Sellers 1

Aaron Sellers

HI 478

Kalinga

11/29/12

Political Islamic and Violence in Nigeria

Religious violence is reaching pandemic proportions across Nigeria. The state is "marred

by frequent religious confrontations between Muslims and Christians."1 In a seven year period,

from the restoration of democratic governance in 1999 to 2006, upwards of 10,000 people were

killed in religious violence.2 Boko Haram, a radical Islamist sect, has been responsible for over

1,000 deaths in northern Nigeria in 2012 alone.3 The situation will continue to spiral downwards

if a solution cannot be found to halt the violence. Any such solution must address the deeply

rooted social unrest among the northern Muslim community that fuels Boko Haram.

British conquest of Nigeria in 1903 lead to an existential crisis for its Islamic community.

Westernization led to decaying Islamic adherence and moral corruption. This spiritual crisis was

coupled with growing economic hardships related to the oil boom and poor governance. The

Maitatsine riots were the first related outbreaks of major violence. Boko Haram emerged out of

all of this. The Nigerian state has been ineffective in quelling the violence and thus it has

proliferated.

The purpose of this paper is to outline the root causes of collective dissatisfaction that

have permeated Nigeria's Islamic population and to link these to outbursts of violence,

1 Montclos, Marc-Antoine Dérouse. "Conversion to Islam and Modernity in Nigeria: A View From the Underworld." Africa Today 54, no. 4 (2008): 71-87. p. 72 2 Laremont, Ricardo and Gregorian Hrach. "Political Islam in West Africa and the Sahel." Military Review 86, no. 1 (2006): 27-36. p. 30 3 The Economist. "Hold Your Nose and Talk." The Economist, September 29, 2012: 18.

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particularly Maitatsine and Boko Haram. After Boko Haram has been properly defined and its

causes have been suitably addressed, this paper will explore the merit of claims that Boko Haram

is moving towards a model of international jihad and allying itself with foreign organizations.

Islamic Foundations and Spiritual Crisis

Islam is deeply entrenched in the culture of the region that is now northern Nigeria. It

was first adopted in Kano in the early 14th century.4 By the 15th century it was recognized as

one of the world's great Islamic cities. Socially and physically it was analogous to North African

and Middle Eastern cities of the time.5 Islam has, since its inception, been a deeply political

religion that is difficult to separate from political governance. Kano was no different. The cities

palace was placed near its mosque in order to parallel Medina and the home of the Prophet

Muhammad.

The 19th century saw Islam transcend Kano and become an immensely powerful force in

the region. Usman Dan Fodio, a religious teacher and reformer, incited a jihad in 1804 against

the Hausa kingdoms.6 The jihad was a response to corruption.7 It has been cited as an early

instance of radical political Islam in Nigeria.8 His goal was to create a Muslim state that was

governed by Sharia law. Several years later the jihad proved to be successful as the Hausa

kingdoms fell and Usman Dan Fodio founded the Sokoto Caliphate. Throughout the 19th century

4 Barkindo, Bawuro. "Growing Islamism In Kano City Since 1970." In Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Louis Brenner, 91-105. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993. p.91 5 Ibid., p. 92 6 (Laremont 2006, 28) 7 Thomson, Valarie. "Boko Haram and Islamic Fundamentalism in Nigeria." Global Security Studies 3, no. 3 (2012): 46-60. p. 47 8 Williams, Pat and Toyin Falola. Religious Impact on the Nation State: Nigerian Predicament. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1995. p. 2

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it was the largest and most powerful state in West Africa.9 Williams and Falola have this to say

on its importance:

The caliphate of the 19th century continues to play an important role to this very day.

Many of the beliefs that underpinned its structures and institutions survived the colonial

period. In the years leading to the country's independence and thereafter, the caliphate

was the rallying force in the creation of a powerful northern group and region... the dream

of Dan Fodio, the caliphate's founder, is as relevant to contemporary Nigeria as it was to

the 19th century society.10

The Sokoto Caliphate began its quick decline after Britain completely colonized Nigeria in 1903.

The state that Britain created cannot be considered a nation with a unified identity. Incorporated

between its borders were 350 ethnic groups that speak 250 distinct languages.11The largest of

these are the Hausa, who are mostly in the north, and the Igbo and Yoruba, who are located more

in the south. These language groups correspond to separate family and social customs, religious

affiliations, and political organizations.12 One scholar is cited as saying this:

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no "Nigerians" in

the same sense as there are "English," "Welsh," or "French." The word "Nigeria" is

merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of

Nigeria from those who do not.13

The artificial nature of Britain's creation was destined for conflict. National unity has been a

concern for the state from the beginning.

9 (Thomson 2012, 48) 10 (Williams 1995, 17) 11 (Laremont 2006, 48) 12 Sklar, Richard and C.S. Whitaker. "The Federal Republic of Nigeria." In National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States, edited by Gwendolen Carter, 7-150. Ithica: Conell University Press, 1966. p. 10 13 Uzoigwe, Godfrey and Isaac Albert and Earnest Uwazie. Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999. p. 7

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These clear divides were only further exacerbated by Britain's method for colonial rule in

Nigeria. Britain administered the northern and southern regions quite differently. The south

operated under direct rule. British legal codes and administrative procedures replaced the

indigenous systems.14 The North remained more autonomous.

Britain lacked the funds or administrators to employ direct rule into the north, and

therefore it was managed under indirect rule through what it's architect, Sir Frederick Lugard,

named the Native Authority System.15 Essentially this system retained the emirate system of the

Sokoto Caliphate. The position of Sultan remained but was degraded to a figure head with little

official political power. One major effect of these differing systems is the difference in resources

that were allocated for each region. Education in particular suffered from inequities. In 1947, the

south had 500,000 students in primary school, compared with the north who had only 71,000

students.16

Preceding this, there was a debate among Sokoto's scholars and the ruling elite about how

to react to British invasion. There were some who argued for refusal of British rule. Among this

group was the Caliph, and the Emir of Kano, who would have recognized their own political

power was under direct attack.17 Opponents of this strategy claimed that they would be militarily

dominated. Their fears were confirmed when the Caliph and his followers were hunted down and

killed by British troops and the Emir was arrested and exiled. Thus the Sokoto Caliphate was

forced to submit to British rule.

14 Adesoji, Abimbola. "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria." African Spectrum 45, no. 2 (2010): 95-108. p. 29 15 (Sklar 1966, 19) 16 Ibid., p. 25 17 (Barkindo 1993, 98)

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For the first time, the Muslim north was forced to open its doors to the forces of

Westernization. British rule meant more than just a spiritual challenge from Christianity.

Westernization assailed all aspects of life. This is well represented by a poem from Kano city

resident Ibrahim Yaro Muhammed:

Young people have taken up evil ways

They have abandoned all our respected traditions

All our customs have been abandoned

They have adopted European customs and they speak English

To indicate their liberation and their worldly wisdom...

They no longer wear our traditional clothes

Preferring jackets and trousers.18

Western ideals and forms of governance were not chosen by Nigerians, especially northern

Muslims. They were imposed. The Sokoto Caliphate was more than a strong state in the region.

It was a nation with a clear identity. There existed a community of citizens with similar moral

standards and an accepted social hierarchy. The British created not just a political mess, but also

a spiritual crisis. British rule gnawed at the legitimacy of Islamic rule. They were foreign

invaders in the most absolute sense. They came with a different language, a different religion,

different dress, different customs, and they looked completely different. The British system was

completely alien to the Muslims that once lived under the caliphate. Post-independence, the

Nigerian state was not been successful at grafting different groups together to unite as a true

nation.

18 (Barkindo 1993, 96)

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The Oil Boom and Economic Distress

Nigeria's population, especially those in the north, suffer from dire poverty.

Nearly 75% of northerners live on $1.25 a day, compared to about 25% in the south.19 Many

people lack basic standards of living such as access to clean drinking water, shelter, and

employment. Nationally, life expectancy is only about 50 years. Nigeria has the 2nd highest rate

of AIDS/HIV in Africa and the highest rate of tuberculosis in the world. All of this is true despite

the fact that Nigeria is the third largest economy in Africa.

The vast majority of Nigeria's economy comes from oil, which became very important in

the 1970's. Nigeria is the 12th largest producer of crude oil in the world. Today, oil sector

revenues represents 85% of gross domestic product.20 Much of its oil is bought by the United

States. Currently about 12% of America's oil needs are meet by Nigeria.21 This number is

expected to grow to 25% by 2015 as the United States begins to attempt to diversify away from

Middle Eastern fuel.22

Much of the oil money that has flooded Nigeria has stayed concentrated with the elite and

has not been shared equitably. Once again the north is disproportionately affected because the

sources of oil reside in the south. Money stays concentrated in southern cities which results in

lower unemployment and higher levels of educational attainment for southerners.23

19 (Thomson 2012, 49) 20 Ibid. 21 (Laremont 2006, 28) 22 Gourley, Sean. "Linkages Between Boko Haram and al Qaeda: A Potential Deadly Synergy." Global Security Studies 3, no. 3 (2012): 1-14. p. 2 23 (Thomson 2012, 49)

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The traditional rural economy that many of Nigeria's poor subsisted on has been

decimated by the transition to a petro economy.24 Rapid urbanization occurred as people flocked

to cities with the hopes of catching some of the scraps left by the burgeoning new class of oil

barons and corrupt government officials. About the two this has been said:

The “oil-boom” led to corruption and reckless spending by the government. Many people

became extremely rich and displayed their wealth by building fashionable mansions,

purchasing flashy cars and the latest electronic gadgets for their homes, and taking

frequent trips abroad... This new-found wealth and the construction fever which gripped

both the government and the private sector was the main cause for the unprecedented

rural-urban migration... in Nigeria..... Many of those who came to look for jobs in the

cities were unable to find them and joined the city’s unemployed. In addition, the lesser

ulama and almajirai, or [Quranic] students, were becoming increasingly marginalized.25

The almajirai were historically considered to be an important social group who remained among

the more pious of society. They were able to subsist on begging and migrant labor. No longer

was this the case. They would later become important followers of Maitatsine and a source of

support for Boko Haram.

Crippling poverty has left millions of Nigerians in a desperate situation. Many have

turned to crime to support themselves through robberies and kidnappings. The Nigerian state has

been an ineffective tool for combating economic hardships. They have done nothing to distribute

wealth and resources in a more sustainable fashion. Many observers naturally associate Nigerian

governance with corruption and waste. This has been said of Nigerian corruption:

24 Ibrahim, John. "Religion and Political Turbulence in Nigeria." The Journal of Modern African Studies 29, no. 1 (1991): 115-136. p. 127 25 (Barkindo 1993, 96)

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Public officials demand payment of ransom before and/or after performing their

legitimate functions. Businesspeople shortchange their customers through unfair dealings,

while law-enforcement agents demand bribes and collaborate with fraudulent elements in

the society. Employee theft is a common occurrence in many organizations.26

Police corruption is rampant. Police and security forces are known to extort citizens.27 The police

have sat up roadblocks and then demanded bribes to be let through.28

The state has proven to be an inadequate actor to address Nigeria's mounting social and

economic woes. Citizens have recognized that trying to work with the government is largely

unproductive. Many Muslims have turned towards Islam in the hopes that it will be more

effective in providing basic material needs. One scholar has pointed out that Nigerian society

contains many themes that are correlated to a rise in Islamic fundamentalism: the presence of oil,

corrupt government, a history of Islam, and a colonial legacy.29

Islamic Fundamentalism and the Maitatsine Uprisings

Since 1970, Nigeria has seen a surge in the importance of Islam for its Muslim citizens.

Many have recognized the failure of their Nigerian identity and have returned to one that had

historically provided better for them. Muslim youth organizations have been an important means

of mobilizing citizens.30 In 1980, the Muslim Student Society prepared a seminar in Kano that

investigated successful Islamic reform movements, such as Usman Dan Fodio's jihad and

Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution in Iran.

26 Afolabi, Gabriel. "Corruption in Contemporary Nigeria." DLSU Business & Economics Review 19, no. 2 (2010): 53-61. p.53 27 "Nigeria Police Corruption Report." Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series 47, no. 8 (2010): 18517B. 28 Walker, Andrew. "What is Boko Haram?" United States Institute of Peace, no. Special Report 208 (June 2012): 1-15. p. 12 29 (Thomson 2012, 47) 30 (Barkindo 1993, 99)

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Prior to 1970, there was only one major mosque in Kano. Since then, many mosques have

been built throughout the city.31 The mosque has become more important for daily life. Today it

is used for much more than the daily call to prayer. Many mosques host lectures and debates on

Islamic issues. There has also been a marked increase in attendance to daily prayers, especially

by the youth and women.32 Many are disposing of their Western garments in favor of traditional

Muslim fashions.

These changes have not been enough for some of the more zealous Nigerian Islamists.

One of these men was Mohammed Marwa, who gained the nickname Maitatsine. He advocated

for the creation of an Islamic state.33 Maitatsine accepted violence as a legitimate means of

creating this. His goals were similar to those of Usman Dan Fodio; both were "directed at

purifying and reforming Muslim society rather than at fighting the infidel."34

Maitatsine was born in northern Cameroon in a town that was once part of the Sokoto

Caliphate. He spent his adult life in Kano as a religious teacher.35 Much of his support came

from individuals who suffered in the economy that resulted from the oil boom. In particular he

gained support from the almajirai. These young beggars were attracted to his message because he

condemned the newly rich and guaranteed salvation to the pious Muslims. At the height of his

support, Maitatsine had 10,000 followers.36 Moderate Muslim scholars condemned him and his

followers as un-Islamic.

31 Ibid., p. 100 32 Ibid., p. 103 33 Hickey, Raymond. "The 1982 Maitatsine Uprising in Nigeria: A Note." African Affairs 83, no. 331 (1984): 251-256. p. 252 34 Ibid. p. 251 35 Ibid., p. 252 36 Kenny, Joseph. "Sharia and Christianity in Nigeria: Islam and a Secular State." Journal of Religion in Africa 26, no. 4 (1996): 338-364. p.344

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The 1980 Maitatsine riots in Kano climaxed in November and December. The Nigerian

Armed Forces were brought in to put it down after hundreds of citizens were killed by rioters.37

Maitatsine and thousands of his followers were killed in the military's assault. His death and the

loss of so many followers did not deter the movement. Similar uprisings occurred that had to be

halted by military intervention: 1982 in Kaduna and Bulumkutu; 1984 in Yola; and 1985 in

Bauchi.38 The fact that violence subsisted long after the death of the sect's leader shows that the

cause was much deeper than simply the charismatic leadership of Mohammed Marwa.

Many of the sources of discontent were economic dislocation, deprivation, and income

inequalities that came about due to the oil boom.39 Adesoji adds spiritual based factors as well.

He says there was dissatisfaction with the secular nature of the Nigerian state.40 The Iranian

revolution in 1979 also became an important factor in influencing radical Islamists across the

globe. It became a model for how a Western backed ineffective secular government could be

ousted by Islamic forces and replaced by a state that is governed by Sharia.

Despite an inadequate response from the Nigerian government, violence began to subside

for a time. However in 1984, Raymond Hickey forecasted an accurate future for Nigeria:

Although quickly forgotten by the world press and overshadowed by the subsequent

expulsion of illegal aliens, the recent elections and coup, the religious disturbances which

broke out in Maidugari and other Northern Nigerian cities... were probably more

portentous for the future of the country than the other more publicized events.41

37 Hiskett, Mervyn. "The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980: An Assessment." Journal of Religion in Africa 17, no. 3 (1987): 209-223. p. 209 38 (Adesoji, The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria 2010, 96) 39 (Hiskett 1987, 210) 40 (Adesoji, The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria 2010, 98) 41 (Hickey 1984, 251)

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Recent history has proven him to be correct as Boko Haram emerged early in the 21st century as

a major hindrance to the Nigerian state.

Boko Haram

The organization of Boko Haram has been around for a while, maybe as long as 15

years.42 During that time it has operated under many different names. When it was created in the

1990's by Mohammed Yusuf it was called ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama‘a wa-lhijra. Early in the 2000's

it began to be common to refer to the group as Boko Haram. Boko is a Hausa word that translates

to book, and Haram is an Arabic word meaning sinful or ungodly. Taken together it means,

"Western education is sinful."43 Boko Haram opposes Western education, western culture, and

modern science. Its goal is to replace the Nigerian state with an Islamic caliphate that adheres to

strict Sharia law. The former United States ambassador to Nigeria, John Cambell said Boko

Haram is:

a movement of grassroots anger among northern people at the continuing deprivation and

poverty in the north... also [it is] a core group of Mohammed Yusuf's followers... the

group could be seen as a personality cult, an Islamic millenarianist sect, inspired by a

heretical but charismatic preacher.44

Like Maitatsine before it, Boko Haram received support from the almajirai. Also, Boko Haram

seems to attempt to fill state functions such as providing welfare handouts, job training,

employment, and community resources. It hopes that this state-like organization will grow and

supersede the Nigerian federal government. Though one should not focus on this too much

because most of their resources appear to go towards acts of violence across northern Nigeria.

42 (Adesoji, The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria 2010, 98) 43 Ibid., p.100 44 Walker, Andrew. "What is Boko Haram?" United States Institute of Peace, no. Special Report 208 (June 2012): 1-15. p.9

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Early cases of violent action taken by Yusuf's followers often took the form of armed

conflict with security forces, such as in 2004 when 200 Boko Haram members attacked police

stations.45 Violence began to swell by 2009 after security forces captured an important hideout in

Bauchi. From July 25 to July 30, rioting spread across the states of Buachi, Kano, Yobe, and

Borno. Around 1000 people were killed and many building were destroyed including police

stations, prisons, government offices, schools and churches.46 Yusuf was among those who were

killed; he was purportedly executed in police custody.

Attacks against police are viewed favorably because of the anger over police extortion at

roadblocks.47 The police have even shot many people at roadblocks. Churches also seem to be a

logical target for Boko Haram because they are seen to be a threat to Muslim hegemony. Also

attacks on government buildings fits with the hostility towards the Nigerian state.

Similar to Maitatsine, after Yusuf's death, Boko Haram did not disappear. In fact attacks

have become more violent and suicide attacks have become a staple tactic of Boko Haram. One

set of coordinated attacks in Kano in January slaughtered over 100 people.48 They attacked

"eight government security buildings... including the regional police headquarters, two local

police stations, the local headquarters of the State Security Service, the home of a police

official and the state police command headquarters." There were reports of more than 30

bomb blasts at this incident. Even after these attacks, it is not uncommon to find residents

45 Loimeier, Roman. "Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria." Africa Spectrum 47, no. 2 (2012): 137-155. p. 150 46 (Adesoji, The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria 2010, 98) 47 (Loimeier 2012, 151) 48 Mojeed, Musikilu. "More Than 100 Killed by a Radical Group in Nigeria." New York Times, January 21, 2012: Web.

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who "voice their heated discontent, not with Boko Haram, but with what they describe as a

shared enemy: the Nigerian state, seen by the poor here as a purveyor of inequality."49

Connections to International Terrorist Organizations

There is a growing fear that Boko already has or will directly ally itself with foreign

terrorists such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or Somlia's Al Shabaab. Nigeria as a

whole became a focus following the attempted bombing of a civilian airline traveling from

Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas day. The attempted bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,

was born in Lagos, Nigeria. This lead many observers to aim a spotlight at Nigeria. They believe

it to be a expanding hotbed of international terrorists. Abdulmutallab was not a Boko Haram

member, nor was he radicalized in Nigeria. It was in Yemen that he received training and support

from al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula.50

In 2011, Boko Haram rammed through two security barriers and crashed a car into the

United Nations building in Abuja that exploded and killed 18 people.51 This was the first, and

still only, time that Boko Haram has targeted a foreign entity. Western, especially American,

observers have used this attack to place Boko Haram squarely in collaboration with al Qaeda.

The U.S. House of Representatives rushed to judgment when they published a report titled,

"Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland."52 In this document they cite the

commander of AFRICOM, U.S. Army General Carter Ham, saying that there is a link between al

Shabaab and Boko Haram. He alleges that the mastermind behind the U.N. attack returned from

49 Nossiter, Adam. "In Nigeria, a Deadly Group's Rage Has Local Roots." New York Times, February 25, 2012: Web. 50 (Thomson 2012, 54) 51 Murray, Senan and Adam Nossiter. "Suicide Bomber Attacks U.N. Building in Nigeria." New York Times, August 26, 2011: Web. 52 United States. Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland. Washington: Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 2011.

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Somalia shortly before. However, General Ham and the rest of the document fails to give any

proof of such a link. It remains speculation.

There have been some weak connections that seem plausible between Boko Haram and

AQIM. After 2009 it appears that some Boko Haram members received temporary sanctuary in

Algeria or Mauritania from AQIM.53 Allegedly they also received training at AQIM camps

during this time. Boko Haram spokesmen claim that they have sent members to various al Qaeda

allied camps in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Mauritania, and Algeria.54 Adesoji

speculates that these claims are one of three things: true statements about a authentic

cooperation; an acknowledgment their inspiration; or a means of attracting sympathy and support

from these groups.

It has only been after the alleged interaction with AQIM that Boko Haram began utilizing

suicide bombers. AQIM and al Shabaab are the only other groups in Africa to regularly utilize

suicide attacks.55 Perhaps Boko Haram did receive direct training from al Qaeda affiliates and

perhaps this is why they have shifted their tactics towards suicide bombings. However this is a

spurious link. There has been no real indication that Boko Haram has shifted its strategy past

Nigeria. There is no evidence that Boko Haram takes orders from al Qaeda. This merely means

that al Qaeda is supportive of Boko Haram's goals. This situation is not unlike when the United

States trains other foreign militaries such as Nigeria's.

Boko Haram still operates under its own directives and is independent from control from

foreign actors. However, there is a threat of unification that should be monitored. Ideologically,

53 (Gourley 2012, 10) 54 (Adesoji, The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria 2010, 101) 55 (Thomson 2012, 53)

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Boko Haram and al Qaeda are suitable allies.56 Gourley points out that Nigeria fits many of the

characteristics of other al Qaeda havens: underdevelopment, incompetent governance, and a

populace is cynical towards the government. However, Boko Haram exists because of a

protracted history of discontent in the Nigerian Muslim community, not because of foreign

organization. Valarie Thomson has this to say:

The fact remains that [Boko Haram] has yet to carry out attacks outside of its strong

holds in the north and central regions of Nigeria. Attack in regions where a group has

sympathy and support from the local population and where the targets are familiar and

accessible are not indicators of transnational capability.57

Until it proves otherwise, Boko Haram should be understood as a Nigerian actor with goals that

are specific to Nigeria.

Conclusion

The causes of Boko Haram and its support among many northern Muslims is strongly

embedded in centuries of history. Eradicating Boko Haram will not eliminate religious violence

in Nigeria. Doing so without at least addressing the socio-economic divide will only inflame the

anger and distrust of the masses. Many of the goals of Boko Haram are favorably viewed by

millions of Nigerians. Without an improvement, there will continue to be a massive pool for

radical leaders to find willing citizens to participate in violent rebellion.

Oil revenue must be more equitably shared among Nigerians and the economy must be

diversified. Society will crumble around gated mansions if nothing is done. This can only happen

if bureaucratic and police corruption can be greatly reduced. The rule of law must take precedent

56 (Gourley 2012, 9) 57 (Thomson 2012, 55)

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over the rule of man. If this can be done then there may be hope. However, it is unclear if the

radical members of the Muslim community will ever accept secular rule. If this proves to be the

case then Nigeria may be forced to go the way of Sudan.

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