BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND THE DYNAMICS OF COUNTER ... · claimed to have killed Shekau at least...

SAJRED Maiden Edition 57

BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND THE DYNAMICS OF

COUNTER-INSURGENCY APPROACH IN NORTHEAST OF

NIGERIA

Mala Mustapha1

Abstract

This article provides the context for discussing the various

approaches to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Northeast region

of Nigeria Since 2009 Boko Haram had sought to establish a theocratic

Islamic state ldquoCaliphaterdquo in North-eastern part of Nigeria and this violent

insurgency was accompanied by dual approaches to counterinsurgency that

includes military interventions as part of the traditional counter-insurgency

COIN measures as well as non-forcible approach by the NGOs using peace

building strategy to counter violent extremism in the region The article

examines how the interplay between the forcible military approach and the

NGOs peace building approach to COIN ultimately help in creating spaces

for sustainable peace in the Northeast The traditional state-centric military

approach to COIN focuses much on deploying units of Special Operations

Forces under the mandate of the Operation Lafiya Dole to conduct targeted

strikes cordon operations and provide intelligence and build the capacity of

local partners to conduct ground operations In contrast to the military use of

force The NGO approach to COIN is laid on the assumptions that countering

violent extremism (CVE) requires not only the capability of states to conduct

military response or conventional war but also building bridges through

peace building perspectives in post-conflict settings Recently peace building

efforts by most humanitarian agencies focused much attention on

reconstructions rehabilitation reintegration (RRR) projects de-

radicalisation and CVE programmes foster social cohesion and building

consensus and dialogue during post-conflict interventions in marginal border

areas This perspective has emerged to reflect the soft-power approaches to

fighting terrorism and the other side of COIN in Africa The article

establishes that military strategy along without peace building effort is

counterproductive in the fight against Boko Haram

Keywords Boko Haram Insurgency Counterinsurgency Operations

Northeast of Nigeria

1 Department of Political Science University of Maiduguri

SAJRED Journal of Resources amp Economic Development (Vol1 No1 2018) University

of Maiduguri

SAJRED Maiden Edition Page 158

Introduction

For nearly one decade the Northeast region of Nigeria is in

humanitarian crisis and peace has remained elusive in the region Boko

Haram attacks since 2009 have internally displaced an estimated 2 million

IDPs in the region The displaced are mainly from Borno with 62 percent

Adamawa 18 percent and Yobe with 13 percent of the IDPs the three states

hardest hit by the violence (IRIN 2014) Majority of the IDPs are living in

Maiduguri either in state-controlled camps or with host communities

Displacement and vulnerability assessment by the UN Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA 2015) indicates that half of

the population of 12 million living in three states of Borno Adamawa and

Yobe are directly affected by the ongoing Boko Haram violence Women and

children are the worst affected by the radical Islamist insurgency and

constitute 75 percent of the IDPs The attacks by the insurgents in the

Northeast region continue to cause death displacements destruction of

livelihood and violations of human rights Many of the victims are mostly

women and children and gave lost access to basic services more particularly

schools and health facilities are being systematically destroyed in the region

As of the end of February 2015 an estimated 56 million people are in dire

need of humanitarian assistance including the 12 million internally displaced

people (IRIN 2014)

The Boko Haram insurgency has implication for security in the

Northeast and Nigeria at large The group‟s attacks have undermined general

security across the region and shattered the socio economic development of

the region leading to declaration of State of Emergency in the three most

affected states of Adamawa Borno and Yobe states A 2012 comprehensive

report by the Word Bank estimate the damage at over $9 billion US dollars

and this means that this backwardness may not likely be reverse by over 50

years of post-conflict reconstruction (World Bank Report 2013) Today

Adamawa and Yobe are among the poorest states in Nigeria with poverty

rates between 60 and 70 per cent and unemployment at 35 per cent In Borno

state the birthplace of Boko Haram 83 per cent of young are illiterate and 89

per cent of children do not go to school as most schools and the affected

communities were destroyed by the insurgents While unemployment

illiteracy and marginalisation may not directly cause youth violence or

insurgency these factors created a receptive audience for Boko Haram‟s

fundamentalist Islamic ideology (International Crisis Group (2014)

Utilising secondary data this article examines the dynamics of

counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by state and international

actors in combating Boko Haram insurgency It argues that contemporary

changing dynamic of COIN includes a shift from the traditional military

Boko Haram Insurgency and the Dynamics of Counter-Insurgency Approach in


SSAJRED Maiden Edition Page 159

approach to the use of soft-power approaches that reflect the on-going NGOs

post-conflict involvement in fighting terrorism using peace building strategy

Boko Haram Insurgency A Historical View

Boko Haram emerged as a group of radical Islamist youth who

worship at the Indimi‟s Mosque in Maiduguri the Borno state capital a

decade ago In 2002 an offshoot of this youth group the Taliban adopted an

anti-statist approach and declared the current secular Nigerian state as un-

Islamic and embarked on Hijrah ie migration by moving from Maiduguri to

Kanamma town in Yobe state bordering Niger Republic to set up a nascent

theocratic Islamic community run under hard-line Islamic principles

(Crowley amp Wilkinson 2013)

In July 2009 Boko Haram members refused to follow a motorbike

helmet law leading to heavy-handed police tactics that set off an armed

uprising in the northern state of Bauchi and spread into states of Borno Yobe

and Kano The army suppressed protests leaving more than eight hundred

dead Human Rights Watch (2012) reported that the sect leader Yusuf his

father-in-law and other sect members were arrested during the clashes and

shot outside police headquarters actions human rights groups denounced as

extra-judicial killings In the aftermath of the 2009 unrest an Islamist

insurrection under a splintered leadership emerged Yusuf Boko Haram‟s

founder didn‟t have complete control of the group and after his execution his

followers splintered into at least five factions The current leader Abubakar

Shekau appears to be focused on fighting the Nigerian government in Borno

while other units expanded their attacks in Nigeria Nigeria‟s military has

claimed to have killed Shekau at least three times yet videos of the leader

threatening his enemies declaring allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and

Syria continue to emerge Nigerian officials and many security experts are

convinced that Shekau has become a brand adopted by leaders of the different

factions of Boko Haram and that the men in the videos are actually look-

alikes (Sergie amp Johnson 2015)

As noted above Boko Haram is an indigenous Salafist group which

only turned itself into a Salafist Jihadist group in 2009 Boko Haram

propagates that not only interaction with the Western World is forbidden but

it is also against the Muslim establishment and the government of Nigeria the

latter of which they accuse of political corruption and weak judicial structure

Boko Haram school of thought considers anything western as completely

non-Islamic and as such the basis for religious weakness In fact its members

do not interact with the local Muslim population and have even carried out

assassinations in the past on anyone who criticizes it including Muslim

clerics The group publicly extols its ideology despite the fact that its founder

and former leader Muhammad Yusuf was himself a highly educated man who

lived a lavish life


of Maiduguri


Boko Haram‟s multiple and complex set of followers and admirers ndash

both the foot soldiers and their sponsors ndash also called Yusuffiya consist

largely of impoverished northern Islamic students and clerics as well as

professionals mostly unemployed or self-employed who are fighting for the

Islamisation of the northern part of Nigeria Some experts view the rise of this

radicalised Jihadist movement as an armed revolt against the government

abusive security and widening regional economic disparity (Sergie amp

Johnson 2015)

Conceptualising Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency

Insurgency refers to a violent move by a group of persons to resist or

oppose the enforcement of law or running of a legitimate government or

revolt against constituted authority of a state or taking part in insurrection

(Brennan 2005) Scholars and theorists have given different definitions of

insurgency While some of these definitions are closely related others are not

so related though contain common elements and this still makes the subject

technically difficult Perhaps insurgency is best understood by first

considering what it is not (Rich amp Duyvesteyn 2012)

Insurgency is not terrorism or conventional war for example though

it shares with them some similarities such as the use of force or guerrilla

tactics to achieve an end which is often political Basically the difference

between insurgency and terrorism lies in the scope and magnitude of

violence While for instance terrorism rarely brings about political change on

its own insurgency attempts to bring about change through force of arms

Similarly terrorists often apply a wide range of damages when compared to

insurgents On the other hand while conventional war involves adversaries

more or less symmetric in equipment or training insurgency involves

adversaries that are asymmetric weak and almost always a sub-state group

(Boyle 2008) Traditionally however insurgencies seek to overthrow an

existing order with one that is commensurate with their political economic

ideological or religious goals (Gompert amp Gordon 2008) According to

Kilcullen ldquoinsurgency is a struggle to control a contested political space

between a state (or a group of states or occupying powers) and one or more

popularly based non-state challengersrdquo (Kilcullen 2006) Kilcullen also

attempt to draw a line between classical and contemporary insurgencies thus

while the latter seek to replace the existing order the former sometimes strive

for the expulsion of foreign invaders from their territory or seek to fill an

existing power vacuum (Kilcullen 2006)

Counterinsurgency referred to by the acronym COIN is just the

opposite of insurgency To put it differently it involves a combination of

measures undertaken by the legitimate government of a country to curb or

suppress an insurgency taken up against it (Nagl 2005) It involves military

paramilitary political economic psychological and civic actions taken by a




government to defeat an insurgency (Boyle 2008) More often than not

insurgents always try to overthrow the existing political authority in order to

establish counter-hegemonic system sovereignty the counter-insurgent forces

try to reinstate the existing political structures as well as reduce or annihilate

the usurping authority of the insurgents (Bruton 2014) Furthermore COIN is

primarily a political strategy and incorporates a wide range of activities of

which security is only one While this new definition included a key point of

addressing core insurgents‟ grievances it fails to reflect the different facets of

COIN operations Effective counterinsurgency integrates and synchronises

political security legal economic development and psychological activities

to create a holistic approach aimed at weakening the insurgents while

bolstering the government‟s legitimacy in the eyes of the population (Pratt

2010)

Approaches to Counterinsurgency There are basically two approaches to COIN strategy first approach

is the enemy-centric approach This approach conceives COIN as a contest

with an organised enemy and thus emphasises defeat of the enemy as its

primary objective using military means while viewing other mechanisms as

secondary (Lorenzo 2010) In other words the focus here is on the complete

annihilation of the insurgents or their guerrilla formations and cadres using

military approach while minimising civilian casualties as well as measures to

gain popular support from the affected community There are also many

variants within this approach including ldquosoftrdquo versus ldquohardrdquo and decapitation

versus marginalisation strategies In modern times this approach is often not

discussed but it is applied in COIN operations It has also been said that if this

approach is applied to its fullest it ldquomight work against incipient insurgencies

that are led or centrally controlled by a particularly charismatic or powerful

individual (David 1964)

Second is the population-centric approach unlike the first approach

this approach focuses on protecting the population and maintaining or

winning its support through ldquowinning hearts and mindsrdquo strategy (Sitter and

Parker 2013) Although direct military confrontation might be needed in

defeating the insurgents it is not seen here as the primary objective which is

to win the supports of the population This approach can be summarised as

ldquofirst protect and support the population and all else will followrdquo There are

more theorists supporting the population-centric approach than they are with

the enemy-centric approach The US style of COIN embedded in the 2006

FM 3-24 also follows this approach to whose credits dates back to early

counterinsurgency theorists as we shall see in the next subheading Although

the people-centric approach presents a good model to tackling insurgent

organisations the reality still remains that ldquoCOIN campaigns will rarely be

purely enemy centric or population-centric but will generally include

elements of both with the relative balance changing over timerdquo In the same


of Maiduguri


vein while the second approach is essentially or theoretically bdquopopulation-

centric‟ it allows for ldquooffensive defensive and stability operationsrdquo

(Petraeus amp Amos 2006) During an initial phase for instance

counterinsurgents could conduct offensive operations in a bid to clearing

possible areas of insurgents By the same token the ldquohold phaserdquo could be

dominated by defence and stability operations Even in the ldquobuildrdquo and

ldquotransitionrdquo phases military training might dominate key humanitarian

activities or other reconstruction plans embedded in stability operations- such

as military training reconstruction and humanitarian activities might

dominate the counterinsurgents agenda (Petraeus amp Amos 2006)

Theoretical Framework for Counter-Insurgency

Many scholars in political science have offered multi-dimensional

approaches to explain the causes and nature of internal conflict such as the

current Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria (Collier 2007

Elbadawi amp Sambanis 2000 244) Many conflict prone regions of the world

mostly in the global South are evidently rich in natural resources such as oil

but paradoxically beleaguered by protracted conflicts This paradox of

warconflict and poverty in the midst of plenty resources has become a key

area of debate This article attempts to apply the ldquoresource curserdquo thesis as the

theoretical framework of analysing the nature of the Boko Haram insurgency

in Nigeria

Since the 1990s there has emerged a growing body of literature on

the causes of civil wars in Africa Most of this research indicates that natural

resources play a key and decisive role in triggering prolonging and fuelling

conflicts epitomised in recent scholarship as the ldquoresource curserdquo or the

bdquogreed and grievances‟ theories of conflicts This link between oil and

insurgency in most extractive economies underpins the resource curse This

theory according to Michael Watts centres on the ldquopathologies of oil statesrdquo

(Watts 200457)

In his recent work Collier argues that resource wealth is an important

part of the story of the poverty of the ldquobottom billion (Collier 2007) This

assertion re-echoed the earlier works of Collier and his World Bank

colleagues on the centrality of the ldquoresource curserdquo model in explaining the

underlying causes of the link between resource rich societies poverty and

conflict (Collier amp Hoeffler 1998) Their findings indicate that there is a link

between resources particularly mineral wealth poverty and conflict However

in a seminal study Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995) used a sample

of 95 developing countries from 1970-1990 to explore the causal relationship

between natural resources export and economic growth

Furthermore Collier‟s new work the ldquobottom billionrdquo analyses the

link between resource-dependency and poverty Oil dependency in his

argument serves as a means by which rebellion and insurgencies are




economically sustained and financed which consequently leads to protracted

conflicts (Collier 2007) This relate to Ross‟ analysis of the causative factors

between oil-dependency and conflict in which he asserts that resource

dependency tends to influence governments by making them less effective in

resolving conflicts and more likely even to fuel them This occurs through

three mechanisms corruption state weakness and reduced accountability all

reinforcing one another (Ross 200324)

Similarly studies by Chaudhry (1997) and Karl (1998) have analyses

the rationale behind the oil-exporting countries‟ failure to develop their

economies by putting forward some compelling research questions why is it

that most oil rich-states end in a state of economic and political decline Why

do oil resources act as catalyst for violent conflict in most oil rich countries

Alternatively was it a mixed blessing that had disadvantages hidden in the

fantastic amounts of petro-dollars Was this path to economic failure

inevitable or was it the outcome of contingent policy choices made at crucial

stage in country‟s development And finally why in contrast to the oil-

exporting countries did other developing countries such as the developmental

states of the East Asia succeed in generating economic growth adjusting to

crises and introducing reforms These questions set the conceptual basis for

Karl‟s comparative studies on the effect of ldquooil-boomrdquo in five countries

Venezuela Iran Nigeria Algeria and Indonesia Their work centres on the

interface between state building institutional capacity and development

(Chaudhry 1997 3) and on the poor performance of oil-exporting countries

(Karl 1998 XV)

This perspective has enabled scholars to assess how the economic

predation of resources fuels violent conflict why states fail to transform

resource-richness into prosperous industrialised economies and how natural

resource wealth contributes or hinders development This clearly indicates

how natural resource abundance sometimes nurtures poor governance and the

absence of the rule of law and thereby subverts the state capacity and creates

violent conflict (Ross 2003) Ross however posits there is now strong and

substantial evidence which suggests that states with abundant resources

wealth perform less well than their resource-poor counter-parts but there is

little agreement on why this occurs Nevertheless a closer look at the growth

rates in the developing world compared with stagnation in the resource-rich

Africa and the rapidly transformed resource-poor East Asia has exposed the

existentialities of the resource curse syndrome (Ross 1999 297)

The Boko Haram insurgency has been blamed on the high rate of

poverty in the midst of abundance resources that characterised the Nigerian

political economy Even though Boko Haram‟s antecedents are rooted in

theology its swelling rank is as a result of a huge reservoir of unemployed

urban youths from many parts of the country These youths who have

completely become disenfranchised by the failure of governance


of Maiduguri


Profiling the Boko Haram Insurgency and COIN Dimensions in the

Northeast

To effectively counter a security threat such as Boko Haram

insurgency a combination of multi-disciplinary multi-agency and multi-

lateral tools of counter-insurgency is required However in the Northeast

several counter-insurgency approaches were adopted and the two dominant

ones includes the military centric approach involving large scale deployment

of conventional military warfare and the NGO-led peace building strategy

focusing on non-violent ways of creating spaces for sustainable peace

The Role of the Military Reflecting on ldquoOperation Lafiya Dolerdquo Mandate

The military operations constitutes the major state-centric COIN

strategy in the Northeast in the last few years and focused largely on

deployment of military means to counter the threats of Boko Haram

insurgency premised within a ldquotheatre of operationsrdquo In this context the 7

Division of the Nigerian Army was mandated with general and specific role

in countering Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast region The latest

response of the government under President Buhari manifested in the

relocation of the Command and Control Centre of the Military to Maiduguri

This action is geared towards adding impetus and renewed vigour to

Operation Lafiya Dole which is aimed at bringing terrorism and insurgency

to an end (Sahara Reporters 2015)

Operation Lafiya Dole is the army‟s code name for the war on terror

in Nigeria‟s North-east This code name literally translates to ldquoPeace by all

meansrdquo in Hausa language The operation was set up to counter terrorism and

insurgency It was subsequently expanded to specialised military operations

including ldquoOperation Crack Downrdquo Operation Gama Aikirdquo and ldquoOperation

Safe Corridorrdquo Operation Gama Aiki was launched to clear the remnants of

Boko Haram from northern part of Borno State and the border region with

Chad and Niger Republic (Christopher 2017) Much success has been

recorded since the beginning of this operation Troops under the Operation

Lafiya Dole have continued to neutralise several Boko Haram insurgents

make arrests free abducted hostages and discover bomb-making factories

The development has assisted to reduce spate of suicide bombing and

insurgents‟ attack (Christopher 2017)

The general role by the Military

i Protecting persons and property (key points VIPs vulnerable people

such as Judges Traditional rules etc)

ii Apprehending violators and suspected violators of the law

iii Ensuring respect for the law

iv Preventing the escalation of violence

v Surveillance intelligence and reconnaissance operations

vi Evacuation operations




The specific role-played the military

i Cordon and search operations (sealing off a village to search for

offenders weapons or equipment)

ii Urban and rural patrols possibly Joint patrol with police or

paramilitary forces

iii Manning observation post gain in urban or rural settings

iv Guard duties at key points

v Road block or vehicle check points

vi Identity checks

vii Controlling peaceful demonstrations

viii Enforcing curfews

ix Making arrests

x Detaining persons

xi Acts as a reserve or reinforcement ie quick reaction duties on standby

for incidence

xii Keeping sides apart (manning a peace line or green line)

xiii Hostage rescue

xiv Ambush

xv Securing or picking routes for example to ensure safe passage of

supplies through sensitive areas

xvi Bomb disposal or dealing with improvised explosive device (IEDs)

xvii Use of youth vigilante group known as the civilian JTF

Non Military Response to Boko Haram Insurgency by the Government

The Nigerian government and the state governments of the region

have responded to the Boko Haram insurgency through the following actions

Dialogue

The government especially during the Jonathan‟s administration has

explored the option of dialogue with leaders of the sect and promising them

amnesty if the sect lay down their arms However the option had not yielded

any positive result due mainly to the fact that members of the sect are

somehow anonymous with no clear cut address of locating them Even if

dialogue even occur between the government team and leaders of Boko

Haram the religious fanaticism of the sect will lead to irreconcilable

positions that will make rapprochement elusive

NGOs Peace building and Counter-Insurgency

In contrast to the traditional coercive and military-centred COIN

approach which only deals with the symptoms of terrorism rather than its key

drivers of terrorism NGO-focused peace building projects targets a wide

range of CVE programmes that the crucial to sustainable peace (Mustapha

2017) Apparently the many NGOs operating in the Northeast are deeply

engaged in peace building programmes that aimed creating the enabling

environment for sustainable peace in the region In addition to delivering

humanitarian assistance NGOs also deploy policy tools that include both


of Maiduguri


short-term and long-term measures such as winning hearts and minds

reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes fostering social cohesion

negotiating the release of hostages mediating conflicts and facilitating peace

processes

For instance in the aftermath of the Boko Haram insurgency in the

Northeast region of Nigeria NGOs have also been playing an important role

in negotiation conflict analysis social cohesion inclusive national dialogue

reconciliation entrepreneurship peace promotion and mediation Since the

beginning of the conflict NGOs have raised concerns about developing local

and national policy frameworks that would promote the inclusion of youth in

peace building and post-conflict reconstruction Thus in addition to providing

humanitarian assistance NGOs also focus on reconstruction rehabilitation

and reintegration to support livelihood of people affected by protracted

conflict via a post-conflict reconstruction efforts Similarly NGOs such as

ICRC UNICEF and Save the Children recently engaged in economic

empowerment of internally displaced persons in Borno Yobe and Adamawa

states Organisations such as UNDP also sponsor numerous residential

training projects on de-radicalisation and counter-terrorism in Borno and

Yobe state aimed at fostering counter-radical narratives to extremism as well

as support intra and inter community coordination in preventing and

responding to emergent cases of radicalism (Mustapha 2015 56)

Figure 1 Military-NGO Interface in Counter-Insurgency Operations in the

Northeast

Source Compiled the author 2018

Military

(Operation Lafiya Dole)

NGOs




Conclusion

By and large this article examined the nature and dynamics of Boko

Haram insurgency and the different approaches to counter-insurgency

measures adopted in order to foster stability in the violent conflict ravaged

Northeast region of Nigeria It identified how the nearly one decade of Boko

Haram insurgency constitutes an existential threat to Nigeria‟s national

security Findings of this article showed that there are basically two major

counter-insurgency approaches adopted in order to counter Boko Haram

violence and open the space for endurable peace and stability in the region

On the one hand there is the state-centric approach largely focusing on

military use of force under the military rhetoric of ldquoOperation Lafiya Dolerdquo

involving large scale military operations in the region in order to degrade and

defeat Boko Haram through conventional method of warfare On the other

hand there is the peace building approach which focuses on the role of NGOs

in fostering humanitarian assistance countering violent extremisms

rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes building dialogue

negotiations mediations and fostering social cohesion aimed that building

sustainable peace

References

Brennan R (2005) Future Insurgent Threats Santa Monica RAND

Boyle M (2008) ldquoTerrorism and Insurgencyrdquo In Snyder C (ed)

Contemporary Security and Strategy Palgrave Macmillan p186

Bruton B (2014) ldquoCounterinsurgency in Somalia Lessons Learned from

the African Union Mission in Somaliardquo The Atlantic Council

httpwwwatlanticcouncilorg (Aceessed 21 August 2017)

Chaudhry KA (1997) The Price of Wealth Economics and Institutions in

the Middle East Ithaca NY Cornell University Press

Christopher Y (2017) ldquoAccessing Military Operations around Nigeriardquo

Vanguard Newspaper Online httpswwwvanguardngrcom

Accessed 01 June 2018

Crowley R amp Wilkinson H (2013) ldquoBoko Haram A New Threat in West

Africardquo In Conflict over Resources and Terrorism Two Facets of

Insecurity edited by Tremolieres M OECD Publications

Collier P (2007) The Bottom Billion Why the Poorest Countries Are

Failing and What Can Be Done About It Oxford University Press


of Maiduguri


Collier P amp Hoeffler A (1998) On Economic Causes of Civil War Oxford

Economics Paper no 50 pp 563-73

David G (1964) ldquoCounterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practicerdquo

Westport Connecticut Praeger Security International

Elbadawi I amp Sambanis N (2000) bdquoWhy Are There So Many Civil Wars in

Africa Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict in Journal of

African Economics Vol 9 (3)

Gompert D C amp Gordon J (2008) ldquoWar by Other Means Building

complete and balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgencyrdquo Rand

Corporation California Online httpwwwrandorgcontentdamrand

pubsmonographs2008RAND_MG5952 Accessed 23 February 2018

Goodhand J (2006) Aiding Peace The Role of NGOs in Armed conflict

London Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers

Human Rights Watch (2012) ldquoBoko Haram Attacks and Security Force

Abuses in Nigeriardquo Online httpswwwhrworggtspiraling-violence

Accessed 05062018

International Crisis Group (2014) Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II) The

Boko Haram Insurgency- Africa Report No 216 April

IRIN (2014) Need to ramp up aid response in Nigeria‟s Violence torn

Northeast [Online] Available from httpwwwmirinnewsorgreport

99971need-to-ramp-up-aid-response-in-nigeria-s-violence-torn-

northeast [Accessed 13 June 2015]

Karl TL (1998) The Paradox of the Plenty Oil Booms and Petro-States

Berkeley CA University of California Press

Kilcullen David (2006) ldquoCounter-Insurgency Redux in Survival The IISS

Quarterly Vol 48 No4 United Kingdom

Lorenzo Z (2010) Counterinsurgencys Impossible Trilemmardquo The

Washington Quarterly 333 July 2010 pp 21-34 As of January 27

2013 httpcsisorgfilespublication twq10julyzambernardipdf

Mustapha M (2017) ldquoDe-radicalisation Counter-Terrorism and Migration

in Northern Nigeriardquo Residential Training for Clerics Youth and

Women Community Stakeholders on Countering Radical Etremism

Held on 10-11 February 2017 in Borno State Sponsored by UNDP in




Collaboration with Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)

Abuja

Mustapha M (2015) ldquoThe Role(s) of Women in Fostering Socio-economic

Development for Good Governance amp Early Recovery in the North East

of Nigeriardquo In Oshita O O Mathew A amp Emmanuel BM (Ed)

Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria

Proceedings of the IPCR GCDA amp UNDP Dialogue Forum on

Strengthening Womenrsquos Engagement in Peace Security amp Good

Governance in the Northeast pp31-53

Nagl J (2005) Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Counterinsurgency

Lessons from Vietnam and Malaya Chicago and London University of

Chicago Press

OCHA UN Office for Humanitarian Coordination (2015) Humanitarian

Situation in North East Nigeria Online HTTPingocongac-

internationalorg Accessed 14 April 2018

Petraeus D H amp Amos J F (2006) ldquoFM 3-24 Counterinsurgencyrdquo Marine

Corps Warfighting Publication No 3-335 Department of the Army

Washington DC

Pratt S (2010) ldquoWhat is the difference between Counter-insurgency and

Counter-terrorismrdquo E-International Relations Series Online

httpwwweirinfo20101221what-is-the-difference-between-

counter-inurgentcy-and-counter-terrorism Accessed December

24 2017

Rich P amp Duyvesteyn I (2012) ldquoThe Study of Insurgency and

Counterinsurgencyrdquo (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and

Counterinsurgency Abingdon Routledge pp1-20

Ross M (1999) The Political Economy of the Resource Curse in World

Politics Volume 51 pp 297-322

Ross M (2003) bdquoThe Natural Resource Curse How Wealth Can Make You

Poor‟ in Bannon I and Collier P (eds) Natural Resources and

Violent Conflicts Options and Actions The World Bank Washington

DC

Sachs J amp Warner A (1995) bdquoNatural Resource Abundance and Economic

Growth Development Discussion Paper No517 Cambridge Centre for

International Development and Harvard Institute for International

Development


of Maiduguri


Sahara Reporters (2015) ldquoBuhari Announces Military Command Relocating

to Maidugurirdquo Online httpwwwsaharareporterscom Accessed 03

June 2018

Sergie MA amp Johnson T (2015) Boko Haram a backgrounder Council on

Foreign Relations [online] Available from httpwwwcfrorg

nigeriaboko-haramp25739 [Accessed 21 October 2015]

Sitter N and Parker T (2013) ldquoNGOs and the Containment Approach to

Counter-Terrorismrdquo Online httpwwwacademiaedu accessed

December 31 2017

Watts M (2004) bdquoResource Curse Governmentality Oil and Power in the

Niger-Delta Nigeria in Geopolitics 9 (1)

World Bank Report (2013) Poverty Unemployment rising in Nigeria

[Online] Available from httpwwwthepost-ngcompoverty-

unemployment-rising-in-nigeria-world-bank Accessed on 13 July

2015


of Maiduguri


Introduction

For nearly one decade the Northeast region of Nigeria is in

humanitarian crisis and peace has remained elusive in the region Boko

Haram attacks since 2009 have internally displaced an estimated 2 million

IDPs in the region The displaced are mainly from Borno with 62 percent

Adamawa 18 percent and Yobe with 13 percent of the IDPs the three states

hardest hit by the violence (IRIN 2014) Majority of the IDPs are living in

Maiduguri either in state-controlled camps or with host communities

Displacement and vulnerability assessment by the UN Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA 2015) indicates that half of

the population of 12 million living in three states of Borno Adamawa and

Yobe are directly affected by the ongoing Boko Haram violence Women and

children are the worst affected by the radical Islamist insurgency and

constitute 75 percent of the IDPs The attacks by the insurgents in the

Northeast region continue to cause death displacements destruction of

livelihood and violations of human rights Many of the victims are mostly

women and children and gave lost access to basic services more particularly

schools and health facilities are being systematically destroyed in the region

As of the end of February 2015 an estimated 56 million people are in dire

need of humanitarian assistance including the 12 million internally displaced

people (IRIN 2014)

The Boko Haram insurgency has implication for security in the

Northeast and Nigeria at large The group‟s attacks have undermined general

security across the region and shattered the socio economic development of

the region leading to declaration of State of Emergency in the three most

affected states of Adamawa Borno and Yobe states A 2012 comprehensive

report by the Word Bank estimate the damage at over $9 billion US dollars

and this means that this backwardness may not likely be reverse by over 50

years of post-conflict reconstruction (World Bank Report 2013) Today

Adamawa and Yobe are among the poorest states in Nigeria with poverty

rates between 60 and 70 per cent and unemployment at 35 per cent In Borno

state the birthplace of Boko Haram 83 per cent of young are illiterate and 89

per cent of children do not go to school as most schools and the affected

communities were destroyed by the insurgents While unemployment

illiteracy and marginalisation may not directly cause youth violence or

insurgency these factors created a receptive audience for Boko Haram‟s

fundamentalist Islamic ideology (International Crisis Group (2014)

Utilising secondary data this article examines the dynamics of

counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by state and international

actors in combating Boko Haram insurgency It argues that contemporary

changing dynamic of COIN includes a shift from the traditional military













































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Conclusion

















sustainable peace

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Accessed 05062018






















Abuja










Chicago Press






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24 2017









DC




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June 2018






December 31 2017






2015













































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Johnson 2015)


















































2010)































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in Nigeria








(Watts 200457)








































(Karl 1998 XV)





















of Maiduguri



Northeast
















































paramilitary forces




vi Identity checks



ix Making arrests

x Detaining persons


for incidence


xiii Hostage rescue

xiv Ambush








Dialogue



















of Maiduguri





processes



















Northeast


Military


NGOs




Conclusion

















sustainable peace

References


















of Maiduguri

















Accessed 05062018






















Abuja










Chicago Press






Washington DC





24 2017









DC




Development


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015


of Maiduguri









Johnson 2015)


















































2010)































of Maiduguri






















in Nigeria








(Watts 200457)








































(Karl 1998 XV)





















of Maiduguri



Northeast
















































paramilitary forces




vi Identity checks



ix Making arrests

x Detaining persons


for incidence


xiii Hostage rescue

xiv Ambush








Dialogue



















of Maiduguri





processes



















Northeast


Military


NGOs




Conclusion

















sustainable peace

References


















of Maiduguri

















Accessed 05062018






















Abuja










Chicago Press






Washington DC





24 2017









DC




Development


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015
















2010)































of Maiduguri






















in Nigeria








(Watts 200457)








































(Karl 1998 XV)





















of Maiduguri



Northeast
















































paramilitary forces




vi Identity checks



ix Making arrests

x Detaining persons


for incidence


xiii Hostage rescue

xiv Ambush








Dialogue



















of Maiduguri





processes



















Northeast


Military


NGOs




Conclusion

















sustainable peace

References


















of Maiduguri

















Accessed 05062018






















Abuja










Chicago Press






Washington DC





24 2017









DC




Development


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015


of Maiduguri






















in Nigeria








(Watts 200457)








































(Karl 1998 XV)





















of Maiduguri



Northeast
















































paramilitary forces




vi Identity checks



ix Making arrests

x Detaining persons


for incidence


xiii Hostage rescue

xiv Ambush








Dialogue



















of Maiduguri





processes



















Northeast


Military


NGOs




Conclusion

















sustainable peace

References


















of Maiduguri

















Accessed 05062018






















Abuja










Chicago Press






Washington DC





24 2017









DC




Development


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015



























(Karl 1998 XV)





















of Maiduguri



Northeast
















































paramilitary forces




vi Identity checks



ix Making arrests

x Detaining persons


for incidence


xiii Hostage rescue

xiv Ambush








Dialogue



















of Maiduguri





processes



















Northeast


Military


NGOs




Conclusion

















sustainable peace

References


















of Maiduguri

















Accessed 05062018






















Abuja










Chicago Press






Washington DC





24 2017









DC




Development


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015


of Maiduguri



Northeast
















































paramilitary forces




vi Identity checks



ix Making arrests

x Detaining persons


for incidence


xiii Hostage rescue

xiv Ambush








Dialogue



















of Maiduguri





processes



















Northeast


Military


NGOs




Conclusion

















sustainable peace

References


















of Maiduguri

















Accessed 05062018






















Abuja










Chicago Press






Washington DC





24 2017









DC




Development


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015








paramilitary forces




vi Identity checks



ix Making arrests

x Detaining persons


for incidence


xiii Hostage rescue

xiv Ambush








Dialogue



















of Maiduguri





processes



















Northeast


Military


NGOs




Conclusion

















sustainable peace

References


















of Maiduguri

















Accessed 05062018






















Abuja










Chicago Press






Washington DC





24 2017









DC




Development


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015


of Maiduguri





processes



















Northeast


Military


NGOs




Conclusion

















sustainable peace

References


















of Maiduguri

















Accessed 05062018






















Abuja










Chicago Press






Washington DC





24 2017









DC




Development


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015




Conclusion

















sustainable peace

References


















of Maiduguri

















Accessed 05062018






















Abuja










Chicago Press






Washington DC





24 2017









DC




Development


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015


of Maiduguri

















Accessed 05062018






















Abuja










Chicago Press






Washington DC





24 2017









DC




Development


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015





Abuja










Chicago Press






Washington DC





24 2017









DC




Development


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015


of Maiduguri




June 2018






December 31 2017






2015

BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND THE DYNAMICS OF COUNTER ... · claimed to have killed Shekau at least...

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