." Such displacement hasoccurred not only to non-white more ex-pensive labor, but, as the effects of slaveryin the West Indies show, to whites by whitecapitalists.3. Cheaper Labor-The employer uses thisclass partly to undermine the position ofmore expensive labor, through strikebreak-ing and undercutting.The forces that makethe cheaper group cost less permit this tooccur. In other words, either they lack theresources to resist an offer or use of forceby business, or they seek a quick return toanother economic and social base.

With the possible exception of sojourners,cheaper labor does not intentionally under-mine more expensive labor; it is paradoxi-cally its weakness that makes it so threat-ening, for business can more thoroughlycontrol it. Cox makes this point (1948:417-8) in analyzing why Pacific coastwhite and Asian workerscould not unite ina coalition against business:. . . the firstgeneration f Asiaticworkerssordinarilyvery much under the control oflaborcontractorsand employers,hence it iseasierfor the employer o frustrateany plansfor their organization.Clearly this culturalbar helpedantagonizewhite workersagainstthe Asiatics.The latterwere conceivedof asbeingin alliancewith the employer. t wouldprobablyhave takentwo or threegenerationsbefore,say, the East Indian ow-casteworkeron the Coast becamesufficientlyAmerican-ized to adjusteasily to the policiesand aimsof organized abor.Ethnic antagonism is specifically pro-duced by the competition that arises froma price differential.An oversupply of equal-priced labor does not produce such an-tagonism, though it too threatens peoplewith the loss of their job. However, hiringpractices will not necessarily fall alongethnic lines, there being no advantage tothe employer in hiring workers of one oranother ethnicity. All workingmen are onthe same footing, competing for scarce jobs(cf. Blalock, 1967:84-92, who uses thismodel of labor competition). XWhenoneethnic group is decidedly cheaper than an-other (i.e. when the labor market is split)

the higher paid worker faces more thanthe loss of his job; he faces the possibilitythat the wage standard in all jobs will beundermined by cheaper labor.Victory for More Expensive Labor

If an expensive labor group is strongenough (strength generally depending onthe same factors that influence price), theymay be able to resist being displaced. Bothexclusion and caste systems represent suchvictories for higher paid labor.1. Exclusion-Exclusion movements gener-ally occur when the majority of a cheaperlabor group resides outside a given territorybut desires to enter it (often at the requestof business groups). The exclusion move-


10/14

THEORY OF ETHNIC ANTAGONISM 555ment tries to prevent the physical presenceof cheaper labor in the employment area,thereby preservinga non-split, higher pricedlabor market.There are many examples of exclusionattempts around the world. In Australia,for instance, a group of white workers wasable to prevent capitalists from importingcheaper labor from India, China, Japan andthe Pacific Islands. Attempts at importationwere met with strikes, boycotts, petitionsand deputations (Willard, 1967:51-7). Ul-timately, organized white labor pressed forstrong exclusion measures, and vigilantlyensured their enforcement. As Yarwood(1964:151-2) puts it: "A comparison ofthe records of various governments duringour period [1896-1923] leaves no doubt asto the special role of the Labour Party asthe guardianof the ports." In other words,a white Australia policy (i.e. the exclusionof Asian and Polynesian immigrants) ap-pears to have sprung from a conflict ofinterests between employers who wanted toimport cheap labor, and a labor force suf-ficiently organizedto ward off such a move.California's treatment of Chinese andJapanese labor is another example of ex-clusion. A socialist, CameronH. King, Jr.,articulates the threatened labor group'sposition:

Unskilled labor has felt this competition[from the Japanese] for some time beingcompelled o relinquish ob after job to thelow standardof living it could not endure.The unskilled laborers are largely unor-ganized and voiceless.But as the tide risesit is reachingthe skilled laborersand thesmall merchants.These are neither unorga-nizednor voiceless,and viewingthe menaceto their livelihoodthey loudly demandpro-tection of theirmaterial nterests.We of thePacific Coast certainlyknow that exclusionis an effectivesolution. n the seventhdecadeof the nineteenthcenturythe problemaroseof the immigration f Chinese aborers.TheRepublican nd Democraticparties failed togive heed to the necessitiesof the situationand the Workingman'sparty arose andswept the state with the campaigncry of"The Chinesemust go." Then the two oldparties'wokeup and havesince realized hatto hold the laborvote they must stand forAsiatic exclusion (King 1908:665-6).King wrote this around the time of theGentlemen'sAgreement,an arrangementofthe U.S. and Japanese governmentsto pre-

vent further immigrationof Japanese laborto the Pacific Coast (Bailey, 1934). TheAgreement was aimed specifically at laborand not other Japanese immigrants, sug-gesting that economic and not racial factorswere at issue.Exclusion movements clearly serve theinterests of higher paid labor. Its standardsare protected, while the capitalist class isdeprived of cheaper labor.2. Caste-If cheaper labor is present in themarket, and cannot be excluded,' thenhigher paid labor will resort to a caste ar-rangement, which depends on exclusivenessrather than exclusion. Caste is essentiallyan aristocracy of labor (a term borrowedfrom Lenin, e.g. 1964), in which higher paidlabor deals with the undercuttingpotentialof cheaper labor by excluding them fromcertain types of work. The higher paidgroup controls certain jobs exclusively andgets paid at one scale of wages, while thecheaper group is restricted to another setof jobs and is paid at a lower scale. Thelabor market split is submerged becausethe differentially priced workers ideallynever occupy the same position.Ethnically distinct cheaper groups (asopposed to women, for example, who face acaste arrangement in many Western soci-eties) may reside in a territory for tworeasons: either they were indigenousor theywere imported early in capitalist-labor rela-tions, when the higher paid group couldnot prevent the move. Two outstandingexamples of labor aristocracies based onethnicity are South Africa, where cheaperlabor was primarily indigenous, and theU.S. south, where they were imported asslaves.Unlike exclusion movements, caste sys-tems retain the underlying reality of a pricedifferential, for if a member of the sub-ordinate group were to occupy the sameposition as a member of the stronger laborgroup he would be paid less. Hence, castesystems tend to become rigid and vigilant,developing an elaborate battery of laws,customs and beliefs aimed to prevent under-cutting. The victory has three facets. First,the higher paid group tries to ensure itspower in relation to business by monopoliz-ing the acquisitionof certain essential skills,


11/14

556 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEWthereby ensuring the effectiveness of strikeaction, or by controlling such importantresources as purchasing power. Second, ittries to prevent the immediate use ofcheaper labor as undercutters and strike-breakersby denying them access to generaleducation thereby making their training asquick replacements more difficult,or by en-suring through such devices as "influx con-trol" that the cheaper group will retain abase in their traditional economies. Thelatter move ensures a backward-slopinglabor supply function (cf. Berg, 1966) un-desirable to business. Third, it tries toweaken the cheaper group politically, toprevent their pushing for those resourcesthat would make them useful as under-cutters. In other words, the solution to thedevastating potential of weak, cheap laboris, paradoxically, to weaken them further,until it is no longer in business' immediateinterest to use them as replacements.South Africa is perhaps the most extrememodern example of an ethnic caste system.A split labor market first appeared therein the mining industry. With the discoveryof diamonds in 1869, a white working classemerged.6At first individual whites did thesearching,but, as with the displacementofsmall farms by plantations, they were dis-placed by consolidated, high-capital opera-tions, and became employees of the latter(Doxey, 1961:18). It was this class to-gether with imported skilled miners fromCornwall (lured to Africa by high wages)which fought the capitalists over the use ofAfrican labor. Africans were cheaper be-cause they came to the mines with a fixedincome goal (e.g. the price of a rifle) anddid not view the mines as their main sourceof livelihood. By contrast, Europeanworkers remained in the mines and devel-

oped organizations to further their interests.Clearly, it would have been to the ad-vantage of businessmen, once they knewthe skills involved, to train Africans to re-place the white miners at a fraction of thecost; but this did not happen. The miningcompanies accepted a labor aristocracy, notout of ethnic solidarity with the whiteworkersbut:(as was to be the case throughout he laterhistory of mining) they had little or nochoice becauseof the collective strengthofthe whiteminers. . . The patternwhichwasto emergewas that of the Europeans how-ing every sign of preparedness o use theircollectivestrength to ensure their exclusivesupremacy n the labour market. Graduallythe conceptof trade unionism,and, for thatmatter, of socialism,became accepted n theminds of the European rtisansas the meansof maintaining heir own position againstnon-white nroads (Doxey, 1961:23-4).The final showdown between mine ownersand white workers occurred in the 1920'swhen the owners tried to substitute cheapernon-white labor for white labor in certainsemi-skilled occupations. This move pre-cipitated the "Rand Revolt," a generalstrike of white workers on the Witwaters-rand, countered by the calling in of troopsand the declaration of martial law. Theresult was a coalition between Afrikanernationalists (predominantly workers andsmall-scale farmers being pushed off theland by larger, British owned farms) andthe English-speakingLabor Party (Van derHorst, 1965:117-8). The Revolt "showed

the lengths to which white labour was pre-pared to go to defend its privileged position.From that time on, mine managementshavenever directly challenged the colour-bar inthe mining industry" (Van der Horst,1965:118).The legislative history of much of SouthAfrica (and of the post-bellum deep south)consists in attempts by higher priced whitelabor to ward off undercutting by cheaper

groups, and to entrench its exclusive con-trol of certain jobs.7

6 Such a split was not found in the early CapeColony, where business was one ethnicity-white,and labor another-non-white. Actuallyin neithercase was the ethnic composition simple or homo-geneous; but the important fact is that, amongthe laborers, who included so-called Hottentots,and slaves from Madagascar, Mocambique andthe East Indies (cf. van den Berghe, 1967b: 4),no element was significantlymore expensive. Theearly Cape is thus structurally similar, in termsof the variablesI consider mportant, to countrieslike Brazil and Mexico. And it is also noted forits "softened" one of race relationsas reflected nsuch practicesas intermarriage.

7Ethnically based labor aristocraciesare muchless sensitiveabout cheap labor in any form thanare systems that do not arrive at this resolutionbecausethey are protectedfrom it. Thus, Suther-land and Cressey (1970:561-2) report that boththe deep south and South Africa continue to usevarious forms of prison contract labor, in con-


12/14

THEORY OF ETHNIC ANTAGONISM 557This interpretationof caste contrastswiththe Marxist argument that the capitalistclass purposefully plays off one segment ofthe working class against the other (e.g.Reich, 1971). Business, I would contend,rather than desiring to protect a segmentof the working class supports a liberal orlaissez faire ideology that would permit allworkers to compete freely in ban openmarket. Such open competition would dis-place higher paid labor. Only under duressdoes business yield to labor aristocracy, apoint made in Deep South, a book writtenwhen the depression had caused the dis-placement of white tenant farmers and in-

dustrial workersby blacks:The economic nterestsof these groups[em-ployers] would also demand that cheapercolored labor should be employed in the"white collar"jobs in businessoffices, gov-ernmentaloffices,stores, and banks.In thisfield, however, he interestsof the employergroup conflictnot only with those of thelowereconomicgroupof whites but also withthose of the more literate and aggressivemiddlegroupof whites. A white store whichemployedcoloredclerks, for example,wouldbe boycotted by both these groups. Thetaboo upon the employment of coloredworkers in such fields is the result of thepolitical and purchasingpower of the whitemiddle and lower groups (Davis, et. al.,1941:480).In sum, exclusion and caste are similarreactions to a split labor market. Theyrepresent victories for higher paid labor.The victory of exclusion is more completein that cheaper labor is less available tobusiness. For this reason I would hypothe-size that a higher paid group prefers exclu-sion to caste, even though exclusion meansthey have to do the dirty work. Evidencefor this comes fromAustraliawhere, in earlyattempts to import Asian labor, businesstried to buy off white labor's opposition byoffering to form them into a class of "me-chanics" and foremen over the "coolies"(Yarwood, 1968:16, 42). The offer was

heartily rejected in favor of exclusion.Apartheid in South Africa can be seen asan attempt to move from caste to the ex-clusion of the African work force.

Most of our examples have contained awhite capitalist class, a higher paid whitelabor group, and a cheaper, non-white laborgroup. Conditions in Europe and aroundthe world, and not skin color, yield suchmodels. White capitalists would gladly dis-pense with and undercut their white work-ing-class brethren if they could, and havedone so whenever they had the opportunity.In the words of one agitator for excludingChinesefrom the U.S. Pacific coast: "I haveseen men . . . American born, who certainlywould, if I may use a strong expression,employ devils from Hell if the devils wouldwork for 25 cents less than a white man"(cited in Daniels and Kitano, 1970:43).In addition, cases have occurred of whiteworkers playing the role of cheap labor, andfacing the same kind of ethnic antagonismas non-white workers. Consider the riotsagainst Italian strikebreakers in the coalfields of Pennsylvania in 1874. (Higham,1965:47-8). In the words of one writer:"Unions resented the apparently inexhaust-ible cheap and relatively docile labor supplywhich was streaming from Europe obviouslyfor the benefit of their employers" (Wittke,1953:10).Even when no ethnic differences exist,split labor markets may produce ethnic-like antagonism. Carey McWilliams (1945:82-3) describes an instance:

During the depressionyears, "OldStock"-that is, white,Protestant,anglo-SaxonAmer-icans, from Oklahoma,Arkansas,and Texas-were roundlydenounced n Californiaas"interlopers." he same chargeswere madeagainst them that were made against theJapanese: they were "dirty;" they had"enormous amilies"; they engagedin un-fair competition; they threatenedto "in-vade" the state and to "undermine"ts in-stitutions.During these turgid years (1930-1938) Californiaattemptedto exclude,byvarious extra-legal devices, those yeomanfarmersjust as it had excluded he Chineseand Japanese."Okies"were "inferior"and"immoral."There was much family discordwhenOkiegirl met Californiaboy, and viceversa. . . The prejudiceagainstthe Okieswas obviouslynot "race"prejudice; yet itfunctionedn muchthe samemanner.

ConclusionObviously, this type of three-way con-flict is not the only important factor in

trast to the northern U.S. where the contractsystem was attackedby rising labor organizationsas eParlv as 1880.


13/14

558 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEWethnic relations. But it does help explainsome puzzles, including, of course, the ex-clusion-caste anomaly. For example, PhilipMason (1970:64) develops a typology ofrace relations and finds that it relates tonumericalproportionswithout being able toexplain the dynamic behind this correlation.Table 2 presents a modified version of hischart. My theory can explain these relation-ships. Paternalismarises in situations wherethe cleavage between business and laborcorresponds o an ethnic difference.A smallbusiness elite rules a large group of workerswho entered the labor market at approxi-mately the same price or strength. No splitlabor market existed, hence no ethnic castesystem arises. The higher proportionof thedominant ethnicity under "Domination"means that part of the dominant groupmust be workingclass. A labor element thatshares ethnicity with people who have suf-ficient resourcesto become the business eliteis generally likely to come from a fairlywealthy country and have resources of itsown. Such systems are likely to develop splitlabor markets. Finally, competition hasunder it societies whose cheaper laborgroups have not been a major threat be-cause the indigenous population availableas cheap labor has been small and/or exclu-sion has effectively kept business groupsfrom importing cheap labor in largenumbers.

Table 2. Numeric-al Proportion ofDominant to Subordinate EthnicGroups*Category

Domination Paternalism CompetitionSituations

South Africa Nigeria Britain(1960) (1952) (1968)1-4 1-2000 50-1II.S. South Nyasaland I..S. North(1960) (1966) (1960)4-1 1-570 15-1Rhodesia Tanganyika New Zealand(1960)1-16 1-450 13-1

Uganda1-650

*Adanted from Mason (1970:64).

This theory helps elucidate other obser-vations. One is the underlying similarity inthe situation of blacks and women. Anotheris the history of political sympathy betweenCalifornia and the South. And, a third isthe conservatism of the American whiteworking class, or what Daniels and Kitano(1970:45) considerto be an "essentialpara-dox of Americanlife: [that] movements foreconomic democracyhave usually been vio-lently opposed to a thorough-going ethnicdemocracy." Without having to resort topsychological constructs like "authoritarian-ism," this theory is able to explain the ap-parent paradox.In sum, in comparingthose countrieswiththe most ethnic antagonismwith those hav-ing the least, it is evident that the differencedoes not lie in the fact that the formerareProtestant and the latter Catholic: Protes-tants are found in all three of Mason'stypes, and Hawaii is a Protestant dominatedterritory. It does not lie in whether thedominant or subordinate group moves:South Africa and the deep south show op-

posite patterns of movement. It is evidentthat some of the most antagonistic terri-tories have been British colonies, but notall British colonies have had this attribute.The characteristic that those British col-onies and other societies high on ethnicantagonism share is that they all have apowerful white, or more generally higherpaid working class.REFERENCES

Bailey, Thomas A.1934 Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises. Stanford: Stanford Uni-versity Press.Becker, Gary1957 The Economics of Discrimination. Chi-cago: University of Chicago Press.Berg, E. J.1966 "Backward-sloping labor supply functionsin dual economies-the Africa case." Pp.114-36 in Immanuel Wallerstein (ed.),Social Change: The Colonial Situation.New York: Wiley.Blalock, H. M., Jr.1967 Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Re-lations. New York: Wiley.Blauner, Robert1969 "Internal colonialism and ghetto revolt."Social Problems 16 (Spring):393-408.Cox, Oliver C.1948 Caste, Class and Race. New York: Mod-ern Reader.


14/14

THEORY OF ETHNIC ANTAGONISM 559Daniels, Roger1966 The Politics of Prejudice. Gloucester,Massachusetts: Peter Smith.Daniels, Roger, and Harry H. L. Kitano1970 American Racism. Englewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall.Davis, Allison W., B. B. Gardner and M. R.Gardner1941 Deep South. Chicago: University of Chi-cago Press.Despres, Leo A.1969 "Differential adaptations and micro-cul-tural evolution in Guyana." SouthwesternJournal of Anthropology 25 (Spring):14-44.Doxey, G. V.1961 The Industrial Colour Bar in SouthAfrica. Cape Town: Oxford University

Press.Ferguson-Davie, C. J.1952 The Early History of Indians in Natal.Johannesburg: South African Institute ofRace Relations.Gillion, K. L.1962 Fiji's Indian Migrants. Melbourne: Ox-ford University Press.Harris, Marvin1964 Patterns of Race in the Americas. NewYork: Walker.Heneman, H. G., and Dale Yoder1965 Labor Economics. Cincinnati: South-western.Higham, John1965 Strangers in the Land. New York:Athenium.Hutchison, Emilie J.1968 Women's Wages. New York: Ams Press.Ichihashi, Yamato1932 Japanese in the United States. Stanford:Stanford University Press.

Iwata, Masakazu1962 "The Japanese immigrants in Californiaagriculture." Agricultural History 36(January) :25-37.King, Cameron H., Jr.1908 "Asiatic exclusion." International Social-ist Review 8 (May):661-669.Lenin, V. I.1964 "Imperialism and the split in socialism."Pp. 105-120 in Collected Works, Volume23, August 1916-March 1917. Moscow:Progress.Lieberson, Stanley1961 "A societal theory of race and ethnic re-lations." American Sociological Review26 (December) :902-910.Lind, Andrew W.1968 An Island Community. New York:Greenwood.Loewen, James W.1971 The Mississippi Chinese. Cambridge:Harvard University Press.Mason, Philip1970 Patterns of Dominance. London: OxfordUniversity Press.

McWilliams, Carey1945 Prejudice: Japanese-Americans. Boston:Little, Brown.Millis, H. A.1915 The Japanese Problem in the United

States. New York: Macmillan.Moles, I. N.1968 "The Indian coolie labour issue." Pp. 40-48 in A. T. Yarwood (ed.), Attitudes toNon-European Immigration. Melbourne:Cassell Australia.Noel, Donald L.1968 "A theory of the origin of ethnic strati-fication." Social Problems 16 (Fall):157-172.Reich, Michael1971 "The economics of racism." Pp. 107-113in David M. Gordon (ed.), Problems in

Political Economy. Lexington, Massa-chusetts: Heath.Schermerhorn, R. A.1970 Comparative Ethnic Relations. NewYork: Random House.Shibutani, Tamotsu, and Kian M. Kwan1965 Ethnic Stratification. New York: Mac-millan.Siu, Paul C. P.1952 "The sojourner." American Journal ofSociology 58 (July):34-44.Sutherland, Edwin H., and Donald R. Cressey

1970 Criminology. Philadelphia: Lippincott.van den Berghe, Pierre L.1966 "Paternalistic versus competitive race re-lations: an ideal-type approach." Pp. 53-69 in Bernard E. Segal (ed.), Racial andEthnic Relations. New York: Crowell.1967a Race and Racism. New York: Wiley.1967b South Africa: A Study in Conflict. Berke-ley: University of California Press.

Van der Horst, Sheila T.1965 "The effects of industrialization on racerelations in South Africa." Pp. 97-140 inGuy Hunter (ed.), Industrialization andRace Relations. London: Oxford Univer-sity Press.Willard, Myra1967 History of the White Australia Policy to1920. London: Melbourne UniversityPress.Williams, Eric1944 Capitalism and Slavery. Chapel Hill: Uni-versity of North Carolina Press.Wittke, Carl1953 "Immigration policy prior to world warI." Pp. 1-10 in Benjamin M. Ziegler (ed.),

Immigration: An American Dilemma.Boston: Heath.Yarwood, A. T.1964 Asian Immigration to Australia. London:Cambridge University Press.Yarwood, A. T. (ed.)1968 Attitudes to Non-European Immigration.Melbourne: Cassell Australia.

bonacich[1] etnste ve sınıf

Documents

Transcript of bonacich[1] etnste ve sınıf