Boghossian Paul - The Rule-Following Considerations (1989)

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Mind Association

The Rule-Following ConsiderationsAuthor(s): Paul A. BoghossianSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 98, No. 392 (Oct., 1989), pp. 507-549Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

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The Rule-Following onsiderations'

PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN

This is thefifth f our commissionedtate of the Art Series

INTRODUCTION

i. Recentyearshave witnessed greatresurgencef interestn thewritingsf the laterWittgenstein,speciallywiththosepassages-roughly, hilosophicalnvestigations#I/38-242nd Remarks n the

FoundationsfMathematics,ection I-that areconcerned ith he opicofrules.Muchofthe redit or ll this xcitement,nparalleledince heheyday fWittgensteincholarshipn theearly 96os, mustgo to SaulKripke'sWittgensteinnRules ndPrivate anguage.2t iseasy oexplainwhy.

To beginwith, he dialecticKripkeuncovered romWittgenstein'sdiscussions enormouslyxcitingn itsownterms. n Kripke's eading,thepassages nrule-followingre concerned ith omeof theweightiestquestionsn the theory f meaning, uestions-involvinghe reality,

reducibility,ndprivacyfmeaning-that ccupy entre-stagencontem-porary hilosophy. urthermore,ripke representedWittgensteinsdefending set of unifiedndextremelyrovocativelaims oncerningthese uestions. nd,finally,e argued or hese laimswith ower ndclarity. he ensuing lood farticlesndbookson thesubject f rule-following asbothpredictablend warranted.

The present aper s theresult f ninvitationosurveyhis iterature.Itcouldhavebeen bout xegetical atters,nwhat he ecent iscussionshavehad to teachus aboutthe historicalWittgenstein'shilosophical

views. n the event,however,t is almost ntirelyoncernedwith aretrospectivessessmentfthephilosophicalontributions.imitationsfspacedictatedhat choicebe made;and thephilosophicalssessmentseemed hemore ruitfulhingodo.3Despite lotofdiscussion,here sroomfor n improved nderstandingf theprecisenature fKripke's

1 I amgratefulo many eople or elpful iscussionfthe ssues overedn this aper, ncludingMarkJohnston,ohn urgess, erryodor,Barry oewer,Richard orty, arry llen, arry klar,CrispinWright,aul Kripke,Neil Tennant, teveYablo,NickWhite, nd participantsn variousseminarsttheUniversityfMichigan. pecial hanks re duetoPaulBenacerraf,enniferhurch,

and David Velleman.2 Cambridge, arvardUniversityress, 982. Henceforth,K'.3 The main reason s that have actually ome to despair f a satisfactorynterpretationf

Wittgenstein'siews. try osay why n The ProblemfMeaningn Wittgenstein',o appear nMeaning cepticism,d. K. Puhl,De Gruyter,orthcoming.

Mind, Vol. 98 . 392 . October I989 ? OxfordUniversity ress I989



5o8 Paul A. Boghossian

arguments,ftheir ltimateogency,ndoftheir elationo thewiderdiscussionfmeaningncontemporaryhilosophyfmind nd anguage.Pulling nthe hread hatsKripke's rgumenteadsquitenaturallyoadiscussionfmany fthemost ignificantssuesoccupying hilosopherstoday;nthat iesthemain mpetus ehind hepresentssay.

I proceed s follows.n parts and II, I layout the essentials fKripke's rgument.n subsequent arts, offern extendedritique fthe dialectictpresents,onsideredn itsown termsndindependentlyof exegetical oncerns.A discussion f the critical iterature ill bewovennasappropriate.he moralwillnotberecognizably ittgenstein-ian: shall rgue hat,aceKripke'sntent,he onceptionfmeaninghatemergess a realist, on-reductionist,nd judgement-independenton-ception,newhich,moreover,ustains o obvious nimus gainst rivatelanguage.

KRIPKE ON MEANING AND THE SCEPTICALPROBLEM

Thesceptical roblem

2. AsKripke ees t, heburden f he ule-followingonsiderationssthatitcannotiterallye true fany ymbolhat texpressesomeparticularconcept r meaning. his is the now-famoussceptical onclusion' eattributesoWittgenstein:

[T]heres no fact boutmethat istinguishesetween ymeaning definitefunctiony +'... andmymeaning othingt all.4

Howis such radical hesis obe supported? ripke rgues,neffect,y

elimination:ll the available factspotentiallyelevant o fixing hemeaningf symbolna given peaker's epertoire-factsbouthow hespeaker asactuallysedthe xpression,actsbouthowhe sdisposed ouseit,and facts bouthisqualitative ental istoryarecanvassed,ndfoundwanting. dequatereflectionn what t is for n expressionopossess meaning ouldbetray,oKripkenvites s tobelieve,hat hatfact ouldnotbe constitutedyanyofthose.

The claim s, ofcourse, ndisputablen connection ithfacts boutactual seandqualitativehenomena;t sa familiarndwell-assimilated

lessonof,precisely,Wittgenstein'snvestigations,hatneither f thosespecies ffact ould, ithern solationr ncombination,apturewhattis for a symbol o possess a meaning.Much more importantndcontroversial,owever,s Kripke's ejectionfa dispositionalccount f

K., p. 2I.



TheRule-Followingonsiderations09

meaningfacts.Why are facts bout how a speaker s disposedto use anexpressionheld to be insufficiento determine tsmeaning?

Kripke developstwo sortsofconsideration. irst, theidea ofmeaning

something y a word s an ideawith n infinitaryharacter if meanplusby + ', then here re iterally o end of truths bouthowI ought o applythe term,namelyto just the members of this set of triplesand not toothers,f am to use it in accordwith ts meaning.This is not merely nartefact f the arithmetical xample; it holds for any concept. If I meanhorseby 'horse', then there are literallyno end of truths bout how itwould be correct orme to applythe term to horseson Alpha Centauri,to horses n ImperialArmenia, nd so on, but nottocowsor catswherevertheymaybe if I am to use it in accordwith ts meaning.But, Kripke

argues, hetotality fmy dispositionss finite, eingthe dispositions f afinite eingthat existsfor a finite ime.And so, facts bout dispositionscannot capturewhat t is forme to mean addition by +'.

The secondobjection o a dispositional heory temsfrom heso-called'normativity'fmeaning.This objection s somewhatharder ostate,butaroughformulation illdo fornow. The point s that, f mean somethingbyan expression, henthe potentialnfinityftruths hat regenerated sa result renormativeruths: hey re truthsbout howI oughtoapplytheexpression,f amtoapply t n accordwith tsmeaning,nottruths bout

how I-willapply t.My meaning omething y an expression,t appears,does not guarantee hatI will applyit correctly;t guaranteesonlythattherewill be a factof thematter bout whethermyuse of it is correct.Now, this observationmaybe convertedntoa condition fadequacyontheoriesof meaning: any proposed candidatefor being the propertynvirtue fwhichan expressionhas meaningmust be suchas to ground henormativityf meaning it ought to be possible to read off fromanyallegedmeaning-constitutingropertyfa word,what s thecorrect se ofthat word.And this is a requirement, ripkemaintains, hat a disposi-

tional heory annotpass: one cannotreadoff speaker'sdisposition o usean expressionna certainwaywhat s thecorrect se ofthat xpression, orto be disposedto use an expressionn a certainway impliesat most thatone will,notthatone should.

The contents f thought

3. But whatabout thoughts, ntentions,nd other ontent-bearing entalstates?How do theyfiguren thesceptical rgument?More specifically:s

the sceptical hesisdirected gainst hem s well,or is itconfinedolelytolinguisticepresentation?

It is hardtoseehow a convincingmeaning cepticism ould be confinedpurely to the linguisticdomain, given the intimate relationbetweenthoughtand language. Philosophersdivide, of course, on the precise



5 IO PaulA. Boghossian

natureofthis relation nd, in particular, n the question of priority: othe semantic propertiesof language derive from the representationalproperties f thought, r is it the otherway round?5Whatever he correct

answer,however, herewould appeartobe no plausible waytopromotelanguage-specificeaning cepticism.On theformerGricean)picture, necannotthreateninguisticmeaningwithout hreatening hought ontent,since it is from hought hat inguisticmeaning s held to derive;and onthe latter Sellarsian) picture, one cannot threaten inguistic meaningwithouttherebyhreatening houghtcontent, ince it is from inguisticmeaningthat thought ontent s held to derive. Either way,content ndmeaningmust standor falltogether.

If a scepticalthesis bout linguisticmeaning s to have any prospect f

succeeding, hen, tmustalso threaten he possibility f mentalmeaning(or content).Of course,on a Sellarsianview,thatresult s automatic, ivena demonstrationhatnothing on-mentalixes inguisticmeaning.But on aGricean view matters re not so simple. Since the Gricean holds thatlinguistictems cquiretheirmeaningfrom heantecedentlyixed ontentof mental tates, n argument o theeffecthatnothingnon-mental ixeslinguisticmeaningwould eave theGriceanunmoved;heneedstobe givena separate rgumentgainst he possibilityfmental ontent.Does Kripkesee this need and does he show how it is to be met?

Colin McGinn has arguedthat theanswerto bothquestions s 'no':

Mythird oint .. points pa real acunanKripke's resentationfhisparadox.The point s that t is necessary orKripke o applyhis paradox t the evelofconcepts;hat s, he has to arguethatthe notion fpossessing determinateconcepts likewise evoid f factual oundation... It cannot e said,however,that ripke xplains ow hisneed s to be met, ow his xtensionf heparadoxto the evelof conceptss to be carried ut; and brief eflectionhows hat heexercises byno means rivial.6

I thinkMcGinn is wrong nboth counts; twill be worthwhile o see why.In fact,the suggestion that some appropriately eneral thought orintentiononstituteshesought ftermeaning-determiningact omes upearly nKripke's presentation, eforehedispositional ccountofmeaningis considered nd foundwanting:

In the United tates,t is the Gricean iew, hat inguisticxpressionscquire heir emanticpropertiesyvirtue fbeing sedwith ertainntentions,eliefs,nddesires, hat s mostnfluential;whereasn Britaint appears obe theSellarsianWittgensteinian?)iew hat hinkings a form finternalizedpeaking-speechn oro nterno,s Sellars ikes o put t-that tends opredominate.

For theGricean iew eeH. P. Grice, Meaning', hilosophicaleview,957; and related apers.See also, S. Schiffer, eaning, xford, larendon ress, 972. For theSellarsian iewsee his'EmpiricismndthePhilosophyfMind', nhis Science, erceptionndReality, ondon,RoutledgeandKegan Paul, 963. For a debate nthepriorityuestion ee The Chisholm-Sellarsorrespon-dence', n Intentionality,indandLanguage,d. A. Marras,Urbana,Universityf Illinois ress,I972.

6 ColinMcGinn,WittgensteinnMeaning, xford, asilBlackwell,984, pp. 44-6.



TheRule-Followingonsiderations I

This set fdirections,may uppose, explicitlyavemyselft some arlierime.It s engravednmymind son a slate. t is ncompatibleith hehypothesishatI meant uus. t is this etof directions,otthefiniteist fparticulardditions

that performedn thepast, hat ustifiesnd determines ypresentesponse.7Andhis response o it seemsclear p. i6ff).The idea is that houghts hatsomeone may have had concerninghow he is prepared to use a certainexpressionwillhelp determine meaningfor hatexpression nly f theircorrectnterpretations presupposed.But this s equivalentto assuming,Kripkesuggests, hatthesceptical hallengehas beenmet withrespect othe expressionshatfigure n those houghts. ut how was theirmeaningfixed?Not byfacts bout their ctualor counterfactualistory f use, (ifthe argumentgainst dispositional ccountof meaning s tobe believed);and notby facts oncerning ssociatedexperiential pisodes.Hence onthe assumption hat no other sortof fact s relevantto the fixation fmeaning bynothing.

The strategyeems clear; but s itnotproblematic? he trouble s that tseems to depend on the assumption that thoughtcontents are thepropertiesof syntactically dentifiablebearers properties, hat is, ofexpressions elonging o a 'languageof thought'.And although heremaybe muchtorecommend hisview, till,does Kripkereallywishtorest hescepticalconclusionon so contestable premiss?

Fortunatelyor he sceptical trategy, e will see belowthat, lthoughcontestablepremissabout thought s involved, t is nothing o rich as alanguageof thought ypothesis. ut we will be in a position o appreciatethis properly nly afterwe have examinedMcGinn's claim that,evengranted linguisticmodelofthinking,t s still mpossible o run a Kripke-style ceptical rgument gainstthought.

The normativityfmeaning

4. McGinn writes:

The issueof normativeness,he rucial ssueforKripke, asno clear ontentnapplicationo the anguage fthought: hatdoes it mean to ask whethermycurrentmploymentf a word nmy anguage fthoughti.e. theexercisef aparticularoncept)s correctnthe ight fmy arliermploymentfthatword?What kind of linguisticmistake s envisagedhere? . . There is justno analoguehere or he deaof inguisticncorrectnessas opposed o the alsityf thought):linguisticncorrectnessof hekindwe are oncerned ith)susing he amewordwith differenteaningrom hat riginallyntendedanddoing o in gnorance

of he hange), utwe cannotnthiswaymake ense f mployingconceptwitha differentontent rom hatoriginallyntended it would ustbe a differentconcept.8

The idea of mentalcontentcannot be threatenedby Kripke,McGinn7

K., pp. 5-I6. 8 Op. Cit.,p. I47.



5I2 Paul A. Boghossian

argues, ecausetheprincipal equirement y whichputative econstructionsofthatnotion re to be dispatched-thenormativityequirement-hasnocogent applicationto the language of thought.The claim calls for asomewhatmore earchingrticulationfthenormativityhesis hanwehaveattempted o far. n what does thenormativityfmeaning onsist?

McGinn offershefollowingharacterization:

The notion fnormativenessripkewants apturedsa transtemporalotion...We havean account fthisnormativenesshen we have twothings:a) anaccountfwhatt s to mean omethingta given imend b) anaccount fwhatit s to mean he ame hing t differentimes-sinceKripkean) ormativenesssa matterfmeaning owwhat ne meant arlier.9

So, the ateruse of theexpression s 'correct', ccording oMcGinn, if tthen expressesthe same meaning s it did earlier; incorrect' f,withoutintending o introduce a change of meaningby explicitstipulation, texpresses a differentmeaning. It is in such facts as this that thenormativityfmeaning s said to consist.

Supposing hiswere heright nderstandingfnormativity,owwould taffectmental ontent cepticism?McGinn saysthat heproblem s thatwecannotmake enseofemploying conceptwith differentontent romhatoriginallyntended-it would ustbe a differentoncept.But although hat

is certainly rue, t is also irrelevant: hat we need to make sense of is notemploying conceptwith differentontent rom hatoriginallyntended,but employing n expressionn the languageof thoughtwith a differentcontent rom hatoriginallyntended,which s a rather ifferent atter.

As it happens, however, t is an idea that s equallyproblematic. hedifficultys thatwe do nothavethesortofaccess to theexpressions f ourlanguageof thought hat an attributiono us of semantic ntentionsnrespect f themwould appeartopresuppose.You cannot ntend hat omeexpressionhave a certainmeaningunless you are able to refer o that

expression ndependentlyf tssemanticproperties. ut we have no suchindependent ccess to the expressions four languageofthought;we donot,for nstance,knowwhatthey ook like. So we cannot have semanticintentionsnrespect fthem nd, hence,cannotmake senseofusingthemcorrectlyr incorrectlyn the sense defined yMcGinn.

IfMcGinn's understandingfnormativityerethe correct ne, then, twould ndeedbe difficultoseehow tcouldoperate t the evelofthought(thoughnot quitefor he reasonshe gives). It oughtto be clear,however,thatthe normativity' equirement efined yMcGinn has nothingmuch

to do with theconceptofmeaningper se and is not therequirement hatKripke is operatingwith.We mayappreciate hispointby observing hat he requirement efined

9 Ibid.,p. 74.



TheRule-Followingonsiderations 3

by McGinn could hardly act as a substantive onstraint n theoriesofmeaning, ven wherethese are theories olely of linguisticmeaning.Anytheoryfmeaning hatprovided n accountof what peakersmean by their

expressions t arbitraryimes however razy thattheorymay otherwisebe would satisfyMcGinn's constraint.n particular, he main theoryallegedby Kripke to founder n the normativityequirement, ould easilypass it on McGinn's reading:since there are perfectly eterminate actsabout what dispositions re associatedwith a givenexpression t a giventime-or, rather, ince it is no part ofKripke's intent o deny that thereare-it is always possibleto ask whether n expressionhas the same or adifferentmeaning on a dispositionaltheory, hus satisfyingMcGinn'srequirement.How to explain, then,Kripke's claim that a dispositional

theory ounders recisely n the normativityequirement?

5. The answer is that the normativity equirement s not the thesisMcGinn outlines.What is it then?

Suppose the expression green'meansgreen. t followsmmediatelyhatthe expressiongreen' appliescorrectlynly o these hings thegreenones)and not to those the non-greens).The fact that the expressionmeanssomething mplies,that is, a whole set of normative ruths about mybehaviour with that expression:namely,that my use of it is correct n

application o certain bjectsand not n application o others.This is not,as McGinn would have it,a relationbetweenmeaningsomething y anexpression t one time and meaning omething y itat some latertime; tis rather, relation etweenmeaning omething yit at some timeand itsuse at thattime.

The normativityfmeaning urns uttobe,inotherwords, imply newnamefor hefamiliar act hat, egardlessfwhethernethinks fmeaningntruth-theoreticrassertion-theoreticerms,meaningfulxpressions ossessconditions fcorrect se. On the one construal, orrectness onsists n true

use,on theother,nwarrantedse.) Kripke's nsightwasto realize hat hisobservationmaybe convertednto condition fadequacyon theories fthedeterminationfmeaning: nyproposed andidate or hepropertynvirtueof which an expressionhas meaning,must be such as to groundthe'normativity'fmeaning-it ought o be possible oreadoff romny llegedmeaning onstitutingropertyf word,what s the orrect seofthatword.It is easyto see how,onthisunderstandingftherequirementnquestion,dispositionalheorymight ppear ofail t:for,twould eem, necannot eadoff dispositionouse a word na certainwaywhat s the correct se ofthat

word, or o bedisposed ousea word na certainway mplies t most hat newill, ot hat ne shouldonecanhavedispositionso use words ncorrectly).0

10 As we hall eebelow, owever,he uestion hetherispositionalccounts fmeaningeally osuccumb o thenormativitybjections muchmore omplicatedhan his. am nothere ryingoassess heobjection,utmerelyostate t.



5 4 Paul A. Boghossian

6. With his larificationf henormativityhesisnplacewe arefinallyna position o settle hequestion: an Kripkedevelop he same sortofmeaning-scepticalrgumentgainst language fthoughts hedevelopsagainst ublic anguage? nd he nswers:clearly, es.For: what ixeshemeaningf xpressionsnthe anguagef hought?ot otherhoughts,npain of viciousregress.Not facts bout the actualtokeningf suchexpressionsr facts boutassociated ualitative pisodes, or familiarreasons.And not dispositionalacts bout the tokeningfsuchexpres-sions, or, incemeaningfulxpressionsfmentaleseossess onditionsfcorrect seinpreciselyhe ame ense s public anguage xpressionso,because orrectnessannot e reconstructedispositionally.o, nothingfixes heirmeaning.

Indeed,we arealsonow na positionosee,as promised,hatnothingso rich s a languagefthought ypothesiss strictlyeeded.A languageofthoughtmodel s composed utoftwo theses: a) that hinkinghethoughthat involves okeningn item-a representationhatmeansthatp; and (b) thattherepresentationhosetokenings so involvedpossesses combinatorialyntactic nd semantic tructure.n otherwords, ccordingo a language fthought ypothesis,houghtontentsare the semantic ropertiesf syntacticallynd semanticallytructuredbearers. ut tshould e quite lear hat othingnthe ceptical rgumentdepends nthe ssumptionf tructure:ven f herepresentationere opossessnointernalyntax, e could till sk, nproper ripkean ashion,what its correctnessonditions re and in virtueof whattheyaredetermined.

It would ppear,however,hat he sceptical rgument'strategyoespresuppose hat ontent roperties ave some ort f bearereven f notnecessarilystructuredne). For,otherwise,herewillbenonatural aytoformulatedispositionalheoryfthoughtontent,nd nonatural aytobring henormativityequiremento bear against t. Therehastobesomething-atate, vent, rparticular,tneednotmatter hich whosedispositionogettokened nder ertain ircumstancesonstitutes,n adispositionalheory,tspossessionf certainontent. ndalthoughhiscommitments, I suppose, trictlypeaking ontestable,t is also verynatural nd plausible.After ll, contents o not figuren a mental ifeexcept s subtended y a particularmode belief, esire, udgement,wish and,hence, renaturallynderstoods thepropertiesfthe tatesorevents hatnstantiatehosemodes.

And so we see thatthe sceptical rgumentmust, an, and does (inintent,nyway)ncludemental ontent ithin he copeofthe cepticismit aims to promote.''

l Sincenothing illhang n it, ndsince t will ase exposition, shallhenceforthrite s iflanguage fthought ypothesis ere rue.




Theconstitutiveature fthe cepticalroblem

7. Having meaning s essentially matter f possessing correctness

condition. ndthe sceptical hallenges to explainhow anythingouldpossess hat.Notice,by theway,that have stated he sceptical roblem bout

meaningwithout nce mentioning ripke's notorious ceptic. Thatcharacter,s everyone nows, roceedsby inviting is interlocutorodefend claim boutwhat e previously eant y he xpression+'. Theinterlocutornnocentlyssumeshimself o have meant ddition; ut thesceptic hallenges im oprove hat he onceptn question asnot nfactquaddition,here uadditions just ike ddition, xcept or singularity

at a pointnotpreviouslyncounteredn the nterlocutor'srithmeticalpractice.Itmay eem, hen,hat he ceptical roblemhavedescribedouldnot

beKripke's. orKripke's roblemppears obeessentiallypistemologicalin character-it oncerns speaker'sbilityodefend particular eaningascription;whereas he problem have outlined s constitutive,otepistemological-itsopic sthepossibilityfmeaning,otourknowledgeof t.

In fact,however, he two problems re the same; Kripke merely

chooses opresenthe constitutiveroblemn an epistemologicaluise.Epistemologicalcepticismbout given lassof udgementss theviewthatour actualcognitive apacities re incapable f deliveringustifiedopinions oncerningudgementsnthat lass.Kripke's ceptic s not ftera thesis fthat ort. his is evident rom hefact hathis nterlocutor,nbeing hallengedo justify isclaimthathe meant ddition y +', ispermitted ompletend omniscientccess to all the facts about hisprevious ehavioural, ental, nd physical istory; e is notrestrictedothe ort fknowledgehat n ordinaryreature,quippedwith rdinary

cognitive owers,wouldbe expected o possess.'2 Kripke's scepticalscenario s, thus, ompletelynsuited o promotingn epistemologicalscepticism.What it is suitedfor s the promotionf a constitutivescepticism.or ifhisscepticsabletoshow hat, venwith hebenefitfaccessto all therelevantacts, is interlocutors stillunableto justifyanyparticularlaim boutwhathemeant,hatwould eaveus nochoicebut to conclude hat here re no factsboutmeaning.3

Pace many fKripke's eaders, hen, heproblems not-not even n

12 McGinn'sfailure o note this eads him towonder ow the constitutivendepistemologicalaspects f Kripke's iscussion re related,for he epistemologicallaim s clearly istinct romhemetaphysicallaim' op. cit.,p. 149).

13 This point s made very icely y CrispinWrightn his Kripke'sAccount f the ArgumentAgainst rivate anguage',ournal fPhilosophy,984, pp.76I-2. Wright,owever,iscernsnothersort f epistemologicalimensiono the ceptical roblem. willdiscuss hat elow.



5I6 Paul A. Boghossian

part-epistemologicalcepticismboutmeaning.14But,ofcourse, nemay gree hat heproblemsconstitutivencharacter,ndyetbelievetto have an epistemologicalimension. ccordingo CrispinWright, orexample, ripke s not nterestedn themerepossibilityfcorrectnessconditions;e s interestedn thepossibilityfcorrectnessonditionshatmaybe, at east n one'sown ase,knownon-inferentially.The problemis essentiallyonstitutivencharacter; ut cceptable nswerso itare tobe subject o an epistemiconstraint.

I do notwish oargue bout his t ength.tdoes eem omethat,ncewe have orrectedor hedistortionsnduced ythedialogic etting,hereoughtnot to be anyresidual emptationo think hatepistemologicalconsiderationsreplayingcritical ole nKripke's rgument.nany ase,whateverntentionripkemayhavehad,theconsiderationse adduceson behalf fthe ceptical onclusionppear o owenothingoepistemolo-gical onstraintsndcan be statedwithoutheir elp.16That, nyway,show shallpresenthem.

The rule-following'onsiderations?

8. Itwouldnotbe nappropriateowonder tthis ointwhat ll thishastodo with hetopicofrule-following?here, recisely,s theconnectionbetween heconcepts fmeaning ndcontent, n theonehand, nd theconcept ffollowing rule, ntheother, orged? shall rgue hat,n animportantense, the answer s 'nowhere', nd hencethat the rule-followingonsiderations's,strictlypeaking, misnomeror hediscus-sionon offer.

Manywriterseemto assume hat he connections straightforward;theymay erepresentedsreasonings follows.xpressionsome ohavecorrectnessonditionss a result fpeoplefollowingules n respect fthem;hence, xploringhepossibilityf correctnesss tantamountoexploringhepossibilityfrule-following.

But, t east nthe rdinarynderstandingfthe oncept ffollowingrule,tcannot e true f ll expressions-in articular,tcannot etrue fmental xpressions-thathey ometohavecorrectnessonditionss aresult f peoplefollowingules nrespectfthem. he point s that heordinaryonceptof following rule-as opposedto thatof merely

14 For example,McGinn, p. cit.,pp. 140-50; G. Baker nd P. Hacker,On MisunderstandingWittgenstein:ripke's rivate anguageArgument',ynthese,984, pp. 09-I0. NeilTennant as

complainedhatKripke's ceptic oesnotultimatelyupply convincingent-ruleeinterpretationfhis nterlocutor'sords. ee his Against ripkean cepticism',orthcoming.ennantmaywellberight bout this.But here gain, think,heperceptionhat his ffectshe force fthescepticalproblemboutmeanings a resultf akinghedialogicettingoo eriously.heconstitutiveroblemaboutmeaning-howould hereo much s be acorrectnessondition-can estated uite orcefullywithout he ctualprovision f a convincinglobal einterpretationf a person'swords.

15 See op. cit.,pp.772-5. 16 With nerelatively inor xceptiono be noted elow.




conformingo one is the concept of an intentionalct: it involves theintentionalttempt o bring one's behaviour n line with the dictatesofsome graspedrule.Crispin Wrighthas decribedthis ntuitive onceptionvery learly:

Correctlypplyingrule o a new ase will, t snatural o think,ypicallynvolvea double success: t is necessary oth to apprehend elevant eatures f thepresentedituationndto knowwhat, n the ight fthose pprehendedeatures,will it r fail ofit he ule.Correctlyastlingnthe ourse f game f hess, orinstance, illdependboth n apprehensionftheconfigurationf chessmentthe ime fthemove, nd on a knowledgefwhetherhat onfigurationand thepreviousourse f thegame)permitsastling t that oint.17

As such,however, he ordinaryoncept f following rule s the conceptofan act among whosecausal antecendentsie contentfulmental tates;con-sequently,t s a concept hat resupposeshe dea ofa correctnessondition,notone that an, in fullgenerality,elp explain t. Since it makes essentialplay with he dea of a propositionalttitude,which n turnmakesessentialplay with he dea ofcontent, ule-followingn this sensepresupposes hatmental xpressionsave conditions fcorrectpplication.On painof regress,then, tcannotbe truethatmental xpressionshemselves cquire meaningas a result fanyonefollowingules n respect f them.

What Kripke's discussion is concerned with is the possibilityofcorrectness;o longas wekeepthat learlynmind, alkof rule-following'is harmless.SimonBlackburnhas capturedthisperspective erywell:

I intend oparticularheoreticalmplicationsy alkingfrules ere. hetopicsthat heres such things the orrectnd ncorrectpplicationf term,ndtosay hat heres such thingsno more han osay hat heres truthndfalsity.shall talk ndifferentlyf therebeingcorrectnessnd incorrectness,f wordsbeingrule-governed,nd of their beyingprinciples fapplication.Whatever his s, itis the fact hatdistinguishesheproduction f a termfrommerenoise,and turns

utterance ntoassertion into themakingof judgment.'8

IITHE SCEPTICAL SOLUTION

A non-factualistonceptionf meaning

9. Having establishedto his satisfaction hat no word could have thepropertyfexpressing certainmeaning,Kripketurns o askinghow this

1 CrispinWright:Wittgenstein'sule-Followingonsiderationsnd the CentralProject fTheoreticalinguistics',n Reflectionsn Chomsky,d. A. George,Oxford, asilBlackwell,989,p. 255.

18 SimonBlackburn,The Individual trikes ack', ynthese,984, pp. 281-2. My only isagree-mentwith hispassage oncernsts dentificationfcorrectnessonditions ith ruth onditions.Truth onditionsre simplynespecies fa correctnessondition; roof onditionsr ustificationconditionsupply urthernstances.



518 Paul A. Boghossian

conclusion s to be accommodated.The questionis urgent, n his view,because the conclusion hreatens o be notmerely hocking utparadoxi-cal. The trouble s thatwe wouldordinarilyake remark o theeffecthatthere ouldnotbe any suchthing s thefact hat meansomething ythe' + ' sign,to entail that there s nothing could mean by theuse of thatsign. Applied quite generally, cross all signs and all people, the claimbecomes the seeminglyparadoxicaland self-refutinghesisthatno onecould mean anything y theiruse oflinguistic xpressions.

A scepticism boutmeaningfactswould appear to be, then,primafacieanyway, n unstableposition.Sustaining trequires howing hat what tasserts does not ultimately apse into a formof pragmatic ncoherence.What is called for, n otherwords, is a rehabilitation f our ordinarypracticeof attributing ontentto our thoughts nd utterances,whichneverthelessonserves hescepticalthesisthatthere re no factsfor uchattributions o answerto. That is what the scepticalsolution' s designedtodo. It is allegedtohave thefollowing tartling onsequence:the dea oflanguage whose meaningsare constituted olely out of an individual'sspeaker's properties, onsidered completely n isolationfrom ny widercommunityo whichhe may belong', s incoherent.'9

The sceptical olutionhas two parts hat re usefully istinguished. hefirstconsists in the suggestion that we replace the notion of truthconditions, n our intuitive picture of sentence meaning, by that ofassertibilityonditions. The second consists in a description f theassertibilityonditions ormeaning-attributingentences, n the courseofwhich it is argued that it is essential to such sentences that theirassertibilityonditions dvertto theactionsor dispositions f a commu-nity.

The adjustmentrecommended n the firstpart is supposed to helpbecause

ifwe supposethatfacts r truth onditionsre of the essenceofmeaningfulassertion,twillfollow romhe kepticalonclusionhat ssertionshat nyoneevermeans nythingremeaningless.n theother and, fwe apply o theseassertionshe estsuggested . nosuch onclusionollows. ll thatsneeded olegitimizessertions hat omeonemeans somethings thattherebe roughlyspecifiableircumstancesnderwhich hey re egitimatelyssertible,nd thatthegameofassertinghemhas a role n our ives.No suppositionhat factscorrespond'othose ssertionss needed.20

19 Following oldfarb, emay allthis heconcept f a 'solitaryanguage'. ee his Kripke nWittgensteinnRules',JournalfPhilosophy,985. Goldfarboesontosay hat he deaof solitary

languages moregeneral han hat f a Wittgensteinianprivateanguage', or he atter ssentiallyinvolves he dea ofnecessarynintelligibilityoanother.t is hard oassess his, ecause t s hard oknowhowto interpretnecessary nintelligibility'.urely t cannotmean:a language o whosepredicateso twopeople ould ttach he amedescriptiveonditions. nd t s not learwhat t s tomean, f notthat.For useful iscussion ee C. Wright,Does Philosophicalnvestigations.258-6oSuggest CogentArgumentgainst rivate anguage?',nSubject, houghtnd Context,d. P. PettitandJ.McDowell,Oxford, larendon ress, 986. 20 K., pp. 77-8.




The proposed account is, in effect, global non-factualism: entencesignificances construed uite generally n assertion-theoreticerms ndno invidious istinctionsdrawnbetween he sortof significance ossessedby meaning-attributingentences nd thatpossessed bysentences f othertypes.

The argumentgainst olitaryanguage

io. The argument against 'solitary language' emerges, according toKripke, from he observation hat, o long as a speaker s considered nisolation we can assignno assertibility onditions o judgements o theeffect hathe has misapplieda symbol n his repertoire:

[I]fwe confineurselveso ookingtone person lone, his s as far s we can go.... There reno circumstancesnderwhichwe cansaythat, ven fhe nclinesto ay125', he hould ave aid5',orvice-versa. .. Underwhat ircumstancescan he be wrong? o one elseby ooking t his mind r behavior lone can saysomethingike,He is wrongfhe does notaccordwithhisown ntention';hewholepoint f the kepticalrgument asthat here re no facts bouthim nvirtue f which eaccordswithhis ntentionsr not.21

The possibility ferror,however, s essential o our ordinary onceptof

meaning, nd can onlybe accommodated fwe widen our gaze and takeinto consideration he nteraction etweenourimagined ule-followernda linguistic ommunity.Were we to do so, Kripke continues,we couldintroduce ssertibilityonditionsfor udgements bout error n termsofthe agreement, r lack of t, between given speaker'spropensitiesn theuse of a term nd thecommunity's. ince, however, his would appeartobe theonlywayto givesubstanceto thecorrelative otionsoferror ndcorrectness, o one consideredwholly n isolation fromotherspeakerscould be said tomeananything.And so a solitaryanguage s impossible.

Let us turn now to an assessmentof the various centralaspects ofKripke's argument.

IIIASSESSMENT OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST

SOLITARY LANGUAGE

Constitutiveccountsnd solitary anguage

i i. Kripke s very learaboutthe imited,whollydescriptive atureofthesceptical solution, t least in his 'official' xplications f the view:

Wehaveto seeunderwhat ircumstancesttributionsfmeaningre made ndwhat olethese ttributionslay nour ives.FollowingWittgenstein'sxhorta-

21 K., p.88.




tionnot to think utto look,we willnotreason priori bout the role suchstatementsught o play; ratherwe will find utwhatcircumstancesctuallylicense uch ssertionsndwhat ole his icense ctually lays. t is importantorealizethatwe are not ooking ornecessarynd sufficientonditionstruthconditions) orfollowing rule,or an analysis f what such rule-following'consistsn'. Indeed uchconditions ould onstitute'straight'olutiono theskeptical roblem,ndhavebeenrejected.22

It is important o see that thecounselledmodesty-we will not reason apriori bout therole such statements ughtto play-is compulsory. heassertibilityonditionsmaynot be understood o providethe content ortruth onditions)ofthemeaning-attributingentences, n pain offallingprey othe acceptedsceptical onsiderations.That iswhythe solutiononoffer as to be sceptical: t has alreadybeen conceded thatnothing ouldcogently mount to the factthata meaning sentencereports). t wouldappearto followfrom his,however, hatthesceptical olution an do nomorethanrecord heconditions nderwhich peakers n fact onsider heattribution f a certainconcept warranted nd the endorsement f aparticular esponseappropriate.The Wittgensteinianxhortationnot tothink ut to look' is notmerely as itmaybe) good advice; themodestytcounsels is enforced y the factthat truth onditions orthesesentenceshas been jettisoned. or how, in theabsence ofa conception fthe truthconditions fmeaning ttributingentences, ould theproject fprovidingan account of their assertion conditionsaspire to anythingmore thandescriptive dequacy?Were we equipped with an accountof theirtruthconditions, fcourse,wemight e able toreasona priori boutwhat theirassertionconditionsoughtto be and, hence, potentially, o revise theconditions or ssertion ctually cceptedfor hem.Butwithout hebenefitof such an account thereis no scope fora more ambitiousproject: adescriptivelydequate account of theactual assertion onditions or uchsentences s themost one maycogently im for.

If this is correct,however,we ought to be puzzled about how thesceptical olution s goingtodeliver conclusion gainst olitaryanguageof the requisite modal force:namely,that there could not be such alanguage.For even f tweretrue hat uractual assertibilityonditions ormeaning-attributingentences dvertto thedispositions fa community,themostthatwould license aying s thatour anguage s notsolitary.Andthiswould be a lot essthantheresultwe werepromised:namely, hat nypossibleanguagehas to be communal.

Communalassertibility onditions?

I 2. Putting hisworry oone side, etus askwhethert s in fact ruethat,if we accept the sceptical conclusion, we cannot introducesubstantive

22 K., pp. 86-7.




assertibilityonditions ormeaning-attributionshat do not advertto thedispositions fa community f speakers? t appears,on the contrary,hatnot only can we introduce uch conditions, ut have actuallydone so.23

Consider thefollowing:

(A) It is warranted o assertofJonesthat he meansadditionby +',provided he has responded with the sum in reply to mostarithmeticalueriesposed thus far.

As a description four practice,A) is, ofcourse,quite rough:roomhas tobe made fortheimportance fsystematic eviations, he greater mport-ance attaching o simple cases,and manyother uchfactors. ut all theserefinements aybe safely gnoredfor hepurpose of raising hefollowingcritical uestion:what n thescepticalconclusionrulesoutattributionsfformA)? It had better ule them out,of course, f the argument gainstsolitaryanguage s tobe sustained, orA) adverts o no one other hantheindividual.But as Goldfarbpointsout, there ppearsto be nothingn thescepticalconclusion hatwill rule it out.24 t can hardlybe objectedthatthe interpretationf sum' is being presupposed n the statement f thecondition, or hesceptical olution s notmeant o be a straightolution othe problemabout meaning; as Kripke himself ays, in fendingoffasimilar maginedobjectionto his own accountofthe assertibilityondi-tions:

WhatWittgensteins doing s describingheutilityn our lives of a certainpractise. ecessarilyemust ive his escriptionnourown anguage. sinthecase ofany uchuseofour anguage, participantnanotherorm f ifemightapplyvarious ermsn thedescriptionsuchas 'agreement')n a non-standard'quus-like'way.... Thiscannot e anobjectionoWittgenstein'solutionnlesshe is to be prohibitedrom nyuseof anguaget all.25

Nor is there ny problem n theassumption hat t is a genuinely actual

matterwhat any two numbers sum to; as Kripke himselfrepeatedlyemphasizes,the sceptical argumentdoes not threaten he existence ofmathematicalacts.But how,then, s (A) tobe ruledout,and theargumentagainst olitaryanguage preserved?

I3. Could itperphapsbe arguedthat A) is permissiblehough arasitic nthe communal ssertibilityonditionsKripkeoutlines?As a matter ffact,just theoppositeseemstrue.26

Kripke's communitarianccountofmeaning-attributionsuns as fol-lows:

Smithwill udgeJones omean ddition y plus'only fhe judges hatJones'sanswersoparticulardditionroblemsgreewith hose e s nclinedogive ...

23 Thissort frejoinders canvassed oth nGoldfarb,p. cit., nd nMcGinn, p.cit.24 Ibid. 25 K., p. I46.26 This is arguednMcGinn, p cit.,pp. 85-7, fromwhich hispoints derived.




IfJonesonsistentlyails ogive esponsesn greement withmith's,mithwilludge hat edoesnotmean dditiony plus'. ven fJonesidmeant nthe ast, he resenteviationillustifymithn udginghat ehas apsed.27

Accordingothis ccount, hen, will udge hat onesmeans ddition y'plus' only fJones ses plus' enough imesn the ameway am nclinedto use it. As a roughdescriptionfourpractice,ndmany mportantrefinementsside, his eems cceptablenough.One oftherefinementsthats calledfor, owever,xposes hefact hatKripke's ommunitarianconditionsreparasiticn the olitaryonditions,nd nottheotherwayround.

Itwould eabsurd orme,under onditionshere hadgoodreason o

believe hat hadbecomeprone omakingrithmeticalistakes-per-hapsowing o ntoxicationrsenilityrwhatever-to nsist nagreementwithme as a preconditionor reditingoneswithmasteryfthe onceptof ddition. nd thiswould ppear oshow hat,ta minimum,ripke'scommunitarianccountmustbemodifiedoread:

(B) It is warrantedoassert fJones hathemeans ddition y +',

providedhe agreeswithmy responses o arithmeticalueries,under onditions here have been reliable omputerfsums.

Butthismodificationould eem mmediatelyoreveal hat he eferenceto 'myownresponses's idle, and that he basicassertiononditionaccept s just A):

It is warrantedo assertofJonesthathe means addition y +',provided ehas responded ith he umnreply o most rithmeticalqueries osedthusfar.

Itwould ppear,notherwords,hat he cceptabilityfthe ommunitar-ian conditionssstronglyarasiticn the cceptabilityf he olitarynes,

andnottheotherway round.In sum:both ecauset sdifficultimpossible?)ogenerateonstitutiveresults utofnon-constitutiveccounts,ndbecause ur ctual ssertibil-ity onditionsormeaning scriptionsppearnottobecommunitarian,conclude hat he cepticalolutionoes notyield convincingrgumentagainstolitaryanguage.

IVIRREALIST CONCEPTIONS OF MEANING

I4. Theargumentgainstolitaryanguage assupposed oflow rom headjustedunderstandingfsentenceignificanceorced ythescepticalconclusion. hescepticalonclusionas tthat tcannotiterallyetrue f

2 K., p. 9I.




any symbol hat t expresses particularmeaning: here s no appropriatefactfor meaning-attributingentence o report.The sceptical olution'srecommendations that we blunt the force of this resultby refusing othink f sentence ignificancen termsof possession of truth onditions,or a capacity to state facts. We should think of it, rather, n termsof possession of assertibility onditions. But is this solution forced?Are there not, perhaps, other ways of accommodatingthe scepticalconclusion?

The solution n offers bound to strike ne as an overreaction,t least atfirst lush, n two possible respects.First, n that toptsfor form f non-factualism, as opposed to an error theory; and second, in that therecommended on-factualisms global,rather hanrestricted olely to theregion of discourse meaning talk that is directlyaffected by thescepticalresult t seeks to accommodate.

Semantically peaking, hemostconservative eaction o thenews thatnothinghas the property fbeing a witch s not to adopt a non-factualistconception f witchtalk, t is to offern error onception f such talk.Anerrorconceptionof a given regionof discourse conservesthe region'ssemantical appearances predicates are still understood to expressproperties, eclarative entences opossesstruth onditions; he ontologi-cal discovery s takento exhibit merely-the systematic alsity f theregion's positive, tomic) sentences.28

Could notthemoral of thesceptical rgument e understood oconsistin an errorconceptionofmeaning discourse? t could not,foran errorconceptionof such discourse, n contrastwitherror onceptions f otherregions, s ofdoubtful oherence.The viewin question would consist nthe claim that all meaning-attributionsre false:

(i) For any S: FS meansthatpl is false.

But thedisquotational roperties fthetruth redicateguarantee hat i)

entails

(2) For anyS: [Si has no meaning.

(i) implies, hat s, thatno sentencewhatever ossessesa meaning.Since,however, sentence annotbefalseunless t is meaningfulo begin with,this n turn mpliesthat i) cannotbe true:forwhat i) says s that omesentences namelymeaning-attributingentences are false.29

28 See JohnMackie,Ethics: nventing ight nd Wrong,ondon, Penguin,977, for uch aconceptionf moral iscourse.

29 Anerroronceptionfmeaning asbeen dvocated yPaul Churchland;ee his EliminativeMaterialismnd thePropositionalttitudes',ournalf hilosophy,98I . Thisargumentselaboratedand defendednmyThe Status fContent',hilosophicaleview, orthcomingpril 990.




So it appears hatKripkewas right o avoid an error onceptionfmeaningdiscourse.But does his non-factualistonception areanybetter?

I5. The canonical ormulationfa non-factualistiew-and theonethatKripkehimselfavours-has tthat ome argetedeclarativeentencesnot genuinelyruth-conditional.non-factualismboutmeaning,on-sists, hat s, ntheview hat

(3) ForanyS, p: rS means hat l is nottruth-conditional.

As I notedabove, however, he projectivismecommendedy thescepticalolutions intendedoapplyglobally:t s not onfinedolely o

meaning-attributingentences.hus,(4) For anyS: rS[ is not truth onditional.

WhydoesKripke doptso extreme view?Whydoes he notsuggestmerelyhatwe abandon truth-conditionalodel or emantic iscourse,while reservingt, s seemsnatural,or t east omeregionsf he est flanguage? ripkedoesnotsay. Butitmaybe thatheglimpsed hat heglobal haracterftheprojectivisms infactorcednthepresent ase.30Forconsider non-factualismolely boutmeaning-the iew hat,ince

there s no suchpropertys a word'smeaningomething,nd hencenosuchfact, omeaning-attributingentenceanbetruth-conditional.incethe ruth-conditionf ny entence is in part,nyway) functionf tsmeaning, non-factualismboutmeaningwillenjoin non-factualismabout ruth-conditions:hat ruth-conditionpossessesouldhardly eafactualmatterfthatnvirtuefwhich t has a particularruth-conditionis not tself factualmatter. nd so wehave tthat3) entails:

(5) Forall S, p: rShastruth-conditionl is nottruth-conditional.

However, ince,courtesyf thedisquotational ropertiesf the truthpredicate, sentence ftheform S has truth-conditionl is true f ndonly f S has truth-condition, and since 5) has it thatrS has truth-conditionl is never imply rue,tfollows hat

(4) ForanyS: rSi is nottruth-conditional

justas predicted.It is, then,a fascinatingonsequence f a non-factualismbout

meaning,hat tentails global on-factualism;nthis espect,fnoother,a non-factualismboutmeaning istinguishestself rom similarhesis

30 Somewhat ifferentrgumentsregiven or hisboth nCrispinWright'sKripke'sAccount',Ioc. cit.,pp.769-70 and inmy Meaning, ontent ndRules', n Part ofmyPh.D. DissertationEssays n MeaningndBelief, rinceton,986.




aboutany other ubjectmatter.Crispin Wrighthas suggested hat t alsorenders t irremediably roblematic:

it s doubtfulhatt s coherento uppose hat rojectivistiews ouldbe appliedquiteglobally. or,howeverxactlyhedistinctione drawn etween act-statingandnon-fact-statingiscourse,heprojectivistillpresumablyantttocomebywayof a discoveryhat ertain tatementsail o qualify or heformerlass; astatementfthe onclusionfthe kepticalrgument,ornstance,s not tselfobe projective.31

It is hard notto sympathizewithWright's uggestion hat theremust besomething nstable bout a projectivisthesis hat s itselfwithin he scopeof the projectivismt recommends. ut it s also not entirelylearto me in

whatthe nstability onsists.To be sure,a globalprojectivismwouldhaveto admit hat t s nomorethan ssertiblehatno sentencepossessesa truthcondition.But what s wrongwith hat? f there s an instability ere, tisnot a transparentne.

i6. In fact,however, do believethata non-factualismbout meaning sunstable,butnotbecause of ts global character.Rather, hereasonshaveto do withthe clash betweenwhatyou have to suppose about truth norder o frame non-factualisthesis boutanything,ndwhatyou haveto

supposeabout truthas a result of accepting a non-factualism bout

meaning. I have developed the argumentfor this in some detail else-where;32hereI have space onlyto sketch ts outlines.

Considera non-factualist hesisabout, say,thegood:

(7) All sentencesoftheformrx s goodl are not truth-conditional.

The pointthatneeds to be kept n focus s that he sentence f which ruthconditions re beingdenied is a significanteclarative entence.For thisfact mmediately mpliesthat theconceptof truth n termsofwhich thenon-factualisthesis s framed annotbe thedeflationaryonceptthatA.J.Ayersuccinctly escribedas follows:

... to say that p is true is simplya way of assertingp.... The traditionalconceptionf truth s a 'real quality'or a 'real relation' s due, like mostphilosophicalmistakes, o a failure o analyze sentencescorrectly . .. There aresentencesn which hewordtruth' eems ostandfor omethingeal . [but]ouranalysis as shown hat hewordtruth' oes not tand or nything.33

If the conceptof truthwere,as Ayerclaims in thispassage,merely heconcept of a device for semanticascent,and not the concept of some

genuineproperty some real relation' that sentence or thought)mayenjoy, then non-factualisms nowhere a coherentoption. For on adeflationarynderstandingf truth, sentencewill be truth-conditional

3" Ibid., p.770. 32 In 'The Status fContent',oc.cit.33~ A.J.Ayer, anguage, Truth nd Logi'c,NewYork,Dover, 952, P. 89.




provided nlythat t is apt for emanticscent; nd itwillbe aptforsemanticscent rovidednly hat t s a significant,eclarativeentence.But tis constitutivef a non-factualisthesis reciselyhat tdenies, fsome argeted,ignificant,eclarativeentence,hatt struth-conditional.It follows, herefore,hata non-factualismbout any subjectmatterpresupposes conception f truth icher hanthe deflationary:t iscommittedo holding hat hepredicatetrue'standsfor ome sortoflanguage-independentroperty,ligibilityorwhichwillnotbe certifiedpurely ythefact hat sentencesdeclarativendsignificant.therwise,therewill be no understandingts claim that a significantentence,declarativenform, ails c.possess ruth-conditions.

So wehave tthat nynon-factualisthesis resupposeshat ruths,asI shallhenceforthut t,robust. ut,now,notice hatudgementsboutwhethern objectpossesses robustpropertyouldhardly ail to befactual.f P is somegenuinelyobust roperty,hen t s hard oseehowthereouldfail obe a fact f hematterboutwhethernobjecthasP. Itdoes notmatterf P is subjective r otherwise ependent pon ourresponses. o long as it is a genuine,anguage-independentroperty,judgementsbout twillhave tobe factual, illhaveto be possessed frobust ruth-conditions.n particular,ftruths a robust roperty,henjudgementsbout sentence'sruthaluemust hemselvese factual. utwe sawearlier-see 5) above-thata non-factualisthesisboutmeaningimpliesthat udgementsbout a sentence's ruth annotbe factual:whether certainentences true annot e a factualmatterf tsmeaningis not.And this xposes hecontradictionehave beenstalking: non-factualismboutmeaningmplies oth hat ruths robust ndthat tisnot.

I7 It is hard odojustice othe ssues nvolved ithin he onfinesfthepresentssay.34 do hope,however,hat hepreceding iscussion as

succeedednsowing omedoubts boutthecogencyf rrealistoncep-tions of meaning-whethern the formof a non-factualismboutmeaning,s inthe cepticalolution,ranerrorheory,s suggested,orinstance, yChurchland.

The uncompromisingtrengthfthe claim s boundtoarouse uspi-cion. Irrealist onceptionsf otnerdomainsmaynot be particularlyappealingrplausible, utthey re not ncoherent. hy houldmattersstanddifferentlyithmeaning iscourse?

The source fthe symmetrysactually ot hat ard otrack own. t

consistsnthefact hat rrorndnon-factualistheoriesbout nysubjectmatterresupposeertainlaims bout ruthndtruth-conditions,hat nerror rnon-factualistonceptionirectedreciselytour alk fmeaningitselfndsup denying. otsurprisinglyheensuing esult s unstable.

34 Again, or moredetailed reatmentee The Status fContent',oc. cit.




Thus,an error hesis bout anysubjectmatter resupposeshat hetarget entences re truth-conditional.ut an errorthesis directedpreciselyt our talk boutmeaningntails hedenial f that resupposi-tion.Thus,also, non-factualismbout ny ubjectmatterresupposesrobust onceptionftruth. ut a non-factualismirectedreciselytourtalk boutmeaning ntails hedenial f thatpresupposition.

if theseconsiderationsre correct,hen, heywouldshow thatthescepticalonclusionannot e sustained:hereppears o beno stablewayof accommodatingheclaim thatthere re no truths boutmeaning.Something ust ewrong,herefore,ith he rgumenthat ppeared olead us to it. What ould t be?

VREDUCTIVE ACCOUNTS OF MEANING

i8. The sceptical rgumentasbeenfaultedn a numberfgrounds,hemostmportanteing:

That itsargumentsgainst ispositionalccounts f meaning o notwork.That tneglects oconsider ll the vailable aturalisticacts.

That ts conclusion epends nanunarguedeductionism.The first woobjectionsssuefrom naturalisticerspective:hey laimthat hesceptical rgumentails o establish ts thesis, vengrantedrestrictiononaturalisticactsndproperties.hefinal bjectiononcedesthe failure f naturalism,ut charges hat the sceptical rgumentspowerlessgainst nappropriatelynti-reductionistonstrualfmeaning.In this art shall xaminehenaturalisticbjections,nd n thenext heanti-reductionistuggestion.

I should say at theoutset,however, hat see no merit o objections f

the secondkind nd will not discuss hem n anydetailhere.All thesuggestionshat have seentothe effect hatKripke gnores ariousviablereduction asesformeaning acts eemto me to restonmisunderstanding.Colin McGinn, forexample,claims thatKripke neglects o considerthepossibility hatpossessionof a concept mightconsist n possessionof acertain ortof capacity.Capacities,McGinn explains,are distinctfromdispositions nd are better uited to meet the normativityonstraint.35This rests n themisunderstandingfnormativityutlined bove. WarrenGoldfarbchargesthatKripke neglectsto considercausal/informational

accountsof thedeterminationfmeaning.36 his derivesfrom failure osee that, n all essentialrespects, causal theory fmeaning s simply nespeciesofa dispositional heory fmeaning, n accountthat s, ofcourse,

3 See McGinn, p. cit.,pp. 68-74. 36 See Goldfarb,p. cit.,n. 3.




extensively iscussed by Kripke. It is unfortunate hatthis connection sobscured n Kripke's discussion. Because Kripke illustrates he scepticalproblem through he use of an arithmetical xample,he tends, under-standably, o focuson conceptual oleversionsof a dispositional ccountofmeaning, ather hanon causal/informationalersions.This has givenrise to the impressionthat his discussionof dispositionalism oes notcovercausal theories.But the mpressions misleading.For the root formof a causal/informationalheorymay be given by the followingbasicformula:

0 means (property)P by predicate S iff it is a counterfactualsupporting eneralization hat)0 is disposedto applyS to P.

Dispositions nd meaning: initude

19. The singlemost mportanttrandn thesceptical rgument onsists nthe considerations gainst dispositional heories fmeaning. t would behard to exaggeratethe importanceof such theoriesfor contemporaryphilosophyof mind and semantics: as I have just indicated, the mostinfluential ontemporary heories of content-determinationinforma-tional' theories and 'conceptual-role' theories are both formsof a

dispositional ccount.37 n mydiscussion shall tendto concentrate,orthesakeofconcreteness,n informationalheories fthe content f mentalsymbols; utthe ssues that rise aregeneral ndapplytoany dispositionaltheorywhatever.

The rootform f an information-styleispositional heory s this:

My mental ymbol horse' expresseswhatever roperty am disposedto applyit to.

Kripke's first bjection amounts, n effect,o suggesting hattherewill

always be a serious indeterminacyn what my dispositions re, thusrenderingdispositional properties n inappropriate eduction base formeaningproperties. or, Kripke argues, f t is indeed theproperty orsethat amdisposedtoapplythe term o,then should be disposed to applyit to all horses, ncludinghorses so far way and so far n the past that twould be nonsenseto suppose I could everget intocausal contactwiththem.Otherwise,what s to saythatmy dispositions nota disposition oapplythe term o theproperty earbvhorse, rsome such? But no one can

37For correlationalheoriesee:F. Dretske, nowledgend theFlowof nformation,ambridge,MIT Press, 98I; D. Stampe,Towards CausalTheory fLinguistic epresentation',idwestStudies n Philosophy,ol. , Minneapolis,Universityf MinnesotaPress, 977; Jerry odor,Psychosemantics,ambridge, IT Press, 987. For conceptual oletheories ee: H. Field, Logic,Meaning ndConceptualole',JournalfPhilosophy,977; NedBlock,Advertisementor Semanticsfor sychology',idwest tudies nPhilosophy,ol. o, Minneapolis,niversityfMinnesotaress,I986.




have a disposition to call all horses 'horse', for no one can have adispositionwithrespectto inaccessibleobjects.

The argument oes not convince. Of course, the counterfactual

If I were now to go to Alpha Centauri, would call the horses there'horse',

is false. f I werenow to go to Alpha Centauri, probablywould not be inany position ocall anything y any name,for would probably ie beforeI got there.But that by itselfneed not pose an insuperableobstacle toascribing he disposition ome. All dispositional roperties re such thattheir exercise the holding of the relevant counterfactual ruth iscontingentn the absenceof nterferingonditions, requivalently,n thepresence of ideal conditions.And it certainly eems conceivable that asuitable dealization fmy biologicalpropertieswill render hecounterfac-tual about my behaviour n Alpha Centauri rue.Kripkeconsiders uch aresponse nd complains:

But how can we haveanyconfidencenthis?How intheworld an I tellwhatwouldhappenfmybrainwere tuffed ith xtra rainmatter?. . Surely uchspeculationhouldbe left oscience iction ritersnd futurologists.38

If the point s supposedtobe, however, hatone can have no reason for

accepting generalization efined ver deal conditionsunlessone knowsexactlywhich counterfactualswould be true if the ideal conditionsobtained, then, as JerryFodor has pointed out, it seems completelyunacceptable.39 or example,no one can claimto knowall ofwhat wouldbe true f moleculesand containers ctually atisfied he conditions verwhich the ideal gas laws are defined;but that does not preventus fromclaiming o knowthat, ftherewere deal gases,theirvolume would varyinverselywiththepressure n them.Similarly, o one can claim to knowall ofwhatwould be true f weresomodified s to survive trip oAlpha

Centauri;but thatneed not preventus from laimingto knowthat, f Iwere to survive uch a trip, would call the horses there horse'.40

Still, it is one thingto dispel an objectionto a thesis, t is another oprovethe thesis rue.And we arecertainlyn nopositionnowtoshow thatwe do have infinitary ispositions.The trouble is that not everytruecounterfactualftheform.

If conditionswere deal, then, fC, S would do A

can be used to attribute o S thedisposition o do A in C. For example,

one can hardlycredit a tortoisewith the abilityto overtake hare, bypointing ut that fconditionswere deal for he tortoise if,for xample,

38 K., p. 27.

39 See 'A Theory f Content',art II,p. I5 (manuscript).40 For a related riticismfKripke nthis core eeBlackburn,p. cit.



TheRule-Followingonsiderations3I

Let us begin withthevery rude dispositional heorymentioned bove:'horse' means whateverproperty am disposed to apply it to. This is ahopeless theory, f course,but thereasons are instructive. here are twoofthem, nd they recloselyrelated.The first ifficultys thatthe theoryis boundto get the extension f horse' wrong. uppose I mean horse y t.Then, presumably, have a disposition o call horses horse'. But it willalso be true that there are certain circumstances sufficientlyarknights-and certain ows sufficientlyorsey ookingones such that,am disposed,underthose circumstances,o call those cows 'horse' too.Intuitively,his is a disposition o make a mistake, hat s, to apply theexpression o something ot in itsextension.But our crudedispositionaltheory, iventhat t identifiesheproperty meanbyan expression iththeproperty am disposed o apply theexpression o, lacks the resources bywhich to effect he requisitedistinctionbetween correctand incorrectdispositions.f what mean by an expression s identified ithwhateveram disposedto applytheexpression o, theneverything am disposedtoapplytheexpression o is, ipso acto, n the extension fthatexpression.But this eads to theunacceptable onclusion hat horse' does not expresstheproperty orsebut rather hedisjunctiveproperty orse rcow.

There is a relatedconceptual difficulty. ny theorywhich, like thecrudedispositional heory urrently nder consideration,implyequateshow itwould be correct orme to use a certain xpressionwithhow I amdisposedto use it,wouldhaveruledout,as a matter f definition,heverypossibilityf error.And as Wittgenstein as fondof remarking,fthe deaof correctnesss to make sense at all,then t cannotbe thatwhatever eemsright o me is (by definition) ight.

One would have thoughtthese points too crucial to miss; but it issurprisinghow littletheyare appreciated. In a recent, comprehensivetreatmentfconceptualrole theories,Ned Block has written

of a choice hatmustbe made by conceptualole emantics]heorists,nethathas had no discussionas far s I know):namely,houldconceptual ole beunderstoodn ideal or normativeerms, r should t be tiedto whatpeopleactuallyo? .. I preferot ocommentnthismatter.. because 'm not urewhatto say . 42

This ought to seem odd. If conceptualrole is supposed to determinemeaning, hen here anbe no question,onpainoffalling rey oKripke'sobjection,of identifyingn expression'sconceptualrolewith a subject'sactualdispositionswithrespectto thatexpression.

2I. The objectionsfrom normativity how, then,thatno dispositionaltheory hatassumesthesimpleform f dentifyingheproperty meanby'horse'withtheproperty amdisposed ocall 'horse', an hope to succeed.Butwhat fa dispositional heory id notassume thissimpleform?What

42 NedBlock, p.cit., . 63I.




if, nstead f dentifyinghat meanby horse'with he ntireange fmydispositionsnrespect f horse', t identifiedt onlywith ertain electdispositions.rovided hetheory pecified principle fselectionhatpicked utonly he xtension-trackingispositions;ndprovidedlso thatit specifiedhatprinciplenterms hatdid notpresuppose henotion fmeaningrextension, ould t notthen e true hat heobjectionsromnormativityadbeendisarmed?

Letus try oputmatters littlemore recisely.f a dispositionalheoryis to have any prospect f succeeding,t must electfrom mong hedispositions have for horse',thosedispositions hich re meaning-determining.n otherwords,tmust haracterize,nnon-intentionalndnon-semanticerms, property such hat: ossessionfM isnecessaryand sufficientor eing dispositionoapply nexpressionnaccordwithits orrectnessonditions.43iven uch property,owever,ouldwenotthen afely quatemeaning omething yan expression ith: he et ofdispositionswith respect o that expression hat possessM? For, sincedispositions ith hatproperty illbe guaranteedo be dispositionsoapply heexpressionorrectly,othof theobjections rom ormativitycanvassed ofarwould ppear o havebeenmet.Therewillbe nofear hatthe quationwill ssue nfalse erdictsboutwhat he xpression eans.And, ince tis onlyM-dispositionshat re guaranteedo be correct,twillnolonger ollow hatwhatevereems ightsright:hose ispositionsnotpossessing willnotbe dispositionsoapply he xpressionowhat tmeans ndwill be free, herefore,oconstituteispositionsoapply heexpression alsely.

Atthispoint woquestionsrise.First, s there eallyucha propertyM? And, second,supposing herewere, s therereallyno more tocapturinghenormativityfmeaninghan pecifyingucha property?

Now, Kripke s clearlyceptical bouttheexistence f an appropriateM-property. will consider hatquestionbelow.But morethanthis,

Kripke seems to thinkthat even if therewere a suitably electeddispositionhat apturedheextension f an expressionccurately,hatdispositionould till otbeidentifiedith hefact fmeaning, ecausetstill emains rue hat heconcept fa dispositions descriptivehereasthe oncept fmeaningsnot. notherwords, ccordingoKripke,ven ftherewere dispositionalredicatehat ogicallyovariedwith meaningpredicate,heonefact ould tillnotbe identified ith heother,or heyarefactsfdistinctorts. numberfwriters avebeen nclinedo followhim nthis. imonBlackburn,ornstance, as written:

43 It is occasionallyuggested hat twouldbe enough fpossession f M were ufficientor hedisposition'sorrectness.utthat s notright.fonly ufficiencyere equiredwewouldnotknow,simply yvirtue fa definitionf M, theexpression's eaning.or although e wouldknowwhatproperties ere efinitelyart f he xpression's eaning ewouldnotknow fwe hadthem ll. Andso wewouldnothaveeven sufficientondition or heexpression'sossessing givenmeaning.




satisfy. This would ensure the intensional equivalence of the twopropertiesn question, thuspavingthewayfor an outright eduction fmeaningto dispositions.

WhatpropertymightM be? There are, n effect,wo sortsofproposal:one, long associated with Wittgenstein imself, eeks to specifyM byexploiting the notion of a community;the other, of more recentprovenance, ttempts o defineM in terms f the notionof an optimalitycondition. shall begin with the communitarianccount.

Thecommunitarianccount

22. The idea that orrectness onsists nagreementwithone's fellows as adistinguished istorynthestudy fWittgenstein.ven before he currentconcern with a 'rule-followingroblem', manycommentators-whetherrightly rwrongly-identifiedommunitarianisms a central hesisofthelaterwritings.As a responseto the problem aboutmeaning, t found tsmost sustained treatmentn Wright's Wittgensteinn theFoundations fMathematics.45Which of themany dispositions speakermayhave withrespect to a given expressiondetermine ts meaning? Or, equivalently,which of themany dispositions speaker mayhave withrespectto anexpression re dispositions o use it correctly?Wright'scommunitarianaccount furnisheshefollowing nswer:

... it is a community f assentwhichsupplies theessentialbackground gainstwhich lone it makes sense to think f individuals' esponses s correct rincorrect . .. None of us can unilaterallymake sense ofcorrect mployment flanguage ave byreferenceothe uthorityfcommunal ssent nthematter;andfor hecommunitytself here s no authority,o no standard omeet.46

It is importanto understand hat, ccording o theproposalon offer, hecorrect application of a term is determinedby the totalityof the

community's ctual dispositions n respectofthatterm.The theory oesnot attempt,n specifying he communaldispositions hat are to serve astheconstitutive rbiters fcorrectness,o select from mongthe commu-nity'sactual dispositions privileged ubset. There is a reason for this.Communitarianisms a responseto the perceived inability o defineadistinction,t the level of the individual,between correct nd incorrectdispositions.The suggestion hatcorrectness onsists n agreementwiththe dispositions f one's community s designedto meetthisneed. Theproposalwill not serve ts purpose,however, fthe problem at the level

of the individual is now merely to be replayed at the level of the4 Cambridge,arvardUniversityress,980. (Hismore ecentwritingsuggesthatWrighto

longerholdsthisview.) See also Christophereacocke, Reply:Rule-Following: he NatureofWittgenstein'srguments',n WittgensteinnFollowing Rule, d. Holtzman ndLeich,London,Routledgend KeganPaul, 98I.

46 Ibid.,pp. I9-20.




community.A communitarian oes not want it to be a further uestionwhether a given actual communal disposition is itself correct. Theproposal must be understood, herefore,s offeringhe folowing harac-terization f M: M is theproperty fagreeingwith he ctual dispositionsfthecommunity.

How does the proposal fare with respect to the outlined adequacyconditions n dispositional heories?

Consider first he 'intensional' requirement, hat possession of thefavouredM-property appear intuitively o resemble possession of acorrectness ondition.Does communal onsensus ommand the sort ofresponse haracteristic f truth?

A number of criticshave complained against communitarianismhatcommunal onsensus s simplynot the same property s truth, hat here sno incoherence n the suggestionthat all the members of a linguisticcommunity ave gone collectively, ut non-collusively, ff-trackn theapplication fa givenpredicate.47 his is, ofcourse,undeniable.But thecommunitarian s not best read as offering n analysisof the ordinarynotionof truth, ut a displacementf t.His thought s thatthe emaciatednotionof truthyielded by communitarianisms the best we can hope toexpect n lightoftherule-followingonsiderations. he crucialquestion,then, s not whether ommunitarianismaptures our ordinarynotion oftruth, or tquite clearly oes not; t s, rather,whether ommunitarianismoffers ny concept deserving f thatname.

This is a large questionon whichI do not proposeto spend a lot oftime.48Although here re subtle questionsabout howmuch of ogic willbe recoverablefrom uch a view, and whether t can be suitablynon-reductivelyrticulatedcan 'non-collusive greement' e definedwithouttheuse of intentionalmaterials?), am prepared o grant, orthe sake ofargument,hat heproposaldoes notfare ll thatbadly nconnectionwiththe 'intensional'requirement.Non-collusive communalagreement n a

judgementdoes usually provide one with some sort of reason forembracinghe udgement even if,unlike ruth, otwith decisiveone); itthus mimics o some degreethe sortofresponsethat s essential o truth.Wherecommunitarianismails, tseemstome, s notsomuch here s withthe extensional equirement.

Considerthe term horse'. What dispositionsdo I have in respectofthis expression?To be sure, I have a dispositionto apply it to horses.But I also have a disposition, n sufficientlyarknights, o apply it todeceptivelyhorsey ooking cows. Intuitively,he factsare clear. Horse'

means horse nd my dispositionto apply it to cows on dark nights s

4 See Blackburn,p. cit.48 For a moreextensive iscussion ee my Essays on Meaning nd Belief,oc. cit.; see also

Blackburn,preadingheWord, xford, xford niversityress, 984, pp. 2ff.




mistaken.The problem is to come up witha theory hat delivers thisresult ystematicallynd in purelydispositional erms.The communitar-ian's idea is that the correctdispositions re constitutivelyhosewhichagreewith the community's.What, then, are the community's isposi-tions ikely o be?

The community, submit,however exactly specified, s bound toexhibitprecisely he same dualityofdispositions hat do: it too will bedisposedto call both horsesand deceptively orsey ooking ows on darknightshorse'. After ll, f can be taken nby a deceptively orsey ookingcow on a darknight,what s to prevent 7,000 people just like me frombeingtaken n by the same,admittedlyffective,mpostor? he point sthatmanyofthe mistakeswemake are systematic:hey rise becauseof thepresenceoffeatures bad lighting,ffective isguises, nd so forth-thathave a generalizableand predictableeffect n creatureswith similarcognitive endowments. This is presumablywhat makes 'magicians'possible.) But, then, any of my dispositionsthat are in this sensesystematicallymistaken, re bound to be duplicatedat the level of thecommunity. he communitarian, owever, annot call themmistakes,orthey are the community's dispositions.He must insist, then, firmconviction o the contrary otwithstanding,hat horse' means nothorsebut, rather, orse r cow.

The problem, of course, is general. There are countless possibleimpostors ndercountlesspossibleconditions; nd there s nothing pecialaboutthetermhorse'.The upshotwouldappearto be that, ccording ocommunitarianism,one of our predicateshave the extensionswe takethemto have, but mean somethingwildlydisjunctivenstead.Which s tosay that communitarianisms bound to issue in false verdicts bout themeaningsof most expressions, hus failing he first equirement n anadequate dispositional heory.

It seemsto me thatwehaveno optionbuttoreject purecommunitari-anism.If we are to have anyprospect f dentifyingheextensions fourexpressionscorrectly, t will simply not do to identify ruth withcommunal onsensus.Even from mongthe communitydispositions,wehaveto selectthosewhichmaybe consideredmeaning-determining,fwearetohavea plausible theory fmeaning.Which s to saythatwe are stilllackingwhatcommunitarianism as supposedtoprovide: hespecificationofa propertyM such that,possessionofM bya disposition s necessaryand sufficientor hatdisposition's orrectness.

Of course,once we have abandoned communitarianism, e lack anymotive for definingM over communal ispositions; nothing-at leastnothingobvious-tells againstdefiningAMdirectly ver an individual'sdispositions.Whichis precisely hewaythe voluminous iteraturen thistopic approachestheproblem nd to a discussionof which now proposeto turn.




Optimaldispositions

23. The literatureupplies what s, in effect, set of variations n a basic

theme:M is the propertyf: being disposition o apply an expression) na certaintype f tu 49 The idea behind such proposals s that here sa certain et ofcircumstances call them optimality onditions' underwhich subjects are, for one or anotherreason, incapable of mistakenjudgements;hence,we may equate whattheymean by a given mental)expressionwith, heproperties hey re disposedto applytheexpressionto,underoptimal onditions. ifferentroposalsprovidedifferentharac-terizations f the conditions hat re supposed to be optimal n this sense.Fred Dretske, forexample, holds thatoptimal conditions re the condi-

tions under which the meaning of the expressionwas first cquired. Anumberofotherwriters ubscribeto some form r otherof a teleologicalproposal: optimality onditions re those conditions definedby evolu-tionary iology-under which our cognitivemechanisms re functioningjustas they re supposedto.50

Now, Kripke s very hortwith uch possible laborationsf dispositionaltheory. e brieflyonsiders he uggestionhatweattemptodefinedealizeddispositions nd says that a little xperimentationillrevealthefutilitvfsuch an effort'."But, surely, hisunderestimateshe complexityf the

problems nvolved nd fails o do justice o the nfluencehat uch proposalscurrentlyxert.WhatKripkeneeds, fhis rejectionfdispositionalccountssto succeed,butdoes notreallyprovide,s a set ofprincipled onsiderationsagainst heexistence fnon-semantically,on-intentionallypecifiable pti-mality onditions.What would iketo do in theremainderfthis ection sto begin o sketch nargumentor hat onclusion. everal pecific roblemsfor pecific ersions fan optimalityheory avereceiveddiscussionn theliterature.52ere, however, wantto attempt n argumentwitha moregeneral weep: want oargue hatwehave reason obelieve hat here ould

not be naturalisticallypecifiableonditions nderwhich a subjectwill bedisposedto applyan expressionnlyto what tmeans; and, hence, hatnoattemptt specifyinguchconditions an hopeto succeed.53

There is one exception to this generalization:JerryFodor's recent proposal has it that S'smeaning-determiningre those that serve as an 'asymmetric dependence base' for S's otherdispositions. See his 'A Theory of Content', Part II, forthcoming. n 'Naturalizing Content',forthcomingn MeaninginMind: EssaYs onthe Wforkf/jerryodor, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, arguethat this theory s subject to the same difficulties s confront tandard optimalityversions.

50 For theories of this form see: David Papineau, Reality and Representation, xford, BasilBlackwell, I987; J. Fodor: 'Psychosemantics', MS, MIT, I984. I shy awaay rom aying whetherR.

Mlillikan, anguage, Thought nd OtherBiological Categories, ambridge,MIT Press, I987, presentstheory f this form.51 K., p. 32.

52 AgainstDretske see Fodor, Psjychosemantics,oc. cit.; againstteleologicaltheories ee myEssayson Meaning and Belief,and Fodor, 'A Theory of Conteint', art I, loc. cit.

5 This amounts to saying that such theoriescannot meet the extensional requirement; o I shallnot even consider whether heymeet the intensionalone.




24. It willbe worthwhileo aytheproblemutwith ome are.ConsiderNeil and a particularxpression,ay,horse', n Neil'smental epertoire.Andsuppose hatNeil is disposed o token hat xpressionin thebelief

mode' both n respect f horses nd in respect f deceptivelyorseylooking owson darknights. et itbe clear, urthermore,hat horse'forNeil meanshorse,nd that n those ccasionswhenheapplieshorse' ocows, his mounts ohis mistakingcowfor horse.Now,thethoughtbehind n optimalityersionf dispositionalheorys that heres a setof naturalisticallypecifiableonditionsnderwhichNeil cannotmakemistakesn the identificationf presentedtems.54Underthosecon-ditions,hen, ewouldbelieve hat here s a horsen frontfhim nlyfthere s one.Butthat n turnmplieshat, nder hose onditions,horse'

willgettokenedin the beliefmode) only n respect f thepropertytexpresses. o, to figure ut whatany expressionmeans: ook at thepropertieseil s disposed o apply he xpressiono,when onditionsreinthis enseoptimal. he end results a dispositionaleconstructionfmeaningacts: orNeil to meanhorse y horse' sforNeilto bedisposedto call onlyhorses horse',when conditions re optimal.Clearly, woconditionsmustbe satisfied:i) thespecifiedonditionsmustreally esuch s toprecludehepossibilityferror-otherwise,t willbe false hatunder hose onditionshorse'willget pplied nly o what tmeans; ii)

the onditions ust e specified urely aturalistically,ithoutheuseofany emantic r ntentionalaterials-otherwise,he heory illhave s-sumed hevery ropertiest wassupposed oprovide reconstructionf.

What propose oargue s that t s impossibleosatisfyoth ftheseconditionsimultaneously.

Optimaldispositionsnd objectiveontents

25. The dispositionalists after non-semantically,on-intentionally

specifiableetofconditions, whichwillbesuch s to yield rue, priorioptimalityquations fthe form:

(8) Forany ubject andconcept : O-(S judgesRx-+Rx).

Couldthere e such setofconditions?Notice, o beginwith, hatwhereR is the concept f an objective

property,e oughtnotto expect ptimalityquations orR, even f0werenot required o meet the rather tiff onstraintsmposedby areductive ispositionalism-namely,pecificationn non-semanticndnon-intentionalerms. or, ntuitively,hevery deaof whollybjectivepropertyorobject rrelation)s the dea of a propertyobject, elation)

5 This restrictiono perceptuallyixed eliefstems artlyrom desire o implifyxpositionndpartlyrom desire oconsideruchtheoriest their trongest.




whose nature s independent f any givenperson'sabilities r udgements:for uch a property,n otherwords, here s no necessary unction romgiven person's abilitiesand judgements o truths bout that property.55

The contrasts with class of contents orwhich theredoes exist a rangeof circumstancesuch that, ppropriate ubjects are necessarily uthorita-tive about those contentsunder those circumstances. hilosophersdis-agree,of course, bout whatcontents allwhere,but t s typical o think fjudgements bout shape as wholly bjective nd of udgements boutpainas representingn extreme xampleof the contrastinglass. Let us call thisa distinction etween ccessible ersus naccessibleontents.56

We are now in a position o see,however, hata dispositional heory fmeaning, by virtue of being committed o the existence of optimality

equations for every concept, is committed therebyto treatingeveryconcept as if it were accessible. It is thus committed o obliterating hedistinction etween ccessibleand inaccessiblecontents.

Of course, this objection will not impress anyone reluctant tocountenancewholly objective, naccessiblecontents n the first lace. Iturn, therefore, o arguingagainst the dispositionaltheoryon neutralground:for ny concept, ubjectiveorobjective, t s impossible o satisfydispositionalism'sbasic requirement: he specification f a set ofcondi-tions0, innon-semantic,nd non-intentionalerms,uch that, nder0,subjects are immune from error about judgements involving thatconcept.

Optimaldispositionsnd belief olism

26. The basic difficultyerivesfrom heholistic haracter ftheprocesseswhichfixbelief. The point is that,under normalcircumstances, elieffixation s typicallymediated by background theory-what contents athinker s preparedto judge will depend upon what othercontentshe is

preparedto judge. And this dependence is, again typically, rbitrarilyrobust: ust about any stimuluscan cause just about any belief,givenasuitablymediating etofbackground ssumptions.Thus, Neil maycometo believeLo, a magpie, s a resultofseeinga currawong, ecause of hisfurther elief thatthat s just whatmagpieslook like; or because of hisbelief hat heonlybirds nthe mmediate icinityremagpies;or becauseofhis belief hatwhatever hePope saysgoes and his belief hatthePope

5 See,for xample, ylerBurge,Cartesianrror nd theObjectivityf Perception',n Subject,

ThoughtndContext,d. J. McDowelland P. Pettit, xford, larendon ress, 986, p. I25, forsimilar ormulationf theconcept f objectiven property.56 It is importantoappreciatehat his s anepistemologicalistinction,ot constitutivene. t

doesnotfollow rom hefact hat contents accessible,hat t s thereforeonstitutedy our bestjudgementsbout t. I take tno one s temptedoconclude rom hefact hatwe areauthoritativeaboutour pains, hatpains reconstitutedythe udgements e make boutthem.We shallhaveoccasion odiscuss onstitutivelaims f this ort ater n in thepaper.




says hat hispresentedurrawongs a magpie.And so on.The thoughtthat omethingsa magpie anget riggeredya currawongnanyofanindefiniteumber fways, orrespondingo thepotentiallyndefinitenumber fbackgroundeliefswhich ouldmediate hetransition.ow,howdoes all thisbearon theprospects ora dispositionalheory fmeaning?

A dispositionalheorist as to specify, ithout se of semantic rintentional aterials, situationnwhich thinker ill be disposed othink,o, a magpienly nrespect fmagpies. ut theobservationhatbeliefs refixed olisticallymplieshat thinker illbedisposed o thinkLo, a magpienrespect fan indefiniteumberfnon-magpies,rovidedonly hat heappropriateackgroundeliefs represent.pecifyingnoptimalityondition ormagpie', herefore,ill nvolve,t a minimum,specifyingsituationharacterizedythe bsence f ll thebeliefs hichcould potentially ediate he transitionromnon-magpieso magpiebeliefs. ince,however, here ooks to be a potentialnfinityf suchmediatingackgroundlusters fbelief, non-semantically,on-inten-tionallypecifiedptimalityituations a non-semantically,on-intention-ally pecifiedituationnwhich t sguaranteedhat one fthis otentialinfinityfbackgroundlusters fbelief s present. ut howis such asituationobe specified? hat sneeded sprecisely hat dispositionaltheory as upposedoprovide: amely,setofnaturalisticecessaryndsufficientonditions orbeing beliefwith certain ontent. ut, ofcourse, f we had thatwe wouldalreadyhave a reductiveheory fmeaning-wewouldnotneed dispositionalheory!Which s tosay hat,ifthere s to beany ort freductivetoryboutmeaningt all, t cannottake heform f a dispositionalheory.

VI

ANTI-REDUCTIONIST CONCEPTIONS OFMEANING

An argumentrom ueerness?

27. Ifthese onsiderationsrecorrect,herewould ppear obeplenty freason to doubtthe reducibilityf content ropertieso naturalisticproperties.utKripke's ceptic oesnotmerely raw nanti-reductionistconclusion;econcludes,armore adically,hat hereimplyouldnotbeanycontent roperties.upposewe grant heanti-reductionism;hatjustifieshecontentcepticism?ot,ofcourse, heanti-reductionismyitself.At a minimumne of twofurtherhings s needed.Either nindependentrgumento the ffecthat nly aturalisticropertiesrereal.Or,failinghat, frontalssault n the rreducibleropertynquestion,showinghatt s, nMackie's hrase,omehownherentlyqueer'.



TheRule-Followingonsiderations4I

The single greatestweakness n Kripke's scepticalargument s that hefails to bringoff itherrequirement.He does not even tryto defend areductionist rinciple about the intentional; nd his brief attempt t a

'queerness' argument s half-hearted nd unconvincing:

Perhapswe may ry o recoup, y arguing hatmeaning ddition y plus' is astate venmore ui generis hanwehave argued efore. erhaps t is simplyprimitivetate, ot obe assimilatedo ensationsrheadaches rany qualitative'states, or o be assimilatedo dispositions,ut state f uniquekind f tsown.

Such a movemay n a sensebe irrefutable,nd f t s taken n an appropriatewayWittgensteinay ven ccept t. But t seemsdesperate:t eaves henatureofthispostulated rimitivetate the primitivetateof meaning ddition y"plus"'-completelymysterious.t is not upposed o be anintrospectibletate,

yetwe supposedlyre aware f t with omefair egree f certainty henevertoccurs. orhowelse can eachofus be confidenthathedoes, tpresent,meanaddition y 'plus'? Even more mportants the logicaldifficultymplicitnWittgenstein'scepticalrgument.thinkhatWittgensteinrgues, otmerelyswe have aidhitherto,hat ntrospectionhows hat he lleged qualitative'tateofunderstandings a chimera,utalso that t s logicallympossibleorat leastthat heres a considerableogicaldifficulty)or here o be a state f meaningaddition y "plus"' at all.

Sucha statewouldhavetobe a finitebject, ontainedn ourfiniteminds. tdoesnotconsistnmy xplicitlyhinkingf each caseof the ddition able. ..Canwe conceivef finitetatewhichould otbe nterpretedn a quus-like ay?Howcouldthat e?57

There are several problemswith this passage. In the firstplace, itmisconstrues he appropriate nti-reductionistuggestion. take t that treally s not plausible that there are 'primitive tates' ofmeaningpubliclanguage xpressionsncertainways,one stateper expression. he processby which the inscriptions nd vocables of a public language acquiremeaning s a manifestlyomplexprocess involving n enormous rray f

appropriatepropositional ttitudes the outlines of whichmay arguablybe foundin the writings f Paul Grice and others.58A plausible anti-reductionism bout meaningwould not wish to deny that there is aninterestingtory obe told about the relation etween inguisticontentndmental ontent;what it maintains, ather, s thatthere s no interestingreduction of mental content roperties o physical/functionalroperties.According o anti-reductionism,n otherwords, t someappropriateevelmental contentpropertiesmust simplybe taken for granted,withoutprospectof identification ithproperties therwise escribed.

Does Kripke manage to create a difficultyorthissuggestion?Thepassagecontains couple of considerations hatmaybe so construed.The firstharge s thatwe wouldhaveno idea how toexplainourability

" K., pp. 1-2.58 See thepapers itedundern.3 above.




to know ur thoughts,fwe endorsed non-reductionistonception ftheir ontent. ow,no onewhohas contemplatedheproblem f self-knowledgeanfail obe impressedy tsdifficulty.59ut think hatwe

wouldbe forgivenf,beforewe allowed his o driveus to a dubiouslycoherentrrealismbout ontent, erequiredomethingnthe rder fproof hatnosatisfactorypistemologyasultimatelyobehad.

Kripke, owever,rovides osuchproof. e merelyotes hat henon-phenomenal haracter f contentfultates precludes n introspectiveaccount ftheir pistemology.ndthis s problematicor woreasons.First,becausetheremaybe non-introspectiveccounts f self-knowl-edge.60Andsecond, ecause tdoes notobviously ollow romhe factthat mental tate acks n individuativehenomenology,hat tis notintrospectible.6'

Kripke's econd bjectionothe nti-reductionistuggestionsthat t sutterlymysteriousowthere ouldbe a finitetate, ealized n a finitemind, hat everthelessontainsnformationbout he orrectpplicabil-ity of a sign n literally o end ofdistinctituations. ut,again,thisamountsmerelyo insistinghatwe find he dea of a contentfultateproblematic, ithoutdducing ny ndependenteasonwhywe should.Weknow hatmentaltateswith eneralontentsre tateswithnfinitarynormativeharacters;t is precisely ith hat bservationhat heentire

discussionegan.WhatKripke eeds,fhe stopulloff nargumentromqueerness,s some ubstantivergument,istinctrom is nti-reduction-ist onsiderations,hyweshould ot ountenanceuch tates. ut thishedoesnotprovide.

None of this should be understood s suggestinghat an anti-reductionismbout ontents unproblematic,or tis far romt.Thereare, forexample, amiliar,nd serious, ifficultieseconcilingn anti-reductionismbout ontent roperties ith satisfyingonceptionf heircausal efficacy.62ut in the context f Kripke'sdialectic, he anti-

reductionistuggestionmerges s a stableresponse o the scepticalconclusion,ne that s seeminglyntouched y all the considerationsadduced nthe atter's avour.

5 For discussionfsomeof thedifficultiesee my ContentndSelf-Knowledge',hilosophicalTopics, pring989.

60 See, for xample, ylerBurge,Individualismnd Self-Knowledge',7ournalfPhilosophy,November988, andD. Davidson,KnowingOne's OwnMind', Proceedingsf theAPA, JanuaryI987.

61 It is nterestingo note,ncidentally,hat ne of hemore trikingxamples fthe ntrospectivediscernmentf a non-qualitative entalfeature s providedby, of all things, n experiential

phenomenon.have nmind hephenomenon,uch iscussed yWittgensteinimself,f eeing-as.We see theduck-rabbitow s a duck,now s a rabbit;we see theNecker ube now with nefaceforward,owwith nother. nd weknow mmediatelyreciselyowwe areseeing hese bjects s,whenwe see them ow noneway, ow nthe ther. ut this hange f aspect', lthough anifestlyintrospectible,s neverthelessot changensomethingualitative,or he ualitativeharacterf hevisual xperienceemains he ameeven s the spect hanges.

62 See below.




McDowell onprivacy nd community

28. If we endorse non-reductionistonceptionfmeaning, oes that

mean that the rule-followingonsiderationsisturbnothingn ourordinaryonceptionfthatnotion? numberfwriters hohavefoundan anti-reductionistuggestionttractiveave certainlyotthoughto;theyhave discernedn thoseconsiderationsmportantessonsforthecorrect nderstandingf the possibilityf meaning,while rejectingsubstantiveeductivenswers o the constitutiveuestion:n virtue fwhatdo expressionsossessmeaning?

JohnMcDowell,for xample, as writtenhat:

By Wittgenstein'sights,t is a mistake o thinkwe candig downto a level t

whichwe no longerhave application ornormative otions like followingaccordingotherule').63

Wehave oresist he emptation,ccordingoMcDowell'sWittgenstein,to form picturef bedrock' 'of howthingsreatthedeepestevel twhich we may sensibly ontemplatehe place of [meaning]n theworld' whichdoes not already mploy he idea of the correct orincorrect)seof an expression.

Oddly,however,McDowell does nottakethisto commit im to a

quietismboutmeaning,positionrom hich osubstantiveesultsbouttheconditionsorthepossibilityfmeaning an be gleaned.On thecontrary,e claims hat t is the discernible oral fthe rule-followingconsiderationshat orrectness,nd hencemeaning,anexist nly nthecontextf communalractice,husprecludinghepossibilityf privatelanguage. e writes:

Wittgensteinarns s not to try o digbelow bedrock'. ut it is difficult,nreading im, oavoid cquiring sense fwhat, s it were,iesdown here: weboffacts boutbehaviornd inner' pisodes, escribable ithoutsing henotion

of meaning.One is likely o be struckby the sheercontingencyf theresemblancesetween ndividualsn which, n thisvision, hepossibilityfmeaningeems odepend

And:

It is truethat certain isorderlinesselow bedrock'would undermineheapplicabilityf henotionfrule-following.o theunderlyingontingenciesearan intimateelationo thenotion frule-following...65

This is,ofcourse,McDowell'scharacterizationfthefamiliarWittgen-

steinianlaim hat certainmeasuref greementncommunalesponsesis a preconditionormeaning. uthow s sucha thesis obemotivated?How,in light ftherejectionf substantivenswers o the constitutive

63 'Wittgensteinn Following Rule', oc. cit.,p. 34I.64 Ibid., p. 348. 65 Ibid., p.349.




question, is it to be argued for?The claim that communalpractice snecessary ormeaning s a surprisinglaim; mere reflection n the conceptof meaningdoesnot reveal t.Andwhat, hort f a substantive onstitutive

account,could conceivablyground t?Considerthe contrastwiththe communitarian iew considered bove.

That view engages he constitutive uestion,offers substantivenswer oit, and generates,hereby, straightforwardrgument or henecessity fa communalpractice: ince correctnesss said toconsistnconformityithone's fellows, orrectness, nd with t meaning, re possible onlywherethere re otherswith whom one may conform. ut McDowell, rightlynmy view, rejects he suggestion hatcorrect pplicationmightbe analysedin termsof communaldispositions. ndeed, as I have alreadynoted, he

rejects heverydemandfor substantive ccountof correctness: orms repartofthe bedrock',beneathwhichwe mustnotdig.But ifwe aresimplyto be allowedto take the idea of correctness orgranted, nreducedandwithoutany prospect of reconstructionn termsof, say, actual andcounterfactualruths bout communaluse, how is the necessityof an'orderly ommunal'practice o be defended? rom what does the demandfor orderlinessflow? And from what the demand for community?McDowell's paper containsno helpful nswers.66

Wright n theudgement-dependencef meaning

29. CrispinWright as writtenbout the anti-reductionistonception hat:

[t]his omewhatlat-footedesponseoKripke's cepticmay eem oprovidegood example f lossofproblems.' . . In fact, hough,nd on thecontrary,think herealproblem osed bytheScepticalArguments acute, ndis one ofWittgenstein'sundamentaloncerns.uttheproblems not hat f nsweringheArgument.he problems that f eeing ow nd why he orrectnswer ivencan be correct.67

Wright's ntriguing uggestion s that thereare important onstitutiveresults o be gleanedfrom he epistemological uestionwe shelvedsomepages back: namely,how, fcontentproperties re simply o be takenfor

66 Though ee his remarks which am afraid do notunderstand on a 'linguisticommunity[that]s conceiveds bound ogether,otby matchnmere xternalsfactsccessible o ust nyone),butby meeting fminds'.McDowell'sproblemsere cho, think,Wittgenstein'swn.The maindifficultyonfrontingwould-be nterpreterf Wittgensteins how to reconcile is rejection fsubstantiveonstitutiveccounts especiallyfmeaning,ee Zettel#i6: The mistakes to saythattheres anythinghatmeaningomethingonsists' with he bvious onstitutivendtranscendental

pretensionsf the rule-followingonsiderations.t is fashionable o soft-pedalherejection fconstitutiveuestions, epresentingt as displaying mere distrust' nWittgenstein'sart. ut thisignoreshefact hat he ejectionf nalysesnd necessarynd ufficientonditonss tied o extremelyimportantirst-orderheses boutmeaning,ncluding, ost entrally,hefamily-resemblanceiew fconcepts.

67 'Wittgenstein'sule-Followingonsiderationnd the Central roject f Theoreticalinguis-tics', Ioc. cit., p. 237.




granted, without prospect of reconstruction ither in experientialordispositional erms, an theybe known?As we saw, Kripkeattempted ouse this question to embarrass his anti-reductionistpponent.Wright,however,has a more constructiveroject n mind. Pressing he epistemo-logical question will reveal, so he claims, that factsabout contentareessentiallyjudgement-dependent'.

What does it mean fora class of facts to be judgement-dependent?Wright's xplanations framedn terms fa failure o pass the order-of-determinationest':

The order-of-determinationest concerns he relationbetweenbest udge-ments-judgements ade n what re, with espect o their articularubject

matter,ognitivelydeal onditionsf both udger nd circumstance-andruth.... Truth, for udgementswhich pass the test, s a standard onstitutedindependentlyf any considerationsoncerningognitive edigree. or judge-mentswhich ail he est, ycontrast,heres no distance etween eing rue ndbeing est; ruth, or uch udgements,s constitutivelyhatwe udge o be truewhenweoperate nder ognitivelydeal conditions.68

We mayexplainthecontrastWrighthas in mindhere by recurringo theidea of an accessible content see above). An accessible content s oneabout which subjects are necessarily authoritativeunder cognitively

optimalcircumstances.Now, a question maybe raised about the correctexplanationfor this authority: s it that,under those optimal circum-stances,subjects are exceptionallywell-equippedto trackthe relevant,independently onstituted acts?or is it, rather, hat udgementsunderthose circumstances imply constitutehe facts in question?A fact isjudgement-independentftheformer,udgement-dependentfthe atter.

The contrast, hen, is between factswhich are constituted ndepen-dentlyof our judgements,howeveroptimal, nd factswhich are consti-tutedprecisely ythe udgementswe would formundercognitivelydeal

circumstances.And the claim is that facts about content have to beconstruedon the lattermodel. Pace Kripke, the targetof the rule-following onsiderationss not the reality f contentfacts,but,rather,judgement-independentor Platonist,fyouthink hesecometo the samething) conception of their constitution. est judgementsconstitutivelydetermine hetruth-valuefsentences scribing ontent omental tates;theydo not track ndependentlyonstitutedtatesof affairs hich confertruth r falsity pon them.

Wright rguesfor his judgement-dependent'onception f content y

attacking he epistemologiesvailableon the alternativemodel. Drawingextensivelyn Wittgenstein'sctualtext,Wright econstructsn interest-ingset ofconsiderationsgainstbothintrospectivend inferentialoncep-tionsofself-knowledge,hus, presumably, xhausting heepistemologies

68 Ibid.,p.246.




available to his opponent. So long as facts about our mental states areconstrued s independent f, and, hence,as trackedbyourself-regardingjudgements,we can have no satisfactoryxplanation f our ability o knowthem.On the assumption, hen, hatKripke's unstable ontentrrealismsto be avoided at all costs,that eaves the udgement-dependentonceptionas the only contender. o goes Wright's rgument.

Wright'sdiscussion raises a number of interestingnd difficultues-tions. s it really ruethatWittgenstein's iscussiondestroys ll cognitiveaccomplishment' heories f self-knowledge?upposingitdoes, does thisinevitably riveus to a judgement-dependentonception fcontent?Aretherenot other onceptions hatwould equallyaccommodate herejectionof a tracking pistemology? nfortunately,one of these questionscan beadequately ddressedwithin he confines f the present ssay. Here I haveto settle for raisinga question about whether judgement-dependentconception f content ould ever be the cogentmoral ofany argument.

30. The suggestions thatwe mustnot construefacts oncerningmentalcontent s genuine bjectsofcognition,nd that his s tobe accomplishedby regarding hemas constituted y truths oncerning ur best judge-ments about mental content.Well, what does this amount to? Forillustrative urposes,Wright ffers he case of colour. What would have to

be true, ffacts bout colourare to udgement-dependent? e would need,first nd foremost, o secure the accessibilityf colour facts,and so abiconditional f the following orm:

if C: S would judge x to be blue+-+x s blue.

But not just any biconditional of this form will serve to secure theaccessibility f colour. For example,unless restrictionsre placed on thepermissible specifications f C, every propertywill turn out to beaccessible; just let C be: conditions under which S is infallible bout

colour. So, itmust be further equiredthatC be specified n substantialterms, voidinga 'whatever-it-takes'ormulation.Now,what twouldtaketogroundnotmerely heaccessibilityfcolour

facts,but theirudgement-dependence?hat is needed, as Wrightpointsout, is that

the uestionwhetherheC-conditions,o substantiallypecified,re atisfiedn aparticularase s logicallyndependentf ny ruthsoncerninghedetails ftheextensionf colour oncepts.69

This seems right.For unless the specification f the C-conditions, r,indeed,ofanything lse on the left-hand-side,s precluded frompresup-posing facts about the colours of objects, it will remain entirely penwhether ubjects' judgements, ormedunder the relevantC-conditions,

69 Ibid.,pp. 247-8.




reallydid determine acts bout colour.For satisfactionf the conditionsdescribedon the left-hand-sidewould alwayspresupposesome antece-dently ixed onstitutionf colourfacts, husundermininghe claim that t

is precisely ruths bout best judgement hat fixthose facts.No doubt, otherrequirementsre in order as well.70But it is, I trust,

already lear that here s a seriousdifficultyeeinghow facts boutmentalcontent ould conceivably atisfy he stated requirements n judgement-dependence. For it is inconceivable,given what udgement-dependenceamountsto, that the biconditionalsn the case ofmentalcontent houldsatisfyhe requirement hat their eft-hand-sidese freeof any assump-tions about mental content. For, at a minimum,the content f thejudgementsaid to fix the factsabout mentalcontenthave to be presup-

posed.And thatmeansthat nysuch biconditionalwillalwayspresupposea constitutionf mental ontent uite independent f constitution ybestjudgement.

In a way, n intuitive ifficultyhould have beenclearfrom hestart.A'judgement-dependent' onceptionof a given fact is, by definition,conceptionof that fact according to which it is constituted y ourjudgements.he idea is clearly ppropriaten connectionwith facts boutthe chic or the fashionable; amiliar, hough ess clearly appropriate, nconnectionwith facts about colour or sound; and, it would appear,

impossible s a conception f facts bout mentalcontent.For itcannot ngeneralbe truethatfacts bout content reconstituted your udgementsabout content: facts about content,constituted ndependently f thejudgements, re presupposedby themodel itself.

Conclusion: obust ealism problems ndprospects

3I. Let robust ealism esignate he viewthat udgements boutmeaningare factual, rreducible, nd judgement-independent.hen themoralof

this paper-if ithas one-is thatthemajoralternativeso robustrealismare beset by very eriousdifficulties.

Irrealism-the view,advocated by Kripke's Wittgenstein,hat udge-ments bout meaning renon-factual-appearsnot evento be a coherentoption. (An error-theoreticariant, s promoted,forexample, by PaulChurchland, eemsno better.)

Reductionistersionsof realismappear to be false.The proposal that

judgementsabout meaningconcerncommunaldispositions s unsatis-factory ot merelybecause, implausibly, t precludesthe possibility f

communal rror, utbecauseitappearsbound to misconstrue hemeaningof everyexpression n the language. The rathermore promising andrathermorepopular)proposal,that udgements bout meaning oncern

70 For a very lluminatingiscussion fthe conditions hatwouldhave to be met, ee ibid.,

pp. 246-54.




certain ort of idealizeddisposition,lso appearsto confronteriousdifficulties:t s hard o see how the dealizationsreto be specifiednanon-question-beggingay.

And,finally, udgement-dependentonceptionfmeaningeemsnot obea stable ption, ecause heverydeaof onstitutionybest udgementappears opresuppose judgement-independentonceptionfmeaning.

It is sometimesaid that n anti-reductionistonceptions too facileresponse o theproblem boutmeaning.t is hardnot osympathize iththis entiment.ut f he onsiderationsanvassedgainsthe lternativesarecorrect,nd f t strue hat herule-following'onsiderationseave nanti-reductionistonceptionntouched,t shard, ltimately,lsotoagreewitht.Meaning ropertiesppear o beneitherliminable,or educible.Perhapst s time hatwelearned olivewith hat act.

I do notpretendhat hiswillbe easy.Robust ealism arboursomeunanswered uestions,hesolutionso which ppearnotto be trivial.There are threemain difficulties.irst: what sort of room s leftfortheorizingboutmeaning,freductionistrogramsreeschewed?econd:how are we to reconcilen anti-reductionismboutmeaning ropertieswith satisfyingonceptionf their ausalorexplanatoryfficacy?nd,finally: oware we to explain ur first-person)nowledgefthem?

I cannot, f course, opetoaddress nyofthese uestions dequatelyhere.A fewbrief emarks illhaveto suffice.

To beginwiththe last questionfirst, cannot ee that an anti-reductionistonception f contenthas a specialproblem bout self-knowledge. sfar s I am concerned,oonehas a satisfactoryxplanationofour bilityoknow urown houghts.7'ut do not ee that he nti-reductionisteedfeel ny pecial mbarrassmentbout his. fanything,tseems ome,theprospectsrebetter orhimthanforhisopponent.reductionist ould have t thatmeanings refixed y certain inds fdispositionalact,he ort ffact hat ouldhardly e known bservation-ally. twould ppear ofollowhat hereductionists committed,fhe sto have a substantialpistemologyf self-knowledge,o an inferentialconception-a onceptionhatmaybe,as I have rgued lsewhere,orsethan mplausible.72he anti-reductionistaboursunderno comparableburden.

As forthecharge hattherewouldbe nothingeftfor theoryfmeaningobe,ifreductionisms eschewed,tseems o mesimply alse.Let me herementionust few fthequestionshat urvive herejectionofreductionistrogrammes.or one thing, s I havestressed, non-reductionismboutmeanings bestunderstoods a thesis boutmentalmeaning,ot bout inguistic eaning.o anti-reductionism,s I under-standt, snotonly onsistent ith, utpositivelynvites, theorybout

" See my Content nd Self-Knowledge',oc. cit. 72 Again ee my bid.




the relationbetween thoughtand language. How do public languagesymbols ometo acquire meaning nd what role does thought lay n thatprocess? econdly, nti-reductionismn my ense s consistent ithwanting

a general ccountof the principles y whichwe interpretther eople. Theimportantworkof Quine, Davidson, Lewis, Grandy,and otherson thetheory f radical interpretationeitherneeds, nor is best understood nterms f, reductionistspirations. ts propergoal is the articulationf theprincipleswe evidently uccessfully mploy n interpretinghespeech andmindsof others.And, finally,n anti-reductionismbout mental ontent sperfectly onsistent oth with substantive heoriesof the nature of thepropositional ttitudes-thats, of whatmakesa givenmental tate belief,as opposed to a wish or a desire; and with theclaim thatthegrasping f

certainmental contentsdepends on the graspingof others, nd so withtheories fthe compositionaltructurefmental ontent.

There is hardly ny fear, hen, hat we shall run out ofthings o do, ifwe forego eductionist rogrammesn the theory f mentalcontent.

Finally, hough, here s the questionofmental ausation:howarewe toreconcile n anti-reductionismbout contentpropertieswith a satisfyingconceptionof their causal efficacy?t is a view long associated withWittgenstein imself, f course,thatpropositional ttitude xplanationsare not causal explanations.But, whether r not the view was Wittgen-

stein's, it has justifiably ew adherentstoday. As Davidson showed, ifpropositional ttitude xplanations retorationalize ehaviour t all, thenthey must do so by causing it.73 But propositional ttitudesrationalizepartlybyvirtueoftheir ontent-it is partlybecause Neil's belief s thatthere s wine n hisglass,that he reachesfor t; so, propositional ttitudeexplanations ommitus toholding hatcontent roperties ave a genuinecausal role in the explanation f intentional ction. But, now,how is ananti-reductionistboutcontent ropertiesoaccordthem genuine ausalrole without ommitting imself,mplausibly, o the essential ncomplet-

eness ofphysics?This is, I believe,the single greatest ifficultyoran anti-reductionist

conception f content. t maybe that t willeventually rove tsundoing.But the subject is relativelyunexplored,and much interestingworkremains o be done.74DepartmentfPhilosophy PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN

Universityf MichiganAnn Arbor, MI, USA 48109

73 See 'Actions,Reasonsand Causes', in his Essayson Actions nd Events,Oxford,OxfordUniversityress, 980.

7' ournalf hilosphy,987,

Boghossian Paul - The Rule-Following Considerations (1989)

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